

UNIwersYTET SZCZECIŃSKI



STUDIA MARITIMA

VOLUME XXXV

2022

Redakcja naukowa Adam Makowski

Rada Naukowa

Andrzej Groth (Gdynia), Bolesław Hajduk (Szczecin–Gdańsk)
Adam Makowski (Szczecin), Jens E. Olesen (Greifswald), Raimo Pullat (Tallinn)
Jacek Wijaczka (Toruń), Eugeniusz Kruszewski (Kopenhaga)

Komitet Redakcyjny

Adam Makowski (redaktor naczelny), Jörg Hackmann (zastępca redaktora naczelnego)
Renata Nowaczewska (sekretarz redakcji)

Redaktor tomu

Adam Makowski

Redakcja językowa i korekta

Renata Nowaczewska

Projekt okładki

Joanna Dubois-Mosora

Skład

Joanna Dubois-Mosora

Adres Redakcji

Uniwersytet Szczeciński
Instytut Historyczny
PL 71-017 Szczecin, ul. Krakowska 71-79
e-mail: redakcja.sm@usz.edu.pl

Lista recenzentów jest dostępna na stronie: www.wnus.edu.pl/sm

Wersja elektroniczna czasopisma: www.smp.am.szczecin.pl

Wersja papierowa jest wersją pierwotną

Streszczenia lub pełne wersje opublikowanych artykułów są dostępne online w bazach danych:
Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ) European Reference Index for the Humanities and
Social Science (ERIH PLUS) Central and Eastern European Online Library (CEEOL) Central
European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (CEJSH) oraz z BazHum

© Copyright Uniwersytet Szczeciński 2022

ISSN (print) 0137-3587 ISSN (online) 2353-303X

WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU SZCZECIŃSKIEGO

Nakład 71 egz. Ark. wyd. 23,0. Ark. druk. 18,1. Format B5.

SPIS TREŚCI / CONTENTS

Marek Smoliński

Wends/Slavs/Pomeranians as Allies Of Margraves of Brandenburg In 1229.
Voice in the Discussion on Political Alliances of the Rulers of West Pomerania
in the 1220's 5

Piotr Nykiel

Intruder in the Harem, or Captain Martin Eric Nasmith's Oriental Adventures 41

Jordan Siemianowski

The Circumstances of the Establishment of "Żegluga Polska" in 1926..... 85

Jarosław Drozd

Establishment and Activity of the Jewish Marine School for Officers
in Civitavecchia (1934–1938) in the Pages of the Revisionist Zionist Press..... 113

Maciej Franz

An Unknown Account of the September Engagements Fought by ORP "Wicher" ... 135

Wojciech Wichert

Nazi Indoctrination of the Kriegsmarine and its Relations with the NSDAP
in the Years 1935–1945 – Outline of Subject Matter 159

Bolesław Hajduk

Administration and Operation of Commercial Seaports in Gdańsk and Gdynia
During the Second World War 189

Anna Szczepańska-Dudziak

Szczecin as the Home Port for Inland Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak Presence
in Szczecin from 1945–1989 205

Jacek Buko, Tomasz Norek, Iwona Windekilde

Gas Supplies by Sea and Biogas as Elements of Ensuring Energy Security:
The Example of Poland 245

Recenzje/Reviews

Karol Łopatecki

The Results of the Dynastic War in Sweden (1597–1660): Swedish and Finnish Refugees..... 271

Życie naukowe / Academic Chronicle

“Baltic Ports. Exchange, Conflicts, Entanglements” / “Bałtyckie miasta portowe. Wymiana, konflikty, historia powiązana,” Kulice, 24–26 March 2022 283

“Sustainable Development and Innovations in Space. E-economy” / “Zrównoważony rozwój a innowacje w przestrzeni. E-gospodarka,” Szczecin-Copenhagen, 28–30 September 2022 287



Marek Smoliński

Institute of History
University of Gdańsk
mszczuj1294@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0003-1231-6531

Wends/Slavs/Pomeranians as Allies of the Margraves of Brandenburg in 1229. Voice in the Discussion on Political Alliances of the Rulers of West Pomerania in the 1220's

Keywords: Wends, Slavs, Pomeranians, Brandenburg, West Pomerania, Margraves of Brandenburg John I and Otto III, Archbishop of Magdeburg Albert II von Käfernburg, Dukes of Pomerania Wartislaw III and Barnim I, Duke Otto the Child of Brunswick-Lüneburg

The goals of the present paper are: 1) to attempt and verify the hypothesis of Pomeranian-armed aid provided to the Brandenburg Margraves in 1229, formulated in the literature on the subject, 2) to indicate the existence of a political alliance between the Ascanians and Griffins, which would fully explain this aid. The first of the assumptions made was based on the analysis of narrative sources that mentioned the military cooperation of the Brandenburg Margraves with the Wends / Slavs. The second assumption required recalling some facts from the history of the policies pursued towards their neighbours by the Margraves of Brandenburg and West Pomeranian Dukes in the 20's of the 13th century. One should also note a certain similarity of the fate of the under-age rulers of Brandenburg (John I and Otto III) and the Dukes of the House of Griffin (Wartislaw III and Barnim I). The policy of the regents watching over the representatives of both dynasties before 1225, when they gradually began to come of age (John I or Wartislaw III), was characterised by a high degree of caution in external relations.

In 1229, the Brandenburg Margraves John I and Otto III took an armed action against the Archbishop of Magdeburg, Albert II von Käfernburg. Most likely in the summer of this year there was a battle between the troops of the Margraves and the

Archbishop on the River Plane (not far from Magdeburg).¹ Medieval narrative sources, whose authors were interested in the history of the broadly understood Saxony, the Archbishopric of Magdeburg and the March of Brandenburg, informed about the fights between the Margraves and the Archbishop. Bearing in mind the chronology of writing or editing the above-mentioned sources, four chronicles should be mentioned. The first one is the so-called *Saxon World Chronicle* (*Sächsische Weltchronik*). Information about the battle is contained in its oldest part. It was written down in the Magdeburg circle, probably around 1230. In the past, it was assumed that its author was a well-known German jurist, Eike von Repgow. Contemporary research has undermined, though probably not ultimately ruled out, the hypothesis about his authorship. The aforementioned chronicle was written in Low German.² The second narrative source is

-
- 1 Christian Wilhelm Spieker, Part 1 (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1839), 534–535; Ferdinand Voigt, “Über das Alter der Markgrafen Johann I. und Otto III. und ihre Familien,” *Märkische Forschungen* 9 (1865): 116–117; Julius Hartung, “Die Territorialpolitik der Magdeburger Erzbischöfe Wichmann, Ludolf und Albrecht, 1152–1232,” *Geschichtsblätter für Stadt und Land Magdeburg* 21 (1886): 234; Alfred Bauch, *Markgrafen Johann I. und Otto III. von Brandenburg: Reichslegat Gebhard von Arnstein, ein Brandenburger im Dienste Kaiser Friedrichs II. Die Wahl Richards von Cornwall zum römischen König* (Breslau: Verlag von Eduard Trewendt, 1886), 18, note 1; Hermann Brosien, *Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg im Mittelalter* (Salzwasser Verlag GmbH: Paderborn, 2015, Nachdruck des Originals von 1887), 66; Georg Sello, *Markgraf Otto III. von Brandenburg* (Brandenburg: J. Wiesicke’s Buchdruckerei, 1887), 4–5; Georg Sello, “Die Erwerbung des Barnim und Teltow durch die Markgrafen Johann I. und Otto III.,” *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte* 5 (1892) 2: 297; Siegfried Passow, “Die Occupation und Kolonisation des Barnim,” *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte* 14 (1902): 41–42, note 1; Hans Silberborth, “Erzbischof Albrecht II. von Magdeburg,” *Geschichtsblätter für Stadt und Land Magdeburg* 45 (1910): 214; Johannes Schultze, *Die Mark Brandenburg*, vol. 1 of *Entstehung und Entwicklung unter den askanischen Markgrafen (bis 1319)* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1961), 139; Wienfried Schich, “Zur Genese der Stadtanlage der Altstadt und Neustadt Brandenburg,” in: *Beiträge zur Entstehung und Entwicklung der Stadt Brandenburg im Mittelalter*, hrsg. v. Wienfried Schich (Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin, 84) (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1993), 70; Jerzy Hauziński, “Uniwersalistyczny kontekst aktu raweńskiego w sprawie Pomorza,” in: *Pomorze słowiańskie i jego sąsiedzi X–XI w.*, ed. Jerzy Hauziński (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo “Marpress,” 1995), 129; Edward Rymar, “Międzynarodowy kontekst genezy przywileju raweńskiego w sprawie lenna pomorskiego ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem roli arcybiskupstwa magdeburckiego,” in: *Polska, Prusy, Ruś. Studia ofiarowane prof. zw. dr. hab. Janowi Powierskiemu w trzydziestelecie pracy naukowej* (Gdańskie Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza 2), ed. Błażej Śliwiński (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo “Marpress,” 1995), 142–143; Edward Rymar, “Termin i okoliczności utraty i rezygnacji księstwa pomorskiego z ziem barnimskiej, teltowskiej i południowej ziemi wkrzańskiej (1180–1230),” *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza* 19 (2015): 163–164. The author spoke in a similar vein in the biography of the Pomeranian Duke Barnim I, which is being prepared for publication. I would like to thank Professor Rymar for this information. See also Marek Smoliński, *Polityka zachodnia księcia gdańsko-pomorskiego Świętopelka* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Oficyna Ferberiana, 2000), 65. The author decided not to refer to entries of a dictionary nature concerning both the Margraves of Brandenburg and the Archbishop of Magdeburg, Albert II.
- 2 Jürgen Wolf, *Die sächsische Weltchronik im Spiegel ihrer Handschriften Überlieferung, Textentwicklung, Rezeption* (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1997), 110, 194, 204, 374. For more information on the doubts regarding the authorship of the first part of the chronicle, see: Hubert Herkommer, “Eike von Repgows «Sachsenspiegel» und die «Sächsische Weltchronik»,” *Jahrbuch des Vereins für Niederdeutsche Sprachforschung* 100 (1977): 7–42; Manfred Zips, “«Daz ist des van Repegouwe rat».

the so-called *Chronicle of the Dukes of Saxony* (*Chronica principum Saxoniae*). To put it simply, it is the first part of the *Chronicle of the Margraves of Brandenburg*.³ The third chronicle referring to the above-mentioned events is the *Deeds of the Archbishops of Magdeburg* (*Gesta Archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensium*) covering the years 968–1513. For some time this source has been called the *Chronicle of the Bishops of Magdeburg* in historiography⁴. Due to the broader description of the battle in its pages, it seems to be of particular importance for this topic. The description of the Battle of the Plane can be found here in the part covering the years 1150–1280. This part was probably edited at the beginning of the 14th century.⁵ The details of the description of the clash of the armies of the Brandenburg Margraves and the Archbishop suggest that the knowledge contained in the *Gesta Archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensium* must have been based on some previous source or living memory of these events kept in the circle of the Magdeburg archbishops. The above accounts were compiled within a relatively short time after the described events took place. For this reason, the authors of the discussed accounts were quite well-versed in the causes and course of the Brandenburg-Magdeburg conflict.

The circumstances and the course of the dispute between the Margraves of Brandenburg John I and Otto III with the Archbishop of Magdeburg Albert II in 1229 have been discussed relatively often in the literature on the subject.⁶ Historians have devoted much less space to the matter of Wendish or Slavic troops supporting the army of the Margraves of Brandenburg. Georg Sello, Siegfried Passow and Edward Rymar spoke the most about this matter. All the mentioned researchers concluded that the Brandenburg Ascanians were supported by Pomeranians in the clash on the River

Bemerkungen zur Verfasserfrage der «Sächsischen Weltchronik», *Jahrbuch des Vereins für Niederdeutsche Sprachforschung* 106 (1983): 43–73.

- 3 Oswald Holder-Egger, “Über die Braunschweiger und Sächsische Fürstenchronik und verwandte Quellen,” *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde* 17 (1892): 172.
- 4 Michale Kleinen, “Die Magdeburger Bischofschronik als Quelle für den Historiker,” in: *Magdeburger Bischofschronik*, hrsg. v. Eckhart Wilhelm Peters, translated by Hermann Michaëlis (Dößel: Verlag Janos Stekovics, 2006), 33–60. See Ludwig Weiland, hrsg. v., “Sächsische Weltchronik,” in: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Deutsch Chroniken*, Vol. 2 (Hannoverae: Hahnsche Buchhandlung 1887): 248; Oswald Holder-Egger, hrsg. v., “Chronica principum Saxoniae,” in: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptorum* (hereinafter: MGH SS), vol. 25 (Hannoverae: impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Haniani 1888), 478; Wilhelm Schum, hrsg. v., “Gesta archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensium,” in: MGH SS, vol. 25 (Hannoverae: impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Haniani 1883), 421; Georg Sello, hrsg. v., “Chronica Marchionum Brandenburgensium. Nach einer Handschrift der Trierer Stadtbibliothek und den Excerpten des Pulkawa,” *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte* 1 (1888): 121; Hermann Krabbo, Georg Winter, bearb., *Regesten der Markgrafen von Brandenburg aus askanischem Hause*, Lief. 1–12 (hereinafter: *Regesten*) (Leipzig et al.: Verlag von Duncker & Humblod, Selbstverlage des Vereins Geschäftsstelle Berlin-Dahlem, Selbstverlag für Geschichte des Mark Brandenburg, 1910–1955), 598.
- 5 Kleinen, “Die Magdeburger Bischofschronik,” 51.
- 6 See the literature from note 1.

Plane.⁷ However, which part of Pomerania the units supporting the Margraves were to come from was already a subject of discussion among the aforementioned historians. Sello concluded that the Ascanians were aided by both Pomeranian Dukes. They shared then an alliance with the Margraves. A testimony to this was the help given by the Margraves to Duke Otto the Child of Lüneburg. He was an opponent of the Hohenstaufen in the Reich, and at the same time brother-in-law of the Margraves of Brandenburg John I and Otto III. He was also closely related to the Danish King Valdemar II. The Duke's mother was Helena of Denmark, daughter of King Valdemar I. Sello also rightly drew attention to the Pomeranian-Danish dynastic relations. He pointed to the marriage of the Pomeranian Duke Casimir II and Ingardis from Scandinavia. He also recalled the later marriage of John I, Margrave of Brandenburg, with Sophia, the daughter of Valdemar II of Denmark. The attention of the cited researcher was also attracted by Barnim I's journeys to Spandau in Brandenburg, which began as early as 1232. The quoted historian did not disregard the rights of the Ascanians to the land of Barnim, preserved in existent sources. According to Sello, this meant an earlier hand-over by the Pomeranian rulers to the margraves of the disputed territories between Pomerania and the March.⁸

Passow, searching for the date of the conquest of the Barnim land by the Brandenburg margraves, preceded his argument with a reflection on the Brandenburg-Pomeranian relations during the times of the Margraves Otto II and Albert II. According to Passow, after 1198, the land of Barnim was to become the property of the Brandenburg Ascanians. It was owned by the sons of Albert II: John and Otto. It was from there that the Slavic detachment was recruited, which assisted the Brandenburg Ascanians in the war with the Archbishop of Magdeburg. These events were, of course, associated with the then functioning peace or even an alliance linking the March of Brandenburg and Pomerania.⁹

Rymar believed that the Duke supporting John I and Otto III was Barnim I. The basis for this conclusion was the strive of Barnim I to maintain control over the southern territories of the Duchy of Pomerania, demonstrated by the quoted historian. The background of the alliance was the war of the Pomeranian Dukes with Denmark, Rügen and Mecklenburg, which, according to Rymar, began as early as 1228.¹⁰ As a result of this alliance, Barnim I gave up his claims to parts of the land of Teltow and all of Barnim, which had been annexed to the March of Brandenburg earlier (before the reign of John I and Otto III).

7 Sello, "Die Erwerbung," 297; Passow, "Die Occupation," 41–42, note 1; Rymar, "Termin," 163–164.

8 Sello, "Die Erwerbung," 297.

9 Passow, "Die Occupation," 41–42, note 1; see Rymar, "Termin," 163–164.

10 Rymar, "Termin," 163–164.

The hypothesis pointing to Pomeranians as allies of John I and Otto III in 1229 seems correct. However, it was not preceded by wider research conducted towards the possibility of identifying the Slavs or the Wends known from the German chronicles with the populations of specific Slav-inhabited territories. Hence, doubts may still arise in this respect. The basis of the assumption that the Pomeranians were the allies of the Margraves in 1229 was the hypothetical identification of the Ascanian allies with the subjects of the Griffin princes. This conclusion resulted mainly from the analysis of the political situation in West Pomerania and the Brandenburg March at the end of the 1220's.¹¹

It seems that not only research into the policies of the rulers of Brandenburg and Pomerania supports the identification of the Slavic troops from the Battle of the Plane with the Pomeranians. There are clear premises for this in the sources as well. So far, historians have not devoted enough attention to them separately. In order to point them out, one needs to start with the *Saxon World Chronicle* and compare its relation with fragments of the *Deeds of the Archbishops of Magdeburg*. The first chronicle laconically stated that [in 1229 – MS] near Brandenburg there was a clash between the Margraves and the Archbishop of Brandenburg. The Margraves emerged without a victory from it, hence they actually lost it. In this battle, the Ascanians and apparently the Wends allied with them suffered heavy losses (“Se quemen tolest to stride bi Brandenburg, dar ward de maregreve segelos unde de Wenede unde namen groten schaden”).¹²

More information about the events of 1229 was provided by the *Gesta archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensium*. In this source it was claimed that the young Ascanians joined the fight against the Archbishop after gathering a strong detachment of knights (or a detachment of valiant knights) from Slavia (i.e., Slavic) countries (“validam de partibus Slauię miliciam conduxsissent”). The battle with the troops of ministeriales of the Archbishop of Magdeburg took place on the River Plane.¹³ It did not end successfully for the Margraves. The attack of the Ascanian forces ground to a halt fairly quickly. The situation was made worse by the fact that a nearby causeway, across which the road to Brandenburg's New Town led, had been blocked by supply wagons. As a result, the

11 See Wolfgang Hermann Fritze, “Das Vordringen deutscher Herrschaft in Teltow und Barnim,” *Jahrbuch für brandenburgische Landesgeschichte* 22 (1971): 101, where the quoted author, based on the Slavic titles of the Pomeranian Dukes Bogislaw I and Casimir I, and the information about the erection of the fortified town of Oderberg against the Slavs by Albert II, Margrave of Brandenburg, which can be found in the *Chronicle of the Margraves of Brandenburg*, also assumed that the Slavs mentioned in German sources relating to the period in question were the Pomeranians. See also Winfried Schich, “Oppida, Kirchenbauten und Fernhandelsstraße zwischen Berlin und Oderberg im 13. Jahrhundert,” in: *Ein gefüllter Willkomm. Festschrift für Knut Schulz zum 65. Geburtstag*, hrsg. v. Franz Felten, Stephanie J. Irrgang, and Kurt Wesoly (Aachen: Ashaken Verlag, 2002), 146 and, most recently, Edward Rymar, “Termin,” 163–164

12 Weiland, “Sächsische Weltchronik,” 248.

13 Ibidem, 85, 86, 143, 163.

escape route was cut off for those who panicked and tried to flee the battlefield. Many of the belligerents tried to save themselves by throwing themselves into the currents of the River Plane. For some of them, it ended in demise. Those fighting on the side of the Margraves who wanted to save their lives surrendered to the Archbishop. The victorious Magdeburg forces unblocked the causeway and gave chase after the escaping Margraves' men. John I and Otto III, taking advantage of the approaching dusk, luckily escaped from the battlefield. They tried to seek refuge in the walls of the New Town of Brandenburg, which was one of their allodial estates. The darkness of the night, however, made it difficult to distinguish the belligerents who found themselves outside the municipal walls. As a result, the town gates were closed by the dwellers of the New Town of Brandenburg. The Margraves, perhaps convinced of the betrayal of the townspeople, fled as far as Spandau. Despite the insistence of the commanders of the Archbishop's army, Albert II decided not to pursue the fleeing Margraves. He argued that the Margraves were not of age and that they were his liege subjects. Albert II von Käfernburg apparently believed that the death or captivity of both Ascanians might have actually brought him more trouble than good.

