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Bolesław Hajduk*

PROFESSOR EUGENIUSZ STANISŁAW KRUSZEWSKI, DOCTOR HABILITATED – HISTORIAN, POLITICAL EMIGRANT, DIPLOMAT AND SOCIAL ACTIVIST

Eugeniusz Stanisław Kruszewski was born in Zbąszyń in 1929 in the family of Maksymilian Leon, a post office clerk and a participant of the Greater Poland (*Wielkopolskie*) Uprising, and Jadwiga, née Synak. After finishing primary school in Zbąszyń, he went to secondary schools in Wolsztyn and Wrocław, and in 1950 he passed the baccalaureate exam. After that exam he did a six-month military service in the School Company of Reserve Officers (*Szkolna Kompania Oficerów Rezerwy*); when he finished it he was sent to the Centre of Quartermaster Training (*Centrum Wyszkolenia Kwatermistrzowskiego*) in Poznań, where he studied finance at the Finance Faculty at the same time. After being promoted to the rank of second lieutenant he was assigned to the post of finance officer in the General Staff in Warsaw and – since 1954 – in the General Staff of the Navy in Gdynia. Released from the army in 1957 he started studying at the Higher School of Economics in Sopot and in 1962 he defended his Master's Dissertation and obtained the title of Master in Economics. In 1966 he commenced his doctoral studies at the Higher School of Agriculture in Poznań in the field of food technology. He spent part of his doctoral studies in *Galliera Veneta* in Milan, Italy, within an *ad personam* scholarship. In the years 1962–1969 he was a lecturer in the Secondary Vocational School of Food Industry and a clerk in the Federation of Grain and Milling (*Zjednoczenie Zbożowo-Młynarski*) in Gdańsk. When he

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came back from Italy he was dismissed from his job without any justification and as soon as he got his passport he left Poland together with his family on October 16th, 1969 and settled in Denmark as a political émigré. In the years 1976–1993 he earned his living as a clerk in the Ministry of Science.

In the exile he continued cultivating his academic interests and resumed doctoral studies in the Institute of the Academy of Agriculture and Veterinary Science (*Det Kongelige Veterinaer- og Landbohojskole*) in Copenhagen, which he finished in 1974. At the same time he specialised in library science the fruit of which was a dissertation 'Bibliography of Danish Translations of Polish Belles-Lettres 1855–1969' (Polish: *'Bibliografia duńskich przekładów polskiej literatury pięknej 1855–1969'*; Danish: *'Bibliografi over dansker oversaetelser fra polsk skonsklitteratur 1855–1969'*); in 1979 he was conferred the title of Certified Librarian by the Royal School of Library and Information Science. As Eugeniusz S. Kruszewski was also interested in political science he undertook doctoral studies at the Faculty of Law and Political Science of the Polish University Abroad (*Polski Uniwersytet na Obczyźnie*) in London. On the basis of the dissertation 'Polish Settlement in Denmark 1893–1939' (*'Problemy osadnictwa polskiego w Danii 1893–1939'*) he was conferred the title of doctor in political science. Afterwards, in 1980, he wrote and defended a postdoctoral (habilitation) dissertation 'The Danish Candidacy for the Polish Throne in 1674', obtaining the title of Docent (Reader). In 1985 he became full professor in the field of history and international relations at the Faculty of Law and Social Science, and since 1998 also full professor in the sphere of the history of Poland and general history at the Faculty of Humanities of the Polish University Abroad. He lectured on history, methodology, law and culture; he also conducted Master and doctoral seminars.

The main research fields of the Professor are: the history of the Polish emigration in Scandinavia, the history of international relations and the links between Poland and Scandinavia. The academic achievements of the Professor are impressive; they include 20 monographs, 40 dissertations in collective works, about 400 articles and academic reviews, and 35 biographical articles and entries in encyclopedic publications. In addition, he prepared over 200 publications for the general public in Europe and North America.

It should be emphasised that the Professor was very active in academic congresses, conferences and symposia, *inter alia:*

- in the European Congress of Lay Persons (Louvain-le-Neuve, 1976),
- the Symposium on the History of the Church in Lithuania (Rome–London, 1976),

- the Symposium ‘Baltic Europe in the Perspective of Global Change’ (Warsaw University, 1993),
- the International Conference ‘Scandinavia and the Baltic Countries’ (Gdańsk, 1995),
- the conference Poland – Denmark (Gdańsk, 2003),
- the conference on the mutual penetration of cultures in the Baltic region, including Poland and Scandinavia (Lund, 2005),
- six symposia on *Biographistics* of the Polish community abroad (Brussels, Kielce, Cracow, Olsztyn, Rome and Vienna, Warsaw),
- the Congresses on the Present-Day Polish Science and Culture Abroad (London, 1970, 1985, 1995, 2014),
- the academic session ‘Emigration Institutions versus Independent Culture in Poland’ (Gdańsk IPN, 2010),
- the symposium ‘Polish Eastern Borderlanders in the World’ (Opole Polytechnic, 2012),
- the academic conference on the 30th anniversary of the Polish-Scandinavian Institute (Gdańsk, 2015),
- the all-Poland Academic Conference ‘Scandinavia – Poland. People, Politics, Economy and Culture’ (Gdańsk, 2017),
- the international academic conference ‘Polish Written Heritage in Foreign Collections’ (Warsaw, 2017).

In 1985 the Professor demonstrated his engagement, energy and organisational skills while setting up the Polish-Scandinavian Institute, a scientific society independent of any state structures, and became its director, and – after changing the statute in 2006 – its president up till now. To become a member of the Institute the candidate has to be an academic worker, irrespective of their nationality or citizenship, specialising in questions concerning Poland or any other of the Baltic countries, especially the Scandinavian ones, who can speak Polish or any language of the Scandinavian ones. The staff of the Institute is composed of 10 members and 10 correspondents from various academic centres in Poland and abroad, who conduct research into Nordic countries and/or lecture on such questions. In accordance with its statute the Institute is engaged in activities in several spheres: the history of Polish emigration in Scandinavia, the question of mutual penetration of Polish culture and the ones of the Scandinavian countries, taking into consideration the Polish and Scandinavian contributions, the question of mutual political and economic relations of the present time, the problem of national

minorities, the promotion of 'Solidarity' movement in the Nordic countries and their support for the democratic opposition in Poland, and biographistics, i.e. biographical entries of the Poles who have settled in the countries of Northern Europe. The activity of the president and the co-workers of the Institute was also visible in their participation in international conferences, lectures, and publications addressed to the general public and in initiating studies into source materials in order to sort out documentation on the martyring of the Poles murdered in Katyń and imprisoned in the camps built by the Hitlerian German Third Reich.

The Institute's journal was *'Rocznik Instytutu Polsko-Skandynawskiego'* ('Yearbook of the Polish-Scandinavian Institute') published in the years 1985–2005; there were 20 volumes altogether. It was multilingual: Polish, Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and English. It was the place where distinguished Polish and foreign scholars presented the results of their research. The Journal dealt with the Polish emigration in Scandinavia and questions of politics, economy and culture, there were scientific reviews and reports of academic conferences and information on the activities of the Institute. Since the academic year 2005/2006 the Board has been publishing the 'Reports of the Polish-Scandinavian Institute', which contain information on the activities of the Institute, on its authorities, on its personal composition, on the academic achievements of its co-workers and on publications concerning Polish-Scandinavian questions.

In order to inspire, support and develop activities in the sphere of knowledge of the links between Poland and the Nordic countries and of the development of Scandinavian philology in Poland in 1995 on the initiative of Eugeniusz S. Kruszewski the Stanisław Sawicki Scientific Prize was established, granted for outstanding achievements in research, lecturing or organisation. Up to 2017 the Prizes were granted to G. Labuda, P. Urbańczyk, B. Piotrowski, Z. Ciesielski, G. Szelągowska, B. Sochańska, S. Ekdahl, L. Kjellberg and R. Pullat.

The national and patriotic activity of Eugeniusz S. Kruszewski, the aim of which was to make Poland regain the real independence and sovereignty, was really impressive. After settling in Denmark he actively joined the process of creating an all-Scandinavia organisation of Polish pro-independence associations that functioned in that country. In 1971 together with Father Jan Szymaszek and Olgierd Tadeusz Zalewski he created the Polish Social and Cultural Centre and the Polish Social and Cultural Council, the structures associated with the Central Organisation of POSK in London. In June 1973 on the initiative of Eugeniusz S. Kruszewski the Committee for Free Poland (KnRWP) was created; in 1977 its

name was changed to the Chief Committee of Free Poles (KnWRP). The KnWRP functioned in Denmark and its headquarters were in Copenhagen, its branch offices – in Stockholm and in Oslo. Shortly afterwards there appeared the Chief Committee of Free Poles in Scandinavia, which was transformed into the Scandinavian Committee for Free Poland. The main task of the above mentioned organisations was to restore full independence and sovereignty to the Polish people. One of the example of the tangible actions taken was the creation of the Support Office and the Foundation of Free Poles; they were the organisations which actively participated in the campaigns to help the people persecuted in the Communist Poland by means of collections of money, food, clothes, medicines and by providing care for emigrants from Poland who arrived in Denmark and the other Scandinavian countries.

The same ideas – i.e. justification and promotion of free Poland also on the initiative of Eugeniusz S. Kruszewski – were behind the creation of another journal *'Kronika'* ('Chronicle'); the first issue appeared in February 1971 with the motto 'May the good of the Republic be the highest law'. The Journal was opinion-forming and influenced the Polish emigrants not only in Scandinavia, as it was sent to all the important emigration centres and Polish libraries in Europe and all over the world. The Journal dealt with both historical and present-day problems, concerning both Poland and the Scandinavian states. In the years 1980–1985 the Journal concentrated on problems related to Solidarity; it informed of strikes of workers and repressions of the Polish authorities, of activists being detained and of the banning of the Independent Self-Governing Labour Union 'Solidarity' (NSZZ *'Solidarność'*). Among the things to be found in the Journal there were leaflets and other information materials concerning the fight of the democratic opposition in Poland. The Journal also informed on the reaction both of the authorities and of the societies of the Scandinavian countries to the events in Poland.

On July 16th, 1976 Eugeniusz S. Kruszewski assumed the function of the Delegate of the Government and later the function of the Plenipotentiary of the Polish Government in Exile, with the Headquarters in Denmark, and those events were of utmost importance for pro-independence activity and maintaining the national awareness and patriotic activity in Scandinavia. The Delegate represented the Polish Authorities in Exile before the authorities of the Scandinavian countries, and kept in touch with the Polish diaspora in Denmark, Sweden and Norway.

It also should be noted that Eugeniusz S. Kruszewski participated in the creation and activities of the Society 'Pro Polonia' (created on May 3rd, 1977); its

basic aim was to inform the Danish on the situation of the Polish in Poland, the repressions of the Polish authorities, the crime in Katyń, the effects of the Yalta Conference for the sovereignty of Poland and the programme of the democratic opposition and the NSZZ 'Solidarity'.

The description of the academic, organisational and patriotic achievements of Eugeniusz S. Kruszewski would be incomplete without the information on his social activities. Together with his wife Marta he supported Polish organisations related to the Polish Government in Exile, *inter alia* the Polish Social and Cultural Centre in London (donor since 1982), the Polish Institute and Museum of General Władysław Sikorski in London (perpetual member since 1984), the Józef Piłsudski Institute in London (perpetual member since 1985), the Polish Library in London (perpetual member since 1998), the John Paul II Foundation in the Vatican (benefactor since 1998), the Polish Catholic Mission and its Polish Library (in the years 1975–1985 he was president of its board).

The activities of Professor Eugeniusz S. Kruszewski were fully appreciated. Eugeniusz S. Kruszewski was decorated by the Polish Authorities in Exile in London with:

- the Polish Army Medal (1978),
- the Home Army Cross (1973),
- and the Golden Medal of the National Treasure (1984).

In addition he was given the following awards:

- the Golden Badge of the Polish Social and Cultural Centre (London, 1982),
- the Medal of the Polish Culture in Exile (1985, 1995),
- the Badge of the Knight of the International White Cross Organisation (Sydney, 1990),
- the Golden Badge of the Society of Polish Eastern Territories (London, 1991),
- the Golden Medal of the American Biographistic Institute (2006),
- the Literary Prize of the Federation of the Societies of Polish Veterans (London, 1992),
- the Prize of the Society of Polish Writers in Exile for the promotion of Polishness abroad (London, 2000),
- the Award of the Children Foundation 'In Time to Help' (Warsaw, 2002),
- the Title of Master of Science and the Honorary Membership of the Kashubian Institute (Gdańsk, 2016).

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ILLVIRKJAR OK ÓSKÍRÐIR. EIRÍKSDRÁPA BY MARKÚS SKEGGJASON AS AN EXAMPLE OF USING THE MOTIF OF THE SLAV-PAGAN IN THE SCANDINAVIAN MEDIEVAL LITERATURE

Keywords: poetry, paganism, Slavs

Summary

The article presents *Eiríksdrápa*, a poem dedicated to Erik the Good, king of Denmark (1095–1103), written by Markús Skeggjason, an Icelandic poet. The poem graced the visit of Jón Ǫgmundarson in Lund w 1105, where the local archbishop Gizurr ordained him Bishop of Hólar. The poem glorifies King Erik's achievements that indicate the Christian character of his rule, which was additionally confirmed by obtaining consent to create a new Archdiocese in Lund and by the king's pilgrimages to Rome and the Holy Land. The Christian dimension of Erik's rule is also reflected in the motif of his military actions against the pagan Slavs; it occupies a prominent place in Markús's poem and is analysed in the present article. The motif depicts the Slavs as traitors (*svikmenn*) and pagans (*heiðnar*), who were a threat to the peace in the kingdom. Erik's lack of mercy to them proved his just and pious rule in Denmark. The motif in question turned out to be very useful in the process of building up an image of a Christian ruler; on the other hand, it shows the artistic skills of Markús, based on the oeuvre of other poets who also described the pagan Slavs.

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The Slavs and the Scandinavians being neighbours and making use of the same Baltic Sea, must have had frequent and intensive relations in the Middle Ages. We learn about migrations, economic contacts and cultural transfers mainly thanks to archaeological research. On the other hand, we learn about political or military events much less, which results from the scantiness of written sources. However, the Scandinavian historiographic tradition of the Middle Ages created a motif of the Slav (*Vinðr*) that constituted an important element concerning the memory of particular people or key events, even though the Slavs were outside the native oecumene (*Vinðland*). Suffice it to recall the legend of the Vikings from Jomsborg or the tradition of the Slavic connections of the Norwegian king Olaf Tryggvason, as examples of the trend, which brought about a double – and self-contradictory – image of the Slavs. On the one hand, it refers to the King Burysław and his daughters, who commanded due respect and the ruler was considered powerful, in spite of being a pagan. That was why the King of Denmark Sweyn Forkbeard or Jarl of Jomsborg Sigvaldi considered it an honour to become a son-of-law of Burysław. The most significant battles of the medieval Northern Europe, at Hjørungavåg and Øresund, were fought with an active participation of Slavic troops. On the other hand, the status of the Slavs as pagans was negative. It was revealed in the tradition of the holiness of Olaf Haraldsson, king of Norway. The Slavs were presented not only as enemies of the only faith but also as a permanent threat to the Christian inhabitants of the North. Still the intercession of the saint king guaranteed them safety and protection.[1]

That trend is represented by the poem entitled *Eiríksdrápa* (*a poem about Erik*) written by an Icelandic poet Markús Skeggjason dedicated to Erik Sveinsson (1095–1103), king of Denmark, known as Eric the Good. The poem is being analysed in this article. It is exceptional, at least in two aspects. Firstly, it may be the most extensive example of the court poetry that has survived, dedicated to the ruler of Denmark. Secondly, one of the main roles is played by a motif of the Slav-pagan.

Markús was – as most skalds – of Icelandic origin. The date of his birth is unknown. He came from a respected and powerful family, which is proved by the fact that between 1084 and 1107 – to be exact October 15th, 1107 when he died – Markús fulfilled the function of legal speaker (*lögsögumaðr*) at the general

[1] More at: J. Morawiec, "Slavs and their lands in Old Norse literature", in: *Scandinavian Culture in Medieval Poland*, eds. S. Możdzioch, B. Stanisławski, P. Wiszewski (Wrocław 2013), 53–63.

assembly (*Alþingi*). Ari Þorgilsson, the author of Íslendingabók (*Books about the Icelanders*), mentions him among the ones on whose authority and knowledge he based his story about the origins of the Icelandic settlement and about the previous legal speakers. Ari emphasises that it was thanks to his support Bishop Skálholt Gizurr Ísleifsson introduced the tithe in 1096, the first regular tax in the history of the Island[2]. The author of another saga *Kristni sagi* (*Conversion into Christianity*) underlines that Markús was one of the most outstanding legal speakers in Iceland.[3] There are many proofs that he was not the only poet in his family. The authors *Morkinskinny*, *Fagrskinny* and *Heimskringli* quote a strophe dedicated to the King of Norway Harald (*Haraldr Sigurðarson*, given the epithet *Hardrada*), the author of which was supposed to be Þórarinn Skeggjason, probably Markús's brother.[4] The latter was associated by Skáldatal with two rulers of Denmark – Knud den Hellige (1080–1086) and the above mentioned Erik Sveinsson – and with the King of Sweden Ingi Steinkelsson (died probably in 1100).[5] Yet that tradition is not reliable and it is quite possible that it was borne as a result of the circumstances in which *Eiríksdrápa* was composed and presented.

Even though the poetic oeuvre of Markús is not impressive (at least in the form we know it today), it is worth mentioning his texts were used not only as a reliable 'voice from the past' (first of all in *Knýtlinga saga*), but also as a refined and exemplary case of poetic art (first of all in Snorri's *Edda* and the Third Grammatical Treatise). In addition to the poem dedicated to Erik, the oeuvre of Markús includes one half-strophe from the poem that may have been dedicated to Knud den Hellige, two fragments (helming and couple/couplet) that may have come from the poem dedicated to Christ and two loose strophes (*lausavísur*).[6]

Contrasted with such a background *Eiríksdrápa* appears to be outstanding; it contains 32 strophes[7] composed in *hrynhent* metre.[8] Most strophes (28) have survived in *Knýtlinga sagi*, the remaining four were quoted by Snorri Sturluson

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2 J. Benediktsson, ed., *Íslendingabók*, *Landnámabók*. Íslenzk fornrit 1 (Reykjavík 1968), 22–23.

3 S. Grønlie, ed., Íslendingabók, *Kristni saga* (London 2006), 52.

4 K.E. Gade, ed., *Scandinavian Poetry of the Middle Ages, Poetry from the Kings' Sagas 1. From c. 1035 to c. 1300*, vol. 1–2 (Turnhout 2009), 294–295 (further SPMA II).

5 J. Sigurðsson et al., eds., *Edda Snorra Sturlusonar. Edda Snorronis Sturlaei*, vol. 3 (Copenhagen 1887), 258, 267.

6 SPMA II, 432.

7 It is conceivable that particular half-strophes thus edited following the example given by the author of *Knýtlinga sagi*, originally were full strophes.

8 On metres cf.: J. Morawiec, *Między poezją i polityką. Rozgrywki polityczne w Skandynawii XI wieku w świetle poezji ówczesnych skaldów* (Katowice 2016), 43.

in his *Edda*.[9] The poem describes the achievements of King Erik, and is regarded as the most reliable source on his rule, at least by Óláf Þórðarson (probably the author of *Knýtlinga sagi*) and Saxo Grammaticus.[10]

The circumstances of composing and presenting the poem that I am interested in are especially engaging. Magnus Olsen's proposal dating back to the 1920s has not been challenged;[11] just the reverse, successive commentators of *Eiríksdrápa* have found it attractive.[12] It is justified to claim that Markús composed the poem dedicated to Erik on the occasion of his trip to Denmark, which took place in 1105. He might have accompanied Jon Qgmundarson, who was to be ordained in Lund the first bishop of Hólar by Qzzur, the local archbishop. It was special time. The Metropolis of Lund was created just two years before as a result of the negotiations of Erik with the Roman Curia. It was a special award for the Scandinavian Church. The status of a separate province was not only a sign of recognition of achievements in Christianisation of the region but it also made the local hierarchs independent from the Archbishopric in Hamburg-Bremen, the fact the latter hardly accepted for a long time.

In summer 1103 Erik, during his pilgrimage to the Holy Land, died in Cyprus. When Jon (and probably Markús too) was arriving in Lund, Niels, Erik's brother and the youngest of Swen (Estridsen) Ulfsson's sons, was the ruler of Denmark.[13] The régime of the brothers who one after another took the throne might hardly be considered peaceful and stable. Rebellions of subjects and the sibling rivalry resulted in dramatic events such as the murder of Knud IV in the St Alban Church in Odense. The murder had been preceded by a rebellion, which was probably inspired by the brother of the future saint, Olaf, who had been imprisoned by Knud and sentenced to exile in Flanders, where his father-in-law was the ruler. When his brother died Olaf succeeded to the throne and it coincided with crop failure and hunger; that is why Olaf earned the appellation 'Hunger', and his disastrous

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9 SPMA II, 433.

10 Cf.: B. Gudnason, "Saxo och Eiríksdrápa", in: *Nordiska studier i filologi och lingvistik. Festskrift tillägnad Gösta Holm på 60-årsdagen den 8 juli 1976*, eds. L. Svensson et al. (Lund 1976), 127–137.

11 M. Olsen, "Lovsigemanden Markus Skeggesøns arvekvæde", *Edda* 15 (1921): 166.

12 J. Jesch, "Old and New in Markús Skeggjason's Eiríksdrápa", in: *Scandinavia and Christian Europe in the Middle Ages. Papers of the 12th International Saga Conference Bonn/Germany, 28th July – 2nd August 2003*, eds. R. Simek, J. Meurer (Bonn 2003), 73; SPMA II, 432.

13 I. Skovgaard-Petersen, "The Making of Danish Kingdom", in: *The Cambridge History of Scandinavia. Volume 1, Prehistory to 1520*, ed. K. Helle (Cambridge 2003), 180–181; M.H. Gelting, "The Kingdom of Denmark", in: *Christianization and the Rise of Christian Monarchy. Scandinavia, Central Europe and Rus' c. 900–1200*, ed. N. Berend (Cambridge 2007), 95.

rule was interpreted as a punishment for the murder of his saint brother; finally on August 18th, 1095 he was murdered too under unclear circumstances.[14] The rule of Erik raised hopes for political stabilisation and strengthening of the Kingdom. His portrayal, which emerges from the few sources (first of all *Gesta Danorum*), might have been exaggerated and – what is more important – idealised. However, it shows that law was respected, unjustified military expeditions were given up and there were forces that wanted the dynasty to be stronger. Such aspirations might be achieved by means of canonisation of Knud IV or establishing a separate ecclesiastic metropolis. Erik was successful in both questions. His sudden death and – what is more – far away from his country might have led to squandering those achievements. The Danish Church hoped that Niels, the new ruler, would continue his brother's policy, which can be seen in the appeal and dedication of Ælnoth from Odense in his *Vita et Passio Sancti Canuti*.[15]

Ordaining an ordinary of the newly created Icelandic diocese was a perfect occasion to emphasise the rank of the new ecclesiastic metropolis in Lund. And so was the appropriate commendation of the late King, who had directly contributed to augmenting the importance of the local bishopric. Markús Skeggjason's *Eiríksdrápa* might have been a gift on the part of Jon to Ǫzzur given as an expression of his gratitude for an awaiting award. Consequently it may be assumed that the way in which Erik was depicted in the poem by the Icelandic skald fully satisfied the expectations of both the King and the Archbishop.

As Judith Jesch has aptly remarked the poem by Markús is the oldest known case where *hrynhent* metre was used, which before could only be found in the poetry by Arnór Þórðarson, a skald working, *inter alia*, for Magnus den Gode, the king of Norway and Denmark, who is rightly regarded as the creator of that metre.[16] It is quite possible that the choice of the metre was not accidental. Markús chose a tool which was not only inspired by the liturgy of the time, but also – or even first of all – already used by Arnór in a similar situation, namely making King Magnus rise to fame, among other things on the basis of his consanguinity with his predecessor, Olaf Haraldsson den Hellige.

[14] Skovgaard-Petersen, "The Making", 181.

[15] Ibidem.

[16] Cf.: Morawiec, *Między poezją*, 239.

The poem conveys a mourning mood, which is visible in strophes 29 and 32:

Andar krafði út í lǫndum síðan harma siklings dauða
alls stýrandi konung snjallan, snjallir menn of heimsbyggð alla,
elli beiðat ofvægr stillir, drúpir herr at dolga steypi
aldar stríð es fregit víða; dyggvan, þat tér verǫld hryggva.[17]

The one who rules everything has called the soul of the wise king in faraway countries, the powerful monarch had not lived to a ripe old age, lamentation can be heard everywhere; afterwards sages all over the world are lamenting over the death of the King, people bow down before the skilful vanquisher of enemies; the whole world is sad.

Fjarri hefr at fœðisk dýrri – hǫva leyfir hverr maðr ævi
flotna vǫrðr á élkers botni hringvarpaðar – gjalfri kringðum.[18]

It is impossible for a more important defender of sea warriors to have been born on the bottom of a boat on stormy waves; everybody glorifies the noble life of the one who has thrown away his rings.

Some time ago Judith Jesch described the poem by Markús as an example of a clash of classical skaldic stylistics with new elements or new meanings.[19] The above presented strophes confirm that opinion. The skald, according to the convention, puts Erik before other rulers, both the ones preceding him and the ones who were to succeed him. That elevation is maximised to a pompous level when we learn that the late King is being bewailed not only by his subjects and his troops but also by the whole world (*allr heimsbyggd*, *verǫld*).[20]

These strophes are a perfect example of how Markús aptly constructed the kennings describing the features of the ruler, elegantly balancing between gallantry, generosity and the concept of *rex iustus*. An example of that may be found in the phrase *dyggvan steypi dolga* (an apt vanquisher of enemies), which can be interpreted as a commendation of Erik's abilities, both the military ones and his

[17] SPMA II, 458.

[18] Ibidem, 460.

[19] J. Jesch, "Old and New", 268–270.

[20] On the other hand, in the poem there are no references to the close relations that connected the poet and the ruler, which was typical of the convention of *erfikvæði*. It may indicate not only the imitative nature of the tradition kept in *Skaldatal* (there is no information on Markús's service for Erik or any other Scandinavian monarchs), but also the rightness of the guess that the poem was composed in Iceland and written and brought to Denmark by Jón.

skills at keeping peace in his kingdom. The kenning *dýrr vǫrdr flotna* (an important defender of sea warriors) may be interpreted in the same way. The basic word (*vǫrdr*) in most cases had been used in the kennings of a just and caring monarch, but in this very case the word that determines the whole of the kenning (*flotnar*) indicates rather the military character of the phrase. Another intriguing example of Markús's poetic style is the phrase *fœðir fremðarráða* (the one who feeds the wonderful achievements). Whereas the basic word (*fœðir*) is typical of the kennings of the warrior, possibly a gallant ruler, the word that determines Markús's phrase – somehow exceptional in the corpus of the poetry – indicates an outstanding king that deserves to be remembered.

Thus Judith Jesch's remark refers also to the ways thanks to which Markús exalts Erik's merits. In addition to commendations typical of the skaldic style of the King's gallantry (*hildarramr sløngvir harra* in strophe 5; *valdari sigrs* in strophe 6; *hróðigr beiðir brynþings* in strophe 7) and generosity (ǫrr, *mildingr* in strophes 5 and 16), there appear new elements, first of all referring to his eloquence and intellect. Erik's merits are presented in the best way in strophe 7:

> Hróðigr átti brynþings beiðir alla hafði ǫðlingr snilli,
> bjartan auð ok frœknligt hjarta ungr nam hann á margar tungur,
> minni gnógt ok manvit annat Eirekr vas, sás mátti meira,
> mest; fylgðu því hvergi lestir; mestr ofrhugi, jǫfri flestum.[21]
>
> The one who enjoyed fame, who arranged meetings of chainmailles, who possessed wealth and a brave heart, an extensive memory and other intellectual attributes to the highest degree; there was no room for defects; the ruler had all the wisdom because as a young boy he mastered many languages, Erik, who could do more than most rulers, was the bravest.

One of terms that defines the merits of the ruler is the noun *snilli*. The word has many meanings, but the majority of them refer to wisdom, eloquence and cleverness. The work is closely related to the adjective *snjallr*, which also contains a wide range of meanings from gallantry, through wisdom and magnificence to strength. Whereas the adjective *snjallr* appears already in the poetry of the turn of the 10th and 11th centuries to depict the ruler (e.g. Óláfsdrápa erfidrápa Tryggvasonar by Hallfreð Ottarsson) and is commonly used by the poets of the 11th

[21] SPMA II, 439.

century, the term *snilli* is much less frequently used by skalds and before Marcus's poem it appeared only once, in the poetry of Sigvat Þórðarson (Óláfsdrápa erfidrápa Haraldssonar). It might mean that *Eiríksdrápa* was one of the oldest texts in which the image of the ruler was created on the basis of his education in the medieval Scandinavia. The phenomenon – in a much more extensive form – is known in the subsequent centuries, including *Konungs skuggsjá*. Consequently, there appears a question of the skald's inspiration. It seems that in this case the point is that the poet fulfilled the expectations of the receivers of the poems in the Archdiocese of Lund. Markús introduces such novelties on the basis of the probably known and widely-held patterns; for example in strophe 7 there is a motif of a young ruler (*ungr*), whose age (in that case not defined) together with his skills indicates his exceptionality. Similar solutions might be found in other, quite often outstanding poets, whose oeuvres must have been an example for Marcús (Sigvatr Þórðarson, Arnórr Þórðarson, Ottarr svarti, Þjóðólfr Arnasson).[22] In the classical approach, the rulers exalted by skalds, still at a very young age showed military or sailing skills. In the case of Erik the most important element is the strength of his intellect and not the one of his sword, although the final phrase – *mestr ofrhugi* – indicates that Markús did not want to give up the accepted canon altogether.

The way of exalting the ruler by referring to the gifts he was given by other rulers should be considered a significant novelty. In this context it is worth quoting strophe 28, in which Markús talks about the meeting of Erik and Alexios I, Byzantine emperor (although his name is not mentioned):

Hildingr þá við hæst lof aldar
hǫfgan auð í gulli rauðu
halfa lest af harra sjǫlfum
harða vitr í Miklagarði;
áðan tók við allvalds klæðum
Eirekr, þó vas gefit fleira,
reynir veitti herskip hǫnum
hersa máttar sex ok átta.[23]

A very wise king was exalted to the highest possible degree not only by poetry but with heavy red gold, half a last, from the ruler of Constantinople himself; before Erik had received garments from the powerful ruler, now he was given even more, the one who tries the power of hersar has given him six and eight war boats.

[22] Cf.: J. Jesch, "'Youth on the Prow'. Three Young Kings in the Late Viking Age", in: *Youth in the Middle Ages*, eds. P.J.P. Goldberg, F. Riddy (York 2002), 123–140; Morawiec, *Między poezją*, 200.

[23] SPMA II, 457.

Klæði, *herskip* and *rauðr gull* are juxtaposed by the skald with fame (*lof aldar*). Undoubtedly, in this context the one who gives presents is essential and so is the fact that the presents given by the emperor were not incidental as it is indicated at the beginning of the second helming (áðan). The merits of the ruler and the respect on the part of others equally important monarchs justified Erik's decision to perform praiseworthy deeds, at the same time revealed the reasons why the deeds turned out to be the King of Denmark's success, the first of which was the erection of the Archbishopric in Lund. Markús devotes four strophes of his poem to that event. Even though they did not constitute a whole,[24] their overtones are uniform:

Eirekr náði útan fœra hljótum vér, þats hag váru bœtir,
erkistól of Saxa merki; hingat norðr at skjǫldungs orðum.[25]

Erik was able to bring the Archbishopric from abroad, through the frontier with the Saxons; we, here in the North, are receiving what improves our situation according to the King's message.

Eyðisk hitt, at jafnstórt ráði leyfði allt, sem konungr krafði,
annarr gramr til þyrftar mǫnnum; Krists unnanda páfi sunnan.[26]

No other ruler will do so much to satisfy people's needs; the pope of the South gave the one devoted to Christ everything he had asked for.

Víða setti vísdóms grœðir vǫru þau með tryggðar tíri
virki skrýddar hǫfuðkirkjur, tíða flaust, es gramr lét smíða
gørva lét þar hollvinr herjar bǫðvar snjallr ok beztr at ǫllu,
hrein musteri fimm af steini; borði merkð, fyr Saxland norðan.[27]

The one who is wise funded five richly ornamented cathedrals, a reliable friend of people, ordered to build five shining stone cathedrals; boats of sacraments, which the king, experienced in battle and the best at everything, ordered to build in the aura of safety north of Saxony, were decorated with wood.

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[24] Yet it is not certain. The conclusion is based on the state the poem had survived in *Knýtlinga saga*. Its author treats two *helmings* (strophes 11 and 12) separately, which originally might have constituted one compositional whole, which is indicated in their common theme and their solemn character.

[25] SPMA II, 442 (strophe 11).

[26] Ibidem, 443 (strophe 12).

[27] Ibidem, 452 (strophe 23).

Dróttinn lét í Danmǫrk settan, hildingr framði heilagt veldi,
dǫglings grundar, skammt frá Lundi hvargegnan má Qzur fregna
erkistól, þanns ǫll þjóð dýrkar, – hǫnum vísar haulda reynir
eljunþungr, á danska tungu; himna stíg – til byskups vígðan.[28]

The charismatic king ordered to establish the archbishopric in Denmark near Lund, which all the subjects of the king exalt in the Danish tongue; the ruler went to the holy kingdom; it is heard that the reverend Qzurr was ordained bishop, the one who puts the hosts to tests shows him the way to heaven.

The above presented strophes without a shadow of doubt show Markús's intentions to depict Erik as the man of the moment for the newly created Archdiocese. The king's attitude, concentrated on the noble work was probably supposed to be a model of relations between the state and the church. What is more, the royal initiative was presented as a sign of Erik's care for his subjects. A faithful friend of people appears as an ardent donor. Thus, the ruler's generosity was transferred to another level, so far hardly present in the skalds' poetry. The subjects are expected to enjoy the magnificent richly ornamented stone cathedrals in the same way as if the king himself had given them some gifts. The five new churches (the skald must have meant the cathedrals of the diocese) were to permanently define Erik's kingdom and its national dimension. The poet's words about all the subjects of the king (ǫll þjóð) exalting the ruler's decision in the Danish tongue (á danska tungu) should be understood in that way.

The contents of the above strophes suggest that Markús built his poetic message not only on the basis of the patterns present in the oeuvres of previous poets. A significant source of inspiration for the skald were the expectations on the part of the receivers of the poem in Lund, who were to be the first to see the effects of the poet's efforts. We do not know the circumstances of the process, but we are fully entitled to figure them out. Bishop Jón Qgmundarson might have had a part to play so that Markús's poem would impress the public. The efforts aiming at establishing a new diocese in Iceland since the beginning subordinated to the newly created archdiocese might have become an occasion to give the poet, also engaged in that process, appropriate contents, which were to reveal the king of Denmark's achievements in a special light.

[28] Ibidem, 454 (strophe 25).

It seems that references to Saxony and its inhabitants, which are to be found in the above strophes, fully testify the fact. The sense of triumph and satisfaction combines with a relief that the whole process was successfully finalised. Consequently, the aura of safety (*tírr tryggðar*) should be understood in the same way; the aura which was to accompany the expansion of the Danish churches. The poet's words and allusions should be directly referred to the discontent which the decision to create a diocese in Lund must have caused in the Hamburg-Bremen Church. The local clergy were able to do any deeds that would protect their control over the Christianity in Scandinavia. Suffice it to recall the abduction of Eskil, Ǫzur's successor, in Germany in 1156. Hence my conviction that the reference of Erik's ecclesiastic achievements to Saxony was not only accidental but it was supposed to fulfil the expectations of the archbishop in the way he and the institution represented by him defined the events.

Another outstanding achievement of Erik was – according to Markús – his pilgrimage to Rome and the Holy Land. The skald devoted three fragments of his poem to the pilgrimage to Italy:[29]

Lýst skal hitt, es lofðungr fýstisk – fylkir sá þar friðland balkat
langan veg til Róms at ganga Fenneyjar hlið – dýrð at nenna.[30]

Now I'll talk about the ruler who wanted to travel to Rome to join his glory; there the ruler saw the protected land of peace, the gates of Venice.

Bróðir gekk í Bǫr út síðan (hylli guðs mun hlífa stilli)
– bragningr vildi guðdóm magna – hǫfuðskjǫldunga fimm (at gjǫldum).[31]

Then the brother of five kings went to Bari, the ruler wanted to strengthen the Kingdom of God; instead, God in his kindness will protect the Prince.

Stóra sótti Haralds hlýri mildingr fór of munka veldi
helga dóma út frá Rómi, móðum fœti sǫl at bœta,
hringum varði áttkonr yngva sveitir kníði allvaldr útan,
auðig skrín ok golli rauðu; Eirekr vas til Róms í þeiri.[32]

[29] Strophes 8–10. The first two are actually half-strophes and originally they could have been a separate strophe.

[30] SPMA II, 439 (strophe 8).

[31] Ibidem, 441 (strophe 9).

[32] Ibidem, 442 (strophe 10).

> Harald's brother visited the holy places outside Rome, the descendant of the king decorated the rich chapels with rings and red gold; generous he passed on foot the country of monks to redeem his soul, a powerful ruler encouraged his people to travel, Erik went to Rome then.

Similarly, as in the case of creating the archdiocese in Lund, the royal pilgrimage to Italy became an occasion to enhance Erik's status. In the above strophes the poet quite often refers to the king's brothers who ascended the Danish throne before him (*bróðir fimm hǫfuðskjǫldunga*, *hlýri Haralds*, áttkonr yngva)[33] and presents Rome as a perfect power. According to Markús Erik makes a pilgrimage to the country of monks (*munka veldi*),[34] which appears as a protected country of peace (*friðland balkat*). Also outside Rome, Erik had the occasion to visit numerous holy places (*helga dóma*). The message conveyed in these strophes is quite obvious. Under the rule of Erik, like before under the rule of his brothers, Denmark is to become a place that approaches the ideal that is Rome, a place of peace where people can glorify God and look for their road to redemption. The key role in that endeavour was played by the word *dómr*, which Markús used in strophes 9 and 10. Although the constructions *guðdómr* and *helga dómar* have a clear religious connotation, they are based on the word, which contains the meaning of 'power', 'court'. The effect produced by the skald must have satisfied the public in Lund who wanted to emphasise the relation between the royal power with the new religious centre.

Erik wanted also to go to the Holy Land, but he did not achieve the aim because of his illness, which ended up with his death in Cyprus. Thus the culminating point, full of religious elation, of the pilgrimage was the visit to Constantinople and the meeting with Emperor Alexios.[35]

Almost one third of the strophes of *Eiríksdrápa* are dedicated to the hostility of the Danish king towards the pagan Slavs. So intense concentration of the poet on that theme clears up all the doubts whether that motif, as all the other ones, was to contribute to the fame of Erik as a Christian ruler or not. We learn about the struggles of the Danish king with the Slavs from two groups of strophes. The first two strophes (4 and 6) are included in the fragment of the poem, where Markús

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[33] Although it is to be noted that similar ones appear also in other strophes of the poem (4, 21, 24).

[34] A similar phrase, *munka valdi* (*ruler of monks*), to describe God, is to be found in one of the strophes of *Knútsdrápa* by Hallvarda Hareksblesi. Cf. K.E. Gade, E. Marold eds., *Scandinavian Poetry of the Middle Ages, Poetry from Treaties on Poetics*, vol. 1 (Turnhout 2017), 238.

[35] SPMA II, 455–457 (strophes 26–28).

concentrates on the merits of the ruler and the circumstances, in which he ascended the throne after his brother Olaf's death:

Vár ǫndurt bjó Vinða rýrir hlýðu studdi borðvið breiðan
veglig flaust ór Gǫrðum austan, bróðir Knúts í veðri óðu,
hlýrum skaut á hola bǫru síðan knátti svikfolks eyðir
helmings oddr í sumars broddi; snilli kenndr við Danmǫrk lenda.[36]

Come spring, the one who destroys the Slavs prepared magnificent boats to navigate to Rus, at the beginning of summer the leader of the troops launched the prows (of the boats) on twisted sea waves; Knud's brother protected the wide side plating against water during stormy weather, the one who destroys traitors, full of wisdom, pulled in to the Danish coasts.

Vǫrgum eyddi Vinða fergir, aldri frásk, at Eirekr vildi
víking hepti konungr fíkjum, allréttligum dómi halla,
þjófa hendr lét þengill stýfa, hǫla kunni sér til sælu
þegnum kunni ósið hegna; sigrs valdari guðs lǫg halda.[37]

The one who destroys the Slavs defeated the outlaws, the king reduced piracy with all his strength, the ruler ordered that thieves would have their hands cut off, he knew how to punish people for their immoral deeds; Erik was never heard to have announced an unfair verdict, the ruler of victories knew how to follow God's orders for his sake.

Both epithets of the ruler – *Vinða rýrir* and *Vinða fergir* – functioned in a specific and interesting context. Markús, as mentioned above, dedicates the strophes in question to justify Erik's right to the throne and to show the quality of his rule. The skald concentrated on presenting his hero as a just ruler, eager to defend law and order and to eliminate anybody who would be against it. In this context, particularly the overtones of strophe 6 speak for themselves. The epithets concerning the Slavs were to enhance the strength of the message twofold. The poem is full of commendation for Erik's deeds, at sea (strophe 4) or towards his subjects (strophe 6). Hence, the obvious conclusion that according to the poet the king was equally effective towards the Slavs. The epithets *Vinða rýrir* and *Vinða fergir* have equivalents in the poetry of skalds, which were analysed by me somewhere else. Like in

[36] Ibidem, 436 (strophe 4).
[37] Ibidem, 438 (strophe 6).

the case of *Eiríksdrápa* they did not refer directly to the actions against the Slavs but they played the role of synonyms of effectiveness and luck – mainly the military one – necessary on other occasions. A good example is the epithet *Vinðum háttr* (the one who threatens the Slavs), which was used by Sigvatr Þórðarson in front of Olaf Haraldsson describing his participation in the siege of Canterbury by the Danish in 1011.[38] Yet there is no doubt that the rhetorical effectiveness of such epithets must have been based on the memory of the notable actions of the hero of the poem against the Slavs; the actions that might be presented as victorious. Markús's poem was just such a case, which will be discussed below. Anyway it is possible that the author of *Eiríksdrápa*, who must have known the poetry of Hallfreð Ottarsson, Sigvat Þórðarson and other poets, was inspired by their message while creating the above mentioned epithets of the hero of his poem.

In both strophes the skald puts at the same level the Slavs and traitors, thieves and pirates, who break God's laws and are a threat to the authority of the king and the happiness of his subjects. The Slavs, as pagans and organisers of incursions into the Danish lands perfectly fitted the above presented profile. The importance of that motif is confirmed by the fact that Markús begins both the strophes with the above mentioned epithets. The skald's intention might have been to impress the public and make them think the lack of mercy on the Slavs was the best definition of the just and pious rule of Erik in Denmark. At the same time, as in the case of using twin epithets, the phrases *Vinða myrdir* and *Vinðum háttr* were to strike the public by their bluntness and explicitness, which allowed the skald to be laconic.

Yet Markús does not content himself with that. The middle part of the poem contains 9 strophes (13–21), which are fully dedicated to Erik's military confrontations with the Slavs:

Veldi þorðut Vinðr at halda,
– villa gerðisk þeim at illu –
– sunnan kom þá svikdómsmanna
sáttarof – þats buðlungr átti.

The Slavs did not dare to regain control over the kingdom, which was taken over by the ruler; that mistake was a real tragedy for them, then the news spread about violating peace by treacherous people from the South.

[38] J. Morawiec, "Vinða myrðir, Vindum hattr. Najazdy skandynawskich hovdingów na ziemie Słowian w świetle wierszy skaldów", *Przegląd Historyczny* 4 (96) (2005): 525–541.

Yngvi helt í óðastrǫngum hlýða skalf, en hristi grœðir
ǫldugangi skipum þangat, hélug bǫrð fyr Vinða gǫrðum.

The king led his boats there when the waves were full of fury, the deck was shaking and the ocean threw the boat prows ashore, near Slavic settlements.

Rǫndu lauk of rekka kindir hamalt – knǫttu þá hlífar glymja –
risnumaðr, svát hver tók aðra, hildingr fylkði liði miklu.

The brave men surrounded the warriors' descendants with shields, so each one was joined with the next one; the ruler commanded his magnificent army in wedge array, then the shields started sounding.

Styrjǫld óx of stilli ǫrvan, mildingr gekk at miklum hjaldri
stengr bǫru framm vísa drengir, malmi skrýddr ok faldinn hjalmi.

The battle broke out around the generous ruler, his warriors carried banners forwards; the generous ruler followed them, dressed in metal and helmet, into the great tumult.

Hǫrga varðisk herr í borgum, Eirekr vakði odda skúrir,
hjaldrganga vas snǫruð þangat, eggjar týndu lífi seggja,
harðir kníðusk menn at morði, sungu jǫrn, en sœfðusk drengir,
merki blés of hilmi sterkan; sveiti fell á valkǫst heitan.

The army of pagan temples defended themselves in their fortresses, the battle soon flared up, the furious warriors pushed forwards to slaughter, the banner fluttered around the strong prince; Erik incited a flood of arrowheads, the arrowheads destroyed human lives, the weapons sounded and the warriors died, the blood was streaming down the pile of corpses.

Blóði dreif á randgarð rauðan, framði sik, þars folkvǫpn glumðu,
rógs hegnir drap ótal þegna, fylkir ungr, en brynjur sprungu.

The blood gushed onto the red wall of shields, the one who punishes any disorder took the life of innumerable people; the young ruler stood out there, where the battle weapons sounded and the chain mail garments broke.

Heiðinn vildi herr of síðir urðu þeir, es virki vǫrðu
hǫmlu vígs ór porti gǫmlu, vangi næst, á hǫnd at ganga.

The pagan army of the battle flagpole finally decided to leave the old fortress; the ones who had defended the fortress near the plain, had to surrender.

Heiðin vǫru hjǫrtu lýða — eisur kyndusk hǫtt í húsum,
hryggðarfull í Vinða byggðum, — hallir nǫðu vítt at falla,
eldi sveif of ótal haulda, — óttu leið, en uppi þótti
Eirekr brenndi sali þeira; — elris grand í himni standa.

The pagan hearts were full of sadness among the Slavic settlements, the fire was creeping up the innumerable hosts, Erik burnt their halls; the flames rose high, the halls collapsed one after another, the night passed and the one who hurts the wood seemed to reach the sky.

Eirekr vas með uppreist hǫri, — yngvi talði erfðir þangat,
undan flýðu Vinðr af stundu, — alþýða varð stilli hlýða,
gjǫld festu þá grimmir hauldar, — veldi réð því ástvinr aldar
gumnar urðu sigri numnir; — einart, lá þat fyrr und Sveini.[39]

Erik achieved a great success, the Slavs fled thence without delay, the furious hosts declared a tribute, they were deprived of the victory; the king announced there his right to the heritage, all the people had to surrender to the ruler, the adored friend of people ceaselessly ruled the kingdom, which before was subdued to Sven.

The above quoted set of strophes is an extension of the contents, which appeared at the beginning of the poem, in strophes 4 and 6. The king proves his effectiveness in establishing law and order by positive actions aimed at the pagan Slavs. Markús presents Erik as a victorious leader, merciless for his enemies and generous for his troops. The distinctive elements in the image of the king of Denmark are his sense of justice (*hegnir rógs*) on the one hand, and on the other his determination in achieving his goals. According to Markús the king pays no heed to the bad weather and sets out southwards as soon as he gets news about the Slavs' treason.

The attitude of the king was to be dictated by the ensuing stake. Firstly, the Slavs, as traitors (*svikmenn*) and pagans (*heiðnar*) were a threat to peace in the kingdom to the same degree as all the other villains. Secondly, according to the poet, the struggles in the south served Erik as an excuse to show his rights to the kingdom of Denmark (*talði erfðir*). Defeating the Slavs, pagans and other

[39] SPMA II, 444–450.

enemies Erik proved that he obeyed God's laws and in that way he passed a test to be an effective ruler, who deserved the respect of his subjects (*alþýða varð hlýða stilli*). Hence Markús without hesitation crowns this part of his poem with the words of the great success (*hár uppreist*), which Erik achieved.[40]

Markús in *Eiríksdrápa* used stylistic solutions that attract attention. Erik's action towards the Slavs were dictated by the treason (*svik*) they had committed against the king. The skald does not give us many details, we only learn that pagans from the south were to break peace. The term *svik* becomes the key word in this context. It not only motivates Erik, but also describes the ones who turned out to be his enemies. The Slavs are *svikmenn*, and the territories where they live may be called *svikdómr*, i.e. the land of treason.[41] This term to denominate Slavdom, somehow original, should be juxtaposed with *guðdómr* and *helga dómar*, which Erik visited during his pilgrimages. The latter two terms were synonyms of a perfect regime based on God's laws and peace, whereas the Slavic territories were just the reverse. Hence the different actions of the ruler, although it should be admitted that Markús made a big effort to convince the addressees of the poem that Erik was equally involved in his fight against pagans and in his pilgrimages to holy places.

The term *svikdómr* seems to be Markús's own invention, whereas the concept of treason, which the hero faces, had already appeared in the poetry of the skalds. The clearest analogies, which might have been inspiring for the author of *Eiríksdrápa*, were supplied by the poetry of Hallfreð Ottarsson and Sigvat Þórðarson. The former in a poem dedicated to the struggles of Olaf Tryggvason in Øresund in 1000 (Óláfsdrápa erfidrápa Tryggvasonar) says in one of the strophes that the

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[40] The second *helming* of strophe 21 crowns a reference to Swen, who was to rule the Danish kingdom before. The author of *Knýtlinga saga* perceived him as Sweyn Forkbeard. Jayne Carroll in a justified way (SPMA II, 450) questions the rightness of such identification, but she refers only to the lack of any reliable information on any command of Sweyn Forkbeard over the Slavs. This argument seems *ex definitione* pointless. Markús speaking about því veldi might have meant Denmark, and in Sweyn I'd rather see Swen Ulfsson, Erik's father. The contents of the *helming* (or rather the whole strophe) would refer to the right to rule Denmark, which the hero of the poem inherited from his father. Such identification is compatible with numerous references to Erik's particular brothers, which may constitute a quite close echo of the controversies and conflicts in the dynasty, first of all among Swen Ulfsson's sons, over the succession to the throne.

[41] Jayne Carroll – in my opinion rightly – identifies the term *svikfolk*, which was used by the skald in strophe 4 concerning the Slavs, cf. SPMA II, 437. It should be said that the phrase *svikdómr* does not appear in any other place but in Markús's poem. Contrary to the proposal of Carroll (Ibidem, 444), who associates this adjective with the adverb 'treacherous', I would be inclined all the more strongly to see that term as an expression of a will to juxtapose – in a clear way, revealing a straight out catechetical dimension – of negative and positive 'regimes' (*dómar*), Erik dealt with.

king of Norway was defeated and died because of the treason on the part of his warriors.[42] In turn, Sigvatr, in strophe 2 of *Víkingarvísur* used the motif in question to justify the Viking action of Olaf Haraldsson towards the inhabitants of Ozylia, who committed treason that the king could not forgive[43]. In this context the second case is even more interesting because Sigvatr, like Markús, wanted to depict the pirate activity of Olaf as a sign of his royal prerogatives.

As the punishment for the treason committed by the Slavs they had to be killed and their settlements burnt. That motif dominated strophe 20 of *Eiríksdrápa*. The skald's picture is extraordinarily expressive and vivid, which was to impress the receivers of the poem. One more time Markús skilfully showed the causative strength of the king: *Eirekr brenndi þeira sali*. The rules of the *runhent* metre, first of all the higher number of syllables in a line, allowed the words of the poet to sound better and more bluntly. In this aspect a potential source of inspiration for the author of *Eiríksdrápa* may be also identified. The above mentioned motif of punishing for treason with fire may be quite frequently found in the skalds' poetry of the 11th century, still Arnór Þórðarson's account of the incursion into Wolin in 1043 by Magnus the Good (den Gode) seems to be of key importance in this context. The author of two poems dedicated to the king of Norway and Denmark, *Hrynhenda* and *Magnússdrápa*, used exactly the same elements: pagans' hearts filled with fear of the king, vivid descriptions of the fire burning the Slavs' settlements, who were punished for their dishonourable misdeeds. It has been well depicted by strophe 8 of *Magnússdrápa*:

Vann, þás Venðr of minnir,
vápnhríð konungr síðan,
sveið of ǫm at Jómi
illvirkja hræ stillir;

búk dró bráðla steikðan
blóðugr vargr af glóðum,
rann á óskírð enni
allfrekr bani hallar.[44]

The king triggered off a storm of weapons, which the Slavs remember, the ruler burnt many a corpse of villains in Jomsborg; a bloody wolf carried away the burnt body from the burnt-down house; the worst death was climbing up the pagans' foreheads in the hall with a fire.

[42] Cf.: Morawiec, *Między poezją*, 292–294.

[43] Ibidem, 325–326.

[44] SPMA II, 217; cf.: J. Morawiec, *Wolin w średniowiecznej tradycji skandynawskiej* (Cracow 2010), 448 and the following pages.

The rhetoric of that account is so close to the way Markús depicted Erik's action against the Slavs that it would be difficult not to interpret it as a result of direct inspiration. Taking into consideration the Danish rule of Magnus and its legitimisation based on his father's intercession, Olaf the Saint, it is justified to say that Magnus the Good, probably not only with reference to his military confrontations with the Slavs, was to serve as a model for Erik as the king, and in the same way Arnór's poetry was to serve as a model for Markús.

Last but not least, it should be emphasised that in spite of the fact that the motif of Erik's battles against the Slavs occupies a prominent place in *Eiríksdrápa*, in the skald's account there are no interesting details up to the standards reached in the descriptions of the king's pilgrimages or of his efforts to establish the archdiocese in Lund. This riddle might be explained in the following way: a worse world, a world of pagans, treasons and villains did not deserve such a dignified treatment as – in Markús's own words – a safely protected empire of monks, full of holy places. Actually, the explanation might be quite different. The skald wanted to present Erik's achievements in the way that would meet the expectations of the receivers of the poem, the political and ecclesiastical elites of Denmark, so undoubtedly he had to collect information on the events the picture of the late king was built of, but the access to that information was difficult. As a result it is easy to identify in *Eiríksdrápa* such elements as the references to Saxony, the number of funded churches, a list of monarchs the late king had contact with, and a list of places he visited as a pilgrim. Markús was able to gather such information only by using the knowledge and memory of the ones who had known the king and cooperated with him. As I have already mentioned, the key role might have been played by the mediation of Jón Ǫgmundarsson, who had a vested interest in Markús's poem having the best possible effect.

In the case of Erik's struggles against the Slavs, the skald did not need any help. While composing *Eiríksdrápa* Markús took advantage of the oeuvre of Arnór Þórðarson and of other poets. The poems of the former, who like Sigvat Þórðarson, seems to be the main source of the poetic inspiration for Markús, could supply the latter with everything he needed, first of all ready-made motifs of the treacherous pagan Slavs and an ardent Christian ruler who effectively eliminated the threat posed by them. It was sufficient to achieve the effect which the skald was interested in. Thus, although Markús's rhetoric concerning the Slavs might be assessed as stereotypical and not very sophisticated, it seems that, like other motifs, it fitted the expectations of the receivers of the poem. The image of pagan

traitors who deserved to be punished, which is revealed in *Eiríksdrápa*, properly rendered the atmosphere in the borderland between Denmark and the Slav lands at the turn of the 11th and 12th centuries. On the other hand, that image was a result not of the will to have a proper look at the neighbours south of Erik's domain but it was rather an effect of uncritical imitating the poetic authority and a will to equal him in the skaldic trade.

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ILLVIRKJAR OK ÓSKÍRÐIR. EIRÍKSDRÁPA MARKÚSA SKEGGJASONA JAKO PRZYKŁAD WYKORZYSTANIA MOTYWU SŁOWIANINA-POGANINA W ŚREDNIOWIECZNEJ LITERATURZE SKANDYNAWSKIEJ

Słowa kluczowe: poezja, pogaństwo, Słowianie

Abstrakt

Tematem artykułu jest *Eiríksdrápa* islandzkiego poety Markúsa Skeggjasona, wiersz poświęcony pamięci króla Danii Eryka Zawsze Dobrego (1095–1103). Poemat uświetnił wizytę Jóna Ǫgmundarsona w Lund w 1105 roku, gdzie miejscowy arcybiskup Gizurr wyświęcił go na biskupa Hólar. Wiersz sławi przede wszystkim te dokonania króla Eryka, które wskazywały na chrześcijański wymiar jego rządów. Świadczyć o tym miały zarówno uzyskanie zgody papieża na erygowanie archidiecezji w Lund, jak i pielgrzymi króla do Rzymu i Ziemi Świętej. Wpisuje się w to również motyw wrogich działań Eryka wobec pogańskich Słowian, co zajmuje w wierszu Markúsa poczesne miejsce i jest głównym przedmiotem analizy w artykule. Motyw ten ukazuje Słowian jako zdrajców (*svikmenn*) i pogan (*heiðnar*) zagrażających pokojowi w królestwie. Brak litości dla nich ze strony Eryka dowodził jego sprawiedliwych i bogobojnych rządów w Danii. Analizowany motyw dowodzi jego przydatności w procesie kształtowania wizerunku chrześcijańskiego władcy, wskazuje także na warsztat artystyczny Markúsa, oparty w głównej mierze na dorobku innych poetów, także opisujących pogańskich Słowian.

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DIE DÄNISCHEN KÖNIGE ALS LEHNSHERREN DER HERZÖGE VON POMMERN (1325–1438)

DANISH KINGS AS THE FEUDAL LORDS OF THE POMERANIAN DUKES (1325–1438)

Keywords: Danish fiefdom of the Principality of Rügen until 1438, documents of the Danish National Archives of Copenhagen, King Valdemar IV Atterdag, Queen Margrethe of Denmark and Norway, King Eric of Pomerania, the dukes of Pomerania: Barnim III, Barnim IV, Barnim VI, Barnim VIII, Bogislaw V, Bogislaw VI, Wartislaw V, Wartislaw VIII, Wartislaw IX, Wartislaw X

Summary

Medieval Denmark´s great period of expansion in the Baltic Region lasted from the middle of the 12th century to the battle of Bornhöved in Holstein in 1227. Before the middle of the 12th century the Danish Realm expanded into Northern Germany including the Duchy of Pomerania. The dukes of Pomerania were vassals of the Danish king. But also after the military defeat of Bornhöved, parts of the duchy belonged to Denmark, namely the Principality of Rügen. Documents in the Danish National Archives in Copenhagen prove that the Danish fiefdom of the Principality of Rügen lasted at least until 1438.

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Einleitung

Das mittelalterliche Königreich Dänemark hatte zeitweilig eine geographisch weit gestreckte Ausdehnung. Die dänischen Könige beherrschten viele Gebiete an der südlichen Ostseeküste bis hin nach Estland. Seine größte Ausdehnung erreichte das dänische Herrschaftsgebiet unter König Waldemar II. Sejr (1202–1241).[1] Bis zur dänischen Niederlage von Bornhöved von 1227 gehörte dazu auch das Herzogtum Pommern.[2] Die Kontrolle des Odermündungsraums war von strategischer Bedeutung, weshalb mehrere Befestigungsanlangen im Auftrag der dänischen Könige errichtet wurden (z. B. „Haus Demmin" bei Demmin und der „Grüttpott" bei Stolpe an der Oder).[3]

Aber auch im Spätmittelalter war der dänische König Lehnsherr pommerscher Herzöge, und zwar für das Gebiet des Fürstentums Rügen. Das Fürstentum Rügen war seit der 1168/1169 erfolgten Eroberung Arkonas[4] ein fester Bestandteil des dänischen Hegemonialbereichs an der südlichen Ostseeküste, noch 1310 sicherte Fürst Wizlaw III. seinem Lehnsherrn König Erich Menved die Erbfolge in Rügen zu, für den Fall, dass sein Haus ausstürbe.[5] Der Bruder des dänischen Königs wiederum, Herzog Christopher (der spätere Christopher II., König von 1320–1326, 1329–1332) belehnte Herzog Wartislaw IV. von Pommern-Wolgast mit der Eventualsukzession für das gesamte Fürstentum Rügen.[6]

Die Dynastie der Fürsten von Rügen erlosch mit dem Tode Wizlaws III. im Jahre 1325. Die Herzöge von Pommern erbten das Fürstentum, das nach dem

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1 J. E. Olesen, „A Danish Medieval „Empire" in the Baltic (1168–1227)?", in: *The Norwegian Domination and the Norse World c. 1100 – c. 1400*, ‚Norgesveldet', Occasional Papers No. 1, hrsg. v. S. Imsen (Trondheim: Tapir Academic Press, 2010), 263–264.

2 C. Jahnke, *Geschichte Dänemarks* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2017), 79–81.

3 J. Krüger, „Stosunki duńsko-brandenburskie nad Odrą w XII/XIII i XIV w. za panowania królów duńskich: Waldemara II Zwycięskiego i Waldemara IV Atterdaga", in: *Cedynia i okolice poprzez wieki*, hrsg. v. P. Migdalski (Chojna, Szczecin: Terra Incognita, 2013), 133–148.

4 Zu der Unsicherheit hinsichtlich der Datierung der Eroberung Arkonas 1168 oder 1169 siehe zusammenfassend Ralf-Gunnar Werlich, „Der Fall Arkonas – Datierung und nationale Geschichtsschreibung", in: *Pommern. Geschichte – Kultur – Wissenschaft. 3. Kolloquium zur Pommerschen Geschichte 13.–14. Oktober1993*, hrsg. v. Horst Wernicke und Ralf-Gunnar Werlich (Greifswald: Steinbecker Verlag, 1996), 31–66. Für 1169 hat sich zuletzt Carsten Jahnke ausgesprochen, vgl. Jahnke, *Geschichte Dänemarks*, 75.

5 *Pommersches Urkundenbuch*, Bd. 1–11, hier Bd. IV, Nr. 2608 (Stettin, Aalen, Köln 1868–1990), im Folgenden PUB. Eine Zusammenstellung der Belehnungen der Fürsten von Rügen durch die dänischen Könige bietet C. Hamann, *Die Beziehungen Rügens zu Dänemark von 1168 bis zum Aussterben der einheimischen rügischen Dynastie 1325* (Greifswalder Abhandlungen zur Geschichte des Mittelalters, Bd. 4) (Greifswald: Verlag Bamberg, 1933), 11–12.

6 PUB V, Nr. 2977 (25. Oktober 1315).

Rügenschen Erbfolgekrieg als Herrschaft in das Herzogtum Pommern integriert wurde.[7] Damit traten die Herzöge von Pommern, speziell die Herzöge des Teilherzogtums Pommern-Wolgast, erneut in ein Lehnsverhältnis zum dänischen König – für das Fürstentum Rügen.

Ob die dänische Lehnsherrschaft überhaupt Auswirkungen hatte und wie lange sie dauerte, war in der Forschung lange umstritten bzw. wurde schlichtweg nicht beachtet. Schließlich wurde das dänische Königreich zwischen 1319 und 1340 von inneren Unruhen erschüttert.[8] Die Datierungsansätze der dänischen Lehnshoheit schwanken zwischen 1348, 1438 und dem frühen 16. Jahrhundert.[9] Erschwerend kommt hinzu, dass die Edition des *Pommerschen Urkundenbuchs* bislang nicht über das Jahr 1345 hinausgekommen ist und dass die skandinavischen Urkundeneditionen, vor allem das *Diplomatarium Danicum,* in der deutschsprachigen Pommern-Historiographie nur wenig Beachtung fanden.[10]

Durch den Verfasser wurde bereits in einem früheren Aufsatz die These aufgestellt, dass die dänische Lehnshoheit für das Fürstentum Rügen 1438 endete.[11] Grundlage der Erörterungen sind die im dänischen Reichsarchiv in Kopenhagen im Bestand *Middelaldersamlingen. Ny kronologiske række* verwahrten mittelalterlichen Urkunden und Regesten.[12]

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[7] O. Auge, *Handlungsspielräume fürstlicher Politik im Mittelalter. Der südliche Ostseeraum von der Mitte des 12. Jahrhunderts bis in die frühe Reformationszeit* (Mittelalterforschungen, Bd. 28) (Ostfildern: Thorbecke, 2009), 70–73. Zur Stellung der Fürsten von Rügen siehe: ebd., 258–264; H.-D. Schroeder, „Der erste Rügische Erbfolgekrieg – Ursachen, Verlauf und Ergebnisse“, in: *Die Demminer Kolloquien 1985–1994*, hrsg. v. H.Th. Porada (Schwerin: Thomas-Helms-Verlag, 1997), 129–139.

[8] N. Skyum-Nielsen, *Fruer og vildmænd*, Bd. 1: *Dansk Middelalderhistorie 1250–1340* (København: Akademisk Forlag, 1994), 252–263.

[9] J. Krüger, „Die dänischen Könige als Lehnsherren der Herzöge von Pommern-Wolgast 1325–1438 anhand der urkundlichen Überlieferung, *Baltische Studien. Pommersche Jahrbücher für Landesgeschichte*, N. F. 95/2009 (2010): 10–11.

[10] Als Ausnahmen sind Klaus Conrad und Oliver Auge zu nennen, die sich allerdings nicht näher mit der Frage nach der Dauer des dänischen Lehnsverhältnisses auseinandergesetzt haben, vgl. K. Conrad, „Die Belehnung der Herzöge von Pommern durch Karl IV. im Jahre 1348“, in: *Kaiser Karl IV. 1316–1378. Forschungen über Kaiser und Reich*, hrsg. v. Hans Patze (Neustadt/Aisch: Verlag Ph. C. W. Schmidt, 1978), 402–403; Auge, *Handlungsspielräume*, 78–79.

[11] Krüger, „Die dänischen Könige“, 29–31.

[12] Als Einführung vgl. *Dänemark und Pommern. Sachthematisches Archivinventar zu den Beständen an Pomeranica und Sueco-Pomeranica im dänischen Reichsarchiv in Kopenhagen*, bearb. v. J. Krüger (Publikationen des Lehrstuhls für Nordische Geschichte, Bd. 12) (Greifswald: Druckhaus Panzig, 2010), 27–28.

Die urkundliche Überlieferung

Der Bestand an mittelalterlichen Urkunden im dänischen Reichsarchiv in Kopenhagen, die Pommern betreffen, ist groß, aber lückenhaft. Speziell Lehnsbriefe sind nur wenige erhalten. Konkret handelt es sich um zwei Regesten in einer Archivregistratur von 1524, die sich auf zwei pommersche Lehnsurkunden beziehen, die ca. 1348/1349 verfasst worden sein müssen. Die Originale sind vermutlich 1728 einem Brand zum Opfer gefallen.

Eine weitere Lehnsurkunde von 1359 ist als Original erhalten, der Text ist im *Diplomatarium Danicum* abgedruckt. Die Urkunde wurde 2010 nach dem Original erneut in den Baltischen Studien ediert.[13] Eine Lehnsurkunde von 1376 ist nur abschriftlich aus dem Jahre 1603 überliefert. Dann gibt es noch einen Huldigungsbrief aus dem Jahre 1402, der als Vidimus aus dem Jahre 1414 bekannt ist.

Die Regesten von 1348/1349

Die Regesten sind in einer Archivregistratur König Friedrichs I. von 1524 enthalten. Sie beziehen sich auf den dänischen König Waldemar IV. Atterdag (1340–1375) und sind in dänischer Sprache verfasst. Hier wird eine deutsche Übersetzung wiedergegeben:

Regest 1: „ein Verpflichtungsbrief/ den der Herzog von Pommern König Waldemar gegeben hat/ für die zu leistenden Dienste/ und in dem er bekennt/ das Land von Pommern von ihm als Lehn empfangen zu haben.“[14]

Regest 2: „ein Bündnisbrief/ zwischen König Waldemar und dem Herzog von Pommern/ dass dieser ihm für das Land Kassuben dienen soll.“[15]

Leider wird der ausstellende Herzog namentlich nicht genannt. Im fraglichen Zeitraum, in dem die von diesen Regesten (1348–1349) nachgewiesenen Urkunden ausgestellt worden sein müssen, gab es vier regierende Herzöge in Pommern, einen im Stettiner (Barnim III.) und drei im Wolgaster Landesteil (Bogislaw V., Barnim IV. und Wartislaw V.). Es ist also nicht klar, welcher Herzog die Urkunden ausstellen ließ. Daran, dass die Urkunden existiert haben, besteht wenig Zweifel.

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[13] Krüger, „Die dänischen Könige“, 33.

[14] *Diplomatarium Danicum*, udg. af Det Danske Sprog- og Litteraturselskab. Under ledelse af C.A. Christensen, I Række 1–7; II Række 1–12; III Række 1–9; IV Række (København: Ejnar Munksgaards Forlag, 1938–2000), hier: III/3, Nr. 238, übersetzt durch den Verfasser. Im Folgenden Dipl. Dan.

[15] Dipl. Dan. III/3, Nr. 239, übersetzt durch den Verfasser.

Die Archivregistratur König Friedrichs I. gilt als sehr zuverlässig. Die hier interessierenden Dokumente sind vermutlich bei einem Brand des Reichsarchivs in Kopenhagen im Jahre 1728 verloren gegangen.[16]

Von den Bearbeitern des *Diplomatarium Danicum* werden die zwei Urkunden, auf die sich die Regesten beziehen, in den Zeitraum 1348–1350 eingeordnet, genauer in die Zeit zwischen der Belehnung Herzog Barnims III. von Pommern-Stettin durch König Karl IV. mit dem gesamten Herzogtum Pommern für sich und seine Wolgaster Vettern am 12. Juni 1348[17] und dem 15. Oktober 1350. Das letzte Datum bezieht sich auf eine in Vordingborg (Seeland) ausgestellte Urkunde der Herzöge Bogislaw V. und Barnim IV. von Pommern-Wolgast, die den Schiedsspruch des dänischen Königs Waldemar IV. Atterdag in einem Streit mit den Herzögen von Mecklenburg um das Land Barth akzeptieren wollen. Bedeutsam an dieser Urkunde ist, dass die Herzöge den dänischen König als „unseren Herren" anreden und dass sie sich auf das Land Barth als Teil des Fürstentums Rügen bezieht.[18] Die Bezeichnung „unser Herr" deutet auf ein bestehendes Vasallenverhältnis gegenüber dem dänischen König hin. Insofern ist es denkbar, dass dieser Urkunde ein Lehensakt vorausging, der zwischen 1348 und 1350 vorgenommen worden ist.

Dass König Waldemar IV. Atterdag vor 1348 das Lehnsverhältnis erneuerte, ist unwahrscheinlich. Nach dem Tode König Christophers II. im Jahr 1332 folgte ein achtjähriges Interregnum in Dänemark. Große Teile des Landes waren verpfändet worden, die königliche Macht befand sich an einem Tiefpunkt. Erst die Ermordung des einflussreichen Grafen Gerhard III. von Holstein am 1. April 1340 bei Randers gab Waldemar IV. Atterdag die Möglichkeit, den dänischen Thron zu besteigen. Die folgenden Jahre bis 1348/1349 werden als Reichssammlung bezeichnet, während der Waldemar IV. große Teile des dänischen Reichs unter seine Kontrolle brachte.[19] Eine Einmischung in die politischen Angelegenheiten an der südlichen Ostseeküste kann mit Ausnahme Holsteins ausgeschlossen werden.

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[16] Zum Brand von 1728 und den Verlusten siehe Thelma Jexlev, *Lokalarkiver til 1559, Gejstlige arkiver*, Bd. 1: Ærkestiftet *og Roskilde stift* (Vejledende Arkivregistraturer, Bd. 17) (København: Rigsarkivet, 1973), 55.

[17] Conrad, „Die Belehnung", 391–392.

[18] Reichsarchiv Kopenhagen, Ny kronologisk række Nr. 665, im Folgenden NKR; abgedruckt im Dipl. Dan. III/3, Nr. 335; *Mecklenburgisches Urkundenbuch*, hrsg. v. Verein für Mecklenburgische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde, Bd. 1–25 (Schwerin: Stiller, 1863–1977), hier Bd. X, Nr. 7128.

[19] A.E. Christensen, *Kongemagt og Aristokrati. Epoker i middelalderlig dansk statsopfattelse indtil Unionstiden*, 3. Aufl. (København: Ejnar Munksgaards Forlag, 1976), 180; siehe auch Jahnke, *Geschichte Dänemarks*, 98–100.

Allerdings kam es 1348 zu politischen Entwicklungen im Heiligen Römischen Reich, die dänische Interessen massiv bedrohten. König Karl IV., der spätere Kaiser, belehnte am 12. Juni 1348 in Znaim (Znojmo) Herzog Barnim III. von Pommern-Stettin für sich und stellvertretend für seine nicht anwesenden pommerschen Vettern Bogislaw V., Barnim IV. und Wartislaw V. mit dem gesamten Herzogtum Pommern. Dieser Akt der Belehnung stellt ein bedeutendes Ereignis in der pommerschen Historiographie dar und ist entsprechend oft beschrieben worden.[20] Das gesamte Herzogtum wurde reichsunmittelbar und der von den Markgrafen von Brandenburg geäußerte Anspruch auf die Lehnshoheit über Pommern wurde vorläufig zurückgewiesen.

Die Belehnung der Herzöge mit dem gesamten Pommern, also auch mit dem Fürstentum Rügen, verletzte massiv die Rechte des dänischen Königs. Dieser Aspekt ist lange nicht beachtet worden, eine Reaktion des dänischen Königs und deren Auswirkung auf das Herzogtum Pommern ist kaum diskutiert worden. Aber eine solche ist belegt.[21] Der dänische König Waldemar IV. Atterdag führte 1349–1350 einen Kriegszug durch. Dabei stieß er bis in den mitteldeutschen Raum vor. Das hatte mehrere Gründe: einerseits diente der Zug der Unterstützung des Wittelsbacher Markgrafen Ludwig I. von Brandenburg. Karl IV. hatte in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit den Wittelsbachern nach dem Auftreten des sogenannten „falschen Woldemar" diesen mit der Mark Brandenburg belehnt.[22] Das verschärfte den Konflikt mit den Wittelsbachern. Waldemar IV. Atterdag war mit den Wittelsbachern verwandt. Markgraf Ludwig hatte 1340 Waldemars Regierungsantritt in Dänemark maßgeblich unterstützt. Im Bund mit Dänemark und Pommern gelang es Ludwig, Karl IV. zum Einlenken zu bewegen. Im Vertrag von Bautzen vom 14./15. Februar 1350 erfolgte die gegenseitige Anerkennung Karls IV. und Ludwigs.[23]

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[20] Auge, *Handlungsspielräume*, 272–273; Conrad, „Die Belehnung", 391–393; O. Heinemann, „Die kaiserlichen Lehensurkunden für die Herzoge von Pommern", *Baltische Studien*, N. F. 3 (1899): 159–185; Roderich Schmidt, „Brandenburg und Pommern in der Politik Kaiser Karls IV.", in: *Kaiser Karl IV. Staatsmann und Mäzen*, hrsg. v. Ferdinand Seibt (München: Verlag Ph. C.W. Schmidt, 1978), 203–208, 456–457.

[21] S. Tägil, *Valdemar Atterdag och Europa* (Bibliotheca Historica Lundensis, Bd. 9) (Lund: Gleerup, 1962), 167–188; W.-D. Mohrmann, „Karl IV. und Herzog Albrecht II. von Mecklenburg", in: *Kaiser Karl IV. 1316–1378. Forschungen über Kaiser und Reich*, hrsg. v. Hans Patze (Neustadt/Aisch: Verlag Ph. C.W. Schmidt, 1978), 368–369.

[22] S. Griesa, „Die Mark Brandenburg im 14. Jahrhundert zur Zeit des falschen Woldemars", *Jahrbuch für Brandenburgische Landesgeschichte* 57 (2006): 32–49.

[23] Tägil, *Valdemar Atterdag*, 20–25, 121 u. 167–188.

Der zweite Grund Waldemars IV., weshalb er in den Konflikt zwischen Ludwig und Karl IV. eingriff, dürfte in der Wiederherstellung der dänischen Lehnshoheit im norddeutschen Raum gelegen haben, die nicht nur das Fürstentum Rügen, sondern auch mecklenburgische Herrschaften umfasste. Und damit war er erfolgreich. Karl IV. erklärte am 16. Februar 1350, dass er Waldemar IV. in seine Gnade aufgenommen habe, und dass er alles anerkenne, was jener (Waldemar) auf seinem Feldzug erreicht habe.[24] Das dürfte die Akzeptanz der Wiederherstellung der dänischen Lehnshoheit über das Fürstentum Rügen sowie der mecklenburgischen Herrschaften Rostock, Schwaan und Gnoien beinhaltet haben.[25]

Zurück zur Frage der Datierung der eingangs erwähnten Regesten: Im November und Dezember 1349 sind mehrere pommersche Herzöge im Gefolge Waldemars IV. Atterdag nachweisbar, Barnim III. von Pommern-Stettin und Bogislaw V. von Pommern-Wolgast. In diesem Zeitraum sind mehrere Urkunden ausgestellt worden, in denen der dänische König und die Herzöge gemeinsam als Zeugen auftreten.[26] Vermutlich sind in Vorbereitung bzw. während der Durchführung der dänischen Operationen auch die zwei Urkunden ausgestellt worden, auf die sich die Regesten beziehen. Denn wegen seines Kriegszuges gegen Karl IV. dürfte Waldemar IV. Atterdag die pommerschen Herzöge nachdrücklich an ihre Lehnspflichten erinnert haben.

Leider sind die Regesten zu ungenau. Es wird nicht klar, auf welches Gebiet sich die geographische Bezeichnung „Pommern“ bezieht. In Frage kommen einerseits das gesamte Herzogtum, andererseits aber nur das Teilherzogtum Pommern-Wolgast bzw. die Gebiete des ehemaligen Fürstentums Rügen. Die Nennung „Kassuben“ deutet zumindest darauf hin, dass eine der beiden Urkunden von einem Wolgaster Herzog ausgestellt worden ist, etwa Bogislaw V. Denn das Gebiet um Stolp, Rügenwalde und Neustettin gehörte bis zum Jahre 1372 zum Teilherzogtum Pommern-Wolgast.

Die Urkunde von 1359

Die Lehnsurkunde von 1359 wirft kaum Fragen auf, bestätigt aber, dass die Wiederherstellung der Lehnshoheit durch Waldemar IV. Atterdag erfolgreich gewesen

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[24] *Regesta imperii*, Bd. 8: *Die Regesten des Kaiserreichs unter Kaiser Karl IV. 1346–1378*, hrsg. v. Johann Friedrich Böhmer (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1877) 97–98, Nr. 1215, Nr. 1222.

[25] Auge, *Handlungsspielräume*, 78–79; Mohrmann, „Karl IV. und Herzog Albrecht II.“, 360–361, 369.

[26] Tägil, *Valdemar Atterdag*, 172, 179–180.

ist. Die mehrfach geäußerte These, dass die dänische Lehnshoheit über das Fürstentum Rügen mit dem Lehensakt Karls IV. im Jahr 1348 beendet gewesen sei, wird durch dieses Dokument eindeutig widerlegt.[27]

Aussteller der Urkunde sind die Herzöge des Wolgaster Landesteils Bogislaw V., Barnim IV. und Wartislaw V. Ausgestellt wurde die Urkunde in Ålholm auf der dänischen Insel Lolland. Alle drei Herzöge waren anwesend und haben den Brief gesiegelt. Empfänger ist der dänische König Waldemar IV. Atterdag. Die Herzöge erklären ihren Beistand für Waldemar IV., den sie als „unseren Herren" bezeichnen, und seinen Sohn Christoph. Außerdem erklären sie, die für das Fürstentum Rügen schuldigen Dienste leisten zu wollen. Das Fürstentum wird eindeutig als das Territorium bezeichnet, auf das sich die Lehnspflichten beziehen. In Übersetzung lautet die Passage: „weiterhin den Dienst/ den wir ihm leisten sollen für das Fürstentum Rügen/ das wir von ihm zu Lehen haben"[28].

Diese Urkunde wurde vor dem Hintergrund des Krieges Waldemars IV. Atterdag mit den Grafen von Holstein und Herzog Albrecht II. von Mecklenburg ausgestellt.[29] Der Konflikt dauerte von 1357 bis 1360. Einer der Aussteller, Barnim IV., versuchte, ab 1358 zwischen Waldemar IV. und Albrecht II. zu vermitteln. Außerdem wurde er als Schiedsherr zwischen dem dänischen König und den Grafen von Holstein berufen. Vor dem Hintergrund der sich 1359 zuspitzenden militärischen Lage – Erik von Schonen, der Sohn des norwegisch-schwedischen Königs Magnus Eriksson, griff in die Kämpfe ein – forderte Waldemar IV. Atterdag eine eindeutige Positionierung der Herzöge von Pommern-Wolgast, möglicherweise verbunden mit der Stellung eines Lehnsaufgebots.[30]

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[27] Diese These wird vertreten u. a. durch F.W. Barthold, *Geschichte von Rügen und Pommern*, Teil IV/1: *Vom Auftreten der Hohenzollern in der Mark Brandenburg (1411) bis zur Rückkehr Bogislaus X. vom h. Grabe (1498)* (Hamburg: Verlag Perthes, 1843), 119–120; darauf basierend M. Wehrmann, *Geschichte der Insel Rügen in 2 Theilen*, Bd. 1 (Pommersche Heimatkunde, Bd. 1) (Greifswald: Verlag Dr. Karl Moninger, 1922), 55–57; N. Buske, *Pommern. Territorialstaat und Landesteil von Preußen. Ein Überblick über die politische Entwicklung. Die Rolle Vorpommerns seit 1945* (Schwerin: Thomas-Helms-Verlag, 1997), 22; K.T. Inachin, *Die Geschichte Pommerns* (Rostock: Hinstorff, 2008), 33.