The terms "Wends" and "Slavs" used in German narrative sources from the end of the 12th and the beginning of the 13th century are not very precise.¹⁴ In the literature on the subject it has long been noticed that the term still present in the chronicles of Helmold and Arnold of Lübeck can actually be applied sometimes (though not always) to Pomeranians.¹⁵ The issue of the use of the Slavic title by the West Pomeranian rulers of the 12th and 13th centuries is also beyond doubt. However, it should be remembered that the Slavs also inhabited territories dependent on the Brandenburg Ascanians in the second half of the 12th century.¹⁶ The aforementioned term could mean the Slavic population inhabiting the lands on the Havel (former Stodorans or Hevelli).¹⁷ The Slavs

-
- 14 Similarly, Scandinavian sources mentioning the Slavs are also characterised by poor precision. This problem requires a separate study. For this reason, it will not be discussed in this work.
- 15 Paweł Czaplewski, "Tytułatura książąt pomorskich do początku XIV wieku," *Zapiski Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu* 15 (1949): 53. On identifying the term Slavia with Pomerania: Gerhard Renn, *Die Bedeutung des Namens "Pommern" und die Bezeichnungen für das heutige Pommern in der Geschichte* (Greifswald: Ratsbuchhandlung L. Bamberg. Hans Adler, E. Panzig & Co., 1937), 49–51, see also Jan M. Piskorski, *Pomorze plemienne. Historia – Archeologia – Językoznawstwo* (Poznań–Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Scorus, Muzeum Narodowe w Szczecinie, Wydawnictwo Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, 2002), 28.
- 16 Gerard Labuda, "Podstawy polityczno-prawne kupna Pomorza Gdańskiego przez Zakon Krzyżacki od margrabiów brandenburskich w latach 1309–1310," *Roczniki Historyczne* 71 (2005): 45, 47.
- 17 In the documents of Henry the Lion from 1154 and 1169, the bishoprics in Ratzeburg, Lübeck, and Schwerin were defined as being in the Polabian Slavia (Slavic lands). See: Georg Christian Friedrich Lisch *et al.*, hrsg. v., *Meklenburgische Urkundebuch* (hereinafter: MUB), vol. I (Schwerin: in Commission der Stillerschen Hofbuchhandlung 1863): 57, 90, 96. See also Gerard Labuda, *Fragmenty dziejów Słowiańszczyzny Zachodniej*, 2nd ed. (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, 2002), 159[728]–162[732], 172[747] *et seq.*; idem, "Podstawy polityczno-prawne"

of the Prignitz district and of the lands on the Havel supported Otto II, Margrave of Brandenburg in his conflict with Denmark in 1198.¹⁸ This did not mean, of course, that the Ascanian estates were no longer exposed to the attacks of the Slavs. In the literature on the subject it was noted that in 1208, the Margrave of Brandenburg Albert II, while issuing a privilege for the abbey in Lehnin, obliged the peasants belonging to the monastery to defend it against any attacks of the Wends.¹⁹ There is a belief in the related literature that the importance of the Slavs in Brandenburg as a separate ethnic group diminished significantly in the following years.²⁰ Hence the doubts as to whether the local Slavs could possibly raise a strong knightly unit that would support the Brandenburg margraves at the end of the 1220's.

The above-mentioned terms describing the Ascanian allies in 1229 can be applied not only to Pomeranians. They may pertain to people who were subjects of the Mecklenburg or Rugian principes.²¹ The rulers of Mecklenburg earlier used the titles of "Slavic lords."²² In a document issued in Werben dated 5 August 1227, Margraves John

41 *et seq.*, where there is more on the term *Slavia* used for areas remote from the territory of the Duchy of Pomerania. On the extension of the margraves' power over the Slavs living in the territory east of the Elbe: Helmut Assing, "Die Anfänge askanischer Herrschaft in den Gebieten östlich der Elbe," in: *Brandenburgische Landesgeschichte und Archivwissenschaft. Festschrift für Lieselott Enders zum 70. Geburtstag*, hrsg. v. Friedrich Beck and Klaus Neitmann (Veröffentlichungen des Brandenburgischen Landeshauptarchivs, 34) (Verlag Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger Weimar, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 1997), 21–35. On the gradual integration of the Slavs with the new settlers brought by the Ascanians in the Brandenburg March, see Eberhard Schmidt, *Die Mark Brandenburg unter den Askaniern (1134–1320)* (Köln–Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1973), 59 *et seq.*

- 18 Johann Martin Lappenberg, ed., ex recensione, "Arnoldi Chronica Slavorum," in: *Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum ex Monumentis Germaniae historicis recudi fecit G.H. Pertz* (Hannover: impensisi Bibliopolii Hahnaniae 1868), lib. VI, cap. 9–10, 229–230; Labuda, "Podstawy," 44–45. On the position of older literature and the identification of the Slavs with the Pomeranians in it, see Felix Rachfahl, "Der Ursprung des brandenburgisch-pommerschen Lehnverhältnis," *Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte* 5 (1892): 58 *et seq.*
- 19 Cf. Jörg Rogge, "Heilige Hallen. Zur Ausbildung der Kirchenorganisation im Bistum Brandenburg vom 10. bis zur Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts," in: *Wege in die Himmelsstadt: Bischof, Glaube, Herrschaft 800–1550*, hrsg. v. Clemens Bergstedt and Heinz-Dieter Heimann (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2005), 108. Herein also about the earlier attacks of the Slavs on the estate and staff of the monastery.
- 20 Helmut Assing, "Zu den Beziehungen zwischen Slawen und Deutschen in der frühen Mark Brandenburg (12./13. Jahrhundert): Gedanken nach der Lektüre des Buches «Das Havelland im Mittelalter»,» *Jahrbuch für Geschichte des Feudalismus* 14 (1990): 197–198. On the importance of the lands on the Havel for the margraves after their conquest and the subjugation of the Slavs, cf. Hans-Joachim Fey, *Reise und Herrschaft der Markgrafen von Brandenburg (1134–1319)* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1973), 26–30.
- 21 About the Slavic titles of Pomeranian dukes, see Czaplewski, "Tytulatura," 53.
- 22 In 1170, and 1177, the ancestor of the thirteenth-century rulers of Mecklenburg, Pribislaw I used the title "princeps [...] Slaue," once with the note "tocius." Also as a Slavic princeps he was described by the obituary of the monastery of St. Michael in Lüneburg in 1178. Later this title was assumed by his successor Niklot. See: MUB, vol. I, 98, 122, 126, 147 *et seq.* In 1199, the Pope wrote a letter to Christians from the Slavic lands on supporting the Christian mission in Livonia – MUB, vol. I, 164. See also index to volumes I to IV, in: MUB, vol. IV: (1297–1300), *Nachträge und Register zu I–IV*

and Otto confirmed that their beloved trusted supporters (“dilecti fideles nostri”), the sons of Lord Borwin, for the salvation of their souls, gave to the Joannites of Accon the village of Mirow, together with the adjacent lake and the stream flowing through it.²³ The confirmation of this granting was issued by the Ascanians in Werben, a place where the Knights Hospitaller of Accon already had their branch. The Werben estate was a foundation by Albert the Bear. The Knights Hospitaller from Mirow in Mecklenburg were therefore connected with the later Brandenburg commandery of the order from their very beginnings. The cited document also indicates at least an alliance between the margraves of Brandenburg and the rulers of Mecklenburg. It could possibly have been forged during the war between the rulers of the Reich and the King of Denmark, Valdemar II. In a broader sense, the phrase used in order to confirm the grants of the “beloved trusted supporters” of the margraves suggests a feudal relationship between the Ascanians and the rulers of Mecklenburg. It would at least concern the object of granting, i.e. the Mirow land. In the period in question, however, nothing (except the aforementioned document) indicates a feudal relationship between the margraves and the sons of Henry Borwin I. The authenticity of the above-mentioned diploma has been subjected to academic criticism in the literature on the subject.²⁴ It was considered to be forged and created later than the date of its issuance. Perhaps its drawing up was related to an attempt by the margraves of Brandenburg to subjugate the Mecklenburg rulers from the Werle line in the 1240’s.²⁵ The aforementioned sons of “Lord Borwin,” in contrast to the Brandenburg margraves, fought against Denmark in 1227. Therefore, their alliance with the Brandenburg Ascanians in the following years does not seem possible. Even in 1229, the rulers of Mecklenburg belonged to the anti-Danish party existing in the Reich. The political sympathies of the Brandenburg Ascanians were then located on the opposite side of the political dispute in the Reich and on the southern shores of the Baltic Sea.

(Schwerin: in Commission der Stiller’schen Hofbuchhandlung, 1867), 382. The lands of Prignitz and Stargard, which had earlier been subordinated by the margraves, adjoined the land of Ture, which in the described period belonged to the rulers of Mecklenburg from the Werle line. Like other representatives of this house, they also bore the title of the Lords of the Wends, see Schmidt, *Die Mark Brandenburg*, 48.

23 MUB, vol. IV, 324, *Regesten*, 592.

24 MUB, vol. II (1251–1280) (Schwerin: in Commission der Stiller’schen Hofbuchhandlung, 1864), 55; Julius von Pflugk-Harttung, *Die Anfänge des Johanniter-Ordens in Deutschland besonders in der Mark Brandenburg und in Mecklenburg* (Berlin: J.M. Spaeth, 1899), 49; Julius von Pflugk-Harttung, “Ueichte Urkunden des Johanniter-Ordens aus dem 12. und 13. Jahrhundert,” *Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte* 11 (1898): 8[308]–9[309]; Gerhard Knoll, *Die Entstehung und Geschichte der Johanniterordenskommande Werben im 13. Jahrhundert mit ihren äußeren Beziehungen und im Lichte der Privilegien und Statuten* (Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktor phil. des Fachbereichs Geschichtswissenschaft der Freie Universität Berlin, 1971), 42–44, 57.

25 Schmidt, *Die Mark Brandenburg*, 48.

If we were to focus on how the concepts of Wends and Slavs were treated in the *Saxon World Chronicle*, two things must be pointed out. In the earliest section of this chronicle, the term Wends refers to the Slavic tribes initially contacting the Carolingian state, and then interacting with the German and Danish rulers. Later, the term Wends refers to the Veleti tribes. For their Christianisation and strengthening of German influence, the Bishoprics in Havelberg, Brandenburg and Stargard were established in the 10th century. The chronicle included among the rulers of the Wends: Mstivoj, Gottschalk, his son Budivoj (Buthue) and Niklot.²⁶ However, while relating the war of Otto II, Margrave of Brandenburg, with Bogislaw I of Pomerania, incorrectly described as the ruler of Demmin, the aforementioned chronicle stated that the conflict was not victorious for the Wends. Its consequence was the death of Lord Casimir I, Lord Borko and many others among the Wends.²⁷

In the Code of Zwickau, which was a later, enriched version of the Saxon chronicle, when describing the death of the Pomeranian Duke Casimir I, it was claimed that his demise was connected with the great victory of the Germans over the Wends.²⁸ Thus, in the 80's of the 12th century, in the Saxon chronicle, the Wends were identified with the Pomeranians. It is possible that this was due to the takeover of Demmin by the Pomeranian dukes. Pomeranian rulers seized Demmin with the consent of the Saxons and the Danes in the 1160's. Pomeranians then settled in the former seat of Pribislaw, son of the aforementioned Niklot.²⁹ The identification of the Wends with the Pomeranians in the Saxon chronicle can also be demonstrated in the description of the Danish king's attack on Demmin in 1233/1234, i.e. on the then seat of Wartislaw III, Duke of Pomerania. In the context of the conquest of Demmin by Denmark, the chronicle again referred to the Wends, although the owners of this stronghold were the Pomeranians at that time.³⁰

26 MUB, vol. II, 169, 174.

27 Weiland, "Sächsische Weltchronik," 119; other sources informing about the death of Casimir call him the princeps of the Pomeranians or the princeps of the Slavs: Lappenberg, "Arnoldi Chronica Salvorum," lib II, cap. 17, 58; Ernst Ehrenfeuchter hrsg., "Chronicon Montis Sereni," in: Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptorum, vol. 23 (Neudruck) (Leipzig: Verlag Karl W. Hiersemann, 1925), 158.

28 Adolf Hofmeister, "Ueber eine Handschrift der Sächsischen Weltchronik," *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für Ältere zur Beförderung einer Gesamtausgabe der Quellenschriften deutscher Geschichten des Mittelalters* 32 (1907): 128; Rymar, *Rodowód książąt pomorskich*, 2nd ed. (Szczecin: Książnica Pomorska, 2005), 119, note 139.

29 Józef Spors, "Przynależność polityczna i administracyjna ziem pomorskich na północ od środkowej Piany do końca XII i w pierwszej połowie XIII wieku," in: idem, *Studia nad wczesnośredniowiecznymi dziejami Pomorza Zachodniego XII – pierwsza połowa XIII w.* (Słupsk: Stowarzyszenie Społeczno-Kulturalne "Pobrzeże" w Słupsku, 1988), 252 i n.; Rymar, *Rodowód*, 119, note 136.

30 Weiland, "Sächsische Weltchronik," 250; Kazimierz Bobowski, "Prawnopaństwowy stosunek Pomorza Zachodniego wobec Brandenburgii na przestrzeni XIII w.," in: *Niemcy – Polska w średniowieczu. Materiały z konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej przez Instytut Historii UAM w dniach 14–16 XI 1983 roku*, ed. Jerzy Strzelczyk (Poznań: Wydawnictwo UAM, 1986): 229; Dietmar

Quite similar is the case with the use of the term Slavs in *Gesta archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensium*. The chronicle of 938 reported the establishment of two bishoprics: in Brandenburg and Havelberg, which were erected in the land of the Slavs – “in terra Slaorum.”³¹ This land belonged mainly to the Slavic tribes of Veleti and both of these bishoprics were responsible, among others, for their Christianisation.

The next mention of the Slavs in the Magdeburg bishop’s chronicle appears in the year 968 in connection with the information about the creation of the Magdeburg Archbishopric. According to the chronicle, it was created to convert all the Slavs between the Saale and the Elbe and direct them towards God.³²

More information related to the Slavs was entered in the chronicle in question in 1115, when it mentioned the victory of Otto the Rich of Ballenstedt over 2,800 Slavs near Köthen.³³ So the defeated side this time were the Polabian Slavs.³⁴ After this mention, the *Gesta archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensiu* remain silent about the Slavs. They do not reappear in the chronicle pages until 1229, with the description of the Battle of the Plane. They are not mentioned again in the later parts of this source. Compared to the previous information about the Slavs, those from 1229 appeared with a comment on their origin – (“de partibus Slauię”). Apparently, the author of the entry did not mean the Slavic lands (“terrae Slauię”), referred to in the previous parts of the “Magdeburg deeds.” These lands were mentioned in the context of the Slavic territories under the rule of the German feudal lords. While this conclusion does not explain anything yet in the context of the terminology used in the Magdeburg bishop’s chronicle, it has some significance when referring to the accounts given in the chronicles related to the margraves of Brandenburg.

As already mentioned, although the *Chronicle of the Dukes of Saxony* and its continuation, i.e. the *Chronicle of the Margraves of Brandenburg* both referred to the hostilities between the Margraves of Brandenburg and the Archbishop of Magdeburg, they

Lucht, “Die Außenpolitik Herzog Barnims I. von Pommern,” *Baltische Studien*, N.F. 51 (1965): 31; Spors, “Przynależność polityczna,” 362; Edward Rymar, “Konflikt pomorsko-meklemburski i pomorsko-rugijski w Czrezpieniu w warunkach likwidacji dominacji duńskiej na Pomorzu z lat 1223/27– 1238/9,” in: *A Pomerania ad ultimas terras: studia ofiarowane Barbarze Popielas-Szultce w sześćdziesiątą piątą rocznicę urodzin i czterdziestolecie pracy naukowej*, eds. Jarosław Sochacki and Agnieszka Teterycz-Puzio (Słupsk: Akademia Pomorska w Słupsku, 2011), 30–31.

31 Schum, “Gesta,” cap. 5, 378; Willy Hoppe, “Das Erzstift Magdeburg und der Osten,” in: idem, *Die Mark Brandenburg, Wettin und Magdeburg. Ausgewählte Aufsätze*, hrsg. v. Herbert Ludat (Köln–Graz: Böhlau Verlag, 1965), 210 *et seq.*; Gerard Labuda, “Magdeburg i Poznań (Założenie arcybiskupstwa magdeburskiego i biskupstwa poznańskiego na tle wschodniej polityki misyjnej Ottona Wielkiego),” *Roczniki Historyczne* 14 (1938): 187 *et seq.*; idem, *Fragmenty*, 183[753] *et seq.*

32 Schum, “Gesta,” cap. 9–10, cap. 14, 380–381, 389.

33 Ibidem, cap. 24, 410.

34 Lutz Partenheimer, *Albrecht der Bär. Gründer der Mark Brandenburg und des Fürstentums Anhalt* (Köln–Weimar–Wien: Verlag Böhlau, 2003), 30.

did not deal with the Ascanians' allies. In the part preceding the fragment mentioning the Brandenburg-Magdeburg conflict of 1229, these sources refer, among others, to earlier fights which took place in a rather similar political constellation. They involved Albert II, Margrave of Brandenburg and the Pomeranian Dukes: Casimir I and Bogislaw I. The mentioned sources referred to them as Slavic princes. The same paragraph also mentioned the war of the Margrave with the Archbishopric of Magdeburg, defended by the brothers Gumbert von Weneborg and Richard von Plawe, as well as other ministeriales of the Archbishopric. According to the cited testimony, "bella [...] contra [...] principes Sclavorum" was in fact a war against the aforementioned Pomeranian Dukes.³⁵ Thus, also in this case the Slavs were considered Pomeranians.

The identification of the Wends and the Slavs with the Pomeranians in the pages of chronicles focusing on the events of 1229 can therefore be considered highly probable. Particular significance must be given here to the *Saxon World Chronicle*. Although this fact was not noticed in the older literature on the subject, in its descriptions of the events in the period between the 1180's and the 1220's, the term Wends always denotes the Pomeranians. The Magdeburg bishop's chronicle, which uses the plural ["de partibus Slaue"], seems to indicate the need to include at least two such Slavic countries (or those located in Slavia).³⁶ In the absence of precise information as to which countries the chronicler could have meant, when trying to define them, one should refer to the history of Brandenburg and Pomerania in the 20's of the 13th century.

The above-mentioned period brought about major changes in the political situation of the countries located on the southern shores of the Baltic Sea. They affected Western Pomerania. They also did not miss the territories whose rulers claimed the right to feudal authority over the Griffin duchy. They were foreshadowed by the death of the Pomeranian rulers Casimir II and Bogislaw II. They both died before the end of 1220 or, at the latest, the beginning of 1221, leaving behind under-age heirs.

In 1220, Albert II, Margrave of Brandenburg, who had made an unsuccessful attempt to wrestle control of Western Pomerania from Denmark's influence a few years earlier, also died. His efforts to force the Pomeranian rulers to recognise his sovereignty

35 Schum, "Gesta," 421; Sello, "Chronica Marchionum," 121.

36 Unfortunately, the term being explained is not unambiguous. One of the publishing reviewers of this text pointed out that it could mean "border areas of Slavia" or generally "areas of the Slavic lands." I would like to express my gratitude for these comments. In contemporary German literature, this phrase is translated as "eine starke Heresmacht aus den slavischen Länder" – see Kleinen, *Die Magdeburger Bischofschronik*, 166. This translation is therefore in line with the interpretation I have adopted. For this reason, with regard to the correct understanding of the passage in question, I decide in favour of the interpretation of Hermann Michaëlis, who translated the discussed chronicle into German. Hence, I understand that the strong unit supporting the Margraves came not from one, but – due to the plural used – a large number of "Slavic countries."

utterly failed, mainly in the face of Danish victories over the Brandenburg armies.³⁷ When dying, the Margrave also left behind under-age heirs.

After the deaths of Casimir II and Bogislaw II, the rule in Western Pomerania was taken over, on behalf of their under-age sons: Wartislaw III and Barnim I, by the Dowager Duchesses: Ingardis i Mirosława.³⁸ The first of them is currently considered to be a representative of the influential Scandinavian House of Hvide, which was associated with the Danish throne. The second was the daughter of Mestvin (Mściwoj) I, the ruler of Eastern Pomerania (Pomerelia). Anastasia of Greater Poland, the youngest daughter of Mieszko III and the grandmother of the under-age princes, also continued to play an important political role in Western Pomerania. The priority of the regency of the Pomeranian Duchesses was the desire to secure the succession of the young Griffins in their respective duchies. The way to do this had been marked out still in the 12th century by Anastasia, Duchess of Pomerania. After the death of her husband, Duke Bogislaw I in 1187, she moved to the Danish court together with her under-age sons Casimir II and Bogislaw II. There, the descendants of Bogislaw I, probably accompanied by their mother acting on behalf of the little Dukes, paid homage to Canute VI.³⁹ This ploy secured the rights of young Griffins to assume control of their domains. However, it did not fully protect the territorial integrity of West Pomerania against the possessiveness of the Dukes' regent. Jaromar I, Prince of Rügen was appointed by Denmark to perform this role in 1193. Using his office, he deprived Pomerania of the lands north of the River Peene.⁴⁰ Anastasia, Duchess of Pomerania eventually managed to regain control of at least the lands of Lassan and Ziethen through a court trial conducted before the arbitration of the Danish king. The problem of recuperating the remaining losses for some time remained an open question.

37 The last author to discuss these events was Rymar, "Zaodrzańska połącz księstwa pomorskiego," 93 *et seq.* See also Marek Smoliński, "Mirosława – księżna pomorska, regentka i dyplomatka," in: *Kobiety i władza w czasach dawnych*, eds. Bożena Czwojdrak and Agata A. Kluczek (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2015), 146–147.

38 Rymar, *Rodowód*, 115–118, 130, 133–134; Smoliński, "Mirosława," 137 *et seq.*; Agnieszka Teterycz-Puzio, *Piastowskie księżne regentki. O utrzymanie władzy dla synów (koniec XII w. – początek XIV w.)* (Kraków: Avalon, 2016), 44–56.