[28] Übersetzung durch den Verfasser, das Original im Reichsarchiv Kopenhagen NKR 843–844; Dipl. Dan III/5, Nr. 213; Krüger, „Die pommerschen Herzöge", 33; *Dänemark und Pommern*, 35.

[29] W. Strecker, „Die äußere Politik Albrechts II. von Mecklenburg", *Jahrbücher des Vereins für Mecklenburgische Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 78 (1913): 80–110; Auge, *Handlungsspielräume*, 80–81.

[30] Ausführlich dazu Krüger, „Die pommerschen Herzöge", 20–23.

Die Urkunde von 1376

Die Urkunde ist nicht im Original erhalten. Der Inhalt ist nur aus einer vermutlich wörtlichen dänischen Übersetzung bekannt, die im 3. Teil der Chronik Arild Huitfeldts 1603 abgedruckt worden ist.[31] Arild Huitfeldt (1546 bis 1609) gilt, was die Nutzung mittelalterlicher Urkunden angeht, als sehr zuverlässig. Außerdem gibt es einen weiteren Beweis für die Existenz dieser Urkunde: auch sie ist als Regest in der Archivregistratur König Friedrichs I. von 1524 verzeichnet. Der Aussteller des Dokuments ist dieses Mal Herzog Bogislaw VI. Verfasst wurde es am 4. März 1376 in Ålholm. Empfänger der Urkunde ist Olaf, der Sohn König Håkons VI. von Norwegen und Schweden und seiner Frau, Königin Margarethe von Dänemark.[32] Die Urkunde ist eine Beistandserklärung Herzog Bogislaws VI. für den (zukünftigen) dänischen König Olaf. Und auch hier gibt es einen eindeutigen Hinweis auf das bestehende Lehnsverhältnis, das sich auf das Fürstentum Rügen bezieht: „weiterhin alle Dienste/ zu denen wir ihm verpflichtet sind/ für das Fürstentum Rügen schulden/ das wir von ihm zu Lehen haben“[33].

Dieses Dokument entstand vor dem Hintergrund der Wahl des neuen dänischen Königs. Am 24. Oktober 1375 war König Waldemar IV. Atterdag ohne männlichen Erben verstorben.[34] Da Dänemark ein Wahlreich war, stand eine Königswahl bevor. Zwei Kandidaten standen zur Auswahl: der erste war Herzog Albrecht IV. von Mecklenburg, Sohn der älteren Tochter Waldemars, Ingeborg, der zweite Kandidat war eben jener Olaf, Sohn der jüngeren Tochter Waldemars, Margarethe. Mit Unterstützung der Hansestädte und der pommerschen Herzöge schaffte es Margrethe, die Wahl ihres Sohnes Olaf durchzusetzen, der am 3. Mai 1376 zum dänischen König gekrönt wurde.[35] Nur folgerichtig trat einige Monate

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[31] A. Huitfeldt, *Den Tredie Part Chronologiæ, Continuatz, oc Forfølge paa vore Danske Historier siden Saxo døde. Inholdendis Kong Oluffs Histori, Dronning Margretis, Kong Erichs aff Pomern oc Kong Christoffers aff Beyeren fra Aar 1370. oc til 1448. som er 78.* Aars Historier, Kiøbenhaffn 1603, 13–14.

[32] Ein vollständiger Abdruck des Texts in Krüger, „Die pommerschen Herzöge“, 33–34; Dipl. Dan. IV/1, Nr. 19.

[33] Übersetzung des Verfassers; vgl. Krüger, „Die pommerschen Herzöge“, 23.

[34] A.E. Christensen, *Kalmarunionen og nordisk politik 1319–1439* (København: Gyldendal, 1980), 96–98; Jahnke, *Geschichte Dänemarks*, 104–108.

[35] Am 8. April 1376 schlossen die Herzöge Wartislaw VI. und Bogislaw VI. von Pommern-Wolgast ein Bündnis mit dem dänischen Reich, dem Reichsrat und dem König, „der vom Reichsrat gewählt werden wird“. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt hatte Königin Margarethe den Reichsrat unter Führung des Bischofs von Roskilde und des Reichsdrosts Henning von Putbus auf ihre Seite gebracht, so dass es sich im Prinzip um eine Beistandserklärung für Olaf handelte. Vgl. Reichsarchiv Kopenhagen, NKR 1160,

später Herzog Bogislaw VI. von Pommern-Wolgast als Fürst von Rügen in die Dienste König Olafs und erklärte seinen militärischen Beistand gegen etwaige Feinde, vor allem aber gegen die Herzöge von Mecklenburg.[36]

Die Huldigung von 1396 und das Ende der dänischen Lehnshoheit 1438

König Olaf verstarb schon im Jahre 1387. Seine Mutter Margarethe vermochte es 1388/89, die drei skandinavischen Königreiche Schweden, Norwegen und Dänemark als Regentin in ihrer Hand zu vereinigen. Als ihren Nachfolger präsentierte sie ihren Großneffen Bogislaw von Pommern-Stolp, der den Namen Erich von Pommern annahm. Seit 1389 befand sich Erich in Skandinavien. Nacheinander wurde ihm in Norwegen, Schweden und Dänemark gehuldigt. Ob es 1389 schon eine Krönung gegeben hat, ist in der Forschung umstritten.[37]

Die formelle Inthronisierung in Dänemark – und nur die ist für das gewählte Thema von Bedeutung – erfolgte im Januar 1396 in Viborg.[38] Ein Huldigungsbrief eines pommerschen Herzogs anlässlich des Ereignisses in Viborg ist nicht überliefert. Tatsächlich muss eine solche Huldigung, wie sie auch von den Grafen von Holstein überliefert ist, stattgefunden haben.[39] Denn 1402 bestätigte Herzog Barnim VI. für sich und seinen Bruder Wartislaw VIII.: „die Huldigung und die Eide/ die wir und unser Bruder/ unserem Herrn, dem König und den Reichen/ gegeben haben/ die sollen gültig bleiben/ und die Briefe/ die wir und unser Bruder/ und unsere Eltern und Vorfahren/ dem König und seinen Eltern und seinen Vorfahren/ und den Reichen Dänemark, Schweden und Norwegen gegeben haben/ die sollen nicht gebrochen werden“[40].

Dipl. Dan. IV/1, Nr. 30; siehe auch *Dänemark und Pommern*, 40, Zu den Hintergründen siehe u. a. Krüger, „Die pommerschen Herzöge“, 24–5.

[36] Reichsarchiv Kopenhagen, NKR 1174; Dipl. Dan. IV/1, Nr. 1; siehe auch *Dänemark und Pommern*, 41. Zum Versuch Herzog Albrechts II., Kopenhagen im September 1376 zu erobern, siehe Auge, *Handlungsspielräume*, 86.

[37] J.E. Olesen, „Analyse und Charakteristik der Kalmarer Union“, in: *Erich von Pommern und Christopher von Bayern. Studien zur Kalmarer Union*, hrsg. v. J.E. Olesen (Publikationen des Lehrstuhls für Nordische Geschichte, Bd. 21) (Greifswald: Druckhaus Panzig, 2016), 12–13.

[38] J.E. Olesen, „Erich von Pommerns Alleinherrschaft 1412–1439/40“, in: *Erich von Pommern und Christopher von Bayern. Studien zur Kalmarer Union*, hrsg. v. J.E. Olesen (Publikationen des Lehrstuhls für Nordische Geschichte, Bd. 21) (Greifswald: Druckhaus Panzig, 2016), 36–37; Auge, *Handlungsspielräume*, 88–89.

[39] Krüger, „Die pommerschen Herzöge“, 28–29.

[40] Übersetzung durch den Verfasser. Die Urkunde ist als Vidimus aus dem Jahre 1414 (25. März) überliefert, Reichsarchiv Kopenhagen, NKR 2454; abgedruckt im Svenskt Diplomatarium från och med

Bei dem Ereignis, auf das hier Bezug genommen wird, kann es sich nur um die Huldigung von 1396 handeln, da Barnim VI. erst 1394 die Regierung in seinem Landesteil übernommen hatte.[41] Auch diese Huldigung dürfte sich explizit auf die dänische Lehnshoheit über das Fürstentum Rügen bezogen haben. Denn Barnim VI. (1394–1405) regierte über das Teilherzogtum Pommern-Barth, dessen territoriale Ausdehnung im Wesentlichen mit dem alten Fürstentum Rügen übereinstimmte.[42]

Auch in der Folgezeit finden wir die pommerschen Herzöge, sowohl aus dem zersplitterten Wolgaster wie auch aus dem Stettiner Landesteil an der Seite König Erichs von Pommern. Mehrere erhaltene Urkunden bezeugen vor allem militärische Leistungen in Erichs Kriegen mit den Grafen von Holstein und den Hansestädten.[43] Im Gegenzug wurden pommersche Herzöge mit Gebieten auf den dänischen Inseln belehnt, z. B. auf den Inseln Seeland und Mön.[44]

Mit König Sigismund setzte sich abermals ein Herrscher des Heiligen Römischen Reichs über die dänische Lehenshoheit über das Fürstentum Rügen hinweg. Er belehnte am 31. Mai 1417 in Konstanz die pommerschen Herzöge u. a. mit dem Land Barth und dem Fürstentum Rügen.[45] Aber dieser Akt hatte keine Auswirkungen auf das bestehende Lehnsverhältnis zu Dänemark. So finden wir 1420 Herzog Wartislaw IX. von Pommern-Wolgast und 1436–1437 Herzog Barnim VIII. an der Seite „ihres Herren", des Königs Erichs von Pommern.[46]

1438 endete jedoch das Lehnsverhältnis zu Dänemark. Arild Huitfeldt berichtet in seiner Chronik, dass König Erich von Pommern das ganze Land Rügen abteilte und es seinen Vettern, den Herzögen Wartislaw IX. und Wartislaw X., übergab.[47] Leider ist keine entsprechende Urkunde bekannt. Allerdings berichtet Huitfeldt

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år 1401, Bd. I/1: 1401–1407, Stockholm 1878, Nr 250; siehe auch *Dänemark und Pommern*, 49; Krüger, „Die pommerschen Herzöge", 28.

41 D. Schleinert, *Pommerns Herzöge. Die Greifen im Portrait* (Rostock: Hinstorff, 2012), 53–55.

42 Krüger, „Die pommerschen Herzöge", 28–29.

43 Reichsarchiv Kopenhagen, NKR 2314 (Vordingborg, 7. November 1411), NKR 2315 (Vordingborg, 7. November 1411), NKR 2454 (25. März 1414), NKR 2733 (Næstved, 4. Dezember 1420); siehe auch *Dänemark und Pommern*, 48–50.

44 Reichsarchiv Kopenhagen, NKR 1958, Helsingborg, 31. Oktober 1403. Die Herzöge Barnim VI. von Pommern-Barth und Wartislaw VIII. von Pommern-Wolgast überlassen Bischof Peder von Roskilde ihren Besitz auf Seeland für sechs Jahre (Stevns und Store Heddinge). Siehe auch *Dänemark und Pommern*, 47; zu weiteren Belehnungen siehe Krüger, „Die pommerschen Herzöge", 28.

45 Krüger, „Die pommerschen Herzöge", 30.

46 J.E. Olesen, *Rigsråd – Kongemagt – Union. Studier over det danske rigsråd og den nordiske kongemagts politik 1434–1449* (Skrifter udgivet af Jysk Selskab for Historie, Bd. 36) (Århus: Universitetsforlag, 1980), 50, 68.

47 Huitfeldt, *Den Tredie Part*, 588.

im gleichen Zusammenhang von Übergriffen der Herzöge Wartislaw IX., Wartislaw X. und Barnim VIII. auf den Besitz des Bischofs von Roskilde auf der Insel Rügen. Die Herzöge zogen die sogenannte Grafschaft Streu ein, die unter der geistlichen und weltlichen Jurisdiktion der Domkirche von Roskilde stand.

Und dieser Streitfall lässt sich tatsächlich urkundlich nachweisen. Bereits 1850 hatte Julius von Bohlen-Bohlendorf auf eine Urkunde hingewiesen, die belegt, dass der bischöfliche Besitz an der Grafschaft Streu und an weiteren Gütern 1438 tatsächlich von Herzog Barnim VIII. angefochten worden ist, und dass Barnim diese Herrschaften eingezogen habe.[48] Es handelt sich dabei um einen am 18. August 1456 in Stege auf Mön geschlossenen Vergleich zwischen König Christian I. und seiner Frau Dorothea auf der einen und den Herzögen Wartislaw IX. und Wartislaw X. auf der anderen Seite.[49] Der dänische König und die pommerschen Herzöge einigten sich, dass Herzog Wartislaw IX. den Hof Streu und weitere Güter auf Rügen, die sein Vetter, Herzog Barnim VIII., vor 18 Jahren besetzt hatte, und die Wartislaw nach dessen Tode übernommen hatte, sofort an den Bischof von Roskilde Oluf Daa zurückgegeben werden sollten. Im Gegenzug verpflichtete sich der Bischof, auf die Hebungen zu verzichten, die dem Domkapitel in den 18 Jahren verwehrt geblieben waren. Rechnet man die 18 Jahre zurück, so befindet man sich im Jahre 1438. Damit ist zumindest die bei Huitfeldt beschriebene Einziehung der Güter bestätigt. Aufgrund dieses Befundes erscheint Huitfeldts Bericht über die Aufhebung des Lehnsverhältnisses durchaus glaubhaft, auch wenn kein offizielles Dokument existiert.

Danach scheint das dänische Lehnsverhältnis für Rügen allerdings tatsächlich nicht mehr weiterbestanden zu haben. Weder aus der Regierungszeit Christophers von Bayern (1440–1448) noch Christians I. (1448–1481) liegen Hinweise auf ein Abhängigkeitsverhältnis, das auf ein Lehnsverhältnis hindeuten könnte, vor. In dem bereits genannten, 1456 geschlossenen Vertrag werden Christian und seine Frau Dorothea zwar ihrem Rang gemäß als „de durchluchtigsten hochgeborenne furste vnde furstinne, her Christiern koningh vnde frowe Dorothea

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[48] J. von Bohlen-Bohlendorf, *Der Bischofsroggen und die Güter des Bisthums Roeskild auf Rügen im erblichen Besitz der Barnekows* (Stralsund: Löfflersche Buchhandlung, 1850), 7–8.

[49] Die Urkunde ist abgedruckt in *Diplomatarium Christierni Primi. Samling af aktstykker, diplomer og breve henhörende til Kong Christiern den förstes historie*, hrsg. v C.F. Wegener (Kopenhagen: Qvist, 1856), Nr. 58. Zu dem Hintergrund des Vergleichs siehe J.E. Olesen, *Unionskrige og Stændersamfund. Bidrag til Nordens historie i Kristian I´s regeringstid 1450–1481* (Skrifter udgivet af Jysk Selskab for Historie, Bd. 40) (Aarhus: Universitetsforlag, 1983), 84.

koninghinne“[50] angesprochen, jedoch eine Formulierung wie etwa „unser Herr“, die ein Abhängigkeitsverhältnis andeutet, fehlt gänzlich. Noch wichtiger ist, dass Wartislaw IX. von „*vnnseme lande to Rugien*“ spricht, das von Christian I. offenbar nicht mehr als dänisches Lehen vergeben worden war.

Dieser Befund wird durch weitere Urkunden aus der Zeit Christians I. bestätigt. Vor dem Hintergrund des dreizehnjährigen Krieges (1453–1466) zwischen dem Deutschen Orden und Polen-Litauen sowie der unsicheren Haltung der Stadt Danzig gegenüber Dänemark schloss Christian I. im Jahr 1462 in Nyköping ein Bündnis mit den Herzögen Wartislaw X. von Pommern-Wolgast und Otto III. von Pommern-Stettin. Die Herzöge treten in beiden Urkunden neben dem dänischen König als gleichberechtigte Partner auf. Ein Lehnsverhältnis ist nicht zu erkennen, besonders nicht gegenüber Wartislaw, der sich u. a. „furste tu Rugen“[51] nennt.

Insofern ist Arild Huitfeldt zuzustimmen, dass die dänische Lehnshoheit über das Fürstentum Rügen vermutlich 1438 endete, auch wenn ein entsprechendes Dokument darüber fehlt.

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[50] *Diplomatarium Christierni Primi*, Nr. 58.

[51] Reichsarchiv Kopenhagen, Tyske kancelli udenrigske afdeling, E 1, b-415, b-416, beide Urkunden ausgestellt in Nyköping, 27. Juli 1462; abgedruckt in *Diplomatarium Christierni Primi*, Nr. 110; *Dänemark und Pommern*, 57. Zu den Auseinandersetzungen vgl. Olesen, *Unionskrige og Stændersamfund*, 167–169.

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DUŃSCY KRÓLOWIE JAKO PANOWIE LENNI KSIĄŻĄT POMORZA

Słowa kluczowe: duńskie lenno nad Księstwem Rugii do 1438 r.; dokumenty z Królewskiego Archiwum w Kopenhadze, król Waldemar IV Atterdag; królowa Danii I Norwegii Małogrzata I, Król Eryk Pomorski, książęta Pomorza: Barnim III, Barnim IV, Barnim VI, Barnim VIII, Bogusław V, Bogusław VI, Warcisław V, Warcisław VIII, Warcisław IX, Warcisław X.

Abstrakt

Wielka ekspansja średniowiecznego Królestwa Danii w rejonie Bałtyku trwała od połowy XII wieku aż do bitwy pod Bornhöved w 1227 roku. Przed połową XII wieku królestwo ekspandowało też na teren Niemiec północnych, włączając w to Księstwo Pomorskie, którego władcy byli lennikami Danii. Także później jednak część Pomorza – Księstwo Rugii nadal było lennem duńskiego króla. Na podstawie dokumentów przechowywanych w Królewskim Archiwum w Kopenhadze można wskazać, że duńskie zwierzchnictwo lenne nad Księstwem Rugii trwało przynajmniej do 1438 roku.

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POMMERSCHE ASPEKTE IN DER NORDISCHEN UNIONSPOLITIK DES KÖNIGS ERICH VON POMMERN

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF POMERANIA IN THE NORDIC POLICY OF KING ERIK OF POMERANIA

Keywords: Kalmar Union, King Erik of Pomerania, Margaret I, dynasty of the Pomeranian Griffins, Duchy of Schleswig, Principality of Rügen, Pomerania.

Summary

The article deals with the Pomeranian-Scandinavian relations during the reign of Erik of Pomerania, the union King of the North. He was adopted by Queen Margaret I, and crowned in Kalmar 1397 as king of the three Scandinavian realms, thus becoming the founder of a new dynasty, the Pomeranian Griffins. The Pomeranian Dukes supported the union King in his long struggle to secure the Duchy of Schleswig for the Danish Crown. Since Erik was childless in his marriage with the English princess Philippa, he designated his cousin Bogislaw IX as his follower. King Eric tried in different ways to secure his hereditary plan, which failed in the end because of the constitutional struggles during the second half of the 1430s with the Counsellors of the realms. During the crisis the Pomeranian Dukes tried to mediate between the king and the Swedish Counsellors. When Erik of Pomerania tried to recover his political-military position, he was dethroned

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in 1439–1441 in his Scandinavian realms. This meant the end of the dynasty of the Pomeranian Griffins in Scandinavia, and one of the consequences was that Denmark lost control over the island of Rügen.

Der Unionskönig der skandinavischen Königreiche Erich von Pommern (gest. 1459) gehört außer Frage zu den prominentesten der pommerschen Herzöge. Er wurde als Herzogsohn in Hinter-Pommern etwa 1382 geboren, machte eine steile Karriere und wurde König über ganz Nordeuropa inklusive Finnland und Island. Im Sommer 1397 wurde die skandinavische Union zur Realität (elf Jahre nach der Gründung der polnisch-litauischen Union 1386), als der noch junge König Erich von Pommern in der südschwedischen Stadt Kalmar zum gemeinsamen Unionskönig der drei skandinavischen Reiche, Dänemark, Norwegen und Schweden gekrönt wurde. Nach vielen Kriegsjahren und unruhigen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den Königreichen im 14. Jahrhundert leitete die gemeinsame symbolhafte Krönung eine neue Epoche in der Geschichte Skandinaviens ein. König Erich wurde der Begründer einer neuen Herrscherdynastie (die Greifen).[1]

Der junge Unionskönig war der Sohn von Herzog Wartislaw VII. von Pommern-Stolp (gest. 1395) und Maria, einer Tochter Ingeborgs, die wiederum die Tochter des dänischen Königs Waldemar IV. Atterdag war. Etwa 1382 wurde der kleine Wartislaw-Sohn im Schloss Rügenwalde (poln. Darłowo) geboren und gehörte in die Pommern-Stettinische Linie. Die Wolgaster-Linie hatte sich 1377 in vier Fürstentümer aufgeteilt: die Fürstentümer Barth, Wolgast, Stargard und Stolp. Daneben gab es noch das selbständige Pommern-Stettin. Im Inneren Pommerns vollzog sich später, 1425, eine erneute Teilung des Herzogtums Pommern-Wolgast in die einzelnen Herzogtümer Wolgast und Barth-Rügen.[2]

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[1] Z.H. Nowak, *Współpraca polityczna państw unii polsko-litewskiej i unii kalmarskiej w latach 1411–1425* (Toruń: Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, 1996), 89 ff., 93 ff.; A.E. Christensen, *Kalmarunionen og nordisk politik 1319–1439* (København: Gyldendal, 1980), 131–171; *„huru thet war talet j kalmarn". Union und Zusammenarbeit in der Nordischen Geschichte. 600 Jahre Kalmarer Union (1397–1997)*, hrsg. v. D. Kattinger, D. Putensen, H. Wernicke (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac, 1997), passim. Weitere Literatur betreffend die Kalmarer Union in: Poul Enemark, *Fra Kalmarbrev til Stockholms Blodbad. Den nordiske trestatsunions epoke 1397–1521* (Tønder: Gyldendal, 1979) und betreffend die polnisch-litauische Union: Z.H. Nowak, „Zur Polnisch Litauischen Union. Stand und Aufgaben der Forschung", in: *Europa in der Frühen Neuzeit. Festschrift für Günter Mühlpfordt*, Bd. 3, hrsg. v. Erich Donnert (Weimar, Köln, Wien: Böhlau, 1997), 479–487; Z.H. Nowak, „Królowe Małgorzata i Jadwiga – dwie unie północnej i *środkowowschodniej* Europy", *Zapiski Historyczne* 62 (1997): 7–16.

[2] G. Carlsson, „Erik av Pommern", *Svenskt Biografisk Lexikon* 14 (1953): 267; M. Wehrmann, *Geschichte von Pommern*, Bd. 1 (Gotha: perthes, 1904), passim; L. Biewer, *Kleine Geschichte Pommerns* (Meckenheim: Bund der Vertriebenen, Kulturreferat, 1997), 6 ff.

Der Name Erich war nicht der ursprüngliche Name des jungen Königs. Von Hause aus hieß er Bogislaw, genauso wie sein Großvater Bogislaw V. und sein Onkel väterlicherseits Bogislaw VIII. Als seine Großtante Margarethe, Tochter des Königs Waldemar IV. Atterdag von Dänemark, ihn zu sich als Adoptivsohn nahm, gab sie ihm, nach dem schwedischen Schutzpatron, stattdessen den Namen Erich. Dazu trug vermutlich auch der Umstand bei, dass der mit Margarethe um die Herrschaft in Schweden rivalisierende König Albrecht von Mecklenburg seinem Sohn und designierten Nachfolger den Namen Erik gegeben hatte.[3]

Mit dem Beinamen „von Pommern" wurde Erich übrigens erst von seinen späteren Gegnern in Schweden bezeichnet. In der nationalen Geschichtsschreibung des 19. Jahrhunderts galt Erich als ein deutscher König, der angeblich weder Dänemarks noch Norwegens und schon gar nicht Schwedens nationale Interessen vertreten habe, obwohl er Königin Margarethes repressive Politik gegenüber den Hansestädten und den Holsteiner Grafen weiterführte. Seit den Tagen des Skandinavismus im 19. Jahrhundert stellten viele nationale Historiker König Erich, im Kontrast zu dem leuchtenden Herrscherporträt der Königin Margarethe, in dunklen Farben dar. Nichtsdestoweniger revidierte die jetzige Forschung ihre über König Erich und seine Politik gewonnene Auffassung und zeichnet das Bild eines bedeutenden Monarchen, der in einer Reihe von Themen nordische Interessen wahrgenommen und verfolgt hat.[4]

In seiner Regierungszeit hielt König Erich die Beziehungen und Kontakte zu Pommern aufrecht. Seine Vettern reisten mehrere Male nach Skandinavien und gaben dem König in vielen Situationen ihre Unterstützung. Dieses Thema ist bis heute nur wenig erforscht.[5] Vor diesem Hintergrund soll im Folgenden die Bedeutung Pommerns sowie die Politik König Erichs, im Hinblick auf die Zusammenarbeit mit seinen Vettern aus Pommern, den Herzögen Bogislaw IX. von Pommern-Stolp (gest. 1446), Barnim VIII. von Barth (gest. 1457), Wartislaw IX. zu Wolgast (gest. 1457) und den Verbündeten und loyalen Herren Grafen, den

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[3] A. Hofmeister, „Zur Geschichte König Erichs von Pommern und seiner Schwester Katharina", *Pommersche Jahrbücher* 32 (1938), 85 f.

[4] J.E. Olesen, „Erich von Pommerns Alleinherrschaft 1412–1439/40", in: „*huru thet war talet j kalmarn". Union und Zusammenarbeit in der Nordischen Geschichte. 600 Jahre Kalmarer Union (1397–1997)*, hrsg. v. D. Kattinger, D. Putensen, H. Wernicke (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac, 1997), 199 ff.

[5] Siehe J.E. Olesen, *Rigsråd-Kongemagt-Union. Studier over det danske rigsråd og den nordiske kongemagts politik 1434–1449* (Aarhus: Jysk Selskab for Historie, 1980), passim.

Gebrüdern Hans (gest. 1446), Witslaw und Albrecht zu Neugarden und Eberstein (Herrschaft bei Massow), genauer betrachtet werden.

Der Weg eines pommerschen Herzogs zur Krone der skandinavischen Reiche am Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts war vor allem durch das Aussterben der alten nordischen Königsgeschlechter im Laufe des 14. Jahrhunderts gebahnt, und erst diese Tatsache machte diese Thronbesteigung möglich. Eine Zeit lang sah es so aus, als ob diejenige der drei Dynastien, welche am längsten Bestand haben sollte, nämlich die als Erbin der Herrschergeschlechter Norwegens und Dänemarks geltende Dynastie der schwedischen sogenannten Folkunger, den ganzen Norden unter ihre Herrschaft hätte bringen können. Nachdem das norwegische Königsgeschlecht 1319 auf der männlichen Seite erloschen war, erbte den schwedischen Thronfolger der Folkunger Magnus Eriksson Norwegen, und 1376 folgte seinem Großvater väterlicherseits, Waldemar IV. Atterdag, der junge Folkunger Olaf Håkonssøn. Nach dem Tod seines Vaters im Jahre 1380 erbte Olaf darüber hinaus Norwegen. Im Jahre 1387 war Olaf Håkonssøn, zu dieser Zeit bereits König über Dänemark und Norwegen, im Begriff, das seit den 1360er Jahren vom deutschen Fürsten König Albrecht von Mecklenburg regierte Schweden (die Heimat der Folkunger), zu unterwerfen. König Olaf hatte gute Aussichten, dieses Ziel zu erreichen, denn die Hochadligen und auch die Bevölkerung Schwedens zeigten zunehmende Unzufriedenheit mit der Regierungsweise des Mecklenburgers, die das Land mit einer verhassten Wirtschafts- und Lehenspolitik bedrohte.[6] Da starb plötzlich unerwartet König Olaf Håkonssøn, der letzte Folkunger, als 17-Jähriger im Sommer des Jahres 1387. Sein Tod war ein schwerer Schlag für seine Mutter, die mit ihm ihr einziges Kind verlor. Bisher hatte Königin Margarethe mit großer Energie und im Namen ihres jungen Sohnes auf die Einigung des Nordens unter den Folkungern hingearbeitet. Mit Olafs unerwartetem Ableben in Schonen schienen sich ihre Hoffnungen zerschlagen zu haben.[7]

Aber schon eine Woche nach dem Tod des Sohnes trat Königin Margarethe eine Rundreise zu den dänischen Landstingen an, auf denen man ihr im Spätsommer und im Herbst 1387 als Regentin Dänemarks die Ehrerbietung erwies. In Norwegen, das mit Olafs Tod ebenfalls seinen König verloren hatte, bestand seit

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[6] Christensen, *Kalmarunionen og nordisk politik 1319–1439*, 81 ff., 96 ff.; D. Kattinger, „Schweden am Vorabend der Kalmarer Union", in: *„huru thet war talet j kalmarn". Union und Zusammenarbeit in der Nordischen Geschichte. 600 Jahre Kalmarer Union (1397–1997)*, hrsg. v. D. Kattinger, D. Putensen, H. Wernicke (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac, 1997), 49–81.

[7] E. Albrectsen, *Fællesskabet bliver til 1380–1536. Danmark-Norge*, Bd. 1: *1380–1814* (Oslo: Univdersitetsforlaget, 1997), 85.

dem 13. Jahrhundert eine auf strengsten Erbprinzipien beruhende Thronfolgeordnung. Dieser Thronfolgeordnung zufolge hätte die Krone nach dem Erlöschen des Folkunger-Geschlechtes eigentlich dem König von Schweden, Albrecht von Mecklenburg, zufallen müssen. Dieser stammte mütterlicherseits von den Folkungern und von dem alten norwegischen Königshaus ab. Dem ungeachtet ließ sich jedoch Königin Margarethe auch in Norwegen – im Verlauf eines Besuches zu Beginn des Jahres 1388 – als Herrscherin huldigen. Nicht nur in Bezug auf Norwegen, sondern auch hinsichtlich Dänemarks kann dieser Vorgang als revolutionär bezeichnet werden. Damit konnte sich aber Margarethe nicht begnügen, denn sie wollte ja weiterführen, was ihr Sohn Olaf zu Lebzeiten nicht vollenden konnte: die Vereinigung Schwedens mit Dänemark und Norwegen. Schon im Laufe des Jahres 1388 fiel der größte Teil Schwedens offen von König Albrecht ab und erkannte Königin Margarethe als seine rechtmäßige Herrscherin an. Im Februar 1389 wurde König Albrecht und sein Sohn in einer großen Feldschlacht bei Falköping in Westschweden von den Reitertruppen der Königin gefangengenommen, und somit befand sich Schweden in Margarethes Gewalt. Zum ersten Mal waren die drei skandinavischen Reiche in einer Hand reell vereinigt.[8]

Es gab jedoch noch ein Problem: Königin Margarethe war zwar Reichsvorsteherin, aber sie war kinderlos. Sollten die drei skandinavischen Reiche über Margarethes Lebzeiten hinaus Bestand haben, musste sie eine Dynastie erhalten, die den Fortbestand der Verbindung zwischen den Ländern sichern konnte. Königin Margarethe war sich somit darüber im Klaren, dass sie sich einen Adoptivsohn beschaffen musste, der als Gründer eines Königsgeschlechtes die Einheit der Reiche sichern konnte. Vor diesem Hintergrund richtete sie ihren Blick auf das Haus Pommern. Sie besaß eine Nichte, welche mit dem früher erwähnten Herzog Wartislaw VII. vom Pommern-Stolp vermählt war. Von den Kindern dieses pommerschen Herzogspaares sind drei bekannt: zwei Söhne und eine Tochter. Der jüngere Sohn starb früh, und nur der ältere Sohn, Bogislaw, und die Tochter Katharina sollten ein höheres Lebensalter erreichen.[9]

Der junge Bogislaw, der den Namen Erich übernahm, wurde von Königin Margarethe auserkoren, um König über das vereinte Norden zu werden. Die

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[8] K. Erslev, *Dronning Margrethe og Kalmarunionens Grundlæggelse* (København: Jacob Erslevs Forlag, 1882; Neudruck 1971), 150 ff.; H. Koht, *Dronning Margareta og Kalmar-unionen* (Oslo: Aschoheug, 1956), 56 ff., 65 ff.

[9] Erslev, *Dronning Margrethe og Kalmarunionens Grundlæggelse*, 195 ff.; Hofmeister, „Zur Geschichte König Erichs von Pommern“, 91.

Vorbereitungen für seine Erhebung waren möglicherweise schon eingeleitet und standen in engem Zusammenhang mit dem norwegischen Reichsrat. Dieser hatte, wie erwähnt, Margarethe nach dem Tod ihres Sohnes zur Regentin des norwegischen Reiches gewählt, aber gleichzeitig wurde klar, dass man mit diesem Schritt keineswegs Norwegens Status als Erbreich aufgegeben hatte. Bei dieser Gelegenheit wollte man über die Nachfolge entscheiden. Mit der Wahl Margarethes zur bevollmächtigten Frau und Regentin Norwegens wurde eine neue Grundlage für das Erbrecht geschaffen. Es lag jetzt an ihr, einen Nachfolger zu bestimmen. Das konnte zwar ihr Neffe, der Sohn ihrer Schwester, also der junge Herzog Albrecht von Mecklenburg sein, doch die Erklärung des Reichsrates erkannte dem Mecklenburger dieses Recht ab, da seine gesamte Familie als Feind des norwegischen Reiches galt.

Daraufhin erklärte der Reichsrat, dass Königin Margarethes Großneffe der nächste Erbe sei, „der Älteste der Söhne von Herzog Wartislaw von Pommern". Er sollte ihr auf den Thron folgen, und mit ihm sollte auch die Erbfolge beginnen. Man proklamierte ihn zum rechtmäßigen Erben des norwegischen Thrones. Die Bestimmungen des Reichsrates lauteten ferner, dass falls Margarethe den jungen Fürsten schon zu ihren Lebzeiten als König einsetzen wolle, der Reichsrat dies akzeptieren würde. Sollte außerdem der Sohn des Herzogs Wartislaw, dessen Name allerdings nicht genannt wird, ohne Erben sterben, fiele der norwegische Thron seinem nächsten männlichen Erben aus dem pommerschen Fürstenhaus zu. Dies alles wurde am 16. Februar 1388 verkündet.[10]

Spätestens Anfang des Jahres 1389 brachte Herzog Wartislaw den jungen Erich und dessen Schwester Katharina nach Dänemark und legte ihre Erziehung in die Hände von Königin Margarethe. Nachdem ihre Truppen die Schlacht gegen Albrecht von Mecklenburg siegreich beendet hatten, konnte die Königin daran denken, ihren Adoptivsohn Erich dem norwegischen Reichsrat vorzustellen. Der junge Erich traf im Sommer 1389 in Helsingborg mit den norwegischen Bischöfen und Reichsräten zusammen, und noch im Laufe desselben Jahres stellte ihm der Reichsrat einen Huldigungsbrief aus. Wie es in diesem Brief hieß, sei Erich norwegischen Rechts zufolge legitimer Thronerbe des Reiches und man wollte ihn und seinen rechtmäßigen Nachfolger als König akzeptieren. Die Krone solle künftig auf Erichs männliche Erbfolger innerhalb des pommerschen

[10] *Diplomatarium Norvegicum III, utgit av Ch. Ch. A. Lange, C. R. Unger*. Kristiania 1853–1855, Nr. 477 (im Folgenden DN III); G. Carlsson, „Erik Pomrarens väg till kungavärdighet i Norden", *Historisk Tidskrift* (Stockholm) 77 (1957): 42 ff.

Herzogshauses übergehen. Mit dem Erreichen der Mündigkeit sollte Erich selbst die Herrschaft antreten. Nach dieser Erklärung gab Margarethe ihre auf Lebenszeit bemessene Regentschaft auf, um weiterhin wie in Dänemark und Schweden nur noch vorläufige Reichsvorsteherin zu sein.[11]

Noch innerhalb des gleichen Jahres geleitete man den jungen Pommer nach Norwegen und huldigte ihn in Trondheim und auf dem Øreting. Wie es aussieht, fand außerdem eine separate norwegische Krönung statt. Die norwegische Forscherin Eldbjørg Haug hat mit guten Gründen dies belegen können. Und tatsächlich hat es den Anschein, als hätte man Erich von Pommern noch im gleichen Jahr in Schweden die Huldigung erwiesen. In Dänemark stand Erich als Margarethes Nachfolger fest. Seine förmliche Thronbesteigung zog sich aber in diesen beiden Reichen bis zum Jahre 1396 hin. Erst danach konnte er den vollständigen Titel als König über Skandinavien führen: König von Dänemark, Schweden und Norwegen.[12]

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Am 17. Juni 1397 erfolgte auf der Unionsversammlung zu Kalmar die Wahl und Krönung Erichs zum gemeinsamen König der drei Reiche. Diese Kalmarer Versammlung stärkte die Position der nordischen Königsmacht und verschob zu ihren Gunsten die Machtbalance zwischen ihr und dem Adel.[13] Die beiden noch erhaltenen Unionsurkunden brachte man in das dänische Schloss Kalundborg und gliederte sie dort in das Königliche Archiv ein. Der Bischof von Roskilde, Jens Andersen (Lodehat) fertigte als ranghöchster Kanzler im September 1425 eine Kopie der Unionsurkunde auf Papier an, aber jetzt in Form eines eingehenden, technisch sorgfältig ausgearbeiteten und zuverlässigen „Vidisse“ (i.e. beglaubigte Kopie) auf Pergament. Unter den Mitbesieglern befand sich der zum Kreis Erichs in Pommern gehörende Graf Witslaw von Eberstein und Neugarden und andere treue Mitarbeiter und Diener des Königs.[14] Allem Anschein nach war die

[11] DN III, Nr. 477; Christensen, *Kalmarunionen og nordisk politik 1319–1439*, 122 ff.

[12] Vgl. Eldbjørg Haug, „Erik av Pommerns norske kroning“, *Historisk Tidsskrift* (Oslo) 74 (1995): 1–21 und die sich daran anschließende Diskussion mit Knut Dørum und Erik Opsahl im gleichen Jahrgang; G. Carlsson, „Förhistorien till 1396 års svenska konungaval“, in: *Historiska studier tillägnade Ludvig Stavenow* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1924), 47 ff.

[13] Nowak, *Współpraca polityczna*, 89 ff., 93 ff.; Christensen, *Kalmarunionen og nordisk politik 1319–1439*, 131 ff., 301 ff.

[14] G. Carlsson, *Medeltidens nordiska unionstanke* (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1945), 75; Christensen, *Kalmarunionen og nordisk politik 1319–1439*, 163 f.; Olesen, „Erich von Pommerns

Kopie des alten Unionsbriefes für den internen Gebrauch bestimmt und sollte den Anspruch Erichs von Pommern auf Kriegsleistungen für den Kampf um das Herzogtum Schleswig rechtfertigen. Doch es ist fraglich, ob die Kopie von 1425 je genutzt wurde. Die Aussagen des Krönungsbriefes über die gemeinschaftliche Krönung und die volle und uneingeschränkte Kompetenz hinsichtlich der Schlossglauben (Verpflichtungsurkunden) gaben König Erich und seiner Ziehmutter Königin Margarethe die Möglichkeit, ein umfassendes königliches Einheitsregime zu errichten und mehr Kooperation zwischen den Reichen zu fordern, als die Bestimmungen des Unionsbriefes dies zuließen.[15]

Königin Margarethe übte bis zu ihrem Tod im Jahr 1412 den Haupteinfluss auf das Unionsregime aus. Sie bemühte sich, gegen die Bestimmungen des Unionsbriefes die Union als eine Einheit zu regieren. Im November 1402 schlossen die Königin und Erich von Pommern in Helsingborg ein Bündnis mit Herzog Barnim VI. und dessen Bruder Wartislaw VIII von Barth-Rügen. Die beiden Herzöge beurkundeten ihre Huldigung und den Treueid gegenüber König Erich und gaben das Versprechen, keinen Krieg ohne königliche Zustimmung zu beginnen. Beide Herzöge und vor allem Herzog Wartislaw hatten lehnsrechtliche Beziehungen zum Königreich Dänemarks.[16] Im Streit mit den holsteinischen Grafen, der darauf ausgerichtet war, Flensburg für Dänemark zu gewinnen, bekamen Margarethe und Erich Ende des Jahres 1411 übrigens auch Unterstützung seitens der pommerschen Herzöge Otto II. und Kasimir V. von Pommern-Stettin sowie Wartislaw IX. von Barth-Rügen. Letzterer versprach der Königin Margarethe 100 bewaffnete Männer, bekam aber als Gegenleistung 4000 sundische Mark. Die Königin Margarethe und König Erich bemühten sich demnach deutlich, die pommerschen Herzöge für sich zu gewinnen. Auch die Herzöge Ulrich und Johann von Mecklenburg verpflichteten sich 1411, gegen Bezahlung König Erich und Königin Margarethe mit bewaffneten Männern zu unterstützen. Im Laufe der Auseinandersetzungen um das Herzogtum Schleswig beurkundeten die beiden Herzöge Johann von Mecklenburg und Wartislaw IX. von Barth-Rügen am 4. Dezember 1420 die Aufrechterhaltung eines eingegangenen Waffenstillstands mit den holsteinischen Grafen. Erich von Pommern ernannte 1412 die Herzöge

Alleinherrschaft 1412–1439/40“, 54 f.

[15] Christensen, *Kalmarunionen og nordisk politik 1319–1439*, 172 ff.; Olesen, „Erich von Pommerns Alleinherrschaft 1412–1439/40“, 204 ff.

[16] *Sverges traktater med främmande magter, utg. af O. S. Rydberg, D. II–III*, Stockholm 1883–1895, hier D. II, Nr. 431. Im Folgenden ST.

Johann von Mecklenburg und Wartislaw VIII. samt Graf Albrecht von Neugarden zu seinen Schiedsrichtern.[17]

Königin Margarethes monarchische Bestrebungen waren auf eine Konsolidierung des neuen Unionsregimes und eine Verstärkung der zentralen königlichen Machtausübung gerichtet. Erich von Pommern lernte von seiner Ziehmutter und er übernahm ihre königliche Herrschaftsauffassung. Im Ganzen fuhr er fort, Margarethes politisches Programm eines Unionskönigtums von Gottes Gnaden zu verwirklichen. König Erich zentralisierte die Macht in den drei Reichen, konsolidierte die neue Unionsdynastie und hob sie auf ein höheres Niveau. Schon die Krönung des jungen Erichs 1397, im Beisein von Vertretern aller drei Reiche, bedeutete eine Machtverschiebung von den einzelnen Reichen weg – hin zum Unionskönigtum.[18]

Das Erbkönigtum wurde von Erich von Pommern schrittweise eingeführt und war in vielerlei Hinsicht eine Fortführung norwegischer Traditionen. Durch die von 1403–1405 erfolgte Aufnahme Katharinas, der Schwester des Königs Erich, in eine Reihe von Schlossglauben, nahm sie schon vor 1406 eine Rolle in der königlichen Erbfolgepolitik ein. Die adligen Hauptleute verpflichteten sich, die Schlösser und Befestigungen zur Hand Erichs von Pommern und Margarethes zu halten, und falls beide sterben sollten, diese an die Jungfrau Katharina oder an denjenigen, der in den drei Reichen zum König gewählt wird, zu übergeben. Die erhalten gebliebenen Lehensbriefe bestätigen, dass sich das Königtum berechtigt wähnte, die uneingeschränkte Vollmacht über die Schlossglauben zur Sicherung des Nachfolgers im Amt des Unionskönigs zu nutzen.[19]

Schon im Jahr 1400 hatte Königin Margarethe in Paris um eine französische Prinzessin für ihren Großneffen und Erben angefragt. Diese Bemühungen blieben erfolglos, aber bereits 1401 begannen Verhandlungen über die Heirat Erichs von Pommern mit Philippa, der Tochter des Königs Heinrich IV. von England; die Heirat erfolgte 1406. Die Ehe war aber kinderlos und so kam es, dass nach dem Tod der Königin Margarethe im Oktober 1412 in der Nähe von Flensburg die

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[17] ST III, Nr. 443a–b, 444–446, 451a und S. 50–51. Zum Krieg um Schleswig vgl.: Kristian Erslev, *Erik af Pommern, hans Kamp for Sønderjylland og Kalmarunionens Opløsning* (København: Jacob Erslevs Forlag, 1901, Neudruck 1971), passim.

[18] Christensen, *Kalmarunionen og nordisk politik 1319–1439*, 172 ff.; Th. Behrmann, „Vor Stralsund (1370) und Wordingborg (1435). Gesandtschaftsverkehr und Königsverhalten im Verlauf zweier dänisch-hansestädtischer Konflikte“, in: *Der Stralsunder Frieden von 1370. Prosopographische Studien*, hrsg. v. N. Jörn, R.-G. Werlich, H. Wernicke (Köln, Weimar, Wien: Verlag Dr. Kovac, 1998), 298 ff.

[19] Christensen, *Kalmarunionen og nordisk politik 1319–1439*, 181 ff.

Nachfolgefrage und die Zukunft der Unionsmonarchie über König Erichs Lebenszeit hinaus ungeklärt blieb.[20] Einige Jahre später entfaltete Erich von Pommern starke Bestrebungen, die Königsmacht in der Union für einen designierten Nachfolger seiner Wahl zu sichern, sollte er keine legitimen Kinder hinterlassen. Dabei folgte er den Regeln der norwegischen Thronfolgeordnung von 1388–89, die denselben, auch für das pommersche Herzogshaus geltenden, rein agnatischen Erbgang vorsah. König Erich bestimmte am Anfang seinen Vetter, den noch unmündigen Herzog Bogislaw IX. von Pommern-Stolp, zu seinem designierten Nachfolger. Er setzte ihn außerdem als subsidiären Inhaber der Schlossglauben und in Stadtprivilegien ein und sicherte damit, dass die Treue und Dienstpflicht der Untertanen, sollte er selber kinderlos sterben, auch Bogislaw gegenüber Gültigkeit hätten.[21]

Herzog Bogislaw IX. war der Sohn des Herzogs Bogislaw VIII. von Pommern-Stolp und Sophia von Holstein und er wurde vermutlich zwischen 1407–1410 geboren. Er beerbte 1418 seinen Vater in der Herzogswürde und heiratete 1432 in Posen Maria von Masowien, eine Nichte des Königs Wladislaw II. Jagiello von Polen, nachdem die ursprünglichen Heiratspläne bezüglich dessen Tochter Hedwig Anfang der 1420er Jahre gescheitert waren. Aus dieser Ehe gingen zwei Töchter hervor, von denen eine, Sophia, als Erbin durch die Heirat mit Herzog Erich II. von Pommern-Wolgast 1451 die hinterpommersche Linie des Herzoghauses wieder mit der Linie von Wolgast verband. Herzog Bogislaw IX. starb am 7. Dezember 1446 und wurde im Kloster Mariencron bei Rügenwalde beigesetzt.[22] Seine Designation in Skandinavien geht aus allgemeinen Lehnsbriefen, königlichen Adels- und Wappenbriefen bei Erhebungen in den Adelsstand sowie aus Stadtprivilegien hervor. Die ältesten Beispiele lassen sich in Adelsbriefen für Schweden von 1416 und für einen Dänen aus dem darauf folgendem Jahr finden. Spätestens im Jahr 1420 wurde Herzog Bogislaws Name in die Schlossglauben der Hauptlehen eingefügt, eine Praxis, die Erich von Pommern auch auf allgemeine Gutslehen ausdehnte.[23]

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[20] A. Hofmeister, „Die Werbung in Frankreich für König Erich im Jahre 1400“, *Pommersche Jahrbücher* 32 (1938): 119–122; Hofmeister, „Zur Geschichte König Erichs von Pommern“, 87 f.

[21] Christensen, *Kalmarunionen og nordisk politik 1319–1439*, 184 ff.; Carlsson, *Medeltidens nordiska unionstanke*, 93 f.

[22] R.-G. Werlich, „Bogislav IX. von Pommern-Stolp – ein Pommer in den dynastischen Plänen der nordischen Reiche in der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts“, in: *Pommern. Geschichte – Kultur – Wissenschaft. 2. Kolloquium zur Pommerschen Geschichte 13. und 14. September 1991* (Greifswald: Steinbecker Verlag Rose, 1991), 37–58.

[23] Olesen, „Erich von Pommerns Alleinherrschaft 1412–1439/40“, 207.

Erich von Pommern versuchte als Unionkönig außerdem, die Städte an seinen pommerschen Erbfolgeplan zu binden. Sein besonderes Augenmerk lag auf der bedeutsamen Stadt Malmö gegenüber Kopenhagen im Öresund. Im Jahre 1429 gestattete König Erich den Bürgermeistern der Stadt das Tragen von Gold und goldenen Kleidern. Als Gegenleistung erwartete der Monarch ewige Treue und Dienste sowohl sich selbst gegenüber als auch gegenüber Königin Philippa und Herzog Bogislaw, „wenn Gott bestimmt haben sollte, dass wir kein eheliches Kind oder Kinder hinterlassen", sowie auch für die nachfolgenden Könige. Von Gotland aus erteilte König Erich 1437, gemeinschaftlich mit Herzog Bogislaw, der Stadt Malmö das Recht, einen gekrönten Greif, das pommersche Herzogswappen, im Siegel und im Schild der Stadt zu führen.[24]

Es ist deutlich zu erkennen, dass die Designation des Herzogs Bogislaw durch Erich von Pommern der Bestandteil eines festen Erbfolgeplans war. Besonders aufschlussreich sind in diesem Zusammenhang zwei, aus dem Monat Juli des Jahres 1420 stammende Urkunden hinsichtlich des Leibgedinges der Königin Philippa. Diese bestätigen die pommersche Erbfolge als eine feste Position und Ordnung. Der Nachfolgeplan knüpfte an die aus dem Jahre 1389 stammende norwegische Erbfolgeordnung und die Bestimmungen des Krönungsbriefs von 1397 über die Designation eines künftigen Königs per Schlossglauben an. Dies bedeutete, dass die im Unionsbrief formulierten Bestimmungen übergangen wurden. Es kann vermutet werden, dass sich gegen König Erichs Dynastie-Pläne sowie seine Schlossglauben-Politik, aber auch gegen sein Einheitsregime und sein persönliches Regime eine gewisse Opposition erhob, doch die königliche Macht verhinderte allem Anschein nach eine Entfaltung des sich ankündigenden Widerstands.[25]

Es scheint, dass die pommersche Sukzession im Falle des kinderlosen Todes Erichs in den 1420er Jahren als eine verbindliche Regelung zu betrachten war, weil sie von der Mehrheit des Hochadels und der Reichsräte der drei Reiche akzeptiert wurde. Trotzdem sah Erich von Pommern es als ratsam an, weitere Garantien für die Erhaltung der pommerschen Thronfolge im Falle seines Todes zu schaffen. Bevor er sich 1423 auf seine große Auslandsreise nach dem Heiligen Land begab und sich neuen Gefahren aussetzte, hatte er die Wendischen Hansestädte veranlasst, einen bereits im Januar mit ihm geschlossenen Bündnisvertrag durch einen

[24] *Danmarks Gamle Købstadslovgivning IV*, hrsg. v. E. Kroman (København: Rosenkilde og Bagger, 1961), 57 ff., 63 ff.

[25] Olesen, „Erich von Pommerns Alleinherrschaft 1412–1439/40", 207 f.

zweiten Vertragstext vom Juni 1423 dahingehend zu ergänzen, in dem verankert war, dass sich diese zum Schutz der Königin und gegebenenfalls eines jeden anderen – im Besitz ihres Wittums – verpflichteten. War die erste Vertragsurkunde von nordischer Seite lediglich durch König Erich besiegelt, treten in der zweiten Vertragsurkunde interessanterweise Reichsräte aus allen drei nordischen Reichen als Mitbesiegler der Urkunde auf, woraus wiederum zu entnehmen ist, dass sie die Regelung von 1420 kannten und akzeptierten.[26]

Neben dem hansisch-nordischen Vertrag ging ein weiteres Abkommen des Jahres 1423 offensichtlich von einer pommerschen Sukzession auf die nordischen Throne als das zunächst gegebene aus. Der Bündnisvertrag vom 15. September zwischen König Erich und fünf pommerschen Herzögen (Otto, Kazimir, Wartislaw IX., Barnim VIII., Bogislaw IX.) auf der einen und dem Deutschen Orden auf der anderen Seite erwähnt dies zwar nicht ausdrücklich, es wurden jedoch Regelungen für den Fall getroffen, dass König Erich stürbe und keiner der Stettiner Herren ihm auf den Thron folgen würde. Diese Absicherung dürfte vermutlich auf Betreiben des Ordens zustande gekommen sein.[27]

Dass in diesen Jahren die Sukzession Bogislaws als relativ sicher angenommen wurde, zeigen wiederum die Verhandlungen des Unionskönigs bezüglich einer Heirat für Bogislaw IX., die dessen geplante Thronfolge im Norden einbezogen haben und belegen, welch bedeutende Rolle Herzog Bogislaw auch in den außenpolitischen Plänen König Erichs spielte. Als Partnerin für Bogislaw fasste er ins Auge keine Geringere als Hedwig von Polen, die Tochter des Königs Wladislaw II. Jagiello von Polen. Beim Zustandekommen dieser Heirat hätte sich für Bogislaw die Aussicht auf eine Ostseeherrschaft eröffnet – von einem bisher nicht gekannten Umfang.[28]

Spätestens in der ersten Hälfte des Jahres 1420 wurden erste Verhandlungen zwischen Gesandten des nordischen und des polnischen Königs geführt, wohl im Zusammenhang mit dem Bündnis, das 1419 – also in jenem Jahr, in dem auch die pommersche Sukzessions-Ordnung im Norden überaus deutlich

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[26] ST III, Nr. 455; Werlich, „Bogislav IX. von Pommern-Stolp“, 44.

[27] ST III, Nr. 456; Erslev, *Erik af Pommern*, 95–96, 202. Betreffend den 1423-Traktat mit dem Deutschen Orden siehe die umfangreichen Forschungen von R. Simiński, „Traktat przymierza króla Eryka Pomorskiego i książąt Pomorza Zachodniego z zakonem krzyżackim w Prusach i Inflantach z 15 września 1423 roku“, in: Średniowiecze *Polskie i Powszechne*, hrsg. v. B. Czwojdrak, J. Sperka, Bd. 7 (11) (Katowice: Uniwersytet Śląski, 2015), 69–94.

[28] Werlich, „Bogislav IX. von Pommern-Stolp“, 44 f.; Nowak, *Współpraca polityczna państw unii polsko-litewskiej*, 154 f.

hervortritt – zwischen den nordischen Reichen und Polen gegenüber dem Deutschen Orden geschlossen wurde. Trotz eines guten Vorankommens scheiterten die Verhandlungen in den folgenden Jahren. 1424 übte der deutsch-römische König Sigismund, der Vetter Erichs von Pommern, auf diesen und die pommerschen Herzöge Druck aus, sich gegen diese Heiratspläne zu stellen, und nachdem es 1425 in Polen zu einer politischen Kursänderung kam, scheiterte das Zustandekommen dieser Ehe.[29]

König Erich vergaß seine pommersche Heimat nicht. Als er 1423 auf seiner Reise nach Jerusalem und dem Heiligen Land durch seine Heimat reiste, zog er, wie erwähnt, die heimischen pommerschen Herzogtümer der Wolgaster und Stettiner Linie durch ein Bündnis enger an sich, ein wichtiger Schritt zu der von ihm angestrebten Herrschaft über den Ostseeraum. Im sogenannten Kamminer Bistumsstreit trat er als Vermittler auf. Seit 1387 beanspruchten die Herzöge von Pommern die Verwaltung des bischöflichen Territoriums um Kolberg und Köslin. Der Streit beschäftigte auch die Konzilien zu Konstanz und Basel (1414–1449). Der Bischof von Kammin wurde 1417 in Konstanz mit seinem Bistum belehnt und dieses erhielt 1422 die Reichsstandschaft, dass als Reichsterritorium geführt wurde. Durch die Vermittlung König Erichs wurde 1436 festgelegt, dass jede Bischofs- und Domherrenwahl von Kammin der Bestätigung durch die pommerschen Herzöge bedurfte und ihnen die 1356 gegründete Schutzherrschaft zustand.[30]

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Durch den langandauernden und erfolglosen Krieg um das Herzogtum Schleswig, an dem u. a. Herzog Barnim von Barth wegen des Lehnsverhältnisses von Rügen zu Dänemark aktiv teilnahm und dabei seine Gesundheit einbüßte,[31] wuchs in den Reichen allmählich die Unzufriedenheit mit dem königlichen Regime. Im Jahre 1434 brach in der schwedischen Landschaft Dalarna nordöstlich von Stockholm

[29] Z.H. Nowak, „Dokument strony polsko-litewskiej traktatu przymierza z państwami unii kalmarskiej z 1419 roku“, *Zapiski Historyczne* 36 (1971): 423–431; Nowak, *Współpraca polityczna państw unii polsko-litewskiej*, 54 ff., 154 f.; Z.H. Nowak, „Die politische Zusammenarbeit zweier Unionen: der Nordischen und der Polnisch-Litauischen in der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts“, *Studia Maritima* III (1981): 37–48; Th. Riis, „Der polnisch-litauische Vertrag 1419 und die Vormachtstellung im Ostseegebiet“, in: *Studien zur Geschichte des Ostseeraumes*, Bd. 1, hrsg. v. Th. Riis (Odense: Universitets Forlag, 1995), 67–78.

[30] ST III, Nr. 456; Biewer, *Kleine Geschichte Pommerns*, 8–9.

[31] *Aktstykker vedrørende Erik af Pommerns Afsættelse som Konge af Danmark*, hrsg. v. A. Hude (København: G. E. C. Gad, 1897), 28.

ein Bauernaufruhr unter Leitung von Engelbrecht Engelbrechtsson aus. Dieser richtete sich zunächst gegen die Willkür und die Steuerforderungen der königlichen Vögte. Der schwedische Adel sah schnell ein, wie sich der Aufstand zur Durchsetzung der eigenen spezifischen wirtschaftlichen Interessen gegenüber der Königsmacht nutzen ließ. Erich von Pommern hätte das schwedische Reich, welches ihm auf Vertrauen anbefohlen und von dessen Regenten er gewählt worden wäre, welches er jedoch nicht durch Erbrecht oder ein anderes Recht erhalten hätte, zu ewiger Knechtschaft bestimmt, indem er es durch die Schlossglauben an Herzog Bogislaw oder an andere, die das Wappen der Greifen führten, hatte besiegeln und verbriefen lassen und auf diese Weise dem freien Reich sein freies Königswahlrecht genommen hätte. Statt auf den Krönungsbrief von 1397, berief man sich wieder auf das traditionelle freie Königswahlrecht für Schweden.[32]

Auf einer Versammlung in Uppsala im Juni 1435 forderte der schwedische Reichsrat, dass König Erich „die ausländischen Herren" aus dem Schlossglauben entfernen und diese dem Reich freistellen solle. Im Oktober 1435 verhandelte Erich von Pommern erneut mit den Schweden in Stockholm, doch diesmal sah er sich im Vertragstext des geschlossenen Vergleiches zu der Feststellung gezwungen, dass es zwischen ihm und den Schweden u. a. so verabredet sei, dass er denjenigen in die Schlossglauben aufnimmt, den die Reichsräte nach seinem Tode wählen würden. Ausgenommen wurde lediglich der Fall, dass Erich eigene Kinder hinterlassen sollte. Dies war ein erheblicher Schlag gegen die pommersche Sukzession und hob diese mindestens auf dem Papier oder besser auf dem Pergament für Schweden ganz auf. König Erich dachte jedoch keineswegs daran, sich an diese Bestimmung zu halten. Die Urkunden von Stockholm (von 1434 und 1435), welche die Vereinbarung zwischen dem König und den Schweden beinhalteten, wurden u. a. von den Grafen Hans und Witzlaw von Eberstein und Neugarden als Garanten mitbesiegelt.[33]

Im Januar 1436 wurde Erich von Pommern u. a. der Vorwurf gemacht, seinen Verpflichtungen auch in diesem Punkt nicht nachgekommen zu sein. Vielmehr hielt sich im Frühjahr 1436 das Gerücht, König Erich wolle Stockholm an Herzog Bogislaw übergeben. Im Sommer kam es wiederum zu zähen Verhandlungen zwischen dem König und den Schweden, diesmal in Kalmar. Als jetzt auch

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[32] L.-O. Larsson, *Engelbrekt Engelbrektsson och 1430-talets svenska uppror* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1984), passim; L.-O. Larsson, *Kalmarunionens tid. Från drottning Margareta till Kristian II* (Falun: Prisma Bokförlag, 1997), 190 ff.

[33] Olesen, *Rigsråd-Kongemagt-Union*, 26 ff.

Mitglieder des dänischen Reichsrates die Fronten wechselten und genau wie die schwedischen Standesgenossen ihren Vorteil in einem konstitutionell bestimmten Regierungssystem sahen, stand Erich von Pommern ohne Rückhalt da. Von allen Seiten dazu gedrängt, sah sich der König dazu gezwungen, einer Regierungsform für Schweden seine Zustimmung zu geben, die dem schwedischen Reichsrat weitgehende Befugnisse einräumte. Bezüglich der Schlossglauben wurde sinngemäß die Regelung vom Oktober 1435 wiederholt.[34]

Wie bereits 1435 ließ jedoch auch diesmal die Ausführung durch Erich auf sich warten, wie er sich auch später weigerte, den Kalmarer Vergleich von 1436, zu dem er unter härtestem Druck genötigt worden war, in der Realität zu akzeptieren. Aus einem Hansebericht geht hervor, dass sich Herzog Barnim VIII. von Barth (mit 129 Mann) und andere pommersche Herzöge in Kalmar aufhielten. Diese waren im Vorfeld in Kopenhagen aktiv, indem sie König Erich zu einer Aussöhnung mit den Schweden geraten haben. Gleiches geschah in Kalmar, wo König Erich auf diese Weise die Unterstützung seiner Vettern und die des dänischen Reichsrates verloren hat. In Schweden wurde der Reichsratskonstitutionalismus bestätigt.[35] Nachdem die Kalmarer Zusammenkunft zum Nachteil Erichs ausgefallen war, reiste der König nach Gotland und rüstete militärisch auf, offensichtlich um die Schweden und die Dänen mit Waffengewalt zur Ordnung zu rufen. Denn den Plan einer pommerschen Sukzession hatte König Erich keineswegs aufgegeben.[36]

Verstärkt durch pommersche Kontingente, lag Erich im Frühling 1437, nach einem Besuch auf der Marienburg, bei dem auch vier pommersche Herzöge zugegen waren, in September-Oktober 1437 mit einer Flotte vor Hiddensee. Herzog Barnim VIII. von Barth und Herzog Wartislaw IX. von Pommern-Wolgast waren schon um den 22. Juli herum mit etwa 2000 Mann auf Gotland angekommen, um den König militärisch zu stärken. Ein Verhandlungsangebot, unterbreitet durch dänische Reichsräte, welche Erich von Pommern aufsuchten, um diesem ihre Treue zu versichern, konnte ihn dazu bewegen, mit seinen pommerschen Verwandten und einigen wenigen Gefolgsleuten nach Dänemark zu reisen.[37]

An seinem Vorhaben, Herzog Bogislaw die Nachfolge zu sichern, arbeitete König Erich zielstrebig weiter, obgleich dieses Unterfangen ihn zunehmend mit

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[34] Ibidem, 38 ff., 48 ff.

[35] HR II:1, Nr. 603 §2, 609; Olesen, *Rigsråd-Kongemagt-Union*, 48 ff.

[36] Ibidem, 65 ff.

[37] Ibidem, 68–70.

dem dänischen Reichsrat in Konflikt brachte. Zunächst übertrug er in Dänemark vier süddänische Burgen Aalholm und Ravnsborg (auf Lolland-Falster), Tranekær (auf Langeland) und Stegehus (auf Møn) auf seine Vettern, die Herzöge Barnim von Barth, Wartislaw von Wolgast, Graf Hans von Eberstein und Graf Witzlaw von Eberstein, um – wie es in einem späteren Schreiben des dänischen Reichsrats heißt – Herzog Bogislaw entgegen den Wünschen des Reichsrats in das Reich und auf den dänischen Thron zu drängen.[38]

Diese Handlungsweise und die Maßnahmen verschärften die Spannungen zwischen dem König und dem Reichsrat, zum endgültigen Bruch führten sie jedoch nicht. Besonders die Herzöge Barnim VIII. und Wartislaw IX. waren beim Zustandekommen eines Vergleichs behilflich, als sie sich zur freiwilligen Abgabe ihrer Schlösser bereit erklärten. Auf einem Treffen des dänischen Reichsrates mit dem König in Wordingborg zu Ostern 1438 erlangten die Verhandlungen über Herzog Bogislaws Nachfolge in Dänemark ihren Höhepunkt. Bei den Verhandlungen wurde klar, dass auch der dänische Reichsrat als Garant des Kalmarer Vergleichs von 1436 nicht mehr bereit war, Herzog Bogislaw als Nachfolger König Erichs zu akzeptieren und ihn im dänischen Schlossglauben zu belassen. Dies, so drückte der Reichsrat aus, widerspreche den Reichsgesetzen und Freiheiten und schade dem Reich.[39]

König Erichs an den Reichsrat gerichtetes Ansinnen, Bogislaw als König anzunehmen, so wie dies bisher im Hinblick auf die Schlossglauben geschehen war, wurde rundweg abgelehnt. Die von König Erich angebotene Alternative, sich aus Altersgründen zurückzuziehen und Herzog Bogislaw als Reichsvorsteher akzeptieren zu lassen, der das Recht hätte, Länder und Schlösser zu verwalten sowie königliche Beamte ein- und abzusetzen, wurde ebenso verworfen. Der dänische Reichsrat erklärte sich lediglich dazu bereit, Bogislaw an der Seite König Erichs nicht als Reichsvorsteher, sondern als einen guten treuen Freund zu betrachten und ihm die Schlösser Ravnsborg und Tranekær zum Unterhalt zu überlassen. Außerdem sollten ihm alle Schlösser und Städte in Dänemark offen stehen.

Als Gegenleistung sollte König Erich innerhalb einer bestimmten Frist die Schlösser Aalholm und Ravnsborg von den beiden Herzögen Barnim und Wartislaw zurückfordern und diese wieder an Dänemark bringen. Erich von Pommern dachte aber keineswegs ernsthaft daran, sich diesen Bedingungen in der Realität

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[38] *Aktstykker*, 4.

[39] Olesen, *Rigsråd-Kongemagt-Union*, 76 f.

zu beugen. Vielmehr schuf er Tatsachen, indem er Herzog Bogislaw nun die ganze Insel Fünen mit den drei Burgen Nyborg, Hindsgavl und Hagenskov übergab. Auch die Herzöge Barnim und Wartislaw blieben auf den ihnen zugewiesenen lolländischen Burgen. Schließlich vollendete sich der endgültige Bruch zwischen dem dänischen Reichsrat und König Erich.[40]

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König Erich von Pommern verließ kurz vor Mittsommer 1438 unter Mitnahme einiger Kleinodien und Kostbarkeiten für immer Dänemark in Richtung Gotland, aber nicht ohne zuvor dem Schlosshauptmann von Kalundborg, Jens Torbernssøn (Sparre), das Versprechen abgenommen zu haben, das Schloss keinem anderen zu übergeben als dem, „der den Greif führt", bzw. einem anderen von des Königs eigenen Blutsverwandten. König Erich von Pommern hoffte offenbar, damit für Herzog Bogislaw als Reichsvorsteher in Dänemark erst einmal hinreichenden Rückhalt geschaffen zu haben.

König Erichs Reise nach Gotland war übrigens ein taktisches Manöver, denn mit der Kontrolle über die Insel nahm der König weiterhin eine zentrale und bedeutsame politische Stellung im Streit zwischen Dänemark und Schweden um die Zugehörigkeit Gotlands ein. Auch steigerte Erich von Pommern 1438 politisch-staatsrechtlichen Druck auf Dänemark, denn das Fürstentum Rügen wurde von der dänischen Lehnshoheit entlassen. Dies bedeutete eine ernsthafte Drohung von Seiten Erichs gegenüber Dänemark, denn damit konnte die dänische Krone zukünftig keine Kriegshilfe und keine lehenspflichtigen Leistungen im Schleswigschen Krieg fordern, wenn Rügen zukünftig dem Heiligen Römischen Reich deutscher Nation angehörte. In kirchlicher Hinsicht sollte Rügen bis 1658 zum Bistum Roskilde gehören. Einige der pommerschen Herzöge blieben zumindest etwa bis zum Juli 1439 im Besitz der ihnen übertragenen dänischen Schlösser.[41]

Der dänische Reichsrat kündigte trotzdem am 23. Juni 1439 aus Lübeck König Erich die Treue und Gefolgschaft und wollte einen anderen Herren suchen. Die neuen Machthaber in Dänemark verbündeten sich mit den Wendischen

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[40] Ibidem, 77 ff.; *Aktstykker*, passim.

[41] Olesen, *Rigsråd-Kongemagt-Union*, 80 f., 96 f. Betreffend Gotland siehe J.E. Olesen, „Eric of Pomerania, Gotland and the Kalmar Union 1436–1440", in: *Medieval Spirituality in Scandinavia and Europe. A Collection of Essays in Honor of Tore Nyberg*, hrsg. v. L. Bisgaard, C.S. Jensen, K.V. Jensen, J. Lind (Odense: Universitets Forlag, 2000), 179–193.

Hansestädten und mit Herzog Adolf VIII. von Schleswig, um den Königswechsel durchzuführen. Laut der Argumentation des Reichsrates hatte König Erich entgegen seinem Eid und dem Willen des Reichsrates ausländische Herren in die Schlossglauben aufgenommen und auf diese Weise versucht, Bogislaw als König des Reiches zu bewahren. König Erichs Absicht, Bogislaw als seinen Nachfolger einzusetzen, wurde außerdem im Schreiben des dänischen Reichsrats an Herzog Christopher von Bayern, den man als Erichs Nachfolger ins Auge fasste, als Hauptgrund für dessen Absage an König Erich genannt. Angeblich erfolgte die Annahme von Schlössern aus seiner Hand nur unter der Einbeziehung Bogislaws in die Schlossglauben, weil man ansonsten um Leben und Gut hätte fürchten müssen und dem Reich daraus ein noch größerer Schaden entstanden wäre! Gegen solche Anschuldigungen wusste sich Erich von Pommern überzeugend zu verteidigen. Etwas begründeter war dagegen der Vorwurf, in Erichs Thronfolgeplänen die Ursache für die innerhalb der nordischen Reiche auftretenden Konflikte zu sehen.[42]

Das Ende des Konfliktes war letztlich nicht die Frage der besseren Argumente, sondern der konkreten Machtverhältnisse. Nach wie vor war König Erich nicht bereit, das konstitutionelle Regierungsprogramm, auf welches sich der dänische und schwedische Reichsrat 1436 geeinigt hatte, anzuerkennen. Dieses widersprach grundlegend seiner bisherigen Herrschaftsauffassung und -ausübung. Er wollte nicht ihr Ja-Herr sein und er hätte die Schweden nicht auf diese Art und Weise von Königin Margarethe in Empfang genommen, entgegnete er seinen Widersachern. Die Folge war der Verlust der nordischen Kronen und das Ende der Greifen-Dynastie in Skandinavien.[43]

Die Niederlage König Erichs bedeutete gleichzeitig Herzog Bogislaws Niederlage als möglicher Thronfolger. Es ist nicht bekannt, wann Bogislaw und die anderen Herzöge Süddänemark und Fünen verlassen haben, aber etwa im Herbst 1439 oder spätestens im Frühling 1440 verließen sie Dänemark. Nur Graf Hans von Eberstein, der dänisch verheiratet war, blieb in Dänemark. Er erkannte Christopher von Bayern, den Sohn der Katharina von Pommern und des Herzogs Johan von Pfalz-Neumarkt, als neuen König an und huldigte ihm. Im Sommer des Jahres 1446 folgte er König Christopher nach Gotland, wo man bis zum Frühling 1448 einen Waffenstillstand mit König Erich bestätigte. Graf Hans ertrank auf

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[42] *Aktstykker*, Nr. 2–6.

[43] Olesen, *Rigsråd-Kongemagt-Union*, 38, 54 f., 97 ff.

dem Heimweg, als das königliche Schiff an einer Klippe zerschellte. Herzog Bogislaw IX. starb im Dezember desselben Jahres in Pommern.[44]

Auch weiterhin wurden die pommerschen Herzöge in der nordischen Politik mit einbezogen. Im Frühling 1441 beriet sich Erich von Pommern mit den pommerschen Herzögen, um eine mögliche Verhandlungslösung zwischen dem alten König und dem dänischen Reichsrat zustande zu bringen. Anfang Mai 1441 verhandelte Erich in Danzig mit dem Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens über seinen Streit mit den Dänen. Schließlich erklärte der König, er wolle sich erst in Stolp mit seinen Vettern beraten. Aus Rügenwalde ließ Erich von Pommern am 15. Juni dem Hochmeister die Zustimmung seiner Vettern zum Vorschlag einer Vermittlung durch den Orden mitteilen. Diese Auffassung teilten König Christopher von Bayern, Erichs Neffe, und der dänische Reichsrat aber nicht. Sie betrieben gegenüber dem Orden eine vorsichtige Politik. Erich von Pommern gelang es nicht, seinen Streit mit den nordischen Reichsräten in den folgenden Jahren rechtlich zu klären.[45]

Nach dem Tod König Christophers Anfang Januar 1448 folgte ein Interregnum. Im Laufe des Monats April wurde als Thronkandidat in Schweden der noch auf Gotland weilende König Erich von Pommern vorgeschlagen. Auch in Norwegen scheint im Sommer 1448 die Kandidatur König Erichs aktuell gewesen zu sein.[46] Die Information über die Thronkandidatur König Erichs stammt aus einer Flugschrift aus dem Kloster von Vadstena, welche in Form einer Offenbarung die Schweden dazu aufforderte, Erich von Pommern wieder als König anzunehmen. Die Meldung und Nachricht geht auch aus einem Briefwechsel des Hochmeisters des Deutschen Ordens hervor. In diesem teilte der Kastellan des Ordens, Johann von Gleichen, dem Hochmeister am 2. Mai 1448 mit, dass er vor kurzem das Herzogtum Erichs besucht und unter anderem eine Zusammenkunft mit einem Ratsherrn der Herzoginwitwe gehabt habe. Dieser habe sich geäußert, dass sich der Kaplan König Erichs in Rügenwalde aufhalte und Schiffe und Lebensmittel beschaffe. Das Land solle 600 Mann zur Verfügung stellen, welche dann zu

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[44] Ibidem, 96 f., 118, 345 ff.

[45] Hansisches Urkundenbuch VII: 1, Nr. 684, 709, S. 348, Anm. l; G.A. Lödgberg, *De Nordiska Konungarna och Tyska Orden 1441–1457* (Uppsala: Appelbergs Boktryckeriaktiebolag, 1935), 24 ff.; K.-E. Murawski, *Zwischen Tannenberg und Thorn. Die Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens unter dem Hochmeister Konrad von Erlichshausen 1441–1449* (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1953), 267–268.

[46] J.E. Olesen, „Die doppelte Königswahl 1448 im Norden", in: *Mare Balticum. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Ostseeraums im Mittelalter und Neuzeit. Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Erich Hoffmann* (Kieler Historische Studien Bd. 36), hrsg. v. W. Paravicini (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1992), 213–231.

Pfingsten (am 12. Mai) in Rügenwalde bereitstehend sein sollten, um später unter der Leitung des Grafen von Neugarden und verschiedener anderer Hauptleute beim ersten günstigen Wind nach Gotland zu segeln.

Auch Herzog Erich der Jüngere von Wolgast (später Erich II. von Pommern-Wolgast, Hinterpommern und Stettin) sollte dem alten König zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Nach gesicherten Auskünften von Gleichens lag der Grund hierfür in einer aus zwei Bischöfen bestehenden Delegation, welche die Schweden zu Erich gesandt hatten. Diese hätten Erich gebeten, sich vor Mittsommer 1448 in Schweden einzufinden, da man ihn von schwedischer Seite aus gern als Herrn annehmen wolle. Aus diesem Grunde hatte der König auch Herzog Erich holen lassen, der sich auf einen längeren Aufenthalt in Schweden vorbereiten sollte. Der König verfolgte die Absicht, mit 300 Mann nach Schweden aufzubrechen, um dort seinen jungen Verwandten als seinen Stellvertreter einzusetzen, „bis er sieht und vernimmt, ob er zugleich mit den anderen Reichen übereinkommen und sich mit ihnen einigen kann“[47]. In einem Brief, den Erich von Pommern am 14. Mai 1448 auf dem gotländischen Schloss Visborg an den Hochmeister schrieb, ließ der ehemalige König nichts Näheres über das schwedische Thronangebot verlauten. Er gab nur an, „dat de vd Sweden willen nw kortliken hir by uns wesen vnde myt vns to worden“. Den übriggebliebenen Teil der pommerschen Truppe wollte der König auf Gotland lassen.[48]

Wie von der Forschung dargelegt, schien die Kandidatur Erichs von Pommern besonders auf einen Vorschlag der Brüder Oxenstierna in Schweden zurückzugehen, denen die Beziehung zu Norwegen in Anbetracht einer möglichen Bedrohung seitens Karl Knutssons (Bonde) nahelag. Der hochadlige Ritter und frühere Marschall Karl Knutsson (Bonde) wurde im Juni 1448 zum neuen schwedischen König gewählt. Er schickte sofort eine Armee nach Gotland, um die Insel für Schweden zu gewinnen. König Erich von Pommern verteidigte sich gut, aber Ende des Jahres wurde er im Schloss Visborg belagert.[49]

In Dänemark wurde nach den Nachrichten aus Schweden Herzog Christian I. von Oldenburg zum neuen König gewählt. Auch er wollte Gotland für Dänemark sichern. Dies gelang, als König Erich von Pommern den Dänen im Jahre 1449 Visborg überließ. Die besten Angebote bekam der alte König aus Dänemark. König

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47 E. Lönnroth, *Sverige och Kalmarunionen 1397–1457* (Göteborg: Wettergren och Kerber, 1934; Neudruck 1969), 258 f.; Lögberg, *De Nordiska Konungarna*, 106 f.

48 Olesen, *Rigsråd-Kongemagt-Union*, 224.

49 Ibidem, 402 ff.

Erich sollte die Schlösser Nykøbinghus auf Falster, Ravnsborg und Aalholm (und somit die ganze Insel Lolland) und eine jährliche Geldsumme von 10.000 rheinischen Goldes erhalten.[50]

Von Gotland aus segelte König Erich nach Rügenwalde (poln. Darłowo). Dort lebte er bis zu seinem Tod im Jahre 1459. Die dänischen Schlösser bekam er jedoch nie. Er wurde im Kloster Buckow beigesetzt, aber etwa 1654 in die Fürstengruft der Marienkirche zu Rügenwalde überführt. Das Gewölbe im Hohen Chor stürzte mehrmals ein, und 1811 sammelten die Rügenwalder Bürger so viel Geld, dass sie für die sterblichen Überreste ihres alten Herzogs einen neuen Sarg kaufen konnten. Auf Anregung des Kaisers Friedrich, schuf man 1888 eine neue Fürstengruft und einen kunstvoll gefertigten Sarkophag aus französischem Kalkstein.[51]

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Mit dem Tode König Erichs von Pommern ging eine wichtige Epoche (etwas mehr als zwei Generationen) in der nordischen und pommerschen Geschichte zu Ende. Mit der Unterstützung seiner Vettern versuchte König Erich von Pommern während seiner Regierungszeit die Kalmarer Union als Einheit zu festigen. Darüber hinaus bemühte er sich, mit einem langandauernden Krieg bis 1435 das Herzogtum Schleswig an Dänemark enger zu binden und bekam dafür auch Hilfe aus Pommern. In seiner Familien- und Dynastiepolitik stützte er sich auf die norwegischen Thronfolgegesetze von 1388–89. Es war für den kinderlosen Erich von Pommern in seiner Ehe mit der englischen Königin Philippa wichtig, seinem Vetter Herzog Bogislaw IX. die Nachfolge zu sichern, und dieses Ziel verfolgte er viele Jahre bis zu seiner Absetzung als Unionskönig. Die Unterstützung seitens der Herzöge Barnim VIII. von Barth, Wartislaw IX. von Wolgast und der Grafen Hans, Witzlaw und Albrecht von (Eberstein) und Neugarden zeichnete sich im Laufe der Regierungszeit König Erichs in mehreren Situationen ab, so z. B. im Krieg um Schleswig oder in internen Unionsverhandlungen.

Die Berücksichtigung nicht nur der Rolle Herzog Bogislaws IX. als Erbfolger auf dem Unionsthron, sondern auch des Einflusses und der in mehreren Situationen aktiven Rolle der pommerschen Herzöge in der nordischen Politik, besonders in den letzten Regierungsjahren König Erichs, öffnet neue Perspektiven

[50] Ibidem, 404 f.

[51] H. Barüske, *Erich von Pommern. Ein nordischer König aus dem Greifengeschlecht* (Rostock: Hinstorff, 1997), 266–268.

und Gesichtspunkte, die es erlauben, die rechtlich-politischen und militärischen Verhältnisse der nordischen Kalmarer Union und die Bedeutung Pommerns seit dem Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts und in der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts gebührend zu erfassen. Mit der Absetzung König Erichs in den drei skandinavischen Reichen in den Jahren 1439–1441 war es mit der Greifen-Dynastie in Nordeuropa vorbei. Auch bedeutete das Ende der Regierungszeit König Erichs, dass das Lehensverhältnis des Fürstentums Rügen zur dänischen Krone seit 1169 aufhörte. Einer der bisher wichtigsten Vasallen des Reiches wurde jetzt dem Heiligen Römischen Reich Deutscher Nation unterstellt. Darüber hinaus verblieb Gotland für viele Jahren ein Streitthema zwischen Dänemark und Schweden. Die Regierungszeit Erichs von Pommern bedeutete somit in mehrfacher Hinsicht das Ende einer markanten Ära in der Geschichte Skandinaviens und der Kalmarer Union.

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ZNACZENIE POMORZA W POLITYCE NORDYCKIEJ KRÓLA ERYKA POMORSKIEGO

Słowa kluczowe: Unia kalmarska, król Eryk Pomorski, Małgorzata I, Dynastia Gryfitów, Księstwo Szlezwiku, Księstwo Rugii, Pomorze

Abstrakt

Artykuł traktuje o relacjach i stosunkach Pomorza i Skandynawii podczas panowania unijnego króla Północy Eryka Pomorskiego, który był adoptowany przez królową Małgorzatę I. i został koronowany w 1397 roku w Kalmarze na wspólnego króla trzech skandynawskich królestw. Tym samym wprowadził na tron nową dynastię pomorskich Gryfitów. Pomorscy książęta popierali unijnego króla w jego długoletniej walce o Księstwo Szlezwik. Eryk Pomorski był w swoim małżeństwie z angielską księżniczką Filippą bezdzietny, dlatego desygnował swego kuzyna Bogusława IX na następcę. Na różne sposoby próbował wprowadzić swoje pomorskie plany sukcesyjne, co ostatecznie, przez konstytucyjny konflikt z radami państwa w drugiej połowie lat trzydziestych XV wieku, przyniosło mu klęskę. Książęta pomorscy próbowali pośredniczyć między unijnym królem i szwedzką radą państwa w unijnym kryzysie od 1434 roku. Kiedy Eryk zabiegał o odzyskanie swojej wcześniejszej polityczno-wojskowej potęgi, został w latach 1439–1441 zdetronizowany. Oznaczało to koniec dynastii Gryfitów w Skandynawii, i przyniosło między innymi zakończenie duńskiego zwierzchnictwa nad Rugią.

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DIE FELDZÜGE DES BOLESŁAW SCHIEFMUND NACH BELGARD UND KOLBERG UND DIE ANFÄNGE DER SYMBOLISCHEN INBESITZNAHME POMMERNS DURCH POLEN

THE EXPEDITIONS OF BOLESŁAW III WRYMOUTH TO BELGARD (POLISH: BIAŁOGARD) AND KOLBERG (POLISH: KOŁOBRZEG) AND THE BEGINNING OF THE POLISH SYMBOLIC APPROPRIATION OF POMERANIA

Keywords: history of Poland, history of Pomerania, Polish medieval chronicles, historical myths, Kołobrzeg / Kolberg, Białogard / Belgard

Summary

For 150 years Kołobrzeg was an important place of remembrance in Germany. In 1945 Pomerania together with that town was captured by the Polish state after bloody fights of the Polish army. With the reference to the 1945 battle the Polish created several historical myths, which also refer to a Medieval narrative. The article is an attempt to investigate – on the basis of chronicles – whether already in the Middle Ages the narrative about Kołobrzeg and nearby Białogard played a similar role in the symbolic policy among the Polish elites. The first part of the article describes the records of chroniclers about the expeditions of Bolesław III Wrymouth to Białogard and Kołobrzeg. The second part

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depicts their significance against the background of the contemporary political situation. It seems that at the beginning of the 12th century Gallus Anonymus (Anonymous) tried to invest those towns with symbolic significance, but with time chroniclers changed the original meaning of the records and entwined their elements in the current political discourse. Those plots came back only when the idea of the union between Poland and Pomerania re-emerged.

Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, als der polnische Staat nach fast tausend Jahren erneut die Herrschaft über den größten Teil Pommerns übernahm – so die damalige Sprachregelung – wurde die Hafenstadt Kołobrzeg (Kolberg) zu einem wichtigen Erinnerungsort für die neu angekommenen polnischen Bürger. Man erinnerte in der Stadt an wichtige Ereignisse der polnischen Geschichte, wie die Gründung des dem Erzbistum Gnesen unterstellten Bistums im Jahre 1000[1] oder die verschiedenen Kämpfe, die polnische Soldaten um die Stadt geführt hatten: unter Bolesław III. Schiefmund, bei der Belagerung der preußischen Festung im Jahre 1807 unter polnischer Beteiligung, insbesondere aber bei der Einnahme der Stadt durch die Erste Polnische Armee des Polnischen Heeres am 18. März 1945. Diese war mit großen Verlusten verbunden und fand ihren krönenden Abschluss in der Zeremonie der Vermählung Polens mit dem Meer.[2]

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[1] Den Bericht Thietmars zum Bistum in Kolberg und über die Tätigkeiten des dortigen Bischofs Reinbern untersuchte S. Rosik, „Reinbern – Salse Cholbergiensis aecclesice episcopus“, in: *Salsa Cholbergiensis. Kołobrzeg w średniowieczu*, hrsg. v. L. Leciejewicz, M. Rębkowski (Kołobrzeg: Le Petit Café, 2000), 85–93. Dank dieser Überlieferung zum Bistum konnte nach 1945 die spätgotische Stiftskirche in Kołobrzeg vor dem Abriss bewahrt werden. Vgl. dazu K. Bastowska, „Polityka władz wobec zabytkowych obiektów sakralnych Pomorza Środkowego w latach 1945–1966 – mity, niedomówienia, półprawdy“, in: *Kościół katolicki w realiach władzy komunistycznej na Pomorzu Środkowym w latach 1945–1989*, hrsg. v. P. Knap, T. Ceynowa (Szczecin: IPN, 2011), 84, 94, 96.

[2] Vgl. etwa den Film *Bitwa o Kołobrzeg* von Jerzy Bossak aus dem Jahr 1945. Sonderausgabe des Filmmagazins Polska Kronika Filmowa Nr. 9–10/45. Zum Denkmal der Vermählung mit dem Meer und den Feiern anlässlich der Jahrestage der Kämpfe 1945 vgl. Z. Mazur, „Między ratuszem, kościołem i cmentarzem“, in: *Wokół niemieckiego dziedzictwa kulturowego na Ziemiach Zachodnich i Północnych*, hrsg. v. Z. Mazur (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1997), 322; Z. Romanow, *Kreowanie „polityki pamięci” na Pomorzu Zachodnim w latach 1945–2000* (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 2002) (Zeszyty Instytutu Zachodniego Nr 24/2002), 22. Zur Bedeutung der Vermählung mit dem Meer für die Propaganda vgl. E. Krasucki, „Zaślubiny z morzem – powojenny mit założycielski Kołobrzegu. Kilka uwag wokół nieco wstydliwej historii“, in: *Kołobrzeg i okolice poprzez wieki*, hrsg. v. R. Ptaszyński (Szczecin: Kadruk, 2010), 297–319. An die heldenhaften Kämpfe der polnischen Soldaten sollte auch das Festival des Soldatenliedes erinnern, das von 1968 bis 1989 in Kołobrzeg stattfand (vgl. K. Bittner, *Piosenka w służbie propagandy. Festiwal Piosenki Żołnierskiej w Kołobrzegu 1968–1989* (Poznań: IPN, 2015) sowie das Polnische Waffenmuseum und Medienberichte (vgl. M. Prusak, „Obraz walk o Kołobrzeg w 1945 roku w audycjach Radia Koszalin w latach 1953–1989“,

Neben den Kämpfen, die 1945 stattgefunden hatten, wurden zu Propagandazwecken vor allem Motive benutzt, die mit der Piastenzeit verbunden waren, insbesondere mit den Feldzügen Bolesław Schiefmunds nach Kolberg und Belgard in den Jahren 1102, 1103 und 1107. Der damalige Chronist Gallus Anonymus führt in einem seiner Berichte ein Lied an, das mit den Worten beginnt: „*Pisces salsos et fetentes apportabant alii* (Salzige und übelriechende Fische holten andere (nämlich die Väter)“[3]. Dieses Lied wurde nach den Worten des Krakauer Historikers Józef Mitkowski „zum Lied des Bundes zwischen Polen und der Ostsee“.[4] Die Geschichtsschreibung wurde nach 1945 in den Legitimationsprozess der polnischen Herrschaft über die Westgebiete eingespannt und griff gerne auf die historischen Kämpfe um Kolberg und die später von Czesław Niemen[5] wundervoll vertonte „Hymne“[6] zurück. Dass Kolberg für die Deutschen nach der Belagerung 1807 oder auch am Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges[7] und für die Polen

in: *Polifonia pamięci. Między niemiecką przeszłością a polską teraźniejszością. Kołobrzeg 1945–2015*, hrsg. v. R. Ptaszyński, J. Suchy (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Humanistycznego Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego MINERWA, 2017), 183–204). Nicht zu vergessen sind in diesem Zusammenhang die Denkmäler (insbesondere das Denkmal zur Vermählung Polens mit dem Meer neben dem Soldatenfriedhof und das Denkmal für die Sanitäterin). Zur Literatur über Kolberg siehe J. Watrak, A. Sawicka, „*Die polnische Lyrik nach 1945 über Kołobrzeg (Kolberg). Einige Anmerkungen*“, *Pommersches Jahrbuch für Literatur* 2 (2007): 274 ff. Erwähnenswert ist hier, dass mit dem Akt der Vermählung mit der Ostsee 1945 eine ähnliche Zeremonie aufgegriffen wurde, die General Józef Haller im Februar 1920 in Puck vorgenommen hatte, vgl. H. Kroczyński, *Zaślubiny Polski z morzem* (Kołobrzeg: Le Petit Café, 1999).

3 Übersetzt nach: W. Schich, *Wirtschaft und Kulturlandschaft. Gesammelte Beiträge 1977 bis 1999 zur Geschichte der Zisterzienser und der „Germania Slavica“* (Berlin: BWV – Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2007), 274.

4 J. Mitkowski, *Pomorze Zachodnie w stosunku do Polski* (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1946), 46. Es ist zu betonen, dass Wollin bereits im 10. Jahrhundert der zweite Erinnerungsort war, der die Verbindungen zwischen Polen und der Ostsee unterstreichen sollte, vgl. P. Migdalski, „Kreowanie polityki pamięci w Wolinie w okresie kulminacji obchodów Tysiąclecia Państwa Polskiego (1966–1967)“, in: *Kulturowe konteksty pamięci Pomorzan. XIII Konferencja Kaszubsko-Pomorska*, hrsg. v. C. Obracht-Prądzyński (Słupsk, Gdańsk: Muzeum Pomorza Środkowego w Słupsku, Instytut Kaszubski, 2016), 156–179.

5 Das Lied wurde in einem Film über die Chronik (*Kronika polska Galla Anonima)* verwendet. Dieser Film wurde 1977 von Grzegorz Królikiewicz gedreht, den Text hat Czesław Niemen vertont. Ein Teil des Liedtextes befindet sich unter anderem auf einer Gedenktafel in der Aleja Żeglarzy in Stettin und an der Bibliothek in Kolberg, die seit 1966 nach Gallus Anonymus benannt ist.

6 Um hier nur einige Autoren zu nennen: L. Gustowski, *Polska a Pomorze Odrzańskie* (Warszawa: Państwowe Zakłady Wydawnictw Szkolnych, 1946), 16; A. F. Grabski, *Bolesław Krzywousty 1085–1138* (Warszawa: Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1968), 104–105; B. Dopierała, *Polskie losy Pomorza Zachodniego* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1970), 37; W. Myślenicki, *Piastowski nurt Odry* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1972), 243; G. Labuda, *Historia Kaszubów w dziejach Pomorza*, Bd. I: *Czasy średniowieczne* (Gdańsk: Instytut Kaszubski, 2006), 93.

7 Vgl. den Film „Kolberg“ von Veit Harlan aus dem Jahr 1945. U. Schröder, „Veit Harlans ‚Kolberg‘. Der letzte ‚Großfilm‘ der UFA“, in: *Konstelacja Szczecin. Aktorzy szczecińscy i kino okresu*

nach 1945[8] zum Erinnerungsort wurde, steht außer Zweifel. Der vorliegende Beitrag möchte jedoch die Chroniken untersuchen und dabei der Frage nachgehen, ob die Geschichtserzählung um Kolberg und das nahe gelegene Belgard nicht bereits im Mittelalter ansatzweise eine ähnliche Rolle in der symbolischen Politik der polnischen Eliten erfüllte.

Beide Orte werden erstmals in der Chronik des Gallus Anonymus erwähnt, die um 1113–1118 entstand. Der Chronist legt in seinem Werk das Programm der polnischen Expansion in Pommern dar, deren Ziel es war, die Herrschaft über die Gebiete an der Ostsee zu erlangen. Zum Schutzpatron dieses Vorhabens beruft Gallus den Heiligen Adalbert, der damals in Polen zunehmend verehrt wurde.[9] Die Unterstützung des Heiligen sollte der Eroberung Pommerns göttliche Legitimation versichern.[10] Kurz nach dem Tod Władysław Hermanns im Jahre 1102 machte sich der junge Bolesław Schiefmund auf, um ins Zentrum des heidnischen Gebietes vorzustoßen (*meditullium patrie paganorum*). Er erreichte die wohlhabende und volkreiche (*urbs opulenta et populosa*), königliche, hervorragende Stadt namens Alba (*urbs regia et egregia Albam nomine*). Man geht davon aus, dass es sich dabei um Belgard an der Persante handelte. Obgleich er über kein

międzywojennego, hrsg. v. R. Skrycki (Szczecin: Instytut Historii i Stosunków Międzynarodowych Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2011), 109–107; M. Dondzik, „Sztuka i ideologia – kolorowe filmy Veita Harlana z okresu III Rzeszy", in: ebd., 87–91. Einen Überblick zum Mythos Kolberg gibt: H. J. Eitner, *Kolberg. Ein preußischer Mythos 1807/1945* (Berlin: Quintessenz Verlag, 1999).

[8] Zu Kolberg als Erinnerungsort siehe M. Golonka-Czajkowska, „‚Gdzie moi żołnierze, tam i ja'. Postać Emilii Gierczak w heroicznym micie o zdobyciu Kołobrzegu", in: *Kołobrzeg i okolice poprzez wieki*, hrsg. v. R. Ptaszyński (Szczecin: Kadruk, 2010), 221–244; Krasucki, „Zaślubiny z morzem", 297–319. Vgl. auch die Konferenz zu den Mythen um Kolberg „Mity Kołobrzegu. Propaganda w służbie wojny i pokoju", die das dortige Polnische Waffenmuseum (Muzeum Oręża Polskiego) am 18. März 2011 veranstaltete.

[9] T. Tyc, „Bolesław III Krzywousty odnowiciel i wykonawca polskiej polityki północnej (1102–1138)", in: T. Tyc, *Walka o kresy zachodnie w epoce Piastów*, hrsg. v. G. Labuda (Warszawa: Państwowe Zakłady Wydawnictw Szkolnych, 1948), 41, 43; T. Tyc, „Polska a Pomorze za Krzywoustego", *Roczniki Historyczne* 2 (1926): 1, 27–35.

[10] J. Hertel, „Pomorze w myśli politycznej elity intelektualnej wczesnośredniowiecznej Polski (Anonim Gall i Wincenty Kadłubek)", *Zapiski Historyczne* 47 (1982) 4: 68–69; P. Żmudzki, *Władca i wojownicy. Narracja o wodzach, drużynie i wojnach w najdawniejszej historiografii Polski i Rusi* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2009), 199; E. Skibiński, *Przemiany władzy. Narracyjna koncepcja Anonima tzw. Galla i jej podstawy* (Poznań: Instytut Historii UAM, 2009), 208–209; D. Güttner-Sporzyński, Święte wojny Piastów (Warszawa: PWN, 2017), 51–75, insbesondere 70. K. Maleczyński sieht die Feldzüge Bolesław Schiefmunds zu Beginn seiner Regierungszeit als ein Unternehmen, das eines tiefer gehenden politischen Zieles entbehrte und lediglich Zbigniew in Schach halten sollte, vgl. K. Maleczyński, *Bolesław III Krzywousty* (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1975), 139–140. Demgegenüber verweisen Powierski, Śliwiński und Bruski darauf, dass die Feldzüge gegen Kolberg und Belgard den Charakter von Beutezügen hatten, vgl. J. Powierski, B. Śliwiński, K. Bruski, *Studia z dziejów Pomorza w XII w.* (Słupsk: Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne, 1993), 25–26.

größeres Heer verfügte, nahm Bolesław die Stadt im Sturm ein, plünderte sie und machte die Befestigungsanlagen dem Erdboden gleich.[11] Im darauffolgenden Jahr (1103) zog Bolesław gegen die Stadt Kolberg, die ebenfalls an der Persante lag. Jedoch wurden die polnischen Krieger, als sie die Stadt stürmten, von den Reichtümern der Vorstadt derart geblendet, dass sie nicht mehr weiterkämpften. Aufgrund dieser sündhaften Verfehlung konnte Boleslaw Schiefmund trotz seines eigenen heldenhaften Einsatzes und des Heldenmuts der übrigen Kämpfer die Stadt nicht einnehmen.[12] Nach Plünderung und Brandschatzung der Vorstadt mussten die Polen den Rückzug antreten. Einen positiven Effekt für die polnische Seite hatte dieser Feldzug allerdings, nämlich den, dass nun, so der Chronist, im ganzen Volksstamm der Barbaren (*nacio tota barbarorum* – also der Pomoranen[13]) Furcht und Schrecken herrschten vor Bolesław.[14] Die Beschreibung dieses Feldzuges endet bei Gallus Anonymus mit folgendem Lied, das nach seinen eigenen Worten die Tapferkeit und den Mut der polnischen Krieger rühmen sollte:

Pisces salsos et fetentes apportabant alii,
Palpitantes et recentes nunc apportant filii.
Civitates invadebant patres nostril primitus,
Hii procellas non verentur, neque maris sonitus.
Agitabant patres nostro cervos, apros, capreas,
Hii venantur monstra maris et opes equoreas[15]

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[11] *Galli Anonymi Cronica et Gesta ducum sive principum polonorum*, hrsg. v. K. Maleczyński, MPH, NS, Bd. 2 (Kraków: PAU, 1952), II, 22, S. 89.

[12] Vgl. die Anmerkungen von Güttner-Sporzyński, Święte wojny, 65.

[13] Die Pomoranen wurden hier als Barbaren bezeichnet. Überhaupt charakterisiert der Chronist die nördlichen Nachbarn Polens mit einer ganzen Reihe negativer Bezeichnungen wie *Plünderer, Aufrührer, glitschige Frösche*. All diese Epitheta und die Charakterskizzen wie die des Gniewomir sollten das Vorgehen der christlichen Polen, die die Heiden verfolgten und mit dem Schwert bekehrten, rechtfertigen. Vgl. K. Liman, „Epitety dotyczące osób w Kronice polskiej Galla Anonima“, in: *Ars historica. Prace z dziejów powszechnych i Polski* (Poznań: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza, 1976), 353–355; Hertel, „Pomorze w myśli politycznej elity“, 63–65.

[14] *Galli Anonimi*, II, 28, S. 96.

[15] *Galli Anonimi*, II, 28, S. 97. Bemerkenswert ist, dass wir heute gleich drei polnische Übersetzungen dieses Textes haben. Sie stammen 1. von Roman Grodecki, Anonim tzw. Gall, *Kronika Polska*, übersetzt von R. Grodecki, bearb. v. M. Plezia (Wrocław, Warszawa, Kraków: Ossolineum, 1999) (BN I 59), 97; 2. von Ryszard Gansiniec, „Liryka Galla Anonima“, *Przegląd Literacki* 49 (1958) 4: 373; 3. von Stanisław Rosik, *Bolesław Krzywousty* (Wrocław: Chronicon, 2013), 155. Dies zeigt, wie populär dieser Text war und immer noch ist. Nach wie vor unterstreicht er die symbolische Dimension der Kämpfe der Polen um Kolberg und das Ostseeufer. Deutsche Übersetzung in: *Polens Anfänge. Gallus Anonymus: Chronik und Taten der Herzöge und Fürsten von Polen*, übersetzt von J. Bujnoch (Graz, Wien, Köln: Styria, 1978), 135.

Gallus erwähnt die beiden Ortschaften erneut in seiner Beschreibung des Pommernfeldzuges im Jahre 1107. Nach Einnahme des in der Landesmitte (*in medio terre*[16]) gelegenen Belgard (*civitas Alba*) rückte der polnische Fürst zum Meer vor (*ad maritima*), um die dort liegende befestigte Siedlung (*castrum mari proximum*) Kolberg einzunehmen. Die Kolberger kamen ihm jedoch zuvor, indem sie die Stadt verließen, ihm entgegengingen und sich ergaben. Seine Dienste bot auch ein namentlich nicht bekannter Pomoranenfürst an (*ipse quoque dux Pomeranorum*). Bolesław zog nach der Einnahme Kolbergs fünf Wochen lang kampfeslustig durch Pommern, fand jedoch keinen Gegner, sodass er, was der Chronist hervorhebt, Pommern kampflos unterwarf.[17]

Spätere polnische Chroniken fassten die Berichte des Gallus Anonymus entweder zusammen oder ließen sie ganz aus. Wincenty Kadłubek erwähnt die von Gallus Anonymus beschriebenen Kämpfe Bolesław Schiefmunds gegen die Pomoranen, die dank göttlicher Hilfe zur Unterwerfung Pommerns führten.[18] Er greift auch die Information über das in der Landesmitte gelegene Belgard auf[19] sowie über die Kolberger und die Bewohner anderer Provinzen am Meer (*alie Maritimorum prouincie*), die sich Boleslaw Schiefmund demütig und aus eigenem Willen ergeben hätten.[20] Besondere Erwähnung verdient die Tatsache, dass Kadłubek Pommern als ‚Pomorania' oder ‚Maritima' bezeichnet, und die Pomoranen ‚Pomorani' oder ‚Maritimi' nennt,[21] was als gebildete lateinische Übersetzung[22]

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[16] Im nächsten Satz betont der Autor, der Ort sei gleichsam das Zentrum des ganzen Landes – *quasi centrum terre medium*.

[17] *Galli Anonimi*, II, 39, S. 109–110.

[18] Dadurch konnte der polnische Herrscher seine Stadtthalter in Pommern ernennen und sich in einem Brief an den ungarischen König Koloman als Herrscher von Pommern bezeichnen. Vgl. *Magistri Vincenti dicti Kadłubek Chronica Polonorum*, hrsg. v. M. Plezia, MPH, NS, Bd. XI (Kraków: PAU, 1994), II, 24–26, S. 69–71; III, 4, S. 90–91; III, 14, S. 99–100; Hertel, „Pomorze w myśli politycznej elity", 74–75.

[19] *Magistri Vincenti*, III, 2, S. 88. Nach Adam Krawiec sind Lagebezeichnungen wie im Fall Belgards bei Kadłubek höchst selten und dienten der Vermittlung moralischer oder symbolischer Inhalte, der erzählerischen Gestaltung des Raumes. A. Krawiec, *Ciekawość świata w* średniowiecznej Polsce. Studium z *dziejów geografii kreacyjnej* (Poznań: Instytut Historii UAM, 2010), 266–267.

[20] *Magistri Vincenti*, III, 2, S. 89. Zur Umgestaltung der Überlieferung des Gallus Anonymus bei Kadłubek am Beispiel der Pommernkriege Bolesław Schiefmunds vgl.: D. Pandowska, „Wincentyńska transformacja kroniki Galla Anonima na przykładzie przekazu o walkach z Pomorzanami", in: *Władcy, mnisi, rycerze*, hrsg. v. B. Śliwiński (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 1996), 81–112. Zu den Motiven, die hier von Interesse sind, vgl. ebd., 87, 93–97.

[21] U. a. *Magistri Vincenti*, II, 12, S. 41; II, 2, S. 47; III, 2, 4, S. 89, 90.

[22] Pomoranen = Menschen am Meer, Anm. d. Übersetzters.

gelten darf.[23] In jedem Fall aber gilt es zu bemerken, dass Kadłubek mit dem Gebrauch der Bezeichnungen ‚Maritima'/‚Maritimi' die Botschaft bezüglich der Kämpfe und Eroberungen der Polen dahingehend verstärkt, dass polnische Krieger direkt bis ans Meeresufer vorgedrungen waren. Er tut dies zu einem Zeitpunkt, als die Zugehörigkeit Pommerns, auch des östlichen Teils, mehr und mehr zur Illusion wurde.

Der Verfasser der *Großpolnischen Chronik (Kronika Wielkopolskia)* schmückt den Bericht über die Belagerung Belgards aus, indem er hinzufügt, die Bewohner dieser „berühmtesten Stadt Pommerns" hätten das Angebot, sich zu ergeben, in überheblicher Weise abgewiesen. Dennoch habe der Fürst, nachdem er die Stadt gestürmt hatte, ihnen Gnade erwiesen, das Leben geschenkt und sie vor Plünderungen bewahrt. Mit seiner Großmut, so der Chronist, habe Bolesław mehr pommersche Städte erobert als mit Waffengewalt, so hätten sich ihm unter anderem auch die Kolberger ergeben.[24] Die kleinpolnische *Kronika Mierzwy (Dzierzwa-Chronik*) und der Kommentar des Jan z Dąbrówki[25] zur Chronik des Kadłubek enthalten hingegen keine Informationen, die in unserem Zusammenhang von Interesse wären.

Die Schlesische Geschichtsschreibung behandelt das Motiv der Einnahme Kolbergs anders. Die *Polnische Chronik* (*Kronika polska*), die zwischen 1281 und 1288 im Umfeld Heinrich IV. des Gerechten entstand, enthält – verglichen mit den Berichten des Gallus Anonymus und des Kadłubek – einige interessante Details. Sie berichtet, die Kämpfer Bolesław Schiefmunds hätten sich während der Schlacht auf dem Hundsfeld mit List Zugang zum Lager des Kaisers Heinrich V. verschafft, um ihn zu entführen und in der am Meer gelegenen Stadt Kolberg ein halbes Jahr gefangen zu halten.[26] Dieselbe Information findet sich in der *Chronik der Fürsten Polens (Kronika książąt polskich*), die unter direktem Bezug auf Gallus Anonymus auch den Feldzug Bolesław Schiefmunds nach Kolberg im Jahr

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[23] J.M. Piskorski, *Pomorze Plemienne. Historia – Archeologia – Językoznawstwo* (Poznań, Szczecin: PTPN, Muzeum Narodowe w Szczecinie, 2002), 26.

[24] *Chronica Poloniae Maioris*, hrsg. v. B. Kürbis, MPH, NS, Bd. 8 (Warszawa: PWN, 1970), c. 20, S. 32.

[25] *Miersuae Chronicon*, MPH, Bd. II, 2. Aufl. (Warszawa: PWN, 1961); Jan z Dąbrówki, *Komentarz do Kroniki polskiej Mistrza Wincentego zwanego Kadłubkiem*, hrsg. v. M. Zwiercan, A.Z. Kozłowska, M. Rzepiela, MPH, NS, Bd. 14 (Kraków: PAU, 2008).

[26] *Chronica Polonorum*, hrsg. v. L. Ćwikliński, MPH, Bd. 3 (Lwów: Eigendruck, 1878), 627–628; Z. Wielgosz, „Kronika polska – metoda prezentacji dziejów", in: *Dawna historiografia śląska. Materiały z sesji naukowej odbytej w Brzegu w dniach 26–27 listopada 1977* (Opole: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Śląskiego w Opolu, 1980), 58–60.

1103 erwähnt. Die *Cronica Petri comitis Poloniae*[27] und die *Cronica silesiae abbreviata*[28] berichten ebenfalls über diese Vorgänge.

Die Information über den Feldzug nach Kolberg, der mit der Plünderung der Vorstadt endete, wurde direkt aus der Chronik des Gallus Anonymus in die Annalen des Jan Długosz übertragen, und zwar im Eintrag zum Jahr 1105. Der Chronist fügte allerdings einige Details hinzu, um herauszustreichen, wie schwer die Aufgabe war, denen sich die Kämpfer gegenübersahen, und um die Klugheit des polnischen Herrschers zu betonen. So vermerkt er, dass der Fluss, den es zu überqueren galt, mehr Hochwasser führte als üblich. Ein Eintrag zu Belgard findet sich unter dem Jahr 1107, wo Długosz in seinem Bericht zur Einnahme der Stadt getreu der *Großpolnischen Chronik (Kronika Wielkopolska)* folgt.[29]

Aus den oben angeführten Berichten über die beiden Ortschaften wird ersichtlich, dass sie auf besondere Weise dargestellt werden und in den Geschichtserzählungen eine besondere Funktion haben. Bereits Gallus Anonymus schrieb beiden Orten verschiedene, sich ergänzende Bedeutungen zu. Ein weiterer Aspekt ist der symbolische Reichtum Pommerns, einer der Hauptbeweggründe für die polnischen Pommernfeldzüge,[30] obgleich sie bei Gallus Anonymus als wider die Heiden gerichtete Kreuzzüge dargestellt werden, als gerechte Kriege, die unter dem Schutz der Heiligen geführt wurden, insbesondere unter dem Schutz des heiligen Adalbert als Patron der polnischen Landnahme in Pommern.[31]

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[27] *Chronica principium Poloniae*, MPH, Bd. 3 (Lwów: Eigendruck, 1878), 457–459, 469; *Cronica Petri Comitis Poloniae*, MPH, NS, Bd. 3 (Kraków: PAU, 1951), 6–7.

[28] *Kronika Szląska Skrócona*, MPH, Bd. 3 (Lwów: Eigendruck, 1878), 720.

[29] Jan Długosz, *Roczniki czyli kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego*, Buch 3–4 (Warszawa: PWN, 1969), 265–266, 274–276.

[30] Neben den erwarteten Reichtümern lockte vor allem die Aussicht darauf, sich im Kampf Ruhm zu erwerben, die Mannen Bolesław Schiefmunds zum Pommernfeldzug an, vgl. *Galli Anonimi*, II, 48, S. 118; J. Hertel, „Pomorze w myśli politycznej kronikarzy Polski piastowskiej (Anonim Gall, Wincenty Kadłubek, kronikarz wielkopolski)“, in: *Prace z dziejów państwa i Zakonu Krzyżackiego*, hrsg. v. A. Czacharowski (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 1984), 31; Żmudzki, *Władca i wojownicy*, 199.

[31] J.K. Kochanowski, „Pierwotna giermanizacja Słowian pomorskich w świetle historiografii niemieckiej“, in: ders., *Szkice i drobiazgi historyczne* (Warszawa: Księgarnia E. Wende i Sp., 1904), 171–173; Tyc, *Polska a Pomorze*, 30–32; G. Labuda, Święty Wojciech. Biskup-męczennik, patron Polski, Czech i *Węgier* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2000), 271 ff.; M. Plezia, *Kronika Galla na tle historiografii XII wieku* (Kraków: PAU, 1947), 61; B. Kürbis, „Pisarze i czytelnicy w Polsce XII i XIII wieku“, in: *Polska dzielnicowa i zjednoczona. Państwo społeczeństwo kultura*, hrsg. v. A. Gieysztor (Warszawa: PWN, 1972), 179; Hertel, „Pomorze w myśli politycznej elity“, 67–70; Hertel, „Pomorze w myśli politycznej kronikarzy“, 29–31.

In unserem Zusammenhang ist die Lagebezeichnung für Belgard (*civitas Alba*) bei Gallus Anonymus als „in der Landesmitte" (*in medio terre*[32]) besonders interessant. Nach Jacek Banaszkiewicz zeugt eine solch exponierte Bezeichnung der Lage möglicherweise davon, dass sich dort ein religiöses und politisches Zentrum der Pomoranen befand. Auch die Tatsache, dass sich Bolesław Schiefmund mit seinem Heer ans Meer aufmachte (*ad maritima*), wo sich ihm in Kolberg ein Pomoranenfürst unterwarf, sollte auf die überregionale Bedeutung des Ortes aufmerksam machen. Die dort angehäuften Reichtümer bestätigen dies. Es ist hierbei zu beachten, dass Feldzüge gegen zentral gelegene Orte wie der des Brzetysław nach Großpolen oder unter Bolesław dem Tapferen nach Kiev, also in die Hauptstadt (*caput regni*), die Einnahme der für die lokale Gesellschaft bedeutenden Zentren zum Ziel hatten. Denn Herrschaft wird nicht allein durch den Herrscher repräsentiert, sondern auch durch den Ort, mit dem diese Herrschaft verbunden ist. Wer die Landesmitte besitzt, besitzt das ganze Land und trägt am Ende den Sieg davon.[33] Diese Orte der Macht konnten ihrerseits zu Kristallisationspunkten für Traditionen werden.[34]

So wird die Einnahme beider Orte in der Erzählung des Gallus Anonymus zum Symbol der Zerstörung und Unterwerfung Pommerns bis hin zum Meer, was bereits aus dem Namen der Stadt Kołobrzeg[35] – Kolberg ersichtlich wird, und somit auch zum Symbol der Unterwerfung des Landesfürsten. Dieser Akt beendete die Pommernkriege vor der Übernahme der eigenständigen Herrschaft durch Bolesław Schiefmund.[36] Besondere Beachtung verdient hier der Umstand, dass Gallus Anonymus ab dem Abschnitt, in dem er von der Unterwerfung Kolbergs

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[32] Im nächsten Satz streicht der Autor heraus, dass dieser befestigte Ort gleichsam das Zentrum des gesamten Landes sei – *quasi centrum terre medium*. Vgl. auch die frühere Beschreibung *Galli Anonimi*, II, 22, S. 89, wo von einer hervorragenden Königsstadt (*urbs regia et egregia Albam nomine*) in der Mitte des heidnischen Landes *(meditullium patrie paganorum*) die Rede ist.

[33] J. Banaszkiewicz, „Jedność porządku przestrzennego, społecznego i tradycji początków ludu (Uwagi o urządzeniu wspólnoty plemienno-państwowej u Słowian)", *Przegląd Historyczny* 77 (1986) 3: 446–449, 457–458, 464; Żmudzki, *Władca i wojownicy*, 199, 205.

[34] P. Wiszewski, *Domus Bolezlai. W poszukiwaniu tradycji dynastycznej Piastów (do około 1138 roku)* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2008), 434–440.

[35] Kołobrzeg = Stadt am Ufer, Anm. d. Übersetzers.

[36] Z. Dalewski, *Rytuał i polityka. Opowieść Galla Anonima o konflikcie Bolesława Krzywoustego ze Zbigniewem* (Warszawa: Instytut Historii Nauki PAN, 2005), 98; Wiszewski, *Domus Bolezlai*, 302; Żmudzki, Władca *i wojownicy*, 205; Rosik, *Bolesław Krzywousty*, 165–166. Nach Stanisław Rosik kann die Einahme der Königsstadt auch als Voraussage der zukünftigen Machtübernahme über das ganze Land verstanden werden.

berichtet, Bolesław als Herzog des Nordens bezeichnet (*dux vero septentrionalis*)[37], was man sicher als Eroberer des Nordens aufschlüsseln kann.

Obwohl es keine archäologischen Belege für die materielle Bedeutung Belgards gibt[38], fügt sich schon der Name, der bei Gallus verwendet wird, in eine ganze Liste von Königsorten und symbolischen Zentren der damaligen Gesellschaften und Staaten ein.[39] Es gilt hier zu beachten, dass zahlreiche Forscher in Kolberg-Belgard den Sitz des Fürsten über ganz Pommern bzw. einen Teil des Landes lokalisieren.[40] Von der Bedeutung dieser beiden Orte zeugt auch die Tatsache, dass sie bald darauf Stationen der Missionsreise Ottos von Bamberg waren, die eigentlich dem Gebiet der Odermündung galt.[41]

Von der Existenz eines zentralen Ortes an der unteren Persante können wir bereits in der zweiten Hälfte des 10. Jahrhunderts ausgehen, also in der Zeit, als die Piasten ihre Herrschaft über Pommern ausdehnten.[42] Dies bezeugen die Tatsache, dass dort im Jahre 1000 das Gnesen unterstellte Bistum eingerichtet wurde, sowie der Ausbau der bewehrten Siedlung in Kołobrzeg-Budzistowo (Kolberg-Altstadt), der von Archäologen mit den Piasten in Verbindung gebracht und auf das ausgehende 10. Jahrhunderts datiert wird.[43] An dieser Stelle ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass vermehrt Zweifel geäußert werden daran, dass polnische Herrscher in der zweiten Hälfte des 10. Jahrhunderts und zu Beginn des 11. Jahrhunderts die Orte an der Odermündung (Stettin, Wollin)[44], aus denen später Städte entstanden, ein-

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37 *Galli Anonimi*, II, 39, S. 109–110.

38 Piskorski, *Pomorze Plemienne*, 176–178.

39 Vgl. J. Banaszkiewicz, „Jedność porządku", 463–464.

40 U. a. K. Wachowski, H. Łowmiański, W. Łosiński, J. Spors, E. Rymar, einen Überblick über die Diskussion bietet J.M. Piskorski, *Pomorze Plemienne*, 40 f., 58 f. Neuerdings auch bei M. Rębkowski, *Chrystianizacja Pomorza Zachodniego. Studium archeologiczne* (Szczecin: Instytut Archeologii i Etnologii PAN, 2007), 34; D. Wybranowski, „Jeszcze raz o taktyce wojen pomorskich Bolesława Krzywoustego oraz okolicznościach ich finału", *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 32 (2017) 2: 72.

41 S. Rosik, *Conversio gentis pomeranorum. Studium świadectwa o wydarzeniu (XII wiek)* (Wrocław: Chronicon, 2010), 329–337.

42 Zur Konzeption der Datierung der Einnahme Pommerns durch die Piasten siehe P. Migdalski, *When did the first Polish rulers take the Pomerania? The history of certain paradigm in the Polish historiography, in: Poland, Pomerania and Their Neighbours' Shaping of Medieval European Civilisation before 1300*, hrsg. v. S. Rosik, (in Druckvorbereitung).

43 L. Leciejewicz, M. Rębkowski, „Uwagi końcowe. Początki Kołobrzegu w świetle rozpoznania archeologicznego", in: *Kołobrzeg. Wczesne miasto nad Bałtykiem*, hrsg. v. L. Leciejewicz, M. Rębkowski (Warszawa: Trio, 2007), 299–317; W. Łosiński, „Struktura terytorialno-polityczna Pomorza w XI stuleciu w świetle archeologii", *Slavia Antiqua* 28 (1981/1982): 117.

44 Vgl. z. B. Piskorski, *Pomorze Plemienne*, passim; Rosik, *Bolesław Krzywousty*, 160. Eine andere Ansicht zum Thema Stettin vertritt Przemysław Urbańczyk, *Mieszko Pierwszy Tajemniczy* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2012), 336 ff., 365 f., 369–386.

genommen haben sollen; auch fehlen archäologische Hinweise auf ähnliche Zentren im östlichen Pommern an der Weichselmündung.[45] In dieser Situation kam den Transport- und Reisewegen zwischen den Zentren an der Persantemündung und Großpolen eine Schlüsselbedeutung zu. Sie verliefen höchstwahrscheinlich auf dem Wasserweg, und nicht unbedingt auf den Hauptströmen Oder und Weichsel, sondern über die Zuflüsse der Persante und der Drage sowie die Schleppwege in Mittelpommern. Das Bestehen eines Verkehrsweges, der durch diesen Landesteil führte, belegen die in letzter Zeit erforschten Fundorte in Nętno und am See Jezioro Zarańskie unweit von Drawsko Pomorskie (Dramburg).[46] Wir hätten es also hierbei mit einem Fall zu tun, in dem die Erinnerung an einen polnischen Hof mit Hauptstadtfunktion in Kolberg und Belgard und der Unterordnung Pommerns unter Polen bereits zur Zeit der ersten Piasten erhalten wurde,[47] wodurch die späteren Eroberungen durch Bolesław Schiefmund legitimiert wären.

In diesem Kontext muss das oben angeführte Lied analysiert werden. Es ist nicht nur ein kommemoratives Zeichen zum Gedenken an den Ruhm und die Tapferkeit Boleslaw Schiefmunds und seiner polnischen Krieger, wie im übrigen die gesamte Chronik,[48] sondern es ist ein Manifest der polnischen Expansion in Pommern bis an die Landesgrenzen, also bis zum Meer und zu den darin verborgenen Schätzen.[49] In diesem Kontext erscheint die Frage, ob es eine polnische Version dieses Liedes gab, ebenso zweitrangig wie die Frage, ob das Lied – wie Błażej Śliwiński[50] annimmt – wirklich in Kolberg gesungen wurde oder – wie Marian

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[45] U. a. B. Śliwiński, *Początki Gdańska. Dzieje ziem nad zachodnim brzegiem Zatoki Gdańskiej w I połowie X wieku* (Gdańsk: Muzeum Historyczne Miasta Gdańska, 2009), passim; W. Chudziak, E. Siemianowska, „Problem przyłączenia Pomorza Środkowego do państwa pierwszych Piastów. Głos archeologa", in: *Tradycje i nowoczesność. Początki państwa polskiego na tle środkowoeuropejskim w badaniach interdyscyplinarnych*, hrsg. v. H. Kóčka-Krenz, M. Matla, M. Danielewski (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 2016), 184.

[46] Chudziak, Siemianowska, „Problem przyłączenia", 191 f.; E. Siemianowska, „O przewłokach raz jeszcze", *Studia Geohistorica. Rocznik Historyczno-Geograficzny* 5 (2017): 115–139; W. Chudziak, „Wczesnośredniowieczny grot włóczni z Nętna – przyczynek do studiów nad chrystianizacją Pomorza Środkowego", in: Świat Słowian wczesnego średniowiecza, hrsg. v. M. Dworaczyk, A. B. Kowalska, S. Moździoch, M. Rębkowski (Szczecin, Wrocław: Instytut Archeologii i Etnologii PAN, 2006), 647–655; *The Island in Żółte on Lake Zarańskie. Early Medieval Gateway into West Pomerania*, hrsg. v. W. Chudziak, R. Kaźmierczak (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2014).

[47] Bereits P. Wiszewski hatte darauf hingewiesen, vgl. Wiszewski, *Domus Bolezlai*, 438–440.

[48] Ibidem, 302.

[49] Vgl. die Anmerkungen von Rosik, *Bolesław Krzywousty*, 166–167.

[50] B. Śliwiński, „Pomorze w polityce i strukturze państwa wczesnopiastowskiego (X–XII w.)", *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 107 (2000) 2: 31, 108.

Plezia meint – es sich um eine literarische Fiktion des Gallus Anonymus handelt, die für die Chronik direkt in lateinischer Sprache verfasst wurde.[51]

Wenn der Bericht des Gallus Anonymus eine klar umrissene symbolische Funktion hatte, muss man überlegen, welchen potentiellen Wirkungskreis er haben konnte. In Frage kommt hier nur die Elite, also lesekundige Geistliche und Laien, die am Hof des Fürsten Zugang zur Chronik des Gallus Anonymus hatten.[52] Der Umstand, dass der Chronist gebundene Prosa, Reime und Rhythmen verwendet, sodass das Werk auch vor einem ausgewählten Publikum rezitiert und in Teilen sogar gesungen[53] werden konnte, trug nicht wesentlich zu seiner Verbreitung bei.[54]

Aufgrund dieser Einschränkungen konnte die Darstellung des Gallus Anonymus nicht in das kollektive Bewusstsein eingehen, auch nicht in das der damals zahlenmäßig kleinen Elite. Wir können daher nur feststellen, dass es sich im Fall des Berichts über Belgard und Kolberg um den Versuch handelte, einen politischen Mythos zu erschaffen, der Handlungsmuster vorgab.[55] Im Übrigen verlor dieses erzählerische Konstrukt schnell an Bedeutung. Die Bedeutungsdekonstruktion setzte ein, was nicht nur mit dem Verstummen des Verfassers (um 1118) und dem Ende der Kämpfe um Pommern (um 1122/1123) zu tun hatte, sondern

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[51] M. Plezia, „Wstęp“, in: Anonim tzw. Gall, *Kronika Polska*, übers. v. R. Grodecki, bearb. v. M. Plezia (Wrocław, Warszawa, Kraków: Ossolineum, 1999), XLIX; Gansiniec, *Liryka*, 356–357. Selbst wenn man davon ausgeht, dass das Werk – wie in der damaligen Kultur üblich – bereits zuvor in mündlicher Form überliefert worden war, so wurde es, wie Skibiński darlegt, aus wichtigen politischen Gründen überformt und in der Chronik in lateinischer Sprache aufgeschrieben und damit festgehalten. Vgl. Skibiński, *Przemiany władzy*, 28.

[52] B. Geremek, „Wyobraźnia czasowa polskiego dziejopisarstwa średniowiecznego“, *Studia Źródłoznawcze* 22 (1977): 3; Wiszewski, *Domus Bolezlai*, 19.

[53] B. Kürbis, „Pisarze i czytelnicy“, 177.

[54] Nach E. Skibiński war „Polen im 12. Jahrhundert ein Land mit überwiegend mündlicher Kultur. Die lateinischen Autoren waren aber für einen Kreis von Lesern lateinischer Texte tätig und somit müssen wir sie zu einer Gruppierung zählen, die sich der Schrift bediente“ (E. Skibiński, „Elementy kultury oralnej w kronikach Galla Anonima i Wincentego Kadłubka“, *Res Historica* 3 (1998): 64). Vgl. die Anmerkungen von P. Węcowski, *Początki Polski w pamięci historycznej późnego średniowiecza* (Kraków: Societas Vistulana, 2014), 19. Über die Beziehung von Sender und Empfänger in der Chronik des Gallus Anonymus siehe: W. Polak, „Gesta Gallowe a kultura oralna“, in: *Tekst źródła. Krytyka. Interpretacja*, hrsg. v. B. Trelińska (Warszawa: DiG, 2005), 72–75.

[55] Ausführlicher zum Mythos: A. von Saldern, „Mythen, Legenden und Stereotypen“, in: *Mythen in Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung aus polnischer und deutsche Sicht*, hrsg. v. A. von Saldern (Münster: LIT, 1996), 14–17; S. Filipowicz, *Mit i spektakl władzy* (Warszawa: PWN, 1988), 42–45, 53–54. Eine ähnliche Definition bei M. Eliade, *Traktat o historii religii* (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1966), 403–427, insbesondere: 404–410, 419, 423; M. Eliade, *Mity, sny i misteria* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo KR, 1994), 7–8. Auf die zyklische Erscheinungsform einiger früherer Rituale verweist auch E. Cassirer, *Mit państwa*, übers. v. A. Staniewska (Warszawa: IFiS PAN, 2006), 310.

vor allem damit, dass Bolesław Schiefmund spätestens nach der endgültigen Eroberung Pommerns das politische Zentrum des Landes an die Odermündung (Stettin, Wollin, Cammin, Usedom) verlegte sowie damit, dass seine Nachfolger keine aktive Nordpolitik betrieben. Die einzige Verbindung zwischen den Piasten und den pommerschen Herzögen kamen durch von Mieszko III. betriebene Heiraten zustande (wofür ihn seinerzeit der Chronist Wincenty Kadłubek lobte) sowie durch die heutzutage zunehmend rätselhaft erscheinende Unterstellung des pommerschen Bistums in Wollin unter das Erzbistum Gnesen.[56]

Parallel dazu erlebten die erwähnten Erzählmotive zu Kolberg und Belgard im 13. Jahrhundert aufgrund der neuen politischen Situation – Pommern war nun von Polen unabhängig – bedeutende Veränderungen. Im 13. Jahrhundert gaben schlesische Chronisten Kolberg als einen Ort an, in dem der während seines Polenfeldzuges 1109 in Gefangenschaft geratene deutsche König Heinrich V. festgehalten wurde.[57] Durch die Nennung Kolbergs sollte scheinbar die Randlage des Ortes, an dem Heinrich festgehalten wurde, unterstrichen werden. Es handelte sich zwar um eine wichtige und stark befestigte Anlage, die jedoch an der Peripherie lag und über die man so gut wie nichts wusste, obwohl polnische und auch schlesische Kirchenstellen dort Güter besaßen.[58] Dadurch sollte die gesamte Erzählung an Glaubhaftigkeit gewinnen. Die Geschichte der Schlacht von Hundsfeld und der Gefangennahme Heinrichs taucht erstmals in der schlesischen *Polnischen Chronik (Kronika polska)* auf und fügte sich gut in den breiteren Kontext dieses Werkes, das Polen als ein Land darstellte, das seit Jahrhunderten mit dem Kaiserreich verbunden war, während die Polen selbst die Deutschen hassten und im Kampf vor List und Hinterhalten nicht zurückschreckten.[59]

Das Motiv der Kämpfe um Kolberg und Belgard lebte, wenn auch in abgeschwächter Form, in den Annalen des Jan Długosz wieder auf. Dies ist kein Zufall,

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[56] *Magistri Vincenti*, IV, 2, S. 130–131; 12, S. 152; Hertel, „Pomorze w myśli politycznej elity", 75–77; Hertel, „Pomorze w myśli politycznej kronikarzy", 35–36; zum pommerschen Bistum im 12. Jahrhundert neuerdings bei P. Piątkowski, *Biskupstwo pomorskie jako początek biskupstwa kamieńskiego* (Wrocław: Chronicon, 2015).

[57] Dies stützt die These B. Geremeks, der zufolge Ereignisse in der Beschreibung mit wachsendem zeitlichem Abstand zunehmend mit legendenähnlichen Motiven ausgeschmückt werden. Vgl.: Geremek, „Wyobraźnia czasowa", 8.

[58] Ich denke hier an die Verleihung einer der Kolberger Salinen an das Zisterzienserinnenkloster in Trebnitz (Trzebnica) im Jahre 1214 (*Pommersches Urkundenbuch*, Bd. I, hrsg. v. K. Conrad (Köln, Wien: Böhlau, 1970), Nr. 162 und an die Einflüsse des Klosters in Mogilno (siehe J. Petersohn, *Der südliche Ostseeraum im kirchlich-politischen Kräftespiel der Reichs, Polens und Dänemarks vom 10. bis 13. Jahrhundert* (Köln, Wien: Böhlau, 1979), 424 f.).

[59] Wielgosz, „Kronika polska", 54, 58–60.

denn Pommern spielte bei Długosz eine wichtige Rolle. Er forderte sogar, ein Teil Pommerns müsse wieder zu Polen kommen als Bestandteil der alten lechischen Gebiete, die dann unter die Herrschaft Bolesław des Tapferen gekommen waren.[60]

Ich möchte meine Überlegungen mit dem Hinweis darauf abschließen, dass man aufgrund der dargelegten Analyse sagen kann, dass bereits im 12. Jahrhundert, zur Zeit der Pommernzüge Bolesław Schiefmunds, im Umkreis seines Hofes und seines Chronisten Gallus Anonymus der Versuch unternommen wurde, den beiden mittelpommerschen Hauptorten Kolberg und Belgard eine symbolische Bedeutung zuzuschreiben. Sie standen symbolisch für die polnische Herrschaft über Gebiete in Pommern. Da diese Geschichtserzählung, die Züge eines politischen Mythos trägt, nur kurze Zeit aktuell war, bildete sich kein kollektives Bewusstsein um diese Erzählung heraus. Ein solches wäre (nach B. Geremek, der darin M. Halbwachs folgt) politisch organisiert und würde ein integratives Moment einer bestimmten herrschernahen gesellschaftlichen Gruppe darstellen. Im Mittelalter belegte sie, wie Geremek dargelegt hat, vor allem die herausragende Rolle des Christentums und legitimierte die Herrschaft.[61] In späteren Werken unterlag die symbolische Bedeutung dieser Erzählung einem Wandel, indem sie (so in Schlesien) mit dem aktuellen politischen Diskurs verwoben wurde. Die Erzählmotive der Kämpfe um diese Orte wurden nur dann aufgegriffen, wenn die Idee einer Verbindung zwischen Pommern und Polen wiederauflebte, was am Beispiel der Großpolnischen Chronik, bei Długosz und insbesondere nach 1945 deutlich wird.

Übersetzung: Torsten Salzer

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[60] „Ich wäre glücklich, wenn vor meinen Augen nach der Güte des Herrn Schlesien, das Lebuser und Stolper Land, wo sich drei Bistümer befinden, die gegründet wurden von dem ersten König Polen, Bolesław dem Großen und dessen Vater Mieczysław, zum Polnischen Königreich zuückkämen und mit ihm vereinigt würden“ (*Joanis Długossii seu Longini Canonici Cracoviensis Historiae Poloniae libri XII*), hrsg. v. A. Przeździecki, Bd. 5, liber XII (XIII) (Cracovie: Typographia Kirchmayerana, 1878), 473, übers. v. Torsten Salzer nach: J. Długosz, *Roczniki czyli kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego*, Ks. 12 1462–1480 (Warszawa: PWN, 2006), 186; Vgl. Anm. von J. Krzyżaniakowa, „Pojęcie narodu w ‚Rocznikach‘ Jana Długosza“, in: *Sztuka i ideologia XV wieku*, hrsg. v. P. Skubiszewski (Warszawa: PWN, 1978), 143, 145; S. Gawlas, „Świadomość narodowa Jana Długosza“, *Studia Źródłoznawcze* 27 (1983): 41 sowie S. Gawęda, K. Pieradzka, J. Radziszewska, *Rozbiór krytyczny Annalium Poloniae Jana Długosza z lat 1445–1480*, Bd. 2 (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1965), 210.

[61] Geremek, „Wyobraźnia czasowa“, 15.

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WYPRAWY BOLESŁAWA KRZYWOUSTEGO NA BIAŁOGARD ORAZ KOŁOBRZEG I POCZĄTKI POLSKIEGO SYMBOLICZNEGO ZAWŁASZCZANIA POMORZA ORAZ WALK O DOSTĘP DO BAŁTYKU

Słowa kluczowe: historia Polski, historia Pomorza, polskie kroniki średniowieczne, mity historyczne, Kołobrzeg, Białogard

Abstrakt

Kołobrzeg był przez prawie 150 lat ważnym miejscem pamięci w Niemczech. W 1945 roku teren Pomorza wraz z tym nadmorskim miastem objęło, po krwawych walkach

armii polskiej, państwo polskie. Nawiązując do walk z 1945 roku, Polacy utworzyli wiele mitów historycznych odwołujących się również do narracji średniowiecznych. Celem artykułu jest próba zbadania na podstawie przekazów kronikarskich, czy już w okresie średniowiecza narracja o Kołobrzegu i pobliskim Białogardzie nie zaczęła spełniać podobnej roli w polityce symbolicznej wśród polskich elit. W pierwszej części artykułu omówiono przekazy dziejopisów o wyprawach Bolesława Krzywoustego na Białogard oraz Kołobrzeg. W drugiej zaś omówiono ich znaczenie na tle ówczesnej sytuacji politycznej. Wydaje się, że w początkach XII wieku Gall Anonim próbował nadać symboliczne znaczenie obu tym ośrodkom, jednak z czasem kronikarze zmienili pierwotny sens tego przekazu i wplatali jego elementy w aktualny dyskurs polityczny. Wątki te powracały jedynie wtedy, kiedy odżywała idea łączności Pomorza z Polską.

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POMERANIA AND THE BALTIC SEA IN THE IMAGINATIVE GEOGRAPHY OF THE POLISH MIDDLE AGES FROM THE END OF THE 10th CENTURY TO THE BEGINNING OF THE 13th CENTURY

Keywords: history of Poland, history of Pomerania, Polish medieval chronicles, imaginative geography, Gallus Anonymus, Wincenty Kadłubek.

Summary

The paper deals with the problem of the place of Pomerania in imaginative geography of the inhabitants of the Polish lands since the rule of Mieszko I until beginning of the 13th century. The choice of the final date is justified by the political changes taking place at that time in Poland and in Pomerania itself, as well as the changes in imaginative geography, i.e. in the system of images of particular territories functioning in a community, in the case in question among the inhabitants of the Polish lands. The possibilities of reconstructing the images of Pomerania and the Baltic are limited because of the scarcity of sources, especially with reference to the earliest period. The article contains an analysis of the circumstances of creating and introducing into the written sources the names 'Pomerania' and 'Pomeranians'. The picture of Pomerania in Gallus Anonymus' chronicle has been extensively discussed, which results from the special position of that region in the spatial concept in that text. The paper indicates the main ways of the conceptualisation of the Pomeranian territory and its inhabitants by Gallus in the context of the contemporary system of learned geographical images, crusade ideology and political

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conditions of the textmaking and presenting the events. There is also a characterisation of the later mentions about Pomerania as a geographical space in the Polish sources of the beginning of the 13th century, among which the predominant place occupies Master Wincenty Kadłubek's chronicle. The article shows how Master Wincenty Kadłubek presents Pomerania in various parts of his chronicle, especially in his narrative about the beginnings of the Polish state and nation, with possible causes and sources of the description. Finally, the article signals the changes which indicate that the period from the 13th to the 15th centuries should be regarded as a separate stage in the history of the Polish imagery of the Baltic and Pomerania.

The questions concerning the image of Pomerania in the Polish medieval sources have long been attracting the attention of researchers. Yet, historiography has rather concentrated on events, i.e. on how political, religious, social and other processes, which took place in Pomerania and in the Baltic Sea Basin, were perceived and presented in Poland; another question that has been explored is the position of these territories in Polish political theory and practice. Much less attention was paid to constructing images of Pomerania and the Baltic Sea as a space and their place in a wider picture of the physical world. Observations and insights concerning this subject are quite often valuable, but they are scattered, on the margins of publications devoted to other questions, and they do not present a comprehensive picture. This article is supposed to fill in this gap.

At the beginning I should explain the key terms that I use in the article. Imaginative geography is a set of geographic images which function in a community and are regarded as real, at least by the majority of the members of the community in question, and which are confirmed by the authorities accepted in the community. Spatial images of particular people are their maps or mental geographies; whereas the way of presenting space in a text of culture (a written source, a map) is called a spatial concept of that text. The spatial concept in a source text corresponds mainly to the mental geography of the author, but those two concepts cannot be used interchangeably. The author might have included in his text elements he did not identify with, e.g. under outside pressure. In most cases researchers cannot verify that. They have access only to the concept of space of source texts, whereas all the rest – mental and imaginative geographies – can only be (re)constructed.

The beginnings of the presence of Pomerania and the Baltic Sea in Polish imaginative geography are poorly documented. But undoubtedly that area played a much more significant role in the images of the world cherished by the Polish elite of the time of Mieszko I and Bolesław the Brave (Chrobry), than it appears from the Polish available written sources. It is proved by – documented in the Saxon sources – Mieszko's activity at the estuary of the Oder and, according to the Scandinavian sources, by his contacts with Eric the Victorious, the king of Sweden, sealed by the marriage between Eric and Mieszko's daughter, probably at the beginning of the 980s[1]. There is a commonly accepted assumption in the historiography, that it was just the period when in the milieu of the Polish ruler, in relation with his Northwest expansion, there appeared an idea of conceptualizing of the area situated south of the Baltic between the Vistula and the Oder as one region called Pomerania, and not as a group of small tribal territories or an empty space without a name[2]. It is, however, only a conjecture, and available sources don't allow us to explain the details of the whole process in a clear-cut way. For example, it is not known which was the first to appear: the endonym or the name of the region. Neither is it clear whether – as most researchers assume – the name 'Pomerania' originally had a character of exonym[3], or since the very beginning it had been used the Pomeranians themselves. Another unclear question is whether the name originally included the whole area or only some part of it. The area denominated as Pomerania might have been expanding in the course of time, as new territories were subdue to the control of the Piast dynasty. On the other hand,

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1 Cf.: L. Leciejewicz, "U źródeł konfliktu Pomorzan z państwem Piastów w X–XI wieku", *Archeologia Historica Polona* 8 (2000): 39 ff, 46 ff; G. Labuda, "Wpływ powstania państwa polskiego na rozwój dziejowy Pomorza", in: *Początki państwa polskiego. Księga Tysiąclecia*, vol. 2, ed. K. Tymieniecki, G. Labuda, H. Łowmiański, ed. 2 (Poznań 2002), 272 ff; *Mieszko I* (Wrocław 2002), 126 ff.

2 S. Rosik, *Conversio gentis Pomeranorum. Studium świadectwa o wydarzeniu (XII wiek)* (Wrocław 2010), 103, note 318 (where older literature is to be found). It has been a view commonly accepted in historiography for a long time. A different opinion was expressed by e.g. S. Zajączkowski, who dated the origin of the name 'Pomerania' at about the mid-11th century, S. Zajączkowski, "Podziały plemienne Polski w okresie powstawania państwa. Geografia plemienna ziem polskich", in: *The Beginnings of the Polish State. The Millennium Book*, vol. 1, eds. K. Tymieniecki, G. Labuda, H. Łowmiański, ed. 2, Poznań 2002, p. 89. On different historiographic views on the date and circumstances of the origin of the names 'Pomerania' and 'Pomeranians' cf.: J. Spors, "O domniemanej jedności plemiennej i państwowej Pomorza we wczesnym średniowieczu", in: *Społeczeństwo Polski średniowiecznej*, vol. 6, ed. S. Kuczyński (Warsaw 1994), 23 ff.

3 E.g. Leciejewicz, "U źródeł", 39: '…in a geographical sense it [the name of 'Pomeranians'] expressed the Polish point of view'. J. Spors proposed a compromise according to which the name 'Pomerania' originally had been an endonym of the inhabitants of the territories situated directly south of the Baltic and later it was extended by the Polans to cover the whole area between their state and the Sea; Spors, "O domniemanej jedności", 28.

the Piast expansion might have enhanced the common collective identity of the people who lived in the region which was later to become Pomerania; those people might have cooperated in their common fight against the invaders, and this struggle contributed to crystallizing and consolidating the name 'Pomeranians' as an endonym[4].

Contrary to the circumstances of coming into being the names 'Pomerania' and 'Pomeranians' south of the Baltic, their etymology is clear and well attested since the Middle Ages. As common nouns they denote an area situated close to the sea shore (old-Polish: 'po-morzu'), and the inhabitants of such an area. In literature concerning that question the words of Herbord of Michelsberg from the mid-12th century are quite oftenquoted, '*Pomerania* […] *id est iuxta vel circa mare sita*'[5]. It should be also noted that such names as 'Pomerania' are commonly used in all the areas where the Slavs had lived, which were situated near a sea. In addition to Pomerania south of the Baltic, other regions bearing the same name may be easily indicated: *Pomorie* in Northern Russia on the White Sea, *Primorie* in the Far East of Russia on the Pacific, the town and district of *Primorie* in Bulgaria on the Black Sea, *Primorje/Pomorje*, a historical part of Serbia, and a few seaside districts in Croatia, e.g. *Dubrovačko Primorje*.

In written records, the names 'Pomerania' and 'Pomeranians' appeared relatively late. They are not to be found in Thietmar of Merseburg, who otherwise was well aware of what the situation in the eastern borderlands of the Ottonian Empire at the end of the 10th was like. In spite of that, there have been historiographical attempts to find some traces of perceiving Pomerania as a separate region in the milieu of Mieszko. With referrence to earlier concepts of Z. Wojciechowski and M.Z. Jedlicki, E. Rymar pointed to Thietmar's words on the tribute Mieszko must have paid to the emperor for the region of *usque ad Vurta fluvium*. According to him, the tribute region up to the River Vistula included the territories north of the right bank of the river, i.e. Pomerania, or at least West Pomerania[6]. Still, it is impossible to prove that the emperor had been vested with any authority over the

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4 Cf.: K. Tymieniecki, "Pomorze za Bolesławów", *Roczniki Historyczne* 3 (1927): 29.

5 Herbord, *Dialog o życiu św. Ottona biskupa bamberskiego* (Warsaw 1974): 59.

6 The historian had been developing his concept since the 1980s. Its final version: E. Rymar, "Terytorium *usque in Vurta fluvium*, czyli Pomorze obszarem trybutarnym Niemiec za Mieszka I", in: *Biskupi, lennicy i żeglarze*, ed. B. Śliwiński (Gdańsk 2003), 189–226; E. Rymar, "On the rights of the German Kingdom and Brandenburg March to the control over the whole of Pomerania", *Roczniki Historyczne* 72 (2006): 7–52. E. Rymar, "On the rights of the German Kingdom and Brandenburg March to the control over the whole of Pomerania", *Roczniki Historyczne* 72 (2006): 7–51.

region; of course, if we disregard the weird concepts of Charlemagne's conquests that reached the banks of the Vistula and the recognition by the rulers from the Ottonian dynasty (as well as the Roman kings or emperors and Brandenburg margraves that succeeded them) of the continuity of their rights that dated back to the Carolingian time[7].

Historians looked for the traces of the region in question in the imaginative world of the Piast elite in the *regestum* 'Dagome iudex', where the phrase *longum mare* could be understood as a literal translation of the Slavic name 'Pomerania' (*'Pomorze'*)[8]. Additionally, there were attempts to identify a place mentioned in the text, *Schinesghe*, with Szczecin[9]. The logic of the description of the boundaries of *civitas Schinesghe* indicated such a possibility, it did not however make sense why all Mieszko's state should have been named after the marginal Szczecin. In the *regestum* the name *Schinesghe* might have meant Gniezno (as the name of region or as its center) in some places and Szczecin in other ones (as a point where the description of the borders ends); the current state of research does not allow us to extend beyond conjectures. What should be noted is the fact that the events taking place in Pomerania during the reigns of the early Piast rulers and their expansion in that region at the turn of the 10th and 11th centuries have been almost completely repressed from historical memory of the Polish elites of the so called second Piast state and the subsequent ones, as perceivable in the written sources.

The name 'Pomerania' did not appear in written sources before the mid-11th century. In 1046 the author of the 'Annales Altahenses' ('Annals of Niederalteich') informed that among participants of a meeting at the court of Henry III

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[7] Cf. G. Labuda, "O zakresie rzekomych uprawnień Królestwa Niemieckiego i Marchii Brandenburskiej nad całym Pomorzem we wczesnym średniowieczu", *Roczniki Historyczne* 73 (2007): 17–34 (résumé of an earlier polemic with E. Rymar's theses). By the way, although basically Labuda's critique of Rymar's theses is fully justified, the former had also committed a few interpretational abuses, e.g. writing, '…at the beginning of the 11th century the name of *'Pomorze'* was used in Germany, because (…) since 1000 Bishop Reinbern resided in Kołobrzeg, who was well known by Thietmar' (ibidem: 25). The second part of that sentence does not justified the first one because – as I have already mentioned – Thietmar had not used the name 'Pomerania' even once.

[8] G. Labuda, in: *Historia Pomorza*, ed. G. Labuda, vol. 1 (Poznań 1969), 31. E. Rymar was of the same opinion: E. Rymar, "Dagome iudex jako organiczna część decyzji Mieszka I w sprawie podziału Polski na dzielnice. Reanimacja hipotezy o piastowskim rodowodzie dynastii pomorskiej", *Materiały Zachodniopomorskie* 23 (1986), 293–350. Later Labuda backed out of that opinion and said that *longum mare* meant 'along the sea', Labuda, "O zakresie", 26.

[9] Such an interpretation was proposed by S. Rospond, Pierwotna nazwa Szczecina, Slavia Occidentalis 18 (1939–1947), pp. 290–304. A review of the previous historiography (up to the beginnings of the 1960s): B. Kürbis, Dagome iudex – studium krytyczne, in: idem, Na progach historii, vol. II: O świadectwach do dziejów kultury średniowiecznej, Poznań 2001, pp. 59ff. Recently P. Urbańczyk tried to resume it, unconvincingly.

were Czech Prince Bretislav and Polish Prince Kazimierz, as well as certain "Zemuzil (Siemomysł?), Prince of Pomeranians" (*Zemuzil dux Bomeraniorum*)[10].

Some 30 years later Pomeranians' land for the first time became part of the medieval learned picture of the world thanks to Adam of Bremen, who mentioned it in the Chronicle of the Archbishopric of Hamburg as the 'first' of Slavic peoples living behind the Oder (as seen from Hamburg)[11]. Adam's text later played an important role in the process of constructing of the image of Pomerania and Pomeranians in West Europe, as well as in creating the identity of the intellectual elites of the late medieval Duchy of Pomerania., According to the available sources however, it was not known in the medieval Poland, and – consequently – it did not influence here the imaginative geography. As a matter of fact, the Polish did not need it, as at that time the main source of their knowledge on Pomerania was the direct contact with that region during the subsequent military expeditions of Bolesław (Boleslaus) Szczodry (the Generous), Władysław Herman and Bolesław (Boleslaus) Krzywousty (Wrymouth)[12].

Under the rule of Bolesław Krzywousty, in the second decade of the 12th century, the Chronicle of the so-called Gallus Anonym(o)us' (*Gesta principium Polonorum*) was created. It is the oldest source containing the geonym 'Pomerania'. The land of Pomeranians, called *Pomorania*, was mentioned at the beginning of the chronicle as a part of *Sclauonia*, the Slavdom. Together with Prussia and Selentia, Pomerania made a triad of barbarous pagan peoples of the north, settled between Poland and the sea[13]. What is interesting here is the phenomenon – quite frequent in the early medieval geographical descriptions – of blurring the line between ethno- and geonymy. In that case the *naciones* were described with the names of the territories, although there were opposite cases when regions were called with the names of their inhabitants. It seems that mentioning of three regions/peoples by Gallus should be – at least partly – considered in the context of

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[10] Annales Altahenses maiores, a. 1046, ed. E.L.B. Ab Oefele, MGH SS rer. Germ. 4, Hannover 1891, p. 41. Cf. J. Sochacki, "Relacja roczników altajskich o księciu pomorskim Zemuzile", in: Średniowiecze polskie i powszechne, ed. I. Panic, vol. 4 (Katowice 2007), 74–92.

[11] *Trans Oddoram fluvium primi habitant Pomerani, deinde Polani…*, Magistri Adam Bremensis Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesiae pontificum, II, schol. 14 (15), ed. B. Schmeidler, MGH SS rer. Germ. 2, Hannover-Leipzig 1917, p. 76; cf. ibidem, IV, 13, p. 241.

[12] On the subject in question cf. recently: A. Krawiec, *Król bez korony. Władysław I Herman, książę Polski* (Warsaw 2014), 167–178 (the rule of Władysław Herman); S. Rosik, *Bolesław Krzywousty* (Wrocław 2013), 155–216 (the rule of Bolesław Krzywousty), to see further literature.

[13] K. Maleczyński ed., *Galli Anonymi Cronica et gesta ducum sive principum Polonorum*, I, prohemium, MPH SN, vol. 2 (Cracow 1952), 7.

the medieval number symbolism[14]. Three peoples meant in a symbolic way all the pagan peoples living north of the Piasts' state, which were a potential and actual target of the expansion and Christianisation by the Piasts. Such a context results from the other place the triad in question was mentioned in the chronicle. In the descriptions of Bolesław Chrobry's expeditions *Selentia*, *Pomorania* and *Prussia*, appear again as the countries defeated or totally Christianised[15]. Of course, in that case not the real events were recorded. Gallus wanted here to create a picture of Bolesław Chrobry as an ideal ruler, who expands his territories in all directions and introduces there the true faith that the chronicler draw upon – kept in the collective memory – the deformed echoes of the temporary control over Pomerania or over its part, which resulted in creating – during the Congress of Gniezno – the bishopric in Salina Kołobrzeska (*Salsa Cholbergensis*)[16].

The picture of the territories north of Poland in the spatial concept in Gallus' text was in principle based on the paradigmatic knowledge of the chronicler, but at the same time it was subordinated to persuasive goals. Describing the Slavdom, he referred to the concept functioning in the ancient and medieval geography of the division of the globe into five latitudinal zones: the equatorial torrid zone (*zona torrida*), the polar frigid zones (*zonae frigidae*) and temperate zones between the two first, and only the moderate zones were thought to be suitable for people to live[17]. Only monsters or similar beings might live in the frigid zones. According to Gallus just at such an edge of oecumene (οἰκουμένη, inhabited zone) Pomerania was to be situated. Farther on there was only *mare septemtrionale* […] *vel amphitrionale*, with some islands inhabited by wild pagans and some other islands, uninhabited, covered with eternal snow and eternal ice[18]. It seems that the chronicler who came from southern Europe visualised the region in question just

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[14] On the subject of the medieval symbolism of the number three, cf. H. Meyer, R. Suntrup, *Lexikon der mittelalterlichen Zahlenbedeutungen* (München 1987), clm 50 ff.

[15] Maleczyński, "Galli Anonymi", I, 6, 17.

[16] Such name of the Bishopric's seat was used by Thietmar, cf. S. Rosik, *Conversio*, p. 33.

[17] Cf. D.H. Strickland, *Saracens, Demons, and Jews. Making Monsters in Medieval Art* (Princeton-Oxford 2003), 30; P. Kochanek, *Die Vorstellung vom Norden und der Eurozentrismus. Eine Auswertung der patristischen und mittelalterlichen Literatur* (Mainz 2004), 378–381. On the subject of creating the picture of the Slavdom in the chronicle of Gallus cf. A. Krawiec, "Koncepcja przestrzeni w tekście Kroniki Galla Anonima, geografia mentalna jej autora i ich znaczenie w dyskusji nad jego pochodzeniem", in: *Nobis operique favete. Studia nad Gallem Anonimem*, ed. A. Dąbrówka, E. Skibiński, W. Wojtowicz (Warsaw 2017), 73–91, on the subject of the influence of the concept of five zones: ibidem, 80 ff.

[18] Maleczyński, "Galli Anonymi", I, prohemium, p. 7. Nota bene, similar motifs appeared in the description of the North in Adam of Bremen, Kochanek, *Die Vorstellung*, 378 ff.

in that way, drawing upon his earlier readings, but at the same time emphasising the place of Pomerania at the edge of the human world he showed off the ominous and monstrous character of its inhabitants against whom the hero of his chronicle had to defend himself. The picture of Pomeranians as an aggressive, constantly threatening Poland, 'nation of barbarians' (*nacio barbarorum*[19]), emerge several times in his chronicle.

The sea shore is a border of the available world, and bringing that border under control is synonymous with the end of the symbolic conquest of the whole 'North'; such a vision appeared in Gallus' narration in the descriptions of Krzywousty's expeditions to Kołobrzeg. The chronicler did not express it explicitly but he referred to pre-knowledge and the system of images of the receiver, giving it a poetic form of a famous song, in which landlocked horizons of the ancestors were contrasted with the new perspectives that were opening due to the proximity of the sea[20]. But the attention is attracted by an overtone of the song that is different from the one of the previous words of *prohemium*. In that case the overtone was negative there and the territories situated outside Pomerania were shown as unwelcoming, hostile and worthless; whereas here the north seems to be a friendly area inviting to a further expansion. It is not known whether that inconsistence is accidental or it reflects actual changes in imaginative geography of the chronicler's milieu or in his personal mental geography, which took place while the chronicle was being written. In the context of this appreciating of the north, especially symptomatic are the words about sea monsters and treasures (*monstra maris et opes equoreas*), which explicitly allude to the fascination for the exotic of the time, especially the tales of Alexander the Great and the marvels of the East[21]. In this way the north changed in the imagined equivalent of the Orient and the 'northern prince' Bolesław became equal to the rulers of the East or the crusaders capturing Jerusalem. That kind of thinking was not typical only for Gallus, to mention is an earlier (1107/1108) crusade manifesto of Magdeburg, in which Polabia was – although in a bit different context – referred to as *Hierusalem*

[19] Maleczyński, "Galli Anonymi", II, 28, 96.

[20] Ibidem, II, 28, p. 97, cf. Rosik, *Bolesław*, 166 ff.

[21] On the subject of 'Aleksandreis' and their role in the culture of the High Middle Ages cf. R. Stoneman, "The Medieval Alexander", in: *Latin Fiction. The Latin Novel in Context*, ed. H. Hofmann (London–New York 1999), 238–252.

nostra[22]. Unfortunately, we cannot assess the extent to which it was shared by Polish clergy and knighthood.

Pomerania in the spatial concept in Gallus' chronicle was one territorial unit, clearly separated from Poland, referred to as *terra, patria*, or even *regnum*. Within that *regnum* the chronicler (or his informant) recognized, however some internal diversity. He seems to distinguish a part of Pomerania situated directly at the seaside (*circa maritima*) from the one situated farther from the sea shore (*infra terram*)[23]. It might have been a reflection of the political division of the region into two powers, concentrated in the main centres, Kołobrzeg and Białogard, in the chronicle referred to as 'towns' (*urbs* or *civitas*), contrasted to the remaining 'castles/strongholds' (*castrum* or *castellum*)[24]. He also wrote about *sinum terre populosiorem et opulenciorem*, which was attacked by Władysław Herman[25]. But the text of the chronicle does not reveal where that more populous and opulent area was, and the historiographical identification with the Pomerelia[26], is only speculation. The chronicler recognized the existence of some different centres of power in Pomerania[27]. He identified a certain central area in Pomerania, although it is not clear whether it should be understood literally or figuratively. The context in which the centre was mentioned, the destruction of the castles *in meditullio regni* at the command of Sieciech and the siege of the 'royal town' of the Pomeranians

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[22] G. Labuda, "Wezwanie wschodniosaskich feudałów do walki ze Słowianami z roku 1108", in: idem, *Fragmenty dziejów Słowiańszczyzny zachodniej*, part 3, ed. 2 (Poznań 2002), 233–269 (803–839), the quoted expression in the text of the document: p. 235 (805). On the subject of the ideology of the document in question in the Polish context cf. M. Gładysz, *Zapomniani krzyżowcy. Polska wobec ruchu krucjatowego w XII–XIII wieku* (Warsaw 2004), 37 ff; D. Güttner-Sporzyński, Święte wojny Piastów (Warsaw 2017), 93 ff.

[23] In that way the *civitates* of the Pomeranians were to be situated, occupied by Władysław Herman, Maleczyński, "Galli Anonymi", II, 1, 65.

[24] The structure of power in Pomerania at the turn of the 11th and 12th centuries is still controversial. For a long time, undoubtedly not without the influence of Gallus' suggestion, part of the researchers considered a possibility of functioning in the area between the Oder and the Vistula of two big early state structures, the southern and the northern, cf. B. Śliwiński, Pomorze w polityce i strukturze państwa wczesnopiastowskiego (X–XII w.), *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 57 (2000), booklet 2, 3–38, where the older works have been discussed. Alternative propositions assume the existence of one centre of prince's power, simultaneously with elements of a tribal veche-based political system, cf. J.M. Piskorski, *Pomorze plemienne. Historia – Archeologia – Językoznawstwo* (Poznań–Szczecin 2002), esp. 38 ff.

[25] Maleczyński, "Galli Anonymi", II, 2, 65.

[26] J. Powierski, "Międzynarodowe okoliczności polityczne wznowienia walk monarchii piastowskiej o Pomorze za Władysława Hermana około 1090 r.", *Komunikaty Instytutu Bałtyckiego* 31 (1994), 5 ff.

[27] Cf. D. Sikorski, "Galla Anonima wiadomości o Prusach. Próba weryfikacji wybranych hipotez", *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 110 (2003), booklet 2, 16–17.

Alba / Białogard which was to be situated *in medio terre*[28], seems to allude to the system of images related to being in power, where the control over the symbolic centre was synonymous with the rule over the whole territory[29]. Especially noteworthy isthe wording *quasi centrum terre medium reputatur*[30], which the chronicler used in relation to Białogard. He did not claim that *Alba* was the centre of the region but that it was considered to be the centre of the region. It is a very rare case in the sources of that time when the writer so openly underlines the creative or imaginative character of the described reality.

The borders of Pomerania were not clearly defined by Gallus. The northern border was the sea. One can find a trace of perceiving the Vistula as the eastern border in the words about *castellum Wysegrad* on the Vistula, situated *in confinium Pomoranie*[31]. The western border was not mentioned explicitly, and establishing where it was is even more difficult because it is related with identifying Selentia referred to as one of the northern neighbours of Poland. In that territorial context the name appears exclusively in Gallus. Because the third of the pagan peoples of the north in Gallus' chronicle were the Old Prussians, eastern neighbours of Pomerania, it points to one logical conclusion that Selentia should be situated west of Pomerania. It may be only said that it was 'a kind of west Slavic territory'[32], but its precise identity must remain a riddle[33]. Gallus presented the southern borderland between Poland and Pomerania, according to the actual state, as a typical zonal border of the time, i.e. a woody and swampy area, situated between the farthest castles controlled by both sides. Gallus described an attempt

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[28] Maleczyński, "Galli Anonymi", II, 1, 65; II, 22, 89.