39 Ellen Jørgensen, ed., "Annales Slesuicenses," in: *Annales Danici medii aevi. Udgivne af Selskabet for udgivelse af kilder til dansk historie med understøttelse af Carlsbergfondet* (København: Hos Nielsen & Lydische. Axel Simmelklear, 1920), 134: "Mortuo Bugislao eius herdes uenerunt ad regem pro auxilio"; Jacob Langebeck, ed., "Chronicon Danicum 1074–1219," in: *Scriptores rerum Danicarum medii aevi 3* (Hafniae: Godiche, 1774), 261: "Mortuo Bugizlao heredes ejus ad Regem K. venerunt pro beneficio suo habendo."

40 Klaus Conrad, hrsg. v., *Pommersches Urkundenbuch* (hereinafter: PU), vol. I, 2 Auflage (Köln–Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1970), 125; Kazimierz Ślaski, *Podziały terytorialne Pomorza w XI–XIII w.* (Poznań: Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk, 1960), 22, 24; Janisław Osiegiński, *Polityka zewnętrzna księstwa Rugii (1168–1328)* (Warszawa–Poznań: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1975), 45, 47; Spors, "Przynależność polityczna," 332–333.

During the times of political independence of Bogislaw II and Casimir II, Danish sovereignty over Pomerania was put to the test several times. One of the causes were the efforts to impose his sovereignty on Pomerania by Albert II, Margrave of Brandenburg. The still unresolved territorial dispute between Pomerania and Rügen was not without importance, either.⁴¹ At the beginning of the 1220's, it could even result in a periodic loss of the castellany of Wolgast by Pomerania.⁴² In the prevailing political realities, the foreign policy of the Pomeranian regent Duchesses boiled down primarily to the diplomatic defence of the current status quo and remaining within the circle of the Danish feudal sovereignty.

In the March of Brandenburg, the burden of guardianship over minors John I and Otto III was initially placed on Matilda of the House of Wettin, the widow of Albert II. In the regency, she was assisted by one of the close relatives of the deceased Ascanian, Count Henry I of Anhalt.⁴³ Already in 1220, the German King Frederick II Hohenstaufen appointed, on behalf of the Reich, the Archbishop of Magdeburg, Albert II von Käfernburg as the regent for John I and Otto III.⁴⁴ At that time, he was a supporter of the Hohenstaufen, additionally maintaining intense relations with the papacy. As a result, at the turn of the first and second decades of the 1220's, he acted as the emperor's representative appointed for parts of Italy or the papal legate appointed for the countries of the Reich.⁴⁵ It is also worth recalling that during the wars of Frederick II with Otto IV of the House of Welf, the Archbishop's army fought Albert II, Margrave of Brandenburg.⁴⁶

41 Recently, mainly owing to the studies by Edward Rymar, research on this period in the history of Western Pomerania experiences a renaissance – see Rymar, “Księstwa zachodniopomorskie, zwłaszcza ich połąć zaodrzańska u schyłku dominacji duńskiej (1215–1223/1228),” in: *Scriptura, diploma, sigillum. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Kazimierzowi Bobowskiemu*, eds. Joachim Zdrenka and Joanna Karczewska (Zielona Góra: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2009), 323–339; Edward Rymar, “Zaodrzańska połąć księstwa zachodniopomorskiego jako teren wojny brandenbursko-duńskiej (1214 rok),” in: *Od najazdów pogańskich dotąd są państwa Waszej Królewskiej Mości spokojne... Studia ofiarowane w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin Profesorowi Karolowi Olejnikowi*, eds. Zbigniew Pilarczyk and Maciej Franz (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2008), 90–102; idem, “Termin,” 157–178; Edward Rymar, “Księstwa zachodniopomorskie w pierwszym okresie wpływów duńskich (1187–1211),” *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza* 17 (2013), 151–178.

42 Rymar, “Księstwa zachodniopomorskie,” 335.

43 Voigt, “Über das Alter der Markgrafen,” 114–115; Bauch, *Markgrafen*, 5–6; Sello, *Markgraf Otto III.*, 8; Schultze, *Die Mark Brandenburg*, 136–137.

44 *Regesten*, 576; Sello, *Markgraf Otto III.*, 8; Voigt, “Über das Alter der Markgrafen,” 114; Bauch, *Markgrafen*, 7–8; Silberborth, “Erzbischof Albrecht II.,” 212; Schultze, *Die Mark Brandenburg*, 136–137.

45 Cf. Hartung, “Die Territorialpolitik,” 228; Aloys Ruppel, “Zur Reichslegation des Erzbischofs Albert von Magdeburg (1222–24),” *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* 13 (1910): 103–134.

46 *Regesten*, 560; Schultze, *Die Mark Brandenburg*, 116.

The appointment of the Archbishop of Magdeburg as the legal guardian of the Margraves of Brandenburg gave Albert II a real influence on the March of Brandenburg. It is worth recalling that from the end of the 12th century, every current Archbishop of Magdeburg was the feudal overlord of the margraves of Brandenburg in terms of at least some of their allodial estates.⁴⁷ Thus, the Archbishop concentrated in his hands the right to use the fiefs of the Reich and hereditary estates that were owned by the margraves and were to be confirmed in the future by Frederick II von Hohenstaufen. The legal situation of the sons of Albert II did not look very good then. For this reason, the actions of their mother, Marchioness Matilda, focused first on weakening the position of the Archbishop in relation to her sons. In 1221, for the price of 1920 ingots of Magdeburg silver, she practically bought the right to regency from the Archbishop.⁴⁸ Albert II von Käfernburg also vowed that he would help the young Ascanians to obtain imperial confirmation for their offices and the lands of the Reich subordinate to them as margraves. It was an important point in the Brandenburg-March relations. Frederick II Hohenstaufen, the king and soon to be emperor, was in no rush to grant this confirmation. The late Margrave Albert II remained in opposition to him for a long time, supporting the deposed Emperor Otto IV of the House of Welf. Even after reconciling with Frederick II, the Brandenburg Margrave Albert II further strengthened his alliance with the Welfs. In 1219, a marriage plan was developed to unite the two houses.⁴⁹ It was predicted that the Duke of Lüneburg, Otto, later known as the Child, being a fosterling and nephew of Emperor Otto IV, would marry Matilda, daughter of Margrave Albert II. This marriage was contracted a few years later, between 1227 and 1229. It was probably the widow of Albert II, Matilda, and her sons John I and Otto III that would make these plans come true.

In May 1223, an event took place that destroyed the political order on the southern shores of the Baltic Sea. The Danish King Valdemar II, along with his eldest son, were taken captive by Henry I, Count of Schwerin. Already at the end of that year, negotiations for the release of the Danish rulers began. The Reich and its rulers: Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen and his son, the German King Henry VII, officially became a party in the Schwerin-Danish negotiations. During the talks, the German allies considered the possibility of military action that would take back lands previously lost by the Reich to Denmark.⁵⁰ The participants of the anti-Danish expedition were to be the princes of the Reich, who had previously been harmed by Denmark. Among those to

47 *Regesten*, 485, 491; Hartung, "Die Territorialpolitik," 118–213; Schultze, *Die Mark Brandenburg*, 104–105; Schmidt, *Die Mark Brandenburg*, 54.

48 *Regesten*, 577; Voigt, "Über das Alter der Markgrafen," 114; Bauch, *Markgrafen*, 7–8.

49 Voigt, "Über das Alter der Markgrafen," 115.

50 MUB, vol. I, 290; *Regesten*, 578; Rudolf Usinger, *Deutsch-dänische Geschichte 1189–1227* (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von E. S. Mittler und Sohn, 1863), 307.

whom this proposal was addressed were also the under-age margraves of Brandenburg. This was a potential chance for them to, inter alia, take up the efforts of their deceased father Albert II to gain supremacy over Pomerania.⁵¹ The accession of the Margraves to the planned expedition would have to mean the end of the policy of political restraint, which was followed at that time by the private guardians of the Margraves (Marchioness Matilda and Henry of Anhalt). In addition, joining the described endeavour must have meant breaking the alliance of the Brandenburg Ascanians with the Danish party, including the Welfs. However, this cooperation was very important to those who were determining the policy of the minor margraves. For this reason, the Brandenburg Ascanians did not decide to support the initiative put forward by the Emperor.

The position of Pomerania on the unfolding events was influenced by at least two factors. The first one was the minority of the heirs of the Pomeranian Duchies and the regency in the hands of their mothers. The second was the kinship linking the Pomeranian rulers with Count Henry of Schwerin, who detained Valdemar II and his son Valdemar III. This was due to the Pomeranian influence of the wife of the Count of Schwerin, Margaret Audacia, and her mother. In the literature on the subject, it is now recognised that this mother was the mysterious “lady from Sławno.”⁵² She was staying in Western Pomerania at the end of 1219 and maybe at the beginning of the 1220's. She was then at the court of Duke Casimir II's wife, Ingardis.⁵³ It is possible that she remained in Western Pomerania at the time of the Pomeranian congress, which took place after the death of Casimir II.⁵⁴

51 *Regesten*, 591; Spors, “Przynależność polityczna,” 361; Rymar, “Termin,” 165 *et seq.*; idem, “Zaodrzańska połącz księstwa pomorskiego,” 90–102.

52 Georg Christian Friedrich Lisch, “Audacia, Gemahlin des Grafen Heinrich I., von Schwerin,” *Jahrbücher des Vereins für Mecklenburgische Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 27 (1862): 131–162; Edward Rymar, “Dobrosława, księżniczka zachodniopomorska, pani na Sławnie potem Chockowie oraz Audacja (Eudoksja) Piastówna, hrabina zwierzyńska,” *Studia i Materiały do Dziejów Wielkopolski i Pomorza* 14 (1982) 2: 6–11; idem, *Rodowód*, 137–138; Labuda, *Fragmenty*, 290 [860]; Rudolf Benl, *Die Gestaltung der Bodenrechtsverhältnisse in Pommern vom 12. bis zum 14. Jahrhundert* (Köln–Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1986). 41–42, note 123; Marek Smoliński, *Świętopełk gdański* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2016), pp. 114–115; idem, “Kilka uwag w sprawie roli politycznej hrabianki szweryńskiej Audacji-Małogorzaty,” *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza* 25 (2022): 242..

53 PU, vol. I, 200; Rymar, *Rodowód*, 215.

54 PU, vol. I, 197, 200, 218, 221; MUB, vol. I, 290; 305; Rymar, “Dobrosława,” 12–16; Edward Rymar, “Zjazd w Kamieniu Pomorskim w końcu 1219 r. Świętoborzyce w ziemi choćkowskiej i kołobrzskiej,” *Materiały Zachodniopomorskie* 22 (1976): 145 *et seq.*; idem, “Sprawa pochodzenia Ermengardy drugiej żony Świętopełka gdańskiego,” *Rocznik Gdańsk* 52/1 (1982): 12; idem, “Księstwa zachodniopomorskie,” 330; Dariusz Wybranowski, “Rola polityczna możnowładztwa i rycerstwa w czasach regencji księżnych Ingardy i Mirosławy w latach 1220–1227. Przyczynek do dziejów Pomorza w czasach zwierzchności duńskiej w pierwszej połowie XIII wieku,” *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 28 (2003), 1: 19; Marek Smoliński, “Potencjalny udział oddziałów zachodniopomorskich w V krucjacie (1217?, 1219?) w świetle relacji krucjatowych Olivera z Padebornu,” in: *Pomorze militarne XII–XXI w. Materiały*

In 1233, in the Pomeranian region of Wkryujście (Ueckermünde), a national congress of dukes, lords and Pomeranian knights was held. It was attended by officials of the Danish king.⁵⁵ One of them, King Valdemar II's royal steward, was mentioned without a name in the document that remained from this colloquy. The lack of the exact date of this diploma significantly hinders the recognition of the goals of the Pomeranian Congress. If it took place after the imprisonment of Valdemar II, then at least one of the reasons for the meeting was the discussion on the further remaining of Pomerania on the Danish side. In addition, the conference could also involve the problem of collecting part of the ransom intended for the release of both Valdemars from captivity, which the vassals of Denmark were obliged to do.

It is also unknown who the aforementioned Danish royal steward was. Recently, a supposition was put forward in the literature on the subject that it could have been Jacob Sunesen from Møn (Möen) of the Hvide family.⁵⁶ His family was strongly associated with the Danish crown already in the times of Valdemar I or Canute VI. During the reign of Valdemar II, Jacob served as the royal governor (= lord) of the Baltic island of Møn. One of his sons, Andrew, held the office of chamberlain to Valdemar II. Most likely, he died at the hands of kidnappers led by Count Henry of Schwerin, during the detention of Danish kings on the night of 6 May 1223.⁵⁷

Jacob is especially notable in historiography on account of his subsequent deeds as “the lord of the island of Møn.” His influence in Danish politics increased significantly in 1225, when Count Albert von Orlamünde was captured by the German counts. In the same year, Jacob successfully negotiated the release of Valdemar II from Schwerin captivity. He then became the guarantor of partial payment of the ransom to the Count of Schwerin and handing over Rendsborg to Count Adolf IV of Holstein. In 1227, Jacob was taken prisoner by the Germans. In 1230, a final agreement was made with the widow of Count Henry of Schwerin Margaret Audacia and her son Gunzelin III regarding the release of the Danish hostages.⁵⁸ According to its provisions, it was Jacob who was to receive the sons of King Valdemar: Eric and Abel after they were freed. Jacob was

z sesji naukowej zorganizowanej 27 listopada 2003 r. w Zamku Książąt Pomorskich, eds. Kazimierz Kozłowski and Edward Rymar, vol. 1 (Szczecin: Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie, 2004), 198–199.

55 Friedrich Wilhelm Barthold, *Geschichte von Rügen und Pommern*, vol. 2: *Von der Belehrung Pommerns zum Christenthume bis zum Tode Barnims I. i. J. 1278* (Hamburg: F. Perthes, 1840), 375. Martin Wehrmann, *Geschichte von Pommern*, 1st ed. (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1904), 97; Lucht, “Die Aussenpolitik,” 16; Wybranowski, “Rola polityczna możnowładztwa i rycerstwa,” 19; Rymar, “Księstwa zachodniopomorskie,” 331.

56 Rymar, “Księstwa zachodniopomorskie,” 331.

57 Frede Bojsen, *Jacob Sunesøn af Møn: Et mindeskript og nogle undersøgelser* (København: Akademisk Boghandel, 1902), 23, 25–26.

58 The last author to discuss these issues was Marek Smoliński, “Kilka uwag w sprawie roli politycznej”, 267.

also one of the signatories of the settlement concluded at that time.⁵⁹ Assuming that the widow of the Pomeranian Duke Casimir II, Ingardis was also a member of the Hvide family,⁶⁰ Jacob of Møn would have to be her relative. Thus, both his origin and the position he enjoyed in Denmark would predestine Jacob to come to Pomerania in 1223 to attend to the matters of his ruler.

However, the above hypothesis raises doubts. One of them is the question of whether the Danish magnate of such great importance in the political life of Denmark actually held the office of the royal steward in the 1320's. His high position is evidenced by the fact that in the undated document of King Valdemar III, which was possibly written in the years 1219–1231, Jacob was mentioned first on the list of witnesses. However, he then appeared without any official title.⁶¹ In 1224, the Danish king's steward was certainly an official named Drugillus. He held his office during another stage of the negotiations for the release of Valdemar II, who was still in captivity of the Count of Schwerin.⁶² It is possible that Drugillus became the royal steward even earlier, namely already in 1223. However, it remains a mystery whether he was appointed before or after the Pomeranian Congress. Regardless of this issue, Pomerania remained faithful to the Danish king in the following years. The arrival of the Danish envoys in Pomerania also indicates the great importance attached in Denmark to the Griffins' reaction to the political situation at the time.

The stay in West Pomerania in 1224 of Barnuta, the former prince of Rügen and son of Prince Jaromar I, may serve as indirect evidence for the above statement.⁶³ It is possible that the reason for his arrival in Pomerania was the ceremony connected with the foundation of the monastery in Marianówek (Marienbusch) near Trzebiatów (Trep-tow).⁶⁴ Its founder was the Pomeranian Duchess Anastasia, daughter of Mieszko III

59 Cf. Usinger, *Deutsch-dänische Geschichte*, 346 et seq.; Bojsen, *Jacob Sunesön*, 39 et seq.; C.A. Christensen, "Jacob Sunesen," in: *Dansk Biografisk Leksikon*, accessed 23 April 2022, https://biografiskleksikon.lex.dk/Jacob_Sunesen.

60 Rymar, *Rodowód*, 134.

61 Niels Skyum-Neilsen, udgivet af, *Diplomatarium Danicaum*, series 1, vol. 5: 1211–1223 (København: Ejnar Munkgaards Forlag S/A, 1957), 164.

62 MUB, vol. I, 305; Henry Petersen, *Adelige sigiller fra det XIII. og XIV. aarhundrede* (København: Ritzel, 1897), 1; Rymar, "Księstwa zachodniopomorskie," 331, note 49.

63 PU, vol. I, 222; Wybranowski, "Rola polityczna możnowładztwa," 21.

64 Franciszek Duda, *Rozwój terytorialny Pomorza polskiego (wiek XI–XIII)* (Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności; Fundusz Nestora Bucewicz, 1909), 94; Herman Hoogeweg, *Die Stifter und Klöster der Provinz Pommern*, vol. 2 (Stettin: Leon Sauniers Buchhandlung, 1925), 758; Jerzy Walachowicz, *Monopole książęce w skarbowości wczesnofeudalnej Pomorza Zachodniego* (Poznań: Polska Akademia Nauk, 1963), 52; Kazimierz Bobowski, "Ze studiów nad autentycznością wczesnośredniowiecznych dokumentów zachodniopomorskich," *Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis. Historia* 499 (1980): 23; Ryszard Marciniak, "O sprawie wiana Anastazji Mieszkówny, księżnej zachodniopomorskiej," *Zapiski Historyczne* 52 (1987), 4: 21–25; Wybranowski, "Rola polityczna możnowładztwa," 21.

and current or former sister-in-law of Barnuta.⁶⁵ The meeting of Barnuta and Anastasia took place during the all-Pomeranian colloquy. It was attended by, among others, the Dowager Duchesses: Miroslava and Ingardis, the Bishop of Cammin (Kamień) Conrad and representatives of Pomeranian knights and local monastic clergy. The former ruler of Rügen visited Pomerania at least once more. It was in 1228, when Barnuta arrived in Demmin at the court of Wartislaw III.⁶⁶

The presence of Barnuta at the Pomeranian Congress of 1224 seems to be particularly important for the attempt to define further political sympathies of the Pomeranians. Despite the problems that affected Denmark as a result of the imprisonment of Valdemar II, Rügen did not decide to break with the Danish sovereignty. In 1224, the preliminary conditions for the release of the Danish prisoners from their captivity in Schwerin were finally agreed. This was to happen during a meeting on the Elbe, which was scheduled for the beginning of November of that year. The Danish delegation was led by Valdemar II's nephew, Albert II, Count of Orlamünde. In addition to him and the Danish nobles, the royal side was perhaps also represented by the then ruler of Rügen, Vitslav I (Barnuta's brother).⁶⁷ The purpose of this mission was to conclude the negotiations and, for a specified amount of money, to free Valdemar II from his captivity in Schwerin. For some reason, this operation ended in a fiasco. There was an assumption in the literature on the subject that some Slavs participated in these unsuccessful negotiations on the Danish side.⁶⁸ If it were so, they could have been Pomeranians or subjects of the Mecklenburg ruler Henry Borwin I. Contrary to his son

65 The widow of Bogislaw I, Duchess Anastasia, was the sister of Władysław III Spindleshanks, who still maintained an interest in the matters of Western Pomerania. The Duke of Greater Poland, if he was not present in person, at least sent his officials to the already-mentioned congress of Cammin of 1219/1220. Władysław Spindleshanks was married to Lucia of Rügen, Barnuta's sister and daughter of Jaromar I, Oswald Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, 2nd ed. (Kraków: Avalon, 2005), 259–361. Still between 1222 and 1224, both Dowager Duchesses certainly maintained relations with Greater Poland, as evidenced by their documents issued for the monastery in Mogilno, PU, vol. I, 210, 211, 214.

66 PU, vol. I, 244; Rymar, "Księstwa zachodniopomorskie," 329–330.

67 Cf. Georg Waitz, edit. "Chronica regia Coloniensis cum continuationibus in monasterio S. Pantaleonis scriptis aliisque Coloniensis monumentis partim ex monumentis Germaniae historicis recusa," in: MGH, *Scriptores rerum Germanicarum*, vol. 18 (Hannoverae: impensis Bibliopolinii Hahnani, 1880), 254. The Slavs, whose shores Lübeck ships were supposed to frequent, were mentioned in the document of Vitslav I of Rügen for Lübeck of 14 September 1224, Johann Friedrich Böhmer and Friedrich Techen, bearb., *Urkundenbuch der Stadt Lübeck* (hereinafter quoted: UB St. Lübeck) Part I (Lübeck: F. Asfchenfeldt, 1843), 27. This diploma concerned the freedoms related to the coastal law, which were granted to the merchants and fishermen of Lübeck by the ruler of Rügen. Barthold, *Geschichte von Rügen*, 376; Usinger, *Deutsch-dänische Geschichte*, 330. In September 1224, the ruler of Rügen appeared near Lübeck. His stay in Polabia was connected with his participation in negotiations for the release of Valdemar II or with the possible conflict between Vitslav I and the ruler of Rostock, Henry Borwin II, or the rulers of Pomerania. However, speculations on this subject assume a thorough disintegration of the Danish political camp as early as 1224/1225.