[29] J. Banaszkiewicz, "Jedność porządku przestrzennego, społecznego i tradycji początków ludu (Uwagi o urządzeniu wspólnoty plemienno-państwowej u Słowian)", in: idem, *Takie sobie średniowieczne bajeczki* (Cracow 2013), 150–156 (reprint from: *Przegląd Historyczny* 77 (1986),booklet 3, 445–466); Z. Dalewski, *Władza, przestrzeń, ceremoniał. Miejsce i uroczystość inauguracji władzy w Polsce średniowiecznej do końca XIV w.* (Warsaw 1996), 15 ff.

[30] Maleczyński, "Galli Anonymi", II, 39, 109–110, cf. Banaszkiewicz, "Jedność", 150.

[31] Maleczyński, "Galli Anonymi", III 26, 162.

[32] *Anonim tzw. Gall, Kronika polska*, trans. R. Grodecki, ed. M. Plezia (Wrocław 1996), 10, note 2.

[33] The proposals in historiography: the most probable land of Lucici (K. Buczek, "Ze studiów nad kroniką Galla Anonima. Sprawa Selencji", *Roczniki Historyczne* 14 (1938), 1–28); Ziemię Lubuską z Sulęcinem (T. Tyc, *Z dziejów kultury w* średniowiecznej *Polsce* (Poznań 1924), 79); some ephemeral power at the mouth of the Oder (O. Kossmann, "Das unbekannte Ostseeland Selencia und die Anfänge Pommerns", *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung* 20 (1971), 641–685); the territory of the Lutician Federation (A.F. Grabski, "Gall Anonim o Selencji i Prusach", *Rocznik Olsztyński* 2 (1959), 9–20), which is not probable because of the location of the Sudovians, i.e. a section of the Yotvingians/ Jatvians (E. Kucharski, "Co oznacza *nazwa* 'Selencja' w kronice Galla Anonima", *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 40 (1926), 145–150).

made by the Pomeranians to narrow that border zone down by building a new, stategically placed stronghold in the direct vicinity of the Polish castle of Santok,[34].

The imaginative Pomerania of Gallus was first of all an area of action for the protagonist of the chronicle and his father. That way of describing a space was typical of the writing of that time. The topography of the area in question was not valuable in itself for the writer, and its elements appeared only in a direct relation to the described events. The way of the presentation of the landscape of Pomerania was presented in the way completely subordinated to the purposes of the narration, i.e. to underline the military talents of Bolesław through showing the difficulties he had to overcome in his struggle against the Pomeranian 'barbarians'. Among the components of the natural landscape of Pomerania, the chronicler mentioned only forests, marshes, rivers and other hydrographic objects, which the Polish warriors had to force their way through. In several places the chronicler recalled the open spaces or fields (*campus*), where battles had been fought[35]. On the other hand, the main element of the cultural landscape were towns/strongholds. Also their place in the narration and the way they were presented were justified exclusively by their narrative context, i.e. the role played during Krzywousty's expeditions. The strongholds were always described as powerful and difficult to conquer, but the invincible Bolesław managed to conquer them, which emphasised his invincibility. The author quotes the following strongholds Białogard[36], Kołobrzeg[37], Czarnków[38], Wieluń[39] Nakło[40], Bytów/Bytyń[41], probably Międzyrzecz[42], stronghold the frontier Wyszegrad (*castellum Wysegrad*). In other cases the castles remained nameless, and the chronicler limited himself to the descriptive expressions of the type of *quoddam nobile satis ac forte castrum*[43]. It seems that not in all the cases it resulted from his ignorance, because the names of the castles were omitted in the descriptions both of the past

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34 Maleczyński, "Galli Anonymi", II, 17, 84.

35 E.g. *campus victorie Drzu*, where the Polish fought battle with the Pomeranians during the retaliatory expedition of Władysław Herman, ibidem, II, 2, 66.

36 *Urb*[*s*] *regia*[…] *et egregia*[…], *Alba nomine*; *civita*[*s*] *Alba*, ibidem, II, 22, 89; II, 39, 109.

37 *Urb*[*s*]/*civitas Cholbreg*, ibidem, II, 28, 95–96; II, 40, 110.

38 *Castellum Carnkou/Charncou*, ibidem, II, 44, 114; II, 47, 117.

39 *Castrum/castellum Velun*, ibidem, II, 48, 117.

40 *Castrum Nakel*, ibidem, II, 3, 67; III, 1, 127; III, 26, 161.

41 *Castrum Bitom*, ibidem, II, 31, 99.

42 *Castrum Meczirecze*, ibidem, II, 14, 78.

43 Ibidem, II, 15, 79.

and of the contemporary events, e.g. an anonymous *castrum aliud*, the siege of which was extensively presented in the last chapter of the chronicle[44].

In Gallus' approach not only Pomerania constituted one region. Also the Pomeranians were presented by him as an uniform group. Introducing elements of the internal division of Pomerania into the spatial concept of the Chronicle's text did not result in the diversity of its inhabitants, who always appeared in the narration as one people of Pomeranians, unanimously taking arms against Poland[45]. They were unambiguously opposed to the Poles[46], and to other ethnic groups such as e.g.the Masovians (*Mazouienses*). It may be disregarded whether this approach reflected the actual relations in the area in question or not, but what should be noted is the analogy with the way of conceptualising the middle-European population relations in 'the Russian Primary Chronicle', which was created in Rus at that time; its author listed the Polans, the Luticis, the Pomeranians and the Masovians as groups the "Lachy" had been divided into[47]. Although Gallus described the Pomeranians as barbarous pagans, they were not a horde of savages living *sine rege et lege*, like their neighbours, the Old Prussians[48]. They demonstrated features of a civilised people: they had their duke (*dux*), they lived in towns, they were able to attain considerable wealth. All that reflected the actual relations in Pomerania, and – at the same time – it referred to the crusade writing, where the same coincidence of aggressive hostility against the infidels was joined with a respect for the level of their civilisation and wealth[49]. It is one more proof that the picture of Pomerania and the Pomeranians in Gallus' chronicle can be depicted in the context of his interest in crusades and may be treated as one of the elements of 'the proto-crusade ideology'[50].

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[44] Ibidem, III, 26, 162.

[45] J. Hertel, "Pomorze w myśli politycznej kronikarzy Polski piastowskiej (Anonim Gall, Wincenty Kadłubek, kronikarz wielkopolski)", in: *Prace z dziejów państwa i zakonu krzyżackiego*, ed. A. Czacharowski (Toruń 1984), 17.

[46] E.g. in a famous statement with reference to 'The Conspiracy of Catiline' by Sallustius: *Poloni gloriam appetebant, Pomorani libertatem defendebant*, Maleczyński, "Galli Anonymi", II, 48, 118.

[47] *Powieść minionych lat*, transl. and commentary F. Sielicki (Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow 1968), 212.

[48] On the picture of the Old Prussians in Gallus cf. Sikorski, "Galla Anonima", 12 ff. It is rather impossible to share the opinion of Güttner-Sporzyński, Święte *wojny*, 72, who puts the equals sign between the way of presenting by Gallus the Pomeranians and the Old Prussians.

[49] Other analogies between the descriptions of fights in Pomerania in Gallus' chronicle and the descriptions of the first crusade indicated by Güttner-Sporzyński, Święte *wojny*, 66–70.

[50] On 'the proto-crusade ideology' in Gallus cf. A.F. Grabski, "Polska wobec idei wypraw krzyżowych na przełomie XI i XII w. 'Duch krzyżowy' Anonima Galla", *Zapiski Historyczne* 26 (1961), booklet 4, 37–63; Gładysz, *Zapomniani krzyżowcy*, 32–36, esp. p. 33.

Gallus' chronicle is being here analysed because Pomerania occupies a special place in its spatial space. It resulted from the context in which the chronicle was created: probably in the milieu of Bolesław Krzywousty, and certainly in the time when Pomerania was especially interesting as a target of expansion. There are no similar sources concerning the period directly after the one covered by the chronicle, which does not mean that the position of Pomerania was weakened in imaginative geography of the Polish elites. Its area still attracted great interest, which sometimes ended with military actions. Successive attacks of the Pomeranians were repulsed. Bolesław continued his military activities in Pomerania, which finally led to subordinating almost the whole area between the Vistula and the Oder, but not to its direct incorporation[51]. The military action was followed by Christianisation, carried out mainly by Otto of Bamberg, and its logical continuation were the efforts to establish a church organisation in Pomerania[52].

Regrettably, all those events were hardly reflected in the available Polish sources. All the Pomeranian activity of Otto of Bamberg and the role of the Polish prince and his milieu in it were known from Otto's *vitae* created in the German lands. The Polish medieval sources passed it over in silence. Polish annals contain only laconic mentions of some fights in Pomerania, and inform of conquered castles and defeated princes, partly nameless[53]. They confirm the fact that in Poland there was an interest in Pomerania, but they do not permit to draw any conclusions about the spatial images associated with this interest in. From the point of view of imaginative geography, the most interesting mention is the one kept in several annals from Lesser Poland (*Polonia Minor*) under the year 1123: *Boleslavus tercius mare transivit et castra obtinuit*[54]. It is not clear which 'sea' the author meant, and neither is the purpose of the expedition. The view that the expedition

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[51] Recently on the same subject: Rosik, *Bolesław*, 178 ff, where there is a critical reference to older literature.

[52] Extensively on Otto's activities: Rosik, *Conversio*, 172 ff.

[53] E.g. *Bolezlaus III Pomeriam subiugavit et II castra obtinuit*, Rocznik dawny, a. 1115, in: *Najdawniejsze roczniki krakowskie i kalendarz*, ed. Z. Kozłowska-Budkowa, MPH SN 5 (Warsaw 1978), 14. Similar recods are to be found in other annals. In the information of 'Rocznik dawny' what attracts attention is a rare form of *Pomeria* instead of *Pomorania/Pomerania*. Unless it had been a scribal error, it might suggest that at the time the record was written the latin form of the name was still not stabilised.

[54] *Rocznik Traski*, a. 1123, ed. A. Bielowski, MPH 2 (Lviv 1872), 832. Analogous records: *Rocznik Krakowski*, ibidem; *Rocznik Sędziwoja*, ibidem, 874; *Rocznik Małopolski* (various editions, partly in 1122), ed. A. Bielowski, MPH 3 (Lviv 1878), 152, 153.

was a crusade to the Holy Land should be rejected as unlikely[55]; instead, most researchers are of the opinion that the purpose was Rugia, Wolin or Szczecin[56]. In the second and third case 'sea' might be interpreted as the Szczecin Lagoon (*Stettiner Haff*). Then the word used here might be interpreted as a sign of the 'land' perspective of images of the authors from Lesser Poland, for whom a relatively tiny, closed water body was 'a sea'. On the other hand, it might be a sign of the paradigmatic knowledge of the author(s) of the annals, who treated – in principle rightly – the Szczecin Lagoon as one of the Ocean's gulfs. It should be also remembered that in the Latin of the time the word *mare* was ambiguous and meant different water bodies, not only seas *sensu stricto.* The Szczecin Lagoon was referred to as *mare* by – for example – the hagiographers of St Otto[57]. The mention from the annals was later used by the author of 'Greater Poland Chronicle', who compiling it from the chronicle written by Wincenty Kadłubek, added a description of the abduction of the Ruthenian prince Wołodar by Piotr Włostowic, and constructed a tale about Piotrek of Dacia (Denmark) and the conquest of Denmark by Bolesław Krzywousty[58].

The chronicle written at the beginning of the 13th century by the Cracow Bishop Wincenty Kadłubek, was created in a different geopolitical context than Gallus' text. Kadłubek represented the elites of Lesser Poland, for whom the areas at the Baltic seaside were not as important as they were for the milieu for whom Gallus worked. Now the centre of gravity of the political interest moved to south-east, and accordingly to that movement the spatial concept in the text of Kadłubek's chronicle was shaped. In his description of the Central Europe, the chronicler used his own system of double names (in some cases even triple names) of peoples and countries (for example, the Polish: *Poloni-Lechitae-Wandali*; the Germans: *Lemanni-Teute*; the Czechs: *Bohemi-Pragite*, the Hungarians: *Ungari-Pannoni-Hunni*)[59]. Pomerania and the Pomeranians had also double names.

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[55] Such a view (e.g. independently one from the other J. Gacki and J. Riley-Smith) was based mainly on the fact that similar expressions had been used to describe the crusade, cf. Gładysz, *Zapomniani krzyżowcy*, 42–43.

[56] Cf. Z. Wojciechowski, "Przeszedł przez morze", *Przegląd Zachodni* 1 (1945), 153–170; Gładysz, *Zapomniani krzyżowcy*, 43–44; Rosik, *Bolesław Krzywousty*, 190–192.

[57] Cf. Rosik, *Bolesław Krzywousty*, 191.

[58] *Chronica Poloniae Maioris*, 27, ed. B. Kürbis, MPH SN 8 (Warsaw 1970), 38 ff; cf. ibidem, 149 ff, note 214.

[59] On that system cf.: A. Krawiec, "Wyobrażenia geograficzne w kronice Wincentego", in: *Onus Athlanteum. Studia nad Kroniką biskupa Wincentego*, ed. A. Dąbrówka, W. Wojtowicz (Warsaw 2009), 300 ff.

In addition to the 'main' names – *Pomorania* and *Pomorani* – there appeared 'learned' names: *Maritima* and *Maritimi*, which were literal translations of the Polish geo- and ethnonyms into Latin[60]. This situation proves that the chronicler, who was an erudite person, was not able to find any ancient name to denominate Pomerania. The main purpose of his system was to stabilise the position of Poland in the world of ancient Greek and Roman civilisation, and to create an impression that the land is situated *in partibus orientis*, like some years later put it his namesake, Wincenty of Kielcza[61]. Therefore, it could be regarded as a way to oppose the spatial concept in Gallus' chronicle, in which Poland had been presented as 'a northern country' situated at the edge of the oecumene, which might have been perceived by Wincenty Kadłubek as deprecating in the light of the symbolism of the time.

The spatial concept in Kadłubek's chronicle represents a purely landlocked perspective and is oriented unambiguously eastwards, both towards the real world of the eastern neighbours of Lesser Poland, where the chronicle was created, and the East of imaginative geography, which combined elements of the ancient Mediterranean world, the contemporary crusade realities and the whole complex of associations related with the Orient. At the first sight it might seem that there was not enough room for Pomerania and the Baltic Sea in that concept. Yet, the Cracow bishop included the northern – Pomeranian and oversea – episode in the oldest history of the pre-Poles. At the beginning of his historical narrative he informed that they conquered not only the *cismaritimas undique naciones*, but also the *danomarchicae insulae*, after having defeated its inhabitants in sea battles, and finally imprisoned Canute, their king[62]. The territory of the first of the mentioned nations was sometimes identified in historiography with Pomerania[63]. Yet, taking into account the system of double names coined by Kadłubek, and especially the name *Maritima* as an additional, 'learned' name of Pomerania, the expression *cismaritimas naciones* should be understood not as 'the nations living on that side of the sea', but rather as 'the nations bordering Pomerania from our

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[60] A list of the cases of using both names: D. Pandowska, "Wincentyńska transformacja kroniki Galla Anonima na przykładzie przekazu o walkach z Pomorzanami", in: *Władcy, mnisi, rycerze. Gdańskie studia z dziejów* średniowiecza, ed. B. Śliwiński, vol. 3 (Gdańsk 1996), 109–111.

[61] [Wincenty z Kielczy], *Sancti Stanislai vita maior*, I, 1, ed. W. Kętrzyński, MPH 4 (Lviv 1884), 364.

[62] *Magistri Vincentii dicti Kadłubek Chronica Polonorum*, I, 2, ed. M. Plezia, MPH SN 11 (Cracow 1994), 7.

[63] G. Labuda, "O imionach książąt pierwszych polskich dynastii", in: idem, *Studia nad początkami państwa polskiego*, vol. 2 (Poznań 1988), 34.

side', so in that case the expression might have referred to the area of what was to be later called Greater Poland (*Polonia Maior*), situated between Pomerania and Lesser Poland, which was for Kadłubek the eternal centre of the whole of Lechia. It must have been a reflection of animosities between Lesser Poland and Greater Poland, which competed for the primacy among the Polish principalities.

From a formal point of view, the mention of the conquest of 'the Danish islands' was most probably a reference to Plato's 'Timaeus'[64]. For Plato, the victory over the insular empire of Atlantis was the main proof of the power of the pre-Athenians. The Polish chronicler used similiar narrative pattern to show the power of the pre-Poles. Moreover, it seems that the episode was included in the tale about the beginnings of Poland as an element of a wider concept, the purpose of which was to emphasise the importance of the country as a kind of centre of the world. The chronicler indicated that the pre-Poles had defeated the powerful enemies from all over the world in the 'primeval age' of Poland, when it was *'in statu nascendi'*. The same narrative strategy was used 150 years later by the author of *The Travels of Sir John Mandeville*. Its anonymous creator highlighted the position of Jerusalem as *umblicus mundi* by enumerating the four roads from Western Europe leading to the Holy City, entering it from east, west, south and north[65]. In addition to that, for representatives of such cultures as the one of the medieval Europe, the events taking place in the mythical time of the beginning possessed a constitutive dimension shaping all the reality. Showing the victories of the pre-Poles over their enemies from the four sides of the world at the beginning of their history, Wincenty wanted to prove that Poland had always been, was and would be invincible.

In that pattern the Danes (*Dacis*)[66] represented the north, and placing them at the very beginning of the chronicle as the first serious enemies of the Poles might have been a conscious reference to the contemporary symbolism of world's directions, where the north was the most negative direction. The pre-Poles started their history with defeating Canute, who personified the worst evil, and subsequently

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[64] Krawiec, "Wyobrażenia geograficzne", 297; cf. J. Mańkowski, "Krak, uczeń Sokratesa (glosa do Kadłubka *Chronica Polonorum* I 5, 3)", in: *Inspiracje platońskie literatury staropolskiej: materiały z konferencji zorganizowanej przez Zespół Badań Literackich nad Historią Kultury Epok Dawnych Instytutu Literatury Polskiej Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 14–15.10.1998 r.*, ed. A. Nowicka-Jeżowa, P. Stępień (Warsaw 2000), 149.

[65] K. Ridder, "Übersetzung und Fremderfahrung. Jean de Mandevilles literarische Inszenierung eines Weltbildes und die Lesarten seiner Übersetzer", in: Übersetzen im Mittelalter. *Cambridger Kolloquium 1994*, ed. J. Heinzle et al. (Berlin 1996), 249 ff.

[66] In the Middle Ages the name of Daci was regularly referred to the Danish (Dani).

crushed all their other enemies, who personified threats from the remaining sides: the western 'German tyrant' (*Lemannorum tyrannus*), the ruler of the East Alexander the Great, and Julius Ceasar ruling in Rome, south of Poland. An additional argument for such an interpretation might be the fragment where the 'Daci' appeared for the second time in Kadłubek's chronicle, in the description of the fights between Kazimierz Odnowiciel (Casimir the Restorer) and Masław, supported by *quatuor Maritimorum acies, totidem Gethicas, nec non Dacorum ac Ruthenorum* […] *suffragia*[67]. The support of the Masovian ruler on the part of the Pomeranians is not questioned by historians, whereas the mention of other peoples seems unintelligible, especially in the case of Ruthenians who were allies of the Polish prince. As I have already proved in another place, the chronicler might have meant to show the fight of Kazimierz with the enemies of the unity of Poland a struggle against the forces of the evil, symbolised by the coalition of the peoples of the ominous north, who came from Magog according to Saint Isidore of Seville[68]. It also might be a loose reference to Gallus' triad of the pagan northern neighbours of Poland.

Previous researchers had supposed that the 'Danish episode' in Wincenty's chronicle was a trace of his contacts with some Dane during his studies in Western Europe and – possibly – a trace kept in the Cracow tradition of some battles fought between Poland and Denmark in Pomerania, or a sea expedition of one of the earlier rulers of Poland, for example the already mentioned expedition of Bolesław Krzywousty[69]. Such explanations should be rather regarded as a supplement, and not as an alternative for the above proposed interpretation. Neither is it possible to discard a contemporary political context of the mention in question. In the second half of the 12th century the Danesh showed interest in Pomerania and Pomerelia. Its culmination was the homage of Duke Mestwin I to King Valdemar II in 1210, who for a few years became the formal ruler of the Słupsk Principality. A bit earlier, in 1185, the West Pomeranian Duke Bogusław I, became a vassal (liegeman) of King Canute VI; Wincenty did not write about those events, but his description of the Polish conquest of Denmark may be treated as a hidden allusion to them, emphasised by the fact that the ruler of the Dacis / Danish was named.

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[67] *Magistri Vincentii* II, 14, 47.

[68] Krawiec, "Wyobrażenia geograficzne", 304.

[69] *Cf.*: Labuda, "O imionach", 34 (he suggested that the Dane in question could have been the chronicler Saxo Grammaticus); H. Łowmiański, *Początki Polski. Z dziejów Słowian w I tysiącleciu n.e.*, vol. 5 (Warsaw 1973), 316 ff (a review of proposals of older historiography).

It would have been a peculiar appeal to the Polish High Duke to recover control over the territory, the independence of which his ancestors going to great pains had been fighting for, and which now had weaker and weaker links with Poland. At the same time, the 'Danish episode' in the history of the pre-Poles permitted to legitimise the earlier expansion (and possible the present one). As can be seen, although the dominance of the eastern direction in the spatial concept and in the 'political thought' in Wincenty's chronicle was unquestioned, Pomerania still occupied an important position in both the aspects[70].

Anyway, it should be noted that the connections between the enemies of pre-Poland with particular directions of the world was not expressed by the chronicler explicitly, but it was alluded by referring to the pre-knowledge of the receivers of the chronicle. The whole concept belonged to those elements of the sophisticated Wincentine vision, which weren't understood by later readers and continuators of his work, or at least were not directly reflected in the later chronicles, along with the double or triple geo- and ethnonymy or the idea to interweave the historiographic narrative with extensive moralising fragments. The wars against Alexander and Ceasar and the failure of the candidate who asked Wanda's hand in marriage became an integral part of the Polish historical memory, whereas the defeat of King Canute is not reflected in it at all. Obviously, the 'Danish islands' occupied too little space in the eastwards oriented imaginative geography of the Polish elites of the late Middle Ages, and their historical awareness might have been too big so as not to see the anachronism of the whole situation. Even in *the Chronicle of Greater Poland*, where the motif of the affiliation of the Baltic region to the imaginative empire of the ancient Lechites appeared in a very extensive form, it was constructed in a way completely different and independent from the one which is to be found in Kadłubek's chronicle[71].

The majority of Wincenty's later remarks about Pomerania and the Pomeranians were more or less literally quotes taken from Gallus. They concern the Pomeranian fights of Władysław Herman and Bolesław Krzywousty[72]. The im-

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[70] Hertel, "Pomorze", 43.

[71] Cf.: esp. B. Kürbis, *Studia nad Kroniką wielkopolską* (Poznań 1952), 145–155; A. Krawiec, *Ciekawość świata w średniowiecznej Polsce. Studium z dziejów geografii kreacyjnej* (Poznań 2010), 336–343. Marcin Bielski returned to Kadłubek's version in the 16th century and he supplemented it with the name of the vanquisher of the Danish, Prince Wizymir, which he had taken from *the Greater Poland Chronicle*, cf. K. Ślaski, *Wątki historyczne w podaniach o początkach Polski* (Poznań 1968), 7, 87.

[72] D. Pandowska, "Wincentyńska transformacja kroniki Galla Anonima na przykładzie przekazu o walkach z Pomorzanami", in: *Władcy, mnisi, rycerze. Gdańskie studia z dziejów średniowiecza*, vol. 3, eds. B. Śliwiński, (Gdańsk 1996), 81–112.

age of Pomerania as a geographical space, not too precisely outlined by the first chronicler, in the case of the other one is even less precise. Among the differences, it is worth to mention the change of the name of the place where Władysław Herman defeated the Pomeranians from *Drzu* to *Drecim/Drecini*. It might have been the influence of the annalistic tradition, according to which the Pomeranians were defeated in 1091 *ad Recin/Rechen*[73]. Kadłubek emphasised the (political? ethnical?) differences between Poland and Pomerania, and called Bolesław Krzywousty *inuictissim*[*us*] *Polonorum ac Maritimorum monarch*[*a*][74] in a fictitious letter to Coloman, king of Hungary. The difference of the Polish and Pomeranian identities is visible in the words about Kazimierz Sprawiedliwy (Casimir the Just), who was described as *monarchus Lechie* by virtue of being the ruler over the provinces of the remaining four Piasts: Greater Poland, Lesser Poland, Silesia and Masovia[75]. The rule of Kazimierz over (Gdańsk) Pomerania / Pomeralia was not mentioned in this context, although the chronicler wrote about it shortly before. The whole narrative of Gallus about Pomerania was reduced, and the crusade elements were weakened. All the Wincentine references to the crusade tradition were made in a different, eastern and north-eastern (Prussian) context[76]. At the same time the Pomeranians were presented in a more negative way, with all the available epithets, which served to describe barbarians and pagans, e.g. the Slavs in the Frankish/Saxon/German writing[77].

For most part of the narrative the chronicler used the forms of *Pomerania* and *Maritima* interchangeably, with the tendency to use the second form to accentuate the events of greatest importance to him, related mainly with the Polish expansion[78]. There are visible traces that Kadłubek differentiated the meanings of the Pomerania's both names in the information about the matrimonial policy of Mieszko Stary in the context of the contemporary political changes. Among the relatives of the Prince two persons were mentioned: *Dux Boguslaus Maritime gener eius*, and nameless *Dux Pomoranie socer alterius*[79]. Bogusław I, the West Po-

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[73] *Magistri Vincentii*, II, 22, p. 63; Rocznik kapituły krakowskiej, a. 1091, in: Najdawniejsze roczniki, p. 53.

[74] *Magistri Vincentii*, III, 4, p. 90.

[75] Ibidem, IV, 8, 148.

[76] Güttner-Sporzyński, Święte wojny, 143 ff.

[77] Hertel, "Pomorze", 22; cf. R. Urbański, *Tartarorum gens brutalis. Trzynastowieczne najazdy mongolskie w literaturze polskiego średniowiecza na porównawczym tle piśmiennictwa łacińskiego antyku i wieków średnich* (Warsaw 2007), 92–103.

[78] Pandowska, "Wincentyńska transformacja", 111.

[79] *Magistri Vincentii*, IV, 2, 130–131.

meranian Duke was described in the same way in another place in the chronicle[80]. It is possible that Kadłubek distinguished in that way a bigger and more important Pomeranian Duchy and one of the smaller powers in Pomerania, which cannot be identified better. Neither is it possible to decide whether it was a stylistic device, a result of an evolution of the author's views, or an attempt to grasp the political changes in the described area, while in the chronicler's milieu the names of the existing political structures had not been consolidated yet. In addition, Wincenty distinguished Gdańsk Pomerania or Pomeralia, described as *Gdanensi*[*s*] *marchia*[81]. But on that basis it is not possible to claim that in his mental geography the area in question was not part of the imaginative Pomerania, because the use of the expression 'Gdańsk March' must have served to underline a closer dependence of that territory on the power of the Piast Princes, and the word 'march' should not be rather understood literally, as an administrative borderland unit of a special type, analogous to the Carolingian or Ottonian Marches[82].

The times of Master Wincenty mark the end of a certain period not only in the history of Poland, the definitive end of the so called second Piast state and a transition to the period of the complete fragmentation, but also in the history of Pomerania, where its western part gradually broke links with Poland and where the division between its eastern and western parts, ruled by separate dynasties, was strengthened. The fact that the chronicler clearly discerned Gdańsk Pomerania, from the whole Baltic region, constitutes an announcement of the changes in the way of conceptualisation of that region, which took place in the 13th–15th centuries. The centre of gravity in the Polish imaginative geography clearly moved to the areas on the lower Vistula, treated as a part of the Polish Kingdom, whereas the areas situated west of it lost their importance. They were conceptualised as a separate country, which, however, created simultaneously a wider community with Poland based on the common ancestors and the historical dependence on the Polish/Lechite ancient rulers. The internal divisions in the area south of the Baltic were noticed and recognised in the late medieval Poland; and they were considered to be eternal, which was rather typical for the geographical and historical imagery of the time.

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80 Ibidem, IV, 8, 147.

81 Ibidem.

82 On the status of Gdańsk Pomerania within the *regnum Poloniae* in the time of Kadłubek: G. Labuda, "Stanowisko prawno-polityczne książąt Pomorza Nadwiślańskiego na przełomie XII i XIII wieku", *Zapiski Historyczne* 66 (2001), booklets 2–3: 7–38.

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POMORZE I BAŁTYK W GEOGRAFII KREACYJNEJ POLSKIEGO ŚREDNIOWIECZA OD KOŃCA X DO POCZĄTKU XIII WIEKU

Słowa kluczowe: historia Polski, historia Pomorza, polskie kroniki średniowieczne, geografia kreacyjna, Gall Anonim, Wincenty zw. Kadłubkiem

Abstrakt

W artykule podjęto problematykę form obecności Pomorza w geografii kreacyjnej mieszkańców ziem polskich w okresie od panowania Mieszka I do początku XIII wieku. Wybór daty końcowej jest uzasadniony zachodzącymi w tym okresie przemianami politycznymi w Polsce i na samym Pomorzu, jak również związanymi z tym przemianami w geografii kreacyjnej, czyli w systemie wyobrażeń o poszczególnych terytoriach, funkcjonującym w określonej zbiorowości, w tym przypadku wśród mieszkańców ziem polskich. Możliwości rekonstrukcji wyobrażeń o Pomorzu i Bałtyku są jednak ograniczone ze względu na niedobór źródeł. Dotyczy to szczególnie najwcześniejszego okresu. W artykule zanalizowano okoliczności powstania i wprowadzenia do źródeł pisanych nazw „Pomorze" i „Pomorzanie". Szczególnie obszernie omówiono obraz Pomorza w kronice tzw. Galla Anonima, co wynika z wyjątkowo wyeksponowanej pozycji tej krainy w koncepcji przestrzeni w tekście. Wskazano główne kierunki konceptualizacji terytorium Pomorza i jego mieszkańców przez Galla w kontekście ówczesnego systemu uczonych wyobrażeń geograficznych, ideologii krucjatowej oraz politycznych uwarunkowań powstania tekstu i opisywanych w nim wydarzeń. Następnie scharakteryzowano późniejsze wzmianki o Pomorzu jako przestrzeni geograficznej w źródłach polskich do początku XIII wieku, wśród których na pierwszy plan wysuwa się kronika mistrza Wincentego zw. Kadłubkiem. Scharakteryzowano sposób przedstawienia Pomorza przez Wincentego w różnych częściach kroniki, zwłaszcza w narracji o początkach państwa i narodu polskiego, ze wskazaniem na możliwe przyczyny i źródła takiego opisu. Na koniec zasygnalizowano przemiany, które powodują, że okres od XIII do XV wieku powinien być uznany za kolejny, odrębny etap w dziejach polskich wyobrażeń o Bałtyku i Pomorzu.

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THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH AND ITS INHABITANTS DURING THE GREAT NORTHERN WAR IN GENERAL MAGNUS STENBOCK'S OPINION

Keywords: Poland, Sweden, the Great Northern War, Magnus Stenbock

Summary

Magnus Stenbock was one of the most outstanding commanders in the army of Charles XII during the Great Northern War (1700–1721). Magnus spent the years 1702–1706 in the Polish territory as an invader with the Swedish troops. His attitude towards Poland and the Polish resulted from his war experience, especially the easy victories over the Polish. The victories confirmed the Swedes in their belief about the low military value of the Polish army and favoured a disdainful approach to the inhabitants of the Commonwealth. Although many Poles took sides with the Swedes and collaborated with them, Stenbock did not trust them, he accused them of hypocrisy, duplicity, instability in their opinions, disobedience and unscrupulousness. The situation of the Polish collaborating with Charles XII required a skill of manoeuvring, so that the exacted taxes would be the least possible burdensome, and on the other hand the ruthless methods of exacting the taxes triggered in the Polish resistance and disobedience. Socialising with the Polish aristocracy and gentry Stenbock noticed their quarrels, intrigues, and dissolution. Their lavish life was attractive for the Swedish general who was not accustomed to luxury and splendour. His interest was aroused not only by the exotic way the Polish got dressed, but also by their arms, silverware, carpets, expensive cloths, furs, bedclothes, tablecloths,

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mirrors, clocks, paintings. Magnus took many of those artefacts to Sweden as loots. The general harshly judged the Polish battle worthiness, but in defence of Scania against Denmark he formed a levy in mass of peasants following the example of Poland. Staying for five years in Poland Magnus Stenbock had many occasions to get to know the Polish; yet, he quite often gave simplified, exaggerated or unjust opinions. Many traits of the Polish character deserved to be condemned, but their duplicity, disobedience or instability – the features the general complained of – were results of the situation the Poles collaborating with the Swedes found themselves in, and of the way the Swedish army behaved in Poland. Opinions on Poland and its inhabitants given by Magnus Stenbock did not differ from the ones given by Charles XII and other army commanders.

Magnus Gustafsson Stenbock (1664–1717) was one the most outstanding figures among the Swedish decision-making milieu at the beginning of the 18th century and – in addition to Charles XII – his influence on the situation in Poland during the Great Northern War was enormous. He came of one of the oldest and the most influential families related to the Swedish aristocracy (his mother was from De la Gardie family), which played a significant role in his career in the state service. Magnus carried on the military traditions of his family, but was forced to reach the strong social and financial position by himself. His family faced the fate shared by many other old Swedish families under the rule of Charles XI. Gustaw Otto, his father, counsellor of the state, governor of Livonia, governor of Scania, and admiral, at the end of his life was removed from all his influential positions and his wealth was greatly depleted.[1] Magnus spent his youth in poverty, thanks to which he developed such features as craftiness, ingeniousness, and consequence in pursuing a goal; the features turned out very useful in his career.

Stenbock had excellent military qualifications and valuable experience. When the Great Northern War broke out he had already had behind him a service in the Dutch army, the Swedish army and the imperial army, where he fought against France and was promoted to the rank of colonel. It was typical of the Swedish gentry to begin military service abroad since Charles XI had introduced the rule under which everybody had to start military service from the rank of private. Aristocrats circumvented the rule starting military service abroad and when they

[1] Z. Łakociński, *Magnus Stenbock w Polsce. Przyczynek do historii szwedzkich zdobyczy w czasie wojny północnej* (Wrocław 1967), 15–16; A. Marklund, "Magnus Stenbock: the Count and the Spy", *History Today* 60 (2010): 19–20; J. Cavallie, "De höga officerarna. Studier i den svenska militäre hierarkien under 1600 talets senare del", *Militärhistoriska studier* 4 (1981): 56 ff.

achieved the rank of colonel they came back to Sweden.[2] Magnus Stenbock participated in the Great Northern War from the very beginning. When the war broke out he commanded the Dalarna infantry regiment; he and his regiment took part in the battle of Narva (1700), victorious for the Swedes. For his merits he was promoted to the rank of general-major and found himself in the closest circle of the king, he won his confidence and had influence on the young ruler, which aroused envy. Magnus participated in the king's campaigns in the Polish Commonwealth, in the crossing of the (Western) Dvina (Daugava) in July 1701, in the battle of Klissow (Klezow) (July 1702), and in capturing Cracow (August 1702) and Lviv (September 1704); Magnus commanded the siege of Toruń (from May to October 1703), was the governor of Warsaw, Cracow and Toruń. Charles XII appreciated his loyalty and his military and organisational skills and entrusted him with responsible tasks and missions. In August 1702 the king appointed Stenbock director of the Swedish General War Office in Poland, of which he was head from 1702 to 1706. In 1706 in recognition of his accomplishments he was nominated the general governor of Scania and promoted to the rank of general-lieutenant. In the same year the king appointed him the general Commissioner of the Swedish army in the occupied Saxony. Next he was entrusted with the task to organise a new Swedish army in place of the one lost in the battle of Poltava. In February 1710 Magnus defeated Denmark in the battle of Hälsingborg. Thanks to that victory he was hailed national hero and was conferred the rank of Field Marshal. His streak of success ended with the surrender of the stronghold of Tönningen (May 1713); Magnus was imprisoned by the Danish and in 1717 he died as a prisoner in Copenhagen.[3]

Undoubtedly, the life of Magnus Stenbock was interesting and varied, and his role in the military campaigns of Charles XII – significant. In the Polish historiography, as well as the foreign one, Stenbock is mentioned *en passant* in the biographies of Charles XII and in the analyses of the Great Northern War. There is a study devoted to Stenbock, especially presenting his participation in the Polish period of the Great Northern War, with emphasis on the plunder of Polish cultural artefacts, entitled *Magnus Stenbock w Polsce. Przyczynek do historii szwedzkich zdobyczy w czasie wojny północnej*, written by Zygmunt Łakociński, a Polish

[2] M. Kopczyński, "Szlachta i państwo w XVI–XVIII wieku – model szwedzki", *Przegląd Historyczny* 3 (1996): 645; B. Asker, "Officerarna och det svenska samhället 1650–1700", *Studie Historica Upsaliensie* 133 (1983): 90.

[3] Łakociński, *Magnus*, 16–17.

Slavist. Among the Swedish biographies of the general it is worth mentioning the works written by Ingvar Eriksson, entitled *Karolinen Magnus Stenbock,* and by Andreas Marklund entitled *Stenbock.* Ära *och ensamhet i Karl XII:s tid*.[4]

The present article is an attempt to show Magnus Stenbock's opinions on the Polish Commonwealth and its inhabitants. Another problem dealt with is an attempt to answer the question whether his opinions and assessments were stereotypical and superficial or resulted from an in-depth knowledge of the country. The author will also indicate the factors that influenced attitudes and behaviours, which the Swedish commander observed in the Polish during the war.

Magnus Stenbock was not only an excellent commander, a brave warrior and skilful organiser within the military sphere. He also was a good speaker and writer, he had a great gift of expressing his thought in a very clear way. When he died he left a rich literary legacy: many official reports, memoranda, instructions, proclamations and private documents (letters and diaries); and just those private documents are the basis for the analysis in the article. From the point of view of the presented subject the reports of his stay in the Polish territory in the years 1702–1703 are the most important: the diary of the expedition of the years 1702–1703, a short description of the expedition of 1704, reports and memoranda addressed to Charles XII, correspondence with Charles XII, letters to his wife, Eva Oxenstierna, a report of the General War Office of the years 1702–1704, dictated by him.[5] Stenbock's reports are an excellent source thanks to which it is possible to reconstruct emotions and opinions of the author. It should be noted that since the rule of Charles X writing war diaries had been included in the regulations of the Swedish army as obligatory, and it had to be done in battlefield, and not *ex post*.[6] Stenbock's reports (diary, description of the expedition, letters to Charles XII) are matter-of-fact, precise, exact, although they also depict dramatic scenes

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[4] Ibidem; I. Eriksson, *Karolinen Magnus Stenbock* (Atlantis 2007); A. Marklund, *Stenbock.* Ära *och ensamhet i Karl XII:s tid* (Lund: Historiska Media, 2008).

[5] *Journal* över *expeditionen 1702–1703af generalmajoren, grefve Magnus Stenbock* (henceforth *Journal*), Karolinska Krigares Dagböcker (henceforth KKD), XII (Lund 1918): 57–86; M. Stenbock, *Kårt Deduction af den Expedition mig uppdragen wart…*, Marienburg d:26 Martii 1704 (henceforth *Deduction*), KKD XII (1918), 87–96; *Bref och skrifvelser till Carl XII från Magnus Stenbock 1702–1705*, KKD, XII (1918), 123–280 (henceforth Stenbock-Karl XII); *Magnus Stenbock och Eva Oxenstierna en brefväxling*, utg. av Carl Magnus Stenbock, del I (Stockholm 1913) (henceforth Stenbock- Oxenstierna). I used the letters to Eva Oxenstierna through Łakociński, *Magnus*; *Berättelse om General-Krigskommissariatets viktigaste* åtgöranden *1702–1704,* (henceforth *Berättelse*) KKD XII (1918), 281–295.

[6] A. Stade, *Erik Dahlberg och Carl X Gustafs Krigshistoria* (Stockholm 1967), rev. J. Serczyk, *Zapiski Historyczne* 35 (1970), 2: 119.

and people's profiles. The author gives many surnames of the Swedes (mainly soldiers) and the Poles, mentions many trivial facts, informs about the movements of the Swedish army in detail, provides its itinerary, describes armed clashes, lists the army units engaged in battle with the numbers of soldiers, informs about the paid tributes and about punishing the reluctant payers. In some cases the names of towns, villages and rivers are deformed, as he might have heard them and not seen their written forms. His attachment to the king is well visible, and so is a strong belief in the rightness of his conduct and in the Swedish *raison d'état*.

It is worth asking the question what it was that shaped the opinions of the Swedish commanders and determined their attitudes and conduct in Poland. The mentality of the Swedish officers were undoubtedly formed by the political, cultural, moral and religious differences between the Polish Commonwealth and Sweden, and the easy victories over the Polish. The Swedes had the characteristics which were missing in the Polish: the determination to achieve goals, the resilience to hardship, an excellent sense of organisation, of which the army was an example. The victorious army shaped the mentality. The conduct of the Swedish officers was also influenced by their material situation. Poland compared to Sweden was a rich country. The officers of the Carolingian army were not rich landowners as their fathers, but low-paid functionaries of the Crown, who had to desperately struggle to support themselves. Many of them strove to recover the former wealth and importance. War was a means to achieve that aim. The correspondence with his wife, Eva Oxenstierna, a daughter of an ancient influential family, shows the needs and interests of Swedish officers in Poland. In the case of Stenbock, in addition to promotions, war was supposed to pay for everything, from the purchase of a landed estate and a real property in town to their furnishings. It is clearly visible in his letter to his wife written in Estonia in 1701: 'If I could afford to live without serving in the army, I would not serve any longer, even a single day'.[7] In Stenbock's case there was an additional motive: the defence of the real estates, which were still in possession of the family, situated in Livonia. In the letter sent after the battle of Narva he wrote: 'I was given a black eye in defence of her [mother's] Livonian estate', and describing his mother's estate he wrote that 'he saw her estate in Livonia with his eyes full of tears'.[8]

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[7] Łakociński, *Magnus*, 25.

[8] M. Kopczyński, "Dania i Szwecja czyli państwa militarne", in: *Rzeczpospolita-Europa XVI–XVIII wiek. Próba konfrontacji*, eds. M. Kopczyński, W. Tygielski (Warsaw 1999), 117; P. Englund, *Połtawa* (Gdańsk 2015), 28.

In spite of the advantages brought by war campaigns, the war itself was arduous. The motif of tiredness of war hardships, of homesickness and of longing for the family and peace frequently appears in Stenbock's letters to his wife. The Saxon diplomacy strove for peace negotiations to finish the war and in December 1700 Stenbock could write to his wife from Narva that he expected that peace would be achieved soon, and in August 1701 he wrote from Courland: 'May God give an end to this war, otherwise we shall all die somewhere'.[9] At the end of 1701 Charles XII together with his army invaded Lithuania, which meant that the war was brought to the territory of the Commonwealth, although formally Poland was not at war with Sweden and from the beginning had been trying to remain neutral. The war was started by Augustus II, Elector of Saxony, without the consent of the *Sejm/Seym* (Parliament) of the Commonwealth. The politics of the Polish monarch led to an internal split and a civil war; there appeared two opposing camps: supporters of the Wettiner and followers of the Swedish king. The opposition against the Polish king negotiated with Charles XII and surrendered to him, hoping to overthrow Augustus II. The aim of Charles XII was not a war against Poland but the dethronement of Augustus II. At the beginning of 1702 Stenbock informed his wife that 'we are marching towards Lithuania. The war has been declared'. He underlined that the defensive war had changed into the aggressive one, and he predicted that the Polish would not be inactive.[10]

The attitude of Stenbock towards the Polish and Poland was not different from the one of Charles XII or other Swedish commanders and officers, and it undoubtedly resulted from his military experience. The Polish army was not prepared to war, especially when it was compared with the Swedish army, perfectly organised; the tactics used by the Polish command was not impressive: avoiding a decisive battle, and when forced to it preferring defensive clashes;[11] as a result, the army of Charles XII won easy victories over the Polish. Those circumstances favoured forming rather a low opinion of the Swedes on the Polish, they confirmed the Swedes in their belief that the Polish army was of low military value and reinforced the disrespectful, or even contemptuous, image of the Polish and Poland. In Stenbock that condescending and sarcastic attitude towards the inhabitants of

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[9] Łakociński, *Magnus*, 27.

[10] Ibidem; I. Eriksson, *Karolinen Magnus Stenbock* (Stockholm 2007), 97.

[11] J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej w dobie wojny północnej* (Warszawa 1956), 196; idem, "Polskie wojsko i sztuka wojenna w czasie wielkiej wojny północnej", *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości* XXI (1978), 359–370.

the Commonwealth was visible from the very beginning. When in Autumn 1700 the conflict with Augustus II was approaching he reassured his wife that on the part of the Polish there was no threat, because they were just rogues and peasants; and in spring 1702 he wrote from Lithuania that she did not have to worry about him as the Polish were cowards by nature.[12] The same overtones could be perceived after the clash with the troops of Michał Wiśniowiecki, the Lithuanian field Hetman in Vilnius in April 1702. Stenbock wrote that the attack was repelled but the Polish 'did not want to fight and the pursuit was a failure, too'.[13] The General's attitude towards the Polish hardened after the Swedish army occupied Warsaw without a fight (May 1702), after the battle of Klissow (July 1702), after the daring capturing of Cracow (August 1702) and Lublin (the beginning of 1703). In September 1703 the Swedish Corps captured Poznań, in October Toruń was captured, in December 1703 the Swedish troops occupied Elbląg without any resistance on the part of the inhabitants. Next they soon occupied the whole of Warmia and a significant part of Royal Prussia. Charles XII did not manage to capture Gdańsk, but the city had to pay high tribute and make many concessions. In September 1704 the Swedes captured Lviv without any effort. In 1705 they dominated in the whole of the country.

The battle of Klissow did not bring the Polish army fame. In the culminating moment when the fate was being decided the Polish companies under the command of Hetman Hieronim Lubomirski retreated from the battlefield. The dishonourable behaviour of the Hetman was not the result of his cowardice, as it was interpreted by the Swedes, and Charles XII sneered at the Polish gentry that they had better turn swords into ploughshares.[14] Lubomirski represented the overwhelming majority of the Polish gentry of the Commonwealth who wanted to remain neutral and did not want to engage in the war with Sweden, and all the less he intended to help Augustus II[15] to win a victory. In that way Lubomirski demonstrated his understanding of the national security which was synonymous with the defence of the king. It was not understood by the majority of the Polish gentry, and the Swedes treated it with contempt. Later on when the Saxon army threatened the Swedish troops Charles XII, remembering the retreat of Lubomirski's companies, responded calmly: 'Let them go wherever they want; they will

[12] Stenbock – Oxenstierna, Parnawa 16.10.1700, no. 202 and Ragowo 1.03.1702, no. 288.
[13] Łakociński, *Magnus*, 30.
[14] Biblioteka Czartoryskich (henceforth B. Czart.), ms. 1995, Relacja z obozu, 19.07.1702, p. 117.
[15] K. Piwarski, *Hieronim Lubomirski, hetman wielki koronny* (Cracow 1929), 89–91.

soon retreat again'.[16] The king still before the battle of Klissow seemed to be in a very good mood and he was sure of the victory in spite of the fact that the condition of his army was rather poor. After the campaign in Livonia and Lithuania the soldiers of Stenbock's corps were tired and hungry, many of them were ill, and when informed that the artillery forces were not strong enough Charles replied that 'soon we'll capture the enemy's cannons and we'll have more of them than we need'.[17]

The victorious battle of Klissow opened the way for the Swedes to Cracow. On August 10th, 1702 Wawel was captured by stratagem, without a single shot, and – as it circulated in the Swedish folk tradition – by one man, Charles XII. The Wawel 200-strong crew did not even try to put up any resistance. Stenbock was given an unlimited power over the city; in a letter to his wife he called himself 'the governor, commissioner and even the devil of the city', which well depicts his actions in the Wawel Stronghold.[18] The General imposed a high tribute and other taxes on the inhabitants, and he confiscated valuables; his search in the Wawel Cathedral for hidden treasures got a lot of publicity.[19]

Gdańsk was much more difficult to capture. The city had sufficiently strong fortifications to effectively defend itself against the Swedes. Stenbock was entrusted with the task of capturing the city. He arrived in Gdańsk at the beginning of 1703. Having only 4,000 soldiers he had no chance to capture the city by force. The inhabitants rejected Stenbock's demands to pay tribute, to hand over their artillery and to give consent to place the Swedish garrison at the mouth of the Vistula. The attitude of the inhabitants irritated the king and Stenbock. The king in his letter to Stenbock wrote: 'If the inhabitants of Gdańsk do not treat you seriously, they will pay for it sooner or later'.[20] The negotiations between the General and the inhabitants took a long time, finally Stenbock forced the inhabitants to pay tribute and to give consent to let in Swedish ships with recruits and military supplies.[21] Stenbock used his stay in Gdańsk for his private matters. He informed

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16 Z. Anusik, *Karol XII* (Wrocław 2006), 91.

17 Ibidem, 88

18 Łakociński, *Magnus*, 33; A. Górny, K. Piwarski, *Kraków w czasie drugiego najazdu Szwedów na Polskę 1702–1709* (Cracow 1932), 25–27.

19 G. Majewska, "Obraz szwedzkiego wojska w Rzeczpospolitej okresu wielkiej wojny północnej (1700–1721)", *Slavica Lundensia* 28 (2017), 100.

20 Anusik, *Karol*, 111.

21 E. Cieślak, "W wirze wojny północnej", in: *Historia Gdańska*, ed. E. Cieślak, vol. III/1: *1665–1793*, part 2: *Okres wojen i dekoniunktury gospodarczej (1700–1793)* (Gdańsk 1993), 485–508.

his wife what the purpose of his stay was: 'to impose tribute, and at the same time to send you a loot stolen in Poland'.[22] The king sent Stenbock to Gdańsk several times, also to look after the military transports coming from Sweden and the shipment of prisoners of war and loots and recruitment to the dragoon regiment. In the letters from Gdańsk and Elbląg the general complained to Charles XII about the difficulties to conduct recruitment in Gdańsk; he wrote that the Swedes were not popular in town and none of his compatriots could feel safe there.[23]

In July 1704 Stenbock marches with his regiment southwards to Lviv.[24] He spoke about his expedition to Lviv unceremoniously: 'we are going to Lviv rather to make money than to fight'.[25] Preparing the capturing of the town the general in the company of his officers made a reconnaissance of the fortifications. He talked about them in a disdainful way and declared that he and his soldiers could capture the town without any assistance. 'On September 5th [Charles XII, GM] encircled its walls and the day after he captured it very quickly by storm', and the inhabitants were 'slaughtered, everyone who dared to resist', wrote the author of *Historya skrócona Karola XII...*[26]

Lviv was captured by storm without any bigger losses. It was a success, but as the defenders did not resist strongly Stenbock and Charles XII did not value the victory highly. He wrote to his wife about the event in that way: 'I'm sure you'll learn through normal channels how HM the king with a sword in his hand captured the city of Lviv. I was present there, got away in one piece and I feel fine'.[27] The march of the Swedish army was marked with burnt villages and towns.

The Polish were considered to be cowards and not to have the will to fight, and the Polish army was thought to be weak; now new accusations appeared: that they were two-faced, wavering, hypocritical and insincere. Magnus Stenbock as the General Director of the War Office of the Commonwealth was responsible for supplying the army and for its logistics. The Swedish army lived at the expense of the occupied country, depriving it of everything they needed by means of the tributes ruthlessly imposed. Still in June 1702 Stenbock, as the governor of Warsaw,

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[22] Łakociński, *Magnus*, 79.

[23] Stenbock – Karl XII, Gdańsk, 14.11.1703, Elbląg 1.01.1704, 216–220.

[24] Anusik, *Karol*, 124.

[25] Łakociński, *Magnus*, 101.

[26] *Historyja skrócona Karola XII króla szwedzkiego z francuskiego na polski język przetłumaczona* (1755), 33. According to Antoni Hyrcyk, the Polish translator, the author, a Frenchman, was to accompany Charles XII in his campaign in Poland.

[27] Łakociński, *Magnus*, 102.

tried to make a good impression. Being afraid of the reaction of the inhabitants to the tributes he issued an announcement, which guaranteed them security and a payment for food supplies over the set limits, he was also responsible for the discipline among the Swedish soldiers.[28] After the battle of Klissow he showed a new face. Fulfilling the duties of the director of the General War Office he proved himself to be not only an efficient organiser but also a ruthless plunderer, who unscrupulously exacted tributes in the form of cash and food supplies from the towns occupied by the Swedes and from landed estates; he tolerated rapes, violence and plundering, of which a significant part of profits lined his pocket. In an appeal to the inhabitants of the south-east voivodships the General announced that evading payments would be punishable by 'royal disgrace and destruction of property', and he also announced that the taxes would be enforced by a military warrant of execution, which meant confiscation of property or burning it.[29] The king himself confirmed him in using such methods.[30] On the other hand, so as not to put off the supporters of Sweden in the Commonwealth altogether the king was prone to some concessions. Contradictory directives required flexibility on the part of Stenbock and a skill of manoeuvring. In turn, the Poles collaborating with the Swedes wanted the taxes exacted by the Swedish to be possibly the least burdensome. Hence, also the Polish had to be flexible.

Although many Poles took sides with the Swedes and collaborated with the invader, Stenbock was aware of the fact that the gentry's allegiance to the Swedish king was illusory. Therefore, he had not confidence in the Polish, accused them of insincerity, unscrupulousness and disobedience. The General's attitude towards the Polish was well rendered by the words recorded by Baron Nils Reuterholm, a Swedish diplomat, which Magnus was to utter: 'They [the Polish] should be treated as puppies that are being trained: to pat them, to stroke their heads, but at the same time to flog them with a scourge'.[31] Stenbock himself wrote: 'The whole of Poland hates us, and although they seem to be our friends when we are together, they murder us all as soon as they catch one of us…'.[32] In October 1702 in a letter to Charles XII he complained about the disobedience of the Polish and

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[28] M. Wagner, *Kliszów 1702* (Warsaw 1994), 31.

[29] Central Archives of Historical Records (*Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych*), Archiwum Radziwiłłów, Jnl. II, no 1970, file 14, Appeal of the General Commissioner (*Odezwa Generalnego Komisarza*) Gen. Stenbock 23.10.1702.

[30] *Deduction*, 87–88.

[31] "Nils Reuterholms Journal", *Historiska Handlingar* 36 (1957), 2: 15.

[32] Łakociński, *Magnus*, 30; Stenbock – Oxenstierna, vol. I, no. 300, 29.06.1702.

expressed a belief that the only way to force them to be loyal and obedient was to punish them ruthlessly by fire and sword. He complained about the stubbornness of the Polish and the difficulties in exacting the taxes. Magnus accused the gentry of Lesser Poland of insubordination, he wrote 'The local gentry were so stubborn that none of them, who lived tree miles off the road, would not come here, unless I went to their place…' (the point was to bring tribute to the Swedish camp).[33] In his diary he often described cases of abandoning homesteads and taking away all the property by the owners before the Swedish quartermasters arrived in the village to exact the tribute. He added that such a village used to be burnt down as punishment.[34] Rural homesteads were burnt also when the owners encouraged the peasants to resist against the Swedes. As Stenbock wrote in his diary, in one of the villages in Lesser Poland the homestead and the presbytery were burnt down because the priest and the starosta (a seneschal, a senior royal administrative official) instigated the peasants to rebellion and then they escaped.[35] Magnus often complained to the king about the difficulties in exacting tribute. In one of his letters he wrote: '…everybody escaped leaving their homesteads and taking everything they could…', but at the same time he assured that he would do everything he could to collect what was due.[36]

Hypocrisy, unscrupulousness, the gift of persuasion and flexibility were the characteristics, according to Stenbock, of Stefan and Józef (especially Józef), Great Crown Hetman Feliks Potocki's sons. On the one hand, they seemed to be supporters of the Swedes who declared loyalty to Charles XII; on the other hand, they were leaders of the gentry's resistance against paying tribute.[37] Thus, Potocki could be compared to Stenbock in his unscrupulousness and flexibility, he might have even exceeded the general. Angry with the behaviour of Józef the general complained to the king that Potocki, like all the Polish, was crafty and beguiled them; embittered Magnus claimed that: '…there is even not a single honest Pole in the whole of Poland, unless he has his own interest in mind'.[38]

The ruthless methods of exacting taxes were also used by other Swedish commanders. Plundering of towns and villages and burning them down were frequent.

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[33] Stenbock – Karl XII, Pilzno 29.10.1702, p. 136; Łakociński, *Magnus*, 48, 49.
[34] *Journal*, 63; Stenbock – Karl XII, Dębica 31.10.1702, p. 137.
[35] *Journal*, 63.
[36] Stenbock – Karl XII, Sokal 23.01.1703, p. 154.
[37] *Deduktion*, p. 93.
[38] Stenbock – Karl XII, Sokal 23.01.1703, p. 153; *cf*.: Łakociński, *Magnus*, 67.

It triggered in the Poles stronger and stronger negative reactions. The tactics commonly used was the one of scorched earth, the property was hidden, the inhabitants took shelter in inaccessible places, or even took up arms against the invader. Stenbock reluctantly had to agree with Potocki that common sense required the terror to be reduced, but '…in the meantime, I am prowling like a devil, and I grab whatever I can…', he wrote.[39]

Stenbock was also charged with the task of convincing the obstructive voivodships to support Charles XII. The general kept sending numerous appeals to the gentry demanding that fighting be stopped and Augustus II dethroned. Negotiations with the gentry hardly brought anything, the Swedish arguments were not convincing, which – according to Stenbock – was a result of Polish stubbornness. 'The worst thing is the Polish are so stubborn as mules, and they will do only what they want themselves', he claimed.[40] When the attempts to convince the Polish turned out to be fruitless, Magnus tried other means – blackmail, violence, plundering – to get support on the part of the gentry. It was well illustrated by the case of Jan Stadnicki, the voivode of Volhynia (Polish: Wołyń). The Swedish commander informed the king that he was going to detain the voivode until the gentry declared support for the Swedes, otherwise Potocki would be shot dead.[41] Stenbock attitude towards Hieronim Lubomirski was friendlier. 'The landed estates of the Hetman will be burnt down unless he goes over together with his troops to Charles XII's side', announced Magnus. There were more cases of that type. Rzeszów was threatened to be ravaged and burnt down if the Crown army with General Brant did not join the Swedish.[42] Stenbock with deliberation kept destroying estates belonging to the supporters of the Saxon; he also destroyed the properties belonging to people who were not loyal to Charles XII.

The Swedish commander did not have any confidence in Hetman Hieronim Lubomirski in spite of his assurances of loyalty. In Autumn 1702 in a letter to the king Magnus wrote: 'The Hetman [Lubomirski] renders me all the possible honours, he announces that he wants to pay tribute regularly, that he has given his troops orders not to take up arms against the Swedish; but, as I don't believe his assurances I have given the order to arrest everything which will seem suspicious

[39] Łakociński, *Magnus*, 68.

[40] Stenbock – Karl XII, Dąbrowa 25.10.1702, p. 133.

[41] Stenbock – Karl XII, Rzeszów 24.12.1702, p. 145; *cf.*: *Berättelse*, 285.

[42] B. Czart, ms 196, *Doniesienie wiadomości podczas szwedzkiej inkursji, 13 XI 1702*, p. 1194; B. Czart, ms, 525, *Relacja posłańca hetmana Lubomirskiego z rozmowy ze Stenbockiem z 5.01.1703*, p. 253.

to me'.[43] Lubomirski's attitude towards the Swedish was wavering; he manoeuvred between the support to Augustus and the support to Charles. He wanted to keep neutrality between the fighting parties; as a result he won nobody over and put many off. Among the Swedes he had an opinion of a man who was capable of concessions but who did not deserve confidence. Stenbock had no confidence in Lubomirski, but he did not keep his own promises given to Lubomirski. He guaranteed the Lubomirski's envoy the security of his estates, but he broke his promise. He exacted high tribute from Lubomirski's properties in the Rzeszów Region without leniency.[44] Inability to compromise and quarrelsomeness had a negative impact on the regime of the Commonwealth according to Stenbock. The gentry could not reach an agreement at *Sejmiki* (the regional-level elected legislature); the Sejmik of the Belz Voivodeship, which debated for four days, ended in a fiasco, as the general wrote.[45]

Other defects of the Polish mentioned by Stenbock were envy and vindictiveness. According to him, they helped the Swedes find hidden property and exact tribute. As a result of denunciation, from the very beginning of the occupation of Cracow, as soon as the Swedish soldiers had been accommodated, they started looking for real or alleged deposits left by the inhabitants who had left the town fleeing from the war.[46] Moving in the Polish aristocratic circles Stenbock noticed intrigues and dissolution. He observed sexual relations among the Polish aristocracy kept changing. He had a low opinion of women of the Commonwealth. In a letter to his wife he wrote that women in Poland were like 'medusas, and a cure for love'.[47] Undoubtedly, such an opinion is an expression of hypocrisy of the author, and probably it was due to calm his wife; Magnus was difficult to please as far as women were concerned, among the Swedish elites he had a reputation of being a dissolute womanizer.

Stenbock did not like the Polish, but in official relations with the Polish community he displayed some positive feelings. After a feast organised by Rzeszów Piarists to celebrate the Swedish commander, the general invited the monks to another feast in the castle. There were toasts, and the Swede gave the Piarists

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[43] Stenbock – Karl XII, Dębica 31.10.1702, p. 137, quote after Łakociński, *Magnus*, 50.

[44] B. Czart, ms 525, *Relacja posłańca hetmana Lubomirskiego z rozmowy ze Stenbockiem z 5.01.1703*, p. 253; *Berättelse*, p. 284.

[45] Stenbock – Karl XII, Bełz 20.01.1703, p. 149.

[46] Górny, Piwarski, *Kraków*, 31; Łakociński, *Magnus*, 41.

[47] Łakociński, *Magnus*, 120.

a painting of St Stanislaus Kostka, and allowed them to look for food in less destroyed areas. In Warsaw, where there were negotiations on the tribute, the occupational authorities and the Swedish soldiers displayed a positive attitude towards the local authorities and inhabitants, but after signing the agreement the Swedish party intensified their restrictive activities. After capturing Toruń the winners behaved in a polite way at the beginning, the Saxon commanders and officers were entertained to dinner, and the soldiers were given provisions; but those friendly gestures were followed by a heavy Swedish occupation.[48]

While staying in Poland Stenbock often complained about the hardship of the marches of his troops and other military actions, and especially about the army supply. Swedish army commanders complained about the bad condition of the roads, especially in the south-east regions of Poland. 'Our horses might suffer because of bad road', wrote Stenbock from somewhere around Rzeszów.[49] Since the beginning of 1703 the Swedish army was plagued with food shortage. Exacting tribute was more and more difficult in the country enfeebled by war. In February 1705 the general sent from Braniewo a message to the king that the country was burnt and ravaged, and peasants suffered from hunger. He wrote that he did not neglect anything, that he used all the possible means, strict discipline and severity so as to exact the highest possible taxes. The troops that exacted taxes were sent everywhere. Yet, Magnus noticed that it was impossible to act too unceremoniously, as everybody would flee to Brandenburg, leaving empty walls.[50] In July of the same year, he complained that the tribute from Warmia had been only partly collected, because the impoverished gentry could not pay anything from their burnt estates.[51] Stenbock was worried by the threat on the part of Polish and Saxon troops to disrupt the transport links. He felt acute anxiety about the collected treasure and how to safely send it to Sweden, especially when the army was far away from the safe seaside bases. At the end of 1704 from Wschowa he wrote to his wife: '…as soon as my luggage arrives, I'll send you, Angel, my loot, unless it is stolen somewhere *en route*'.[52]

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[48] J. Nieć, *Rzeszowskie za Sasów: szkic historyczny* (Rzeszów 1938), 45; M. Wagner, *Kliszów 1702* (Warsaw 1994), 37; J. Poraziński, "Oblężenie Torunia w 1703 r.: uwagi i refleksje w związku z 300 rocznicą", *Rocznik Toruński*, 30 (2003): 75.

[49] Stenbock – Karl XII, Strzyżów 4.12.1702, p. 140.

[50] Stenbock – Karl XII, Braniewo 23.02.1705, p. 263.

[51] Stenbock – Karl XII, Malbork 15–25.07.1705, p. 271.

[52] Łakociński, *Magnus*, 104, 106

More optimistic news appeared much less frequently in the reports and correspondence of the Swedish general. Here are some examples: in March 1702 from Wiłkomierz, Lithuania he wrote to his wife: 'It is OK here. We're sleeping, eating and drinking free of charge, end even sometimes we are given money, and we shall as long as we can…'; in October of the same year from Cracow: 'Thank God I feel fine and live like a grand *seigneur*, I eat using silverware and I have my own six musicians'.[53] The lavish life of the Polish aristocracy and gentry was undoubtedly attractive for the people who were not accustomed to luxury and splendour. Higher officers from the circles around Charles XII would have very fond memories of their stay in Poland (June 1702). A rich social life flourished there, with marvellous feasts and balls. And Stenbock was known for his penchant for grand feasts and parties, he became famous for organising fetes and various celebrations. A good example could be the ceremonies at the Castle in Rzeszów (November 1702) to celebrate the victory over Hieronim Lubomirski, which was immortalised in print.[54]

The long-lasting occupation of the Commonwealth undoubtedly had an impact on the Swedish invaders. As a result of the contacts with the local population, which not always were hostile, the Swedes gained a lot. Stenbock, a sociable person, established contact with Polish supporters of the Swedish and Stanisław Leszczyński. The Swedes were interested in colourful exotic attire of the Polish. The general was leaving Cracow in 1702 dressed in a Hungarian robe with a Polish sabre.[55] He must have liked pickled cucumbers because he wrote to his wife: 'I'll do everything I can to deliver the recipe for pickling cucumbers'.[56]

Stenbock criticised the battle worthiness of the Polish army, but in a critical moment for Sweden he introduced Polish solutions. Preparing the defence of Scania against the Danish invasion at the beginning of 1710, he used the Polish models and demanded levy in mass of peasants be organised following the example of Poland. So as to keep order a few officers were assigned to the peasants and the commander-in-chief was appointed in the rank of general. That solution fully worked very well in battlefield.[57]

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[53] Ibidem, 29, 35

[54] Nieć, *Rzeszowskie*, 44.

[55] Górny, Piwarski, *Kraków*, 43.

[56] Łakociński, *Magnus*, 97.

[57] Ibidem, 122.

The war was an occasion for capturing spoils. Plundering took place openly, with the king's knowledge and consent, as well as the transports of the war spoils to Sweden. Stenbock's participation in the war spoils was probably bigger than other officers of the Swedish army, which resulted from the position he occupied in the court of Charles XII, from his official posts, especially the post of director of the General War Office, from the key role that he played in the most important battles, and also from the post of the governor of Warsaw, Cracow and Toruń; as the governor he was given gifts in cash and in kind. Capturing the spoils of war did not cost him much effort or attention. In the correspondence with his wife the artefacts he stole in Poland and their safe transport to Sweden took a lot of room. In Autumn 1701 he sent from Courland a red coat trimmed with a gold tape lined with fur.[58] With the distance to the Baltic ports growing longer, the communication with Sweden became more difficult, and in a letter from Kavarskas, Lithuania Magnus complained that he could not send linen, which was there the most beautiful in the world and cheap; from Vilnius he wrote: 'I have multiplied my property here in Lithuania with silver bowls and spoons, with horses and robes'; in Lithuania he also collected church silverware and chasubles.[59] In 1704 from Rawicz he sent 'two tablecloths and two dozen doilies, there aren't prettier'; from Toruń he wrote: 'I captured a pretty, however small, loot in Toruń, which I'll sent to you. It is not valuable, but still it is a nice souvenir from Poland'.[60] For Stenbock and other Swedes the most valuable acquisitions were: Polish weaponry, silverware, richly ornamented attire, horse tack, tapestries, valuable fabrics, bedclothes. During his stay in Greater Poland the general wrote to Eva Oxenstierna: 'We are here in the land of beautiful bedclothes'. He sent to Sweden also tablecloths, tableware, tents, carpets, mirrors, candlesticks, furs, clocks, paintings.[61]

Staying for five years in the Commonwealth Magnus Stenbock had many occasions to get to know the Polish. Many features of the Polish character undoubtedly deserved to be condemned. Yet, quite often his opinions were exaggerated, simplified or unjust. Stenbock, like other Swedish commanders, seemed not to notice that maintaining a foreign army in a country being destroyed by both parties (the Polish were harassing the enemy) had to trigger a reaction. He seemed not to understand that the situation in which the collaborating Polish were required

[58] *Stenbock – Oxenstierna*, a letter dated 10.10.1701, p. 159.
[59] *Deduction*, 95.
[60] Łakociński, *Magnus*, 29, 91, 107.
[61] Ibidem, 122–123.

a lot of flexibility and the skill of manoeuvring, so that the tributes and other taxes exacted by the invader would be possibly the lowest. He did not want to accept the fact that the fickleness and hypocrisy of the Polish society, which the Swedes complained of, resulted from the hostile conduct of the foreign army contrary to their declared friendly attitudes. He seemed not to understand that violence and plundering of the Swedish army were the reason the followers of Charles backed down from their pledge to support him.

Assessments and opinions given by Magnus Stenbock on Poland and their inhabitants did not differ from the ones given by Charles XII and other Swedish commanders participating in the Great Northern War.[62] The Polish were accused of recklessness, duplicity, instability, unscrupulousness, unruliness, self-interest. The gentry were criticised for betraying their obligations, for conceit and a condescending attitude towards the others. The battle worthiness of the Polish troops was ridiculed, they were accused of indiscipline and disobedience. On the other hand, the weaponry and soldiers' kit of the Polish winged Hussars were impressive. The regime of the Commonwealth was criticised. The Swedes were shocked at the unlimited freedom of the gentry, which crippled the Parliament and the Sejmiki; it surprised them that the king was not respected.

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[62] Cf.: G. Majewska, "Szwedzkie elity w XVII i XVIII wieku o Polsce i jej mieszkańcach", *Slavica Lundensia* 26 (2011): 39–60.

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RZECZPOSPOLITA I JEJ MIESZKAŃCY W DOBIE WIELKIEJ WOJNY PÓŁNOCNEJ W OPINII GENERAŁA MAGNUSA STENBOCKA

Słowa kluczowe: Polska, Szwecja**,** wojna północna, Magnus Stenbock

Abstrakt

Magnus Stenbock należał do najwybitniejszych dowódców w armii Karola XII czasu wielkiej wojny północnej (1700–1721). Na ziemiach polskich przebywał w charakterze okupanta wraz ze szwedzkim wojskiem w latach 1702–1706. Jego nastawienie do Polski i Polaków wynikało z doświadczeń wojennych, zwłaszcza łatwych zwycięstw odnoszonych nad Polakami. Zwycięstwa utwierdziły Szwedów w przekonaniu o małej wartości militarnej armii przeciwnika i sprzyjały utrwaleniu się lekceważącego, przechodzącego w pogardę stosunku do mieszkańców ziem Rzeczpospolitej. Mimo że wielu Polaków stanęło po szwedzkiej stronie i współpracowało z najeźdźcą, Stenbock nie darzył ich zaufaniem, zarzucał obłudę, dwulicowość, niestałość w poglądach, oskarżał o nieposłuszeństwo i brak skrupułów. Sytuacja w jakiej znaleźli się kolaborujący z Karolem XII Polacy wymagała umiejętności lawirowania, tak by ściągane kontrybucje były możliwie najmniej uciążliwe. Bezwzględne metody ściągania przez Szwedów kontrybucji wyzwalały jednak w Polakach nieposłuszeństwo i opór. Obracając się wśród polskiej arystokracji i szlachty, Stenbock dostrzegał skłócenie, intrygi, rozwiązłość. Atrakcyjny dla szwedzkiego generała, nieprzywykłego do zbytku i przepychu, był wystawny tryb życia polskich wyższych sfer. Zainteresowanie budził nie tylko egzotyczny ubiór Polaków, ale także broń, srebrne zastawy stołowe, dywany, kosztowne tkaniny, futra, pościel, obrusy, lustra, zegary, obrazy. Wiele z tych przedmiotów Stenbock wywiózł w postaci łupów do Szwecji. Generał krytycznie oceniał wartość bojową polskiej armii, ale dla obrony Skanii przed Danią utworzył pospolite ruszenie chłopów na wzór polski. Przebywając 5 lat na ziemiach polskich Magnus Stenbock miał wiele okazji dobrze poznać Polaków. Często jednak wydawał uproszczone, przesadzone i niesprawiedliwe oceny. Wiele cech polskiego charakteru zasługiwało niewątpliwie na potępienie, ale na chwiejność,

dwulicowość, lawirowanie czy nieposłuszeństwo społeczeństwa polskiego, na co skarżył się generał, wpływała sytuacja w jakiej znaleźli się kolaborujący ze Szwedami Polacy oraz postępowanie obcego wojska. Oceny i sądy wydawane przez Magnusa Stenbocka na temat Polski i jej mieszkańców nie odbiegały od opinii formułowanych przez Karola XII oraz innych szwedzkich dowódców wojskowych.

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NORWEGIAN SHIPOWNERS IN THE PORTS OF THE POLISH CUSTOMS AREA IN THE YEARS 1919–1939 (MAIN PROBLEMS)

Keywords: Polish-Norwegian relations in the years 1919–1939, Norwegian merchant fleet, Norwegian shipowners, economy of Gdańsk in the years 1919–1939, economy of Gdynia in the years 1919–1939

Summary

In the interwar period the Norwegian merchant fleet was ranked fourth-sixth in the world. That is why Norway was an attractive economic partner for Poland, which in 1919 did not possess any merchant fleet. In the same year the Norwegian government sent to Poland an economic mission headed by Samuel Eyde, the Norwegian shipowners and their Union were represented by Thor Thoresen. Regrettably, at the beginning of the 1920s financial problems of Poland resulted in the lack of interest in operating the port of Gdańsk on the part of the Norwegian shipowners.

In 1921 one of the biggest Norwegian shipowners, *Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab* (BDS), took up transporting herring to Gdańsk purchased within the so called second Polish-Norwegian Herring Contract. In the same year BDS set up a branch in Gdańsk, and in 1928 – in Gdynia, *Bergenske Baltic Transport plc* ('Bergenske' or BBT). In 1921 BDS set up a navigational line to the Baltic ports and London, and in 1931 – together with *Det Stavangerske Dampskibsselskab* – another line to the ports of western Norway. BDS participated in the creation of smaller shipping companies (*Nord Ost-See Reederei A-G*, *Standard Line Reederei A-G*, *Bellmore Reederei A-G*, *Norna Reederei-Gesellschaft*

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mbH). The BDS ships also sailed in the South-American line, *Den Norske Syd-Amerika-linjen* (SAL).

Among the Norwegian shipowners the biggest line to Gdańsk and Gdynia was operated by Wilhelm Wilhelmsen (*Gulf-Gdynia Line*, GGL). Thanks to that line a huge quantities of American cotton were delivered to the ports of the Polish customs area. Navigational lines were operated also by Fred Olsen & CO. (a line to the ports of eastern Norway) and *Gunstein Stray & Sønn* (*Vore-Line* to Antwerp). The Norwegian shipowners in many cases used tramps, which dominated in Gdańsk, and so were they in Gdynia with the exception of the years 1934–1936.

An essential element of the activity of BBT was broking and forwarding. BBT was one of the biggest brokers in Gdańsk and Gdynia. In addition, thanks to the fact that *'Bergford' Holz-Speditions und Lager GmbH* and *'Berghof' Lager und Warrant GmbH* remained in the same hands, BBT exported a large quantity of wood from Gdańsk. 'Bergenske' cooperated also with Polish forwarding companies, the Polish Lloyd and C. Hartwig. All those companies had branches in Poland and abroad, which enabled BBT to run complementary transport, i.e. using sea and land transport.

In the interwar period (1919–1939) the Norwegian merchant shipping was the 4th to 6th biggest in the world and its scope of operation included mainly ocean ports of the world. As far as the entries into the ports of Gdańsk and Gdynia are concerned, it occupied – respectively – the 5th and the 6th places. The importance of the Norwegian shipowner in the Polish harbours (the Port of Gdańsk was included in the Polish customs area on January 1st, 1922) was augmented by the fact that the Republic of Poland was a young state at that time and possessed a tiny merchant shipping, which could not satisfy the country's shipping needs; additionally, the size and importance of the Norwegian merchant shipping might further the development of the ports in Gdańsk and Gdynia, as well as enhance establishing ocean connections of those ports.

The above presented facts translate into research postulates, which will be analysed in this article. What should be first investigated is the scope of engagement of the Norwegian shipowners in the ports of Gdańsk and Gdynia. Additionally, the article is an attempt to answer the question concerning the extent to which the Norwegian merchant fleet was used by Poland. As this article is an abbreviated version of a wider publication (to be launched soon), here the characterisation of the sources and the current state of research have been omitted.

Attempts to Establish Shipping Relations with the Port of Gdańsk by the Norwegian Shipowners

In 1919 the young Polish State suffered from the shortages of the basic food articles and raw materials. The country's economic problems were exacerbated by the fact that Poland had no merchant shipping then, which could transport goods. That is why Norway – as a neutral state not related to any of the belligerent countries – that possessed an enormous merchant fleet (1,892,000 GRT[1]) was a very attractive economic partner for the Polish authorities. The Norwegians seemed to be interested in the Polish matters, which was proved by – *inter alia* – the Norwegian press, where the importance of regaining independence by Poland was emphasised.[2] A perfect occasion to develop closer relations between the Norwegian shipowners and Gdańsk appeared at the peace conference in Paris, where the Norwegian industrial and commercial circles were looking for markets for their raw materials and food articles, especially herring, as they had just lost the Russian market. Fredrik Hartwig Wedel-Jarlsberg,[3] the envoy of the Kingdom of Norway in Paris, was appointed president of the Norwegian delegation to the peace conference in Paris. An important role was also played by Samuel Eyde, an engineer and industrialist, and Christian Monsen,[4] a shipowner. Poland was represented by Roman Dmowski, Ignacy Jan Paderewski and Władysław Grabski. An important event that facilitated the bilateral relations was the recognition of Poland by the Norwegian government as an independent state by virtue of the Royal rescript dated 31st May, 1919.[5]

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1 J.O. Egeland, *Kongeveien. Norsk skipsfart fra århundreskiftet til den Annen verdenskrig*, vol. 2 (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1973), 249.

2 M. Stachurska, „Obraz Polski w prasie norweskiej w latach 1914–1918", *Rocznik Gdański* 64 (2005), 1–2: 70.

3 E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, „Stosunki polityczne i gospodarcze Polski z Norwegią w latach 1918–1926", *Zapiski Historyczne* 70 (2005) 2/3: 54.

4 A. Matla, „Zarys polsko-norweskich kontaktów gospodarczych w latach 1918–1921", *Komunikaty Instytutu Bałtyckiego* 20 (1983) 35: 152; J. Szymański, *Stosunki gospodarcze Polski z Norwegią w latach 1918–1929* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2005), 28.

5 R. Omang, *Norsk utenrikstjeneste*, vol. 2: *Stormfulle tider 1913–1928* (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1959), 304; Szymański, *Stosunki gospodarcze*, 39; idem, „Etablering av diplomatiske forbindelser mellom Polen og Norge i årene 1919–1923", *Folia Scandinavica Posnaniensia* 9 (2006): 305. In the letter from KNP to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) dated 17th June, 1919, and in *'Monitor Polski'* there appeared the information that the Polish State had been recognised by Norway by virtue of the Royal rescript dated 21st May, 1919. Cf.: Archiwum Akt Nowych (henceforth: AAN), Przedstawicielstwo Rady Regencyjnej Królestwa Polskiego w Berlinie, catalogue no. 20, Letter from KNP to MSZ (MFA) dated 17th June, 1919, 924; *'Monitor Polski'*, 136 (21.06.1919), 2.

Official Polish-Norwegian talks took place in Paris in June.[6] The Norwegians had already known that the Polish intended to build a new port on the Baltic shore they were given. The Polish were of the opinion that from among the three Scandinavian states the best choice was Norway, as it possessed a huge merchant fleet and was able to breathe new life into the Polish maritime commerce, at the same time taking care of exports and imports of Poland. Those plans resulted from Poland's aspirations to become independent from the domination of the German economy, and especially the German merchant fleet.[7]

The Polish-Norwegian talks produced tangible results already on July 9th, 1919 when – in view of a fall in the turnover with France – a decision was made in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Utenriksdepartementet*, UD) to organise an economic mission in Poland headed by S. Eyde.[8] Another important decision was to appoint a representative of the Norwegian Union of Shipowners (*Norges Rederforbund*, NRF)[9] to be sent to Poland. Kristofer Lehmkuhl, director of *Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab* (BDS), one of the biggest Norwegian shipping companies, proposed Einar Nielsen for that position, a member of the BDS board and a person responsible for shipping contacts within the Baltic Sea in that company.[10] The management of NRF appointed Thor Thoresen as the shipowner's candidate.[11]

The Norwegian mission headed by Eyde came to Poland in August 1919. The meeting of the Polish and Norwegian representatives took place in Warsaw, with

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6 E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, „Działalność dyplomatyczna i gospodarcza Samuela Eydego w Polsce w latach 1919–1923", in: *Polska-Norwegia 1905–2005*, ed. J. Szymański (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2005): 97.

7 Nasjonalbiblioteket i Oslo, Håndskrifstsamlingen, Sam Eydes arkiv (henceforth: NBO, Hs, SE arkiv), untitled document that commences with the words: *Under mit ophold i Paris*, 1–3.

8 *Riksarkivet* (henceforth: RA), *Utenriksdepartementet* (henceforth: UD), catalogue no 2559, H4–NII, *Kommersielldelegasjon til Polen fra Norge*, Bind I 1919, Letter from UD to Jörgen Blydt, the commissioner for trade, dated 10 VII 1919.

9 The Norwegian Union of Shipowners, since 1984 the Norwegian Union of Shipping Companies (*Norges Rederiforbund*), was created in 1909 as an organisation protecting shipowners against the state's interference in the technical, financial and organisational questions of the Norwegian sea freight. In the 1920s that organisation gained influence in many ports dispersed all over the world, *inter alia* in New York, New Orleans, Newcastle, Cardiff, Liverpool, Hull, Atwerp, Hamburg, and Rotterdam. Cf.: S.A. Brækhus, *Norges Rederforbund 1909 15. september – 1934* (Oslo: Forbundet Oslo, 1934), 14; B. Kolltveit, J.G. Bjørklund, „Norsk sjøfart i det 20. århundre", in: *Norsk sjøfart*, vol. 2, ed. B. Berggren, A.E. Christensen, B. Kolltveit (Oslo: Dreyer, 1989), 171; F. Olstad, *Norsk Sjømannsforbunds historie*, vol. 1: *Vår skjebne i vår hånd* (Oslo: Pax Forlag A/S, 2006), 112.

10 RA, UD, catalogue no 2559, H4–NII, *Kommersielldelegasjon til Polen fra Norge*, Bind I 1919, Letter from W. Klaveness to C. Michelet dated 12.07.1919.

11 Ibidem, Letter from W. Klaveness to UD dated 15.07.1919.

the participation of – *inter alia* – Sophus E. Dahl, head of the *Norges Bank* (Norwegian Bank), Wilhelm Gjersøe, T. Thoresen, Żegowski, Barański[12] and Ludwik Spiess, the Norwegian honorary consul in Warsaw. The most important document that presented the state of research of the Mission is a 37-page study of October 1919, which is a picture of the Polish economy at the beginning of its independent functioning. It contains – *inter alia* – the record of the conversation between W. Gjersøe and Admiral Kazimierz Porębski,[13] which shows that there was no coordination in the plans of the Polish side concerning the creation of a Polish-Norwegian shipping company.[14]

Another problem dealt with at the meetings was the question of the Vistula, which was to facilitate the transport of goods from the whole of the country to Gdańsk and *vice versa*.[15] Very detailed information on the parameters of tugs, sluices, shipping conditions in particular seasons suggests that the Norwegians treated Poland as a transit country. Such a statement may be deduced from the fact that according to the report of October 1919 the Vistula was still for a long time to play a transit role. The Norwegians also got interested in the Black Sea, which Poland might use for navigation after building a port in the Romanian town of Brăila.[16]

Regretfully, the poor financial condition of Poland eliminated the possibility of establishing more intensive Polish-Norwegian shipping relations and of using the port of Gdańsk in 1919. What may be regarded as the only success of the mission of S. Eyde is signing the Polish-Norwegian Herring Contract on November 3rd, 1919 and the related loan of 28 million given by Norway,[17] as well as appointing S. Eyde Norwegian minister and general consul of Norway in Warsaw. On

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[12] Regrettably, the first names of Żegowski and Barański were unavailable.

[13] Admiral Kazimierz Porębski fulfilled the most important post in the sphere of maritime policy, the head of the Department for Maritime Matters; he was responsible for merchant fleet, maritime economy, ports, shipping and inland navigation.

[14] NBO, Hs, Se arkiv, *Rapport fra den norske delegation til Polen*, Kristiania 1919, 33; RA, UD, catalogue no 2559, H4–NII, *Kommersielldelegasjon til Polen fra Norge*, vol. 1 1919, Copy no 4, W. Gjersøe, record of the meeting, dated 28.08.1919.

[15] RA, UD, catalogue no 2559, H4-NII, *Kommersielldelegasjon til Polen fra Norge*, vol. 1 1919, Copy no. 2, W. Gjersøe, record of the meeting, dated 27.08.1919.

[16] *Rapport fra…*, 6, 19, 31.

[17] T. Cieślak, „Stosunki polsko-skandynawskie w latach 1918–1939", in: *Przyjaźnie i antagonizmy. Stosunki Polski z państwami sąsiednimi w latach 1918–1939*, ed. J. Żarnowski (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1977): 65.

the other hand, according to Rye Holmboe, Norwegian minister of supplies, the appointment was paid by a huge surplus of herring.[18]

There was another Norwegian mission to Poland, in April 1920. That time it was headed by captain Richard Otter and Gabriel Smith, port director, who established contacts with Prime Minister Leopold Skulski and Antoni Olszewski, minister of industry and trade.[19] The envoys were charged with researching the functioning of the future Polish merchant fleet and the usefulness of Gdańsk plots, which the Polish government might purchase to build wharves, shipyards, buildings and storage places.[20] The fact that R. Otter and G. Smith had been employed shows that Poland was still uncertain about the possibility to fully enjoy the rights in the Free City of Danzig/Gdańsk. In spite of such doubts, just after signing the Treaty of Riga, one of the biggest Norwegian shipowners, BDS, invested his capital in Gdańsk, and next quite soon he created one of the biggest broking company there, which enhanced the development of the port of Gdańsk, and in the subsequent years also of the port of Gdynia.

The Activity of Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab in Gdańsk and Gdynia

After the First World War BDS, Walford Baltic Transports Ltd. (WBT), a London shipping company, and *Polskie Towarzytwo* Żeglugi *Morskiej* (Polish Shipping Company) 'Sarmacja', plc, established cooperation providing part of the supplies resulting from the second Polish-Norwegian Herring Contract signed on January 22nd, 1921.[21] The deliveries made by the Bergen shipowner allowed to reveal the condition prevailing in the port of Gdańsk and the needs of the Polish maritime trade; thanks to that, on April 27th, 1921 the representatives of the three companies signed a contract of mutual cooperation.[22] Therefore, the statement

[18] Omang, *Norsk utenrikstjeneste*, 306.

[19] P. Jaworski, „Prasa norweska wobec niektórych problemów odradzającej się Polski 1920–1921", *Rocznik Gdański* 58 (1988) 2: 92.

[20] RA, UD, catalogue no 2772, H2-N, Polen: *Skipsfarten havneforholdene og olje bunkringstasjon* 1920–1937, Letter written by S. Eyde to UD dated 25.02.1920.

[21] The contract included a purchase of 100,000 barrels of herring payable before January 1st, 1925. Cf.: *Statsarkivet i Kristiansand, Norges Bank avdeling Kristiansand*, catalogue no 0048, Letter from *Norges Bank* to *Norges Bank avdeling i Kristiansand*, dated 27.12.1924; Szymański, Stosunki gospodarcze, 61.

[22] *Bergens Sjøfartsmuseum Arkiv* (henceforth: Bsj), Ms 26 (*Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab*, henceforth: BDS): *Aa–Forhandlingsprotokoll* III 1921–1927, Report of the meeting of the management of BDS, dated 21 V 1921.

expressed by Jan Szymański is false: the idea to create 'Sarmacja' did not mature during the talks within the mission of S. Eyde.[23] The second Polish-Norwegian Herring Contract and the transports of herring were a decisive factor in rapprochement between BDS and 'Sarmacja', and also the port of Gdańsk. Besides, 'Sarmacja' was created on November 9th, 1919 in Cracow without Norwegian capital.[24]

The final decision about the cooperation with WBT was made by the management of BDS in July 1921, when the company of *Bergenske & Walford Baltic Transports Ltd.* (B&WBT) was created.[25] The company functioned for almost a year and on May 15th, 1922 it finished its activity and instead another company was set up: *Bergenske Baltic Transports Ltd.* (BBT or 'Bergenske').[26] After a few years BBT stopped providing shipping services, the cause was setting up a new company in Gdańsk on July 1st and 27th, 1927; its name made reference to its London predecessor *Bergenske Baltic Transports Ltd. A-G*.[27] The development of the port of Gdynia made BDS decide to set up on October 2nd, 1928 a branch of 'Bergenske' in Gdynia, which was preceded by creating a Norwegian honorary consulate in Gdynia headed by E. Nielsen.[28] On May 29th, 1936 the same E. Nielsen was appointed General Consul of Norway in Gdańsk.[29]

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[23] Cf.: Szymański, *Stosunki gospodarcze*, 52.

[24] National Archives in Cracow, *Archiwum Narodowe w Krakowie* (henceforth: ANK), II Department (*Oddział II*), Files of the company (*Akta firmy spółkowej*) *Polskie Towarzystwo Żeglugi Morskiej 'Sarmacja'*, RHB VI 88, Entry in the Commercial Register (*Wpis do rejestru handlowego*) of the company (*firmy spółkowej*) *Polskie Towarzystwo Żeglugi Morskiej 'Sarmacja'* Ltd (*Spółka z o.o.*), 23.12.1919. In literature there are false dates of setting up 'Sarmacja' (e.g. 1916). Cf.: D. Steyer, "Polish Merchant Navy", *Acta Poloniae Historica* 23 (1971): 119; Zbigniew Landau and Jerzy Tomaszewski gave a false date of setting up 'Sarmacja' – March 1922. Cf.: Z. Landau, J. Tomaszewski, *Gospodarka Polski międzywojennej 1918–1939*, vol. 2: *Od Grabskiego do Piłsudskiego. Okres kryzysu poinflacyjnego i ożywienia koniunktury 1924–1929* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1971), 243. According to Szymański 'Sarmacja' was set up in 1920. Cf.: J. Szymański, "Kapitał norweski wobec gospodarki Polski międzywojennej (1919–1939)", *Zapiski Historyczne* 52 (1987) 2: 67.

[25] W. Keilhau, *Norges eldste linjerederi. Jubileumsskrift til Bergenske Dampskibsselskabs 100-års dag* (Bergen: A.S. John Griegs Boktrykkeri, 1951), 377; A. Matla, "Działalność norweskiego koncernu Bergenske w portach polskiego obszaru celnego w latach 1919–1939", *Komunikaty Instytutu Bałtyckiego*, R. 29 (1992) 41: 37.

[26] National Archives in London, Board of Trade (henceforth: NAL, BT), Companies Registration Office, WBT, catalogue no 31/25751/6C729, Resolution of B&WBT dated 15 V 1922; *Handbok over Norske Obligationer og Aktier utgit av Carl Kierluf & Co.,* vol. 2: *Skibselskaper, Industri og Handelsseslkaper, Trafikselskaper, Grubeselskaper, Forskringsselskaper* (Kristiania: Carl Kierulf & Co., 1923), 86.

[27] Matla, "Działalność norweskiego", 38.

[28] Ibidem, 40.

[29] RA, UD, Ambassaden and Warsaw, catalogue no 22, *Norske konsulater i Polen og Danzig*, 7.06.1937–25.08.1939, Letter written by R. Battagli to the Senate of the Free City of Gdańsk dated 9.07.1937;

As early as in the first year of its activity in the port of Gdynia BDS set up a maritime connection with western Norway, the Baltic (Gdańsk, Riga, Tallinn, Petersburg) and London; the Russian port was operated by four to six ships.[30] The potential of BDS as a shipowner in the ports of the Polish customs area was not fully exploited. And even the Polish-Norwegian Commercial and Navigational Contract signed on December 22nd, 1926 could not change the situation,[31] because in 1927 the tariffs on ships up to 5,000 GRT[32] were raised in the biggest Norwegian ports, i.e. for many units of BDS. Because of the increased cost the Bergen shipowner decided to operate only two vessels in the Baltic.[33]

In 1931 BDS started a new chapter in its activity setting up – together with *Stavangerske Dampskibsselskab* (DSD), a shipowner from Stavanger – a new sea connection of *Bergenske-Stavangerske* Østersjølinjen (Baltic Line). The moment was propitious for such activities because by virtue of the Law dated February 20th, 1929 a new protocol was added to the Polish-Norwegian Commercial and Navigational Contract, thanks to which treacle containing less than 70% of sugar, imported to Norway, was duty-free; all the additional charges on rock salt were done away with, and the duty on herring imported to Poland was decreased by 66.5%.[34] What was more on October 1st, 1929 new tariffs were introduced, which – *inter alia* – included discounts on the exported grain at the level of 5–10%.[35]

APG, Senate of Free City of Gdańsk (henceforth: SWMG), catalogue no. 1078, Letter written by R. Battagli dated 9.07.1936.

30 *Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskabs virksomhet i aaret 1921*; RA, UD, 2765, H1–F, Danzig: Årsberetninger, Årsberetning for 1922.

31 Polish-Norwegian Commercial and Navigational Contract signed on December 22nd, 1926 guaranteed equal treatment of ships with their cargoes, passengers and luggage in ports, basins, territorial waters of the sides. Additionally, the contract introduced a uniform norm for all the payments. In the case of granting a profit to a third country the norm was to be automatically implemented in the commerce between Poland and Norway excluding special concessions granted to domestic fishery and cabotage. The conditions of granting tonnage certificates for ships were specified, and so were the questions concerning cargoes in ports and sea rescue. The decisions included in the Contract were in force in the territory of the Free City of Gdańsk. Cf.: Szymański, *Stosunki gospodarcze*, 146–148.

32 APG, *Rada Portu i Dróg Wodnych* (henceforth: RPiDW), microfilm no. 64213, catalogue no. 366, *Opłaty portowe*, vol. IV, Letter written by the Honorary Consul of Poland in Tønsberg to the Polish Diplomatic Mission in Oslo dated 27.06.1927.

33 *Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskabs virksomhet i aaret 1928–1930.*

34 Law dated 12.01.1929, Additional Protocol to the Commercial and Navigational Contract between the Republic of Poland and the Kingdom of Norway (*Protokół dodatkowy do Traktatu handlowego i Nawigacyjnego pomiędzy Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Królestwem Norwegii*) dated 22.12.1926, Journal of Laws (*Dziennik Ustaw*), 1929 no. 31, position 296.

35 W. Czerwińska, *Rola państwa w polskiej gospodarce morskiej 1919–1939* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie Gdańsk, 1975), 77.

Bergenske-Stavangerske Østersjølinjen operated the ports of western Norway (i.e. Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim and others) according to the contract with Fred Olsen & Co, a shipowner from Oslo, whose ships entered the ports of eastern Norway (mainly Kristiansund, Oslo, Moss, and Drammen).[36] In practice it meant creating a monopoly in sea freights from the ports of the Polish customs area to Norway. Thus BDS and DSD got the guarantee on regular transports, moreover they had only two ships involved in those freights. At the beginning within the 14-day line there was one ship belonging to DSD, S/S *Jæderen*. When *Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab* became more involved in the Baltic freights, it introduced another ship, a small S/S *Ursa*.[37]

After the normalisation of the Polish-Lithuanian relations in 1938 the ships of the Baltic Line reached Klaipėda, which was connected overland with the Polish District of Vilnius. For the shipowners from Bergen and Stavanger the most important were the transports of grain and linen.[38] In due time the ships of *Bergenske-Stavangerske* Østersjølinjen reached Skudenæs,[39] Ventspills (Widau), Liepaja,[40] and Helsinki.[41] In 1913 *Den Norske Syd-Amerikalinjen* (Norwegian Line to South America, SAL) had a much bigger range, as it included ocean freights. The South-American freights were organised by Otto Thoresen, a shipowner, and to a lesser degree by BDS, *Det Nordenfjeldske Dampskibsselskab* (NFDS)[42] and

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[36] *Rocznik Rady Interesantów Portu w Gdyni* (henceforth: RRIPwG), 1934, 92.

[37] *Det Stavangerske Dampskibsselskabs virksomhet i aaret 1930*, Stavanger 1931; *Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab Bergen. Beretning og Regnskap 1931*, 7; *Universitetsbiblioteket i Bergen*, (henceforth: UBB), *Manuskriptsamlingen*, consul Einar Nielsen (henceforth: Ms.), 1570/24–8, Letter between J. Ejbøla and E. Nielsen dated 3 III 1934. Within the Baltic BDS used the ship S/S Ara. *Cf.*: Jordan Siemianowski, „Działalność Bergenske-Stavangerske Østersjølinjen w portach polskiego obszaru celnego w latach 1931–1939", *Nautologia*, 48 (2013) 150: 47.

[38] Statsarkivet and Stavanger (henceforth: SS), Pa 41 *Det Stavangerske Dampskibsselskab* (henceforth: DSD), februar 1936–mars 1939, catalogue no. 751, Letter from BDS dated 5.05.1938.

[39] Ibidem, Pa 41 DSD, November 1933–Oktober 1934, catalogue no. 748, Letter from DSD to BDS dated 2.10.1934.

[40] Ibidem, Letter from Ø. Blydt-Hansena to BBT dated 13.10.1934.

[41] Ibidem, Letter from DSD to BDS dated 31.05.1934.

[42] NFDS was submitted on 28.01.1857 in Trondheim so as to operate the sea connection between that town and Hamburg. The composition of the management of the company was made up of three shareholders (Hans Petter Jensen, Helmer Lundgreen and Fritz Lorck), and three deputies. The first unit was the sailing ship *Nidelven*. Additionally, the company operated *hurtigruten*, and also the connection to Szczecin, sea freights between London and the Baltic ports (including Gdańsk, Klaipėda, Liepāja, Ventspils, Riga, Tallinn and Petersburg, the years 1920–1925). Cf.: *Det Nordenfjeldske Dampskibsselskab foretningsaar* (the years 1920–1926); K. Koren, J. Pedersen, *Det Nordenfjeldske Dampskibsselskab 1857–1890.Den eldste norske rutefart* (bmw, 1907), 62; Leif B. Lillegaard, *Nordenfjeldske 125 år. I storm og stille på alle hav* (Trondheim: *Det Nordenfjeldske Dampskibsselskab*, 1982), 54; P. Alm, *Det Helgelandske Dampskibsselskab gjennem 75 år 1867–1942* (Oslo: Reistad

Fred Olsen & Co. The last one, together with the Bergen shipping company, Johan Ludvig Mowinckels Rederi, took over the business of O. Thoresen and NFDS in 1924. Since 1920 SAL had had a branch in Finland, which streamlined the transports of wood,[43] and two years later by virtue of the contract with B & WBT SAL had an agency in the port of Gdańsk.[44] From among the BDS ships SAL was operated by M/S *Cometa* and M/S *Estrella*,[45] which sailed to Rio de Janeiro, Santos, Buenos Aires, and the Baltic ports, including the Finnish harbours.[46] In 1924 the SAL ships stopped for a while operating the port of Gdańsk. The Norwegian freights of the South-American line to the ports of the Polish customs area was resumed in 1932, but they were never to achieve a significant level.

BBT was also engaged in the activities of tiny shipping companies in Gdańsk. On April 4th, 1922 *Nord Ost-See Reederei A-G*[47] was set up, which altogether had five vessels[48] sailing under the flag of Gdańsk between that town and other Baltic ports and the harbours of the North Sea,[49] as well as between Norway and the Mediterranean ports. The company was closed down at the beginning of 1925.[50]

Another company, *Standard Line Reederei A-G*, was set up on the initiative of BDS and E.B. Aaby, a shipping company from Christiania that operated a connection between the ports of southern Portugal and the western coast of France. After Spain and Portugal imposed an embargo on Norwegian exports goods, *inter alia* on klipfish,[51] E.B. Aaby registered the ships under the Gdańsk flag in a newly

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& Sønn Boktrykkeri, 1942), 16–17; R. Danielsen, O. Vedeld, *Det Nordenfjeldske Dampskibsselskab 1857 – 28. januar – 1957* (Trondheim: Det Nordenfjeldske Dampskibsselskab, 1957), 9, 21; F.R. Hansen, *Det Nordenfjeldske Dampskibsselskab Trondheim 1857–1985. Fartøyene og deres historie* (Trondheim, Det Nordenfjeldske Dampskibsselskab, 1999), 5, 9; G. Myhre, *Blå horisont. Det Nordenfjeldske Dampskibselskab 150 the anniversary* (Trondheim: Trondheim Kommunikasjoner Forlag, 2007), 16.

43 B. Kolltveit, *Over Linjen. Den Norske Syd-Amerika Linje 1913–1973* (Oslo: Dreyers Forlag, 1976), 38, 116; L. Pettersen, *A/S J. Ludvig Movinckels Rederi 1898–1960* (Bergen: A.S. John Griegs Boktrykkeri, 1961), 35.

44 Kolltveit, *Over linjen*, 93.

45 *Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskabs virksomhet i aaret 1922.*

46 RA, UD, H2–B1, catalogue no. 2506, *Norge–Polen, Spørmålomskibsfartsforhold*, Report of N.C. Ditleff a and BBT.

47 A. Matla, "Polsko-norweskie kontakty żeglugowe w latach 1919–1926," *Komunikaty Instytutu Bałtyckiego*, 23/24 (1986/1987) 38/39, 55.

48 Danziger Zeitung, 186 (21.04.1922).

49 Ibidem, 313 (7.07.1922).

50 Matla, "Polsko-norweskie kontakty", 56.

51 B. Kolltveit, *E.B. Aaby. Historien om et familierederi* (Oslo: Sævelid AS, 2013), 57–58; Egeland, *Kongeveien*, 2, 172; O.-B. Furre, *Mellomkrigstid 1920–1940* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget Oslo, 1996), 164.

created shipping company, with the help of the capital of BBT.[52] When the restrictions were abolished in April 1923, four ships of E. B. Aaby were registered again under the Norwegian flag.[53] The company was closed down much later, on December 1924.[54]

Another company, which cooperated with BDS, was – created on September 9th, 1922 – a partly English company, *Bellmore Reederei A-G.*[55] The company had a sailing/motor vessel *Bellmore* (248 GRT) purchased from the company Bell Lines Ltd of Hull. Regrettably, in mid-January 1923 *Bellmore* was taken in for repair at a shipyard. After the repair the ship kept losing manoeuvrability in bad weather conditions, and as a result almost all her voyages took too long and kept making a loss. That is why since October 1923 *Bellmore* was moored at a quay in the port of Gdańsk,[56] and the company was soon closed down.

At the turn of April and May 1930 still another shipping company was set up, *Norna Reederei-Gesellschaft mbH.*[57] The company had S/S *Barbara* (2,150 GRT), the name of which was changed to S/S *Norna* by virtue of the contract signed on March 26th, 1930 between BBT and Fridtjof Sundt; at the same time she was registered under the Gdańsk flag as a property of the company *Norna GmbH* with the headquarters in Gdańsk.[58] Next S/S *Norna* was made over to Fridtjof Sundt by virtue of a time charter,[59] thanks to which the shipowner took over the whole control over the ship leaving all the formalities to be done in Gdańsk by BBT.[60] Unfortunately, S/S *Norna* ran aground near Namsos. As a result of the damage

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[52] Kolltveit, E.B. Aaby, 58; Egeland, Kongeveien, 172.

[53] Kolltveit, E.B. Aaby, 58.

[54] APG, Files of Notary Gustaw Zander (henceforth: ANGZ), catalogue no 36, Annual report of the activity (*Sprawozdanie roczne z działalności*) of Standard Line *Reederei Aktiengesellschaft* dated 18.12.1924, 134–137.

[55] Matla, "Polsko-norweskie kontakty", 55.

[56] APG, ANGZ, catalogue no 36, Attachment III the annual report of 1924 of the company *Bellmore Reederei A-G,* dated 4.12.1924, 167.

[57] UBB, Ms, 1570/24–5, Consul Einar Nielsen, Privat fra 1.01.1930 til 31.12.1930, Letter from E. Nielsen to A. Figenschou dated 30.11.1931.

[58] Ibidem, 570/24–4, Consul Einar Nielsen, Privat fra 1.01.1930 til 31.12.1930, Contract setting up the company *Norna GmbH* dated 26.03.1930.

[59] Time charter (*czarter na czas*) is a contract by virtue of which the shipowner commits himself to giving a ship together with her captain and crew to the lessor at his disposal for a certain period of time for a charter fee. The contractual period oscillates between one voyage to twenty years. Cf.: J. Neider, *Słownik skrótów i terminów. Transport, spedycja, logistyka* (Gdynia: Polish International Freight Forwarders, 2011), 35.

[60] UBB, Ms, 570/24–5, Konsul Einar Nielsen, Privat fra 1.01. 1930 til 31.12.1930, Letter from E. Nielsen to A. Figenschou dated 30.11.1931.

the management of BBT revoked the contract with *Norna GmbH* together with its expiration (the contract was to expire on October 20th, 1931).[61]

Undoubtedly, the above mentioned 'Sarmacja' was in the Polish historiography one of the best investigated shipping companies of the interwar, which had close relations with BDS. That fact allows me to pass over the detailed questions related with the functioning of the Polish shipowner referring the reader to the available literature.[62] The only thing I would like to emphasise are the positive effects of the activity of 'Sarmacja'; undoubtedly, the effect that should be regarded as positive is the fact that many sailors working for the company in question were soon employed in *Żegluga Polska* and *Gdynia – Ameryka Linie* Żeglugowe SA (GAL).

Additionally, it is worth discussing the question of the collapse of 'Sarmacja'; in relevant publications two events of 1926 are passed over, although they should not be marginalised. In May English miners staged a strike, thanks to which Poland very quickly captured new coal markets in Scandinavia, the region that so far had been buying coal from the United Kingdom. That situation induced the Scandinavian shipowners and the ones coming from other countries to get interested in the ports of the Polish customs area; 'Sarmacja' with its obsolete fleet of ships certainly could not face up to the ensuing intensified competition. Additional competition was to appear in the form of a new Polish shipping company; the Norwegians had known about the plan to set up such a company at least since March 23rd, 1925.[63] *Żegluga Polska*, a Polish shipping company, was set up in 1926; it was subsidised by the Polish government.

The literature is silent about the circumstances in which BBT was closed down. The discussion about this topic should be started with the information that the Norwegian shipowner decided to close down the activity in Gdańsk and Gdynia because of the escalating conflict between Poland and Germany in the Free City of Gdańsk, and by the efforts of Poland to increase its influence in *'Bergenske'*. Finally, in place of the BBT branches a new company was set up in Gdańsk

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[61] Ibidem.

[62] Cf.: D. Steyer, *Półwiecze Polski na morzu* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie Gdańsk, 1970), 108–110; W. Czerwińska, *Polska żegluga morska w latach II Rzeczypospolitej* (Gdańsk: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich – Oddział w Gdańsku, 1971), 33–34; Matla, "Polsko-norweskie kontakty", 50–54; Matla, "Działalność norweskiego", 45–52; T. Miciński, *Księga statków polskich 1918–1945*, vol. 1 (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Oskar, 1996), 134–150; J. Siemianowski, "Współpraca Polskiego Towarzystwa Żeglugi Morskiej „Sarmacja" z Bergenske Baltic Transports Ltd. i Walford Baltic Transports Ltd. w latach 1920–1926", *Zapiski Historyczne* 78 (2013) 4: 119–143.

[63] RA, UD, catalogue no. 2507, H2–B2, Polen. Understöttelse av handelsflåten, Letter from T. Knudtzon to UD, 23.03.1925.

(February 17th, 1937) and Gdynia (March 12th, 1937) under the name of *'Bergtrans' Shipping Co Ltd*, where the majority of the shares were invested by the Polish.[64] The Polish pressure had negative effects, E. Nielsen decided to renounce the post of consul and in November 1937 was replaced by Lauritz Myrebøe.

The conflict between Polish and German influences took also place in the management of BBT. E. Nielsen represented the German side and Jens Ejbøl, a Dane, the Polish one. At a moment they both negotiated on their own; the Norwegian consul not being able to reach some German circles came to an agreement with the Gdańsk Senate. The talks of E. Nielsen were to closer bind BBT to German capital when loans from *Dresdner Bank* and *Bank von Danzig* were taken out to reorganise the company. On the other hand, since the end of 1936 J. Ejbøl had been in touch with Bohdan Nagórski, the director of the Council for Ports and Water Ways, who represented the Maritime Department.[65] According to Zygmunt Jędrzejewicz, employed in *'Bergtrans'*, the Norwegians who were alarmed at the prospect of taking over the capital of BBT by the Germans joined J. Ejbøl.[66]

The Remaining Norwegian Shipping Lines and Tramp Fleet

As far as ocean sailing is concerned an interesting shipowner was Wilhelm Wilhelmsen from Tønsberg, who on January 1st, 1914 had taken over the Norwegian Line to the Gulf of Mexico (*Norge-Mexico Gulf Linjen*, NMGL).[67] In the years 1920–1956 the post of the NMGL director was fulfilled by Christian Strand,[68] a worker of Wilhelm Wilhelmsen. The most important merchandise that was transported by the Tønsberg shipowner was cotton. As early as in 1924 there were attempts to direct NMGL from New Orleans to Gdańsk, thanks to which it could have been possible to import American cotton and tobacco to Eastern Europe omitting the ports in Hamburg and Bremen.[69] In 1925 BBT set up an agency

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[64] Matla, "Działalność norweskiego", 41.

[65] State Archives in Gdańsk, the Gdynia Branch, *Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku Oddział w Gdyni* (henceforth: APGOG), Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, Firma „Bergtrans", catalogue no. 235, Note dated 25.11.1937, addressed to the President of *Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego*, 43–44.

[66] Z. Jędrzejowicz, "Ze wspomnień o Bergtransie", *Nautologia* 9 (1974): 15.

[67] B. Kolltveit, H.Ch. Bangsmoen, *Wilhelm Wilhelmsen 150 år. Historien og historier* (Oslo: WW/Dinamo Forlag, 2011), 93; S.A. Solberg, *Halfdan Wilhelmsen – Mannen og striden etter ham* (Oslo: Andresen & Butenschøn Utgivertjenesten, 2001), 33.

[68] A. Olsen, *Wilhelm Wilhelmsen i hundre år* (Oslo: Wilhelm Wilhelmsen, 1962), 184.

[69] *Przemysł i Handel* 9 (1924), 240; *Danziger Neueste Nachrichten* 82 (5.04.1924); *Danziger Zeitung* 136 (16.05.1924).

in Gdańsk for Wilhelm Wilhelmsen and a few Swedish shipowners, including the ones belonging to Broström.[70] In the years 1923–1925 the ships of the Tønsberg shipowner reached Gdańsk.

A bigger involvement of Wilhelm Wilhelmsen in Gdańsk and Gdynia resulted from a meeting that took place in October 1930 in Grand Hotel in Oslo between the representative of the Tønsberg shipowner (C. Strand) and the ones of the Broström Concern (Vidar Olburs and captain Birger Zander) who were to finally endorse the plan to create cotton transports to Gdynia.[71] The talks ended with signing an agreement between the Swedish American-Mexican Line (*A/B Svenska Amerika-Mexico-Linjen*, SAML) and Wilhelm Wilhelmsen, which regulated the future transports of cotton to Gdynia. The Tønsberg shipowner wanted his ships to enter Gdynia once a month and to transport cotton and tobacco.[72]

Undoubtedly, the cardinal factor in organising cotton transports was played by the decision of the Ministry of Communications dated January 1st, 1931, according to which cotton transported through the German-Polish border was moved from tariff class 3 to tariff class 2.[73] In February 1931 that propitious situation made Wilhelm Wilhelmsen together with SAML set up a new navigation line from the Gulf of Mexico to Gdynia and Gdańsk, Gulf-Gdynia Line (GGL), which actually was a branch of NMGL. In May of the same year Wilhelm Wilhelmsen' ships sailing within that line started voyages to Galveston, Houston, New Orleans,[74] and a little bit later to Tampa and Tampico; and trans-shipment to and from the islands of Middle America took place in New Orleans.[75] The GGL vessels were among the biggest ones that called in at the Polish ports, as on average they had 8,000 DWT.[76] The Norwegians wanted to streamline the cotton line by setting up a vice-consulate in Łódź on September 21st, 1932; it was headed by Arno Kindermann, the sales manager of the Pabianice company *Krusche & Ender*.[77]

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[70] Keilhau, *Norges eldste*, 382.

[71] UBB, Ms., 1570/24–4, Letter from J. Ejbøl to E. Nielsen dated 7.12.1930.

[72] Ibidem, Letter from E. Nielsen to T.S. Falck dated 12.12.1930.

[73] R. Pfeiffer, *Geneza i dzieje Izby Arbitrażowej Bawełny w Gdyni* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1976), 53.

[74] *Rocznik Rady Interesantów Portu w Gdyni* (henceforth: RRIPwG) 1 (1931), 65.

[75] *Rocznik Morski i Kolonialny* 1938, (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ligii Morskiej i Kolonialnej, 1938), 174.

[76] RRIPwG, 2/3 (1932/33), 90.

[77] RA, UD, catalogue no 4773, KG–23 Lodz, Diploma of the Vice-Consul A. Kindermann dated 24.09.1932.

The line developed quickly and in October 1933 70% of the cotton imported from America to the Polish customs area was transported by Norwegian ships.[78] As early as in 1933 it was certain that breaking the monopoly of Bremen was only the matter of time when new warehouses had been built, new contracts with the American producers of cotton signed and export duties on cotton reduced three times; the reduction was restricted only to the cotton imported thorough the port of Gdynia.[79]

In 1937 Wilhelm Wilhelmsen became a shareholder of the company *'Bergtrans'* (he held 26 out of 1,000 shares); the company was set up in place of BBT which had been closed down.[80] At the beginning the cooperation with the new broker did not indicate a significant growth, but as early as in January 1938 Wilhelm Wilhelmsen recorded seven entries into the port of Gdynia.[81]

Wilhelm Wilhelmsen tried to expand his activity in the ports of the Polish customs area creating in 1933 a branch of the Norwegian Africa & Australia Line, which connected the Australian ports with Gdańsk and Gdynia. The merchandise transported to the Polish port was wool, and that time the function of broker was fulfilled by the Polish Maritime Agency (PAM).[82] Regrettably, the line to Australia and Africa stopped functioning in 1935.[83] In 1933 Wilhelm Wilhelmsen together with the Swedish East Asiatic Company of Göteborg set up another short-lived sea connection between Gdynia and the ports in British India.[84]

Among the Norwegian shipping companies that operated the lines to Gdańsk and Gdynia in the interwar period the shipowner from Farsund, *Gunstein Stray & Sønn*, should be mentioned; its director was Andreas Stray, who in January 1932 set up a new line (*Vore-Line*) connecting Antwerp with the ports of the Polish customs area. The line was operated by three ships, S/S *Doravore*, S/S *Bravore* and S/S *Ellavore*, for which the function of broker was fulfilled by BBT, and in

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78 UBB, Ms., 1570/24–7, Letter from E. Nielsen to N.C. Ditleff dated 9.11.1933.

79 B. Dopierała, *Wokół polityki morskiej Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1978), 355–356.

80 APGOG, Sąd Grodzki w Gdyni, catalogue no. 815, 'Bergtrans', k. 58.

81 APG, Gulf Line, Akwizycja bawełny 1936–1939, catalogue no. 1069, Import statistics of ships from the Gulf, Letter from PAM to GAL dated 11 XI 1938, k. 89.

82 Ibidem, 2/3 (1932/1933), 82, 92.

83 Ibidem, 5 (1935) Table: Lines regularly calling at the port of Gdynia, 102–105.

84 Ibidem, 2/3 (1932/1933), 82. At that time paddy rice was transported directly from Rangoon to Gdynia, then it was husked and transported to the Scandinavian countries. The rice flour and bran were exported to Norway in big quantities. Cf.: B. Koselnik, W. Zakrzewski, *Port gdyński, jego urządzenia i handel zamorski* (Wąbrzeźno: nakład Wiesława Zakrzewskiego, 1934), 85.

Antwerp – the *Agence Maritime Zeyen* (AMZ, since May 9th, 1935 AMZ was renamed *Société Anonyme Zeyen*, SAZ).[85] In 1933 as a result of misunderstandings BBT stopped being the broker for *Vore-Line*, and PAM occupied that post.[86] The contract with PAM included a stipulation that *Vore-Line* in cooperation with AMZ would be operating first of all the ports of Gdańsk and Antwerp, and other Belgian ports – Ghent, Brussels and Ostende – would be less important.[87]

Thanks to the Rhine River navigation the merchandise transported by the ships of *Vore-Line* (in that case wood) reached Basel and Strasbourg through Antwerp. The freights were transported also to Haren,[88] Szczecin[89], and Bristol[90] with Antwerp used as a trans-shipping port.

The activity of *Vore-Line* was mainly based on complying with the conditions of the contracts concerning the transport of merchandise such as wood and corn (from Gdańsk and Gdynia) and scrap metal (return cargo from the Belgian ports). The main feature of those contracts was the interference on the part of the state authorities of the Republic of Poland through PAM. For those reasons the Norwegian shipowner could expect many financial profits and standing orders for transport of a lot of merchandise. This fact cannot be ignored while analysing the decision of *Gunstein Stray & Sønn* to go over to the Polish broker. Regrettably, *Vore-Line* kept suffering from problems concerning clearances of ships with full cargoes and the competition from the area of Finland.[91] Those problems contributed to the conflict between *Gunstein Stray & Sønn*, SAZ and PAM. Judging only from documents it is difficult to say who was right in the conflict, but what may be said is that the freights were poorly organised through the fault both of the Polish side and the Belgian one. The cooperation between *Gunstein Stray & Sønn* and SAZ was finished when on June 29th, 1939 the Norwegian shipowner signed a contract with

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[85] Norsk Maritimt Museum, catalogue no. 642, *Bergenske Baltic Transports Ltd. AS i korespondanse med Gunstein Stray & Sønn*, Letter from BBT to Gunstein Stray & Sønn dated 27.04.1931.

[86] Ibidem, catalogue no. 642, *Bergenske Baltic Transports Ltd. AS i korespondanse med Gunstein Stray & Sønn*, Letter from Gunstein, Stray & Sønn to BBT dated 20.04.1933.

[87] Ibidem, catalogue no 633, *Gunstein, Stray & Sønn A/S Vore Stray Korespondanse med PAM i 1933, 1934 og 1935 med gjennomparten av PAMs og Zeyen i sammen tidsrom*, Letter from PAM to Gunstein Stray & Sønn dated 2.01.1933.

[88] Ibidem, catalogue no. 642, *Bergenske Baltic Transports Ltd. AS i korespondanse med Gunstein, Stray & Sønn*, Letter from PAM to AMZ dated 17.03.1933.

[89] Ibidem, Letter from PAM to AMZ dated 1.08.1933.

[90] Ibidem, Letter from PAM to AMZ dated 20.03.1933.

[91] Ibidem, catalogue no. 638, *Gunstein Stray & Sønn i korespondanse med PAM* 1935–1936, Letter from SAZ to *Gunstein Stray & Sønn* dated 11.07.1935.

Agence Maritime Baltique (AMB) represented by Henry Fiechter and Paul Braun[92]. In Brussels AMB was represented by *J. J. Claes & Co*, and in Ghent the company *P. Best & Co SA*,[93] but – according to the documents – PAM still was the agent of *Vore-Line* in Gdańsk and Gdynia.

While analysing navigation lines it is worth mentioning a few facts related to the shipowner *Fred Olsen & Co*, in spite of the scarcity of sources. First of all it should be underlined that *Fred Olsen & Co* belonged to the oldest Norwegian shipowners, as it had been set up in 1848.[94] According to some sources he started operating a navigation line from the Norwegian ports to Gdańsk in 1921.[95] The ships of *Fred Olsen & Co* transported corn delivered by the Polish Union of Corn Industry.[96] The sources indicate a cooperation between *Fred Olsen & Co* and the Polish Exports of Iron plc, which by virtue of the contract signed in February 1936 enabled the Norwegian shipowner to transport scrap metal and rails to the ports of eastern Norway.[97]

An important element of the activity of the Norwegian shipowners was tramp shipping, i.e. irregular shipping. As far as Gdańsk was concerned the number of arrivals of tramps at the port was higher than the number of arrivals of liners throughout the interwar period.

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92 Ibidem, catalogue no. 641, *Gunstein Stray & Sønn A/S Vore, Stray's korespondanse med AMB i 1939 og 1940 samt AMB's med PAM i 1939 og PAM's med AMB*, Contract made between *Gunstay Stray & Sønn and AMB* dated 29.06.1939.

93 Ibidem, Contract of July 1939, made between *Gunstay Stray & Sønn* and AMB.

94 Anthony Cooke, the Fred. Olsen Line and its Passenger Ships (London: Carmania Press, 2007), 8.

95 APG, RPiDW, catalogue no. 1438, *Schiffseingangs Journal vom 30 Juli 1918 bis 30 Januar 1924.*

96 UBB, Ms, 1570/24–8, vom 1.01.1934 bis 31.12.1934, Letter from J.T. Haugen to BBT dated 13.03.1934.

97 APK, Polski Eksport Żelaza, catalogue no. 85, Contract between Fred Olsen & Co. and Polski Eksport Żelaza dated 6.02.1936, 1.




Figure 1. Share of Norwegian ships operating in Gdańsk according to tramps and liners in the years 1919–1939

Source: the author's own production based on: APG, RPiDW, catalogue no. 1438, Schiffseingangs Journal vom 30.07.1918 bis 30.01.1924; catalogue no. 1439, Schiffeingags 1924–1926; catalogue no. 1440, Eingang. Vom 1.05.1929 bis 31.08.1931; catalogue no. 1441, Eingang vom 1.09.1931 bis 31.08.1934; catalogue no. 1442, Eingang vom 1.09.1934 bis 31.05.1937; catalogue no. 1443, Eingang vom 1.06.1937 bis 31.07.1939; catalogue no. 1444, Eingang vom 1.08.1939 bis 26.06.1944; catalogue no. 1477, Schiffsausgang Journal vom 1913 bis 1922; catalogue no. 1478, Ausgang vom 1.09.1922 bis 31.12.1926; catalogue no. 1479, Ausgang Januar 1927–1929; catalogue no. 1480, Ausgang vom 1.05.1929 bis 31.05.1930; catalogue no. 1481, Ausgang vom 1.06.1930 bis 31.10.1932; catalogue no. 1482, Ausgang vom 1.11.1932 bis 31.08.1935; catalogue no. 1483, Ausgang vom 1.09.1935 bis 31.12.1937; catalogue no. 1484, Ausgang vom 1.01.1938 bis 31.07.1940; Norges Handels- og Sjøfartstidende for the years 1919–1939.

Analysing Diagram 1 attention should be paid to the changing share of tramps in particular years in the port of Gdańsk. In the years 1921–1925 (in the years 1919–1920 the Norwegian shipping lines did not operate in Gdańsk) the degrees of the involvement of tramps and liners were almost identical, but in 1924 the number of liners was higher than the number of tramps. In turn, since 1926 the advantage of tramps over liners had been visible. What is more, that phenomenon cannot be explained by the strike of English miners and the ensuing increase of quantities of coal exported from the Polish customs area. Because of the fact that the Polish-Norwegian commercial and navigational contract was signed as late as in December 1926 the export of coal from Gdańsk on board the Norwegian ships started to the full in 1927.

The Norwegian ships were fairly engaged in operating Gdańsk up to 1931. The decrease of their involvement was parallel to the economic crisis in Poland, which dragged out till 1935. In turn, in Gdynia in the years 1934–1936 the number of departures of liners exceeded the number of departures of tramps.




Figure 2. Share of Norwegian ships operating in Gdynia according to tramps and liners 1925–1939

Source: the author's own production based on: APGOG, catalogue no. 27, Harbour Master's Office in Gdynia, Book of pilotage, year 1930/32; catalogue no. 28, Book of pilotage, year 1932/33; catalogue no. 458, Harbour Master's Office in Gdynia, year 1934/35; catalogue no. 459, Harbour Master's Office in Gdynia, year 1935; catalogue no. 29, Harbour Master's Office in Gdynia, Book of ships' movement of foreign navigation, year 1935; catalogue no. 30, Harbour Master's Office in Gdynia, Book of ships' movement of foreign navigation, year 1936; catalogue no. 31, Harbour Master's Office in Gdynia, Book of ships' movement of foreign navigation, year 1937; catalogue no. 33, Harbour Master's Office in Gdynia, Book of ships' movement of foreign navigation, year 1938, vol. 1; catalogue no. 32, Harbour Master's Office in Gdynia, Book of ships' movement of foreign navigation, year 1938, vol. 2; *Norges Handels- og Sjøfartstidende for the*, years 1919–1939.

Before 1925 the port of Gdynia had not played a significant role in Poland's maritime commerce[98], and the Norwegian fleet was little engaged there. The proportion of arrivals of tramps and liners was different in Gdynia and Gdańsk. The advantage of tramps over liners was still visible, but in the years 1934–1936 liners gained an advantage in deadweight tonnage mainly thanks to a significant

[98] W. Stopczyk, *Handel międzynarodowy na Bałtyku* (Toruń: Instytut Bałtycki, 1928), 69.

activity of Wilhelm Wilhelmsen's ships, which conclusively contributed to granting the privilege of 'base port' to Gdynia.[99]

The available documents suggest that out of all the Norwegian lines operating in Gdańsk in the years 1921–1924 BDS had the biggest share; in turn, in the years 1927–1939 – *Fred Olsen & Co.* There were other Norwegian shipping companies operating in Poland: *Bergenske-Stavangerske Østersjølinjen*, *Vore-Line*, *Gulf-Gdynia Line* and SAL; the last two had ships of the biggest capacity. In the port of Gdynia the most significant role was played by Wilhelm Wilhelmsen, next *Fred Olsen & Co* and *Bergenske-Stavangerske Østersjølinjen*. The vessels of SAL rarely called in at the Polish ports.

As far as the merchandise transported to Gdańsk in the interwar period is concerned the biggest share had package cargo (1291).[100] In addition to herring, of which the biggest cargoes were delivered to the port of Gdańsk in the years 1920–1926, important merchandise was scrap metal. It should be remembered that the majority of the voyages of the Norwegian ships to Gdańsk were made without cargo. The Norwegian ships took package cargoes from Gdańsk, with the exception of 1927 when wood was the dominant cargo, and the years 1928–1932 when coal was the dominant freight.

If countries are taken into consideration the most important was Norway: 1,352 arrivals at the port of Gdańsk; Great Britain – 665, Sweden – 559, Denmark – 470, and Germany – 424. Altogether from the non-Norwegian ports the Norwegian ships called in at Gdańsk 3,305 times. Norway also played a very important role in departures from the port of Gdańsk (1,739). Great Britain was the second (804);

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[99] AAN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Protocol, catalogue no. 724, Polish orders for Norwegian citizens. Correspondence, conclusions. 1938–1939. It was emphasised also in the Report of MPiH that the transports of cotton had had an impact on the increase of imports of Gdynia. Cf.: AAN, PRM, Minister of Industry and Trade, conclusion at KEM and a note report concerning the management of the Gdynia port and streamlining the turnover of Gdynia (21.01.–17.03.1933), catalogue no. 1194, Document starting with the words: *Porty polskie odgrywają…*, 13.

[100] In the sources, which have been the basis for the sheets, something is missing. The registers of arrivals and departures at the port of Gdańsk do not include the quantities of cargoes, and quite often they contain false names of the shipowners and of the ships. In addition, the register of departures of ships in the years 1913–1922 does not include the short period 27.01.1922–7.03.1922. What is more, the research conducted in the State Archives in Gdańsk (APG) has demonstrated that there is no information on the arrivals of ships at the port of Gdańsk from 1.01.1927–30.04.1929. In the case of Gdynia (cf.: Table 2) the pilotage books for the years 1930–1934 that have survived do not contain the directions of arrivals and departures, or the lists of merchandise. More precise data are to be found in *Księgi ruchu statków* żeglugi *zagranicznej* for the years 1935–1938, which contain the directions of arrivals and departures, as well as kinds and weights (in kilograms) of the merchandise.

much less significant roles were played by Sweden (480 departures), Denmark (199 departures) and Germany (152 departures).

In the years 1935–1938 the import of scrap metal to the port of Gdynia displayed an increasing tendency (altogether 259,417,792 kg). The package cargo was the second most important merchandise (91,975,675.2 kg), followed by herring (45,288,000 kg). As far as export from Gdynia is concerned the most important was coal (1,216,269,750 kg), which was the most important merchandise exported from that port. A bit less important was coke (78,769,918 kg) and package cargo (340,363,008 kg), the freights of which exceeded half of the values of the exported coal in 1937.

The analysis of the arrivals at the port of Gdynia according to the countries indicates that the main role was played by Norway (302 arrivals), Great Britain (104 arrivals), Sweden (196 arrivals), Denmark (108 arrivals) and Germany (81 arrivals). There were 851 arrivals for the non-Norwegian ports. As far as departures are concerned: 399 vessels sailed away to Norway, 110 to Great Britain, 104 to Sweden, 35 to Germany, 30 to Denmark (Diagram 58). There were altogether 1090 voyages to non-Norwegian ports.

Voyages without cargo were typical of the freights operated by the Norwegian merchant fleet. The Norwegian ships called 1,898 times at the port of Gdańsk without cargo, they sailed away from Gdańsk without cargo 577 times. In the case of the port of Gdynia the numbers were respectively 892 and 598 in the years 1935–1938.[101]

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[101] APG, RPiDW, catalogue no. 1438, *Schiffseingangs Journal vom 30 Juli 1918 bis 30 Januar 1924*; catalogue no. 1439, *Schiffeingags* 1924–1926; catalogue no. 1440, *Eingang. Vom 1 Mai 1929 bis 31 August 1931*; catalogue no. 1441, *Eingang vom 1 September 1931 bis 31 August 1934*; catalogue no. 1442, *Eingang vom 1 September 1934 bis 31 Mai 1937*; catalogue no. 1443, *Eingang vom 1 Juni 1937 bis 31 Juli 1939*; catalogue no. 1444, *Eingang vom 1 VIII 1939 bis 26 VI 1944*; catalogue no. 1477, *Schiffsausgang Journal vom 1913 bis 1922*; catalogue no. 1478, *Ausgang vom 1 IX 1922 bis 31 XII 1926*; catalogue no. 1479, *Ausgang Januar 1927–1929*; catalogue no. 1480, *Ausgang vom 1 Mai 1929 bis 31 Mai 1930*; catalogue no. 1481, *Ausgang vom 1 Juni 1930 bis 31 Oktober 1932*; catalogue no. 1482, *Ausgang vom 1 November 1932 bis 31 August 1935*; catalogue no. 1483, *Ausgang vom 1 IX 1935 bis 31 Dezember 1937*; catalogue no. 1484, *Ausgang vom 1 Januar 1938 bis 31 Juli 1940*; APGOG, catalogue no. 27, Harbour Master's Office in Gdynia, Pilotage book, year 1930/32; catalogue no. 28, Pilotage book, year 1932/33; catalogue no. 458, Harbour Master's Office in Gdynia, year 1934/35; catalogue no. 459, Harbour Master's Office in Gdynia, year 1935; catalogue no. 29, Harbour Master's Office in Gdynia, Book of ships' movement of foreign navigation, year 1935; catalogue no. 30, Harbour Master's Office in Gdynia, Book of ships' movement of foreign navigation, year 1936; catalogue no. 31, Harbour Master's Office in Gdynia, Book od ships' movement of foreign navigation, year 1937; catalogue no. 33, Harbour Master's Office in Gdynia, Book of ships' movement of foreign navigation, year 1938, vol. 1; catalogue no. 32, Harbour Master's Office in Gdynia, Book of ships'

Broking and Freight Forwarding

An essential aspect of the involvement of the Norwegian shipowners in operating Gdańsk and Gdynia was broking and freight forwarding, and BBT was the only Norwegian company that decided to undertake it. As far as broking is concerned, the most important partner of *'Bergenske'* was *Svenska Orient Linien* (SOL); on March 24th, 1933 the two companies set up the Shipping Agency 'Poland-Levant' (Limited Liability Company) *'Polska-Lewant' Agencja Okrętowa Spółka z ograniczoną poręką* with its headquarters in Gdynia.[102]

In 1934 a few modern ships were added; they were equipped with the latest cooling apparatus. The Swedish line cooperated also with the Polish shipowner *Żegluga Polska SA*, whose ships participated in transports to/from the Near East since September 1st, 1935. The terms of cooperation between SOL and the Polish shipowner were set on the basis of the agreements of May 26th, 1934 and September 9th, 1935. On September 15th, 1934 a Polish-Swedish line was started.[103] The ships of that line operated Algiers, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Greece and the ports of the Black Sea.[104] Further profits were expected from the cooperation with the Polish shipping company on account of greater concentration of the trade in the ports of the Polish customs area.[105]

According to the data depicting broking in 1936 *'Bergenske'* provided broking service to all the Norwegian shipowners who had regular connections with Gdańsk and Gdynia with the exception of *Gunstein, Stray & Sønn*, the owner of *Vore-Line*. BBT provided service to five Swedish shipping companies, three English companies and three German companies. The Finnish shipowners played a minor role. *'Bergenske'* was among the leading Gdynia brokers, just after PAM and *'Polskarb'*.[106]

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movement of foreign navigation, year 1938, vol. 2; *Norges Handels- og Sjøfartstidende* for the years 1919–1939.

[102] APGOG, *Sąd Grodzki w Gdyni*, catalogue no. 646, *"Polska-Lewant" – Agencja Okrętowa, spółka z ograniczoną poręką w Gdyni*, 1933–1939 [1942], *Ogłoszenie Sądu Grodzkiego w Gdyni*, 20.

[103] On the contracts dated 26.05.1934 and 9.09.1935, cf.: J. Szymański, *Polsko-skandynawska współpraca w zakresie żeglugi w okresie międzywojennym (1919–1939)* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 1988), 147–150; idem, "Polsko-szwedzka współpraca w dziedzinie żeglugi morskiej w latach 1919–1939", *Zapiski Historyczne* 44 (1979) 4, 80–81.

[104] RRIPwG, 1935, 113.

[105] APGOG, *Sąd Grodzki w Gdyni*, catalogue no. 646, *"Polska-Lewant" – Agencja Okrętowa, spółka z ograniczoną poręką w Gdyni*, 1933–1939 [1942], *Sprawozdanie z działalności firmy „Polska-Lewant" Agencja Okrętowa Spółka z o.o. w Gdyni za rok operacyjny* 1935, 88.

[106] *Rocznik polskiego przemysłu i handlu,* 1936, position 11059.

BDS exploited the potential of the port of Gdańsk, from which huge quantities of wood were exported in the interwar period. The management of B & WBT decided to deal in freight forwarding of wood setting up the company *'Bergford' Holz-Speditions und Lager GmbH* between September 30th and October 10th, 1921. The name of the company was a combination of BERG-enske and Wal-FORD. The greatest credits for organising the company should be given to J. Ejbøl and Wilhelm Wirtschaft,[107] a Gdańsk businessman representing the wood sector; Wilhelm Wirtschaft and Otto Bühler[108] were directors of the company. Since May 22nd, 1932 the post of director was occupied by Ralph Johannes, who developed *'Bergford'* establishing contacts with many companies of the wood industry. He set up a branch in Amsterdam, Antwerp, Pressburg (now Bratislava), Lviv, Paris, Prague, Warsaw and also in Vienna.[109]

A difficult situation of *'Bergford'* resulting from closing down BBT, as well as incertitude compounded by NRF, which in 1936 decided to decrease wood freights from the Baltic Sea and the White Sea, made BDS put its companies in Gdańsk and Gdynia up for sale. R. Johannes bought *'Bergford'* for 1,000,000 Gdańsk gulden on credit obtained from *Deutsche Bank*.[110]

The company *'Berghof' Lager und Warrant GmbH* (*'Berghof'*), functioning under the wings of BDS, had a similar profile to *'Bergford'*. The company was set up on the initiative of J. Ejbøl, M. Slaweit and S. Owren on June 23rd, 1923 in Gdańsk, where the company's headquarters were situated.[111] Because of the dependence on the economic situation of the wood market the development of *'Berghof'* was parallel to economic fluctuations. The company was closed down on January 24th, 1938.[112]

BBT also cooperated with companies dealing in freight forwarding of other goods than wood. In 1923 'Sarmacja' as the supplier of forwarding service was replaced by the *Polish Lloyd plc*, run by Aleksander Lednicki.[113] At the beginning the activity of the company was focused on agency in freight between Poland and

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[107] Matla, "Działalność norweskiego", 56.

[108] APG, ANGZ, catalogue no. 15, *Dokument przedsiębiorstwa "Bergford" Holz- Speditions und Lager Gesellschaft* dated 16.12.1921, k. 562–565, 579, 588–590.

[109] W. Treue, *"Zur Geschichte zum Deutsche Holzhandels ein Vierteljahrhundert Bergford* 1921–1945", *Zeitschrift zür Unternehmengeschichte*, 25 (1980), 7.

[110] Treue, Zur Geschichte, 7–8.

[111] APG, ANGZ, catalogue no. 29, *Dokument założenia spółki "Berghof" Lager und Warrant Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung* dated 23.06.1923, 977–981.

[112] Matla, "Działalność norweskiego", 60.

[113] *Monitor Polski* 35 (15.02.1921).

the countries such as the USA, Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Latvia, Germany, Norway, Romania, Sweden and Hungary.[114] Undoubtedly, BBT decided to cooperate with the Polish Lloyd because the latter had numerous branches dispersed all over Poland, which streamlined the transport of goods in the whole territory of the country.[115]

In 1930 BBT broke its cooperation with the Polish Lloyd, and afterwards on August 22nd it made an agreement with *C. Hartwig plc*, a Poznań company; and – according to the agreement – it took over the Gdańsk and Gdynia forwarding branches of the Poznań company.[116] At that time *C. Hartwig plc* was headed by Bolesław Weber and Ernest Hellwig. It was not a propitious moment to enter into agreement with the Poznań company, as the company's turnover had decreased dramatically, which was caused by an economic crisis.[117]

BBT represented the Gdańsk and Gdynia branches of *C. Hartwig* only in Poland, because they had kept independence abroad.[118] *'Bergenske'* finished its cooperation with *C. Hartwig* in 1933. Unfortunately, it was impossible to get access to the documents revealing the name of the new forwarding company BBT started cooperating with. The fact is that since 1933 *'Bergenske'* decided to limit in Gdańsk and Gdynia its forwarding activity to the lines permanently bound to BDS.

After closing down of BBT a new broker appeared: the above mentioned *'Bergtrans' Towarzystwo Żeglugowe* (limited liability company); Norwegian shipowners held shares in that company: BDS – 6.5%, and Wilhelm Wilhelmsen – 2.6%. The majority of the shares were in Polish hands. The company's directors were J. Ejbøl and Bohdan Nagórski, and J. Ejbøl held 179 shares (17.9%).[119]

'Bergtrans' was the only company – in addition to PAM – of that type with the majority of the shareholders being Polish. The former focused its activity on

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[114] *Przemysł i Handel* 2 (1923), 314.

[115] APGOG, *Sąd Grodzki w Gdyni, W sprawie rejestrowej firmy Polski Lloyd Spółka Akcyjna oddział w Gdyni*, 1931–1936, vol. 1, catalogue no. 730, Certified copy, 8.

[116] AAN, Ministerstwo Skarbu, catalogue no. 6304, *Bergenske* Baltic Transports Ltd. *Podatek przemysłowy za lata* 1932–1933, *Międzynarodowi ekspedytorzy C. Hartwig S.A. Zarząd Główny, Firma Bergenske* Baltic Transports Ltd. Gdańska, Poznań dated 22.08.1930, 91.

[117] J. Neider, *120 lat firmy C. Hartwig* (Wydawnictwo PSM C. Hartwig – 1982), 14–15.

[118] AAN, MS, catalogue no. 6304, Bergenske Baltic Transports Ltd. *Podatek przemysłowy za lata 1932–1933*, *Międzynarodowi ekspedytorzy C. Hartwig S.A. Zarząd Główny, Firma Bergenske* Baltic Transports Ltd. Gdańska, Poznań dated 22.08.1930, 91.

[119] APGOG, *Sąd Grodzki w Gdyni*, catalogue no. 815, *Lista wspólników firmy "Bergtrans" Towarzystwo Żeglugowe Spółka z o.o. w Gdyni*, 58.

liners, whereas the latter – on freights of package cargoes representing several lines at the same time but to a lesser degree. The activity of *'Berhtrans'* was directed towards supporting Polish shipping businesses by choosing the ships of *Żegluga Polska* in transports to Finland.[120] In addition, the broker in question dealt in importing iron ores and scrap metal to Poland, exporting coal,[121] selling bunker coal,[122] organising transports of cotton;[123] the company also participated in the import of herring from England and Scotland and transported sugar to England.[124]

In 1938 *'Bergtrans'* established a close cooperation with a line belonging to *Robert Wilsen & Nyquist* from Oslo and *Maersk Antwerp-Polen Line* which was the property of A. P. Møller. The first ships of those lines called in at Gdynia at the beginning of 1939. In addition, since January 1939 a new sea connection was established organised by Knut Knutsen,[125] a Norwegian shipowner from Haugesund. Those lines were short-lived, still Gdynia and its increasing potential might be said to attract such enterprises.

The above mentioned facts show that the scope of activity of the Norwegian shipowners in Gdańsk and in Gdynia in the years 1919–1939 was multifaceted. On the one hand, the engagement of the shipowners is visible; they set up new navigational lines (BDS, DSD, *Wilhelm Wilhelmsen*, *Gunstein Stray & Sønn*, *Fred Olsen & Co*), ran tramp navigation or – as BDS – forwarding and broking companies. The most effective were the shipping companies whose lines created a monopoly in sea transport: GGL, *Bergenske-Stavangerske* Østersjølinjen and the sea connection of *Fred Olsen & Co*. On the other hand, *Vore-Line*, which kept facing the competition on the part of Finland's wood market had financial problems all the time. A lack of engagement is visible for SAL ships.

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[120] Ibidem.

[121] Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie z działalności Zarządu Spółki "Bergtrans" Towarzystwo Żeglugowe Spółka z o.o. w Gdyni za rok operacyjny 1937*, 193.

[122] State Archives (*Archiwum Państwowe*) in Katowice, *"Skarboferm", Sekretariat Generalny "Bergtrans" S. A. w Gdyni i Gdańsku*, catalogue no. 1159, *Sprawozdanie Zarządu Spółek "Bergtrans" w Gdańsku i w Gdyni za rok 1937*, 79.

[123] APGOG, *Sąd Grodzki w Gdyni*, catalogue no. 815, *Sprawozdanie z działalności Zarządu Spółki "Bergtrans" Towarzystwo Żeglugowe Spółka z o.o. w Gdyni za rok operacyjny 1937*, 193.

[124] Ibidem, *Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego Oddział w Gdyni*, catalogue no. 815, *Sprawozdanie z działalności Zarządu Spółki "Bergtrans" Towarzystwo Żeglugowe Spółka z o.o. w Gdyni za rok operacyjny 1937*, 194.

[125] Ibidem, *Sąd Grodzki w Gdyni w Gdyni*, catalogue no. 815, *Sprawozdanie z działalności Zarządu Spółki "Bergtrans" Towarzystwo Żeglugowe Spółka z o.o. w Gdyni za rok operacyjny 1938*, 277; RRIPwG, 1938, 31–32.

Talking about broking and forwarding companies in the ports of the Polish customs area first of all it should be underlined that they limited themselves to the activity of the companies bound to BDS. That is why the share of the Bergen company in the ports of the Polish customs area stood out against the background of the other Norwegian shipowners, because actually it was based on a complimentary system composed of varied (sea and land) lines of communication, and different means of transport, which mutually complemented each other. The crucial points of that system functioned in Gdańsk and Gdynia, and the delivery of merchandise by BBT might be organised so that the broking, forwarding and ship ownership would be managed by one company, BDS. It seems that in most cases the presented system changed by changing only one ring of the chain, the shipowner, which was in relation to the fact *'Bergenske'* fulfilled the role of broker for many shipping companies.

What was then the degree of engagement of the Norwegian shipowners in operating the ports of Gdańsk and Gdynia? On the one hand, the share was not meaningless for the maritime economy of the Republic of Poland and the Free City of Gdańsk/Danzig against the background of the overall economic and political relations of the two states. As far as the arrivals at the ports of Gdańsk and Gdynia are concerned the Norwegian ships might be ranked fifth or sixth, and BBT was the second – after PAM – most important broker. What is more, GGL helped to overcome the domination of Bremen and Hamburg in trans-shipment of cotton transported to Poland. On the other hand, the activity of the Norwegian shipowners in the ports of the Polish customs area did not play a prominent role in the history of the Norwegian merchant fleet, and it did not translate into a significant development of the Polish-Norwegian trade relations. Taking into account the fact that the Norwegian merchant fleet in the interwar period was ranked fourth-sixth in the world it should be concluded that the potential of the Norwegian shipowners was not fully exploited by Poland. It was caused by the profile of the Norwegian merchant fleet well adapted to ocean navigation, and by the economic weakness of the Republic of Poland.

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DZIAŁALNOŚĆ NORWESKICH ARMATORÓW W PORTACH POLSKIEGO OBSZARU CELNEGO W LATACH 1919–1939 (GŁÓWNE PROBLEMY)

Słowa kluczowe: stosunki polsko-norweskie w latach 1919–1939, norweska flota handlowa, norwescy armatorzy, gospodarka Gdańska w latach 1919–1939, gospodarka Gdyni w latach 1919–1939

Abstrakt

W okresie dwudziestolecia międzywojennego norweska flota handlowa pod względem wielkości plasowała się na 4–6 miejscu na świecie. Z tych względów Norwegia była atrakcyjnym partnerem gospodarczym dla Polski, która w 1919 roku nie miała floty handlowej. W tym samym roku norweski rząd wysłał do Polski misję gospodarczą pod kierownictwem Samuela Eydego, a także z udziałem m.in. norweskiego armatora i reprezentanta Norweskiego Związku Armatorów – Thora Thoresena. Niestety na początku lat dwudziestych ubiegłego wieku problemy finansowe Polski spowodowały brak większego zainteresowania norweskich armatorów obsługą portu gdańskiego.

W 1921 roku jeden z największych norweskich armatorów, Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab (BDS), zaangażował się w transporty śledzi do Gdańska zakupionych w ramach tzw. drugiej polsko-norweskiej umowy śledziowej. W tym samym roku BDS utworzyło filię w Gdańsku, a w 1928 roku w Gdyni – Bergenske Baltic Trasnport Ltd. („Bergenske" lub BBT). W 1921 roku BDS założył linię żeglugową do portów bałtyckich i Londynu, zaś w 1931 roku wraz ze Det Stavangerske Dampskibsselskab – linię do portów zachodnio-norweskich. BDS współtworzył również mniejsze przedsiębiorstwa żeglugowe (Nord Ost-See Reederei A.-G., Standard Line Reederei A.-G., Bellmore Reederei A.-G., Norna Reederei-Gesellschaft m.b.H.). Statki BDS uczestniczyły także w linii południowo-amerykańskiej linii żeglugowej – Den Norske Syd-Amerikalinjen (SAL).

Spośród norweskich armatorów największą linię żeglugową do Gdańska i Gdyni utrzymywał Wilhelm Wilhelmsen (Gulf-Gdynia Line – GGL), dzięki której dostarczano do portów polskiego obszaru celnego duże ilości amerykańskiej bawełny. Linie żeglugowe utrzymywali również Fred Olsen & CO. (linia do wschodnich portów norweskich) oraz Gunstein Stray & Sønn (Vore-Line do Antwerpii). Norwescy armatorzy w wielu przypadkach korzystali z żeglugi trampowej (nieregularnej), która dominowała w Gdańsku, natomiast w Gdyni przeważała z wyjątkiem lat 1934–1936.

Istotnym aspektem aktywności BBT była działalność maklerska oraz spedycyjna. BBT było jednym z największych maklerów w Gdańsku i Gdyni. Ponadto dzięki posiadaniu „Bergford" Holz-Speditions und Lager G.m.b.H. oraz „Berghof" Lager und Warrant G.m.b.H. eksportowało duże ilości drewna z Gdańska. „Bergenske" współpracowało

także z polskimi firmami spedycyjnymi – Polski Lloyd SA i C. Hartwig SA. Wszystkie te firmy miały filie w Polsce i zagranicą, co pozwoliło BBT prowadzić transport komplementarny, a więc z użyciem transportu morskiego i lądowego.

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EKONOMISKA RELATIONER MELLAN FRIA STADEN GDANSK OCH DANMARK UNDER ÅREN 1920–1939

ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE FREE CITY OF DANZIG AND DENMARK IN 1920–1939

Summary

Economic relations of Gdansk and the Kingdom of Denmark date back to the Middle Ages. Danish – Gdansk relations on economic grounds are confirmed by the sources from 1368. Significance of Gdansk for Denmark in bilateral commercial relations is proclaimed by establishing trade and diplomatic representatives by the Danish government in Gdańsk where in the period from 1656 to 1920 there were 10 of them in following ranks: residents, consular agents, vice-consuls, consuls. After excluding Gdańsk in 1920, along with a small territory from the borders of Germany and the establishment of the Free City, the full-time consuls positions were held by Bent Falkenstjerne (1921) and Harald Koch (1922–1936). Then in 1937–1945, the duties of the honorary consul were entrusted to Holger Ditlevow Schrader.

The inclusion of the Free City into the customs and economic area of Poland was a factor encouraging the Danish people to take various economic initiatives on its territory. The participation of Danes and Danish capitals should be noted in the ship owners -forwarding and brokerage companies registered in Gdańsk, such as: Branch of the United Baltic Corporation (*Filia Zjednoczonej Korporacji Bałtyckiej*), Baltic – American Oil Importing Company Ltd. (*Bałtycko-Amerykańskie Towarzystwo Importu Nafty z o.o.*), Gdańsk Shipping and Trade Joint Stock Company Artus (*Gdańskie Żeglugowo-Handlowe*

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Towarzystwo Akcyjne Artus). Furthermore, the activity of Danish enterprises and Danes in the Free City area was marked by trade, combined with forwarding, among which the following companies can be mentioned: Domestic and Foreign Commissions Company Limited Filiale Danzig, Skandinwisch – Danziger Handelsgesellschaft GmbH "Skandia", Handelsgesellschaft Skandinavia GmbH, I. P. Kraberg & Co Aktieselskab, "Danobalt" Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Rudolph Als Aktieselskab and Langelandskorn GmbH. Textile products were dealt with by "Danopol" Dänisch – Polonische Gesellschaft für Auswärtigen Handel GmbH. A well-known Danish company 'Infico' Internationale Financierungs Compagnie Aktien – Gesellshaft, operated on the insurance market. Danes' activity in the Free City also occurred in the field of manufacturing. In 1926–1930 a refinery operated in Gdańsk started by the Danish company Aarhus Oliefabrik AS, equipped with the most modern equipment for the production of vegetable oils, margarine and other edible fats. Mention should also be made of cooperation established in the 1930s by Gdańsk Shipyard (*Stocznia Gdańska*) with the Danish company Burmeister & Wain AS in the field of diesel engine construction.

Gdansks kommersiella kontakter med Danmark går tillbaka till medeltiden. Att det sedan 1368 har funnits kopplingar mellan Gdansk och Danmark är styrkt. Gdansks invånare kom till Jyllands kust samt till Själland och Bornholm, där de köpte fisk, främst sill för marknaden i Gdansk. I sin tur tog danska köpmän med sig kött och köttvaror samt saltad, rökt och torkad fisk till Gdansk där de i gengäld köpte spannmål, malt och mjöl. I slutet av 1300- och början av 1400-talet upprättade man mellan orterna Falsterbo och Skanör som ligger vid Östersjön i Skåne som då tillhörde Danmark, permanenta "handelsläger" för Gdansk och för andra preussiska städer i syfte att köpa in fisk, främst strömming. "Handelslägret" för Gdansk styrdes av s.k. fogdar som skickades dit från Gdansk, bland annat under åren 1379, 1399–1401 och 1405–1410. Under de följande århundradena led kommersiella kontakter mellan köpmän från Gdansk och från Danmark av många avbrott, på grund av de krig som utkämpades i norra Europa på land och till sjöss.[1]

[1] Mer om Gdansks handelsförbindelser och om Gdansks handel från medeltiden och fram till början av 1900–talet har skrivits av: M. Biskup, *Under Tyska ordens styre – från 1308 till 1454. Handel*, i: *Gdansks historia, volym I fram till 1454*, redigerat av E. Cieślak, Gdańsk 1978, 403–405; Samma, *Gdansk i slutet av Tyska ordens era (1409–1454)*, i: *Gdansks historia*…, s. 526–527, 542–543; A. Zbierski, *Hamnen i Gdansk mot bakgrund av staden på 9 – 1200-talet*, Gdańsk 1964, s. 238–248; H. Samsonowicz, *Dynamiskt handelscentrum*…; J. Trzoska, *Varierande konjunktur inom Gdansks handel och sjöfart*, i: *Gdansks historia*, vol. III/1 (1655–1793), Gdańsk 1993, s. 70, 73, 86, 90; Samma, *Förändringar i baltisk och europeisk handel*, i: ibidem, s. 345–346, 352–355; Samma, E. Cieślak, *Gdansk handel och sjöfart på 1700-talet*, i: ibidem, s. 372, 378, 383–384, 430–431, 439; C. Biernat, *Handel, sjöfart och tillverkning*, i: ibidem, vol. III/2, s. 42, 46–48, 50–52, 55–56; W. Zajewski,

Gdansks betydelse för Danmark i de bilaterala ekonomiska förbindelserna styrks av det faktum att de danska myndigheterna inrättande kommersiella och diplomatiska representanter i staden vid Motlawa-floden, som under åren 1656–1920 var tio till antalet: residenter, konsulära tjänstemän, vicekonsuler och konsuler.[2] Den sista konsuln innan Fria staden proklamerades, Richard Marx, utsågs 1912 med den tyske kejsaren Vilhelm II:s godkännande (exekvatur).[3]

Att Gdansk tillsammans med det angränsande området hamnade utanför Tysklands gränser och att man tillkännagav att Fria staden skulle proklameras, skapade en nytt politiskt och ekonomiskt läge som de danska myndigheterna hade för avsikt att anpassa sin konsulära och diplomatiska beskicknings funktion till, vilket i mars 1921 avspeglades i etableringen av nya regler och i utnämningen av Bent Falkenstjerne till generalkonsul. Utnämningsbrevet av den 17 februari 1921 ställdes ut av kung Kristian X, och exekvatur beviljades den 1 juli 1921 av den polska statschefen Jozef Pilsudski. På grund av det faktum att Fria stadens utrikespolitik anförtroddes den polska regeringen, var artikel 4 i konventionen mellan Polen och Gdansk av den 9 november 1920 den rättsliga grunden för beviljande av exekvatur, och utnämningen av Bent Falkenstjerne skedde med godkännande från Fria stadens senat med medverkan av Republiken Polens generalkommissionär i Gdansk. Framtida utnämningar av konsuler i Konungariket Danmarks konsulära och diplomatiska beskickning i Fria staden Gdansk gjordes enligt samma princip, med beaktande av bestämmelserna i genomförandeavtalet mellan Polen och Gdansk som ingicks den 24 oktober 1921 i Warszawa.[4] Mot slutet av 1921 omplacerades Bent Falkenstjerne genom ett kungligt dekret till tjänstgöring som

Ekonomisk stagnation och finansiellt utnyttjande av Fria staden Gdansk, i: ibidem, vol. III/2, s. 152–155; J. Stanielewicz, *Stagnation inom handel och sjöfart*, i: ibidem, vol. IV/1 (1815–1920), Sopot 1998, s. 100, 104, 106, 108, 129–130; Samma, Återhämtning av den maritima ekonomin, i: ibidem, s. 365; B. Wachowiak, *Problem med Gdansks handel under 1800-talet första hälft*, "Rocznik Gdański" 1981, vol. 41, häfte 2, s. 5–44.

[2] Konungariket Danmark representerades i Gdansk av: residenterna – Johann Melchior Rötlin (1656–?), Christian Martin de Friese (1722–?), konsulära tjänstemannen Johann Carl Ludwig Fromm (1822–?), konsulerna – Carl August Wilhelm Fromm (1822–1836), Friedrich Böhm (1836 –1844), Gustav George Lindhberg (1844–1876), Adam Wilhelm Müller (1878–1891), Archibald York (1892–1904), Peter Ludwig Müller (1904–1912) samt Richard Marx (1912–1920); se Rigsarkivet i Köpenhamn, Udenrigsministeriet (nedan RaK, Udm), Journalnummer H 52–45, pakkenummer 52. Danzig 2, b. pag.: Danska konsuler i Gdansk, b.d.; ibidem, b. pag.: Anteckning, 19.02.1912; ibidem, b. pag.: Danska konsulatet i Gdansk till konsuln i Hamburg, 18.04.1912.

[3] RaK, Udm, Jnmr H 52–45, pknm 52. Danzig 2, b. pag.: Ministeriet for Handel og Søfart do Udenrigsministeriet, 31.10.1912; ibidem, b. pag.: Legationen i Berlin till Udenrigsministeriet, 16.10.1912.

[4] Ibidem, b. pag.: Legationen i Warszawa till Udenrigsministeriet, 26.08.1919; ibidem, b. pag.: Konsulatet i Gdansk till Udenrigsministeriet, 14.02.1921; Riksarkivet i Gdansk (nedan APG), Senat, 966, s. 5: Danmarks Generalkonsulat till Senatens ordförande, 11.03.1921; ibidem, s. 19: Republiken

legationsrådgivare vid Konungariket Danmarks legation i Stockholm. Samtidigt utsågs den förre rådmannen vid Hovrätten i Köpenhamn och karriärdiplomaten Harald Koch till generalkonsul i Gdansk den 1 januari 1922. Utöver honom arbetade följande personer på Konungariket Danmarks generalkonsulat i Fria staden: vicekonsul Einar Christensen, sekreterare och sedan mars 1923 vicekonsul Theodor West och stenograf Gudrun Køhler. I februari 1925 utvidgades räckvidden av danska generalkonsulatets verksamhetsområde till en del av pomorskie-län, dvs. distrikten Wejherowo och Puck.[5]

Generalkonsul Harald Kochs stora kompetens när det gäller internationell rätt uppskattades, och som ett bevis på detta valdes han 1926 av Nationernas förbund till posten som ordförande för Tysk-polsk-gdanska skiljedomstolen för transittrafikfrågor (Deutsch – Polnisch – Danziger Schiedsgericht für den Durchgangsverkehr) med säte i Gdansk.[6] Under andra hälften av 1920-talet, till följd av åtstramningsåtgärder från de danska myndigheternas sida, uppstod det svårigheter med att täcka kostnaderna för ett permanent konsulat och betala ersättning till generalkonsuln i Fria staden Gdansk. Efter det att det danska parlamentet (Folketinget) antog den s.k. besparingslagen 1927, som även omfattade utrikesministeriet (Uderigsministerium) och alla underordnade beskickningar utomlands, ville man i syfte att minska utgifterna stänga det permanenta konsulatet i Gdansk den 1 april 1928 eller eventuellt göra om det till en beskickning av honorär karaktär.[7] I slutändan beslutade man emellertid efter samråd med företrädare för regeringarna i Polen, Danmark och Tyskland samt med Nationernas förbunds högkommissarie och Fria stadens senat att behålla Danmarks permanenta generalkonsulat i Gdansk, och Harald Kochs månadslön på 40 000 gulden skulle fr.o.m. den 1 april 1928 betalas av de polska och tyska myndigheterna (18 000 gulden var) och av Fria stadens senat (4 000 gulden). I praktiken uppbar alltså Konungariket Danmarks generalkonsul Harald Koch en ersättning i egenskap

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Polens Generalkommissionär i Gdansk till Fria stadens Senat, 21.05.1921; ibidem, b. pag.: Exequatur för Bent Falkenstjerne, 1.07.1921; K. Skubiszewski: Polens västra gräns, Gdańsk 1969, s. 109–111.

5 APG, Senat, 966, s. 23 i 53: Danska legationen i Warszawa till Fria stadens Senat, s. 18.06 och 31.12.1921; ibidem, s. 47: Danska legationen i Warszawa till minister K. Skirmunt, 8.10.1921; ibidem, s. 45, 63 i129: Republiken Polens Generalkommissionär till Fria stadens Senat, 12.11.1921, 26.01.1922, 24.03.1923; ibidem, s. 49: Christian X:s utnämningsbrev för Harald Koch, september 1921; ibidem, s. 73: J. Pilsudskis exequatur, 28.01.1921; ibidem, s. 105 i 107: Danska Generalkonsulatets personal, 9.11.1922; ”Danziger Volksblat” 3.01.1922, nr 2.

6 APG, Senat, 966, s. 293: Danska konsulatets anteckning, 5.10.1926, s. 329: Skiljedomstolen i Gdansk till Fria stadens Senat, 2.12.1926.