68 Barthold, *Geschichte von Rügen*, 376.

Henry Borwin II, the senior ruler of Mecklenburg probably stood, until his death in 1227, at the side of Denmark, supporting her against Count Adolf of Holstein.⁶⁹ His subjects could therefore have been in the ranks of the Danish delegation. However, the hypothesis that Pomeranians were also there cannot be verified. Despite the opinion that Pomerania stood by Denmark in 1224, there is no evidence that the Pomeranians were actively involved in the attempts to free Valdemar II.

During the period in question, the Duchy of Wartislaw III particularly manifested its loyalty to Denmark. From 1225 to 1228, in his documents, the aforementioned ruler used a seal containing a legend around the perimeter referring to his kinship with the Danish king.⁷⁰ This period coincided with the newly-gained independence of Wartislaw III and the end of the regency of Duchess Ingardis. Maintaining relations with Barnuta of Rügen by the Duke of Demmin in 1228 also seems to prove that Pomerania continued to support Denmark.

The events of 1225 further undermined Denmark's current political position. Nephews of Valdemar II: Albert von Orlamünde and Otto the Child suffered defeat in 1225 in a battle with the forces of the German counts and the Bremen Archbishop Gerhard II, which took place at Mölln. Albert von Orlamünde was then taken prisoner by the Schwerin army. Otto the Child escaped this fate by fleeing the battlefield and hurriedly crossing the Elbe.⁷¹

The involvement of the Duke of Lüneburg and Brunswick on the Danish side and the alliance of Otto the Child with the Margraves of Brandenburg largely determined the attitude of John I and Otto III to the conflict between the Reich and Denmark, as well as the Hohenstaufen and the Welfs. The matter was of utmost importance in the light of the succession policy pursued by the Welfs. The precursor of this policy was Henry V, Count Palatine of the Rhine. As his son, also named Henry, died in 1214, the Count Palatine began to look around for other heirs to his domain. First, he excluded his daughters: Irmengard, Margravine of Baden (by marriage to Herman V) and Agnes (wife of Otto II Wittelsbach, Duke of Bavaria). Eventually, Henry V chose his relative, son of Duke William of Lüneburg and Helena of Denmark, i.e. Otto the Child.

69 Cf. Rymar, "Księstwa zachodniopomorskie," 332. From 1225, the sons of Henry Borwin I fought in the ranks of the German counts against Denmark.

70 PU, vol. I, 227; Rymar, "Księstwa zachodniopomorskie," 331.

71 Carl Ferdinand Allen, *Geschichte des Königreichs Dänemark: mit steter Rücksicht auf die innere Entwicklung in Staat und Volk* (Kiel: Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1842), 110; Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann, *Geschichte von Dänemark*, vol. 1 (Hamburg: Perthes, 1840), 385; Usinger, *Deutsch-dänische Geschichte*, 336–337; Grethe Jakobsen, "Wicked count Henry," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 9 (1978), 4: 328; Peter Thorau, *König Heinrich (VII.), das Reich und die Territorien. Untersuchungen zur Phase der Minderjährigkeit und der «Regentschaften» Erzbischof Engelberts I. von Köln und Herzog Ludwigs I. von Bayern (1211) 1220–1228* (Jahrbücher des Deutschen Reich unter Heinrich (VII.), Teil 1) (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1998), 245–251; Nils Hybel, *The Nature of Kingship c. 800–1300* (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2017), 336.

In 1223, he was officially recognised as the successor and heir of Henry V.⁷² However, the emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen, who had already manifested in 1220 plans to take over at least some of the former lands belonging to the Welfs, was reluctant to agree with Henry's deed. When Henry V died, the emperor enticed to his side the ministeriales of the deceased, recognising them as Reich ministeriales. It was a prelude to an attempt to seize control of at least some of the territories belonging to the Welfs by force.

In the above-mentioned Danish-German conflict of 1225, Otto the Child already participated as heir to the former might of the Welfs. Among the lands he was to inherit were the territories between the Elbe and Weser. The Archbishopric of Magdeburg raised claims to some parts of those lands. At the end of April 1227, Henry V, Count Palatine of the Rhine, died. The forces of Otto the Child, supported by the Brandenburg margraves, then focused on the defence of Brunswick, which was threatened by an attack by the Hohenstaufen army.⁷³ This operation was successful for the Duke. In July 1227, Otto set out to support his uncle Valdemar II of Denmark. In the battle of Bornhöved in 1227, which proved decisive for the history of Denmark, the Duke of Lüneburg and Brunswick was captured by the Schwerin forces. The Hohenstaufen tried to take advantage of this situation. Frederick II Hohenstaufen offered the Margrave of Baden 2300 silver ingots in exchange for a pledge, which was to be established on Welf estates, the heir of which was, in his eyes and by his marriage, the Margrave of Baden. At the same time, the emperor tried to take over the claims of the Bavarian Duke to Brunswick.⁷⁴ Imperial troops, commanded by the German King Henry VII, made an attempt to take control of Brunswick already in 1227. This action failed due to the loyalty which the Brunswick townspeople manifested to Otto the Child as well as the military assistance brought personally to Brunswick by the Margraves of Brandenburg: John I and Otto III.⁷⁵ The young Ascanians once again clearly declared themselves on the side of their brother-in-law. Thus, they found themselves in the anti-imperial and pro-Danish political camp. In local politics, this led to a significant

72 *Regesten*, 590; Egon Boshof, "Die Entstehung des Herzogtums Braunschweig-Lüneburg," in: *Heinrich der Löwe*, hrsg. v. Wolf-Dieter Mohrmann (Veröffentlichungen der Niedersächsischen Archivverwaltung, 39) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 256; Thorau, *König Heinrich*, 320–328; Gudrun Pischke, "Brunonen und Welfen als Königskandidaten und Königswähler vom 11. bis 14. Jahrhundert," in: *Königliche Tochterstämme, Königswähler und Kurfürsten*, hrsg. v. Armin Wolf (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002), 139; Hans Patze, "Die Begründung des Herzogtums Braunschweig im Jahre 1235 und die «Braunschweigische Reimchronik»," in: *Ausgewählte Aufsätze von Hans Patze*, hrsg. v. Peter Johaneck, Ernst Schubert, Matthias Werne (Vorträge und Forschungen, Herausgegeben vom Konstanzer Arbeitskreis für mittelalterliche Geschichte, 1) (Stuttgart: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2002), 593–954.

73 *Regesten*, 590.

74 Patze, "Die Begründung," 593–594.

75 *Regesten*, 593; Bauch, *Die Markgrafen*, 16; Thorau, *König Heinrich*, 323.

cooling of the relationship between the Brandenburg Margraves and the local pillar of the Hohenstaufen party, i.e. the Archbishop of Magdeburg, Albert von Käfernburg. The Ascanians must have remembered his failure to keep his promise related to the imperial confirmation of their offices.

Another threat that John I, Otto III and their advisory circles had to deal with at that time was the renewal of the dispute between the Margraves and the Halberstadt bishopric. It certainly concerned financial matters and the problem of ownership of the district and Castle of Alvensleben as well as Walbeck Castle.⁷⁶ From 1209, the Bishopric was headed by Frederick II Burggraf von Kirchberg, who was trying to raise the political significance of his diocese and was pursuing an exuberant investment policy.⁷⁷ Despite the growing dispute between the Empire and the papacy, the Bishop sought the success of his plans (similar to Albert II von Käfernburg) in cooperation with the imperial court. The alliance between Bishop Frederick II and Archbishop Albert II thus seems to be fully understandable.

The defeat suffered by Denmark at the Battle of Bornhöved in 1227 made it possible to implement the German-Danish agreements of 1225. Valdemar II was to relinquish his sovereignty over the lands of the Reich located between the estuary of the River Eider (in today's Schleswig-Holstein) and the Rivers Levensau and Elbe. Valdemar II had to yield and return to the Reich the lands belonging to Lord Borwin (Henry Borwin I), and all lands of Slavia, except Rügen and its territories.⁷⁸

The rulers of West Pomerania, whose state fell within the concept of the land of Slavia, did not really believe in the permanence of the situation and the final defeat of Denmark. This was still the case in the year 1228, when Pomeranian-Rugian contacts can be proven. However, this state of affairs began to change in the face of political compromises that the Danish king had to make. To make matters more complicated, there were additional consequences of implementing the provisions of the treaty of 1225. Rügen, which was to remain with Denmark, decided to extend the borders of its

76 *Regesten*, 650; see: Georg Sello, "Halberstädtisch-brandenburgische Fehde 1238–1245," *Zeitschrift des Harzvereins für Geschichte und Alterthumskunde* 24 (1891): 201–219; Schultze, *Die Mark Brandenburg*, 121 *et seq.*, which discusses the disputes between the Church and the margraves since the time of Albert II. The conflict with the Diocese of Brandenburg seems of primary importance here. It concerned income collected from the so-called new lands of the March. However, other dioceses also faced problems with the collection of church benefits and the enforcement of the rights of the Church in the territories belonging to the margraves of Brandenburg.

77 *Regesten*, 598 believed that Ludolf was then the Bishop of Halberstadt. In contemporary literature, however, it is assumed that the person in question is Frederick II Burggraf von Kirchberg, Bishop of Halberstadt in the years 1209–1236. Cf. Helmut Beumann, "Beiträge zum Urkundenwesen der Bischöfe von Halberstadt (965–1241). Mit 4 Tafeln," *Archiv für Urkundenforschung* 16 (1939): 5, where there is a board showing, inter alia, years in office of particular bishops of Halberstadt.

78 MUB, vol. I, 317; Usinger, *Deutsch-dänische Geschichte*, 350–351.

continental possessions to the limit. At that time, Mecklenburg also spotted a chance to resolve earlier border disputes with Pomerania.

According to the assumptions of contemporary researchers, Wartislaw III, who came of age around 1225, earlier lost to Rügen the castellany of Wolgast.⁷⁹ These circumstances may have been mentioned in the later fief treaty concluded between him and the Brandenburg margraves in Kremmen in 1236. The Duke wrote in it the request for the help which the Ascanians were to provide him in regaining what Wartislaw had lost in his childhood. According to historians, this loss was supposed to be Wolgast. The young Griffins: Wartislaw III and Barnim I managed to regain the disputed lands by the summer of 1228. Documents issued by both Dukes during this period are considered as evidence of this. They mention: Cieszymir, castellan of Demmin, accompanying Wartislaw III and Mirosław, castellan of Wolgast, accompanying Barnim I.⁸⁰ It was connected with the division of the regained territories between the two rulers.⁸¹

It is possible that Lübeck provided aid to the Pomeranian dukes in the described project. Its Pomeranian interests outweighed the considerable benefits that the privilege granted by the ruler of Rügen Vitslav I in 1224 gave to ships and merchants coming from this city.⁸² In the following period, Lübeck effectively became a pillar of the anti-Danish opposition in the countries of the Reich.⁸³ After the disastrous events of 1227, Valdemar II began to forge anti-Lübeck alliances composed mainly of trading cities competing with it: Bremen, Stade, Brunswick and Cologne. The location of the city of Soest by Valdemar II is also viewed as part of this process. In addition, the Danish king reached an agreement with the Archbishop of Bremen, Gerhard II and Count Adolf IV of Holstein. These feudal lords contributed greatly to the victory over

79 PU, vol. I, 252; *Regesten*, 636; Fritz Zickermann, "Das Lehnverhältnis zwischen Brandenburg und Pommern im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert," *Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte* 4 (1891): 41; Rymar, "Księstwa zachodniopomorskie," 331.

80 PU, vol. I, 248, 250; Spors, "Przynależność polityczna," 354 *et seq.*; Rymar, "Księstwa zachodniopomorskie," 336.

81 Cf. Dietmar Lucht, "Herzog Wartislaw III. von Pommern," *Baltische Studien*, N.F. 53 (1967): 13; Rymar, "Księstwa zachodniopomorskie," 336.

82 UB St. Lübeck, 27; Barthold, *Geschichte von Rügen*, 376; Usinger, *Deutsch-dänische Geschichte*, 330; Christian Reuter, "Lübeck und Stralsund bis zum Rostocker Landfrieden 1283," *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 32 (1904/1905): 11–12.

83 The privileges granted by the Griffins to the city (PU, vol. I, 250–251) can testify to the alliance between Lübeck and Pomerania; Spors, "Przynależność polityczna," 351 *et seq.* On the anti-Danish activity of Lübeck, see Usinger, *Deutsch-dänische Geschichte*, 359 *et seq.*; Osieglowski, *Polityka zewnętrzna*, 70–71

Denmark in 1227.⁸⁴ Valdemar II managed to considerably weaken in the Reich the Count's party, whose troops defeated the King at Bornhöved.

The Griffins' move against Rügen and their alliance with Lübeck certainly caused a state of tension between West Pomerania and Denmark. Initially, however, it did not lead to an open severance of relations and war. The fights broke out a little later, and another factor contributing to the conflict between Pomerania and Denmark were border disputes between the Duchy of Wartislaw III and Mecklenburg. This dispute had a diocesan dimension and concerned the conflict between the Bishop of Schwerin, Brunward, and the Bishop of Cammin, Konrad II.⁸⁵ The territorial aspect of the conflict concerned the affiliation of the Bisdede and Tribeden lands.⁸⁶ Sources directly relating it come only from the 1230's. However, it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that the dispute aggravated already at the end of the 20's of the 13th century. In 1226, the ruler of Mecklenburg, Henry Borwin II of Rostock, founded a collegiate church with 10 prebendaries in Güstrow, which borders with Pomerania.⁸⁷ After his death, the donation was confirmed by his father, Henry Borwin I.⁸⁸ In June 1229, the estate of the funded collegiate church was confirmed by the Bishop of Schwerin, Brunward.⁸⁹ In the papal approval of this collegiate church of 11 May 1230, it was defined as situated in the Cammin diocese ("Gustrowe, Caminensis diocesis").⁹⁰ On 1 November 1228, the rulers of Mecklenburg: John, Nicholas, Henry and Pribislav stayed in Güstrow and confirmed the municipal rights granted to it by their father, Henry Borwin II. In the summer of 1229, Bishop Brunward confirmed the collegiate property in Güstrow. So it was probably after that date, and before May 1230, that the fights between Pomerania and Mecklenburg erupted. Perhaps Rymar rightly proposed the hypothesis that in the second half of 1229 the Mecklenburgers attacked the Pomeranian lands. At the same time, their appetites expanded significantly and targeted not only Circipania, but also the Wozlende lands.⁹¹ The conflict is evidenced by the granting by

84 Usinger, *Deutsch-dänische Geschichte*, 387 *et seq.*, Dahlmann, *Geschichte von Dänemark*, 393; Osiegiński, *Polityka zewnętrzną*, 70–71; Rymar, "Księstwa zachodniopomorskie," 337; idem, "Konflikt pomorsko-meklemburski," 30–31.

85 Wilhelm Biereye, "Bischof Brunward von Schwerin," *Mecklenburgische Jahrbücher* 98 (1943): 108, 129–130; Hellmuth Heyden, *Kirchengeschichte von Pommern*, vol. I: *Von den Anfängen des Christentums bis zur Reformationszeit* (Stettin: Verlag von Fischer & Schmidt, 1937), 78–79; Rymar, "Konflikt pomorsko-meklemburski," 26.

86 Rymar, "Konflikt pomorsko-meklemburski," 26.

87 MUB, vol. I, 323.

88 Ibidem, 331.

89 Ibidem, 368.

90 Ibidem, 378, PU, vol. I, 244; Rymar, "Konflikt pomorsko-meklemburski," 26.

91 It results from a subsequent agreement on the collection of tithes by Konrad II, Bishop of Cammin, from these lands and the transfer of half of them to Nicholas and Henry of Rostock. MUB, vol. I, 369;

the Mecklenburg rulers Nicholas and Henry of Rostock in 1229 again in Güstrow in favour of the Benedictine monastery in Arendsee in March. It concerned the granting of the village of Wargentín and the right to half of the fish caught in half of the lake of Malchin. The diploma was also a confirmation of earlier grants from Pomeranian Dukes Casimir II and his son Wartislaw III.⁹² Apparently, the object of the Pomeranian donation was in the hands of the Mecklenburgers in 1229.

Contrary to the opinion in the literature on the subject, I do not think that the Pomeranian-Mecklenburg war of 1229 immediately resulted in Denmark's move against the Pomeranian dukes. Rather, the political circumstances leading up to the Battle of the Plane point to the opposite. Despite the fact that since 1227 Otto the Child was in Schwerin captivity, it was quite obvious for the Welfs' political faction, which was associated with him and supported by Denmark and Brandenburg, that the Duke's imprisonment was only a temporary state. On 10 May 1228, through the intercession of Agnes of Wettin, mother-in-law of Otto the Child, the Duke was given all the estates in the Verden Bishopric that belonged to Count Palatine Henry.⁹³ In September that year, strong ties with Otto were clearly confirmed by the Danish King Valdemar II. In exchange for their loyalty to Otto and defence against the armies of King Henry VII, he granted the people of Brunswick numerous customs freedoms.⁹⁴ At the end of that year, the Danish King, Pope Gregory IX and the English King Henry III launched a large-scale diplomatic campaign aimed at forcing the widow of Henry of Schwerin Margaret-Audacia and her son Gunzelin III to release Otto the Child.⁹⁵ Pope Gregory IX and King Henry III who supported him saw in Otto a natural candidate for an anti-king who could be opposed to the Hohenstaufen. However, these plans could not be implemented mainly due to the fears and reluctance of Otto the Child himself.

Welf was released at the beginning of 1229 after the settlement he made with the Saxon Duke Albert I and the promise made to Schwerin that he would no longer support Valdemar II against Gunzelin III.⁹⁶ Judging by the correspondence between Otto and the papacy, the Duke of Brunswick and Lüneburg did not intend to keep this

Rymar, "Konflikt pomorsko-meklemburski," 28, note 34.

92 MUB, vol. I, 371; cf. Friedrich Salis, "Forschungen zur älteren Geschichte des Bistums Kammin," *Baltische Studien*, N.F. 26 (1924): 42; Rymar, "Konflikt pomorsko-meklemburski," 27–28.

93 MUB, vol. I, 353; Boshof, "Die Entstehung," 268.

94 MUB, vol. I, 357; Bauch, *Die Markgrafen*, 16.

95 MUB, vol. I, 361, 366, 367; Bauch, *Die Markgrafen*, 16; Boshof, "Die Entstehung," 268; Pischke, "Brunonen und Welfen," 140; Patze, "Die Begründung," 594; Smoliński, "Kilka uwag w sprawie roli politycznej," 259–260.

96 MUB, vol. I, 364; *Regesten*, 599; Hermann Steudener, "Albrecht I., Herzog zu Sachsen 1212–1260," *Zeitschrift des Harz-Vereins für Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 28 (1895) 1: 47–48; Smoliński, "Kilka uwag o roli politycznej," 259–260.

promise.⁹⁷ Unexpectedly, however, the Duke's main ally, the Danish king, began to incline towards a settlement with the still hostile German counts. Valdemar II decided to end the war with Schwerin and finally be reunited with his younger sons who were held in captivity. The conflict with the Hohenstaufen and their local party became for Otto the Child much more urgent than the relations with Gunzelin III and the Saxon Duke Albert I. The Duke of Brunswick and Lüneburg got involved in the war with the Hohenstaufen virtually immediately after his release from Schwerin captivity. The newly-liberated ruler had to tame the Brunswick ministeriales who switched sides and joined the Hohenstaufen. The rebellious ministeriales sought help from the Archbishop of Magdeburg. The fierceness of the conflict was so great that what mattered was not only defeating the opponent, but physically eliminating him. During the fighting, an accusation was raised that Otto the Child and, indirectly, the Brandenburg margraves supported the plan to assassinate the Archbishop.⁹⁸ One of Otto's officials, Cesarius, was to prepare it. He was notorious even earlier on account of his actions against the Archbishopric of Magdeburg. When he was captured, the margraves of Brandenburg saved him from losing his life by interceding on his behalf with the Archbishop of Magdeburg. The released Cesarius not only did not change his behaviour, but during the war of the Archbishopric with Brunswick and the March, he offered to kill Albert II von Käfernburg.

Otto the Child continued the war with the Archbishop of Magdeburg and the Bishop of Halberstadt with the help of his former allies. They were his Brandenburg brothers-in-law and probably the Pomeranian dukes still associated with Denmark. The policy pursued by the Archbishop of Magdeburg could have induced the Griffins to join the fight against Albert II von Käfernburg. At least from 1210 until 1228, he carried out extensive campaigns in the Roman Curia aimed at recognising the subordination of the Bishopric of Cammin to Magdeburg.⁹⁹ These efforts were also intensified in 1228. At the end of June that year, Pope Gregory IX ordered the bishop of Cammin to respect the former decision of Innocent III to subordinate the Cammin diocese to the Archbishopric of Magdeburg.¹⁰⁰ The attempt to deprive the Pomeranian church of independence was certainly not positively received in Pomerania in 1228 or 1229.