7 Ibidem, s. 401: Anteckning, 8.10.1927; „Danziger Hafen und Handel”, 1.12.1927, nr 13.

av ordförande för Tysk – polsk – gdanska skiljedomstolen för transittrafikfrågor i Gdansk.[8]

Utvecklingen av Gdynias kommersiella hamn samt av faciliteter med koppling till den maritima ekonomin gjorde att den polska regeringen kom med ett förslag om att i denna stad skapa en dansk konsulär beskickning som skulle vara oberoende av beskickningen i Gdansk. Som ett resultat av förhandlingar mellan regeringarna i Polen och Danmark, gick det danska utrikesministeriet med på att skapa ett honorärt vicekonsulat, vars verksamhet var begränsat till staden Gdynias område. Den 5 februari 1932 utsågs Lucjan Byczkowski till honorär vicekonsul, och i april 1935 utnämndes han till honorärkonsul ad personam. Efter generalkonsul Harald Kochs död den 5 juli 1936 lade den polska regeringen fram ett förslag om att döpa om vicekonsulatet i Gdynia till ett honorärkonsulat, och utvidga dess behörighet utanför staden Gdynias område, dvs. över havsdistriktet, inklusive Wejherowo och Puck, vilket godkändes av de danska myndigheterna. Dessutom utnämndes Lucjan Byczkowski till honorärkonsul.[9]

Det blev emellertid mer angeläget för Konungariket Danmarks regering samt för den danska befolkningen i Fria staden att efter Harald Kochs frånfälle utse en ny konsul i Gdansk, vars arbetsuppgifter utfördes tillfälligt av vicekonsul Theodor West. Följande personer kandiderade till befattningen: Holger Ditlev Schrader – chef för ett dotterbolag till det multinationella oljeföretaget ”Unida Lever” och ordförande för utländska handelskammaren i senaten samt Peder Gjersing – avdelningschef på rederiet Zjednoczona Korporacja Bałtycka i Gdansk, (United Baltic Corporation, Danzig Branch), som dessutom ledde seglarklubben med namnet Übersee – Clubs Verein Danzig och Danska föreningen i Fria staden. Problemet som skulle lösas efter Harald Kochs frånfälle var frågan om den nya konsulns lön. Danska utrikesministeriet ville stödja konsulatet i Gdansk med den lilla summan av 8 000 danska kronor per år, och ordföranden i Fria stadens senat

[8] APG, Senat, 966, s. 509–510: Diplomaten Gellhorn till Fria stadens Senat, 13.04.1928; ibidem, s. 517, 519, 527 och 539: Anteckningar från samtal, 8 och 18.05, 22.06 och 14.08.1928; ibidem, s. 521: Fria stadens Senat till Republiken Polens generalkommissionär, 21.05.1928.

[9] Ibidem, Senat, 969, s. 7: Republiken Polens generalkommissionär till Fria stadens Senat, 23.07.1937; ibidem, s. 1122, 519, 5 och 9: Anteckningar, 17 och 28.07.1936: Arkivet för nya akter i Warszawa, Utrikesministeriet (nedan AANW, MSZ), 437, s. 69, 107–111: Exequatur för L. Byczkowski, 5.02.1932 och 28.06.1937; ibidem, s. 7–9: Skrivelse från MSZ, 10.02.1932; ibidem, s. 84, 97–98, 114: Danska legationen till polska utrikesministeriet, 18.12.1931, 22.02 och 12.05.1937; Rak, Udm, jnmr H 52–45, pknmr 52. Danzig 2, b. pag.: Danska utrikesministeriet till legationen i Warszawa, 17.02.1937; ibidem, b. pag.: Anteckning hos danska utrikesministeriet, 20.02.1937.

garanterade endast en sänkning av det skattepliktiga beloppet.[10] I detta läge gick Holger Schrader med på att ta över rollen som chef för Konungariket Danmarks honorärkonsulat med jurisdiktion som begränsats till Fria stadens område. Den 28 april 1937 beviljades han exekvatur att bedriva sin verksamhet som Danmarks honorärkonsul inom Fria stadens område. Senare, i februari 1938, erhöll Holger Schrader titeln som generalkonsul ad personam.[11] Enligt den information som finns hos det danska utrikesministeriet, vistades konsul Holger Schrader i Gdansk fram till den 14 mars 1945. Vicekonsul Jørgen Lønborg Friis Mogensen (1909–2000) som samarbetade med den i Östpommern verksamma hemliga militära organisationen „Gryf Pomorski", arbetade enligt bekräftade uppgifter på Danmarks generalkonsulat i Gdansk från den 1 augusti 1940 och fram till det att han greps 1944.[12]

Bestämmelserna i fredsfördraget med Tyskland, som undertecknades i Versailles den 28 juni 1919, om att Gdansk och områden runt staden skulle hamna utanför Tysklands gränser samt om att Fria staden skulle skapas och införlivas i polska statens pris- och ekonomiska område, utgjorde en faktor som bland annat uppmuntrade danskarna till att vidta olika initiativ på detta område. Det noterades en märkbar aktivitetsökning hos skandinaver, däribland de danskar som redan var bosatta i Gdansk, och en tillströmning sedan 1919 av medborgare från de skandinaviska länderna, även från Danmark.[13]

Efter det att Ententen i april 1919 delvis hade hävt handels- och sjöblockaden av Centraleuropa, var Filia Gdańska Zjednoczonej Korporacji Bałtyckiej (United Baltic Corporation, Danzig Branch) först med att bedriva verksamhet med inriktning på den framtida Fria staden och den polska staten. Aktiekapitalet på två miljoner brittiska pund hos dotterbolaget till detta rederi tillhörde det berömda danska rederiet Ostindiska kompaniet (Det Østasiatisk Kompagni). Dotterbolaget

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[10] APG, Senat, 970, s. 1: Senatens anteckning, 17, s. 1936.

[11] RaK, Udm, jnmr H 52–45, pknmr 52. Danzig 2, b. pag.: Danska legationen i Warszawa till Udenrigsministeriet, 24.05.1937, 7.02.1938; APG, Senat, 970, s. 45, 99: Exequatur för H. D. Schrader, 28.04.1937, 8.02.1938; ibidem, s. 19: Kung Christian X:s utnämningsbrev för H. D. Schrader, 15.02.1937.

[12] APG, Morski Urząd Rybacki, 150, s. 71: Utländska diplomater i Gdansk, status per den 1.08.1940; E.S. Kruszewski, *Den outtröttliga kraftkarlen Jørgen Lønborg Mogensem (1900–2000)*, "Acta Cassubiana", Gdansk 2003, s. 369–371; Samma, *Jørgen Lønborg Friis Mogensen (3.04.1909–26.08.2000) Svaneke*, i: *Polsk-Skandinaviska Institutets XV:e årsbok 1999/2000*, Köpenhamn 2000, s. 79–80.

[13] APG, Senat, 966, s. 220: Statistiska byrån till Fria stadens senat, 18.05.1925; ibidem, s. 979, 291: Anteckning, 22.01.1927.

drev regelbunden trafik mellan Gdansk och engelska hamnar, och samtidigt tillhandahöll speditions- och mäklartjänster för skandinaviska fraktföretag.[14]

Bolaget registrerades med dansk kapital 1919, ursprungligen i Sopot, och omregistrerades 1922 till ett rederi och speditionsföretag i Gdansk, nämligen Bałtycko – Amerykańskie Towarzystwo Importu Nafty z o.o. (Baltisk-amerikanska bolaget för petroleumimport, med begränsat ansvar) (Baltisch – Amerikanische Petroleum Import GmbH). Gustav Adolf Stein, direktör för Det Dansker Petroleum Aktieselskab i Köpenhamn, satt bland andra i bolagets styrelse. Bolaget bedrev verksamhet i Fria staden fram till 1935 och sysslade med handel och transport av petroleumprodukter och bulkvaror (kol, koks). I hamnen i Gdansk hade bolaget sex bränsledepåer med en kapacitet på 12 000 ton samt disponerade över en flotta av stora tankfartyg, varav 25 på 25 256 bruttoregisterton registrerades under Fria stadens flagg, vilket gjorde det under denna period till det största rederiet inom det polska tull- och ekonomiska området. Till följd av effekterna av den världsomspännande kris som även drabbade sjöfarten, upphörde bolaget i maj 1935 med sjöfartsverksamhet, och fartygen såldes till bolaget Panama Transport Company Limited och seglade under panamansk flagg.[15]

Man har också styrkt engagemang av skandinaver, dvs. dansken Albert Jansen, ordföranden för Offentliga Kassen i Köpenhamn, och svensken A.P. Appelquist, direktören för Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget i Stockholm, i dotterbolaget till den tyska koncernen Hugo Stinnes med namnet Gdańskie Żeglugowo-Handlowe Towarzystwo Akcyjne ”Artus” (Danziger Reederei und Handels Aktiengesellschaft ”Artus”), som bildades den 17 oktober 1919 och som registrerades i Gdansk. Dotterbolaget gjorde omfattande affärer inom handel med virke, kol och petroleumprodukter samt spedition, mäklarverksamhet och sjötransportförsäkringar. I hamnen i Gdansk hade bolaget bränsledepåer med en kapacitet på 20 000 ton och sju upplag för trä samt registrerade sex fartyg på 27 972 bruttoregisterton under Fria stadens flagg. 1926 omregistreras emellertid dessa fartyg

[14] B. Hajduk, *Polska och danska hamn- och sjöfartskontakter under åren 1919–1939*, ”Östersjöinstitutets meddelanden” (nedan „K.I.B.”), 1979, häfte 30, s. 34.

[15] Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Preussische Ministerium fur Handel und Gewerbe (GSPK, PMHG) i Berlin, C XIII 5, nr 32, Bd. 1, b. pag.: Bałtycko-Amerykańskie Towarzystwo till Rikets ekonomiministerium, 2.05.1920; APG, Polizei Prasidium, 6566, b. pag.: Fartygsregister för åren 1920–1930; Lloyd Register of Shipping 1937/1938; Staatsanzeiger fur die Freie Stadt Danzig 5.03.1921, nr 9, post 278, 10.04 och 15.06.1922, nr 16 och 24, post 380 och 543.

under tysk flagg och användes fortfarande av rederiet Stinnes Hugo Linien från Hamburg.[16]

Förutom att bilda dotterbolag och tillhandahålla kapital till företag som registrerades i Fria staden, byggde danska rederier upp ett nätverk av regelbundna fartygsförbindelser med hamnen i Gdansk. Regelbunden trafik till hamnen i Gdansk ombesörjdes sedan 1919 av två välkända danska rederier, nämligen United Steam Navigation Company (Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab AS) och Ostasiatiska kompaniet (Det Østasiatiske Kompagni). Den första av dem transporterade passagerare längs den nordamerikanska rutten, en indirekt rutt från Gdansk till danska och franska hamnar, och sedan vidare med fartyg som tillhörde Skandinavien-Amerika-Linjen (Scandinavian America Line) till New York. På grund av den globala krisen inom sjöfarten och konkurrensen från det polska företaget Gdynia – Amerika Linie, upphörde det danska rederiet i februari 1936 med SAL:s verksamhet och drog sig ur passagerartransport på denna rutt.[17]

Däremot lanserade Ostasiatiska kompaniet 1919 en direkt reguljär trafik och transport av emigranter och passagerare mellan hamnarna i Liepaja, Riga, Gdansk och New York. I mars 1930 upphörde det danska företaget med denna linje och sålde Östesjö-Amerika-linjen till den polska regeringen, vilket resulterade i att Polskie Transatlantyckie Towarzystwo Żeglugowe SA Bildades, som 1935 omvandlades till företaget Gdynia Ameryka Linie Żeglugowe.[18]

Utöver de som omnämnts tidigare, startade rederiet ”Aarhus Shipping Company” en reguljär linje från Århus till Gdansk och Gdynia 1933. Mäklare åt detta danska rederi var mäklarföretaget ”Friedrich Gottlieb Reinhold” från Gdansk.[19]

De danska rederiernas engagemang i transport av människor och varor, jämfört med rederier från de andra skandinaviska länderna åskådliggörs av statistiken över fartygstrafik i hamnen i Gdansk (tabell 1).

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[16] GSPK, PMHG, C XIII, nr 32, Bd. 1, b. pag.: Information om företaget “Artus”, 5.11.1919; ibidem, Bd. 3/4, b. pag.: Konsulatet i Gdansku till Auswaertiges Amt, 21.10.1922; Lloyds Register of Shipping 1927/1928, s. 178. 17 AANW, MSZ, 5713, s. 52–53: Republiken Polens legation i Köpenhamn till MSZ – rapport nr 39, 8.07.1931; ibidem, 2511, s. 12, 66: Rapporter från Republiken Polens legation till MSZ, 29.10.1935 och 22.02.1936.

[17] AANW, MSZ, 5713, s. 52–53: Republiken Polens legation i Köpenhamn till MSZ – rapport nr 39, 8.07.1931; ibidem, 2511, s. 12, 66: Rapporter från Republiken Polens legation till MSZ, 29.10.1935 och 22.02.1936.

[18] APG, Gdynia Ameryka Linie Żeglugowe (GAL), 2, s. 103: Avtal av den 11.03.1930; ibidem, s. 387–389: Industri- och handelsministeriet till GAL, 26.02.1938; AAN, Ministerrådets presidium(PRM), mkfm nr 27251, s. 125–128: Begäran från industri- och handelsministern till KEM, 21.06.1933.

[19] APG, Kommunala domstolen, 94 RHB/27, b. pag.: Notarius publicus anteckning om F.G. Reinhold, 2.06.1927; ”Rocznik Morski i Kolonialny” 1938, Warszawa 1938, s. 169.

Tabell 1. Andel av danska och andra skandinaviska rederier i fartygstrafiken i hamnen i Gdansk under åren 1920–1938 (anlöpande fartyg)

År	Anlöpande fartyg enligt flagg								Sammanlagt	
	svensk		dansk		norsk		finsk			
	a.f.	%	a.f.	%	a.f.	%	a.f.	%	a.f.	%
1920	103	2,7	124	7,9	59	3,5	16	0,6	302	14,7
1921	119	2,6	195	20,5	87	4,4	3	0,8	404	28,3
1922	179	4,3	257	25,6	152	6,7	24	0,3	612	36,9
1923	173	2,9	288	19,2	155	6,0	18	0,1	634	28,2
1924	226	5,0	415	18,6	161	5,8	23	0,2	825	29,6
1925	496	9,7	458	16,6	143	5,8	45	0,7	1142	32,8
1926	1302	22,2	987	20,1	301	6,2	78	1,4	2668	49,9
1927	1563	20,1	982	18,1	383	6,0	62	1,6	2990	45,8
1928	1352	16,4	985	18,4	352	6,5	82	2,7	2771	44,0
1929	1327	18,5	864	18,4	327	6,3	103	2,9	2621	46,1
1930	1427	18,5	1072	19,7	257	5,1	136	3,4	2892	46,7
1931	1442	18,5	1061	18,7	310	5,7	120	2,8	2933	45,7
1932	985	18,2	861	18,1	220	5,3	101	3,4	2167	45,0
1933	886	15,2	726	17,0	234	5,7	100	4,9	1946	42,8
1934	927	14,8	818	16,0	324	7,1	108	5,3	2177	43,2
1935	762	15,4	757	17,3	318	8,8	115	6,5	1952	48,0
1936	945	16,6	972	16,7	372	8,6	154	6,3	2443	48,2
1937	1128	17,7	843	13,5	415	6,8	290	8,8	2676	46,8
1938	1370	19,8	876	12,4	547	8,5	407	9,2	3200	49,9

a.f. – antal fartyg
% – procent av det totala tonnaget

Källa: Jag citerar B. Hajduk, *Skandinaver i Fria staden Gdansks ekonomiska liv 1920–1939*, i: *Polen – Sverige 1919–1999*, redigerat av Jan Szymański, Gdańsk 2000, s. 157.

Uppgifterna i tabellen visar kommersiell och tonnagedominans av dansk flaggade fartyg fram till 1924. De stod för den största andelen när det gäller antalet fartyg 1930 och 1931, i övrigt, med undantag av 1936, anlöptes hamnen i Gdansk av fler fartyg under svensk flagg.

Ett annat område där danskar och danska företag var aktiva i Fria staden var handel kopplad till spedition. I februari 1922 registrerade man i handelsregistret företaget Domestic & Foreign Commission Company Limited, Filiale Danzig, som var ett dotterbolag till företaget Inden & Udenlandsk Commissions Compagni Aktieselskab från Köpenhamn. Avdelningen i Gdansk hade ett aktiekapital på 30 000 danska kronor och var mellanhand i handeln av alla slag. I liknande syfte, dvs. handel med olika varor, registrerades i Gdansk avdelningar av danska kommersiella företag, såsom Handelshus Henrik Politur, Beckmann & Jørgensen,

Hellenberg & Larsen Trading Co. samt I. P. Karberg & Co. Aktieselskab.[20] Dessutom drev dansken Albinus Pedersen inköpsbolaget Baltic Supplies GmbH som bildades 1921.[21] Likaså var Jens Eibøl delägare i flera kommersiella företag i Gdansk, bland annat i företaget Spanisch – Baltische Handel AG som drev en börs för citrusfrukter och ett partihandelsvaruhus som på 1920-talet var huvudleverantör av citrus på den polska marknaden.[22]

Med medverkan av ingenjören Ber Schor från Köpenhamn bildades i Gdansk i mars 1922 företaget „Skania" Skandinavisch Danziger Handelsgesellschaft GmbH. Företaget specialiserade sig på agenturhandel med alla slags varor mellan Fria staden och Skandinavien.[23] Liknande verksamhet som baserades på agenturhandel med varor som importerats från de skandinaviska länderna bedrevs av företaget Handelsgesellschaft Skandinavia mbH, där en av grundarna var köpmannen Jakob Mendelssohn från Köpenhamn.[24] De danska köpmännen Christian Ammentrop från Köpenhamn och Marius Germsen från Riga ägde det i Gdansk i januari 1922 bildade företaget „Danobalt" Handelsgesellschaft mbH som utvecklade handel med alla varor mellan Fria staden, de baltiska länderna och Polen.[25]

En betydande och erkänd position i Gdansks spannmålshandel innehades sedan 1919 av det danska företaget Langelandskorn GmbH som hade ett stort spannmålslager med namnet „Gehrt" på Wyspa Spirzchów (Speicherinsel).[26]

Företaget Rudolph Als Aktieselskab från Köpenhamn, vars ägare Rudolph Als bosatte sig i Gdansk och 1927 grundade företaget Rudolph Als Aktiengesellschaft, exporterade kol från gruvorna i Övre Schlesien via Gdansk och Gdynia till Danmark och till andra länder.[27]

Dansken Jens Eibol som tillsammans med köpmannen W. Wirtschaft från Gdansk grundade företaget Begford Holzspeditions und Lager GmbH, satte sin prägel på timmerhandel. Efter ett kapitaltillskott från det norska rederiet Det Bergenske Dampskibselskab skapades det största företaget i hamnen i Gdansk för

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[20] Staatsanzeiger…, 24.05., 24.11.1924, nr 44, 96, post 791, 2403; 27.10.1926, nr 88, post 2202, 31.05., 25.10.1933, nr 39, 74, post 839, 1591; 8.08.1934, nr 6, post 1354.

[21] Ibidem, 11.06.1921, nr 23, post 660.

[22] Ibidem, 19.11.1922, nr 46, post 1208; A. Matla, *Polsko-norweskie kontakty żeglugowe w latach (Polsk-norska sjöfartskontakter under åren) 1919–1926*, "K.I.B.", 1986/1987, häfte 38, s. 55.

[23] Staatsanzeiger… 11.06.1922, nr 13, post 333; 15.07.1925, nr 88, post 1430.

[24] Ibidem, 5.03.1921, nr 9, post 285; 26.07.1924, nr 67, post 1203.

[25] Ibidem, 25.02., 8.04.1922, nr 8, 15, post 219, 353; nr 5, post 88.

[26] Ibidem, 5.02.1921, nr 5, post 166; 25.03.1925, nr 40, post 384.

[27] Ibidem, 8.06.1927, nr 52, post 1257; B. Hajduk, *Skandinaver…*, s. 162.

timmerhandel, som disponerade över upplag med en yta på 17 hektar, hamnbassänger med 600 meter långa lastkajer och ett sidospår för järnväg.[28]

I mindre omfattning gjordes affärer inom timmerhandel av företaget ”Storage” Holzlagerungsgesellschaft mbH som Erik Pontoppidan från Köpenhamn var en av medgrundarna till, och denne samarbetade i sin tur med den i Gdansk bosatta danska köpmannen Carl O. Thørbjornsen.[29]

Ett intressant initiativ i handeln med textil var bildandet av företaget „Danopol” Danisch-Polnische Gesellschaft für Auswärtigen Handel GmbH av köpmän från Köpenhamn, Lodz och Gdansk. Grunden för dess verksamhet under åren 1921–1925 var import för den polska marknaden av bomull, textil- och läderprodukter från Danmark samt export till detta land av produkter från den polska bomulls- och linneindustrin.[30] Man kan också notera danskarnas aktivitet i handlesagentbranschen i Fria staden. Eigil Johannsen var agent för det kommersiella företaget Dansk-Polsk Kompagni AS från Köpenhamn. Köpmannen Harald Rygberg representerade i sin tur intressen av tobaksbolaget International Planters Corporation AS i Gdansk. Fullmakter att vara representanter beviljades också till medborgarna i Fria staden. Så gjorde styrelsen för De Dansker Spiritfabrikker från Köpenhamn när den gav fullmakt till advokat Gustaw Zander från Gdansk att representera dem. På ett liknande sätt hade Georg Jacobi, en mäklare från Gdansk, fullmakt att representera intressen av danska och norska tillverkare av ätliga oljor och fetter. Fullmakt att ingå transaktioner på uppdrag av det välkända företaget Det Forenede Kulimportorer i Köpenhamn, som importerade polsk kol till Danmark, hade köpmannen Jens Brochmann.[31]

Medverkan av utställare från Danmark på internationella mässor som syftade till att främja handel och tillverkning i Fria staden är värt att notera. Utställare från Danmark deltog i Vårmässan i Gdansk (Danziger Frühjahrmesse) som arrangerades mellan den 18 och 25 februari 1920 samt i Internationella mässan

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[28] Staatsanzeiger… 4.02.1922, nr 5, post 143, 26.01.1938, nr 5, post 60; A. Matla, *Verksamhet av norska koncernen Bergenske i hamnar på det polska tullområdet under åren 1919–1939*, „K.I.B.”, 1992, häfte 41, s. 56–58.

[29] Staatsanzeiger… 10.12.1921, nr 49, post 1288; 16.08.1924, nr 79, post 1356.

[30] Ibidem, 13.08.1921, nr 32, post 866; 21.10.1925, nr 119, post 2132; 10.03.1926, nr 18, post 447.

[31] APG, Senat, 970, s. 1: Anteckning, 2.01.1929; B. Hajduk, *Gdansks ekonomi under åren 1920–1945*, Gdańsk 1988, s. 130 – 131.

i Gdansk (Danzig Inter Messe) som anordnades mellan den 2 och 5 oktober 1924, den 5 och 8 februari i och den 24 och 27 september 1925.[32]

Danska handelscirklar visade intresse för att utveckla de ekonomiska förbindelserna i Fria staden. Bevis på detta är ett besök av representanter för handelskammaren (Grosserer-Societetet) i Köpenhamn mellan den 21 och 23 maj 1924. Följande personer kom till Gdansk: Kammarens ordförande Ernst Meyer, grossisten Harald Kjær, direktören O.E. Andersen, grossisten O. Skovgaard-Petersen samt Kammarens sekreterare advokat Raffenberg. I Gdansk höll de samtal med senatens ordförande Heinrich Sahm och med ledamöter i styrelsen för den lokala handelskammaren (Handelskammer) samt träffade den i staden vid Motlawa-floden bosatta danska befolkningen. Samtalen fokuserade på handels-och sjöfartsfrågor samt på huruvida det var möjligt att öka den bilaterala handeln och den danska ekonomiska närvaron i Fria staden Gdansk. Ytterligare ett besök av danska köpmän ägde rum den 26 och 27 maj 1937. De deltog i samtalen som hölls på Handelskammaren i Gdansk och som kombinerades med en föreläsning av kammarens ordförande dr. Kronhert om handelsrelationerna mellan Gdansk och Danmark. I föreläsningen framhöll man behovet av att ytterligare bygga ut ömsesidiga ekonomiska förbindelser samt införa lättnader för turisttrafiken mellan Gdansk och de danska hamnarna.[33] Andelen av Konungariket Danmark i Fria staden Gdansks utrikeshandel presenteras i tabell 2.

Tabell 2. Danmark och Island i Fria staden Gdansks utrikeshandel.

År	Omsättning		År	Omsättning	
	tusen ton	värde mln gld.		tusen ton	värde mln gld.
1923	109	0,496	1931	1589	51 936
1924	160	56 222	1932	934	34 018
1925	305	51 679	1933	953	30 834
1926	706	50 826	1934	462	17 988
1927	856	60 851	1935	392	19 940
1928	639	59 538	1936	382	27 173

[32] Erhvervsarkivet i Århus, Landbrugsraadet, 9. A. 10, b. pag.: Landbrugsministerium till Landbrugsraadet, 9.06.1925; B. Hajduk, *Gdansks ekonomi*… s. 135–136.

[33] RaK, Udm, jnmr H 65–86, pakknmr 65. I. 61, b. pag.: Danska konsulatet i Gdansku till Udenrigsministerium, 14.04., 24.05.1924; ”Danziger Zeitung”. Beilage 24.05.1924, nr 213; Beilage der ”Danziger Rundschau” 19.05.1924, nr 20; ”Danmarksposten” 06.1924, nr 6, s. 117; “Kurier Bałtycki” 29.05.1937, nr 48.

År	Omsättning		År	Omsättning	
	tusen ton	värde mln gld.		tusen ton	värde mln gld.
1929	1142	68 193	1937	334	23 156
1930	1137	62026	1938	304	18 612

Värdet av gulden i förhållande till polsk zloty:
januari 1924: 1 gld = 0,898 zł
december 1925: 1 gld = 1,706
januari 1930: 1 gld = 1,738
april 1935: 1 gld = 1,486

Källa: Berichte über die Lage von Handel, Industrie und Schiffahrt im Jahren 1923, s.45, 48 – 49; 1924, s. 57; 1926, s. 73; 1927, s. 71; 1928, s. 77; 1929, s. 79; 1930, s. 55; 1931, s. 79; 1934, s. 42; 1935, s. 59; 1936, s. 62; 1937, s. 81; 1938, s. 59; Danziger Statistische Mitteilungen 25.04.1925, nr 9/10, s. 50; 22.03.1933, nr 1, s. 15; 17, 31.03.1934, nr 1, 20.

Uppgifterna i tabellen visar att den lägsta omsättningen när det gäller volym inföll åren 1923, 1924 och 1925 och att den därefter gradvis ökade för att 1931 vara som störst. När det däremot gäller värde ser vi fluktuationer under enskilda år, från det lägsta värdet 1923 till det högsta 1929.

Utöver de områden som diskuterats, noterades också danskarnas närvaro inom bankväsendet i Gdansk. Banken Osteuropäische Bank AG bedrev sin korta verksamhet i Gdansk under åren 1922–1924 med medverkan av bankiren Erik Steven från Köpenhamn. Banken stöttade kommersiella transaktioner med länderna i Östeuropa. Även bankhuset Vinkel Lundgaard Bankgeschäft från Köpenhamn öppnade en filial i Gdansk.[34] Denna bank hade också en avdelning i Berlin, och den var verksam i staden vid Motlawa-floden under åren 1923–1926.[35]

Dessutom började ett finansinstitut med namnet „Infico" Internationale Finanzierung Compagnie Aktiengesellschaft, med huvudsakligen dansk kapital, sin verksamhet i Gdansk 1930. Bolagets startkapital på 100 000 gulden ökades till 500 000 gulden. Bolaget specialiserade sig på att ta över finansieringen genom förvärv av andelar (aktiepaket) i företag från Gdansk och i utländska företag, för att därmed utöva kontroll över dem och förvalta de tillgångar som placerats i dem. Inom kort ägde bolaget aktier i bland annat den välkända kolimportören Rudolph Als Aktieselskab och i dess dotterbolag Rudolph Als GmbH från Gdansk. Bolaget köpte också danska statsobligationer, telekomaktier i Köpenhamn samt inteckningsstödda värdepapper i Fria staden. Förluster till följd av krisen 1934 och 1935

[34] Staatsanzeiger… 15.07.1922, nr 29, post 637; "Danziger Hafen i Handel" 6.06.1928, nr 7, s. 6.

[35] Staatsanzeiger… 31.03.1923, nr 24, post 514; 3.11.1926, nr 91, post 2254; B. Hajduk: *Gdansks ekonomi…*, s. 68.

tvingade emellertid bolagets ledning att i november 1937 inleda ett konkursförfarande.[36]

Versicherungs Aktien – gesellschaft Skandinavia, Filiale Danzig, vars aktiekapital uppgick till 20 miljoner danska kronor, ett dotterbolag till ett danskt försäkringsbolag från Köpenhamn, registrerades i december 1922 och var verksamt på försäkringsmarknaden i Fria staden. Filialen i Gdansk, tillsammans med andra sådana företag, specialiserade sig på återförsäkringar i alla typer av försäkringar. På grund av ökad konkurrens och dåliga ekonomiska resultat likviderades filialen 1927.[37]

Danskar var också aktiva i tillverkningssektorn i Fria staden. Det danska företaget Aarhus Oliefabrik AS:s medverkan i utvecklingen av olje- och fettindustrin, dvs. i framställningen av vegetabiliska oljor, margarin och andra matfetter var betydande. Efter första världskrigets slut levererade det omnämnda danska företaget sina produkter till Fria staden och till den polska marknaden. Höjda tullar på importerade fetter och frön av vissa oljeväxter, som den polska regeringen införde 1925–1926, gjorde att bolagets ledning inrättade filialer och byggde ett raffinaderi på hamnområdet i Gdansk under åren 1927–1928, som var utrustad med de senaste maskinerna för framställning av kokosnöt-, palm-, sojabön-, sesam- och jordnötsolja. Raffinaderiet hade automatiserade produktionslinjer och en kaj i hamnen i Gdansk. Kollapsen av den allmänna konjunkturen och ökad konkurrens från andra tillverkare av ätbara oljor och fetter i Fria staden ledde till att huvudkontoret i Århus beslutade att avveckla produktionen i Gdansk. Raffinaderiet togs över av engelskt kapital som tillhörde koncernen ”Unida – Lever” och sedan 1930 drevs det före detta danska raffinaderiet under namnet Unida Oelwerke GmbH. Efter ägarbytet hade danskar fortfarande chefspositioner i styrelsen för företaget ”Unida – Lever”, bland andra den förre verkställande direktören Holger Schrader. Dessutom hade Holger Schrader chefspositioner i andra fabriker i denna bransch i Gdansk, nämligen styrelseordförande i Danziger Oelmühle A. G. och i företaget ”Dida” Margarine Betriebs Gesellschaft mbH samt ledamot i styrelser för Towarzystwo Przemysłowo – Handlowe ”Oleo” och i marmeladfabriken ”Dagoma” som tillhörde det holländskt-engelska företaget ”Amada”.[38]

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[36] Staatsanzeiger… 7.01.1931, nr 1, post 23, 1.06.1932, nr 41, post 978, 20.04.1938, nr 26, post 399; B. Hajduk, *Bankväsende i Gdansk under åren 1922–1945*, i: *Banker och bankirer i Gdansks historia*, redigerat av E. Cieślak, Gdansk 1999, s. 155–156.

[37] Staatsanzeiger… 6.01.1923, nr 1, post 11, 23.03.1927, nr 24, post 605.

[38] RaK, Udm, jnmr H 52–45, pakknmr 52. Danzig 2, b. pag.: Anteckning, 12.02.1937; ibidem, b. pag.: Udenrigsministerium till legationen i Stockholm, 4.02.1937; GSPK, PMHG C XIII 5, nr 32, Bd 7/8,

Bortsett från oljeindustrin kan man notera engagemang av det danska företaget M. Mortensen Canning Company Limited från Assens i produktionen av konserver, som startades 1924 på en fabrik med namnet Mortensen Konservenfabrik GmbH.[39]

Det bör också nämnas att ett samarbete etablerades på 1930-talet mellan skeppsvarvet i Gdansk (Międzynarodowe Przedsiębiorstwo Budowy Statków i Maszyn) med det danska företaget Burmeister & Wain AS för att bygga dieselmotorer. Utöver samarbetet i fråga om motorer köpte varvet i Gdansk licens för produktion av kylutrustning från det danska företaget Atlas Maskinfabrik AS.[40]

Ansträngningar för att i Fria staden starta en filial gjordes från april 1935 av det kända danska företaget Nordisk Insulina Laboratorium AS, men till ingen nytta.[41] Det danska företaget ”A. G. H. Hein & Söhne” sökte på ett liknande sätt partners i Fria staden för att tillverka motorer till fiskebåtar.[42]

Den framlagda och säkerligen inte fullständiga översikten av de bilaterala förbindelserna och av danskarnas ekonomiska aktivitet i Fria staden Gdansk, gör det möjligt att identifiera de områden där de engagerade sig. Danska initiativ var påtagliga inom sjöfarten, handeln, fettindustrin, bankväsendet och försäkringsbranschen. Den institution som stödde etableringen och utvecklingen av det bilaterala samarbetet var Konungariket Danmarks konsulat som var verksam i Gdansk fram till slutet av andra världskriget.

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RELACJE GOSPODARCZE WOLNEGO MIASTA GDAŃSKA Z DANIĄ W LATACH 1920–1939

Słowa kluczowe: Dania, Wolne Miasto Gdańsk, Handel

Abstrakt

Kontakty handlowe Gdańska z Królestwem Danii sięgają średniowiecza. Potwierdzone w źródłach są związki handlowe gdańsko-duńskie od 1368 roku. O znaczeniu Gdańska dla Danii w bilateralnych relacjach gospodarczych świadczy ustanawianie

w nadmotławskim grodzie przez władze duńskie przedstawicieli handlowo-dyplomatycznych, których w okresie od 1656 roku do 1920 roku było dziesięciu w rangach: rezydentów, agentów konsularnych, wicekonsulów i konsulów. Po wyłączeniu w 1920 roku Gdańska wraz z niewielkim terytorium z granic Niemiec i utworzeniu Wolnego Miasta funkcje konsulów etatowych pełnili: Bent Falkenstjerne (1921) i Harald Koch (1922–1936). W latach 1937–1945 obowiązki konsula honorowego powierzono zaś Holgerowi Ditlevowi Schraderowi. Włączenie Wolnego Miasta w obszar celno-gospodarczy państwa polskiego stanowiło czynnik zachęcający do podejmowania przez Duńczyków różnych inicjatyw gospodarczych na jego terenie. Odnotować należy udział Duńczyków i kapitałów duńskich w zarejestrowanych w Gdańsku spółkach armatorsko-spedycyjno-maklerskich, takich jak: Filia Gdańska Zjednoczonej Korporacji Bałtyckiej, Bałtycko-Amerykańskie Towarzystwo Importu Nafty z o.o., Gdańskie Żeglugowo-Handlowe Towarzystwo Akcyjne „Artus". Ponadto aktywność duńskich przedsiębiorstw oraz Duńczyków na obszarze Wolnego Miasta zaznaczyła się w handlu, połączonym ze spedycją, spośród których wymienić można spółki: Domestic & Foreign Commission Company Limited Filiale Danzig, Skandinawisch-Danziger Handelsgeselschaft GmbH „Skandia", Handelsgesellschaft Skandinavia GmbH, I.P. Karberg & Co Aktieselskab, „Danobalt" Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Rudolph Als Aktieselskab oraz Langelandskorn GmbH. Handlem artykułami włókienniczymi zajmowała się spółka „Danopol" Danisch-Polnische Gesellschaft fur Auswartigen Handel GmbH. Na rynku ubezpieczeniowym w Gdańsku działała znana duńska firma „Infico" Internationale Financierungs Compagnie Aktien-Gesellschaft. Aktywność Duńczyków w Wolnym Mieście zaistniała także w dziedzinie wytwórczości. W latach 1926–1930 funkcjonowała w Gdańsku rafineria uruchomiona przez duńską spółkę Aarhus Oliefabrik AS, wyposażona w najnowocześniejsze wówczas urządzenia do produkcji olejów roślinnych, margaryny i innych tłuszczów jadalnych. Należy również wspomnieć o współpracy nawiązanej w latach trzydziestych XX wieku przez Stocznię Gdańską z duńską spółką Burmeister & Wain AS w dziedzinie budowy motorów diesla oraz z zakładami Atlas Maskinfabrik AS w zakresie produkcji urządzeń chłodniczych.

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ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN POLAND AND NORWAY IN THE YEARS 1945–1946

Keywords: Polish-Norwegian relations, establishing diplomatic relations in the years 1945–1946, activity of diplomatic representatives of the Polish Government in Exile in Norway, taking over Polish Mission in Oslo by Poland's Provisional Government of National Unity, envoy Mieczysław Rogalski (April 1946), Rolf Andvord's mission in Poland (August-September 1945), coal contract and establishing diplomatic relations with Poland, envoy Alfred Danielsen in Warsaw (November 1945).

Summary

The article depicts the process of establishing diplomatic relations between Poland and Norway after the end of the Second World War, which started in August 1945 and ended in April 1946. The article is composed of two basic parts. The first part describes the efforts of the Polish Government in Exile to maintain the Polish diplomatic mission. Next it presents the activities of Colonel Tadeusz Tokarz, military *attaché* of the Mission of the Republic of Poland, accredited to the Norwegian Government in Exile in London, concerning the varied assistance for several thousand Poles gathered in repatriation camps, mainly in Moss and Mysen. At the end of the first part the author explains how and why the Polish Mission in Oslo was taken over on April 6, 1946 by Mieczysław Rogalski, the Communist representative of the Temporary Government of National Unity in Warsaw. He describes the first diplomatic contacts with the Norwegian authorities. In the second part a special attention was paid to the presentation of the endeavours of the Norwegian

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Government aimed at establishing – as soon as possible – their own diplomatic mission in Warsaw. The description concentrates on the central role played by Rolf Otto Andvord, the Norwegian Ambassador in Moscow, during his two-month mission in Poland concerning commercial and diplomatic matters. The mission took place in August and September 1945. Andvord was charged with two tasks: to sign a contract with the Polish authorities for a fast delivery of coal to Norway and to establish fast and good diplomatic relations with Poland. It has been emphasised that Andvord was provided with a three-roomed accommodation for the Norwegian Mission at the *'Polonia'* Hotel. At the end of the article there is a short life history of Envoy Alfred Danielsen, who arrived in Warsaw on November 12, 1945, and a description of his first diplomatic activities and contacts with the Polish authorities.

1. Establishing Diplomatic Relations on the Part of the Polish Authorities

Establishing diplomatic relations between the Provisional Government of National Unity (*Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej*, TRJN) and the Norwegian Government in 1945 was much more difficult as in the case of Sweden or Denmark. After Hitler invaded Norway Władysław Neuman, a Polish envoy in Oslo, together with the Norwegian Government, went to Great Britain and there he continued fulfilling his duties till October 31st, 1942.[1] Władysław Günther-Schwarzburg replaced Władysław Neuman and held his post formally till July 5th, 1945.[2] During the war the Polish fought together with the Norwegians at Narvik, and the Polish Government was one of the three coalition partners of Norway. Yet, when the war ended the Norwegian Government did not grant consent for the representation of the Polish Government in exile together with the Norwegian Government to come back to Oslo. The talks concerning that question held by Günther-Schwarzburg first with Haakon VII, the King of Norway, on May 12th, and later – on May 15th – with Trygve Lie, Minister of Foreign Affairs, did not produce the desired result, in spite of the courteous conduct of the Norwegian partners. The Norwegian Government decided to stall for time, giving false hopes instead of a positive solution. The Norwegians knew that the position of

[1] Władysław Neuman (1893–1945), a Polish diplomat, *chargé d'affaires* in Tallinn (1921–1922), envoy in Oslo (1.09.1931–31.10.1942); the Norwegian King Haakon VII trusted and liked him, from October 31st, 1942 to January 24th, 1945 an envoy of Poland in Mexico; cf.: *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. IV (1918–1939), ed. P. Łossowski (Warsaw: PWN, 1995), 631, 638; also: http://www.ipsb.nina.gov.pl/a/biografia/wladyslaw-neuman, access 4.03.2017.

[2] Cf.: M. Gawinecka-Woźniak, *Stosunki rządu polskiego z rządem norweskim na emigracji w Londynie w latach 1940–1945* (Toruń: Druk-tor, 2008), 81–88.

the Polish Government in London was unstable and they waited for the situation in Europe to normalise and for the Governments of Great Britain and the USA to adopt an attitude towards the Polish question.[3]

1.1. A Struggle to Keep the Diplomatic Mission in Oslo by the Polish Government in Exile – Wiesław Patek's Efforts (May 25th – August 15th, 1945)

The Polish Government in Exile in London decided – despite everything – to take action to keep on the Mission in Oslo and not to let in representatives of the Communist Government from Warsaw. For that reason it sent to Oslo Wiesław Patek, the Secretary of the Polish Diplomatic Mission in Stockholm[4]. Patek arrived in Stockholm as early as on May 25th and – according to the instructions of Henryk Sokolnicki, the Plenipotentiary Minister in Stockholm – he was to reopen the Mission and start functioning, as far as possible, as *chargé d'affaires*; and should it fail he was supposed to remain there as an observer. In his talks with the Norwegians Patek emphasised the need to organise help for about 25,000 Poles staying in the Norwegian territory (15,000 from the *Wehrmacht*; 7,500 from OT and 1,500 POWs). As early as on May 26th he got in touch with the Branch Office of the Norwegian Government in order to obtain information about the arrival of a new Polish Mission from London, and he was replied that such a mission was not included in the list of foreign diplomatic posts that were to come together with the Norwegian Government[5].

Since his arrival in Oslo Patek had been very active 'organising' the work of the Polish mission. His activity is worth analysing as it shows how difficult the Polish political situation was just after the war. Patek, as a representative of the Polish Government in Exile, first of all strove to establish contacts with the Norwegian authorities, which was hardly possible before the beginning of June, when Johan Nygaardsvold, Prime Minister, and the whole Norwegian Government returned from exile; between 14 and 31 of May only the Branch Office, already

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[3] Ibidem, 142–143.

[4] Wiesław Patek, born on December 18th, 1909, in Warsaw, died on April 11th, 1994, in Stockholm, columnist; in the interwar period bound with *'Bunt Młodych'* and *'Polityka'*; since 1933 in the diplomatic service in Moscow, Paris, Strasbourg, Oslo, Stockholm; May 5 – August 15, 1945 *chargé d'affaires* in Oslo; 1946–1948 in a Swedish shipping company; a university lecturer (historian, expert on Eastern Europe); 1951–1971 columnist of *'Svenska Dagbladet'*: https://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo/Patek-Wieslaw;3954976.html, access 4.03.2018.

[5] Gawinecka-Woźniak, *Stosunki*, 143.

mentioned, functioned in Norway, which was composed of five ministers headed by Prince Olav, and the expeditionary corps under the command of General Andrew Thorne.[6]

The very first thing Patek dealt with in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Utenriksdepartementet*, UD) was an attempt to get back the seat – a villa at 33, *Josefinesgate* – of the Polish Mission in Oslo. Patek was staying in the centre of Oslo at the Grand Hotel, which had become a seat of the Polish Mission for an undefined time. Whereas in the former seat of the Polish Mission one of the rooms had been occupied during the war by the Union of Brewers (*Bryggeriforeningen*), and the other rooms were cluttered with packed furniture and other objects of the Polish Mission. When Patek had learnt about it he tried to recover that furniture, getting in contact with the Norwegian UD and Astrid Hesselberg, the owner of the building where the Mission had been housed. After many such contacts Ms Hesselberg informed Patek that most of the furniture had been stolen by the Germans, and the rest had been left as security for the unpaid rent. Patek's efforts to recover the furniture came to nothing in the end. Nevertheless, Stanisław Szydłowski, an ancient secretary of the Mission, managed to recover part of his private furniture he had left there in August 1939, when he arrived in Oslo from London in February 1946 and talked about it with George Collin, a protocol secretary in UD.[7]

Another question – much more important – was to recognise Patek as *chargé d'affaires* by the Norwegian Government. For that reason, on June 26th Patek paid a visit to Trygve Lie, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who informed him that the recognition had to be put off because of the existing political situation. After that visit, still on the same day, Patek paid a visit to Rasmus Skylstad, a secretary of UD, expressing understanding for the decision of the Norwegians, made under pressure, to establish contact with the new Polish Government. At the same time he underlined that the only thing he wanted was to be useful in solving the problem of the large number of the Polish forced labourers and POWs and the Poles

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[6] E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, *Norwegia na drodze dylematów i przemian 1945–1949* (Toruń: TNT 1992), 26–35.

[7] *Riksarkivet Oslo* (henceforth: RA), *Utenriksdepartementet* (henceforth: UD) 1940–1949, *Eske* (henceforth: E.); 10165, note of G. Collin dated 12.02.1946. In the note, in addition to a description of the question of the furniture in the Polish mission, there is a mention of the fact that in August 1945 the Polish *charge d'affaires* in Stockholm (J. Pański – E. D.-Sz.) sent a note to the Norwegian UD asking for help in securing and sealing the Polish movables in Norway. The note was sent to the Norwegian Ministry of Justice, which in a letter dated 29.08.1945 replied that the movables in question were mostly office equipment that had been occupied by the Germans.

forcibly conscripted into the Wehrmacht who found themselves in the Norwegian territory. According to him, he might turn out to be really useful, as the Polish liaison officers in the Allied Command had no direct contacts with the Norwegian civil authorities. Skylstad took a positive stance on that question, and consented to Patek's further activity concerning the Polish in the Norwegian territory, but he added that 'he must be prepared for the relations to change, when the new Polish Government had to be recognised'.[8]

On July 10th Patek again arrived at UD so as to lodge – on the behalf of the Polish Government in Exile – a formal protest against the recognition of the Provisional Government of National Unity by the Norwegian Government on July 6. At the same time he tried to return to the question of his status, again expressing his wish to continue his activities for the Polish DPs (displaced persons). As a reply he heard from Per Prebensen, an adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, that 'he had been considered *persona non grata* and obtained eight days to leave the country'.[9] Patek's argument that there was a universal rule that Polish diplomats enjoyed a right to remain in the country where they had been staying, was rejected. According to the documents that have been analysed the Norwegians wanted to help the Polish suggesting the same solution that was applied to the Polish DPs; they had had a choice of where to go; *inter alia,* they might choose Great Britain and obtain British citizenship.[10] Yet, the situation changed dramatically when a counsellor of the USSR Embassy in Oslo (of unknown name) paid a visit to the above mentioned protocol secretary Collin on July 18th asking about Patek, who still stayed at the Grand Hotel and was quite active. Collin replied,

> I told him that Patek had come to Norway and the Norwegian Government did not know anything about it, and that UD – after the Norwegian Government came back to the country – informed Patek that he could not be recognised as the Polish chargé d'affaires, but the authorities agreed that he might deal with the Polish POWs and deportees in the territory of Norway. I explained to him that after the Norwegian Government had recognised the new Government in Warsaw UD informed Mr Patek that under the circumstances he could not deal with the Polish DPs any longer and should leave Norway as soon as possible.

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8 Ibidem, note of R.B. Skylstad dated 26.06.1945: *Den polske representasjon i Oslo*, p. 1–2.

9 Ibidem, note of P. Prebensen dated 11.08.1945: *W. Pateks stilling*, p. 1.

10 Ibidem, Handwritten annotation to the above mentioned note dated 16.07.1945, signature illegible.

Then, according to what Collin writes, the Soviet representative remarked, 'since Mr Patek is still staying at the Grand Hotel, it is impossible for the Russian Embassy not to notice that he is still visible in his activities and still receives many applicants'. Collin apologised and said that Patek had ignored the official recommendation to put an end to his activities. In the end the secretary said, 'we shall deal with that'.[11]

As a result, as late as on August 27, in his note dated July 11, P. Prebensen, a counsellor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, made a handwritten annotation, 'After many attempts to persuade him, Patek finally left the country – as already mentioned on September 15 – for Stockholm'.[12]

Undoubtedly, the intervention of the Soviet Embassy in Oslo was a key factor in the decision of removing Patek from Oslo. It seems justified to claim that if it had not been for that intervention, Patek would have been continuing his work for the Polish DPs in Norway.

1.2. The Activity of Colonel Tadeusz Tokarz, a Military *Attaché* of the Mission of the Polish Republic in London, concerning the Polish Camps in Moss and Mysen

Just after the Second World War a representative of the Polish who had been fighting alongside the British, an officer of the General Staff of Władysław Sikorski, came from Great Britain to Oslo; during the war he had supported and organised the military cooperation between the Polish and the Norwegians. It was colonel Tadeusz Tokarz. Since March 15th, 1942 he had been occupying the post of military *attaché* in the Mission of the Polish Republic, accredited to the Norwegian Government in exile in London.[13] He arrived in Oslo on May 8th together with the Norwegian military corps and the High Command of Defence (*Forsvarets Overkommando*), where he was accommodated at the Grand Hotel. His presence in Oslo was recorded in documents issued on a trivial occasion when food ration

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[11] Ibidem, note of G. Collin dated 18.07.1945, *Den polske legasjonssekretaer Patek*, p. 1–2, cf.: K. Tarka, *Emigracyjna dyplomacja. Polityka zagraniczna rządu RP na uchodźstwie 1945–1990* (Warsaw 2003), 23–24.

[12] RA, UD 1940–1949, note of P. Prebensen dated 11.07.1945, *W. Pateks stilling*, p. 1.

[13] Ibidem, E.10345, 20.20 *Fremmede statsborgeres St. Olavs Orden*, 91. Polen, bd. I, letter from *Det kgl. Forsvarsdepartamentet* to *Utenriksdepartamentet*, 21 Sept. 1946, which informs that the Commander-in-Chief of the Norwegian ground forces proposes to decorate with the Cross of Freedom of the King Haakon VII two Polish officers: general Stanisław Sosabowski and colonel Tadeusz Tokarz.

coupons were given out. According to Otto von Hanno, a Norwegian lieutenant-colonel, Tokarz was given meals in the officers' canteen at the Bristol Hotel. In November 1945, when the officers' canteen at the Bristol Hotel was closed down, colonel Tokarz had to be provided with ration coupons for civilians. That is why with the full knowledge of the Norwegian High Command of Ground Forces (*Haerens Overkommando*) lieutenant-colonel Otto von Hanno turned first to the Ministry of Supplies and next to the Secretariat of UD. There, as he writes in his note, he heard that Tokarz might be given ration coupons only waiting for them in a queue as a civilian private person, and not as a diplomat. Further he adds,

> I fear to think that the Soviet Union might use repressive measures against Norway if we continued to treat the representatives of the Government in Exile friendly, which we have been doing for the last five years. I suspect that it would be advantageous if the way of thinking and behaving of those young diplomats could bring about more harmony with their innocent attitude.[14]

The decision was made by the Head of the diplomatic protocol of UD, Cerge Collin, on November 12th, who confirmed that he had talked to major Hanno during his visit at UD. The worst in the whole story – according to what Collin writes – was that the major – in spite of expressing understanding for the developing of the situation in that way – went to *Rasjoneringskontor* in Oslo and confirmed the right of Tokarz to be given coupons as a diplomat, citing as the authority his talks in UD. In that way Tokarz was given coupons, but the clerk at the office telephoned to UD asking for confirmation whether Tokarz was entitled to coupons as a diplomat and it was just that telephone call that caused all the commotion.[15]

A conclusion arises that the Norwegian major tried to save the situation of Tokarz, taking the risk of his own insubordination to the authorities. He behaved as a normal man, who wanted to help another in need. Undoubtedly, he seemed not to fully understand the sudden change in behaviour of his Government towards one of the three allies, the Polish ally, with whom – like with the British and the French – Norway had been cooperating throughout the war. In addition, colonel Tokarz was the most important person, who had helped to organise schools in

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[14] Ibidem, letter from major Otto v. Hanno dated 7.11.1945 to *Det Kongelige Norske Utenriksdepartement*, entitled *Yngre diplomaters opptreden*, p. 1–2.

[15] Ibidem, note of Klavenes dated 12.11.1945, *Rasjoneringskort til „den polske militaerattache"*, and an attached whole-page handwritten annotation of the head of Protocol G. Collin with the same date.

Mysen and Moss for those Poles who did not want to return to Poland. When in April 1946 Mieczysław Rogalski, an envoy of TRJN, came from Warsaw to Oslo, Tokarz together with the liaison officers were put under surveillance on the part of the Polish Mission. Tokarz was the central figure among the Polish Londoners. He came to Oslo to support repatriation, and at the same time he was seeking ways to gather the Poles who decided to remain in Norway in one organisation, the Polish Union with its headquarters at 53b, *Munkendammsveien*. The seat of the Polish Red Cross, a branch of the Norwegian Red Cross, was located at the same address. All the correspondence concerning the Polish was sent to that address, and it was so still after Rogalski had come to Oslo. In the same street, at number 36, there was a Norwegian company (*Maskinutstyr*), which produced spare parts for machines; Tokarz was employed there and in that way he could remain in Norway legally. It was very important as Tokarz often left for London, organising help for the Polish schools in Mysen and Moss in the form of textbooks, paper, exercise books, as well as financial means. His last departure to London took place in June 1946. On August 31st, 1946 envoy Rogalski paid a visit to UD complaining about Tokarz's activity among the Polish addressed against the Warsaw Government. He also added that Tokarz had come back a few days before and now he intended to set up a Union of Poles under the direction of captain Roman Budka, and had been charged with the task of handing over the Golden Cross of Merits, brought from London, to major Harrisson, the military *attaché* of the USA Embassy in Oslo and an opponent of the Polish regime. Rogalski was promised that the whole thing would be investigated through the diplomatic channels.[16] The results of that investigation were to be found in the Norwegian documents in the form of seven letters and notes made by UD and the Main Passport Office (*Sentralpasskontoret*, SK); the documents depict who gave Tokarz a visa to stay and later return to Norway and what was done to expel him from Norway. According to the documents Tokarz stayed in Norway till June 1946, and then, before he went to London he had asked Knut Nicolai Stilloff, the head of SK, to give him a return visa, which Stilloff refused to give his consent to, and he also refused to give him a work permit in Norway. Suspicion arose that the return visa was issued by the Norwegian Embassy in London.[17] UD secretary Collin asked colonel H. Haneborg Hansen

[16] RA, Sos. dep. FFD, *Sentralarkiv*, *E-saksarkiv*, E.0087, *mappe 9.1121 Polakker*, bd. XIII, *Notat fra UD av* 31 August 1946; cf.: AMSZ, Z.6, T.1096, W.76, Political report of the Polish envoy in Oslo M. Rogalski to Minister J. Olszewski, Oslo 30.08.1946, k. 24.

[17] Ibidem, Erik Dons, Notat av 2 Sept. 1946.

from the military staff to clarify the situation via the Norwegian military intelligence. The latter writes that major Karl Evang from the command of the military intelligence service informed him that,

> Tokarz is «a persona non grata» here in Norway, and his activity may lead to nasty things. He should leave Norway. Tokarz has links to anti-Russian circles and hence to Sweden where people flee to. In addition, he has huge financial means, the origin of which is difficult to define.[18]

Quite soon it turned out that neither the Embassy of Norway in London nor the Consulate in Leigh issued the return visa. Nevertheless, the investigation was not fruitless; it proved that Tokarz had had the so-called British re-entry permit valid till September 25th, 1946. In virtue of that permit he was given a visa by the Norwegian Passport Control Office in London. Having that document Tokarz was allowed to move about Denmark and Sweden, too. In September he was in Denmark; that is why it was decided not to allow him to enter Norway and send him from the Oslo airport to England avoiding thus the situation of forcible expulsion from the country.[19] On November 4th, 1946, as Mieczysław Rogalski, an envoy of the Republic of Poland, writes, P. Prebensen, the secretary general of the Norwegian UD, informed him officially that colonel Tokarz had left for London, and 'some authorities have obtained instructions so that he would never be granted an entry visa again'.[20] Rogalski, in his inquiries concerning organising the pro-London Polish community, stated that he was an official representative of reactionary circles of London. He added that Tokarz was on the list of the Organisational Committee of Education in Germany, situated in London, and that he was the person the Polish repatriation camps in Norway could communicate with in all questions and take instructions from. Rogalski regarded Tokarz's activity as harmful, and herewith he substantiated his *aide-mémoire* addressed to the Norwegian UD, with which P. Prebensen, the above mention secretary general of UD, had to agree and take appropriate action.[21] Rogalski added that there was still another important question, which was a kind of pressure both on the Polish Mission in Oslo and the Norwegian authorities. It was the information that

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[18] Ibidem, notat av H. Haneborg Hansen, 20 Sept. 1946.

[19] Ibidem, *notat fra den norske ambassaden i London av 20 Sept. 1946*; *notat av Erik Dons*, 26.09.1946.

[20] AMSZ, Z.6, W.76, T.1096, Political report of Polish envoy in Oslo M. Rogalski dated 9.11.1946 to Minister J. Olszewski, Political Dep. of the MFA, k. 31.

[21] Ibidem, k. 30.

Rogalski had been visited by colonel Petrenko, the military *attaché* of the Soviet Embassy, who was to say that the Polish from the camp in Mysen, whom Tokarz had been helping, might have been trained as parachutists who were to join the Polish bands fighting against the new authorities in Poland.[22]

Like in the case of Patek, the fate of colonel Tadeusz Tokarz, who got engaged in helping the Polish remaining in Norway, was decided because for purely political reasons, and a special role was played by the pressure of the Soviet Embassy in Oslo. Hence the excessive activity of Rogalski to eliminate 'all the London elements' from the Norwegian territory as soon as possible.

1.3. Bjarne Holter-Sørensen, a *Pro Tempore* Honorary Consul General

Norway waited longer than the other Scandinavian countries for a diplomatic envoy from Warsaw. An attempt made by the Polish Government in Exile to place its own envoy in Oslo failed, still taking care of the huge number of the Polish was a problem to solve. The Norwegians themselves demanded a Polish envoy be sent as soon as possible, which was the matter of their prestige. They were not interested in appointing a common envoy for Sweden and Norway with the seat in Stockholm on account of their recent forced union with Sweden. Rolf Andvord, the Norwegian ambassador in Moscow, expressed it during his visit to Warsaw at the beginning of August 1945; he came to Poland to prepare a place for the Norwegian mission in Warsaw and to establish the first diplomatic and commercial contacts with Poland (these questions will be dealt with later). On August 6, during his visit to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) he complained that since his departure from Moscow he had not received any reply to his note of recognising TRJN by Norway. He also asked that there be an independent envoy in Oslo and that such an envoy be sent as soon as possible, because 'the Norwegian Government attaches a lot of weight to it'.[23]

The Polish authorities were informed about the situation in Norway by a person, whose name appeared while the Polish Repatriation Mission was being organised. It was Jerzy Halwic, a former worked of OT; in 1942 he had come to the region of Alta in northern Norway with *Bodmann u. Hildebrandt*, a German company from Łódź where he was employed as an accountant. After the war, like

[22] Ibidem, Political report of Rogalski dated 30.08.1946, k. 24.
[23] AMSZ, Z.6, W.76, T.1091, *pro domo* note dated 6.08.1945, k. 1.

many of over the 7,500 Polish forced workers of the *Todt* Organisation (German: Organisation *Todt*, OT) he waited to be evacuated in one of the dozen or so camps for civilians. At that time he was recruited by Jerzy Pański, *chargé d'affaires* of TRJN in Stockholm, into cooperation with the Communist Government in Poland.[24]

J. Pański, a Polpress correspondent and an organiser of the Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden during the war, was nominated for his post in three Scandinavian countries, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, and held it from July to September 3rd, 1945. A denouncing letter handwritten by Halwic in August 1945, i.e. when he still was in Norway, proves that he had a good knowledge of the situation in Norway. He depicts the situation in that country, mentioning the people related to the London Government, including the Polish liaison officers who looked after POWs and civilians.[25] Halwic's report must have been a stimulus for the authorities in Warsaw to start dealing with the huge number of the Polish in Norway; that number was three times bigger than that in Sweden, and they should be evacuated to Poland as soon as possible. It might be easier as at the beginning of September to the Polish Mission in Stockholm TRJN sent Adam Ostrowski, who soon got support in the territories of Denmark and Finland, and he writes to the Consular Department of the Polish MFA:

> …in view of the arrival of chargé d'affaires, dr Szymański, in Denmark, and expecting the post in Finland to be soon taken up, I could restrict myself to Norway. According to the order of Ministry I turned to Mr Germanowič, the envoy of Yugoslavia for the Scandinavian countries in Norway, who agreed that the honorary consul general of Yugoslavia in Norway, Mr Bjarne Holter-Sørensen, domiciled in Oslo, (Toldbodgatan 11, telephone number 23 700) could deal with urgent matters of Polish citizens until the Polish mission was established.

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[24] In one of his reports to the Director of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pański writes about his visit in Oslo at the invitation of the Norwegian Government concerning the Poles in Norway; he underlines that he was received with full honours by the Minister of Interior S. Oftedal and the commander of Russian troops general Ratow; he says that the Norwegian Government held a conference of delegates from Polish camps, where the question of repatriation of the Polish was discussed. He mentions that a vote of no confidence was expressed concerning the liaison officers of the London Government and that he was asked to send liaison officers from Poland. In the end, which was characteristic, he adds that five liaison officers should be sent to general Thorne or should be nominated from among the Polish officers and soldiers in Norway. The whole report in: AMSZ, Z.6, W.78, T.1165 Political notes [Jerzy Pański, Adam Ostrowski], report no. 5 to the Director of the Department J. Olszewski, k. 20.

[25] Ibidem, Z.6, W.76, T.1092, Jerzy Halwic, *Sprawozdanie z działalności osób szkodliwych dla Państwa Polskiego na terenie Norwegji*, p. 6.

He informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that just to settle that matter Tadeusz Tabaczyński, head of the Consular Department, went to Norway and he talked to both Sørensen and Collin in the Norwegian UD. As a result Sørensen agreed to act as a consul, and in more important matters, especially related to evacuation, he was to turn to the Consular Department of the Polish Mission in Stockholm.[26] All these facts are confirmed in Norwegian documents; e.g. in his letter dated November 18th, Collin writes that Holter-Sørensen telephoned him first (November 17th) and the following day he asked again on the telephone whether he might pay a short visit together with the secretary of the Polish Mission in Stockholm (no names were mentioned). In spite of the fact that it was Sunday both gentlemen were received by Collin. The Pole explained that the Polish authorities were not able – on account of the problems with the post and telegraph – to send a letter from Warsaw; that is why it was done by the Mission in Stockholm. He added that the matter was urgent taking into consideration a big number of problems, which the Mission in Stockholm could not solve, and hence the post might be temporarily taken up by Sørensen until the Polish envoy came to Oslo. Collin consented to such a solution, and he added that also the Polish consuls of the pre-war time might continue to perform their function automatically without the need to issue new documents (*eksekvatur*).[27] Sørensen's activity has not been confirmed by any documents. His work must have been restricted to the most urgent consular matters. In practice, the Polish awaiting evacuation or a departure to another country were served by Norwegian institutions that cooperated with the Allies.

1.4. Taking up the post by Mieczyslaw Rogalski, a TRJN Envoy

As late as in mid-February 1946 the decisions were made in the Polish MFA concerning the candidature for the post of envoy in Norway. On February 15 M. Rogalski was given a letter of accreditation to Haakon VII, king of Norway, signed by Bolesław Bierut, and on February 19th Bierut, the President of KRN, informs Rogalski, at that time Director of the Consular Department of MFA, that he had been appointed extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary to the Government of the Kingdom of Norway in Oslo. We learn from the Norwegian

[26] Ibidem, Z.6, W-76, T -1090, Letter of A. Ostrowski dated 20.11.1945, to MFA, Consular Department in Warsaw, k. 1.

[27] RA, UD 1940–1949, box 10165, *14.21/91 Polens sendemann i Norge*, Note of Collin dated 18.11.1945 entitled *Polens representasjon i Oslo*, p. 1–2.

press that envoy Rogalski together with his wife arrived in Oslo on Saturday April 6 on board a plane from Stockholm, where he had been staying since April 3.

Mieczysław Rogalski was born in Warsaw in 1889. He finished his secondary school in the capital, and started his university studies first at the Faculty of Law in Liège, Belgium and later at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Jagiellonian University. He also graduated from the Diplomatic-Consular Faculty of the Political Science School in Warsaw. From 1916 he was a teacher in the newly created Lublin University. In the years 1919–1928 he was employed at MFA, and in the years 1928–1930 he was secretary of the Polish Mission in Bucharest, Romania; afterwards he returned to the Consular Department, where he worked till 1932 in Legal-Revindication Section. From 1932 to 1939 he was consul in Eastern Prussia, first for a year in Olsztyn (German: Allenstein) as a vice-consul of the first class, and in the years 1933–1935 as Polish Consul in Kwidzyń (German: Marienwerder), from 1935 to the outbreak of the war as Consul General in Ełk (German: Lyck). In September 1939 he managed to force his way through to Poland and hide in Lublin. There for six years he was a simple labourer, a painter. From July to August 1944 he was involved in the activity on behalf of the Lublin Government, organising the system of education. Since August 24th, 1944 he was employed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and cooperated with Prime Minister Osóbka-Morawski and Minister Jakub Berman. In September he represented the Government in the matters concerning evacuation, and in December 1944 he became an MP of KRN on behalf of the Democratic Party, where he was a member of the presidium. On January 1st, 1945 he was appointed director of the Consular Department of MFA. He was actively engaged in the political work on behalf of PKWN; he was a member of several societies, such as the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society or the Polish-French Friendship Society. It is worth mentioning that in his youth until 1918 he had been active in the Polish Socialist Party – Left (*PPS-Lewica*) and since 1918 for ten years in the Polish Peasant Party – Liberation (*PSL-Wyzwolenie*). He was not affiliated to any political party from 1928 to August 1944, when he got engaged in the underground activity of the Democratic Party as commander of the Lublin Region of OWO (*Obóz Wyzwolenia Ojczyzny*, Camp of Liberation of the Homeland). Married to Ludwika Klaudia, *née* Potocka on December 21st, 1916. From his first marriage he had two children, who perished in Warsaw during the Warsaw Uprising in 1944.[28]

[28] AMSZ, Purchase 24.97, W.17, Personal card of M. Rogalski dated 17.01.1945 and his cv, k. 3–7.

Mieczysław Rogalski was an experienced diplomat and a clerk of the MFA administration of many years' standing. He spoke the language of diplomacy – French – fluently, and in addition he knew German, Russian and Romanian. So he was well prepared to work in international diplomacy, although it was the first time he held the post of envoy. After arriving in Oslo on April, 1946, as early as April 10 he paid a visit to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he talked to Minister Halvard Lange and Per Prebensen, the counsellor and an informal deputy of Lange, and handed over the copy of his accreditation letter to the Minister. The original was submitted to King Haakon VII after Easter on April 27th. He also paid a visit to the diplomatic corps in Oslo, where he met his ancient friends, *inter alia* the secretary of the Polish Mission in Bucharest or a friend from his stay in Belgium. He was received by the dean of the diplomatic corps, Kuzniecow, ambassador of the USSR. In a letter he informed UD that he was planning a visit to Iceland on June 10th, like many other envoys who were representatives both for Norway and Iceland. Then he would be able to submit his accreditation letter and participate in the celebrations that took place on June 17th to memorise the second anniversary of proclaiming Iceland an independent country. At the same time, on account of the fact that the Icelandic envoy for Norway had his residence in London, he would establish relations with the Icelandic envoy for Sweden and hand over the copy of his accreditation letter to him with a request to send it, according to the customs existing in Oslo, to his government in Reykjavik.[29]

In a separate letter to Minister Józef Olszewski, head of the political department of MFA of the same day (April 10th) he depicted the situation he had encountered in Oslo. He underlined considerable influence of the Polish Government in Exile on the Polish DPs who were in the repatriation camps in Norway, and as he put it 'it will be necessary to crush it somehow'. He added that the cause of the campaign against Communist Poland in the Norwegian press had been – *inter alia* – the fact that there had been no Polish representative in Norway for too long. He also mentioned the poor housing standards of the Mission, which was located in two rooms at the Grand Hotel in Oslo. Together with his wife he occupied the bigger room with an alcove, and the other room served as the office of the Mission, where clients were received. Rogalski also complained about the

[29] Ibidem, Z.6, W.76, T.1094 – Taking over the mission by Mieczysław Rogalski, handwritten letter of Rogalski to minister J. Olszewski dated 10.04.1946, k. 1–2.

scarcity of means to pay for accommodation; it was a cost of 60 kroner (basic price) daily; that is why the personnel of the Mission were located in cheaper third-rate boarding houses or pensions. The envoy also complained about the too modest – compared to other missions – number of staff, smaller than he had fixed in the Personnel Office before leaving for Norway. Instead of six persons there were only two: the second secretary Andrzej Zalewski and the head of the office K. Święcicki. At the end of the letter Rogalski emphasised the need to increase the budget of the Mission and the need to make the Personnel Office increase the number of the staff, first of all to employ commercial *attaché*[30]. And shortly afterwards, at the beginning of June 1946 the Mission managed to rent a two-storey villa at Olav Kyrres Plass 1, where the Mission was moved and started work on June 12th, 1946.[31] The Polish Mission has been located there until now.

2. Establishing Diplomatic Relations on the Part of the Norwegian Authorities

Norway fairly early recognised the Provisional Government of National Unity (*Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej*, TRJN) formed on June 28th, 1945. It took place on July 6th, just one day after it had been done by the USA and Great Britain.[32]

The Norwegians, like the Swedish and the Danish, had problems with fuels, coal and coke, to heat houses, and for the needs of industry. Additionally, they were deprived of supplies from Great Britain and Germany, so they soon diverted their attention to Poland, rich in coal.[33] It was one of the main reasons for which those countries recognised TRJN so soon, although in the case of Norway it was not the only reason. It is worth reminding that as a result of the so called continuation war (1941–1944) between Finland and the USSR the northern patch of Finland, Petsamo, was annexed to the territory of the Soviet Union (the present

[30] Ibidem, Z.6, W.76, T.1096, handwritten letter by Rogalski to minister Olszewski dated 10.04.1946, p. 1–2.

[31] Ibidem, Z.6, W.76. T.1095, Report of Przesmycki dated 15.06.1946 of the official trip to Oslo and Copenhagen, k. 2.

[32] W. Materski, *Dyplomacja Polski "lubelskiej" lipiec 1944 – marzec 1947* (Warsaw 2007), 281.

[33] Cf.: E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, "Polsko-norweskie kontakty handlowe w latach 1945–1949", *Dzieje Najnowsze* XXXVIII (2006) 4: 109–122.

name: Pechenga; Russian: *Печéнга*).[34] In that way Norway began to have a common land border with the Soviet Union, 196 km long, which at the end of the WW2 changed the political situation of Norway. The pro-Western course in the policy of the Norwegian Government was stopped and replaced by the politics of balancing between the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, referred to as 'the policy of building bridges' (1945–1949).[35] Additionally, after the war the social-democratic Government of Norway with Communist participation raised – at least at the beginning – some prospects of political cooperation with the states now dependent on the Soviet Union. Poland was the second most important partner (after the USSR), in addition, strategically situated and rich in coal and coke. That is why having in Warsaw their own diplomatic mission as soon as possible was for the Norwegians very important.

2.1. Diplomatic and Commercial Mission of Rolf Andvord, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Norway in Moscow

Sending a Norwegian envoy to Poland and placing him in Warsaw was not an easy task, mainly because of problems with transport, especially a lack of direct connection, also the telephonic and telegraphic ones. All the correspondence of the Norwegian diplomats was directed via the Norwegian Mission in Stockholm. The motive force that urged Norway to establish contacts with Poland was the deficiency of coal. The former supplier, Great Britain, as the Norwegian ambassador in Moscow, Rolf Andvord writes:[36]

> …was no longer able to supply us with that merchandise, and Poland, where coal seams in the south were sufficiently extensive, and not destroyed, was actually the only country in Europe where coal might be extracted.[37]

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[34] Cf.: O. Jussila, S. Hentila, J. Nevakivi, *Historia polityczna Finlandii 1809–1999* (Cracow 2001), 223–237.

[35] Cf.: E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, *Norwegia na drodze dylematów i przemian 1945–1949* (Toruń 1992), 63–115.

[36] Rolf Otto Andvord (1890–1976), father, physician, studied law in Oslo in the years 1910–1915, next he assumed the post of secretary in UD, after a few years as *chargé d'affaires* in Copenhagen, in 1921 nominated secretary, and then envoy in the Mission in Paris, afterwards he spent a short time as counsellor in the mission in London, in 1935 he was nominated envoy in Argentine with accreditation to many South-American states; Norwegian ambassador to Moscow (1941–1946), Paris (1948–1958) and Madrid (1958–1961), where he ended his diplomatic career; cf.: https://nbl.snl.no/Rolf_Andvord, access 8.03.2018.

[37] R. Andvord, *Med hånden på hjertet* (Oslo 1964), 278.

And the Norwegian Government charged Andvord, who had been staying in Moscow since 1941, with a quick diplomatic action, because sending a diplomatic representative immediately to Poland was not easy on account of the reasons mentioned above, and it was a known fact that the Swedish had signed a preliminary contract for supplies of coal already on June 29th. As Andvord was on holiday, the first talks with representatives of TRJN were initiated in Moscow by E. Krogh-Hansen, a counsellor of the Norwegian Embassy in Moscow. The first meeting took place on July 2nd, on the day when the delegation of TRJN headed by Hilary Minc, the Minister of Industry, came to Moscow; the second – on July 17th with Zygmunt Modzelewski, Ambassador of TRJN in Moscow, who in the meantime was nominated vice-minister of foreign affairs of the Warsaw Government, and two days later together with his trade consultant, Zygmunt Wyrozembski, was to leave for Warsaw. Modzelewski promised to draft a Norwegian-Polish coal contract, based on the Swedish-Polish contract signed for five years and 500,000 tonnes of coal, and it needed to be coke and bunker coal as well. In turn Norway was to supply herring and fish oil. Modzelewski suggested that Krogh-Hansen come to Warsaw the following week to sign the contract and recommended that he take a few coal and transport experts with him.[38] Luckily, on July 20th Andvord was already in Moscow and could personally see vice-minister Modzelewski to the airport. Modzelewski agreed with Andvord that he would give him all the details concerning the sorts of coal on the phone from Warsaw and at the same time he invited the Norwegian to Poland. To that end UD sent Andvord a confidential report with the basic offer concerning the quality and quantity of the merchandise from both sides (coal: 500,000 tonnes, 45 mm large, and at least 100,000 tonnes of coke, and approximately 50,000 tonnes of bunker coal) together with a recommendation to seek coal as large as possible; the USA and Great Britain offer only small coal (slack). In its report UD underlined that there was a need for more coke, preferably 250,000 tonnes, which would be offset by an increased number of barrels of pickle herring (instead of 100,000 – 150,000) and (medicinal) fish oil (instead of 1,000 tonnes – 1,250 tonnes). Supplies were to be delivered from both countries for five months, and the payment for the part of the value of the merchandise from Poland not offset by Norwegian goods was to be made in the pound sterling. The report also emphasised the need to make

[38] RA, UD 1940–1949, Box 11592, *44.4 Handelspolitikk. Allment*, 91. Polen, Bd.I 1945, *Melding fra ambassaden i Moskva av 19.7.1945*, J.nr 19332/45, *Kull-og koks-avtale med Polen*.

a framework contract of preliminary character, after which UD would send experts to Warsaw so that they would finalise the sales and purchases.

It should be explained what the reasons for those hasty operations were. The Norwegian Mission in Moscow had received a telephone call from the Polish Embassy in Moscow with the recommendation that:

> Andvord should leave immediately for Warsaw and sign the contract as the struggle for Polish coal intensifies with each day. In addition to the Danish, who have already been in Warsaw, a delegation from Finland is expected in Moscow who will go there at once, still the French and Italians have been on the way.

Under such circumstances Andvord found that the best solution would be if he signed the contracts himself instead of the Norwegian salesmen, as soon as the prices offered by the Norwegians were accepted by the Polish.[39]

Andvord arrived in Warsaw on July 30th together with his adjutant, captain Just Bortenen. At the airport he was welcomed by Prince Krzysztof Radziwiłł, head of the Protocol of MFA, and then Andvord and his adjutant were accommodated at the 'Polonia' Hotel, where they put up the Norwegian flag. As he emphasised in his note of August 8th, it was the only building in the centre of Warsaw that had not been destroyed, as it was the seat of the Gestapo. The rest of the city did not exist, it was a sea of ruins. The hotel became a temporary seat of many diplomatic missions in Warsaw, the Norwegian one including, thanks to the effective activity of Andvord. It should be noted that Andvord proudly underlines the presence of Norway among other states there writing that the flag of his country 'now is hanging together with the American, British, Danish and Yugoslavian ones, whereas the population gather in front of the building are happy that the isolation of Poland is over'.[40] On July 31st, Andvord was received in a friendly atmosphere by Wincenty Rzymowski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who promised him to send a Polish representative to Oslo as soon as possible to deal with the repatriation of the Polish. Andvord was also received by Dr Stefan Jędrychowski, the Minister of Foreign Trade and Navigation, who promised him to take care of the coal contract as soon as possible.

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[39] Ibidem, *Melding fra Ambassaden i Moskva av 27.VII.1945*, no 20475/45, *Kull-kjøp i Polen*.

[40] Ibidem, E.10601, 27.5/39B, bind VI, Confidential note of R. Andvord to the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw 8.08.1945, p. 1–2.

Andvord also talked to the businessmen, who had been staying in Poland since the pre-war times, *inter alia* Jens Ejbol, a representative of the shipping company *Wilhelmsen*, and Sjurd Lien, who had been running a farm of foxes near Warsaw for years; Andvord informed them about the preparations concerning the arrival of the Norwegian delegation, who were to conduct commercial negotiations with Poland.[41]

Andvord held the further talks with Z. Wyrozembski, Director for Trade, according to the detailed instruction of UD dated August 2nd concerning two questions. The first question was to establish the highest and lowest prices of herring and fish oil, and to deliver 400 railway wagons to Poland to carry coal. The second question was to fix the terms of payment, which was all the more difficult as it was already known that the value of the Norwegian merchandise would be lower than the Polish one; hence the Norwegian importer of Polish coal (*Norsk Brenselimport*), representing the state of Norway, was to pay for herring and fish oil in the Norwegian kroner, and the rest of the Polish merchandise would be paid in the pound sterling.[42] It was supposed to simplify the settlement.

The talks with Wyrozembski were difficult and did not end with satisfactory results; that is why Andvord decided to turn to Modzelewski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had invited him to Poland. Modzelewski happened to have come back from Potsdam and at the meeting with Andvord:

> was surprised that the contract had not been signed yet, and said that he'd telephone Wyrozembski and he'd tell him that it was necessary to sign the contract as soon as possible. They had to sign, he repeated. Unfortunately, the Foreign Trade Minister was to fly to London to the UNRRA Conference the following day but he [Modzelewski] would try to sort everything out before his departure.[43]

Andvord was not altogether convinced that the contract would be finalised. That is why on the same day in the evening together with the Russian ambassador he went to the airport, where they welcomed Marshals Zhukov and Rokossovsky. He met Modzelewski there and told him that he wanted to go to Oslo soon to pass on the information and send experts. Modzelewski advised him against going to Oslo; he said that Andvord should not go without having obtained a document in

[41] Ibidem.

[42] Ibidem, *Melding til Ambassaden i Moskva*, 2.08.1945, *Polsk-norsk kullavtale*.

[43] Ibidem, p. 2.

which Poland would declare the readiness to deliver coal to Norway. He added that such a declaration might be signed either by the Foreign Affairs Minister or the Trade Director, which – in short – Modzelewski managed to do. Hence on Sunday August 5th Andvord together with captain Borthen were invited to the country estate of Trade Director Wyrozembski, where they obtained a short declaration signed by him.[44] The declaration addressed to Ambassador Andvord says that the Polish Government commits itself to deliver to Norway 500,000 tonnes of hard coal, 100,000 tonnes of coke and 50,000 tonnes of bunker coal within five months.[45] Captain Borthen sent that document to Trygve Lie, the Foreign Affairs Minister; to that end, on the same day (August 5th) Borthen went to the airport and left the document together with the description of the whole situation on board a plane flying to Stockholm. The first step to secure coal for Norway was made in that way. Now it was time to fix the details concerning sorts, prices and transport both ways, so as to finalise the contract as soon as possible. And again both gentlemen had to do their best. The Polish were not interested at all, which is reflected in the Polish archival documents, where the name of Andvord appears only once in the form of his signature on the contract (without a specification as for his post).

Andvord conducted further talks with Norwegian experts in Stockholm and the Polish ones in Warsaw until August 29th, when the contract was finally signed. Andvord described in an extensive report of August 31st the main reasons of why the negotiations took a whole month and not five days as he had expected. At the beginning he gives five main reasons. First, he mentioned the difficult conditions in Poland, where everything was missing, experienced negotiators and experts including. Second, Norway's offer was rather modest, its value was one fourth of the value of the Polish merchandise. Third, there were enormous problems with transport to the Baltic ports. In the end he underlines the financial limitations; it was impossible to give Poland a credit to purchase herring before coal was sent to Norway or give guarantees concerning the exchange rates. In order to make quick decisions it was necessary to obtain a special authorisation of the Norwegian Government, which Andvord could not obtain on account of communication

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[44] Ibidem, p. 3.