97 MUB, vol. I, 367.

98 *Regesten*, 601.

99 PU, vol. I, 168, 216, 245; Hartung, "Die Territorialpolitik," 229–230; Heyden, *Kirchengeschichte von Pommern*, 72 *et seq.*; Rymar, "Termin," 165; Edward Rymar, *Biskupi, mnisi, reformatorzy: studia z dziejów diecezji kamieńskiej* (Rozprawy i Studia Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 45) (Szczecin: Scientific Publishers of the University of Szczecin, 2002), 17–18. While the attempt of subordination was successfully resisted by Bishop Sigwin, his successors, including Konrad III of Salzwedel, were inclined to recognise the claim of the Magdeburg Archbishopric.

100 PU, vol. I, 245.

Due to the impossibility of obtaining real help by the Pomeranians from Valdemar II in the war with Rügen and Mecklenburg, the Griffins decided to seek an alternative political solution. Without actively working against Denmark itself, they turned towards an alliance with the Brandenburg margraves. Since both Wartislaw III and Barnim I owned lands which were the subject of the dispute with Rügen and due to the message of the Magdeburg Bishop's chronicle mentioning the margraves' auxiliaries in the battle of Plane (a detachment from Slavic countries and not from one country), one can cautiously theorise that both Pomeranian rulers decided on an alliance with the margraves.

The war between Pomerania and Denmark probably took place in the early 1330's. The policies of the Danish king and the Brandenburg margraves had the greatest influence on the severance of the Pomeranian dukes with Valdemar II. In 1230, Valdemar II concluded a peace agreement with Gunzelin III and regained his younger sons and the rest of the Danish hostages. This act symbolised the end of the anti-Danish alliance of the German counts. In the following years, this enabled Valdemar II to attack the Pomeranian ally, i.e. Lübeck, and then, in alliance with Rügen, Pomerania itself. The Brandenburg margraves, after their defeat in 1229, made a political turn, seeking an agreement with the Hohenstaufen party. They succeeded in 1231, when John I and, in the event of his death, Otto III, obtained confirmation of their March offices and estates as well as the right to supremacy over the Pomeranian Duchy.¹⁰¹ If parts of the Teltow and Barnim lands had already fallen away from Pomerania, it is possible that Barnim I, when joining, together with Wartislaw III, an alliance with the March also agreed to give up claims to these territories.¹⁰² Their brother-in-law, Otto the Child, also made it possible for them to work towards a settlement with the imperial party. The war of 1229 was quickly ended by concluding an agreement with the Archbishop of Magdeburg and the Bishop of Halberstadt regarding the Walbeck castle. The Duke promised them that the castle would not be rebuilt.¹⁰³ After successfully defending the Welf's Brunswick legacy, at least for a time, he was not interested in escalating the conflict with the Hohenstaufen. Owing to this attitude and English mediation, in 1235 he managed to come to an agreement with Emperor Frederick II.

101 Ibidem, 279.

102 Rymar, "Termin," 176. Since this hypothesis contradicts the message of the *Chronicle of the Margraves of Brandenburg*, where it was claimed that these territories were obtained by Margraves John I and Otto III, this matter should still be the subject of research.

103 Bauch, *Die Markgrafen*, 18, note 1, where the source material is quoted.

Bibliography

Printed sources

- Böhmer, Johann Friedrich, and Techen, Friedrich, bearb. *Urkundenbuch der Stadt Lübeck* Part I. Lübeck: F. Asfchenfeldt, 1843.
- Conrad, Klaus, hrsg. v. *Pommersches Urkundenbuch*, Vol. I, 2 Auflage. Köln–Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1970.
- Ehrenfeuchter, Ernst, hrsg. v. “Chronicon Montis Sereni.” In: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptorum*. Vol. 23, 138–226. (Neudruck). Leipzig: Verlag Karl W. Hiersemann, 1925.
- Holder-Egger, Oswald, hrsg. v. “Chronica principum Saxoniae.” In: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores*. Vol. 25, 472–480. Hannoverae: impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Haniani, 1888.
- Jørgensen, Ellen, ed. “Annales Slesuicenses.” In: *Annales Danici medii aevi. Udgivne af Selskabet for udgivelse af kilder til dansk historie med understøttelse af Carlsbergfondet*, 132–135. København: Hos Nielsen & Lydische. Axel Simmelklear, 1920.
- Krabbo, Hermann, Winter, Georg, bearb. *Regesten der Markgrafen von Brandenburg aus askanischem Hause*. Lief. 1–12. Leipzig et al.: Verlag von Duncker & Humblod, Selbstverlage des Vereins Geschäftsstelle Berlin-Dahlem, Selbstverlag für Geschichte des Mark Brandenburg, 1910–1955.
- Langebeck, Jacob, ed. “Chronicon Danicum 1074–1219.” In: *Scriptores rerum Danicarum medii aevi* 3, 259–269. Hafniae: Godiche, 1774.
- Lappenberg, Johann Martin, ed., ex recensione. “Arnoldi Chronica Slavorum.” In: *Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum ex Monumentis Germaniae historicis recudi fecit G.H. Pertz*. Hannover: impensis Bibliopolii Hahnianie 1868.
- Lisch, Georg Christian Friedrich *et al.*, hrsg. v. *Meklenburgische Urkundefuch*, Vol. I. Schwerin: in Commission der Stiller’schen Hofbuchhandlung, 1863; Vol. II (1251–1280). Schwerin: in Commission der Stiller’schen Hofbuchhandlung, 1864; Vol. IV: (1297–1300), *Nachträge und Register zu I–IV*. Schwerin: in Commission der Stiller’schen Hofbuchhandlung, 1867.
- Schum, Wilhelm, hrsg. v. “Gesta archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensium.” In: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores*, Vol. 25, 369–374. Hannoverae: impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Haniani, 1883.
- Sello, Georg, hrsg. v. “Chronica Marchionum Brandenburgensium. Nach einer Handschrift der Trierer Stadtbibliothek und den Excerpten des Pulkawa.” *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte* 1 (1888): 117–180.
- Skyum-Neilsen, Niels, udgivet af. *Diplomatarium Danicaum*, Series 1, Vol. 5: 1211–1223. København: Ejnar Munkgaards Forlag S/A, 1957.

- Waitz, Georg, edit. "Chronica regia Coloniensis cum continuationibus in monasterio S. Pantaleonis scriptis aliisque Coloniensis monumentis partim ex monumentis Germaniae historicis recusa." In: *Monumeta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum*, Vol. 18. Hannoverae: impensis Bibliopolinii Hahnani, 1880.
- Weiland, Ludwig, hrsg. v. "Sächsische Weltchronik." In: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Deutsche Chroniken*, Vol. 2. Hannoverae: Hahnsche Buchhandlung 1887.

References

- Allen, Carl Ferdinand. *Geschichte des Königreichs Dänemark: mit steter Rücksicht auf die innere Entwicklung in Staat und Volk*. Kiel: Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1842.
- Assing, Helmut. "Zu den Beziehungen zwischen Slawen und Deutschen in der frühen Mark Brandenburg (12./13. Jahrhundert): Gedanken nach der Lektüre des Buches «Das Havelland im Mittelalter»." *Jahrbuch für Geschichte des Feudalismus* 14 (1990): 181–209.
- Assing, Helmut. "Die Anfänge askanischer Herrschaft in den Gebieten östlich der Elbe." In: *Brandenburgische Landesgeschichte und Archivwissenschaft. Festschrift für Lieselott Enders zum 70. Geburtstag*, hrsg. v., Friedrich Beck and Klaus Neitmann (Veröffentlichungen des Brandenburgischen Landeshauptarchivs, 34), 21–35. Verlag Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger Weimar, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 1997.
- Balzer, Oswald. *Genealogia Piastów*. Second Edition. Kraków: Avalon, 2005.
- Barthold, Friedrich Wilhelm. *Geschichte von Rügen und Pommern*. Vol. 2: *Von der Belehrung Pommerns zum Christenthume bis zum Tode Barnims I. i. J. 1278*. Hamburg: F. Perthes, 1840.
- Bauch, Alfred. *Markgrafen Johann I. und Otto III. von Brandenburg: Reichslegat Gebhard von Arnstein, ein Brandenburger im Dienste Kaiser Friedrichs II. Die Wahl Richards von Cornwall zum römischen König*. Breslau: Verlag von Eduard Trewendt, 1886.
- Benl, Rudolf. *Die Gestaltung der Bodenrechtsverhältnisse in Pommern vom 12. bis zum 14. Jahrhunderts*. Köln–Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1986.
- Beumann, Helmut. "Beiträge zum Urkundenwesen der Bischöfe von Halberstadt (965–1241). Mit 4 Tafeln." *Archiv für Urkundenforschung* 16 (1939): 1–101.
- Biereye, Wilhelm. "Bischof Brunward von Schwerin," *Mecklenburgische Jahrbücher* 98 (1943): 101–138.
- Bobowski, Kazimierz. "Ze studiów nad autentycznością wczesnośredniowiecznych dokumentów zachodniopomorskich." *Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis. Historia* 499 (1980): 23–37.
- Bobowski, Kazimierz. "Prawnopaństwowy stosunek Pomorza Zachodniego wobec Brandenburgii na przestrzenie XIII w." In: *Niemcy – Polska w średniowieczu. Materiały z konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej przez Instytut Historii UAM w dniach 14–16 XI 1983 roku*, edited by Jerzy Strzelczyk, 225–235. Poznań: Wydawnictwo UAM, 1986.

- Bojsen, Frede. *Jacob Sunesön af Møn: Et mindeskrift og nogle undersøgelser*. København: Akademisk Boghandel, 1902.
- Boshof, Egon. "Die Entstehung des Herzogtums Braunschweig-Lüneburg." In: *Heinrich der Löwe*, hrsg. v. Wolf-Dieter Mohrmann (Veröffentlichungen der Niedersächsischen Archivverwaltung, 39), 249–274. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980.
- Brosien, Hermann. *Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg im Mittelalter*. Salzwasser Verlag GmbH: Paderborn, 2015, Nachdruck des Originals von 1887.
- Christensen, C.A., "Jacob Sunesen." In: *Dansk Biografisk Leksikon*. Accessed 23 April 2022 https://biografiskleksikon.lex.dk/Jacob_Sunesen.
- Czaplewski, Paweł. "Tytułatura książąt pomorskich do początku XIV wieku." *Zapiski Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu* 15 (1949): 18–53.
- Dahlmann, Friedrich Christoph. *Geschichte von Dänemark*, Vol. 1. Hamburg: Perthes, 1840.
- Duda, Franciszek. *Rozwój terytorialny Pomorza polskiego (wiek XI–XIII)*. Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności; Fundusz Nestora Bucewicza, 1909.
- Fey, Hans-Joachim. *Reise und Herrschaft der Markgrafen von Brandenburg (1134–1319)*. Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1973.
- Fritze, Wolfgang Hermann. "Das Vordringen deutscher Herrschaft in Teltow und Barnim." *Jahrbuch für brandenburgische Landesgeschichte* 22 (1971): 41–50.
- Hauziński, Jerzy. "Uniwersalistyczny kontekst aktu raweńskiego w sprawie Pomorza." In: *Pomorze słowiańskie i jego sąsiedzi X–XI w.*, edited by Jerzy Hauziński, 121–136. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo "Marpress," 1995.
- Hartung, Julius. "Die Territorialpolitik der Magdeburger Erzbischöfe Wichmann, Ludolf und Albrecht, 1152–1232." *Geschichtsblätter für Stadt und Land Magdeburg* 21 (1886): 1–58, 113–137, 217–252.
- Herkommer, Hubert. "Eike von Repgows «Sachsenspiegel» und die «Sächsische Weltchronik»." *Jahrbuch des Vereins für Niederdeutsche Sprachforschung* 100 (1977): 7–42.
- Heyden, Hellmuth. *Kirchengeschichte von Pommern*, Vol. 1: *Von den Anfängen des Christentums bis zur Reformationszeit*. Stettin: Verlag von Fischer & Schmidt, 1937.
- Hofmeister, Adolf. "Ueber eine Handschrift der Sächsischen Weltchronik." *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für Ältere zur Beförderung einer Gesamtausgabe der Quellschriften deutscher Geschichten des Mittelalters* 32 (1907): 85–122.
- Holder-Egger, Oswald. "Über die Braunschweiger und Sächsische Fürstenchronik und verwandte Quellen." *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde* 17 (1892): 159–184.
- Hoogeweg, Herman. *Die Stifter und Klöster der Provinz Pommern*, Vol. 2. Stettin: Leon Sauniers Buchhandlung, 1925.

- Hoppe, Willy. "Das Erzstift Magdeburg und der Osten." In: idem, *Die Mark Brandenburg, Wettin und Magdeburg. Ausgewählte Aufsätze*, hrsg. v. Herbert Ludat, 207–220. Köln–Graz: Böhlau Verlag, 1965.
- Hybel, Nils. *The Nature of Kingship c. 800–1300*. Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2017.
- Jakobsen, Grethe. "Wicked count Henry." *Journal of Baltic Studies* 9 (1978) 4: 326–338.
- Kleinen, Michale. "Die Magdeburger Bischofschronik als Quelle für den Historiker." In: *Magdeburger Bischofschronik*, hrsg. v. Eckhart Wilhelm Peters, translated by Hermann Michaëlis, 33–60. Döbel: Verlag Janos Stekovics, 2006.
- Knoll, Gerhard. *Die Entstehung und Geschichte der Johanniterordenskommende Werben im 13. Jahrhundert mit ihren äußeren Beziehungen und im Lichte der Privilegien und Statuten*. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktor phil. des Fachbereichs Geschichtswissenschaft der Freie Universität Berlin, 1971.
- Labuda, Gerard. "Magdeburg i Poznań (Założenie arcybiskupstwa magdeburskiego i biskupstwa poznańskiego na tle wschodniej polityki misyjnej Ottona Wielkiego)." *Roczniki Historyczne* 14 (1938): 186–238.
- Labuda, Gerard. *Fragmentsy dziejów Słowiańszczyzny Zachodniej*, Second Edition. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, 2002.
- Labuda, Gerard. "Podstawy polityczno-prawne kupna Pomorza Gdańskiego przez Zakon Krzyżacki od margrabiów brandenburskich w latach 1309–1310." *Roczniki Historyczne* 71 (2005): 32–61.
- Lisch, Georg Christian Friedrich. "Audacia, Gemahlin des Grafen Heinrich I., von Schwerin." *Jahrbücher des Vereins für Mecklenburgische Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 27 (1862): 131–162.
- Lucht, Dietmar. "Die Außenpolitik Herzog Barnims I. von Pommern." *Baltische Studien*, N.F. 51 (1965): 15–32.
- Lucht, Dietmar. "Herzog Wartislaw III. von Pommern." *Baltische Studien*, N.F. 53 (1967): 13–17.
- Marciniak, Ryszard. "O oprawie wiana Anastazji Mieszkówny, księżnej zachodniopomorskiej." *Zapisku Historyczne* 52 (1987), 4: 21–34.
- Osięgłowski, Janisław. *Polityka zewnętrzna księstwa Rugii (1168–1328)*. Warszawa–Poznań: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1975.
- Partenheimer, Lutz. *Albrecht der Bär. Gründer der Mark Brandenburg und des Fürstentums Anhalt*. Köln–Weimar–Wien: Verlag Böhlau, 2003.
- Passow, Siegfried. "Die Occupation und Kolonisation des Barnim." *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte* 14 (1902): 1–43.

- Patze, Hans. "Die Begründung des Herzogtums Braunschweig im Jahre 1235 und die «Braunschweigische Reimchronik»." In: *Ausgewählte Aufsätze von Hans Patze*, hrsg. v. Peter Johaneke, Ernst Schubert, and Matthias Werne (Vorträge und Forschungen, Herausgegeben vom Konstanzer Arbeitskreis für mittelalterliche Geschichte, 1), 588–608. Stuttgart: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2002.
- Petersen, Henry. *Adelige sigiller fra det XIII. og XIV. Aarhundrede*. København: Reitzel, 1897.
- Pflugk-Harttung, Julius von. "Unechte Urkunden des Johanniter-Ordens aus dem 12. und 13. Jahrhundert." *Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte* 11 (1898): 301–309.
- Pflugk-Harttung, Julius von. *Die Anfänge des Johanniter-Ordens in Deutschland besonders in der Mark Brandenburg und in Mecklenburg*. Berlin: J.M. Spaeth, 1899.
- Pischke, Gudrun. "Brunonen und Welfen als Königskandidaten und Königswähler vom 11. bis 14. Jahrhundert." In: *Königliche Tochterstämme, Königswähler und Kurfürsten*, hrsg. v. Armin Wolf, 107–161. Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002.
- Piskorski, Jan M. *Pomorze plemienne. Historia – Archeologia – Językoznawstwo*. Poznań–Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Scorus, Muzeum Narodowe w Szczecinie, Wydawnictwo Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, 2002.
- Rachfahl, Felix. "Der Ursprung des brandenburgisch-pommerschen Lehnverhältnis." *Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte* 5 (1892): 31–84.
- Renn, Gerhard. *Die Bedeutung des Namens "Pommern" und die Bezeichnungen für das heutige Pommern in der Geschichte*. Greifswald: Ratsbuchhandlung L. Bamberg. Hans Adler, E. Panzig & Co., 1937.
- Reuter, Christian. "Lübeck und Stralsund bis zum Rostocker Landfrieden 1283." *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 32 (1904/1905): 3–34.
- Ruppel, Aloys. "Zur Reichslegation des Erzbischofs Albert von Magdeburg (1222–24)." *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* 13 (1910): 103–134.
- Rogge, Jörg. "Heilige Hallen. Zur Ausbildung der Kirchenorganisation im Bistum Brandenburg vom 10. bis zur Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts." In: *Wege in die Himmelsstadt: Bischof, Glaube, Herrschaft 800–1550*, hrsg. v. Clemens Bergstedt, and Heinz-Dieter Heimann, 99–111. Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2005.
- Rymar, Edward. "Zjazd w Kamieniu Pomorskim w końcu 1219 r. Świętoborzyce w ziemi choćkowskiej i kołobrzesckiej." *Materiały Zachodniopomorskie* 22 (1976): 123–161.
- Rymar, Edward. "Dobrosława, księżniczka zachodniopomorska, pani na Sławnie potem Chockowie oraz Audacja (Eudoksja) Piastówna, hrabina zwierzynska." *Studia i Materiały do Dziejów Wielkopolski i Pomorza* 14 (1982) 2: 6–11.
- Rymar, Edward. "Sprawa pochodzenia Ermengardy drugiej żony Świętopełka gdańskiego." *Rocznik Gdańsk* 52 (1982) 1: 5–15.

- Rymar, Edward. "Międzynarodowy kontekst genezy przywileju raweńskiego w sprawie lenna pomorskiego ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem roli arcybiskupstwa magdeburgskiego." In: *Polska, Prusy, Ruś. Studia ofiarowane prof. zw. dr. hab. Janowi Powierskiemu w trzydziestolecie pracy naukowej* (Gdańskie Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza 2), edited by Błażej Śliwiński, 137–148. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo "Marpress," 1995.
- Rymar, Edward. *Biskupi, mnisi, reformatorzy: studia z dziejów diecezji kamieńskiej* (Rozprawy i Studia Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 45). Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2002.
- Rymar, Edward. *Rodowód książąt pomorskich*. Second Edition. Szczecin: Książnica Pomorska, 2005.
- Rymar, Edward. "Zaodrzańska połącz księstwa zachodniopomorskiego jako teren wojny brandenbursko-duńskiej (1214 rok)." In: *Od najazdów pogańskich dotąd są państwa Waszej Królewskiej Mości spokojne... Studia ofiarowane w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin Profesorowi Karolowi Olejnikowi*, edited by Zbigniew Pilarczyk and Maciej Franz, 90–102. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2008.
- Rymar, Edward. "Księstwa zachodniopomorskie, zwłaszcza ich połącz zaodrzańska u schyłku dominacji duńskiej (1215–1223/1228)." In: *Scriptura, diploma, sigillum. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Kazimierzowi Bobowskiemu*, edited by Joachim Zdrenka and Joanna Karczewska, 323–339. Zielona Góra: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2009.
- Rymar, Edward. "Konflikt pomorsko-meklemburski i pomorsko-rugijski w Czreżpieniu w warunkach likwidacji dominacji duńskiej na Pomorzu z lat 1223/27– 1238/9." In: *A Pomerania ad ultimas terras: studia ofiarowane Barbarze Popielas-Szultce w sześćdziesiątą piątą rocznicę urodzin i czterdziestolecie pracy naukowej*, edited by Jarosław Sochacki and Agnieszka Teterycz-Puzio, 25–43. Słupsk: Akademia Pomorska w Słupsku, 2011.
- Rymar, Edward. "Księstwa zachodniopomorskie w pierwszym okresie wpływów duńskich (1187–1211)." *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza* 17 (2013): 157–178.
- Rymar, Edward. "Termin i okoliczności utraty i rezygnacji księstwa pomorskiego z ziem barnimskiej, teltowskiej i południowej ziemi wkrzańskiej (1180–1230)." *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza* 19 (2015): 157–177.
- Salis, Friedrich, "Forschungen zur älteren Geschichte des Bistums Kammin." *Baltische Studien*, N.F. 26 (1924): 1–155.
- Schich, Wienfried. "Zur Genese der Stadtanlage der Altstadt und Neustadt Brandenburg." In: *Beiträge zur Entstehung und Entwicklung der Stadt Brandenburg im Mittelalter*, hrsg. v. Wienfried Schich, 51–102 (Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin, 84). Berlin: De Gruyter, 1993.

- Schich, Winfried. "Oppida, Kirchenbauten und Fernhandelsstraße zwischen Berlin und Oderberg im 13. Jahrhundert." In: *Ein gefüllter Willkomm. Festschrift für Knut Schulz zum 65. Geburtstag*, hrsg. v. Franz Felten, Stephanie J. Irrgang, and Kurt Wesoly, 143–172. Aachen: Ashaken Verlag, 2002.
- Schmidt, Eberhard. *Die Mark Brandenburg unter den Askaniern (1134–1320)*. Köln–Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1973.
- Schultze, Johannes. *Die Mark Brandenburg*. Vol. 1 of *Entstehung und Entwicklung unter den askanischen Markgrafen (bis 1319)*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1961.
- Sello, Georg. *Markgraf Otto III. von Brandenburg*. Brandenburg: J. Wiesicke's Buchdruckerei, 1887.
- Sello, Georg. "Halberstädtisch-brandenburgische Fehde 1238–1245." *Zeitschrift des Harzvereins für Geschichte und Alterthumskunde* 24 (1891): 201–219.
- Sello, Georg. "Die Erwerbung des Barnim und Teltow durch die Markgrafen Johann I. und Otto III." *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte* 5 (1892), 2: 289–299.
- Silberborth, Hans. "Erzbischof Albrecht II. von Magdeburg." *Geschichtsblätter für Stadt und Land Magdeburg* 45 (1910): 110–232.
- Smoliński, Marek. *Polityka zachodnia księcia gdańsko-pomorskiego Świętopelka*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Oficyna Ferberiana, 2000.
- Smoliński, Marek. "Potencjalny udział oddziałów zachodniopomorskich w V krucjacie (1217?, 1219?) w świetle relacji krucjatowych Olivera z Padebornu." In: *Pomorze militarne XII–XXI w. Materiały z sesji naukowej zorganizowanej 27 listopada 2003 r. w Zamku Książąt Pomorskich*, edited by Kazimierz Kozłowski and Edward Rymar, Vol. 1, 175–200. Szczecin: Archiwum Państwowe w Szczecinie, 2004.
- Smoliński, Marek. "Miroslawa – księżna pomorska, regentka i dyplomatką." In: *Kobiety i władza w czasach dawnych*, edited by Bożena Czwojdrak and Agata A. Kluczek, 135–162. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2015.
- Smoliński, Marek. *Świętopełk gdański*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2016.
- Smoliński, Marek. "Kilka uwag w sprawie roli politycznej hrabianki szweryńskiej Audacji-Małgorzaty." *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza* 25 (2022): 241–280.
- Spieker, Christian Wilhelm. *Kirchen- und Reformations- Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg*, Part 1. Berlin: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1839.
- Spors, Józef. "Przynależność polityczna i administracyjna ziem pomorskich na północ od środkowej Piany do końca XII i w pierwszej połowie XIII wieku." In: Józef Spors, *Studia nad wczesnośredniowiecznymi dziejami Pomorza Zachodniego XII – pierwsza połowa XIII w.*, 331–377. Słupsk: Stowarzyszenie Społeczno-Kulturalne "Pobrzeże" w Słupsku, 1988.
- Steudener, Hermann. "Albrecht I., Herzog zu Sachsen 1212–1260." *Zeitschrift des Harzvereins für Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 28 (1895) 1: 1–116.

- Ślaski, Kazimierz. *Podziały terytorialne Pomorza w XI–XIII w.* Poznań: Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk, 1960.
- Teterycz-Puzio, Agnieszka. *Piastowskie księżne regentki. O utrzymanie władzy dla synów (koniec XII w. – początek XIV w.).* Kraków: Avalon, 2016.
- Thorau, Peter. *König Heinrich (VII.), das Reich und die Territorien. Untersuchungen zur Phase der Minderjährigkeit und der «Regentschaften» Erzbischof Engelberts I. von Köln und Herzog Ludwigs I. von Bayern (1211) 1220–1228* (Jahrbücher des Deutschen Reich unter Heinrich (VII.), Teil 1). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1998.
- Usinger, Rudolf. *Deutsch-dänische Geschichte 1189–1227.* Berlin: Druck und Verlag von E. S. Mittler und Sohn 1863.
- Voigt, Ferdinand. “Über das Alter der Markgrafen Johann I. und Otto III. und ihre Familien.” *Märkische Forschungen* 9 (1865): 114–127.
- Walachowicz, Jerzy. *Monopole książęce w skarbowości wczesnofeudalnej Pomorza Zachodniego.* Poznań: Polska Akademia Nauk, 1963.
- Wehrmann, Martin. *Geschichte von Pommern.* Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1904.
- Wolf, Jürgen. *Die sächsische Weltchronik im Spiegel ihrer Handschriften Überlieferung, Textentwicklung, Rezeption.* München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1997.
- Wybranowski Dariusz. “Rola polityczna możnowładztwa i rycerstwa w czasach regencji księżnych Ingardy i Mirosławy w latach 1220–1227. Przyczynek do dziejów Pomorza w czasach zwierzchności duńskiej w pierwszej połowie XIII wieku.” *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 28 (2003) 1: 7–27.
- Zickermann Fritz. “Das Lehnsverhältnis zwischen Brandenburg und Pommern im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert.” *Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte* 4 (1891): 1–120.
- Zips Manfred. “«Daz ist des van Repegouwe rat». Bemerkungen zur Verfasserfrage der «Sächsischen Weltchronik».” *Jahrbuch des Vereins für Niederdeutsche Sprachforschung* 106 (1983): 43–73.

English version: Radosław Dolecki, Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

In 1229, a battle took place on the River Plane near Brandenburg. In the battle, troops of the Margraves of Brandenburg John I and Otto III met the army of the ministeriales of the Magdeburg Archbishopric, led by Archbishop Albert II von Käfernburg himself. The margraves were supported by a strong detachment of Slavs / Wends coming from Slavic countries. An analysis of narrative sources, mainly the *Saxon World Chronicle* and the *Deeds of the Archbishops of Magdeburg*, makes it possible to identify the Slavs / Wends with the subjects of Pomeranian dukes. They supported the margraves of Brandenburg and thus the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Otto the Child. Hence, in the described period, the Pomeranians have not broken with Denmark yet. The war with Valdemar II occurred only in the 1230's,

when the king of Denmark openly supported Rügen, while the margraves of Brandenburg and the duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg altered their policies aiming at an agreement with the Hohenstaufen.

Wendowie/Słowianie/Pomorzanie jako sprzymierzeńcy margrabiów brandenburskich w 1229 r. Głos w dyskusji w sprawie sojuszy politycznych władców Pomorza Zachodniego w latach 20. XIII w.

Słowa kluczowe: Wendowie, Słowianie, Pomorzanie, Brandenburgia, Pomorze Zachodnie, margrabiowie brandenburscy Jan I i Otton III, arcybiskupa magdeburgski Albrecht II von Käfernburg, księżęta Pomorza Warcisław III i Barnim I, księżę Brunszwiku i Lüneburga Otton Dziecię

STRESZCZENIE

W 1229 r. doszło do bitwy nad rzeką Plane koło Brandneburga. Wzięły w niej udział oddziały margrabiów brandenburskich Jana I i Ottona III oraz wojska ministeriałów arcybiskupstwa magdeburgskiego na czele z samym arcybiskupem Albrechtem II von Käfernburg. Margrabiów wspomagał przy tym silny odział Słowian/Wendów pochodzący z krajów słowiańskich. Analiza przekazów źródeł narracyjnych, głównie *Saskiej kroniki świata* i *Czynów arcybiskupów magdeburgskich* pozwala z dużą pewnością utożsamić wspomnianych Słowian/Wendów z poddanymi księząt pomorskich. Wspomogli oni margrabiów brandenburskich i przez to księcia brunszwisko-lüneburskiego Ottona Dziecięcia. Tym samym w opisywanym okresie Pomorzanie raczej nie zerwali jeszcze z Danią. Do wojny z Waldemarem II doszło dopiero w latach 30 XIII w., gdy król duńskich otwarcie wsparł Rugię, a margrabiowie brandenburscy i księżę brunszwicko-lüneburski zmienili swą politykę zmierzając do ugody z Hohenstaufami.

Citation

Smoliński, Marek. "Wends/Slavs/Pomeranians as Allies of Margraves of Brandenburg in 1229. Voice in the Discussion on Political Alliances of the Rulers of West Pomerania in the 1220's." *Studia Maritima* 35 (2022): 5–39. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2022.35-01.



Piotr Nykiel

Jagiellonian University
Department of Turkish Studies
piotr.nykiel@uj.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0001-6079-7849

Intruder in the Harem, or Captain Martin Eric Nasmith's Oriental Adventures

Keywords: Martin Eric Dunbar-Nasmith, "E11," WW1, Dardanelles, Gallipoli, Sea of Marmara

Martin Eric Nasmith's (1883–1965) name¹ was immortalised in the history of the British Navy, although to Polish historians and enthusiasts of maritime affairs he is perhaps better known due to his contributions to the Polish Navy, for which he was awarded the Order of Polonia Restituta I class² on 19 August 1941 (fig. 1). He also manifested his devotion to Polish sailors after WW2, serving as chairman of the Honorary Committee of the Naval Armed Forces Self-Help Association (in 1961 renamed the Association of Naval Armed Forces) in London from 1947 until his death.³ This article, however, is devoted to the initial period of this outstanding officer's career and is an attempt to summarise his achievements during three underwater patrols in the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara in 1915. The first of those missions won him the Victoria Cross, and all three together the appellation of the most effective British submariner of WW1.

- 1 He changed his surname to Dunbar-Nasmith in 1920, having married Beatrix Justina Dunbar-Rivers.
- 2 In his justification for the application for awarding Adm. Dunbar Nasmith this decoration, Rear Adm. Jerzy Świrski emphasised his outstanding merits in the field of operational cooperation between the British and Polish Navies in the early months of WW2, including the organisation of the Polish naval base in Plymouth and the evacuation of Polish soldiers from France in June 1940, Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum (hereafter PISM), cat. no. MAR. (A.V.12/680); *Royal Navy (RN) Officers 1939–1945*, unithistories.com, accessed 20 July 2022, https://www.unithistories.com/officers/RN_officersD6.html.
- 3 Tadeusz Kondracki, *Stowarzyszenie Marynarki Wojennej 1945–1992* (Gdynia: Muzeum Marynarki Wojennej w Gdyni, 2003), 51, 96.



Figure 1. Captain Martin Eric Nasmith, VC, in 1918, in a portrait by Ambrose McEvoy

Source: Imperial War Museum, © IWM Art.IWM ART 1335, <https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/18579>, accessed 30 October 2022.

Anglophone historiography has paid quite a lot of attention to Nasmith, because every author who has written about the Gallipoli Campaign in 1915 felt obliged to refer more or less exhaustively to his merits. However, all these texts constitute a one-sided narrative, based solely on British sources.⁴ The author of this article is offering the first attempt in Western historiography to compare the British and Turkish points of

4 Most of them repeat information contained in a book by Pether Shankland and Anthony Hunter, titled *Dardanelles Patrol* (London: Mayflower Books, 1971). These authors based their work on Nasmith's own memories (both those written by the admiral himself and those he provided directly in interviews he gave to the authors while he was still alive), official documents from the collections of the admiral and other submariners fighting in Turkish waters during WW1, as well as on the recollections of several then still living crew members of "E11."

view. The decision to take up this challenge came from an awareness that Nasmith's view of the situation at the moment when he was observing the effects of his attacks through the periscope, or at best from the navigation bridge on "E11"'s conning tower, could not be complete and entirely objective. He could not have known that some of the vessels he had sunk in shallow coastal waters were salvaged by the Turks and restored to service. Consequently, such a vessel, considered by the British until now to have been definitively eliminated, had in fact only been seriously damaged. Thus, Nasmith probably did not realise that during the second patrol, he sunk the very same ship twice. Presumably, he was also unaware that he attacked the same transport ship without success during each of the three missions in the Sea of Marmara. The author draws attention on some controversial issues, i.e. possible violations of international law by Nasmith, or collaboration of Christian minorities living in the area with crews of the British submarines too. Those topics are, however only signalled and certainly deserve more detailed analysis in separate articles. The aim of this one was only to present a possibly most extensive and detailed account of operational activities and military achievements of "E11" and her commander in the Dardanelles and on the Sea of Marmara in 1915.

It should be noted here that Turkish historiography has attempted such a comparison of sources, but the results are not widely known to Western historians, and in some cases they raise objections. The most valuable works are certainly two monographs written jointly by Ahmed Gülerüz and Bernd Langensiepen. However, the first of these books, published in English,⁵ requires careful reading and frequent verification with sources and other Turkish-language studies, because it contains numerous, sometimes very confusing editorial errors and a few factual ones too. At first glance, the latter work⁶ appears to be the Turkish edition of the former one, but in reality it is an extensively rewritten text, in which most of the errors of the English edition have been corrected and numerous pieces of new information added – unfortunately at the expense of removing many other important threads. A fairly complete picture can only be obtained by using both works of the above-mentioned authors.

Other books that should be mentioned here are two monographs by the amateur historian Serkan Ertem. The first is dedicated to submarine warfare during operations in the Dardanelles.⁷ This work, although pioneering and long-awaited in Turkey, unfortunately presents a very low level of scholarship, thus many interesting and unique pieces of information provided only by this author should be approached with great

5 Bernd Langensiepen and Ahmet Gülerüz, *The Ottoman Steam Navy 1828–1923* (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1995).

6 Ahmet Gülerüz and Bernd Langensiepen, *Osmanlı Donanması 1828–1923* (İstanbul: Denizler Kitabevi / Kaptan Yayıncılık, 2007).

7 Serkan Ertem, *Canakkale Denizaltı Harekâtı* (İstanbul: Denizler Kitabevi, 2011).

caution, all the more so because in some cases he shows a very clear tendency to falsify facts relating to a specific thesis (for example, that Nasmith knowingly violated international conventions by attacking ships carrying wounded soldiers). In his second book, devoted almost exclusively to Nasmith,⁸ Ertem avoids unfounded accusations against the commander of “E11,” but in terms of the level of scholarship, this work is not much different from the previous one. Some new and undoubtedly interesting information can be found in it, but unfortunately this has not been supported by any reliable sources (maybe hence the bizarre subtitle: *Çanakkale Denizaltı Savaşının Gizli Tarihi* [A secret history of the submarine war in the Dardanelles]). The author’s extremely selective and inconsistent approach to the issue of bibliographic footnotes is one of the most glaring shortcomings of the aforementioned monograph.

However, let us move on to the subject of this article. When he took over the command of “E11” as a sub-lieutenant on 3 August 1914, Martin Eric Nasmith already had eight years of service on A, C and D type submarines,⁹ which placed him among the more experienced submariners of his day. In spite of this, he could not count the first months of the Great War as a success. In October, due to a technical failure of his submarine, he had to abandon the mission of penetrating the Baltic Sea along with the “E1” and “E9” submarines. Two months later, a torpedo he fired passed under the keel of the German battleship SMS “Posen,” which had previously shelled Hartlepool.¹⁰ In a fit of despair, Nasmith, who was already in the rank of commander, swore that he would touch neither alcohol nor cigarettes until he had sunk a battleship.¹¹

-
- 8 Serkan Ertem, *Gelibolu Korsanı. Çanakkale Denizaltı Savaşının Gizli Tarihi* (İstanbul: AZ Kitap, 2014).
- 9 Type A: Displacement: 190 t surfaced, 205–207 t submerged; built in the Vickers shipyard between 1902 and 1905; machinery: one 16-cylinder 350 hp Wolseley petrol engine plus one 125 hp electric motor (“A1” and “A12”), 450 hp / 150 hp (“A2” and “A4”), 550 hp / 150 hp (“A5” and “A7”), 600 hp / 150 hp (“A8” and “A12” [after modification]), one 6-cylinder 500 hp heavy oil engine plus one 150 hp electric motor (“A13”); speed on surface 9.5 kts (“A1” and “A12”), 10 kts (“A2” and “A4”), 11.5 kts (“A5” and “A7”), 11 kts (“A8” and “A12” [after modification], “A13”), in submersion 6 kts (“A1,” “A8” and “A12” [before and after modification], “A13”), 7 kts (“A2,” “A4,” “A5” and “A7”); range: 320 nm (when surfaced at a speed of 10 kts); armament: one 457 mm torpedo tube (“A1”–“A4”), two 457 mm torpedo tubes (“A5”–“A13”); crew of 11 men. Type B: Displacement: 287 t surfaced, 316 t submerged; built in the Vickers shipyard between 1904 and 1906; machinery: one 16-cylinder 600 hp Vickers petrol engine plus one 290 hp electric motor; speed on surface 12 kts, in submersion 6 kts; range: 1000 nm (when surfaced at a speed of 8.75 kts); armament: two 457 mm torpedo tubes; crew of 15 men. Type C: Displacement: 287–290 t surfaced, 316–320 t submerged; built between 1906 and 1910 in the Vickers shipyard (with the exception of “C17”–“C20,” “C33” and “C34” which were built by Chatham DYd; machinery: one 16-cylinder 600 hp Vickers petrol engine plus one 300 hp electric motor; speed on surface 13 kts, in submersion 7.5 kts; range: 1000 nm (when surfaced at a speed of 8.75 kts); armament: two 457 mm torpedo tubes; crew of 16 men. Randal Gray, ed., *Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships 1906–1921* (London: Conway Maritime Press, 2006), 86–87.
- 10 Michael Wilson, *Destination Dardanelles* (London: Leo Cooper, 1988), 81–82.
- 11 Stephen Snelling, *VCs of the First World War. The Naval VCs* (Thrupp-Stroud-Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing – Phoenix Mill, 2002), 61.

It was only his achievements in a completely different theatre of war that ended his spell of bad luck and freed him from his self-enforced abstinence. On 19 May 1915, “E11”¹² entered the Dardanelles for the first time under Nasmith’s command. The aim was to penetrate the Sea of Marmara (which had been an internal basin of the Ottoman Empire since 1453) and cause the greatest possible harm to Turkish transport and war vessels supporting the army fighting at that time against the landings of the Entente troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula (fig. 2).¹³



Figure 2. “E11” returning from one of her patrols on the Sea of Marmara in 1915

Source: Piotr Nykiel’s collection.

After easily overcoming a naval minefield and the narrowest section of the strait between Çanakkale and Kilitbahir, Nasmith spotted the battleships “Turgud Reis” and “Barbaros Hayreddin”¹⁴ through his periscope. The Ottoman vessels were manoeuvring in Poyraz Bay (opposite Cape Nara), from where they were conducting indirect shelling over the Gallipoli Peninsula at the Australian and New Zealand troops (ANZAC),

12 Displacement: 667 t surfaced, 807 t submerged; launched in 1914 in the Vickers shipyard; machinery: 2 eight-cylinder 1600 hp Vickers diesel engines plus two 840 hp electric motors; speed on surface 15 kts, in submersion 9 kts; range: 3000 nm (when surfaced at a speed of 10 kts); armament: 5 x 457 mm torpedo tubes, 1 x 76 mm gun (since the second patrol on the Sea of Marmara); crew of 30 men. Gray, ed., *Conway’s*, 87–88.

13 Çanakkale Boğaz Komutanlığı, ed., *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915* (İstanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 2008), 12.

14 Here (as in the case of the names of other Ottoman vessels), transliteration from the Ottoman-Turkish language was used. This ship also appears in literature in modern spelling as “Barbaros Hayrettin,” and sometimes even in abbreviated form as “Barbaros.”

as well as the ships supporting their fight in the Kabatepe area. The commander of “E11” ordered the crew to prepare for a torpedo attack, but the battleships, apparently warned of the presence of an enemy submarine by destroyers that were protecting them, headed for the northern end of the Dardanelles. Nasmith did not take up the pursuit, being aware that he had to save the vessel’s batteries, especially since dawn was already breaking and he had not yet reached the middle of the length of the strait.¹⁵

Leaving the Dardanelles, “E11” headed towards Tekirdağ (in western literature Rostodo) on the northwestern shore of the Sea of Marmara. After making sure that the port there was empty, Nasmith decided to continue towards Istanbul. At 11:30 a.m. on 21 May, he stopped and searched a small coaster, from which he requisitioned four chickens and eighty eggs (the captain of the ship refused to accept payment from the British). The submarine commander decided to tie the prize to his starboard and use it as a kind of screen, preventing “E11” from being seen from the land. Under such cover, he continued in the previously chosen direction until 8:00 p.m., when he detached the coaster and allowed her to sail away.¹⁶

At 5:30 a.m. on 23 May, the British submarine opened the list of her victories by sinking the Ottoman torpedo gunboat “Peleng-i Derya”¹⁷ at Bakırköy, near Istanbul.¹⁸ The vessel had been on surveillance duty near the local ammunition factory (n.b., its director was a German, Capt. Hermann Hugo Waldemar Pieper, who had been “exiled” to Istanbul for sailing the armoured cruiser SMS “Yorck” into a German naval mine-field in the Baltic Sea in November 1914¹⁹). “E11” paid for this success with quite bizarre damage, as the periscope was hit by a shell (most likely of 75 mm calibre) fired from the


15 Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 53–55.