[45] Ibidem, Text of the announcement: *Monsieur l'Ambassadeur! Par la prezent j'ai L'onneur de Vors faire savoir que le Gouvernement Polonais sera pret – sous sertains conditions stipulee dans un accord special – a delivrer Au Gouvernement Norvegien pendent les 5 moins restent de l'annee 1945 500.000 tonnes de charbon et Au moins 100.000 tonnes de coke, ainsie que 50.000 tonnes „bunkers". Z. Wyrozembski. Warszava, le 5 Aout 1945.*

difficulties. He also underlines that Poland was given the credit by the Swedish (100 million kronor) and the Danish (7 million kroner). Those countries could sell Poland much more merchandise than Norway, thus maintaining a balance in commercial exchange. As for the details he mentioned that the prices of herring and fish oil were high compared to the pre-war prices, and that Norway did not have split herring at that moment, which was usually bought by the Polish. Additionally, UNRRA informed the Polish that they could count on a free gift in the form of the same merchandise Norway was offering. It complicated the negotiations, which were well under way, and the Polish suddenly announced that they did not need to buy such goods in Norway because they got them free from UNRRA.[46] In spite of all those difficulties the contract was finalised and signed on August 29th. According to the annexes the quantities were kept, of coal and coke (altogether 600,000 tonnes), and additionally 50,000 tonnes of bunker coal, in which Norway had been interested from the very beginning. Till the end of 1945 Norway was to receive 150,000 tonnes.[47] As Andvord underlines:

> we have been assured by the Polish negotiators, both by the Industry Minister and the Director of the Polish mines, that the deliveries will be made in Polish railway wagons drawn by locomotives without the need to provide 400 Norwegian wagons and 12 locomotives to which we had committed ourselves. The Polish did not know whether they can count on their delivery till the end of the year. The remaining quantity of coal will have been sent by the end of March 1946, 150,000 tonnes monthly, and it is up to the Norwegians to decide on the proportion of coal and coke in the deliveries of the next year.[48]

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[46] Ibidem, report of R. Andvord to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD), Oslo, 31.08.1945, p. 1–2.

[47] Archives of Modern Files, *Archiwum Akt Nowych* (henceforth: AAN), Ministry of Treasure II, *Ministerstwo Skarbu* II, catalogue no 385, Contract made between TRJN of the Republic of Poland and the Royal Government of Norway to regulate merchandise exchange, Warsaw, 29.08.1945, attachment no. 3, k. 17.

[48] RA, UD 1940–1949, Box 11592, *44.4 Handelspolitikk. Allment*, 91. Polen, Bd.I 1945/08.05–15.09, report of R. Andvord to the Norwegian MFA (UD), Oslo 31.08.1945, p. 2.

2.2. Andvord's Struggle for an Additional Protocol to the Commercial Contract of August 29th, 1945

On August 29th after signing the preliminary contract, Andvord started to struggle for an additional protocol, which would include the detailed quantities of separate sorts of coal. The annexes only included the prices, they did not include the dates and the quantities of the deliveries in separate months, starting October 1945 till April 1st, 1946.

Andvord's activities might be divided into two parts: the first part from August 30th to September 7th; and the second part in Poland, first in Katowice (11–13 September), next in Warsaw (13–14 September).[49] Andvord takes the first steps in Oslo, where he came on August 30th and first he went to the Central Office dealing with deliveries of fuels (*Norsk Brenselimport A/S*). There on September 3rd they – Andvord and the management of *Norsk Brenselimport A/S* – drafted a coal contract, which was to be presented to the Central Office of Coal Industry Products in Katowice for possible corrections and approval.[50] Next Andvord had a meeting with Johann George Raeder, head of Commercial Policy Department, during which a draft of the additional protocol was prepared to the contract of August 29.[51] Andvord's activity during those eight days in Oslo (from September 30 to October 7) was extraordinary. He obtained a person from UD to help him, which must have been inspired by him; that person could not only assist him in the purchase of coal in Poland, but could also be a temporary diplomatic representative of Norway in Warsaw, so that Andvord might resume his duties in Moscow. Lauritz Myrebøe was chosen, a pre-war consul general in Gdańsk/Gdynia and a businessman from Bergen; already on July 25, 1945 in a letter to UD he had offered to hold that post. Myrebøe had 20-year experience in consular work in the Free City of Danzig; that is why he was the best candidate.[52]

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[49] Cf.: E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, "Misja handlowo-dyplomatyczna Rolfa Andvorda w Polsce w sierpniu i wrześniu 1945 roku", *Zapiski Historyczne* LXXVII (2012) 3: 23–49.

[50] RA, UD 1940–1949, Box 11592, 44.4 *Handelspolitikk. Allment*, 91. Polen, Bd.I 1945/08.05–15.09, Contract between *Norsk Brenselimport A/S* as buyers and the *Centrala Zbytu Produktów Przemysłu Weglowego*, Katowice, as sellers, the following contract made for the shipment of Polish coal and coke to Norway, p. 2; *cf.*: letter of Andvord to the minister of foreign affairs T. Lie dated 13.09.1945, p. 1.

[51] Ibidem, *Protocole supplementaire*, project (no date), p. 2; cf.: letter of R. Andvord to the minister of foreign affairs T. Lie dated 13.09.1945, p. 1.

[52] RA, Amb/Leg Warsaw, E.50, G5-A *Norske konsulater i Polen*, 3.11.1945–15.12.1950, letter of L. Myrebøe to UD, Bergen, 25.07.1945.

The second phase of Andvord's activities took place in Poland. On September 8 Andvord and Myrebøe came to Warsaw. There the two Norwegians learnt that Z. Wyrozembski, the vice-minister of foreign trade, together with a 17-strong delegation, was going to Stockholm and he also intended to go to Oslo. Andvord quickly notified Raeder, the above mentioned head of Commercial Policy Department, and asked him to get in touch with Wyrozembski and invite him to Oslo. The reaction of the Norwegian MFA was immediate. It was established – via the Norwegian Mission in Stockholm – that a Polish delegation composed of Wyrozembski, Wojciech Chabasiński, trade counsellor in Stockholm, and a secretary (the name unknown) would come to Oslo by plane on Saturday September 22 for one or two days, at the invitation of the Norwegian Government, which would cover all the costs.[53] It may be said that Andvord was successful again in his struggle to put in motion deliveries of coal to Norway.

In the meantime, Andvord had to focus his efforts on getting approval for the above mentioned projects – the coal contract and the additional protocol – from the Polish. To that end, on September 11 Andvord and Myrebøe went to Katowice, where Andvord presented Myrebøe – as he writes –

> to many outstanding people from the Polish coal industry and at the same time had a longer talk with Mr Gorączko, the general director. We studied the original coal contract of August 22 and compared it with the more detailed one, which I had received from Norsk Brenselimport during my last stay there.[54]

Andvord informs that Gorączko consented to the contents of the suggested coal contract, which was composed of eight paragraphs, with the exception of paragraph four, concerning the distribution of the deliveries of coal according to the individual months. The Norwegians wanted 50,000 tonnes monthly for three months till December 1945, and from January at least 150,000 tonnes monthly, so that the whole supply might end before April 1, 1945. Mr Gorączko's offer was different, starting in October with a small delivery of 30,000 tonnes, in November – 110,000 tonnes, in February – 120,000–140,000 tonnes, and the rest in April. It means that Gorączko from the beginning was aware that it would be impossible

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[53] RA, UD 1940–1949, Box 11592, 44.4 *Handelspolitikk. Allment*, 91. Polen, Bd. I 1945/08.05–15.09, three handwritten notes of Raeder dated 13 and 14 IX. in the above mentioned letter, which he received from Andvord.

[54] Ibidem, Letter of Andvord to the minister of foreign affairs of Norway Trygve Lie, Warsaw 13.09.1945, p. 1.

to finalise the deliveries till the end of March and that is why he distributed the deliveries in another way, starting with small deliveries and then increasing them; thus he extended the whole supply by one month, i.e. April. As Andvord writes

> Gorączko put down all his corrections on the draft of the contract I had brought, he signed each paragraph with the date and took one copy to his files, as if the whole thing had been concluded. We both – Myrebøe and me – came to the conclusion that the purpose of the Polish had been to arrange the deliveries in that way and that they thought it was feasible.

At the end of their stay in Katowice both the Norwegians were invited to dinner by Mr Gorączko, during which he gave a speech underlining the will on the part of the Polish to help Norway in the sphere of coal.[55]

On September 13, when they came back to Warsaw, Andvord went to a meeting with Jędrychowski, Minister of Foreign Trade, and presented the draft of the additional protocol, which he had brought from Oslo. The Polish side suggested some changes, which could not be accepted by Andvord without the consent of his Government, although he personally was prone to do it. In addition to some formal changes consisting in crossing off a few words, paragraph 8 aroused the greatest controversy. The Norwegians wanted to introduce a regulation fixing the end of the mutual deliveries on April 1, 1946, to which the Polish side did not want to consent. The position of the Polish – as Andvord writes in his letter to Trygve Lie, Minister of Foreign Affairs – was motivated by the fact that according to the contract the Polish had to keep delivering the missing quantities of coal still after April 1, 1945. The Polish claimed that the Norwegians could refuse to receive the coal after that date, they also could demand to change the price; hence, it was not necessary to put that date in the additional protocol, all the more – as he underlines in his letter – that

> Article 9 of the main contract [of 29 August – E.D.-Sz.][56], the contents of which we have proposed ourselves to some degree is incompatible with the detailed stipulations of the coal contract concerning deliveries, and when Raeder told me that it was necessary to put paragraph 8 in the additional protocol, I did not discuss any

[55] Ibidem.

[56] AAN, Ministry of Treasure II, *Ministerstwo Skarbu II*, catalogue no. 385, Contract between TRJN of the Republic of Poland and the Royal Government of Norway to regulate merchandise exchange, Warsaw, 29.08.1945, art. 9, k. 4: the Agreement coming into force from the moment of signing. Valid till the mutual obligations have been satisfied.

longer the need to introduce the changes suggested by the Polish. In spite of all that, both in my opinion and in Myrebøe's this paragraph should be removed without any doubts.[57]

After that clash the Norwegians must have come to the conclusion that sooner or later UD would have to consent to the corrections in the additional protocol, all the more so as they were compatible with the documents signed before, as well as on account of the fact that the contract was to expire after 45 days since the date of signing. Therefore Andvord left the rest of his duties to Myrebøe informing him that he would be given further instructions as soon as possible (in a telegram from UD sent to Moscow, and next in the form of air waybill via the Swedish MFA). He said he was leaving Warsaw for good and the following day – 14 September – he was leaving for Moscow.

Soon the matter was solved in the way Andvord wanted. After he arrived in Moscow, on September 18, a telegraphic dispatch was sent to UD from the Norwegian Embassy in Moscow, the contents of which was coincident with what Andvord had included in the above mentioned letter to Trygve Lie, Minister of Foreign Trade, with the exception of the so called clear emphasis on the fact that both Andvord and Myrebøe came to the same conclusion that it was urgent to cross off article 8. In addition to that they recommended other changes in the additional protocol be approved as soon as possible, especially for the reason that the director of the mine in Poland had assured them with his own signature under each of the monthly delivery (from October 1945 to the end of April 1946), the size of which he personally had added to the coal contract. They were included also in this dispatch, which proves that Andvord attached a lot of weight to that element and at the same time he considered the quantities and dates to be feasible. At the end the dispatch says that Andvord recommended Myrebøe be given the authorisation to sign the additional protocol.[58]

Two days later UD sent a telegraphic reply to its Mission in Moscow, in which it in principle consented to the changes introduced in the protocol. According to article 1 UD wanted the credit given by *Norges Bank* for the purchase of herring

[57] RA, UD 1940–1949, Box 11592, 44.4 *Handelspolitikk. Allment*, 91. Polen, Bd. I 1945/08.05–15.09, Letter of Andvord to the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs Trygve Lie, Warsaw 13.09.1945, p. 2.

[58] Ibidem, Box 11592, 44.4 *Handelspolitikk. Allment*, 91. Polen, Bd. II 1945/16.09–26.09, confidential telegram J. no. 545 II/45 – Melding fra ambassaden i Moskva – Kullavtalen med Polen, p. 1–2.

and fish oil from Norway to cover the costs of transport of those goods to Poland, too. The next two paragraphs which said that:

> the payments to the Norwegian exporters will be made via Norges Bank by bank draft issued by the National Bank of Poland (article 2) and the amounts paid by Norges Bank will be put on the debit side of the account, which will be opened on behalf of the National Bank of Poland (article 3)

were left unchanged. The changes introduced in article 4 were also approved; they concerned the possibility of obtaining dollars by Poland for the quantities of Polish coal that were not offset by the value of the goods delivered by Norway. UD demanded that it be clearly underlined that the first conversion factor will be the Norwegian krone at the rate of 4.97 for a dollar. The costs of transport should be added to the settlement; the costs of transport as well as the accrued interest would be covered by the credit given by Norway. A consent was also given to remove article 8, to establish the final date of delivery on April 1, 1946, because – as it had been discussed before – it was incompatible with the contract itself. But UD explained that the intention behind that article was so that both sides after April 1, 1946 could on equal terms discuss the problem of possible later deliveries of the quantities that had not been supplied.[59]

At that moment the question of approving the text of the additional protocol to the contract of August 29, 1945 was concluded. On September 28 UD sent a letter to Lauritz Myrebøe, Consul General, in which once again it depicts all the details of the changes in each of the articles of the draft of the contract, and it mentions the visit to Oslo of two Polish trade representatives, Z. Wyrozembski, Foreign Trade Vice-Minister, and W. Chabasiński, Trade Counsellor. It was a short two-day visit (arrival on Saturday evening October 22 and departure on Tuesday morning October 25), during which they conducted talks with Johann Nore, a *Brenselimport* director, concerning streamlining the transport of coal from Silesia to the ports. In turn, inside UD a possible increase of the deliveries of fish oil from Norway was discussed. The Norwegians encouraged the Polish representatives with a cheap offer of their merchandise, 2.51 kroner for a kilo of fish oil, underlining that it was the price they sold fish oil to UNRRA, whereas that organisation paid for herring much more than Poland. The difference was

[59] Ibidem, *Melding til ambassaden i Moskva 20.09.1945.*

about 20 kroner for a barrel of both big and small herring.[60] It was a signal from UD to Myrebøe, a *pro tempore* diplomatic representative of Norway in Warsaw, to use that piece of information as a bargaining instrument in further negotiations with the Polish.

On October 3, 1945 Consul L. Myrebøe informs UD that on that day the additional protocol to the Polish-Norwegian Contract of August 29 was signed, and on the part of the Polish it was signed by Stefan Jędrychowski, the Minister of Foreign Trade and Navigation. He adds that before signing the protocol, he discussed the most important question from the point of view of the Norwegians: placing in article 4 the statement that the Polish cannot demand dollars before the value of the coal delivered to Norway, converted into Norwegian kroner, has been offset by the value of the Norwegian goods sent to Poland, including the costs of their transport. He added that he had obtained a confirmation on the part of the Polish Minister, which made the signing of the contract possible.[61] He explained that he had been acting according to the instructions given by Ambassador Andvord on October 1, 1945.[62] Andvord's arrangements were not unknown in UD, and it was a known fact that he was the author of them. That is why UD, after discussions and minor changes, approved them in the end. Once again it was confirmed how important for the Norwegians Andvord's activity had been; he took care of the contract until the end, although in the last phase he did it from a distance, from Moscow. In two months (August and September 1945) in spite of many obstacles he managed to finalise the two most important questions: securing the deliveries of coal to Norway and finding a place in Warsaw for the Norwegian diplomatic mission, including placing Consul General Lauritz Myrebøe, a *pro tempore* diplomatic envoy of Norway, in Poland. Those two months of Andvord's struggles was a transitory period, but very important for Norway, to find its place in Central Europe, both from the economic and political point of view. Thanks to the effective efforts of an experienced diplomat, Andvord, Norway broke the traditional dominance of Sweden in the Polish market and fortified its position as an independent political partner, at the same time maintaining perfect relations with its Scandinavian neighbours.

What comes as the biggest surprise is the fact that the Polish side was so little interested in establishing contacts with the Norwegians, leaving many problems

[60] Ibidem, letter from UD to Myrebøe, the Consul General in Warsaw, 28.09.1945, p. 2.

[61] Ibidem, letter no. 1 of L. Myrebøe to UD, Warsaw 3.10.1945.

[62] Ibidem, letter no. 2 of L. Myrebøe to UD, Warsaw 3.10.1945.

concerning Polish matters in the hands of the Swedes. It might be gathered that if it had not been for Ambassador Andvord's presence in Poland, who came to the capital three times during those two months of 1945, Poland would not have sent its diplomatic envoy to Oslo still for a long time and would have held the pre-war option of having the same envoy for both Sweden and Norway.[63]

2.3. Taking up the Post by Envoy Alfred Danielsen

On September 20, 1945 UD appointed Alfred Danielsen envoy in Warsaw. Warsaw was to be his working place for the second time. He had come to Warsaw for the first time in January 1920 to hold the post of *chargé d'affaires* of the Mission in the years 1920–1922. Year 1945 was much more difficult for him as Warsaw was in ruins, and the Polish state was being created in disparate political conditions. Who was Danielsen and why was he charged with that diplomatic mission in Poland?

Alfred Danielsen was born on November 11, 1885 in Riga. His father, Daniel Danielsen (1850–1917) was the owner of a factory in Riga; his mother was Elise Danielsen (1851–1923), *née* Elmberg in Stavanger. He started university studies in Riga in 1905. In 1909 he finished Bachelor studies of law at the University of Oslo. One year later he was employed as an auxiliary lawyer in Oslo and at the same time as a counsellor for foreign politics in the newspaper *'Verdens Gang'*. In the years 1911–1914 he worked as an attorney *ad litem* for the first three years and in the last year – as a lawyer in the court of justice in Skien. In Autumn 1914 he started a career in UD. Till 1918 he held the post of a UD secretary of the so called second class (one of the four secretaries in UD),[64] next in the same year he was a *pro tempore* secretary of the Mission of Norway in Berlin. In 1919 he stayed in France as a scholarship holder, and on January 16, 1920 he was appointed secretary of the Mission and at the same time consul in Warsaw. Danielsen cooperated with Samuel Eyde, a special envoy, Consul General in Poland and a well-known

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[63] Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych* (henceforth: AMSZ), Z. 6, W. 76, T. 1091, *pro domo* short note, Warsaw 6.08.1945, k. 1; cf.: note 19. The note is the only document in the Polish archival collections confirming that Andvord was in Poland. It was made by a Br. Wyszyński from the Political Department of the MFA, who confirmed that on August 6 Mr Andvord, the Norwegian Ambassador in Moscow, arrived at the MFA, who complained that since leaving Moscow he had not received any reply to his note on the recognition of TRJN by Norway. In addition, he asked that a Polish envoy be sent to Oslo.

[64] R.Omgang, *Norsk utenrikstjeneste*, bd. II *Stormfulle tider 1913–1928* (Oslo 1959), 220.

Norwegian entrepreneur. Both gentlemen contributed to establishing good economic and political relations with Poland. Eyde also maintained very good relations with Józef Piłsudski.[65] In February 1922 he ended his mission in Warsaw, and till 1929 was employed as the head of the Secretariat of UD. In the same year he was sent to the Mission in Moscow, where for six years he was a counsellor. In the years 1935–1943 he was *chargé d'affaires* in Havana and parallel in the years 1935–1938 in Mexico, after which from 1943 to the end of war he was promoted to the post of envoy in Havana and parallel in two neighbouring islands: Haiti (in Port-au-Prince) and Puerto Rico (in Ciudad Trujillo). In the years 1945–1950 he was appointed envoy in Warsaw and parallel in the years 1947–1948 in Bucharest. Since 1950 he was the head of the Norwegian Military Mission in Berlin and Bonn. He died in Cologne (German: Köln) on April 13, 1952. It may be added that during his first stay in Warsaw he married Astrid Marie Hesselbom (born October 5, 1896). He had two sons, Arne (born on July 8, 1922) and Arild Johann (born on August 22, 1928).[66]

Alfred Danielsen arrived in Warsaw on November 12, 1945, i.e. almost two months after his appointment for the post of envoy in the capital of Poland. After an audience with Bolesław Bierut on the same day when he submitted the letter of accreditation he had a long talk with with Bierut and Modzelewski about the current problems in Norway and in Poland, and afterwards he was driven by the head of the diplomatic protocol Dr Adam Gubrynowicz to the 'Polonia' Hotel.[67] Ten days later on November 22 he paid a courtesy visit to the Scandinavian Section of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where – like Andvord two months earlier – delicately asked Adolf Bryczkowski, head of the above mentioned Section, when a Polish Mission was expected to come to Oslo. The following day at a dinner party to which he had invited A. Bryczkowski in an equally delicate way he dropped a hint to his guest that the Norwegian Government had problems with Polish refugees in Norway. It was about the clashes with the local communities for various reasons, and arrival of a Polish diplomatic

[65] E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, "Józef Piłsudski w norweskiej opinii publicznej – na przykładzie korespondencji posła nadzwyczajnego Królestwa Norwegii w Polsce dr Samuela Eydego", in: *Józef Piłsudski wobec Europy i wybranych zagadnień wewnętrznych Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej (1918–1935). W 70.rocznicę śmierci*, eds. M. Wojciechowski and Z. Karpus (Włocławek–Toruń 2007), 23–33; idem, "Stosunki polityczne i gospodarcze Polski z Norwegią w latach 1918–1926", *Zapiski Historyczne* LXX (2005) 2–3: 51–75.

[66] Biogram Alfreda Danielsena in: *Hvem er hvem?* (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co, 1950), 128.

[67] RA, Arkivmateriale hjemsendt fra Amb./Leg.Warsaw, Eske 45, A 7-D 01/45 Sendemann Danielsen, bd. I, letter of Danielsen to UD dated 12.11.1945.

representative might solve the problem. In addition, Danielsen asked whether it would be an envoy or only *chargé d'affaires*, suggesting that it would be better to send an envoy. Bryczkowski in his note to Modzelewski underlined that if it was not an envoy it would be *chargé d'affaires*, but *ad interim* and for a short time. Bryczkowski expressed a very positive opinion of the Norwegian envoy

> Mr Danielsen is a very direct and unpretentious man. His attitude towards Poland is very positive. He declared – undoubtedly – frankly that he was glad that after 20 years he could come back to Poland. He intends to learn Polish and get to know Poland better.[68]

The conditions the Norwegian diplomat was working under were poor, although they were better than the situation of the Danish envoy, who had only one room, which served him as a bedroom and an office. It is worth reminding that Danielsen owed his relatively good situation to Andvord, thanks to whom the envoy and his wife and the auxiliary staff occupied three rooms at the *'Polonia'* Hotel (no. 317, 12 m^2; no 319, 21 m^2; and no 320, 13 m^2) [69]. Those rooms served as a place of work and rest. Regular heating was missing and it was a real nuisance, and so were electricity blackouts, and current water was not always available[70]. As far as the auxiliary staff were concerned, still in Autumn 1945 Danielsen employed a Pole, Beata Hłasko[71] to help him to deal with correspondence in Polish and French, and the chauffeur of the former envoy Niels Ch. Ditleff, Walenty Adamski, who

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[68] AMSZ, Z.6, W 76, T. 1091, note of the head of the Scandinavian Department to minister Modzelewski dated 24.11.1945, k. 2.

[69] Two years later Danielsen mentioned it in his letter to UD dated 3.09.1947, RA, *Arkivmateriale hjemsendt fra Amb./Leg.Warsaw*, E.46, A7-D 1/47, *Sendemann Danielsen*, bd. II, letter of Danielsen to UD, 309.1947, p. 1.

[70] Ibidem, E. 45, A7-D 01/45, *Sendemann Danielsen*, bd. I, Letter of Danielsen to the director of the 'Polonia' Hotel dated 27.11.1945, in which he asks to put in missing windowpanes in the rooms occupied by the Mission; he also complains about the lack of current water and heating; cf.: letter of Danielsen to UD dated 6 December, 1945, in which he says that the work in the Mission is done in the worst possible office space. Now, when a frost has set in, it happens that the central heating in the hotel does not work during the day. We try to manage somehow using three electrical ovens, but when the electricity disappears for many hours, the fingers become so stiff that it is impossible to separate thin sheets of paper one from the other when we type. We have secured lighting in the form of candles, which we use when the electricity is cut off.

[71] Beata Hłasko, *née* Andrychewicz (born 10.01.1908 in Warsaw, died 9.11.1975 in Warsaw), daughter of a Pole and a Norwegian, translator of Norwegian literature. In the years 1928–1930 she worked in the MFA, 1931–1944 teacher of foreign languages in the Chamber of Industry and Trade in Warsaw. Since 1938 she was married to Maciej Hłasko; an activist of the Home Army, participated in the Warsaw Uprising; in the years 1945–1949 she was a translator in the Norwegian Mission in Warsaw; cf.: https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beata_H%C5%82asko, access 12.07.2018.

was to be a courier, too. Danielsen had to deal with all types of office work, i.e. opening the incoming correspondence, recording it in a book, writing all the letters in Norwegian, German and English, sealing the correspondence and courier post, encoding and decoding the correspondence, conducting talks with guests, who arrived at the Mission. Therefore, as he states himself, he was active from 7 o'clock in the morning to 8 o'clock in the evening, and that is why he wrote a letter to UD on December 6 asking for a secretary of the Mission to be assigned.[72] On December 20 UD informed him that on February 1, 1946 Mr Helge Akre had been appointed secretary and he arrived in Warsaw on February 16, 1946. He was a sworn translator of French, and spoke a little bit of Russian.[73] Danielsen writes that *'Akre soon learnt the Polish language and also had a skill to negotiate difficult cases on his own'*, hence he was very useful for the Mission and Danielsen suggested that he should be promoted to the post of counsellor of the Mission of Norway in Warsaw.[74] And the following year he was, but to the advantage of the Norwegian Mission in Moscow, and not the one in Warsaw.

The above mentioned three rooms of the Mission were to be sufficient for five people, A. Danielsen and his wife Astrid, Secretary Helge Akre, and the two Poles; for the first three they were not only a working place but also private quarters. In the meantime an urgent matter to settle, from the point of view of the interests of the Norwegian merchant fleet, was reaching a full representation of Norwegian consulates in Warsaw and in Gdańsk/Gdynia. On November 27 Danielsen writes to UD about the need to set up consular missions in Poland, in Warsaw and in Gdańsk/Gdyni as soon as possible. As far as the consulate in Warsaw was concerned he proposed Mieczysław Grabiński, a lawyer, for the post of unpaid consul, attaching appropriate certificates from three institutions in Warsaw: the Chamber of Trade and Industry, the Commercial Bank and LOT Polish Airlines, where the above mentioned worked as a lawyer. Danielsen adds that Grabiński has good contacts in the Government, that is why it should not be difficult to get *exequatur* for him. In turn, for the post of Consul General in

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[72] UD, Ibidem, letter of Danielsen to UD dated 6.12.1945.

[73] UD *Arkivmateriale hjemsendt fra Amb/Leg. Warsaw, E. 45, A7-D2/45 Legasjons sekretær Akre*, letter from UD to *Den Kgl Legasjon i Warszawa* dated 20.12.1945. In the letter there is a short life history of Helge Akre: born in 1903, he worked in the missions in Rio de Janeiro and Tokyo, and in the General Consulate in Shanghai.

[74] RA, *Arkivmateriale hjemsendt fra Amb. / Leg. Warsaw, Eske 45*, A 7-D 01/45 Sendemann Danielsen, bd. I, letter of Danielsen to UD dated 18.12.1946.

Gdynia he proposes Lauritz Myrebøe, who used to work in WMG for 20 years.[75] UD replied immediately and positively, and underlined the importance of the Mission in Gdynia/Gdańsk. UD attached a letter from the Mission of Norway in Stockholm, which said that Sweden did not have a representation in Gdańsk, in spite of the fact that the Polish wanted it, which would facilitate the export of coal to Sweden. Therefore it was justified, in the opinion of UD, 'to focus all the attention to appointing a Norwegian consular representative in Gdynia'.[76] Yet, the question of the quick nomination of Myrebøe complicates when it turns out that the Polish Government does not recognise the *exequaturs* issued by the former Polish Governments, all the less the ones issued by the Senate of WMG. Hence, Danielsen advised UD to send as soon as possible a new diploma for Myrebøe as an unpaid Consul General in Gdańsk and Gdynia. He suggested it should be investigated whether Consul Ola Walstad could be recognised by the Polish authorities as Consul General before that matter was settled and the post was taken up by Myrebøe.[77] Danielsen set about working in contact with the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As he relates the Polish kept asking him why Norway wanted to send a honorary consul, and he answered that Norway had 600 consulates all over the world, which was motivated by the needs of its merchant fleet. The overwhelming majority of them were unpaid consuls, because on account of a limited budget it was feasible to send only a certain number of paid consuls. Then he was said that 'Poland does not like to issue exequaturs to unpaid consuls, especially when they are citizens of the state that sends them'. Danielsen writes on '…the gentlemen from the Polish MFA asked me to advise UD against using the words "unpaid" or "honorary" in the consuls' diplomas that would be sent to the Polish Government'.[78] The reaction of UD was immediate, because on December 27 the Mission in Warsaw received a telegram with the information that Myrebøe had been appointed to that post, but at the moment he was ill, hence Ola Walstad would take up the post *pro tempore*.[79]

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[75] RA, UD, Amb/Leg Warsaw, E. 50, G 5-A *Norske konsulater i Polen 1945 3/11–1950 15/12*, letter of Danielsen no. 24 dated 27.11.1945 to UD concerning the consular representation of Norway in Poland.

[76] Ibidem, letter from UD no. 30 dated 28.11.1945 to Danielsen, and the attachment – a letter from the Norwegian Mission in Stockholm dated 6.10.1945.

[77] Ibidem, letter of Danielsen no. 44 dated 8.12.1945 to UD concerning the free-of-charge General Consulate in Gdańsk and Gdynia.

[78] Ibidem, letter of Danielsen no. 47 dated 12.12.1945 to UD.

[79] Ibidem, telegram of UD to the Norwegian Mission in Warsaw dated 27.12.1945.

In that way after the long-lasting negotiations all the matters concerning establishing mutual diplomatic relations between Poland and Norway were finally concluded.

Résumé

Formally the diplomatic relations between Poland and Norway, taking into consideration the dates of sending both the envoys: the Norwegian one – on November 12, 1945, and the Polish one – on April 6, 1946, were established with a significant difference in time, i.e. five months. A detailed analysis of the archival documentation shows clearly that the Norwegians took the first steps much earlier, on August 30, 1945, sending Rolf Andvord, the Norwegian ambassador in Moscow, to Warsaw in a commercial-diplomatic mission. They took into account both the reality of the Norwegian foreign policy and the different political situation of Poland, as well as the two most important tasks: a fast purchase of coal in Poland and placing their own mission in Warsaw. Andvord carried out the tasks to perfection, which brought greater advantages to Norway than the Norwegians and Andvord himself could have expected. In addition to signing a temporary commercial contract, in which the most important merchandise for the Norwegians was coal, thanks to Andvord the Norwegians obtained relatively good terms for their mission at the *'Polonia'* Hotel and established good diplomatic relations with Poland, and the Polish authorities realised they needed a separate diplomatic mission in Norway. From the Polish documentation it clearly appears that the Polish side noticed all that, and Andvord, who was in Modzelewski's good graces, could have worked out that his postulate, repeated two months later by Danielsen, would be fulfilled sooner or later. In the whole thing a significant role was played by Danielsen, who from the very beginning gained respect in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A need to establish a separate diplomatic mission in Oslo was fortified in Polish politicians by the desire to eliminate representatives of the Government in Exile in London. For the first months after the end of the war they still had strong influence on the several thousand Poles who lived in Norway and for whom they provided financial assistance. The bargaining card for TRJN was to impel the Poles who had remained in Norway to come back to Poland, although the financial and technical side of the repatriation was left actually in the hands of the Allied Command in Norway. It should be underlined that the endeavours of the Polish Government in Exile were doomed to failure from the start because of

purely political reasons, in spite of the fact that the London Government decided to maintain the diplomatic mission in Oslo at all costs sending its representatives there. The decisive role in the whole thing was played by the pressure of the Soviet Embassy in Oslo on the Norwegian authorities, as well as by the activities of Mieczysław Rogalski, a pro-Communist envoy of TRJN in Warsaw. It may be claimed that establishing diplomatic relations between Poland and Norway was a kind of clash of two different worlds: the Western one, to which Norway had always belonged, and the Communist one, which in the years 1945–1949 it had only to tolerate.

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NAWIĄZANIE STOSUNKÓW DYPLOMATYCZNYCH MIĘDZY POLSKĄ A NORWEGIĄ W LATACH 1945–1946

Słowa kluczowe: stosunki polsko-norweskie, nawiązanie stosunków dyplomatycznych 1945–1946, działania przedstawicieli polskiego rządu emigracyjnego z Londynu w Norwegii, objęcie poselstwa polskiego w Oslo przez Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej, poseł Mieczysław Rogalski – kwiecień 1946 rok, misja Rolfa Andvorda – sierpień–wrzesień 1945 rok, umowa węglowa i nawiązanie stosunków dyplomatycznych z Polską, poseł Alfred Danielsen – listopad 1945 roku

Abstrakt

W artykule zaprezentowano proces nawiązywania stosunków dyplomatycznych między Polską a Norwegią po zakończeniu II wojny światowej, co trwało od sierpnia 1945 roku do kwietnia 1946 roku. Artykuł składa się z dwóch zasadniczych części. W pierwszej części przedstawiono wysiłki polskiego rządu emigracyjnego w Londynie zmierzające do utrzymania polskiej placówki dyplomatycznej w swych rękach. Następnie omówiono rozległe działania płk. Tadeusza Tokarza, attaché ds. militarnych Poselstwa RP, akredytowanego przy rządzie norweskim na emigracji w Londynie, związane z różnorodną pomocą dla kilku tysięcy Polaków zgromadzonych w obozach repatriacyjnych na terenie Norwegii, głównie w Moss i Mysen. Na zakończenie tej części wyjaśniono w jaki sposób i dlaczego polskie poselstwo w Oslo zostało przejęte 6 kwietnia 1946 roku przez komunistycznego przedstawiciela Tymczasowego Rządu Jedności Narodowej w Warszawie – Mieczysława Rogalskiego. Opisano także jego pierwsze kontakty dyplomatyczne z władzami norweskimi. W drugiej części szczególną wagę przywiązano do pokazania działań rządu norweskiego, którego zadaniem było, możliwie jak najszybciej, utworzenie własnego przedstawicielstwa dyplomatycznego w Warszawie. Sedno tej części artykułu stanowi centralna rola, jaką odegrał norweski ambasador w Moskwie Rolf Otto Andvord, podczas swej dwumiesięcznej misji w Polsce związanej ze sprawami handlowymi i dyplomatycznymi (08.–09.1945 r.). Jego zadanie związane było z dwoma konkretnymi kwestiami – podpisaniem umowy z polskimi władzami na szybką dostawę

węgla do Norwegii oraz nawiązaniem szybkich i dobrych stosunków dyplomatycznych z Polską. Podkreślono też znaczenie tego, że udało mu się zapewnić 3-pokojowe lokum dla Poselstwa Norwegii w Hotelu Polonia. W końcowej części artykułu zaprezentowano krótki biogram norweskiego posła Alfreda Danielsena, który przybył do Warszawy 12 listopada 1945 roku oraz opisano jego pierwsze dyplomatyczne działania i kontakty z polskimi władzami.

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Einar Magne Floe*

NÅR DRAUM OG RØYNDOM KRYSSAR KVARANDRE SINE BANER. DRAUMEN OM LECH WALESA OG SOLIDARITET, OG DRAUMEN OM PAVEN OG FJELLET



Kunstnaren fotografert i Ulsteinstranda
i samband med TV-film om Walesa – serien, 1983

Own archives.

WHEN DREAM AND REALITY INTERPENETRATE. A DREAM ABOUT LECH WAŁĘSA AND SOLIDARITY, AND A DREAM ABOUT JOHN PAUL II AND A MOUNTAIN

Keywords: Einar Magne Floe, Lech Wałęsa, John Paul II

Summary

In the two last decades of the 20th century Poland's impact on the history of all Europe was strong. The impact cannot be restricted only to political history. The example of artistic production of Einar Magne Flo, a Norwegian painter, shows how the figures of Lech Wałęsa and John Paul II have become part of the spiritual legacy of Europe and at the same time an inspiration for artistic creation of visions of freedom. The author presents his own sensations of the Martial Law in Poland, the ceremony of awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to the president of 'Solidarity', and the papal leadership, which have become an imperative impelling the author to activities supporting the values represented by the two figures.

Det er, ikkje minst frå ein kunstnars ståstad, interressant å merke seg at det i alle kulturar vi kjenner har funnest menneske som har nytta draumen i sitt kreative arbeid. Dei har gått inn i draumen og kome utatt med idear til verk innan ulike åndelege og kunsnarlege disiplinar og uttrykk.

Gjennom mitt mangårige arbeid med sjølvopplevde nattedraumar som kilde og til inspirasjon for mitt kunstnarlege virke, litterært som i min bildekunst, har eg fått ein glimt inn i ein annan dimensjon. Ein dimensjon der eg som deltakar og vitne observerer og opplever hendingar som tek meg med på ei indre reise der fokus og perspektiv endrar seg. Frå dei i mine første draumearbeid symbollada og ofte trugande draumeopplevingane, sprunge utav og som krinsa om angsten og utryggleiken i det å stå med eine foten "på trygg grunn", i det tilvante og forutseielege ved tilværet, og den andre "enno i spranget og utan nytt fotfeste". Berre navigert etter den indre vissa om nødvendigheita av oppbrot og lausriving. Som kunstnar og enkeltmennenneske Ein søken som gjennom apokalyptiske drama og visjonære openberringar, løftar "meg og mitt", opp frå det personleg nære og kjente, inkorporerer meg med alt eg er berer av og som før var, over og inn i ein annan sfære til nye og grensesprengende nattlege draumeopplevingar.

Den spente situasjonen i Polen, 1980/1981. Lech Walesa og Solidaritet. Det polske folket sin kamp for sjølvråderett og fridom frå undertrykkende ytre makter, tangerte ein open nerve i meg: Noko var iferd med å skje "der ute i det store bildet", som "eg i mitt mikro-tilvære i utkanten av det", identifiserte meg med og engasjerte meg i.

Atelieret mitt ligg ved havet på ei øy i utkant-norge. I ytterkanten av Europa. Geografisk langt frå Polen og Gdansk. Den 12. desember 1981 var eg i arbeid med min tredje draumebildeserie, for eit par timar over midnatt å låse døra bak meg og ta fatt på den tre kilometer lange vegstrekninga mellom atelièret og heimen min lenger inne på øya. Stoppa opp midtvegs. Vart stående vendt mot havet, blant ei rekke med tre langs nedsida av vegen. I stille ettertanke å ta innover meg situasjonen eg var komen i. Tankane og kjenslene eg under arbeidet i atelièret på eit vis klarte å fortrenge, kom no, på same tid og stad som dei hadde gjort det kvar natt i fleire veker, i nærkamp med mørket og den ruvende stilla i landskapet rundt meg. Men denne natta meir hardtslående enn før. Konfronterte meg med konsekvensane av min ikkje-kommersielle innstilling til utøvinga av mitt kunstnarlege virke. Med den helsenedbrytande rovdrifta på meg sjølv, med månadar med fysisk tunge og sterkt belastende arbeidsstillingar gjennom arbeidsdagar som strekte seg over midnatt. Kvar dag. Eg kjente meg fanga i ein situasjon avgrensa til to utgangar å komme meg igjennom: Å kapitulere. Gi opp visjonen om å fullføre eit prosjekt som ellers aldri ville sjå dagslyset. Eller, bli stående i situasjonen. Våge å tru eg kunne meistre prøvingane eg visste venta meg. Fullføre arbeidet med den tredje draumebildeserien. Trasse vissa om at det ville innebere eit framhald av det alt for høge forbruket av sovemedisin som eg over tid hadde sett meg nødd til å nytte meg av, for nokre timar kvar natt å kunne kople meg fri frå den altoppslukende og kontinuerlege konsentrasjonen på utfordringane i draumearbeidet. Fri nok til at eg i møte med kvar ny arbeidsdag i atelièret skulle kunne ha det minimum av kvild som måtte til for å måle nye bilder. Ein situasjon som fram til desse første nattetimane av 13. desember 1981, trass aukende dosar sovemedisin, likevel ikkje hindra antal timar somn per natt i å krympe.

Erkjenninga av kva som uansett måtte vente meg neste dag, dagane og månadane fram i tid, var iferd med stryke ut, slette og sjå alle tidligare ord og vyer om verdien av å skape kunst, som svulstige, egoistiske, meiningslause. Eg tenkte ikkje lenger på å ta noko avgjerd for tida som kom. Draumearbeidprosessen hadde ført meg inn i ein isolasjon og ei einsemd for tung å leve med. Eg visste, utan å snu meg der eg stod blant trea, at den kvar natt så mennesketome og aude vegen

eg hadde att å gå før eg kom meg heim, også denne natta måtte gåast. Men vart stående nokre minutt til. Kjenne skuldrane senke seg. Eg stritta ikkje lenger imot då eg høyrde min eigen stemme bryte den ytre stilla i bøn til Gud: "Send nokon inn på denne vegen til meg i natt, eller la meg somne inn for aldri meir å våkne, når eg komen heimatt legg meg for å sove".

Eg var komen ut av sentrum i heimbygda mi. Hadde runda svingen der landskapet foldar seg med vid opne armar ut mot Ulsteinstranda og ope hav. Føtene bar meg rolegare framover no, slik dei alltid brukte gjere det når eg stega inn på den omlag hundre meter lange og rette vegstrekninga, med rekka av tre langsmed på nedsida og berre eit steinkast frå strandlina. Den svake men djupe orgeltonen frå havet senka ein stille og høgtidsam fred i meg, som var ei tung bør løfta bort frå skuldrane mine. Eg høyrde knapt mine eigne steg mot den snødekte vegen. Ei stille brått broten av lyden av taktfaste steg og metallisk klang frå våpen. Av soldatar komne inn på den same vegen. Men, like etter eller samtidig, heilt andre lydar som nådde meg. Lyden av sivile menneske. Så mange at dei etterkvart stod tett, tett saman langs vegen. Andletsuttrykka og kroppspråket. Utryggleiken. Spenninga. Håpet og forventningane. Dei spegla det alt. Men mest dette: at dei samla utstråla som ei hemmeleg visse om at noko av stor betydning for mange snart ville openberrast. Og at det skulle skje ein stad på vegen der vi stod.

Så eg tok steget. Gjekk bort til og inn blant. Vart saman med alle desse stående og vente der, mellom rekka av tre langs vegen langs havet. Vente på det ingen kunne sette ord på eller skildre korleis skjedde. Som gjorde at dei rundt og ved sida av meg, med store auge overraska no såg meg stå der, med denne mannen ved min side: Lech Walesa. Dei flokka seg straks om Walesa og meg, men opna som på usynleg teikn likevel ein passasje imellom seg dit vi to under vår samtalende gange snart såg høge portalar bli opna og latne att etter oss. Og det så raskt, at eg knapt rakk å reflektere over, at eg som dagleg og nattestid brukte gå denne vegen til og frå atelieret, aldri før hadde sett dette byggverket stå der.

Vel innafor vart tida som viska ut av dei mange salane vi kom til og vandra vidare ifrå etter møte der det vart teke viktige avgjerder inn i framtida. Walesa viste meg så ei stor samling måleri han hadde med seg, som vi saman utarbeidde ein utstillingsplan for. Ei utstilling som skulle arrangerast i dei same salane der vi no stod og planla den. Alt som skulle seiast og avtalast oss imellom var klart. Det var like før vårt møte var over. Det hadde skjedd så mykje på så kort tid, og eg kjente meg overvelda av alle inntrykka. Av alt som hadde skjedd og blitt sagt "der inne". Halvhøgt og mest til meg sjølv sa eg "Dette var då ein noko uvanleg

stad å stille ut måleria..der,..inne i ei kyrkje,..ein katedral..?" Walesa hadde høyrt meg. Smilte svakt. Nikka. Med eit fast handtrykk tok vi farvel med kvarandre.

Stående tilbake åleine der brått, stokk det i meg "Måleria ?!.. Kvar var dei, alle måleria Walesa hadde gitt meg i oppdrag å stille ut..? Eg sveipte med augene rundt meg..var alt i spranget "Måtte finne dei no,… Straks!!"

Framleis i spranget, men utan å vite om eg drøymde eller var våken, landa eg på golvet framfor senga mi. Føtene bar meg ned ei trapp, stoppa ikkje før eg tid-og stadvill fann meg fråslengt på ein stol i eit kjøken, lyttende til ei nyheitsending på ein radio eg knapt hadde registrert å ha slått på: "Lech Walesa og fleire medlemer av Solidaritet var arrestert. Det var innført Unntakstilstand i Polen, 13.desember 1981".

Eg hadde, i dei same timane som Walesa vart arrestert i Polen, møtt han i denne draumen, som utspela seg på vegstrekninga mellom atelièret og heimen min, i Norge. Samantreffen mellom draumeopplevinga og den politiske prosessen som var i utvikling i Polen, og som sia 1980 så sterkt hadde fanga min interesse, sende skakingar igjennom meg. I den eine augneblinken som var eg råka av eit takras. I den neste, fortviling over korleis kome meg ut av det, i ein situasjon der eg fysisk og mentalt ikkje berre var utbrent, men var komen til eit stadie der eg ikkje lenger såg noko meining i å leve.

Etter to vekers arbeid med å skrive ned Walesadraumen opplevde eg, at eg likevel ikkje hadde noko valg. For første gong i min kunstnarkarriere opplevde eg å vere i besittelse av eit materiale som knytte meg til ei historisk hending i min eigen samtid. Ei hending som vekte internasjonal oppsikt og merksemd, kontinuerleg halden oppe ved reportasjar og dokumentarar i aviser, radio og TV. Ved å gå i gang med prosessen å skape draumebildeserien bygt på Walesadraumen, arbeidde eg ikkje lenger i "eit lukka rom", med motiv og tema som for meg rett nok var åndeleg og kunstnerleg viktige og utfordrende prosjekt. Men, som kunstinteresserte og dei som var kjent med mine draumearbeid fram til den tredje serien, syntes oppleve som "for smal», og i liten grad relatert til det som engasjerte og opptok enkeltmennesket og folk flest i deira kvardag. Arbeidet med Walesaserien "kopla meg til", og gav meg ei unik kjensle av å vere på lag og i solidaritet med millionar av menneske i deira kamp for menneskeverd og menneskerettar, fred og fridom frå maktovergrep og undertrykking.

Den tredje draumebildeserien hadde blitt "sett på vent", medan eg skreiv ned Walesadraumen. Eg måtte no innsjå at den aldri ville bli fullført. Det hadde gått

opp for meg, at eg var komen til "eit før- og etter" vegskilje i mitt kunstnerlege virke. Eit vegskilje knytt til ein dato og eit årstall: 13. desember 1981.

Det skulle ta meg eit og eit halvt års arbeid, og under same situasjon som før å fullføre Walesaserien, som NRKTV (Norsk nasjonalt tv), hausten 1983 produserte ein TV-film av. Vist på NRKTV i samband med tildelinga av Nobels Fredspris til Lech Walesa, 10. des. 1983.

Ein engasjert journalist, forfattar og forleggar, hadde som meg sett filmen på norsk TV. I det same minutt filmen var over, ringte han meg. Uttrykte sin begeistring for bildeserien, og ville straks sikre seg opsjon på å gi ut ei bok, illustrert av Walesaserien og med tekster skrivne av meg. Eg visste at å forlenge den alt for langt skridne belastningen på eigen helse med den tida det ville måtte ta å gå inn på ein slik avtale, ville være uansvarlig, og måtte takke nei. Dette trass i at forleggaren var snar å tilføye "Eg skal bere deg inn og ut av radio og tv studio, løfte deg og din kunst opp og fram i lyset og kunstverda, om du berre seier ja".

Eg hadde ikkje noko valg. Walesaserien, som samtidig med pristildelinga vart stilt ut i Den Katolske Domkyrkje i Oslo, skulle gjennomførast. Det var først etterpå, når serien vart henta tilbake til atelièret, at eg kunne la *det* skje som eg visste måtte kome.



Draumen om Lech Walesa og Solidaritet, 13. desember 1981

Own archives.

Dei første vekene av den lange og tunge rekonvalesensperioden eg såg fram i etterpå, førte meg med pensel og palett ut til det aude landskapet ytst på øya,

på Flø. I nokre veker vandrende der blant dei mange tonn tunge og ruvende steinblokkene ved foten av steinura under fjellet dei eingong var del av og høydre heime i. Eit ytre bilde på mitt eige indre, som eg gjennom bilda eg måla hadde som mål å gjenerobre. Igjen å oppleve verdt å leve i og med. Etter endt arbeidsdag der ute, vende eg så kvar kveld tilbake til heimen min.

Det var ei av desse nettene heime, etter på dagtid kvar dag å ha måla bilde der ute på Flø, på den smale sletta mellom havet og steinkolossane under fjellet, at eg drøymde den neste draumen. Den som vart eit framhald av, og uløyseleg knytt til Walesadraumen.

Draumen om Paven og Fjellet

Eg fann meg sjølv i samtale med den polske paven, Johannes Paul II. Stående på toppen Fløfjellet sin majestetisk og reinskorne profil ut mot ope hav; eg, ytst på fjellplatået med ryggen til havet og på kanten av stupet. Paven stående på berre ein armlengds avstand framfor og vendt mot meg. Paven utstråla sin milde ro og indre visse av tryggleik, slik eg kjente han att frå bilde. Bilde eingong lagra, men no brått henta oppatt frå mitt indre. Bilde like kvikt avløyst av andre. Av møtet "eg visste" hadde funne stad mellom Lech Walesa og paven. Samtalen mellom paven og meg gjekk naturleg, til eg spurte han "Kva sa du til Lech Walesa? Kva vil skje med han? Kva med Solidaritet og Polen?"

Det vart dødsens stilt med eitt, og eit bleikt lys senka seg over paven og heile hans skikkelse. Nærast umerkende vende paven ryggen til meg, og stega lenger inn på fjellplatået. Gjorde så, til eg miste han av syne. Så eg snudde meg heilt om. Vart stående med bratte fjellsida rett ned og framfor føtene mine. Skode utfor kanten. Nedover. Ei bratte ufarbar for menneske. Men det var der nede eg no igjen fekk auge på paven. Like trygt og verdig og i all sin skrud skridende nedover der, som stega han over mosaikkgolvet i ein dom. Det var som om naturen sjølv opna seg og danna fri passasje framføre han for kvart steg han tok. Det var berre kvar gong passasjen gjorde ein krapp sving, og då han passerte under bergframspring, at eg ein augneblink miste han av syne. Det syntest som om paven sjølv ikkje ensa det farefulle i sin ferd, og gjekk beint på vidare nedover utan å sjå seg om. Blikket hans var vendt innover. Han gjekk fort og bestemt. Bleik og i ettertanke. Som om han hadde blitt minna om noko som hasta.

Om nokon tidleg i mitt kunstnarliv kunne sett inn i framtida og fortalt kva som venta meg. Om livet eg skulle leve, draumane eg skulle kome til å drøyme

innan få år. Kva tema som skulle kome til å engasjere meg og spegle seg i min kunst..Om kva konsekvensar det skulle få for kunsten og livet mitt i ti-åra som kom… Om nokon før Walesadraumen hadde fortalt meg at eg skulle drøyme om eit møte med Lech Walesa i mitt heimlege landskap, samtidig som han vart arrestert i Polen… At eg om lag tre år etter Walesadraumen skulle komme til å drøyme om eit møte med den polske paven oppe på fjellet over staden der eg under rekonvalesensen etter arbeidet med Walesaserien, var i arbeid med å måle landskapsbilde…Om nokon før Walesa og Pavedraumen hadde fortalt meg at det ville bli produsert TV-filmar av dei, (Walesaserien i 1983, og Paveserien i 1986)… At ein kopi av Walesafilmen skulle nå fram til og bli sett av Walesa sjølv, på eitt tidspunkt då Walesa, av kommunistregimet var erklært å være "ein ikkje person" i Polen og at fagrørsla Solidaritet var forboden… Og at eg, forholda teke i betraktning, etterpå skulle få eit personleg takkebrev frå Lech Walesa…

Om nokon før eg drøymde Walesaserien hadde fortalt meg… At ein medlem av den polske eksilregjeringen i London, og leiar for Polsk-Skandinavisk Forskningsinstitut i Köbenhavn, professor dr. Eugeniusz S.Kruszewski, etter å ha sett Walesafilmen på TV, skulle kome til å sende meg eit takkebrev "Frå frie polakkar i Skandinavia". Og vidare, at E.S.K. i alle år etter skulle bli ein sentral person for mykje av det som seinare førte til aukande interesse for desse verka i Polen… Og i 2008, at Polsk-Skandinavisk Forskningsinstitutt, til min store overrasking tildelte meg instituttet sin høgste utmerking; "Medal Pro Mertis" for desse to verka. Ei utmerking på det tidspunkt kun tildelt 14 personar på verdsbasis. Først på lista; Pave Joh. Paul II… Om nokon før 1988, då boka "Draumen om Paven og Fjellet" var gitt ut, illustrert av serien og med tekstar skrivne av meg, også skulle ende opp med eit eksemplar i Vatikanet og lest av den polske paven… Som eg etterpå også fikk eit takkebrev frå…

Om nokon før Walesa og Pavedraumen hadde fortalt meg… At seriane i 1990/1991 skulle bli stilt ut i Gdansk, Krakow og Warzawa, og at utstillingane og filmane samtidig vart vist og omtala på polsk nasjonal TV… Om nokon før 13.desember 1981 hadde fortalt meg… At "Oslosenteret for Fred og Menneskerettigheter", ved leiaren, tidligare norsk statsminister Kjell Magne Bondevik, skulle kome til å invitere meg til å stille ut Walesaserien under Oslosenteret sitt seminar i Oslo i 2015, for at eg der skulle møte og guide Lech Walesa gjennom den utstilte serien… Og vidare… At Oslosenteret skulle kome til å kjøpe inn eit måleri av Walesaserien, som etter Walesa sitt foredrag under konferansen, skulle overrekkast som gåve til Walesa… Om nokon i desember

1981 hadde fortalt meg… at Universitetet i Gdansk i 2017 skulle invitere meg til der å halde eit foredrag om mitt arbeid med Walesa og Paveserien, og samtidig vise dei to TV filmane av verka på storskjerm… Og så, over dei to siste dagane av opphaldet mitt… Den eine dagen bli guida gjennom Gamlebyen i Gdansk av ein professor i historie ved universitetet… Den andre dagen… Av ein annan, som guida meg gjennom Solidaritetsmusèet. Og der til sist under omvisninga, i øverste etasjen av musèet og medan vi stod framfor det enkle kontoret Walesa hadde nytta under streikane ved Leninverftet, høyre professoren seie: "her skulle også din historie knytt til dei historiske hendingane i Polen, vore presentert".

Om nokon, då eg våkna av Walesadraumen 13.desember 1981, hadde fortalt meg at hendingane som ovafor er skildra, skulle komme til å skje… Og at Ulsteinstranda, Fløfjellet- og Storsteinen gjennom desse to verka skulle bli løfta opp frå sitt nære, lokale og nordiske kystlandskap og bli scener for skildringar av draumeopplevingar knytt til den største politiske omveltinga i Europa etter 2. verdskrig, ville eg ha kalla det fantasiar utan rot i røymdomen.

Men det skjedde..



Møte mellom Lech Walesa og Einar Magne Flø under konferansen i Oslo 2015

Own archives.

KIEDY SEN I RZECZYWISTOŚĆ PRZENIKAJĄ SIĘ. SEN O LECHU WAŁĘSIE I SOLIDARNOŚCI ORAZ SEN O PAPIEŻU I GÓRZE

Słowa kluczowe: Einar Magne Floe, Lech Wałęsa, Jan Paweł II

Abstrakt

W dwóch ostatnich dekadach XX wieku Polska wywarła silne piętno na dziejach całej Europy. Piętno to nie ograniczyło się wyłącznie do dziejów politycznych. Przykład artystycznej aktywności norweskiego malarza Einara Magne Flo pokazuje w jaki sposób postaci Lecha Wałęsa i Jana Pawła II stały się częścią duchowego dziedzictwa Europy i jednocześnie inspiracją i kanwą do artystycznej kreacji wizji wolności. Autor przedstawia własne doznanie stanu wojennego, nagrodzenia przewodniczącego „Solidarności" pokojową Nagrodą Nobla oraz doświadczenie papieskiego przywództwa, które stały się imperatywem zmuszającym autora do działania na rzecz wsparcia reprezentowanych przez nich wartości.

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Sven Ekdahl*

SLAGFÄLTSARKEOLOGI VID GRUNWALD (TANNENBERG/ ŽALGIRIS) (1410). ETT POLSK-SKANDINAVISKT FORSKNINGSPROJEKT UNDER ÅREN 2014–2017**

BATTLEFIELD ARCHEOLOGY AT GRUNWALD. A POLISH-SCANDINAVIAN RESEARCH PROJECT 2014–2017

Keywords: Battlefield Archeology, Grunwald (Grünfelde), Polish-Scandinavian research project.

Summary

The paper describes the search for the field of the battle of Grunwald / Tannenberg / Žalgiris (1410) with metal detectors in the years 2014–2017. In February 2014, a joint project of the Grunwald Museum (Polish: *Muzeum Bitwy pod Grunwaldem w Stębarku*) and the Danish Archaeological Society *Harja* was agreed upon and signed in Odense, Denmark. According to the agreement, Harja was to provide the main group of metal detectorists that were to scan the areas chosen by the Museum. The main goal of the project was to try and locate the area named 'Valley of the Great Stream' (*Dolina Wielkiego Strumień*) to the south and east of the village of Stębark (German: Tannenberg), which, according to Andrzej Nadolski (1921–1993), a Polish archaeologist and historian, was supposed to

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** Den presenterade texten är en utökad version av det meddelandet som publicerades i tidskriften Przegląd Historyczny CIX, 2018, nr 2 under titeln Battlefield Archaelogy at Grunwald (Tannenberg, Zalgiris) A Polish – Scandinavian Research Project during the period 2014–2017.

be one of the most important places of the Battle of Grunwald in 1410, where the allied Polish-Lithuanian forces clashed with the Teutonic Knights in Prussia. However no battlefield was found in that area. For the next three years, the search was therefore extended to other fields to the south and east of the village of Grunwald (German: Grünfelde), that time with excellent results. There is now no doubt that the main battle took place in the area which is situated about 2–3 kilometers to the west of the 'Valley of the Great Stream'. For 180 years historians and archaeologists have accepted a fallacious theory about the march routes and battlefield deployment of the armies, the theory created by the famous Prussian historian Johannes Voigt in 1836. The paper provides information about the successful international project and its findings.

År 2014 påbörjades ett viktigt polsk-skandinaviskt forskningsprojekt mellan det polska Grunwald-museet – *Muzeum Bitwy pod Grunwaldem w Stębarku* – och det danska arkeologiska sällskapet *Harja* från Odense. I det följande skall skildras vad som föranledde detta samarbete, hur det inleddes, utvecklades och vilket resultat det lett fram till.

Det stora slaget vid Grünfelde (på polska Grunwald) den 15 juli 1410, då den Tyska orden i Preussen led ett förintande nederlag mot två allierade polska och litauiska härar, har 1910, 1960 och 2010 firats särskilt storslaget av de segrande nationerna och alltmer kommit att framträda som en dominerande händelse i Polens och Litauens historia (bild 1). I Litauen kallas det slaget vid Žalgiris, medan den hävdvunna tyska beteckningen är slaget vid Tannenberg (på polska Stębark). De båda byarna ligger på ca 3 km avstånd från varandra och bildar tillsammans med byn Ludwigsdorf (på polska Łodwigowo) en triangel.

Den viktigaste konferensen i Polen 2010 om denna händelse hölls i den gamla tyska ordensborgen Marienburg, som på polska heter Malbork, och i anslutning därtill vid det Jagellonska universitetet i Kraków. Ett av föredragen befattade sig med temat "Grunwald-forskningens problem och perspektiv" och förutspådde att den arkeologiska forskningen framledes skulle komma att spela en allt större roll.[1]

[1] S. Ekdahl, *Probleme und Perspektiven der Grunwaldforschung*, i: *Conflictus magnus apud Grunwald 1410. Między historią a tradycją*. Materiały z międzynarodowej konferencji naukowej „Grunwald-*Tannenberg*-Žalgiris*", zorganizowanej 20–24 września 2010 r. w Malborku i Krakowie*, redigerat av K. Ożóg, J. Trupinda, Malbork 2013, s. 81–89, här s. 88–89. En utmärkt översikt över Grunwald-forskningen under senare år ger Krzysztof Kwiatkowski från universitetet i Toruń i sin bok *Memoria continenter historiam denotat. Bitwa pod Grunwaldem/Tannenbergiem/*Žalgirisem *1410 w najnowszych badaniach*, Toruń 2015 (= Roczniki Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu, Rocznik 95, zeszyt 1).




Bild 1. Ordenslandet Preussen 1410.
Efter Sven Ekdahl, Prologue: The Battle of Tannenberg and its political circumstances, i: Journal of the Monastic Military Orders 4, 2012, s. 14. Karta tecknad av Sven Ekdahl.

Så har också blivit fallet. Ledningen för det 1960 invigda Grunwald-museet och historiker från universiteten i Łódź (på tyska Lodz), Olsztyn (Allenstein) och Toruń (Thorn) ansökte 2012 och 2013 om statligt bidrag för att kunna genomföra omfattande arkeologiska och andra undersökningar enligt sina föreställningar, men fick båda gångerna avslag av Narodowe Centrum Nauki (National Science Centre) i Kraków. Man tvingades därför söka efter ett alternativ som inte skulle belasta de egna finanserna. Museichefen Szymon Drej M.A. och arkeologen dr Piotr A. Nowakowski från universitetet i Łódź utvecklade tillsammans med museumsmedarbetaren Jarosław Malecki M.A. ett nytt projekt som huvudsakligen byggde på privat engagemang och understöd från främst utlandet men även från Polen.

En lycklig omständighet spelade därvid museet i händerna. Det danska arkeologiska sällskapet Harja, som även har många norska medlemmar, planerade 2013 en av sina årliga bussresor till Baltikum och tog i det sammanhanget kontakt med Grunwald-museet. Därigenom träffade Harja-medlemmen Leif Tvilum

museumsmedarbetaren Sławomir Moćkun, som visade sig mycket intresserad av ett samarbete med Harjas detektoravdelning, som specialiserat sig på arkeologiska undersökningar med metalldetektorer i in- och utlandet.[2] Under ett följande besök av Glenn Abramsson, Michael Nielsen och Kenny Thygesen i museet i september 2013 tog planerna konkret form. Man kom överens om att Harja skulle hjälpa till att söka efter slagfältet vid Grunwald med metalldetektorer. Det nödvändiga tillståndet härför inhämtades från wojewodskapets konservator och därmed var vägen fri. Projektet innebar bl.a., att alla deltagare själva skulle svara för kostnaderna för resan till Polen och uppehället där. I februari 2014 undertecknades fördraget i Odense. Senare tillkom även i Storbritannien bosatta polacker som har sökning med metalldetektorer som hobby. Kontaktperson och chef på den dansk-norska sidan var datorspecialisten Glenn Abramsson från Odense, som skulle dokumentera sökspåren (*Search tracks)* och fyndorterna med *Global Positioning System* (*GPS*) och framställa kartor.

Projektets målsättning var i första hand att leta efter och försöka finna slagfältet (resp. slagfälten) från 1410. Visserligen hade man under tidigare arkeologiska undersökningar 1958–1960, då museet byggdes och man förberedde 550-årsjubileet, samt även på 1980-talet, funnit både artefakter och massgravar, men det hade varit i närheten av Mariakapellet, som byggdes av högmästaren Heinrich von Plauen 1411 för de stupade kristna på båda sidor, och inte inneburit att själva det stora slagfältet påträffats.[3]

Det finns två teser om varför kapellet restes just på denna plats inom triangeln som bildades av byarna Tannenberg-Grünfelde-Ludwigsdorf. Enligt den länge rådande uppfattningen har högmästaren Ulrich von Jungingen stupat just där, medan jag företräder åsikten, att detta varit platsen för Tyska ordens fältkapell under slaget och att åtgärden därigenom hade en stark symbolisk innebörd.

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[2] Upplysning av Glenn Abramsson, Odense, ledare för Harja-gruppen under Grunwald-projektet 2014–2017.

[3] S. Ekdahl, *Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg 1410. Quellenkritische Untersuchungen*, Bd. I: *Einführung und Quellenlage*, Berlin 1982 (= Berliner Historische Studien 8). Där kapitel IV: *Die archäologischen Quellen* (s. 320–369). Polsk översättning: Sven Ekdahl*, Grunwald 1410. Studia nad tradycją i źródłami*. Tłum. M. Dorna, Kraków 2010. Där kapitel IV: *Źródła archeologiczne* (s. 299–341); R. Odoj, *Archäologische Forschungen auf dem Schlachtfeld von Grunwald/Tannenberg (1410)*, i: Fasciculi Archaeologiae Historicae, Fasciculus XXVII: *Weaponry as a Mirror of the Epoch*, Łódz 2014, s. 57–72.

Kapellet i sin tur befann sig i enlighet med bestämmelserna i Ordens statuter i mitten av härens läger.[4]




Bild 2. Efter Johannes Voigt, Geschichte Preußens VII, Königsberg 1836. Karta ”Plan der Schlacht bei Tannenberg” längst bak i boken.

Även i övrigt finns det viktiga skillnader mellan mig och den hittillsvarande forskningen. Jag har påvisat att denna inte bygger på någon tillförlitlig analys av de skriftliga källorna utan helt enkelt följer en tradition som grundades av den preussiske historikern Johannes Voigt i sjunde bandet av hans kända bok ”Geschichte Preußens” som utkom1836 (bild 2). Utan att ha stöd i källorna – trots hänvisning till den polske krönikören Jan Długoszs viktiga verk *Annales*[5] –

[4] S. Ekdahl, *Aufmarsch und Aufstellung der Heere bei Tannenberg/Grunwald (1410). Eine kritische Analyse,* i: *Tradycje kulturowe i historyczne ziem pruskich. Krajobraz grunwaldzki w dziejach polsko-krzyżackich i polsko-niemieckich na przestrzeni wieków. Wokół mitów i rzeczywistości*, redigerat av J. Gancewski, Olsztyn 2009 (= Biblioteka „Mrągowskich Studiów Humanistycznych”, Historia, nr 1), s. 31–103 (samt tre kartor i färg över området kring Tannenberg/Grunwald på den handkolorerade originalkartan *Karte von Ost-Preußen nebst Preußisch Litthauen und West-Preußen nebst dem Netzedistrikt, aufgenommen* […] *in den Jahren 1796–1802* av Friedrich Leopold Freiherr von Schroetter i skala 1:50 000).

[5] Senaste utgåva: [Jan Długosz] *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae*. Liber decimus et Liber undecimus 1406–1412. Consilium editorum: C. Baczkowski et al., Varsaviae 1997. Długoszs beroende av den tidiga *Cronica conflictus* vad gäller skildringen av slaget 1410 kan inte behandlas här: *Cronica conflictus Wladislai regis Poloniae cum Cruciferis anno Christi 1410. Z rękopisu Biblioteki Kórnickiej* wyd. Zygmunt Celichowski, Poznań 1911. Äldre utgåva av Ernst

hävdade Voigt att den polske kungens läger under dagarna före slaget befann sig söder om staden Gilgenburg (Dąbrówno) och att den polsk-litauiska hären på morgonen den 15 juli 1410 alltså bröt upp från ett härläger söder om den stora Damerausjön (Jezioro Dąbrowa Wielka). Enligt honom befann sig lägret ”eine halbe Meile [ungefär 4 km] südlich von der Stadt [Gilgenburg]“ (s. 78), medan Dlugosz i sin berömda krönika tvärtom skriver *supra lacum*, alltså „ovanför sjön“.[6] Jag å min sida hänvisar till den av forskningen hittills – och än i dag – fullständigt ignorerade uppgiften av den samtida krönikören *Annalista Thorunensis* att lägret befann sig vid nordvästra hörnet av den lilla Damerausjön (Jezioro Dąbrowa Mała). Det heter nämligen hos denne franciskanermunk från Thorn (Toruń): *Fixit* [kung Władysław Jagiełło] *tentoria sua non longe a civitate Gilgenborg, prope campum, qui dicitur Virczighuben*, dvs. kungen slog upp sitt läger inte långt från staden Gilgenburg, nära fältet Vierzighuben (Vierzighufen). Denna välkända ort med det nuvarande polska namnet Wierzbica var ett gods tillhörande Tyska orden med vidsträckta fält nordväst om Lilla Damerausjön.[7] Denna viktiga uppgift leder till en helt annan slutsats än den som forskningen hittills dragit om härarnas uppmarschvägar och formering samt slagfältets belägenhet. Johannes Voigts felaktiga tes har emellertid sedan 180 år levt vidare i alla länders forskning[8] och bl.a. i en känd polsk variant under 1900-talets andra hälft företrätts av professor Andrzej Nadolski (1921–1993) från universitetet i Łódź (bild 3). Enligt honom befinner sig slagfältet öster om vägen mellan Stębark (Tannenberg) och Łodwigowo (Ludwigsdorf) i ett område som han helt

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Strehlke i Scriptores rerum Prussicarum III, Leipzig 1866, s. 434–439, här s. 435. Se Ekdahl, *Aufmarsch* (som anm. 4), s. 36–38. Prof. Marek A. Janicki från universitetet i Warszawa kommer att utge en större kritisk undersökning av förhållandet mellan de båda krönikorna. Han har tidigare bl.a. utgivit: *O pewnych dogmatach i kontrowersjach historiografii grunwaldzkiej. Miejsce postoju Władysława Jagielly przed bitwa pod Grunwaldem a miejsce obozowania po niej w świetle „Cronica conflictus” i „Annales” Jana Długosza*, i: Średniowiecze Polskie i Powszechne, IV, 2014, s. 202–256.

6 J. Voigt, *Geschichte Preußens* VII, Königsberg 1836 (även reprint Hildesheim 1968), s. 78, 81. Utförlig analys av problematiken i Ekdahl, *Aufmarsch* (som anm. 4), s. 32–44.

7 *Franciscani Thorunensis Annales Prussici (941–1410)*, redigerat av E. Strehlke, i: Scriptores rerum Prussicarum III, Leipzig 1866 (även reprint Frankfurt am Main 1965), s. 314. Se Ekdahl, Aufmarsch, s. 32–36.

8 Se de mer än 30 kartorna från olika länder som Tyskland, Polen, Litauen, USA, Sovjetunionen och Ryssland, Belarus och Ukraina med härarnas uppställning på slagfältet, som återges hos Ekdahl, *Aufmarsch*. Exemplen skulle kunna mångfaldigas. De motsäger varandra alla vad gäller härarnas uppställning och slagets förlopp, men utgår liksom Johannes Voigt genomgående från uppfattningen, att den polska härens läger vid avmarschen på morgonen den 15 juli 1410 befunnit sig söder om den stora Damerausjön. De är med andra ord alla felaktiga! – En positiv feedback på mina forskningar gavs av den franske historikern Sylvain Gouguenheim i boken *Tannenberg. 15 juillet 1410*, Paris 2012 (med två kartor på s. 102–103).

omotiverat kallar ”Dolina Wielkiego Strumień” (”Den stora strömmens dal”).[9] En av hans anglo-amerikanska efterföljare är den brittiske militärhistorikern Stephen Turnbull, som publicerat en ofta citerad bok med titeln ”Tannenberg 1410. Disaster for the Teutonic Knights”.[10]




Bild 3. Härarnas uppmarsch enligt Andrzej Nadolski (t.h.) och Sven Ekdahl (t.v.). Karta tecknad av Norbert Suchorzewski för ”Mówią wieki” 2015:7 och 2017:7.

Jag framförde min egen, från den polska forskningen helt avvikande analys i en seminarieuppsats för professor Erik Lönnroth vid Göteborgs universitet redan 1965,[11] men publicerade den först långt senare, utförligast i ett polskt konferensband från 2009.[12] Enligt min uppfattning finns det minst tre olika slagfält öster och söder om Grunwald (Grünfelde), dvs ca 2–3 kilometer längre

[9] Andrzej Nadolski, *Grunwald. Problemy wybrane*, Olsztyn 1990 (= Rozprawy i materiały ośrodka badań naukowych im. Wojciechą Kętrzyńskiego 115). En andra upplaga av denna bok under redaktion av Tadeusz Poklewski-Koziełł och Maria Żemigała utgavs efter Nadolskis död (1993) i Łódź 2010. Se även Nadolskis sammanfattande och med kartor i tvåfärgstryck försedda översikt *Grunwald 1410*, Warszawa 1993, som utgivits i flera upplagor.

[10] Stephen Turnbull, *Tannenberg 1410. Disaster for the Teutonic Knights*, Oxford 2003 (6th impression 2008, digital print on demand 2010). Boken har många kartor i färg som huvudsakligen bygger på gängse felaktiga teorier.

[11] Sven Ekdahl, *Ordenshärens och den polsk-litauiska härens marsch under dagarna före slaget vid Tannenberg 1410. Problemen rörande uppställningen på slagfältet samt dettas belägenhet och utseende*. Uppsats för Historiska seminariet vid Göteborgs universitet den 10 maj 1965 (otryckt).

[12] Se anm. 4.

bort än vad som hävdats och delvis fortfarande hävdas av polska kollegor (bild 4 och 5).




Bild 4. Andrzej Nadolskis karta över slagfältet (1993).
Efter Andrzej Nadolski, Grunwald 1410, Warszawa 1993, karta „Szkic 2" efter, s. 88.




Bild 5. Härarnas uppställning före slaget. Skiss av Sven Ekdahl 2011.

Det största av dessa befinner sig nordost om vägen mellan Grunwald och Łodwigowo (bild 6). Som kunde förutspås med tanke på de vittgående

konsekvenserna av min analys av de skriftliga källorna har denna betraktats med skepsis och avvisats eller ignorerats av alla de polska historiker och arkeologer som företrätt den gamla uppfattningen om ett slagfält öster och söder om Stębark (Tannenberg). Det fanns och finns emellertid också kollegor i Polen som insett värdet av mina forskningsresultat. Jag citerar ur ett brev till mig från dr Ryszard Walczak i Poznań (Posen) av den 29 september 1986: ”Man kan säga att alla – med prof. Labuda i spetsen – tillhör Er ’lobby’; det gäller bara frågan om och hur långt detta räcker för att betvinga den Nadolski’ska ’lobbyns’ genomslagskraft!?”[13]



Bild 6. Detalj av friherre v. Schroetters preussenkarta 1796–1802.
Slagfältet från 1410 markerat med två korslagda sablar.
Friedrich Leopold Freiherr von Schroetter, Karte von Ost-Preußen nebst Preußisch Litthauen und West-Preußen nebst dem Netzedistrikt, aufgenommen […] in den Jahren 1796-1802. Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin Preußischer Kulturbesitz – Kartenabteilung. Handkolorierte Originalkarte im Maßstab 1:50.000. Sign. N 1020. Blatt (Sektion) 59.

[13] ”Man kann sagen, dass alle – mit Prof. Labuda an der Spitze – zu Ihrer ‚Lobby‘ gehören; es entsteht nur die Frage, ob und wie weit das reichen wird, um die Durchsetzungskraft der Nadolski’schen „Lobby“ zu besiegen!?“ Den som avses är den polske medeltidshistorikern prof. Gerard Labuda (1916–2010).

Grunwald-museet och de närliggande imposanta segermonumenten byggdes inför 550-årsjubileet av slaget på en plats som överensstämde med den då rådande tolkningen enligt traditionslinjen från Johannes Voigt, som vid den tiden var prominent företrädd av bl.a. de kända professorerna Stefan M. Kuczyński (i boken ”Wielka Wojna”)[14] och Stanisław Herbst.[15] Enligt Kuczyński var detta högmästarens och ordensledningens postering under slaget.

Genom det av museet 2014 initierade projektet ville man dels verifiera den nu rådande Nadolski-tesen, dels hoppades man finna artefakter som skulle kunna berika det befintliga beståndet av fynd och presenteras i museet.

Artikelns uppbyggnad

Efter denna kortfattade presentation av de skriftliga källorna och de viktigaste olika tolkningarna av dessa ska vi nu rikta uppmärksamheten mot det inledningsvis nämnda projektet, som initierats av Grunwald-museet och den danska arkeologiska föreningen Harja. Avsikten är bl.a. att undersöka i vilken mån de olika teorierna får stöd av det arkeologiska fyndmaterialet.

Eftersom det därvid inte rör sig om två skilda företeelser utan om ett sammanvävt komplex av faktorer som är beroende av varandra, har jag avsiktligt valt att i komprimerad form skildra resultatet av de fyra årens efterforskningar (omfattande vardera en vecka) och samtidigt undersöka i vilken mån de arkeologiska fynden bekräftar respektive inte bekräftar tolkningarna av de skriftliga källorna. Denna uppbyggnad ger läsaren möjlighet att själv draga viktiga slutsatser om de båda tesernas trovärdighet.

Givetvis kan det här endast bli fråga om en kortfattad genomgång av projektets fortskridande och resultat. Artikeln bygger på ett föredrag jag höll under IPS-konferensen i Gdańsk (Danzig) den 24 november 2017 och gör givetvis ingalunda anspråk på fullständighet. Det är endast de stora linjerna som här presenteras. En större sammanfattande publikation under beaktande av alla aspekter förbereds av dr Szymon Drej och dr Piotr A. Nowakowski vid Grunwald-museet och

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[14] S.M. Kuczyński, *Wielka wojna z Zakonem Krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411*, 5 uppl. Warszawa 1987. Boken utgavs första gången 1955. Kuczyński var rådgivare åt regissören Aleksander Ford vid inspelningen av filmen Korsriddarna (Krzyżacy) 1960 och har även medverkat vid gestaltningen av anläggningen vid Grunwald-museet (bl.a. den stora plastiska kartan framför amfiteatern med härarnas uppställning före slaget).

[15] Bl.a. genom ett flertal artiklar i „Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie” 1958–1960. Se litteraturförteckningen hos Odoj, *Archäologische Forschungen* (som anm. 3), s. 70.

beräknas utkomma i bokform om några år. Detta bidrag är alltså inte platsen för en ingående diskussion av det arkeologiska fyndmaterialet och inte heller för en ingående diskussion av de problem och frågor som är förknippade med en undersökning av detta slag. Vad gäller det sistnämnda nöjer jag mig med att hänvisa till publikationerna rörande ett liknande norskt projekt, nämligen det framgångsrika sökandet med metalldetektorer och delvis även med markradar efter slagfälten från striderna vid Re i Norge 1163 och 1177. Projektet startade 2007 och pågick under flera år, varvid båda slagfälten påträffades. Se www.slagenepare.com och senast Kjersti Jacobsen, Rapport. Arkeologisk feltarbeid i 2011, 2012 og 2013. Slagene pa Re prosjektet. Re kommune 2013.

2014

Sökandet med metalldetektorer vid Grunwald påbörjades under en vecka i september 2014.[16] 22 av deltagarna var Harja-medlemmar från Danmark och Norge medan 11 var polacker (bild 7). Flertalet Harja-medlemmar var utrustade med GPS eller s.k. loggers, vilket möjliggjorde för Glenn Abramsson att följa deras sökspår (*Search tracks*) på sin laptop och senare föra in dessa på en Google Earth-karta. Även om det inte framgår av de av honom presenterade kartorna undersöktes också området mellan de synliga sökspåren, men detta av personer som inte hade någon GPS-utrustning och därför inte efterlämnade några *Search tracks*. År 2014 var Harja-medlemmarnas sökspår ljusblå, medan de under de följande åren framställdes i andra färger: 2015 i rött, 2016 i ljusgrönt och 2017 i gult (på röda eller rödbruna fält). Detta framgår tydligt av den karta som ritades av Glenn Abramsson efter den senaste sökningen 2017 (bild 8).

Abramsson har dessutom under alla fyra åren skrivit sökrapporter *(Search tracks reports)*, i vilka de undersökta fälten numrerats i kronologisk följd med angivande av datum, antalet deltagare och söktimmar samt storleken på de

[16] Närmare upplysningar ger S. Ekdahl, *Archäologische Grabungen bei Grunwald (Tannenberg, Žalgiris) in den Jahren 2014 und 2015,* i: *Lietuvos Did*žiosios Kunigaikštystės istorijos atodangos. Profesoriaus Mečislovo Jučo 90-mečio jubiliejui skirtas mokslinių straipsnių rinkinys, sudarytojai Vydas Dolinskas, Rimvydas Petrauskas, Edmundas Rimša, Vilnius 2016, s. 175–205, här s. 182–186 samt 196–198. Jfr. P.A. Nowakowski, *Sprawozdanie z badań archeologicznych prowadzonych na terenie Pól Grunwaldu w dniach 14–24.09.2014 r.*, i: Nowe Studia Grunwaldzkie I, Stębark 2015, s. 79–87.

undersökta fälten angiven i hektar.[17] 2016 och 2017 tillfogades dessutom uppgifter om *Search conditions*, dvs. markens beskaffenhet.



Bild 7. Deltagare i sökandet 2014.
Foto Ewelina Miksa.

Som framgår av den första rapporten av den 3 oktober 2014 var det nio fält som scannades detta år (nr 1–9 på Glenn Abramssons ovannämnda karta bild 8). Flertalet av dessa låg öster om vägen Stębark-Łodwigowo, eftersom Grunwald-museets ledning hoppades kunna verifiera Andrzej Nadolskis tes. Detta lyckades emellertid inte. Under sammanlagt 799 söktimmar undersöktes 155 hektar land, men resultatet blev mycket magert. De enda ”militariaföremål” som påträffades var ett par pilspetsar och bett till betsel samt en del av en sporre (bild 9). Museets management beslöt därför att nästa år beakta mina forskningsresultat, utan att för den skull överge Nadolskis synpunkter.[18] Detta bekräftas i ett brev till tidskriften Mówią Wieki i september 2017, i vilken det bl.a. heter: ”Som framhållits ovan sker vår forskning *sine ira et studio*. Av denna anledning beslöt vi att 2015 undersöka områden som enligt Sven Ekdahls åsikt utgör den egentliga platsen för slaget vid Grunwald. Detta innebär emellertid inte att vi gav upp [försöket] att verifiera den hypotes som förts fram av Andrzej Nadolski.”[19] I mitt svar i samma tidskrift

[17] Återgivna i Ekdahl, *Archäologische Grabungen* (som anm. 16), s. 196–198 och 201–203 med undantag för sökrapporterna från 2016 och 2017, som kommer att publiceras av mig på annan plats.

[18] Brev från direktor dr Szymon Drej (14.11.2014) och arkeologen dr Piotr A. Nowakowski (19.11.2014).

[19] ”Ponieważ nasze badania, co sygnalizowano wcześniej, prowadzone są *sine ira et studio*, w roku 2015 postanowiliśmy rozpoznać tereny będące według Svena Ekdahla właściwymi polam bitwy grunwaldzkiej. Nie oznacza to, że zarzuciliśmy weryfikację hipotezy Andrzeja Nadolskiego.”

framhöll jag att brevet från museet till redaktionen för Mówią Wieki i själva verket är ett försvarsmemorandum för att visa att de traditionella riktlinjerna inte har övergivits.[20]



Bild 8. De undersökta fälten 2014–2017 med numrering och GPS-sökspår.
Karta av Glenn Abramsson.




Bild 9. ”Militaria”– fynd 2014. Karta av Glenn Abramsson.
Numren har inte med antalet fynd att göra.

Muzeum Bitwy pod Grunwaldem w Stębarku [Szymon Drej och Piotr A. Nowakowski], *W sprawie artykułu prof. Svena Ekdahla*, i: Mówią Wieki, 2017, 9 (september), s. 70.

20 ”List z Muzeum Bitwy pod Grunwaldem w Stębarku do redakcji ‘Mówią wieki’ jest w istocie memorandum obrony pokazującym, że dotychczasowe wytyczne nie zostały zarzucone.” S. Ekdahl, *Do dyrekcji Muzeum Bitwy pod Grunwaldem*, ibidem, s. 71.

2015

Som framgår av Glenn Abramssons nya redogörelse deltog detta år 15 Harja-medlemmar från Danmark och Norge i sökandet, vartill kom ett tiotal detektorister från Storbritannien och Polen (bild 10).[21]



Bild 10. Deltagare i sökandet 2015. De i England bosatta polackerna hade ännu ej anlänt. Foto Aleksandras Matonis.

Göteborgs universitet och därmed Sverige samt Polsk-Skandinaviska Forskningsinstitutet i Köpenhamn (IPS) representerades av mig, medan den Litauiska televisionen företräddes av Aleksandras Matonis från Vilnius (bild 11). I juli året dessförinnan hade jag för övrigt förlänats den förnämliga Grunwald-medaljen (bild 12).

[21] Närmare upplysningar hos Ekdahl, *Archäologische Grabungen* (som anm. 16), s. 186–195 samt 199–203. Se även anm. 25.



Bild 11. Aleksandras Matonis från litauiska televisionen med kamerautrustning. Glenn Abramsson (t.h.), Sven och Heide Ekdahl. Foto Ieva Matonienė 2015.



Bild 12. Förläning av Grunwald-medaljen till Sven Ekdahl 2014. Foto Romuald Odoj.

Under en vecka i augusti 2015 undersöktes 8 fält (nr 10–17) väster om vägen Stębark-Łodwigowo med en sammanlagd yta av 120 hektar under 681 söktimmar. Resultatet blev denna gång betydligt bättre än året dessförinnan: man fann bl.a. delar av sporrar, svärd och pansarhandskar, tre yxor eller bilor och ett större antal armborstpilspetsar och vanliga pilspetsar (bild 13). En jämförelse med de magra fynden 2014 är slående. Uppgifterna om antalet sådana projektiler

varierar, enligt vad Piotr A. Nowakowski senare meddelat rörde det sig 2015 om 37. Dessutom påträffades liksom 2014 många hästskor, men dessa härrör till större delen från senare tiders lantbruk och inte från slaget 1410. Det stora antalet ”militaria”-fynd i närheten av kapellet tolkar Nowakowski liksom jag som belägg för att häftiga strider utspelats här när de under slagets slutskede i all hast sammanfogade vagnborgarna i Tyska ordens läger stormades och erövrades.[22] Flera andra fynd har att göra med att kapellet under lång tid efter slaget utgjort en vallfartsort.[23] När samma fält undersöktes än en gång 2017 under gynnsammare väderleksförhållanden påträffades ytterligare ett stort antal artefakter, inte minst vad gäller ”militaria” från 1410 (se nedan).

Som särskilt intressanta får man betrakta fynden av armborstpilspetsar m.m. på båda sidor om vägen halvvägs mellan Grunwald och Łodwigowo, där enligt min uppfattning trupper från den litauiske storfursten Vytautas (på polska Witold) här drabbade samman med Tyska ordens vänstra här (se bild 13).[24] Polackernas slagfält befinner sig längre åt nordväst, närmare byn Grunwald (Grünfelde), men det var 2015 inte möjligt att söka på fälten där, eftersom det växte olika grödor på dessa. De särskilt intressanta områdena ägs nu av bönder eftersom de i överensstämmelse med Voigt-Kuczyński-Nadolski-tesen alltid ansetts vara betydelselösa av Polens ledande Grunwald-forskare. Museet äger visserligen stora markområden som förvärvats i samband med jubileet 1960, men detta skedde i enlighet med de felaktiga premisser jag skildrat ovan. Som en konsekvens härav måste nu ständigt överenskommelser träffas med markägarna innan någon sökning kan äga rum på andra än museets egna områden.

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[22] Jfr. P.A. Nowakowski, *Sprawozdanie z badań archeologicznych prowadzonych na terenie Pól Grunwaldu w dniach 15–22.08.2015 r.*, i: Nowe Studia Grunwaldzkie II, Stębark 2016, s. 113–139, här s. 114.

[23] S. Ekdahl, *Pobojowisko grunwaldzkie i okolica w XV i XVI stuleciu,* i: Studia Grunwaldzkie 3, Olsztyn 1994 (= Rozprawy i Materiały Ośrodka Badań Naukowych im. Wojciecha Kętrzyńskiego w Olsztynie 136), s. 61–118. Se även S, Ekdahl, *Heliga Birgitta, slaget vid Tannenberg och grundandet av klostret ”Triumphus Mariae” i Lublin,* i: *Skandinavien och Polen. Möten, relationer och ömsesidig påverkan*, redigerat av B. Törnquist-Plewa, Lund 2007 (= Slavica Lundensia 23), s. 1–24; idem, *St Birgitta of Sweden, the Battle of Tannenberg (Grunwald) and the Foundation of the Monastery ”Triumphus Mariae” in Lublin*, i: *Między Śląskim a Wiedniem. Księga Jubileuszowa z okazji 60. urodzin prof. dr hab. Krzysztofa A. Kuczyńskiego*, redigerat av: A. Kozłowski, M. Znyk, Płock 2008, s. 287–301; idem, Św. Brygida Szwedzka, bitwa pod Grunwaldem i założenie Klasztoru *„Triumphus Mariae” w Lublinie,* i: Studia Archiwalne III, redigerat av P. Dymmel, Lublin 2010 (utg. 2015), s. 9–24.

[24] Ekdahl, *Aufmarsch* (som anm. 4), s. 56. Vad beträffar slagets förlopp se S. Ekdahl, *Quellenaussagen über die Taktik in der Tannenbergschlacht,* i: *Tannenberg-Grunwald-Žalgiris 1410: Krieg und Frieden im späten Mittelalter*, redigerat av W. Paravicini, R. Petrauskas, G. Vercamer, Wiesbaden 2012 (= Deutsches Historisches Institut Warschau. Quellen und Studien 26), s. 285–305.



Bild 13. ”Militaria”-fynd 2015. Karta av Glenn Abramsson.
Numren har inte med antalet fynd att göra.

2016

Sökandet fortsattes under en septembervecka 2016 (bild 14). Det inleddes med en högtidlig ceremoni i Pałac Pacółtowo (tidigare godset Groß Pötzdorf) ca 10 km norr om Grunwald i närvaro av bl.a. Warmia och Mazurys (Ermlands och Masurens) marskalk Gustaw Marek Brzezin och direktor Zdzizław Fadrowski från Kultur- och Utbildningsdepartementet i Olsztyn (Allenstein). Jag hade liksom året dessförinnan blivit ombedd att hålla ett anförande och överlämnade i det sammanhanget några bundna exemplar av ett nyutkommet arbete jag skrivit om undersökningarna på slagfältet: ”Archäologische Grabungen bei Grunwald (Tannenberg, Žalgiris) in den Jahren 2014 und 2015”.[25] Avhandlingen hade bara några få veckor tidigare publicerats in en litauisk festskrift med anledning av Vilnius-professorn Mečislovas Jučas 90-årsdag.

[25] Se anm. 16. Mina anföranden på engelska 2015 och 2016 finns tryckta i*: Sprawozdanie Instytutu Polsko-Skandynawskiego 2014/2015 / Beretning af Polsk-Skandinavisk Forskningsinstitut 2014/2015*, Kopenhaga 2015, s. 27–29 samt för 2015/2016 (Kopenhaga 2016) på s. 25–27. Beträffande 2015 se även Ekdahl, *Archäologische Grabungen* (som anm. 16), s. 199–200.




Bild 14. Deltagare i sökandet 2016. Foto Ewelina Miksa.

Liksom under de andra åren organiserades sökandet 2016 fackmannamässigt av Jarosław Malecki M.A. från Grunwald-museet enligt de riktlinjer som bestämts av dr Drej och dr Nowakowski. Harjas medverkan var även nu oumbärlig. Av de 26 deltagande detektoristerna kunde tack vare GPS sökspår från 11 Harja-medlemmar återges av Glenn Abramsson på en Google Earth-karta. Under 470 söktimmar undersöktes ungefär 100 hektar på 11 fält som i anslutning till tidigare år numrerades från 18 till 28 (se bild 8). Bortser man från fynden i omgivningen av kapellet så var resultatet särskilt givande i vissa områden längs vägen mellan Grunwald och Łodwigowo.

Åren 2014 och 2015 hade Grunwald-museet ställt sin fyndförteckning (*Inwentarz znalezisk*) till Harjas förfogande, men 2016 vägrade man göra detta. Anledningen var mitt ovannämnda arbete om undersökningarna 2014 och 2015, i vilket jag i samarbete med Abramsson publicerat kartor med angivande av fyndplatserna.[26]

Trots att det alltså för året 2016 saknas belägg i form av en karta över fyndplatserna, står det klart att de flesta ”militaria”-artefakterna (armborstpilspetsar och vanliga pilspetsar samt andra delar av vapen och ryttarutrustning) påträffades på fälten mellan Grunwald och Łodwigowo, särskilt inom det område som på den berömda

[26] Se härom S. Ekdahl, *Współczesne badania archeologiczne pola bitwy pod Grunwaldem* [Contemporary archaeological research on the battlefield of Grunwald], i: Mówią Wieki 2017, 7 (juli), s. 24–27.

Schroetterska kartan från omkring 1800 markerats som slagfält med två korslagda sablar (se bild 6).[27] Även väster om vägen mellan de båda byarna påträffades ”militaria”-artefakter från 1410. Sökandet öster om vägen Stębark-Łodwigowo (i det område som av A. Nadolski betecknats som ”Den stora strömmens dal”) ledde däremot inte heller detta år till något positivt resultat. – *OBS! SE TILLÄGG!*

Sökningen avslutades fredagen den 16 september med att Grunwald-museet bjöd projektdeltagarna på middag i Pałac Pacółtowo och i det sammanhanget arrangerade en utställning av de viktigaste påträffade föremålen detta år (bild 15).



Bild 15. Utställning av några av fynden 2016. Foto ”Kolekcjonerzy Czasu”, Warszawa.

Sökandet efter massgravar

Artefakter av metall kan med hjälp av metalldetektorer spåras till ett djup av ca 30 cm, men för att finna massgravar erfordras annan teknisk utrustning, nämligen markradar, som på engelska kallas *Ground Penetration Radar (GPR).* Det var därför en lycklig omständighet att ett litauiskt *GPR*-team under ledning av den redan omnämnde TV-journalisten, redaktören och diplomaten Aleksandras

[27] Betr. den Schroetterska kartan se anm. 4. Kartan förvaras i Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Kartenabteilung, Sign. N 1020, Avsnittet med slagfältet finns i sektion 59.


Matonis anlände till Grunwald den 16 september 2016 och kunde närvara vid invigningen av utställningen i Pałac Pacółtowo. Litauerna tillhörde inte Harja-gruppen och jag var helt ovetande om deras förehavande som skedde på eget initiativ av Aleksandras Matonis (bild 16).



Bild 16. Det litauiska GPR-teamet 2016 med förf. Fr. v. Saulius Palauskas, Rokas Vengalis, Ieva Černiūtė, Sven Ekdahl, Eduardas Bareika och Aleksandras Matonis. Foto Heide Ekdahl.

Under de båda följande dagarna hade litauerna möjlighet att under några timmar söka efter massgravar. Eftersom mina forskningar om slagfältet var kända av Matonis sedan tidigare bad han mig att förestå ett lämpligt sökområde, vilket jag också gjorde.

Resultatet av denna undersökning med markradar den 17 och 18 september 2016 var mycket givande, för inom ett av mig föreslaget område nordost om vägen mellan Grunwald och Łodwigowo (ungefär halvvägs mellan dessa byar) upptäcktes 17 anomalier i marken, nämligen gropar eller på engelska ”*pits*” av olika storlek, form och djup (bild 17). Djupet varierade mellan 1och 2,4 meter. I flera av groparna finns det reflekterande föremål, som troligen är av metall. Detta talar emot att de skulle vara av naturligt ursprung.



Pic. 7. General layout of GPR-identified pits in Lots 3-5.

Bild 17. Karta av Rokas Vengalis över fälten med de påträffade anomalierna mellan Grunwald och Łodwigowo (2016).

Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Earthstar Geographic, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, AEX, Gemapping, Aerogrid, IGN, IGP, swisstopo, and the GIS User Community

Givetvis ger denna upptäckt anledning till frågan om några av dessa anomalier möjligen kan vara massgravar från slaget 1410. Som litauernas tekniske expert dr Rokas Vengalis fastslagit i sin rapport på litauiska av den 29 september 2016 (översatt till engelska i april 2017) erfordras det en regelrätt arkeologisk utgrävning för att man ska kunna fastställa om de är av naturligt ursprung eller inte.[28] Problemet är, att Grunwald-museets management av någon anledning betraktar dessa anomalier som tämligen betydelselösa[29] och inte heller verkar vara särskilt intresserat av att genomföra en sådan undersökning trots att frågeställningen är viktig. Detta har jag och andra med mig framhållit upprepade gånger.

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[28] R. Vengalis, *Report on Geophysical Survey of Grunwald Village (Grunwald, Warmia-Masurian Voivodeship, Poland) using a Ground-Penetrating Radar*. Vilnius, 29/09/2016. – Den på litauiska skrivna rapporten översattes i april 2017 till engelska och tillsändes mig den 16.04.2017 som bilaga till ett email av Aleksandras Matonis. Till texten har Vengalis fogat 8 bilder. En av dessa återges i omtecknad form i min artikel *Współczesne badania archeologiczne* (som anm. 26). Rapporten kommer att utges i tryck av mig på annan plats.

[29] Muzeum Bitwy pod Grunwaldem w Stębarku [S. Drej och P.A. Nowakowski], *W sprawie artykułu prof. Svena Ekdahla*, i: Mówią Wieki 2017, 9 (september), s. 70. – Se härtill mitt svar: Sven Ekdahl, *Do dyrekcji Muzeum Bitwy pod Grunwaldem*, ibidem, s. 71.

2017

Min ovannämnda avhandling ”Archäologische Grabungen bei Grunwald (Tannenberg, Žalgiris) in den Jahren 2014 und 2015” om sökandet med metalldetektorer och de därvid uppnådda resultaten mottogs tyvärr inte välvilligt av Grunwald-museet, som från och med oktober 2016 inställde all korrespondens med mig. Inget av min sju brev rörande olika frågor blev därefter besvarat. Förhållandet blev 2017 inte bättre av att jag höll ett föredrag om slagfältsarkeologin vid Grunwald på en konferens vid universitetet i Haifa den 23 februari[30] och ett annat vid universitetet i Warszawa den 24 april[31] och dessutom publicerade ett par artiklar om min forskning och resultatet av utgrävningarna i den kända populärvetenskapliga historiska tidskriften Mówią Wieki.[32] Därvid nämnde jag även litauernas intressanta upptäckt av anomalier på fälten mellan Grunwald och Łodwigowo med hjälp av markradar, vilket i hög grad irriterade museets ledning. Dr Szymon Drej och dr Piotr A. Nowakowski bemödade sig omgående att relativera betydelsen av denna upptäckt.[33] Givetvis har jag aldrig hävdat att det rör sig om massgravar, utan enbart framhållit detta som en tänkbar möjlighet och framhållit nödvändigheten av en regelrätt arkeologisk utgrävning.

Den 24 augusti 2017, dvs. två veckor före min planerade avresa från Göteborg till årets undersökning med metalldetektorer vid Grunwald, fick jag helt oförmodat ett email från dr Drej och dr Nowakowski, i vilket de förklarade att jag inte var välkommen att deltaga i årets sökning.[34] Som en konsekvens härav måste jag i all hast avboka resan med färja från Karlskrona till Gdynia och hotellvistelserna i Polen för mig och min fru trots mitt medlemskap i Harja och min funktion som IPS generalsekreterare.[35] Denna åtgärd av museets ledning ansågs som oförklarlig

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[30] S. Ekdahl, *Battlefield Archaeology at Tannenberg (Grunwald, Žalgiris): Physical Remains of the Defeat of the Teutonic Order in Prussia in 1410.* Lecture on 23 February at the conference “*The Art of Siege Warfare and Military Architecture from the Classical World to the Middle Ages. An International Conference for the Study of Poliorcetics, Military Historiography and the Archaeology of Battlefields”*, Haifa, February 20–25, 2017. Se Abstract Book, Haifa 2017, s. 30.

[31] S. Ekdahl, *Modern Battlefield Archaeology at Grunwald*. – Inbjudan av Museet för Polens historia (Muzeum Historii Polski) och Historiska institutionen vid universitetet i Warszawa (Instytut Historyczny UW) 2017.

[32] Se ovan, anm. 20 och 26.

[33] I det ovannämnda brevet *W sprawie artykułu prof. Svena Ekdahla* (se anm. 29).

[34] ”Due to the upcoming launch of this year’s excavation season at Grunwald Battlefield, we would like to inform you that we are not seeing the possibility of working with you during the research.” Email den 24.8.2017.

[35] Se härtill S. Ekdahl, *Das Instytut Polsko-Skandynawski in Kopenhagen (IPS). Ein* Überblick, i: Zapiski Historyczne LXXXII, 2017: 2, s. 193–199 (380–385).

av såväl de danska och norska projektdeltagarna som av IPS i Köpenhamn. Även många andra personer i olika länder – historiker och arkeologer – har uttryckt sin förundran.

Genom mina skandinaviska kollegor från Harja fick jag trots det negativa beskedet från Grunwald-museet och trots en senare av museet införd nyhetsspärr jämte borttagandet av diverse filer med informationer i internet värdefulla upplysningar om resultatet av 2017 års sökning, främst av dansken Glenn Abramsson och norrmännen Trond A. Hansen och Kjell Kåsastul.[36] Antalet deltagare med metalldetektorer varierade under de olika dagarna och låg som mest knappt under 40 (bild 18). Bland dessa befann sig nu endast 5 Harja-medlemmar från Danmark och 2 från Norge (bild 19). Antalet söktimmar uppgick till ca 900 och den undersökta storleken av 7 fält (nr 29–35) var ca 90 hektar. Osäkerheten beror på att inga Harja-medlemmar deltog i sökandet på de båda sistnämnda fälten, varför de inte kunde beaktas i Glenn Abramssons rapport för detta år.



Bild 18. Deltagare i sökandet 2017.
Foto Dariusz Jezak.

[36] Abramsson har bl.a. sänt mig sin rapport för 2017 och ritat en värdefull karta över alla fält som undersökts under åren 2014–2017 (bild 8). Hansen har i ett längre email av den 18 september 2017 lämnat viktiga informationer om resultatet av sökandet detta år och även bifogat en karta över fälten ifråga (bild 20). Ett tack går också till Kjell Kåsastul, som dagligen genom email till Göteborg höll mig underrättad om sökandet och dessutom bifogade flera foton (jfr. bild 21).



Bild 19. De deltagande Harja-medlemmarna 2017. Fr. v. Knud Sørensen, Trond Hansen, Hans Berendtsen, Dariusz Jezak, Glenn Abramsson, Morten Skovsby, Kjell Kåsastul. Foto N.N.

Slagfältet funnet!

Öster om vägen Stębark-Łodwigowo gjordes inte heller 2017 några viktiga fynd av ”militaria” i den s.k. ”Stora strömmens dal”, ”Dolina Wielkiego Strumień” (enligt Andrzej Nadolskis hypotes), men sökningen i omgivningen av kapellet och väster om detta vid vägen Grunwald-Łodwigowo gav mycket gott resultat. Trond A. Hansen har ritat en värdefull karta över just dessa fält (bild 20) och dessutom meddelat vilka fynd som gjordes på dem.[37]

Det var i stort sett samma fält som redan undersöktes 2015, men tack vare den fuktiga väderleken nu med ännu större framgång. Markens ledningsförmåga växlar, och särskilt när det är torrt går signalerna inte alltid fram till metalldetektorn. Av de fyra år som projektet pågått var 2017 det mest givande. Bl.a. påträffades ca 65 armborstpilspetsar och ett 20-tal vanliga pilspetsar, förutom delar av sporrar, stigbyglar och pansarhandskar m.m. Ett foto från utställningen 2017 visar några av de många fynden (bild 21). Harja-medlemmarna Kjell Kåsastul från Norge och Dariusz Jezak från Danmark fann två intressanta, möjligen litauiska eller prussiska spjutspetsar. Några av projektilerna är kanske av tatariskt ursprung.

[37] Email av den 18.9.2017 (se föregående anm.). Jag avstår här från att precisera fynden.




Bild 20. Trond A. Hansens karta över de viktigaste undersökta fälten 2017.
Jfr. undersökningen 2015.



Bild 21. Från utställningen i Grunwald-museet 2017.
Foto Kjell Kåsastul.

Även om resultatet av de skildrade sökningarna med metalldetektorer 2014–2017 endast är preliminärt och alla fält ännu inte kunnat scannas, råder det ingen tvekan om att slagfältet från 1410 nu är funnet. Det befinner sig inte där Andrzej Nadolski och andra med honom placerat det, alltså söder och öster om Stebark (Tannenberg) utan istället söder och öster om Grunwald (Grünfelde). Min analys från 1965 om härarnas uppmarsch har fått ett starkt stöd genom de arkeologiska fynden och det finns inte något som talar emot denna.

Framtidsperspektiv

I framtiden är det särskilt viktigt att fortsätta sökandet på de stora fält söder och öster om Grunwald som ännu är ”jungfruliga” ur forskningssynpunkt eftersom de hittills bedömts som ointressanta av de tongivande kollegerna i Polen eller varit otillgängliga på grund av växande grödor, framför allt majs (se bild 8). Som framhållits ovan är givetvis även en arkeologisk utgrävning av de påträffade anomalierna på fälten vid vägen Grunwald-Łodwigowo ett särskilt viktigt desiderat.

Jag vill här citera ett uttalande av Glenn Abramsson i en artikel i januarinumret 2018 av Harjas tidskrift ”Fynboer & Arkaeologi”. På den ständigt återkommande frågan när Harjas medlemmar har sökt med metalldetektorer vid Grunwald, nämligen om man påträffat slagfältet, lyder svaret enligt Abramsson: ”Ja, det har vi. Vi fann faktiskt platsen redan år 2015. Det vi använt de tre sista åren till har varit att taga reda på var yttergränserna för slagfältet går”.[38]

Tesen om ett slagfält öster om vägen Stębark-Łodwigowo kan alltså nu definitivt läggas *ad acta*. Det har kostat 820 söktimmar och en undersökning av 180 hektar land att definitivt bevisa detta. Dessa resurser hade enligt min åsikt kunnat användas på bättre sätt om Grunwald-museets management från början varit berett att acceptera min analys av de skriftliga källorna.

Det hårda motståndet från Nadolski-teorins anhängare kommer förmodligen att bestå en längre tid framöver. Jag hänvisar här än en gång till det ovan citerade uttalandet av dr Ryszard Walczak i brevet till mig av den 29 september 1986. Den där nämnda frågeställningen har ännu inte förlorat sin aktualitet.

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[38] G. Abramsson, *Sagaen om det forsvundne ridderslag*, i: Fynboer & Arkaeologi, 2018: 1, s. 8–9, här s. 8: ”’Har I fundet slagmarken?’ Det er det spørgsmål, der stilles, hver gang Harjas detektorfolk har været i Grunwald. Og svaret er ‘Ja det har vi‘. Vi fandt faktiskt stedet allerede i 2015. Det vi har brugt de sidste tre år på, er att finde ud af hvor ydergrænserne for slagmarken går.”

Den första etappen av samarbetet mellan Grunwald-museet och det danska arkeologiska sällskapet Harja avslutades enligt Glenn Abramsson 2017. Projektet har i sin helhet inneburit att sammanlagt 450 hektar undersökts under närmare 3000 söktimmar. Sökningen kommer emellertid att fortsättas innevarande år (2018). Enligt uppgift från Harja är en ny sådan planerad till den 15–21 september. Uppenbarligen vill museumsledningen, dvs. dr Szymon Drej och dr Piotr A. Nowakowski, även i framtiden draga nytta av Harja-medlemmarnas entusiasm, offervilja och tekniska kunnande. Många danskar och norrmän har uttryckt önskemål om att få deltaga i en ny undersökning nu när det berömda slagfältet bevisligen har påträffats. I april 2018 hade 12 danskar och 5 norrmän anmält sitt intresse.[39]

Varje framtida ”militaria”-fynd i område söder och öster om Grunwald kommer att utgöra ytterligare belägg för mitt påstående att forskningen om det stora slaget sedan 180 år befunnit sig i en återvändsgränd, i en *cul-de-sac*. Jag ser därför fram mot resultatet av alla kommande undersökningar med stort intresse.

Grunwald-museets dilemma

Den logiska konsekvensen av allt detta är uppenbar och samtidigt smärtsam för Grunwald-museet. Den hittillsvarande tolkningen av slaget har visat sig inte hålla måttet. De imposanta segermonumenten och museet byggdes inför jubileet 1960 enligt de felaktiga premisser om härarnas uppmarsch och uppställning och slagfältets belägenhet som då behärskade forskningen och befinner sig därför på en plats som inte har särskilt mycket med själva slaget att göra.

2016 beviljades ca 5 miljoner Euro (22 miljoner złoty) till byggandet av ett nytt museum vid Grunwald. Av denna summa ställer Wojewodskapet Warmia och Mazury (Ermland och Masuren) 6,7 miljoner złoty till förfogande, medan resten är EU-hjälp till främjande av turismen i denna region.[40] Byggandet påbörjades under första halvåret 2018 på en plats som sedan länge varit fastställd. Den befinner sig nära parkeringsplatsen vid vägen mellan Stębark (Tannenberg) och Grunwald (Grünfelde).

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[39] Meddelande av Glenn Abramsson.

[40] A. Porowska, *Grunwald musi żyć nie tylko latem!,* i: Gazeta Olsztyńska, 26.09.2017, s. 5 (intervju med marskalken i wojevodskapet Warmia i Mazury, Gustaw Marek Brzezin).

Intressant är här en jämförelse med ett liknande problem för ”Bosworth Battlefield Heritage Centre” i Leicestershire i Storbritannien till minne av det avgörande slaget vid Bosworth under ”Rosornas krig” mellan de båda rivaliserande släkterna Lancaster och York den 22 augusti 1485.[41] Kung Rikard III från huset York besegrades därvid av Henrik Tudor, Earl av Richmond, som genom sin seger blev den förste kungen av Tudor-dynastin under namnet Henrik VII. Genom William Shakespeares drama och filmatiseringen av detta 1955 med Laurence Olivier i huvudrollen som Rikard III har slaget blivit känt i hela världen (”A horse, a horse! My kingdom for a horse!”).

Slagfältets belägenhet var länge omstridd i forskningen. Enligt den länge gällande officiella tolkningen av Leicestershire County Council befann det sig i närheten av staden Bosworth, vid foten av kullen Ambion Hill. Rådet hade engagerat historikern Daniel Thomas Williams (1937–1998) från universitetet i Leicestershire för att fastställa slagfältets läge, och använt sig av dennes 1973 publicerade tes[42] för att ett år senare bygga ”Bosworth Battlefield Heritage Centre” som turistattraktion på det av honom föreslagna stället. Sedan dess har emellertid riktigheten av Williams tes blivit ifrågasatt.

Särskilt var detta fallet efter 500-årsfirandet av slaget 1985. Geologiska undersökningar som genomförts av organisationen ”Battlefields Trust” 2003–2009 visade att det av Williams utpekade området inte kommer ifråga som slagfält, eftersom sumpmarken som nämns i de skriftliga källorna inte funnits där. Kostnaden för sökandet på dussintals fält uppgick till en miljon pund och betalades av ”Battlefields Trust” med lotteripengar från ”Heritage Lottery Fund”. Det var den dittills mest omfattade arkeologiska undersökningen av ett slagfält i Storbritannien. Ledare var dr Glenn Foard (född 1953) från universitetet i Huddersfield, känd som en av världens ledande slagfältsarkeologer.[43] Enligt hans åsikt, som grundar sig på jordprover och fynd av medeltida militär utrustning, ägde slaget rum 2 engelska mil (3,2 km) sydväst om det av Williams och andra föreslagna området.[44] Den exakta belägenheten hölls först hemlig för att om möjligt undvika illegal skattsökning. Englands statliga kulturminnesmyndighet

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[41] Det finns en omfattande litteratur om slaget och dess följder, även vad gäller frågorna kring slagfältet. Se internetartikeln ”Battle of Bosworth Field” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bosworth_Field) och Bosworth Battlefield Heritage Centres hemsida: www.bosworthbattlefield.org.uk.

[42] D.Th. Williams, *The Battle of Bosworth, 22 August 1485*, Leicester 1973.

[43] https://research.hud.ac.uk/ourstaff/profile/index.php?staffid=850.

[44] Se exempelvis följande internetartikel från 2010: “Is this the field where Richard III lost his kingdom for a horse? Real location of Battle of Bosworth finally revealed after 500 years”.

”Historic England”[45] har på grund av de nya forskningsresultaten gjort en ny definiering av gränserna för det registrerade slagfältet.

”Bosworth Battlefield Heritage Centre” har följaktligen byggts på en plats som utpekats enligt Daniel Williams felaktiga tes. Museiledningen har medgivit detta, tagit konsekvenserna och kommit fram till en pragmatisk lösning. Denna innebär att platsen med museet förblir som hittills, likaså den en och en halv kilometer längre bort (”on the wrong spot”) resta minnesstenen över Rikard III, eftersom denna enligt kuratorn Richard Knox blivit ett ”landmark in its own right”.[46] Besökarna erbjuds emellertid att följa en stig över slagfältet (*Battlefield Trail*) och samtidigt – förutom panoramablicken över landskapet – få audio- och visuella informationer om slaget. Förhandlingar har förts och överenskommelser har träffats med de privata markägarna för att möjliggöra fritt tillträde för besökarna: ”The Battlefield covers a wide area of farmland, which is owned by many different landowners. Although there is a network of public right of way across the area, there is no parking on the Battlefield itself and the lanes are narrow and dangerous. The Heritage Centre remains the gateway to the Battlefield and we encourage people to join our wider battlefield walks to see where the actioned happened”.[47]

Vore inte en liknande pragmatisk lösning lämpad även för *Muzeum Bitwy pod Grunwaldem w Stebarku*?

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Efter varje slag blev fältet där det utspelats alltid noggrant genomsökt för att tillvarataga allt av värde, inte minst metallföremål. Även stora drabbningar har därför efterlämnat få synliga spår åt eftervärlden. Endast vapen och delar av vapen och rustningar m.m. som trängt ner i jorden eller tryckts in i denna av hästarnas hovar har ofta förblivit oupptäckta tills användandet av metalldetektorer blev en standardmetod inom arkeologin. Jag vill emellertid framhålla, att inte heller sökandet med metalldetektorer alltid leder fram till det resultat man hoppats på och att det kan finnas flera anledningar till detta. Ibland kan man fråga sig om

[45] Det officiella namnet på English Heritage är ”The Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission for England”.

[46] Så Richard Knox i en intervju för Daily Telegraph 2009: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/623613/Battle-of-Bosworth-is-in-wrong-spot.

[47] Citat från Bosworth Battlefield Heritage Centres hemsida.

det verkligen rör sig om platsen för ett slag. Ett exempel härpå är det ytterst magra fyndmaterialet på de förmodade fälten för slaget vid Azincourt/Agincourt (1415).[48] – Därför är de många påträffade artefakterna vid Grunwald (Grünfelde) efter den stora drabbningen1410 något alldeles enastående.

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Grunwald-museet och dess management förtjänar stort tack för iniativet till det framgångsrika samarbetet med det danska arkeologiska sällskapet Harja och för projektets organisering och förverkligande! Frågan om var slaget vid Tannenberg/Grunwald/Žalgiris i trängre bemärkelse ägde rum, har nu äntligen, efter 180 år, fått ett tillförlitligt svar. Framgången baseras inte minst på det faktum att det rört sig om ett samarbete mellan flera olika nationer, förutom Polen även Danmark, Norge, Storbritannien och Litauen, samt dessutom – genom mina egna forskningar – Sverige. Projektet och dess resultat utgör utan tvekan en milstolpe i slagfältsarkeologins historia.

TILLÄGG: Undersökningen i september 2018

Genom tillmötesgående av redaktionen för Studia Maritima, främst av chefredaktören professor Adam Makowski, kan ett tillägg göras om resultatet av undersökningen med metalldetektorer den 15–21 september 2018. Det skall i sammanhanget också nämnas att det viktiga projektet redan väckt internationell uppmärksamhet. Så publicerade den arkeologiska facktidskriften ”Archäologie in Deutschland” 2017 en illustrerad artikel med rubriken ”Massengräber aus der Schlacht bei Tannenberg gefunden?”[49] och problematiken tematiserades 2018 med en karta och bilder på en dubbelsida i den stora dagstidningen ”Welt am Sonntag”.[50] Något senare följde en rikare illustrerad version under annan

[48] Se T. Sutherland, *Archaeological metal detector survey on the acknowledged site of the Battle of Agincourt* (online 2002, updated 2015). Se även densamme, *The Battle of Agincourt: An Alternative Location?,* i: Journal of Conflict Archaeology 1, 2006, s. 245–265.

[49] N.N., *Massengräber aus der Schlacht bei Tannenberg gefunden?,* i: Archäologie in Deutschland, 2017, Heft 4, s. 73–74.

[50] B. Seewald, *Die Schlacht der 40.000 Krieger*, i: Welt am Sonntag, Nr. 25, 24. Juni 2018, Leben & Wissen, s. 18–19.

rubrik i ”Welt online”.[51] Intressant är också ett arbete med en aktuell översikt av forskningsläget på spanska, som utgivits vid universitätsinstitutet General Gutiérrez Mellado i Madrid.[52] Viktigast är emellertid en med kartor och foton illustrerad uppsats på engelska i den renommerade polska historiska tidskriften Przegląd Historyczny, som utges i Warszawa.[53]

I september 2018 blev jag av Harja – alltså inte av Grunwald-museet – informerad om att häfte III av ”Nowe Studia Grunwaldzkie” publicerats 2017.[54] Däri finns dels en skildring av Piotr A. Nowakowski om sökandet 2016,[55] dels en av Ewelina Miksa sammanställd inventarieförteckning över de fynd som gjorts detta år.[56] Vad man saknar är en karta över fyndplatserna och dessutom ett omnämnande av de anomalier i marken (”pits”) som konstaterats av det litauiska GPR-teamet i området mellan Grunwald och Łodwigowo.

I sökandet med metalldetektorer i september 2018 deltog enligt uppgift av Glenn Abramssom dagligen ungefär 33–35 personer, varav närmare hälften var Harja-medlemmar, nämligen 11 danskar och 5 norrmän (jfr. bild 22).[57] Tyvärr kunde de ovannämnda, särskilt intressanta och fortfarande ”jungfruliga” fälten öster om Grunwald inte scannas eftersom de var planterade med raps. Detta var givetvis en besvikelse, särskilt för de långväga deltagarna från Skandinavien, eftersom man nu övergick till att söka på de ”gamla” fälten. Som Kjell Kåsastul uttryckte det: ”Litt kjedelig å søke i gamle spor”.[58] Emellertid gjorde man trots detta och

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[51] Berthold Seewald, *Der wahre Ort der Riesenschlacht.* […] *Neueste Ausgrabungen zeigen: Die Kämpfe fanden an einem anderen Ort statt*. 09.07.2018. https://www.welt.de/179018906.

[52] M.F. Lammoglia Cobo, *Relevancia de la arqueología de los campos de batalla en la batalla de Tannenberg/Grunwald/Žalgiris. Relevance of battlefield archaeology for the battle of Tannenberg/Grunwald/Žalgiris.* Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado. 31/07/2018.

[53] S. Ekdahl, *Battlefield Archaeology at Grunwald (Tannenberg, Žalgiris). A Polish-Scandinavian Research Project during the period 2014–2017*, i: Przegląd Historyczny, Vol. CIX, 2018, no 2, s. 239–266.

[54] Den 29 september 2018 fick jag ett häfte tillsänt av Glenn Abramsson, som inte heller han informerats tidigare. Häftet hade han tagit med sig från Grunwald-museet samma månad. Underligt nog står jag däri fortfarande upptagen som medlem av tidskriftens vetenskapliga råd.

[55] P.A. Nowakowski, *Sprawozdanie z badań archeologicznych prowadzonych na terenie Pól Grunwaldu w dniach 11–17.09.2016 r.*, i: Nowe Studia Grunwaldzkie, Vol. III, Stębark 2017, s. 39–40 samt på s. 41–63. Glenn Abramssons „Search track report” med kartor och diverse foton. Som vanligt finns ingen hänvisning till Abramssons insats.

[56] E. Miksa, *Inwentarz znalezisk, 2016 R., pozwolenie WKZ w Olsztynie nr 293/2016 z dnia 08.06.2016 r.,* i: Nowe Studia Grunwaldzkie III, Stębark 2017, s. 65–82. Koordinaterna finns angivna, men det saknas en karta över fyndplatserna.

[57] Email den 3.10.2018. Jag är givetvis fortfarande „portförbjuden“ av Grunwaldmuseet och kunde därför inte deltaga.

[58] Email den 21.9.2018.

trots den uttorkade marken med dålig ledningsförmåga uppenbarligen en hel del intressanta fynd på de fält som redan tidigare undersökts. Nämnas kan särskilt en välbevarad sporre med trissa, som påträffades den första dagen vid högsta delen av vägen mellan Grunwald och Łodwigowo (bild 23).[59] Fredagen den 21 september utställdes de funna artefakterna på museets kontor i Stębark (bild 24) och dagen därpå avtackades deltagarna under en mottagning i Pałac Pacółtowo.



Bild 22. Skandinaverna under en utflykt till Lidzbark Warmiński (Heilsberg) i september 2018. Foto ur Glenn Abramssons privatsamling.

Sammanfattningsvis har 2018 års ”survey” tillfullo bekräftat de resultat om slagfältets belägenhet som uppnåtts under de tidigare undersökningarna 2014–2017. Intressant nog avstod museets ledning från att återigen låta scanna fälten öster om vägen Stębark-Łowigowo. Tydligen har dr Drej och dr Nowakowski nu insett att slaget 1410 inte kan ha ägt rum i den av Andrzej Nadolski så kallade ”Stora strömmens dal” (Dolina Wielkiego Strumień), som f.ö. inte alls är någon ”dal” utan ett relativt platt landskap.[60] Som jag tidigare framhållit, befinner sig den i *Cronica conflictus* och senare även av Długosz i dennes *Annales* omnämnda

[59] Uppgift i email från Kjell Kåsastul den 16.9.2018: ”Det ble litt skuffelse i dag. Vi måtte søke i gamle søkeområdet. Detta var på andre side av veien der hvor di gamle gravene ble lokaliseret. Ble funnet en fin spore og en pilspiss. […] Ser ut som de ikke har klart å skaffe nye søkeområdet.” Sporren (avbildad) omnämns även i email från Kåsastul den 17.9.2018: ”Funnet toppen ved veien i går.”

[60] Se den av K. Kwiatkowski i boken *Memoria continenter historiam denotat* (som anm. 1) utgivna kartan över slagfältets omgivningar med angivna höjdskillnader i terrängen: *Mapa 1: Okolica pola bitwy pod Grunwaldem/Tannenbergiem/Žalgirisem.*

dalsänkan (*vallis*) istället söder om byn Grunwald, till väster om vägen som leder mot Łodwigowo.



Bild 23. Sporre påträffad mellan Grunwald och Łodwigowo i september 2018. Foto Kjell Kåsastul.



Bild 24. Utställning av de i september 2018 gjorda fynden. Foto Kjell Kåsastul.

Framtida undersökningar kommer enligt min uppfattning att ytterligare cementera de redan uppnådda forskningsresultaten beträffande slagfältets belägenhet. Jag ser dessa också som en bekräftelse på mina åsikter rörande härarnas uppmarsch och uppställning. Förhoppningsvis kommer även de 2016 påträffade anomalierna på fälten mellan Grunwald och Łodwigowo att bli föremål för en ingående arkeologisk undersökning. Från litauisk sida har man förklarat sig beredd att genomföras en sådan och dessutom taga på sig kostnaden för ett avtal med markägaren.[61] 2018 nöjde sig museet med att än en gång scanna området med metalldetektorer. Den intressanta finslipningen av problematiken rörande slaget vid Tannenberg/Grunwald/Žalgiris återstår!

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[61] Uppgift av Aleksandras Matonis i Vilnius (Wilno/Wilna) den 07.2018.

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Flera internetartiklar om och av Richard Knox, Heritage Development Manager for Leistershire County Council. Se: Richard Knox, Bosworth.

ARCHEOLOGIA POLA WALKI W GRUNWALDZIE. POLSKO-SKANDYNAWSKI PROJEKT BADAWCZY 2014–2017

Słowa kluczowe: archeologia pola bitewnego, Grunwald (Grünfelde), polsko-skandynawski badawczy projekt

Abstrakt

W artykule opisano poszukiwania, które przeprowadzono w latach 2014–2017 na polu bitwy pod Grunwaldem / Tennembergiem / Žalgirisem (1410) za pomocą wykrywaczy metalu. W lutym 2014 roku in Odense w Danii podpisano umowę na wspólne przedsięwzięcie pomiędzy Muzeum Bitwy pod Grunwaldem w Stębarku i Duńskim Towarzystwem Archeologicznym *Harja*. Zgodnie z tą umową *Harja* miała dostarczyć główną partię wykrywaczy metalu, które miały za zadanie zeskanować obszar wyznaczony przez Muzeum. Zasadniczym celem przedsięwzięcia było zlokalizowanie obszaru określnego jako *Dolina Wielkiego Strumienia* na południe i wschód od wioski Stębark, która według Andrzeja Nadolskiego (1921–1993), polskiego archeologa i historyka, była uważana za najważniejsze miejsce bitwy pod Grunwaldem w 1410 roku; to tam zjednoczone siły

polsko-litewskie starły się z Zakonem Krzyżackim. We wskazanym miejscu nie znaleziono jednak żadnych śladów pola bitwy.

Przez następne 3 lata poszukiwania rozszerzano na inne obszary na południe i wschód od wioski Grunwald, tym razem ze znakomitym wynikiem. Obecnie nie ma wątpliwości, że główna bitwa odbyła się w obszarze położonym około 2–3 km na zachód od wspomnianej *Doliny Wielkiego Strumienia*. Zatem przez 180 lat historycy i archeolodzy wyznawali błędną teorię na temat dróg przemarszu wojsk i formowania się szyków bojowych; autorem tej błędnej teorii z 1836 roku był pruski historyk Johannes Voigt. Artykuł zawiera opis realizacji tego międzynarodowego przedsięwzięcia oraz opisuje jego wyniki.

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THE HISTORY OF SCANDINAVIA IN THE POLISH HISTORIOGRAPHY, REMARKS AND REFLECTIONS

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Summary

The article outlines the achievements of the Polish historiography concerning the Nordic region, from the inter-war period to the present times. The problems dealt with are included in the two main trends of the Polish historical research concerning Scandinavian questions: the topics of Polish-Nordic relations of any kind, and the topics of the history of Scandinavia itself and of the Nordic region.

The third trend, much weaker than the two others, comprises the comparative studies concerning the social history, the history of states and cultures. Still another trend, the edition of sources to the history of the Nordic region, is hardly to be found in Polish historiography.

The article is also a review of the main centres of Scandinavian studies in Poland, both individual scholars, single historians functioning at departments of history at universities, and institutional centres of Polish Scandinavian Studies, especially the ones which carry out research into the whole region in an interdisciplinary approach: into languages, literature, culture, politics, economy and history. Some emphasis has been put on the weaknesses of the Polish research concerning the Nordic region, especially the ones resulting from the inability to use original archival materials and sources.

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At the beginning of the 1980s Maria Janion, an outstanding Polish scholar in the field of Romantic Literature, attracted the attention to the importance of the Scandinavian Middle Ages and the literature in Old Norse for Polish Romanticists, who in their artistic production drew heavily on the Nordic cultural stereotypes and the Medieval Scandinavian culture.[1] In the ideology of Romanticism medievalism was important everywhere, but for the Polish artists – as Janion writes – it constituted 'the centre of all the times and a measure of history'. The Polish Romanticists kept learning Nordic languages; even more, they studied ancient texts in Old Norse, first of all sagas and the Elder (poetic) Edda.

But it was not a poet that was the first to translate the text of Elder Edda into Polish. The translation was done – not from Old Norse but on the basis of Latin and French texts – by Joachim Lelewel, the first Polish professional historian; in 1807 he published *Edda or the Book of the Religion of Ancient Inhabitants of Scandinavia*. The interest of Lelewel, as well as other Polish historians of the second half of the 19th century, in the Nordic region was not accidental and did not result from the romantic spirit of the times. It was connected with the concepts of the genesis of the Polish people, who were linked to other peoples: the Scythians, the Goths, the Sarmatians and the Scandinavians themselves. In the mid-19th century it was Karol Szajnocha who might have come to the most extreme conclusion putting forward a theory of the so called Lechite state, according to which the first Polish state had been organised by a Scandinavian tribe of 'Lechites'. The present-day Polish Mediaevalists are still analysing the problem of the origin of Mieszko I: whether he was a stranger from the South (Moravia) or a Slav or a Viking from the North.

The above outlined problems fall into two main trends of Polish historical research into Scandinavia: the questions concerning Polish-Nordic relations in all spheres, and the history of Scandinavia and the Nordic region with hardly any references to Poland. The third trend, the least marked, is the edition of the sources for the research into the Nordic region. All these trends will be analysed from several points of view (which might lead to some repetitions) of what had been achieved by various historians in various research centres at various stages of research and in various subfields.

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[1] M. Janion, "Estetyka Średniowiecznej Północy", in: *Problemy polskiego romantyzmu. Series III*, ed. M. Żmigrodzka (Wrocław: Ossolineum 1981).

The most interesting achievements – in my opinion – of Polish historians in the field in question have been presented below; it is worth underlining that the remarks presented here do not exhaust the topic, and besides such was not the role of these randomly selected reflections. It should be emphasised that the article does not belong in the history of historiography, it is rather an essay, which does not exhaust the theme whatsoever. Several of its aspects, such as the analysis of journals and editorial series, although exceptionally important for the Polish Scandinavian studies, simply are beyond the scope of the article. Therefore, numerous petty studies published in academic journals have been hardly included here. The academic institutions, important from the point of view of their role as stimuli for research into the history of Scandinavia (e.g. the Baltic Institute in Gdańsk), and related to them editorial houses and series have been also passed over. Undoubtedly, they also deserve to be separately treated in several studies.

I'd rather attract the attention to the most interesting research areas, so far not fully explored by Polish scholars, as well as present reflections as for a further development of that section of Polish historiography. The present text should not be expected to include the bibliography of Polish academic publications concerning the Nordic region; instead, it is a subjective selection, so some names and titles might happen to be omitted. And so will be research centres affiliated to various institutes of political science and international relations (e.g. the Centre 'Norden', affiliated to the Warsaw University, or the Department of Nordic Countries, which is part of the Management and Administration Faculty of the Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, and the like). It does not mean at all that the achievements of those centres are not appreciated, just the reverse, but – like in the case of journals and series – their activities deserve to be depicted more extensively than the preliminary reflections included in this article. In principle, the publications for general public are not mentioned, either; whereas, what does matter in research work is the participation of original sources and the equally original literature in Old Norse.

The preliminary remarks may be concluded with one reservation. These deliberations cannot be aimed at indicating detailed research themes and questions. Taking into account their size, it is the task of supervisors dealing with and seminars concerning the history and culture of Scandinavia.

Even the preliminary research indicates that the problems that prevail are the ones of the first trend: the Polish-Nordic relations of any kind, including the ones dealing with the pre-war period. There are two topics here: the one concerning

diplomatic and military relations of the modern-age Poland with the Scandinavian countries (especially in the 17th century), and the one concerning the political and diplomatic questions of the partition of Poland at the end of the 18th century.

The attention should – first of all – be paid to the achievements of Władysław Konopczyński (1880–1952), one of the most outstanding Polish historians of the pre-war period, who as a research worker into the history of the Polish Commonwealth of the 18th century attracted the attention to the Scandinavian questions, first of all to the diplomatic relations of the Commonwealth with Sweden and Denmark at the time of the partitions. His achievements in that sphere made him become a member of the Swedish Academy of Literature, History and Archaeology; the Scientific Society in Lund; and the Royal Society for Publishing Sources to the History of Scandinavia in Stockholm. Among his numerous works the ones that should be mentioned are: *Polska a Szwecja* ('Poland versus Sweden'); the two-volume *Konfederacja Barska* ('The Bar Confederation'), in which Konopczyński drew heavily on the diplomatic archival materials from Stockholm; *Kwestia bałtycka do XX wieku* (1947) ('The Baltic Question up to the 20th Century'); and the posthumous edition of *Pierwszy rozbiór Polski* ('The First Partition of Poland').[2] Especially in the last work Konopczyński underlined the importance of the research conducted by Polish historians into the Polish partitions in the Swedish archives.

Władysław Czapliński, author of the only synthesis of the history of Denmark (this topic will be discussed later), paid much less attention to the Danish policy towards the Commonwealth at the time of partitions just mentioning that the Kościuszko Uprising had aroused the curiosity at the highest level in Denmark.[3] Zbigniew Anusik, a present-day research worker of the Polish-Swedish relations at the time of Stanisław August(us) Poniatowski, treated the question of Denmark's attitude towards the Polish partitions in a similar way.[4] However, it should be noted that the diplomatic sources of the Copenhagen State Archives (*Rigsarkivet*) and the Central Archives in Copenhagen (*Elementa ad fontium*

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[2] W. Konopczyński, *Polska a Szwecja; od pokoju oliwskiego do upadku Rzeczypospolitej 1660–1795* (Toruń: Instytut Bałtycki 1935); W. Konopczyński, *Konfederacja Barska*, vol. 1–2 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Kasy im. Mianowskiego – Instytut Popierania Nauki, 1936–1938); W. Konopczyński, *Kwestia bałtycka do XX wieku* (Gdańsk: Baltic Institute, 1947); W. Konopczyński, *Pierwszy rozbiór Polski* (Cracow: Arcana, 2010).

[3] W. Czapliński, K. Górski, *Historia Danii* (Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow: Ossolineum 1965), 245.

[4] Z. Anusik, *Misja polska w Sztokholmie w latach 1789–1795* (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego 1993).

editiones. Res Polonicae ex Archivo Regni Daniae)[5] are the basis for the extensive five-volume publication of the correspondence and diplomatic documents of the 16th–17th centuries.

Among the Polish scholars of the pre-war period the one that should be mentioned is Oskar Halecki (1891–1973), a research worker of the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Union (Commonwealth).[6] In his work *Dzieje unii jagiellońskiej* ('A History of the Jagiellonian Union') Halecki performs an interesting analysis, in which he compares the Scandinavian Kalmar Union to the Polish-Lithuanian Union of Krevo. Halecki's interest in the Jagiellonian foreign policy resulted in the work *Polityka skandynawska Jagiellonów* ('Scandinavian Policy of the Jagiellonians'). Such a comparative approach was to fascinate Polish historians in later years, for example Antoni Mączka (1928–2003), who in the 1970s and in the 1980s in many of his works conducted interesting and inspiring analyses of the systems of government by the gentry in Denmark and Commonwealth in the 16th and 17th centuries and of the models of nepotism functioning in both countries.[7]

Some interesting questions arise here, for example the question about the causes of diverse evolutions of the both states and their societies, and the question of what mechanisms and phenomena allowed Denmark to transform into an absolutist state with an excellent legal and political system, whereas the Commonwealth was on the decline, falling into ruin.

Denmark and Sweden, the two Nordic countries nearest to Poland and historically the closest, also in the post-war period (until 1898), are the ones that have aroused the most interest in Polish historians. The history of both the countries have been described in synthetic works; those works, although almost half a century old and incriminated by the times they were written, are still in circulation as newer works are missing; the ones concerning Denmark were written by Władysław Czapliński (1905–1981): *Dzieje Danii nowożytnej 1500–1975*[8]

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[5] *Elementa ad fontium editiones. Res Polonicae ex Archivo Regni Daniae*. Pars I collegit Leon Koczy, Pars II, II, IV, V, ediderunt Carolina Lanckorońska et Georgius Steen Jensen (Romae 1964, 1969, 1971, 1972).

[6] O. Halecki, *Dzieje unii jagiellońskiej* (Cracow: Akademia Umiejętności, 1919–1920); O. Halecki *Polityka skandynawska Jagiellonów* (Warsaw: Towarzystwo Naukowe Warszawskie, 1927).

[7] A. Mączak, *Nobility in comparative perspective* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2000); A. Mączak, *Klientela. Nieformalne struktury władzy w Polsce i Europie w XVI–XVIII w.* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, 1994/2000); A. Mączak, "Dania i Rzeczpospolita w dobie nowożytnej. Problemy i perspektywy badań porównawczych", *Zapiski Historyczne*, 47 (1982) 4.

[8] Czapliński, Górski, *Historia Danii*; W. Czapliński, *Dzieje Danii nowożytnej 1500–1975* (Warsaw: PWN, 1982).

('A History of Modern-Age Denmark') and – in cooperation with Karol Górski (1903–1988) – *Historia Danii* ('A History of Denmark'). *Historia Szwecji* ('A History of Sweden') written by Adam Kersten (1930–1983) is more modern, and it is perfectly supplemented by the work written by Ingvar Andersson *A History of Sweden* (translated into Polish by Adam Kersten).[9] Those two syntheses have been functioning in academic circulation up to the date, although in some aspects they are anachronistic, *inter alia* because the authors put too much emphasis on the traditional history of events passing over the social history and culture, especially in the anthropological sense. The series was continued with *Historia Finlandii* ('A History of Finland') written by Tadeusz Cieślak; although it includes biased interpretations of – for example – the Winter War (1939–1940), it is still an important source of knowledge on the history of Finland.[10] Cieślak also wrote a very general synthesis of the history of the whole Nordic region of the 19th and 20th centuries, the one-volume *Zarys historii najnowszej krajów skandynawskich*.[11] Tadeusz Cieślak (1917–1985) was one of the historians who in the 1970s and in the 1980s explored the history of Scandinavia and mutual relations very actively; in addition to the already mentioned syntheses he published some short collections of essays, e.g. *Szwecja: z dziejów XIX i XX wieku* (Poznań Publisher, 1969), *Norwegia: z dziejów XIX i XX wieku* (Poznań Publisher, 1970), *Polska-Skandynawia w XIX i XX wieku: szkice historyczne* (Poznań Publisher, 1973)[12]. It should be noted that Cieślak's interest in the history of Scandinavia was only a tiny part of his academic passions.

The publishing of the bulky work *Tysiąclecie polsko-skandynawskich stosunków kulturalnych* written by Kazimierz Ślaski (1912–1990) is a very important landmark in the history of the Polish Scandinavian historiography.[13] The publication, on the one hand encyclopaedic in character, on the other a kind of synthesis, not only inspired many Polish research workers to concentrate on the Polish-Nordic contacts throughout the history, but also initiated one of the most

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[9] A. Kersten, *Historia Szwecji* (Wrocław: Ossolineum 1973); I. Andersson, *Dzieje Szwecji*, transl. A. Kersten (Warsaw: PWN, 1967).

[10] T. Cieślak, *Historia Finlandii* (Wrocław: Ossolineum 1983).

[11] T. Cieślak, *Zarys historii najnowszej krajów skandynawskich* (Warsaw: PWN, 1978).

[12] T. Cieślak, *Szwecja: z dziejów XIX i XX wieku* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1969); T. Cieślak, *Norwegia: z dziejów XIX i XX wieku* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie 1970); T. Cieślak, *Polska-Skandynawia w XIX i XX wieku: szkice historyczne* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1973).

[13] K. Śląski, *Tysiąclecie polsko-skandynawskich stosunków kulturalnych* (Wrocław: Ossolineum 1977).

important topics in the Polish research into Scandinavian questions: the one of mutual relations.

Before 1989 and now the Polish research into the Nordic region has been dispersed, conducted at the Philological Faculties (e.g. in Poznań and Gdańsk), or undertaken by individual workers at the Institute of History (IH) at the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN) and other academic centres. Talking about the research centres and workers that dealt with Scandinavian questions before 1989 and in addition to the already presented Tadeusz Cieślak (IH PAN), among the ones that deserve to be mentioned is Zdzisław Grot (1903–1984), related to the Institute of History of the Adam Mickiewicz University, although his work *Pruska polityka narodowościowa w północnym Szlezwiku 1864–1920* was only a subplot of his research activity; his main area of research was the history of the Grand Duchy of Posen, and it must have led him to the topic of Schleswig and Prussia.[14] The history of Scandinavia, especially the history of Norway, is among the research areas of Janusz Małłek (his other areas of research being the modern history of Prussia and the Reformation in the Polish lands) from the Nicolaus Copernicus University (UMK) of Toruń, Karol Górski's disciple (Karol Górski was the one of the authors of *Historia Danii*). His outstanding achievements may be proved by Volume 3 of his series *Opera selecta. Skandinavica*.[15] Professor Małłek's role in the development of the Polish Scandinavian Studies will be still discussed beneath.

In turn, Bernard Piotrowski (1939–2015) was related to the Scandinavian Institute of the Adam Mickiewicz University (UAM) in Poznań, the author of such works as *Walka Norwegów o rozwiązanie unii politycznej ze Szwecją 1884–1907* ('The Struggle of the Norwegians to Dissolve their Political Union with Sweden').[16] In the case of this scholar Scandinavia was the main area of research, and among many important and revolutionary for the Polish historiography works the ones that should be mentioned deal with the process of Nordic integration, the origin of which Piotrowski saw in the Viking community: *Tradycje jedności*

[14] Z. Grot, *Pruska polityka narodowościowa w północnym Szlezwiku 1864–1920* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1967).

[15] J. Małłek, *Opera selecta, vol III. Skandinavica* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK, 2016).

[16] B. Piotrowski, *Walka Norwegów o rozwiązanie unii politycznej ze Szwecją 1884–1907* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 1974).

Skandynawii: od mitu wikińskiego do idei nordyckiej and *Integracja Skandynawii: od Rady Nordyckiej do wspólnoty europejskiej*.[17]

Many interesting observations may be made looking at particular academic centres. What is seen is the fact that individual research areas are consequently attributed to them, which makes the activities of Polish academic institutes in the sphere of the Scandinavian studies be marked clearly on the map of the Polish historiography of the Nordic countries. It goes without saying that the above mentioned centres are teaching centres, among other things of Scandinavian languages, which results in Master, Doctoral and Habilitation dissertations. One of the oldest institutions of that type – and the very few (sic) – is the Faculty of History of UMK in Toruń, which comprises several institutes, one of them is the Institute of History and Archival Studies, which in turn comprises some basic structural units, and one of them is the Unit of the History of the Baltic Countries. In the 1960s Tadeusz Małłek, inspired by Karol Górski, began research into the history of Scandinavia. The first structural units where the modern history of the Nordic countries was investigated were created in the Toruń University on the initiative of Janusz Małłek, and so were the first (Master and Doctoral) seminars. After numerous changes in its name the present Unit of the History of the Baltic Countries deals with the research areas of the Scandinavian countries of various periods. Among the people that should be mentioned here is Emilia Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, who within the Toruń University (namely, within the Institute of Scandinavian Studies and Applied Linguistics) has created an important milieu of people (Masters, doctors), who are carrying out research into the political and social history of Norway of the 20th century. E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak belongs to the historians who conduct research into the history of Norway during the Second World War and into the Polish emigration to that country. Contrary to many authors who have been publishing works concerning the years 1940–1945 on the basis of Anglo-Saxon sources and literature, E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak refers to original sources, including the archival sources in the Norwegian archives.[18] A kind of review of the academic production of the young historians from the

[17] B. Piotrowski, *Tradycje jedności Skandynawii: od mitu wikińskiego do idei nordyckiej* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 2006); B. Piotrowski, *Integracja Skandynawii: od Rady Nordyckiej do wspólnoty europejskiej* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 2006).

[18] E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, *Polska siła robocza w Organizacji Todta w Norwegii i Finlandii w latach 1941–1945* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo UMK, 1999); E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, "Norwegia na drodze dylematów i przemian 1945–1949", *Roczniki Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu* (1992).

milieu created by E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak is a collection of studies edited by her, entitled *Norwegia w I połowie XX wieku*[19].

The second academic centre where an interesting milieu is *in statu nascendi* is the group of historians at the Gdańsk University. Gabriela Majewska,[20] a research worker specialising in the modern-age history of Sweden and the Polish-Swedish relations of the same time, is related to the Faculty of History; Arnold Kłonczyński, a historian exploring the history of the 20th century, first of all of Sweden (economy, the Polish emigration)[21]. At Polish universities cooperation between institutes is a rare phenomenon, but the Institute of History and the Institute of Scandinavian Studies have established it. The scope of the cooperation exceeds regular teaching and research in the philological sphere, and approaches the discipline which is called Regional Studies including culture, politics, society and history of the Nordic states. Such a programme of teaching and research has been set up by the founders of the Gdańsk Scandinavian Studies, the two outstanding scholars and experts in the history of culture of the Scandinavian countries and the mutual Polish-Nordic relations: Jan Szymański (1941–2007) and Zenon Ciesielski. Jan Szymański initiated an important trend in historical research, focusing on the Polish-Scandinavian economic relations, now continued by – *inter alios* – Bolesław Hajduk (see beneath) and many other young scholars from Szczecin and Gdańsk[22]. Among numerous publications written by Z. Ciesielski, concerning the Polish-Scandinavian cultural relations there is one that attracts a lot of attention: his *opus magnum*, over a thousand pages of the two-volume *Dzieje kultury skandynawskiej*, and the famous anthology *Skandynawia w oczach Polaków*, often quoted and an inspiration to next generations.[23] What the private library of each scholar

[19] E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, ed. *Norwegia w I połowie XX wieku* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo UMK, 2004).

[20] G. Majewska, *Polityka handlowa Szwecji w latach 1720–1809* (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1991); G. Majewska, *Szwecja: kraj, ludzie rządy w polskiej opinii drugiej połowy XVIII wieku* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo UG, 2004).

[21] A. Kłonczyński, *Stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1945–1956* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo UG, 2007); A. Kłonczyński, *„My w Szwecji nie porastamy mchem…": emigranci z Polski w Szwecji w latach 1945–1980* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo UG, 2012).

[22] J. Szymański, *Stosunki gospodarcze Polski z Norwegią w latach 1918–1929* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo UG, 2005); J. Szymański, *Stosunki gospodarcze Polski ze Szwecją 1919–1939* (Gdańsk: Gdańskie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1978); J. Szymański, *Polsko-skandynawska współpraca w zakresie żeglugi w okresie międzywojennym 1919–1939* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo UG, 1988).

[23] Z. Ciesielski, *Dzieje kultury skandynawskiej*, vol. 1–2 (Gdańsk: Marpress, 2016); Z. Ciesielski, introduction, selection, ed., *Skandynawia w oczach Polaków* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1974).

specialising in Scandinavian Studies, philologist or historian, cannot be missing is *Słownik pisarzy skandynawskich* edited by Z. Ciesielski.[24]

The third teaching and research centre is being created in the Institute of History and International Relations of the Szczecin University, where the Scandinavian research is coordinated by Bolesław Hajduk. The research scope includes first of all the socio-economic history of the 20th-century Scandinavia, the mutual Polish-Scandinavian commercial relations, as well as the Polish emigration to the Nordic countries. B. Hajduk has been publishing the results of his research in series of articles concerning, *inter alia*, the economic Polish-Scandinavian contacts, especially the Polish-Danish and the Polish-Norwegian ones.[25]

It is worth reminding the figure of Leszek Słupecki, working at the Rzeszów University at the Unit of Medieval History and Nordic Studies of the Faculty of Sociology and History,[26] which like many other centres of this kind gathers young seminar students.

In addition to these clearly defined research centres, on the map of the Polish Scandinavian historiography there are names of individual research workers, who function in various academic milieux and in various research fields. The historians whose universities run Scandinavian studies are in a much better situation, as such universities can easily start seminars and language courses, which is the case of the Jagiellonian University, where research into the modern history of Sweden is conducted by Wojciech Krawczuk,[27] or the Szczecin University and the Gdańsk University. Such cooperation is usually fruitful, especially if – e.g. in Gdańsk and in Szczecin – the studies exceed the framework of philology and are enriched with economic, legal and political questions.

On the other hand, the historians who carry out research without any basis of Scandinavian Studies are in much worse situation; modest and simple language course do not guarantee inflows of students. What comes as a surprise is the fact that the Warsaw University, the biggest Polish university, does not have any unit

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[24] Z. Ciesielski, ed. *Słownik pisarzy skandynawskich* (Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 1991).

[25] "Inter alia: Economic Relations Between Poland and Norway", *Studia Maritima* 22 (2009); "Norwegia w pierwszej połowie XX wieku", *Nautologia* 143 (2006); *Polskie uchodźstwo niepodległościowe w Skandynawii w latach 1945–1989*, in: *Zakończenie II wojny światowej – polityka i dyplomacja międzynarodowa 1945–2005*, ed. M. Nurek (Gdańsk: Fundacja Rozwoju UG, 2006).

[26] L. Słupecki, *Wyrocznie i wróżby pogańskich Skandynawów: studium do dziejów idei przeznaczenia u ludów indoeuropejskich* (Warsaw: Instytut Archeologii i Etnologii PAN, 1998); L. Słupecki, *Mitologia skandynawska w epoce wikingów* (Cracow: Zakład Wydawniczy „Nomos", 2003).

[27] W. Krawczuk, *Samuel Pufendorf and some stories of the Northern War 1655–1660* (Cracow: Jagiellonian University Press, 2014).

dealing with Scandinavian Studies in its organisational structure (with the exception of a straightforward language course in the School of Foreign Languages). The author of the present article functions in such a space (the Institute of History).

Let us have a look at the achievements of Polish historians dealing with Scandinavian questions from the above mentioned academic centres from a different point of view: of their specialisation (some repetitions will be necessary). Which disciplines dominate? Which specialisations and periods are the most popular ones? And what are the weaknesses of the Polish Scandinavian historiography? It goes without saying that the most explored period are the Middle Ages. The Nordic Middle Ages in Polish research is first of all the one into their earliest parts, i.e. the ones of Vikings and Old Norse. L. Słupecki has already been mentioned, equally important has been the research of Jakub Morawiec from the Silesian University, who concentrates on sagas and skalds' poetry.[28] Additionally, there are numerous editions of sagas and the poetic Edda launched by small and unknown publishers, which are deprived of any professional apparatus and as a result their academic value is doubtful. In any case, they prove the tremendous popularity of the Viking period in Poland. The tradition in Polish historical research initiated still in the inter-war period (Władysław Konopczyński, Adam Szelągowski) has been its concentration on the modern-age times. And whereas the older scholars – and also some of the post-war period, like A. Kersten – were interested mainly in Polish-Scandinavian relations (especially the Polish-Swedish ones) from the period of *'Potop'*, i.e. the Polish-Swedish War of the years 1655–1660, the present-day historians concentrate mainly on the strictly Scandinavian questions. For many years Janusz Małłek has been conducting interesting research into the history of Reformation and religion, and the Polish-Nordic diplomatic and cultural relations, recently gathered in the above mentioned *Opera selecta*.[29] Zbigniew Anusik, a historian from the Łódz University carries out research into the modern history of Sweden, and – on the one hand – explores the problems of the Swedish diplomacy in the 17th–18th centuries, and on the other he is the author of important

[28] J. Morawiec, *Między poezją a polityką: rozgrywki polityczne w Skandynawii XI wieku w świetle ówczesnych skaldów* (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2016); J. Morawiec, *Knut Wielki, król Anglii, Danii i Norwegii (ok. 955–1035)* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo „Avalon", 2013); J. Morawiec, *Norwegia*. Series „Początki państw" (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2017).

[29] Małłek, *Opera selecta.*

biographies of the Swedish monarchs of the Absolutist Sweden.[30] The Absolutist Sweden is also the area of interest of the above mentioned historian from the Gdańsk University, Gabriela Majewska.

In addition to those traditional problems and equally traditional approach, there has appeared an interesting and completely new trend in research into the history of culture and ideas of the Nordic countries in modern times, with new research methods. The scholar that should be mentioned here is Krystyna Szelągowska from the Białystok University; her watershed works concerning the shaping of the national awareness of the Norwegians from the 17th–18th centuries were enthusiastically received in Norway.[31] K. Szelągowska is also the author of the biography of Ludwig Holberg, an outstanding figure of the Scandinavian Enlightenment; it was the first biography of that figure published in Poland.[32] Another historian concentrated on the modern-age period in Scandinavia is Maria Sibińska from the Institute of Scandinavian Studies of the Gdańsk University; she continues the trend initiated by the founders of the Institute; the trend consists in combining history with research into culture and literature; she focuses her academic interest on the history of theatre of the Enlightenment and of later epochs.[33]

Polish historians devote relatively a small amount of time to the 19th century; it might be caused by the fact that there were no important relations between the Nordic countries and the Polish lands under the rule of the partitioners. Tiny collections of essays written by T. Cieślak (cf. Footnote 12) and by Z. Grot (cf. Footnote 14) have already been mentioned. In the 1980s Jadwiga Wróblewska analysed the attitude of Sweden towards the January Uprising, at the same time raising the question of the Nordic unionism, the Scandinavism.[34] That question was discussed more extensively by the author of this article, where she based her

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[30] Z. Anusik, *Dyplomacja szwedzka wobec kryzysu monarchii we Francji w latach 1787–1792* (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2000); Z. Anusik, *Gustaw II Adolf* (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1996); Z. Anusik, *Karol XII* (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 2006).

[31] K. Szelągowska, *inter alia „My Norwegowie". Tożsamość narodowa norweskich elit w czasach nowożytnych* (Cracow: Avalon, 2011) (the book available also in the English translation at: http://repcyfr.pl/dlibra/docmetadata?id=8222&from=publication&).

[32] K. Szelągowska, *Ludvig Holberg: uczony, pisarz, prześmiewca* (Białystok: Instytut Badań nad Dziedzictwem Kulturowym Europy, 2014).

[33] M. Sibińska, *Skandynawski wiek świateł. Doświadczenia teatralne Ludviga Holberga* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2011); *Ludvig Holberg: na tropach wspólnej tożsamości europejskiej* (Gdańsk: Fundacja Rozwoju Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2005).

[34] J. Wróblewska, *Szwecja wobec powstania styczniowego* (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1986).

conclusions on the archival sources and the 19th-century prints.[35] The 19th century has also been explored by Michalina Petelska, who examines the literary legacy of Georg Brandes.[36] It should be expected that in the future she will not restrict herself to mutual relations, but she will try to look at the social and cultural phenomenon of Brandes in the context of the 19th-century Danish and Norwegian culture.

On the other side of the temporal axis there is an abundant literature, and for a few decades a literature devoted to the history of the Nordic region during the Second World War, with a special emphasis on the Polish episode, i.e. the battles of Narvik. And here again in addition to the academic works meeting the standards of professional academic research, there are publications that are of much worse quality. One of the first such works was the profusely documented book entitled *Ruch oporu w Danii 1940–1945* written by Władysław Czapliński.[37] The opposite extreme is represented by a publication with a bibliography which includes hundreds of titles, but only two in Scandinavian languages; there is not a single memoir written by a Scandinavian participant in the war, and among the archival materials there are only lists of the Polish envoys to the Nordic capitals. The author of the publication in question seems not to know the latest (I mean the works of the last 25 years!) studies concerning the Second World War, which were launched in the Nordic countries, especially in Norway.[38]

The modern times traditionally arouse the most interest, which is visible in the case of the above mentioned E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak and her disciples. The diplomacy of the war period is the area of interest of Paweł Jaworski from the Wrocław University (which will be discussed further). The scope of problems concerning that period has become much wider now, and there are prospects for Polish scholars to write innumerable works, especially concerning controversial topics, such as the question of collaboration (with the Germans during the war), the children of the Wehrmacht's soldiers, the *Lebensborn* action, the participation of Danish and Norwegian volunteers in the German military structures, e.g.

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[35] G. Szelągowska, *Idea zjednoczonej Północy w skandynawskim ruchu studenckim w I połowie XIX wieku* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1992); G. Szelągowska, *Poddany i obywatel. Stowarzyszenia społeczne w Danii w dobie transformacji ustrojowej* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo DiG, 2002).

[36] M. Petelska, *Georg Brandes i Polacy czyli o fenomenie wzajemnego zainteresowania z Polską w tle* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2017).

[37] W. Czapliński, *Ruch oporu w Danii 1940–1945* (Wrocław: Ossolineum 1973).

[38] T. Konecki, *Skandynawia w Drugiej Wojnie Światowej* (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 2003).

during the Warsaw Uprising. Investigating those problems from the Polish point of view would be extremely interesting.

Another research area, intensively explored, is the inter-war period, especially the Polish-Nordic bilateral relations. The economic contacts have already been discussed in the context of the specialisation of the Szczecin centre. In addition to that trend, research into the diplomatic inter-war and wartime relations has been thriving for the last fifteen or so years, especially in Wrocław. The most interesting achievements in that aspect present a work written by Paweł Jaworski, concerning the Polish-Swedish relation in the years 1939–1945, and a synthesis of the Polish-Scandinavian relations in the years 1918–1939.[39] Both works deserve attention not only because of the author's approach to the topic, but also on account of a rich use of Swedish, Polish and British sources of various kinds, such as archival materials, press excerpts, memoirs, etc. The synthesis of the history of Denmark of the 20th and 21st centuries written by the author of the present article may be included in the historiography of the modern times, too.[40]

In the historiography concerning the history of Scandinavia there is still another trend, less noticeable but worth presenting: the critical edition of sources. The publications of the oldest texts – chronicles, sagas, Eddas – have a long tradition in Poland, dating back to the epoch of the Romanticism. Not all of those editions are equally valuable, but the translations produced by Apolonia Załuska-Strömberg should be mentioned; she translated the Elder (poetic) Edda and a few sagas.[41] Another interesting editorial initiative was made at the Jagiellonian University, where several works, critically edited, concerning modern Scandinavia (especially Sweden) were published thanks to Wojciech Krawczuk (and in his translation), thus initiating editorial series,[42] *inter alia* the monumental *Seven Books about the Deeds of Carl Gustav, the Kind of Sweden (Siedem ksiąg o czynach Karola Gustawa, króla Szwecji)* by Samuel Pufendorf; without that position any bibliography will be incomplete.[43]

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[39] P. Jaworski, *Polska niepodległa wobec Skandynawii 1918–1939* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2001); P. Jaworski, *Marzyciele i oportuniści. Stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1939–1945* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego i IPN, 2009).

[40] G. Szelągowska, *Dania w XX i XXI wieku* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo TRIO, 2010).

[41] A. Załuska-Strömberg, transl., *Saga rodu z Laxdalu* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1973); A. Załuska-Strömberg, transl., *Saga o Egilu* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1974); A. Załuska-Strömberg, transl., *Edda poetycka* (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1986).

[42] Źródła do dziejów relacji polsko-szwedzkich Series (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Eternum).

[43] S. Pufendorf, *Siedem ksiąg o czynach Karola Gustawa, króla Szwecji*, transl., ed. W. Krawczuk (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo DiG, 2013).

The above reflections are just an outline of the Polish historiography concerning the history of the Nordic region. It is not difficult to notice that dominating element are the Polish-Scandinavian cultural, economic and diplomatic relations. Undoubtedly, they are important and they constitute an essential part of our knowledge about that region. Yet, the basic task of Polish historians dealing with Scandinavia is – in my opinion – to include in the Polish academic discourse the knowledge not only about the Polish-Nordic contacts, but also about the Scandinavian countries themselves and their history, as well as to popularise it. The above mentioned syntheses are half a century or so old, but they are still included in the bibliographies of the latest works; they are outdated and obsolete (there are new works, but not fully successful[44]). Undoubtedly, the impressive work by Z. Ciesielski concerning the history of the Scandinavian culture (Footnote 23) belongs to the latest achievements. It is advisable that Polish historian join in the academic discussions taking place at the Scandinavian universities on the Second World War or specific historical experiences of particular countries (e.g. Sweden during WW2, the colonial past of Denmark, the participation of Danish and Norwegian volunteers in the military structures of the Third Reich).

And the last question. In spite of many various conferences, especially the cyclic ones (Gdańsk plays an important role here), regular meetings are still missing, which might become a place to exchange ideas and experiences, but first of all a platform of integration and a meeting point for scholars from different centres, the centres of history and the ones of Scandinavian Studies.

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[44] B. Szordykowska, *Historia Finlandii* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo TRIO, 2011); cf.: review of Ł. Sommer, *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 120 (2013) 3.

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DZIEJE SKANDYNAWII W POLSKIEJ HISTORIOGRAFII WSPÓŁCZESNEJ – UWAGI I REFLEKSJE

Słowa kluczowe: dzieje Skandynawii w Polsce, skandynawiści polscy, historycy polscy

Abstrakt

W artykule przedstawiono w ogólnym zarysie historyczne dokonania polskiej historiografii dziejów regionu nordyckiego – począwszy od okresu międzywojennego po czasy współczesne. Powyższa problematyka mieści się w dwóch głównych nurtach polskich historycznych badań skandynawistycznych – podejmowania tematów wskazujących na polsko-nordyckie relacje we wszelkich zakresach, oraz skupianie się na dziejach Skandynawii i regionu nordyckiego. Trzecim nurtem, najsłabiej zaznaczonym, jest w sposób nowoczesny ujęta komparatystyka w odniesieniu do historii społecznej, dziejów państw i kultury. W minimalnym zakresie występuje w polskiej historiografii edycja źródeł do dziejów regionu nordyckiego. Artykuł stanowi jednocześnie przegląd aktywności głównych ośrodków badań skandynawistycznych w Polsce, zarówno pojedynczych badaczy-historyków funkcjonujących samodzielnie w poszczególnych uniwersytetach i wydziałach historycznych, jak i centrów polskiej skandynawistyki, zwłaszcza takich, które obejmują swymi badaniami studia nad całym regionem w ujęciu interdyscyplinarnym: nad językiem, literaturą, kulturą, polityką, gospodarką i historią. W artykule zwraca się także uwagę na słabości polskich badań nad dziejami regionu nordyckiego, co wynika przede wszystkim z wielu uwarunkowań, a także z niemożności wykorzystania oryginalnych zasobów archiwalnych i źródłowych.