16 Victor Rudenno, *Gelibolu. Denizden Saldırı*, transl. Dilek Cenkçiler (Ankara: ODTÜ Yayıncılık, 2009), 173; Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 65–67.

17 Displacement: 900 t (full); launched in 1890 at Kiel; machinery: 2 “Germania” AG 4700 hp steam turbines; speed: 14 kts; armament: 3 x 75 mm quick-firing guns, 4 x 47 mm quick-firing guns, 3 x 355 mm torpedo tubes; crew: 12 officers, 15 NCO’s, 83 sailors, see: Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 157–158. At the time of the ship’s sinking, the crew consisted of 19 officers and 82 sailors. According to the report of Maj. Seyfi, Head of the Ottoman Intelligence Department of the General Staff dated 23 May 1915, six crew members, including one officer, were killed as a result of this attack, and six sailors were wounded. Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, Directorate of State Archives, Ottoman Archives (hereafter: COA), cat. no. DH. EUM. VRK./14-102-1. According to Saim Besbelli only one seaman was killed and five crew members (including one officer) were injured. See: Saim Besbelli, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi*. Vol. 8: *Deniz Harekâtı* (Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1976), 279. Ertem, on the other hand, writes about two fatalities. See: Ertem, *Gelibolu*, 94

18 Today it is a district of this city.

19 Erol Mütercimler, *Korkak Abdul’dan Coni Türk’e. Gelibolu 1915* (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2005), 151152. Pieper’s tragic navigational error in the approach to Wilhelmshaven cost the lives of his 336 subordinates.



gun of the sinking ship (fig. 3).²⁰ Although Nasmith's first prey was not a battleship, his subordinates decided it was time to release him from virtuous abstinence. During the time used to repair the periscope, the commander of "E11" received some beer and a box of cigars from his officers.²¹

Figure 3. "E11"'s periscope after being hit by a shell from the sinking "Peleng-i Derya" torpedo gunboat

Source: "L'illustration," Samedi 24 Juillet 1915, 73e Année, No 3777, 95, Piotr Nykiel's collection.

The next day, the submarine stopped the Turkish steamer "Nağra" (474 GRT), which was carrying ammunition and weapons.²² Having allowed the crew and the passengers to leave the ship, the British blew her up.²³ Before leaving the scene, Nasmith spotted another ship on the horizon and pursued her as far as Tekirdağ. There he torpedoed

20 It was the second and the last shell that the gunboat managed to fire before she sank, which happened only 5 minutes after being hit by a torpedo. See: Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 70–71.

21 Rudenno, *Gelibolu*, 174.

22 The cargo consisted of, among others, a 150 mm L/45 gun dismantled from the battlecruiser "Yavuz Sultan Selim" (formerly known as SMS "Goeben") (including 250 pcs. of ammunition) and 350 pieces of 88 mm artillery cartridges. Besbelli, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 279.

23 One of the passengers of this vessel was the *Chicago Daily News* correspondent Raymond Gram Swing. Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 117–118. Snelling does not give the name of the journalist who, in his opinion, worked for *Chicago Sun*. See: Snelling, *VCs of the First World War*, 58. Adm. Wester-Wemyss and Vice-Adm. Osborne also claim that the commander of "E11" spoke to the *Chicago Sun* reporter Silas Q. Swing. See: Rosslyn Erskine Wemyss, *The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign* (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1924), 154; Cecil Vivian Osborne, *Smoke on the Horizon: Mediterranean Fighting 1914–1918* (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1933), 172. Shankland and Hunter confirm that he was Raymond Gram Swing, but from the *Chicago Herald*. See: *Dardanelles Patrol*, 80. The same authors claim that the name Silas and the initial Q were given to the American in an official report by officers of "E11," who only managed to remember his surname. Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 87.

her.²⁴ The unlucky vessel was the passenger ferry “Hünkâr İskelesi” (521 GRT),²⁵ which had a significant amount of rifle ammunition onboard.²⁶ This attack ended with damage to “E11”’s only other periscope. A rifle bullet got lodged in its base. Fortunately for Nasmith, it did not pierce the instrument and it was enough to remove it to regain the ability to rotate and pull in the periscope.²⁷ While coming out of Tekirdağ Bay, in the vicinity of Marmaraeğlisi, his submarine stopped the side-wheeled paddle steamer



tug “Kismet” (GRT Unknown), which was carrying horses and a significant amount of barbed wire. Two attempts to board the vessel in order to blow her up failed. Each time, the tug pulled away at the last moment and tried to ram “E11.” The captain of the vessel masterfully used the advantage in manoeuvrability that the side-wheel drive gave him. However, his constant retreat towards land finally deprived him of an escape route. Fearing being hit by a torpedo, he decided to beach the “Kismet.” Although the crew hastily left the deck of the tugboat, another British attempt at boarding ended in failure too – this time due to the intervention of an approximately fifty-man-strong Ottoman cavalry unit, which showered “E11”’s conning tower with rifle bullets from a nearby hill. While retreating, the British submarine fired a torpedo from her stern tube, but it exploded on the shore without even slightly damaging “Kismet” (fig. 4).²⁸

Figure 4. Remains of torpedo fired by “E11” at the paddle steamer tug “Kismet”

Source: Istanbul Naval Museum, inventory no. 0428, photo © Piotr Nykiel.

24 Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 81–82.

25 Before the war, this vessel belonged to the civilian shipowner Şirket-i Hayriyye, from which it was taken over by the Ottoman Navy. See: Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 118.

26 Langensiepen and Güteryüz, *The Ottoman*, 36. Apparently, the ship must have arrived at the port some time before she was caught up by “E11” and, thanks to this, casualties among the crew were limited to two dead, see: *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*, 14. Ertem claims that the surfaced “E11,” flying a Turkish flag on her conning tower (!), tried to stop “Hünkâr İskelesi” near Tekirdağ, but her captain, Tahsin Bey, made an attempt to escape and finally, just before receiving a torpedo hit, grounded the ship on the rocks at the entrance to the port and, thanks to this, it was possible to save most of the crew and part of the cargo. Unfortunately, the author does not give the source of this information. Ertem, *Gelibolu*, 100–101.

27 Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 83.

28 Osborne, *Smoke on the Horizon*, 173–174; Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 83–86. The next day the tug was pulled into deep water and reached Tekirdağ on her own. See: Langensiepen and Güteryüz, *The Ottoman*, 36; Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 119.

Undeterred by this failure, Nasmith continued his voyage towards Istanbul, where at 12:40 p.m. on 25 May he attacked the steamer "İstanbul" (3359 GRT), moored at the quay at Tophane, although the assault had negligible results. Because of a Gyro failure, the first of the torpedoes launched went around in a circle, almost hit "E11" and exploded on the waterfront,²⁹ while the second one, according to some sources,³⁰ sank a barge moored to the side of the above-mentioned steamer. There are, however, historians, like Saim Besbelli, who believe that "İstanbul" was directly hit by a torpedo, which resulted in a hole in her side measuring 6.3 x 3.5 m.³¹ After all, contrary to the intelligence information that Nasmith received a few days later by radio, the ship did not sink.³² It should be stressed that this, not entirely successful, attack had an effect which the commander of "E11" certainly did not expect: the Turks had to pause the transport of the 1st Infantry Division, which has just started to embark "İstanbul" and on several other vessels, in order to reach the Dardanelles by sea. Bearing in mind the poorly-developed rail and road infrastructure, and thus the lack of an alternative way to provide a fast delivery of supplements to this front, we must admit that Nasmith (at least temporarily) significantly supported the war effort of the Entente troops fighting on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

After the attack on "İstanbul" returning happily, though not without hassle, to the much safer waters of the Sea of Marmara,³³ "E11" had then the next day a confrontation with an Ottoman seaplane, which dropped three bombs.³⁴

On the night of 27/28 May, Nasmith encountered the Ottoman battleship "Barbaros Hayreddin."³⁵ However, the attempt to torpedo her while on the surface ended in failure, as thanks to the glowing moon and cloudless sky, the submarine was spotted by one of the two escort vessels (it is not known whether it was the torpedo boat "Draç" or the destroyer "Yarhisar"), which tried to ram her. "E11" managed to submerge at the

29 Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 93; Osborne, *Smoke on the Horizon*, 174–175.

30 Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 119 and *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*, 15.

31 He has based his statements on documents from the Archive of Military History and Strategic Studies (ATASE) in Ankara. Besbelli, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 280. The damage to the bow of this vessel was also confirmed in the report of the head of the Intelligence Department, Ottoman General Staff Maj. Seyfi dated 2 June 1915. COA, cat. no. DH. EUM. VRK./25-24-2.

32 Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 114.

33 After the described attack, the crew fought a long and dramatic struggle to regain control of "E11," tossed in different directions and to various depths by bottom and surface currents. Due to the intense fire from the coastal artillery, it was also not possible to surface to the periscope depth in order to determine the position of the submarine to the shore. Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 94–97.

34 *Ibid.*, 106.

35 Ertem is the only author who claims that she was "Turgud Reis," the second of the Brandenburg-class battleships purchased by the Ottoman Empire. See: *Gelibolu*, 118.

last moment, avoiding a collision. This happened only a minute before the planned launch of torpedoes towards the battleship.³⁶

The next day, in the vicinity of İzmit Bay, the British submarine encountered a convoy consisting of three passenger ships and the cargo ship “Bandırma” (474 GRT), protected by the torpedo boat “Akhisar.”³⁷ These vessels were carrying soldiers and artillery ammunition to the Gallipoli Peninsula. “E11” fired a torpedo which blew up 7,000 pieces of ammunition for field guns carried in the holds of “Bandırma,” sinking her within less than a minute, along with almost all of the crew and about 250 infantry soldiers. As it turned out, it was the most severe loss ever suffered at sea by the Ottoman land troops.³⁸ At 1:45 p.m., east of İmralı Island, “E11” launched a failed attack on the unarmed steamer “Doğan” (GRT Unknown), carrying about 7,000 civilians (including women and children) on the route from Istanbul to Bandırma.³⁹ The torpedo hit the target, but did not explode. So the ship reached her destination port, and “E11” salvaged a drifting torpedo.⁴⁰ After it was dismantled and carefully checked, all the crew members present during the examination agreed that it was in full working order. Thus, its failure to explode could be considered a miracle.⁴¹

On 30 May near Cape Kapıdağ, “E11” fought a fruitless artillery duel with the Ottoman motor gunboat “No. 20.”⁴² Then she headed for the Bandırma port, where she severely damaged the freighter “Madeleine Rickmers” (3431 GRT), which was about to set off for Istanbul with a cargo of barley, soap, and olive oil.⁴³ As the ship formally be-

36 Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 109–110; Osborne, *Smoke on the Horizon*, 176–177.

37 Ertem, *Canakkale*, 120. According to Shankland and Hunter it was a convoy of five merchant ships, protected by a single destroyer. *Dardanelles Patrol*, 115.

38 Ertem, *Canakkale*, 120 and 130; Besbelli, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 280; Langensiepen and Güleriyüz, *The Ottoman*, 37.

39 COA, cat. no. HR.SYS./2099-9; Rudenno, *Gelibolu*, 181–182.

40 Langensiepen and Güleriyüz, *The Ottoman*, 37. It was only after firing the torpedo and finding that it did not explode that Nasmith took a closer look at his would-be victim and found that he had attacked a passenger ferry. Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 117–118. The attack without warning on an unarmed commercial steamer carrying 700 civilian passengers, including women and children, was also reported in a protest note of 10 August 1915 issued by the Ottoman Minister of War Enver Pasha, cf.: Hümmet Kanal, “Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Çanakkale Muharebelerinin Harp-Harekât Hukuku Açısından İncelenmesi,” in: *100’üncü Yılında Çanakkale Zaferi Sempozyumu, Ulusal Sempozyum*, 2–29 Nisan 2015, İstanbul, ed. Zekeriya Türkmen (İstanbul: Harp Akademileri Basımevi, n.d), 510.

41 Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 120.

42 Besbelli, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 280. Full displacement 12 t; launched in 1911 in Southampton-Woolston; machinery: 2 6-cylinder 70 hp JT Thomycroft engines; speed: 11,9 kts (during sea trials); armament: 1 or 2 37 mm quick-firing guns; crew: 2 officers and 4 seamen. Güleriyüz and Langensiepen, *Osmanlı Donanması*, 186.

43 While using the periscope to observe the last phase of the ship’s loading, Nasmith was, however, convinced that the numerous small boats were carrying soldiers who, according to his assumptions, must have come to Bandırma by rail, and were to be shipped further to the Gallipoli Peninsula.

longed to a German civilian shipowner (“Rickmers Reismühlen Rhederei & Schiffbau Actien Gesellschaft,” based in Bremen), the Ottoman government issued an official, though essentially unfounded, protest over the alleged violation of international law.⁴⁴

On 1 June, near San Stefano (now Istanbul's Yeşilköy district), “E11” attacked another ship that belonged to the same shipowner – “Lilly Rickmers” (4081 GRT) – which, in addition to the German flag, reportedly had clearly visible Red Cross markings,⁴⁵ because she was allegedly carrying several hundred wounded. The torpedo launched by Nasmith missed, but the attack itself prompted another protest – this time perhaps rightly – by the government of the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁶ It is significant that British historiography only mentions “E11”'s attack on “Madeleine Rickmers.”⁴⁷ There is also no conclusive evidence that “Lilly Rickmers” was ever used as a hospital ship. She does not appear in this capacity in any German or Turkish list of vessels for the period 1914–1918. We only know that this ship had remained in Ottoman waters since 18 August 1914.⁴⁸ On that very day, she arrived at the port of Çanakkale, where she was immediately transferred into the floating HQ of General Clemens Weber, the German delegate of the Ottoman General Staff in that city. Under pressure from the diplomats of the Entente countries still residing there, she had to hoist the Turkish flag on her mast.⁴⁹ In February 1916, “Lilly Rickmers” was included in the register of Ottoman coal ships.⁵⁰ In 1917 she was sold to the shipowner “See- und Kanalschiffahrt Wilhelm Hemsoth A.G.” from Dortmund and renamed “Hans-Wilhelm Hemsoth.”⁵¹ However, it cannot be ruled out that on 1 June 1915, the ship was used to transport the wounded on a one-off basis, and the Germans, more cautious than the Turks, decided to mark the ship

Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 132. “Madeleine Rickmers” was hit by a torpedo on the port side, at the level of the engine room, but thanks to the assistance of the tugboat sailing at her side, she was able to reach the shore and beach. After the provisional removal of damage, the ship went to Istanbul for more complex repairs. *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*, 16.

44 COA, cat. no. HR.SYS./2099-9; Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 120; Langensiepen and Güteryüz, *The Ottoman*, 37.

45 COA, cat. no. HR.SYS./2099-9; Besbelli, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 280; Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 120. In the monograph *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915* (16) there are only references to the signs of the Red Crescent on a white background, applied with paint on the ship's sides, and about Red Crescent jacks on masts.

46 COA, cat. no. HR.SYS./2099-9; Besbelli, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 280; *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*, 16.

47 Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 132–133. Osborne admittedly describes the attack on “Madeleine Rickmers” quite accurately, but gives the wrong date (31 May), nor does he mention the vessel's name or her nationality. Osborne, *Smoke on the Horizon*, 178.

48 Langensiepen and Güteryüz, *The Ottoman*, 30.

49 Piotr Nykiel, *Wyprawa do Złotego Rogu. Działania wojenne w Dardanelach i na Morzu Egejskim (sierpień 1914 – marzec 1915)* (Kraków-Międzyzdroje: Arkadiusz Wingert, 2008), 106.

50 Langensiepen and Güteryüz, *The Ottoman*, 50.

51 *The Ships List*, theshipslist.com, accessed 20.07.2022, <https://www.theshipslist.com/ships/lines/rickmers.shtml>.

with the Red Cross emblems. Nasmith's disregard for them may have been due to the fact that as a freighter with probably only a few passenger cabins, "Lilly Rickmers" was not suitable for permanent use as a hospital ship. "E11"'s commander presumably decided that medical markings were only a "cover" for unescorted military transport. The fact that soldiers were hidden on civilian merchant vessels and passenger ferries was indirectly admitted by the Turks themselves, who claimed that due to the high activity of the enemy submarines, it was recommended that officers and soldiers should take their seats in cabins under the main deck on ferries plying between the two shores of the Bosphorus and in the archipelago of the Princes' Islands.⁵²

At 9:40 a.m. on 2 June, "E11" launched a successful attack near Tekirdağ on the cargo ship "Tecilli" (390 GRT), despite the cover provided by the destroyer "Samsun." After receiving a torpedo blow to the starboard below the captain's bridge, the vessel sank within three minutes, along with the entire eighteen-person crew. The force of the explosion and the short time within which the ship plunged into the depths of the Sea of Marmara indicated that she was carrying ammunition.⁵³ At 10:15 a.m., "E11" encountered another steamer, which turned out to be "Başlangıç" (381 GRT). She kept as close to the shore as possible. After 35 minutes of tracking her, Nasmith fired a torpedo, but missed. The captain of the freighter realised that he was being attacked and headed towards the mouth of the Ana River, south of Panidos (today Banados). There he dropped anchor and carried out a quick evacuation of the crew.⁵⁴ The commander of "E11" intended to send a boarding group onto "Başlangıç" with explosives, in order to blow her up. This plan, however, was thwarted due to intense rifle fire from the shore. This also made it impossible to find and salvage the torpedo.⁵⁵ At 12:20 p.m. on the same day, "E11" came across a small, two-funnel transport ship escorted by two destroyers. Despite the very calm sea, Nasmith imperceptibly managed to take a position between one of the escort ships and the cargo vessel. However, the torpedo launched by him missed again. The reason for this – as the commander of "E11" assumed – was the slight submersion of his would-be victim. An inspection of the torpedo, which was

52 Besbelli, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 280.

53 Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 138; Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 120–121; *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*, 16. It is worth mentioning that after this action, Nasmith reported via radio that he had sunk a 'large ammunition ship' (Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 147), which taking into account the tonnage of "Tecilli" (only 390 GRT) was a blatant embellishment of the facts.

54 Turkish historiography claims that the panicked captain of the freighter that was missed by "E11"'s torpedo decided to run his ship aground. See: Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 120–121; Ertem, *Gelibolu*, 127; *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*, 16. This was also the first interpretation of the manoeuvres undertaken by "Başlangıç," which Nasmith made. Eventually, however, the commander of "E11" noticed that the ship had dropped anchor. Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 139.

55 *Ibid.*, 139–140.

recovered some time later, showed that it had had no contact with the target, which would indicate that it must have passed under the attacked ship.⁵⁶

The next day, "E11" pursued the steam yacht, which Nasmith intended to stop and blow up. The large distance between the two vessels in the initial phase of the action and the low smoke from the funnel of the Turkish yacht meant that none of those present on the top of the submarine's conning tower (including Nasmith himself) realised that the enemy at some point made a U-turn and was heading at full speed towards them. This observation was only made when the distance between the two vessels had decreased to about a mile. In order to avoid ramming, "E11" was forced to perform a crash dive in the record time of 16 seconds. Although collision was averted, it was not possible to prevent the diesel engines from flooding.⁵⁷

Nasmith's last target before returning to base at Imroz was the freighter "Ceyhan" (3509 GRT), which had been converted into a surveillance ship. She was torpedoed on 7 June near the Musa Shoal (off the eastern bank of the Dardanelles, at the same latitude as the Akbaş Bay).⁵⁸ At the last moment, the ship avoided sinking by beaching.⁵⁹

The way back through the strait was calm until the submarine passed its narrowest section between Çanakkale and Kilitbahir, despite a serious failure of the electric engine, which reduced the maximum speed of the submerged vessel to 6 knots. However, after passing Çanakkale, the mooring wire of a mine got hooked on "E11"'s bow hydroplane, and remained stuck between the hydroplane and the hull. Aware of the danger, the commander of the submarine did not share his knowledge with the crew, but continued the cruise with sangfroid, pulling the mine (along with its anchor), which was floating only 20 feet from the hull.⁶⁰ He only freed himself from the deadly ballast in the open sea, after coming out of the firing range of the Turkish guns guarding the entrance to the Dardanelles (fig. 5).⁶¹

56 Ibid., 140–141.

57 Ibid., 144–146; Osborne, *Smoke on the Horizon*, 179.

58 Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 151–152. As Besbelli (*Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 280) and the authors of *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915* (16) say, the "Ceyhan"'s main task was to cover with her own hull (in case of a torpedo attack) the battleships "Barbaros Hayreddin" and "Turgud Reis," which conducted indirect fire from the Dardanelles at the ANZAC troops fighting on the western shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula.

59 Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 121. Langensiepen and Güteryüz (*The Ottoman*, 37) and the authors of *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915* (16) claim, however, that the ship sank in shallow water.

60 Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 153–157. Osborne writes about 1–2 feet, that is only 30.48–60.96 cm, which seems unlikely. *Smoke on the Horizon*, 181.

61 Ibid., 181–182; Snelling, *VCs of the First World War*, 60.




Figure 5. “E11” returning from her first patrol on the Sea of Marmara

Source: “L’Illustration,” Samedi 24 Juillet 1915, 73e Année, No 3777, 95, Piotr Nykiel’s collection.

For this spectacular patrol, Commander Nasmith was awarded the Victoria Cross and promoted to the rank of Captain.⁶² It should be emphasised, however, that there are grounds to assume that the official reports written by him were silent about the attack on the ship with the Red Cross markings. Nor can one be indifferent to the (fortunately also unsuccessful) attempt to sink the ferry “Doğan” (Nasmith only clarified that she was a vessel carrying civilians after the torpedo he had fired did not explode).⁶³ It should also be added that two of the ships damaged by his submarine were recorded by the British as sunken, and the “Tecilli” with a load capacity of only 390 GRT was reported as a “large ship with ammunition.” The total tonnage of the steam-powered transport vessels definitively eliminated by “E11” was therefore very modest and amounts to only 1,859 GRT. Even if we add to this the sailing ships of

62 Ibid., 59–61.

63 Shankland and Hunter, *Dardanelles Patrol*, 117–118.

known tonnage, this fact cannot significantly affect the final assessment. It should be remembered, however, that “E11” was the first Allied submarine that managed to sink an enemy vessel after entering the Sea of Marmara. For the Ottoman Empire, which had a very rickety transport fleet, the loss of any, even the smallest ship – especially if it was carrying equally scarce war materials – was undoubtedly a blow.

The experience of the first patrol exposed a significant deficiency of “E11,” namely the lack of a gun to attack smaller ships seeking refuge in shallow coastal waters, as well as some land targets such as rail or road infrastructure. Nasmith’s great personal achievement, later exploited during subsequent patrols both by him and commanders of other Allied submarines, was the discovery of how to “set” stably a submerged submarine on the border of surface and bottom currents flowing in opposite directions (in the Sea of Marmara it runs at a depth of 50–70 feet). As a result, it was theoretically possible to stay in the same place for an extremely long time with the electric engines turned off. This gave the crew the opportunity to spend the night peacefully, or to wait out the threat from enemy vessels that were trying to hunt down the submarine.⁶⁴

Table 1. Ottoman and German vessels (except sailing ships) sunk or damaged by “E11” during her first patrol (May 19 – June 7, 1915)

NAME OF THE VESSEL	CLASS	DISPLACEMENT (t)	TONNAGE (GRT)	FATE OF THE VESSEL ACCORDING TO BRITISH SOURCES		FATE OF THE VESSEL ACCORDING TO TURKISH SOURCES	
				SUNK	DAMAGED	SUNK	DAMAGED
“Peleng-i Derya”	torpedo gunboat	900	–	x		x	
“Nağra”	transport ship	–	474	x		x	
“Hünkâr İskeleyi”	ferry	–	521	x		x	
“Kismet”	tug	–	N/D		x		x
“İstanbul”	transport ship	–	3,359	x			x
“Bandırma”	transport ship	–	474	x		x	
“Madeleine Rickmers” (G)	transport ship	–	3,431		x		x
“Tecilli”	transport ship	–	390	x		x	
“Ceyhan”	transport ship	–	3,509	x			x
IN TOTAL			at least 12,158	7	2	5	4

Note: In the table, the vessels damaged according to Turkish sources also include those salvaged and restored to service. (G) – a vessel under the German flag. Source: compiled by the author.

64 Ibid., 142–143.

At 1:30 a.m. on 5 August, "E11," set off from Kephalo Bay on Imroz Island (today Aydıncık Bay on Gökçeada Island) for her second patrol in the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara, rearmed with a 76 mm gun. She covered the most difficult section of the strait without much problem, although she got entangled in a new anti-submarine net while passing Cape Nara. Fortunately for Nasmith and his crew, a strong bottom current broke the anchor wires of the net just where "E11" came across it. Thanks to this, after a long and laborious manoeuvre, the submarine managed to squeeze between the net and the bottom.⁶⁵ At 7:00 a.m., she reached Akbaş Bay (about 4 km northeast of Cape Nara), where Nasmith spotted the hospital ship "Ziya" through the periscope, along with several transport ships including "Haleb" (3648 GRT). A torpedo fired towards the latter hit her bow from starboard, which resulted in the sinking of the vessel in shallow water (with superstructures protruding above the surface), but only three days later, the "Haleb" was salvaged and towed to Istanbul for repairs.⁶⁶

Continuing her cruise towards the Sea of Marmara, "E11" surfaced in the vicinity of Doğanaslan (now Demirtepe), to recharge her batteries. Soon after, she came across the gunboat "Aydın Reis," on her way from Istanbul to the Dardanelles,⁶⁷ on board which (a fact that Nasmith obviously could not have known) were the staff officers of Adm. Guido von Usedom – the German commander of the Black Sea straits. Both vessels undertook a fruitless exchange of artillery fire. Due to the still too low battery level, "E11" was unable to dive and carry out a torpedo attack.⁶⁸ Nasmith decided against firing a torpedo while on the surface, probably because this would have involved getting within the range of "Aydın Reis"'s guns, and such a risk was not worth taking.⁶⁹

In the period when Nasmith reappeared in the Sea of Marmara, the activity of warships was – for this basin – relatively intense. The Turks, already aware that the minefield and nets laid in the Dardanelles were not able to prevent enemy submarines from passing through the strait, regularly patrolled the Sea of Marmara on the east-west axis, using for this purpose, among others, the torpedo cruiser "Peyk-i Şevket," as well as the destroyers "Gayret-i Vataniyye," "Yadigâr-ı Millet," "Basra" and "Yarhisar." In addition to "E11," another Allied submarine operated in the aforementioned waters,

65 Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 12–122.

66 *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*, p. 24; Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 39.

67 Displacement 503 t; launched in 1912 at St Nazaire; machinery: 2 SACA St Nazaire 1025 hp steam turbines; speed: 10 kts; armament: 2 x 100 mm quick-firing guns, 2 x 47 mm quick-firing guns, 2 x 7,6 mm machine guns; crew: 14 officers and 61 seamen, Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 166.

68 Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 39; Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 122; *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*, 24–25.

69 Rudenno writes that Nasmith, using the speed advantage of the surfaced "E11," maintained a distance that prevented the gunboat from conducting effective fire, which eventually prompted the Turks to stop the clash. Rudenno, *Gelibolu*, 237.

namely “E14,” commanded by Lt. Cmdr. Edward Courtney Boyle. At midnight on 6 August, the two British submarines met west of Marmara Archipelago. Their commanders agreed on the joint conduct of the offensive operations. However, this plan was quickly thwarted by the Ottoman Gotha WD 1 seaplane with the tactical number 286 (German crew: pilot Jansen and observer Thiele), which spotted the submarines on the surface and launched an attack on “E11” with two hand-dropped bombs (fig. 6). It did not score any hits but forced the enemy submarines to separate temporarily.⁷⁰




Figure 6. An Ottoman airplane dropping bombs on a British submarine near Bolayır – a painting by an Ottoman artist dated 1915/1916 and reproduced on a postcard

Source: Piotr Nykiel's collection.

When the threat ceased, Nasmith and Boyle reestablished communication, as a result of which they jointly followed the torpedo cruiser “Peyk-i Şevket,” starting at 3:00 p.m.⁷¹ Finally, after taking up a convenient position, “E11” launched a torpedo attack and hit

70 Cenk Avcı, *The Skies of Gallipoli* (İstanbul: Nart Yayıncılık, 2003), 201–202; Cenk Avcı, *Çanakkale Cephesinde Hava Savaşları* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2009), 139.

71 Displacement 775 t; launched in 1906 in Kiel; machinery: 2 “Germania” 5100 hp turbines; speed: 18 kts; armament: 2 x 105 mm L/40 quick-firing guns, 6 x 57 mm L/40 guns, 2 x 37 mm quick-firing guns, 2 machine guns, 3 x 450 mm torpedo tubes; crew: 145 men. Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 148–149.

the Ottoman warship in the starboard between the funnels.⁷² The heavily-damaged cruiser prevented herself from sinking by digging her bow into the beach near Güvercinlik (between the villages of Selim Paşa [today Bigados] and Celaliye). The British, however, did not let up. “E11,” still submerged, fired another torpedo, but this time missed. The surfaced “E14” tried to join the action, but “Peyk-i Şevket”’s artillerymen managed to keep her at a distance, making it impossible to carry out an effective attack. The Ottoman torpedo cruiser avoided sinking, but serious damage (flooded boilers and engine room) eliminated her from service for almost two years.⁷³ However, most of her crew was saved (four sailors did not survive the British attack) (fig. 7).⁷⁴



Figure 7. Peyk-i Şevket-class torpedo cruiser

Source: Piotr Nykiel's collection.

On 7 August, the two submarines jointly shelled the road in the Bolayır area (the narrowest section of the Gallipoli Peninsula) with their guns, paralysing for some time the transfer of reinforcements for Turkish troops defending the Suvla area, where the British had landed several hours earlier. Nasmith and Boyle managed to inflict some

⁷² Besbelli, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 282.

⁷³ The hull was temporarily patched up and the water pumped out, after which “Peyk-i Şevket” was towed to Istanbul, where she arrived on 9 August at about 9:00 a.m. Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 123. The complete overhaul of this vessel was only completed in 1917. Gülerüz and Langensiepen, *Osmanlı Donanması*, 112; Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 37.

⁷⁴ Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 122–123.

losses on the Ottoman infantry, though it is difficult to estimate the extent of them. However, the Turks quickly brought field artillery to the area, and so forced the submarines to stop the action.⁷⁵

At about 5:00 a.m. on the following day, "E11" came across the battleship "Barbaros Hareddin" again between Gelibolu and Doğanaslan (fig. 8).⁷⁶ She was only being escorted by the torpedo boat "Sivrihisar."⁷⁷ As a result of an attack launched by Nasmith, the Ottoman battleship was hit by a torpedo at the starboard at the level of the 8th compartment. Despite the flooding of the right boiler, the immobilisation of one turbine and an electricity failure, the ship, which could already only manage a speed of 3 knots, made an attempt to manoeuvre in order to avoid being hit again. However, the water penetrated into other compartments, which caused the tilt of the significantly-overloaded battleship to increase rapidly.⁷⁸ Finally, about 30 minutes after being torpedoed, the old battleship lay on starboard and sank along with 258 crew (including 21 officers). "Sivrihisar" and the destroyer "Basra,"⁷⁹ which was just passing by then on her way from Bandırma to Çanakkale, managed to save 51 officers (among them the deputy commander of the Ottoman Navy, Capt. Arif Bey and the commander of "Barbaros Hayreddin" Capt. Muzaffer [Adil]) and 347 seamen, and transport them to the port of Gelibolu. During the rescue operation itself, Nasmith made an unsuccessful attempt to torpedo "Sivrihisar,"⁸⁰ which undoubtedly did not reflect well on his "chivalry" (fig. 9).

75 Rudenno, *Gelibolu*, 237–239.

76 Full displacement 10 670 t; launched in 1890 at Wilhelmshaven as "Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm," in 1910 sold to the Ottoman Empire; machinery: 2 10,110 hp turbines; speed: 10 kts; armament: 4 x 280 mm L/40 guns, 2 x 280 mm L/35 guns, 6 x 105 mm L/35 quick-firing guns, 6 x 88 mm L/30r quick-firing guns, 12 machine guns, 3 x 450 mm torpedo tubes; crew: 600 men. Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 140–141. More about the service history of "Barbaros Hayreddin" in: Piotr Nykiel, "Pancerniki typu «Brandenburg» w służbie tureckiej," part 1, *Okrety Wojenne* 5 (2012), 115: 20–29 and *Okrety Wojenne* 6 (2012), 116: 9–13.

77 Displacement 97 t; launched in 1907 in Chalons-sur-Saône; machinery: 1 Schneider & Cie 2200 hp turbine; speed: 16 kts; armament: 2 x 37 mm quick-firing guns and 3 x 450 mm torpedo tubes; crew: 3 officers and 17–20 seamen (in 1915 32 Turks and 4 Germans). Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 156–157.

78 At that time, "Barbaros Hayreddin" was carrying a significant load of ammunition for the troops fighting on the Gallipoli Peninsula. It consisted of 400 rounds for 105 mm howitzers, 4836 rounds for field guns, 1791 rounds for mountain guns and 9600 hand grenades, Besbelli, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 282; Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 124.

79 Displacement 284 t; launched in 1907 in Bordeaux; machinery: 2 SACAG 5950 hp turbines; speed: 17 kts; armament: 1 x 65 mm L/50 quick-firing gun, 6 x 47 mm L/50 quick-firing guns, 2 x 450 mm torpedo tubes; crew: 7 officers and 60 seamen (in 1915 74 Turks and 17 Germans). Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 158.

80 Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 12, *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*, 25–26; According to Langensiepen and Gülerüz (*The Ottoman*, 39) the ship that avoided being sunk by a hair's breadth was "Basra."




Figure 8. “Barbaros Hayreddin” battleship

Source: postcard issued by E.F. Rochat, Constantinople, Piotr Nykiel’s collection.




Figure 9. “Basra” destroyer in 1911

Source: A postcard issued by R. Guilleminot, Boespflug et Cie., Paris, Piotr Nykiel’s collection.

While near Doğanaslan at 12:45 p.m. on 8 August, Nasmith's submarine also attacked the transport ship "Mahmud Şevket Paşa" (2690 GRT), which was then acting as a guard ship. The Turkish vessel headed towards the shore, where she intended to beach due to the risk of being torpedoed. "E11" and "E14," which joined her during the clash, only fired their guns, scoring several hits.⁸¹ On the same day, the crew of "E14," which was finishing her patrol on the Sea of Marmara, transferred two torpedoes to "E11".⁸²

Between 9 and 10 August, Nasmith sank two small sailing ships and stopped and searched the hospital ship "Ziya." Having determined that she was not carrying materials or persons prohibited by conventions, he allowed her to continue her voyage.⁸³ Then "E11" used her gun to shell the railway station in Mudanya, scoring three hits on the main building. The Turks, who shelled the surfaced enemy from the shore, prevented any further destruction.⁸⁴

On 11 August, the British submarine was spotted by the "Sivrihisar" torpedo boat, which was just returning to Istanbul. The shelled "E11" dived but did not undertake a torpedo attack. After some time, however, she appeared near San Stefano, where she sunk two sailing ships with her gun.⁸⁵

Two days later, Nasmith's submarine approached the port of Erdek, but she left before long, having found nothing to sink. On the same day, however, the small freighter "İsfahan" (843 GRT) became her victim. "E11" managed to take her by surprise at the Haydarpaşa quay (on the Asian side of Istanbul), while unloading coal for the Berlin-Baghdad railway. The ship sank in shallow water, but was salvaged the very next day and moored in the Kadıköy harbour (today a district of Istanbul located southeast of Haydarpaşa railway station).⁸⁶

Between 14 and 21 August, "E11" patrolled the Sea of Marmara without encountering any Ottoman vessels. Nasmith used this period to communicate via radio the need for gun ammunition, which was running out. It was sent on board the "E2" submarine, which met "E11" on 15 August near the island of İmralı.⁸⁷ Thus, the very next day, Nasmith was able to fire fifteen rounds at the railway line and viaduct near Gebze,

81 According to Langensiepen and Gülerüz (*The Ottoman*, 168) the ship was, however, hit with a torpedo fired by "E14." Sometime later, "Mahmud Şevket Paşa" was towed to Istanbul where she underwent an overhaul. It was not until 1917 that she returned to service.

82 Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 168; Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 124.

83 *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*, 26. This clearly undermines Serkan Ertem's thesis about "E11" attacking hospital ships. We will come back to this issue later in the essay.

84 Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 124.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.; Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 39.

87 Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 124–125.

scoring several inconsequential hits on its pillars.⁸⁸ On 18 August, along with “E2,” he again shelled the road in the Bolayır area of the Gallipoli Peninsula.⁸⁹

On the night of 20/21 August, “E11”’s first lieutenant, Lt. Guy D’Oyly Hughes, went ashore near Gebze, with the intention of planting explosives under the railway viaduct. After reaching the vicinity of the target, he realised that his target was guarded, so there could be no question of destroying it by himself alone. Therefore, he decided to place his explosives in the nearest culvert he encountered in the railway embankment. While arming it, he was heard by a three-man Turkish patrol. D’Oyly Hughes ran for about a mile in complete darkness, occasionally firing a pistol at the soldiers chasing him, while being fired at himself with rifles. He then jumped into the sea and, after many adventures, he finally got on board his submarine at dawn, in a state of extreme exhaustion. The bomb he had planted exploded, destroying the railway tracks.⁹⁰

On 22 August, “E11” came across the tug “Dofen” (124 GRT) between Marmara Island and Gelibolu. The boat was pulling four sailing barges loaded with ammunition and soldiers, and the entire convoy was being protected by the destroyer “Yarhisar.”⁹¹ The warships began to fire at each other with their guns, but after a while “E11” had to dive due to the superiority of the destroyer’s firepower. When she did not appear on the surface for a long period of time, the “Yarhisar”’s commander decided to sail away because, according to the orders he had received, he was to cover not only this convoy, but also all other vessels in this area that were heading to the Dardanelles. To make matters worse, just after losing the escort, “Dofen” also lost her drive as a result of an engine failure. So, when “E11” resurfaced, she had a motionless and completely defenceless convoy in front of her that she could shell with her gun with impunity. After a while, however, the surveillance ship “İskenderun”⁹² appeared (she was identified by Nasmith as an armed tugboat). Her commander engaged in an exchange of fire with the submarine, but quickly realised that his superiority in firepower would be of little use in the face of the fact that the opponent was more manoeuvrable. It was

88 Usborne, *Smoke on the Horizon*, 225; Rudenno, *Gelibolu*, 241.

89 Besbelli, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 284.

90 Ibid.; Usborne, *Smoke on the Horizon*, 225–233; Wemyss, *The Navy*, 157–159; Thomas R. Frame and Greg J. Swinden, *First in, Last out. The Hague Navy at Gallipoli* (Kenthurst: Kangaroo Press, 1990), 102.

91 Displacement 284 t; launched in 1907 in Bordeaux; machinery: 2 SACAG 5950 hp turbines; speed: 17 kts; armament: 1 x 65 mm L/50 quick-firing gun, 6 x 47 mm L/50 quick-firing gun, 2 x 450 mm torpedo tubes; crew: 7 officers and 60 seamen (in 1915 74 Turks and 17 Germans). Langensiepen and Güleriyüz, *The Navy*, 158. Usborne (*Smoke on the Horizon*, 234) and Rudenno (*Gelibolu*, 243) claim that the destroyer (not identified by Nasmith as “Yarhisar”) escorted at least three tugboats pulling about eight sailing ships. This information, however, is not confirmed by Turkish sources.

92 Displacement 142 t; launched in 1895 in Paisley; machinery: Ross & Duncan steam turbine; speed: 5 kts; armament: 1 x 37 mm quick-firing gun, 2 x 47 mm quick-firing gun; crew (in 1915): 6 officers, 6 seamen from the Ottoman Navy, 8 merchant navy men. Güleriyüz and Langensiepen, *Osmanlı Donanması*, 181.

therefore only a matter of time before “İskenderun” was hit. Out of concern for his own vessel and her crew, the Turk withdrew, thus finally enabling Nasmith to sink the defective tugboat and two barges.⁹³ Twenty crew members of the sunken vessels (including “Dofen”'s commander Lt. Ahmed Nazmi [Gökdeniz] and 12 seamen of the Ottoman Navy⁹⁴) were rescued by the crew of “E11” and then transferred to the deck of a sailing ship that was stopped a little later. In order to be able to take the survivors on-board, her crew was forced to throw the cargo of watermelons into the sea. It is worth of mentioning here that in addition to the Greek captain and the five- or six-person crew, two Albanian owners of the watermelons were also on board this sailing ship, i.e. representatives of the ethnic minorities that were already deeply conflicted about the Ottoman state. No wonder that they decided not to take the “Dofen”'s crew to Tekirdağ, as Nasmith told them to, but instead leave it on the desert island of Ekinlik (in the Marmara Islands archipelago). To avoid the inevitable death of hunger and thirst, Capt. Ahmed Nazmi and his men had to take control of the sailing ship by force.⁹⁵ Let us also mention that British submarines operating in the Sea of Marmara did not always have to get provisions by force. They could also count on voluntary cooperation from the representatives of ethnic minorities living in this region. In ciphertext of 31 May 1915, the Directorate of Public Security informed the office of governor of sanjak in Çanakkale about the capture of the Haçadorian and Dikran tradesman brothers, who had been secretly supplying enemy submarines.⁹⁶

On the night of 22/23 August, Nasmith's submarine headed with “E2” towards Mudanya, so as to fire again at the railway station there. However, most of the shells hit nearby houses.⁹⁷

The next day, “E11” received radio information about the increased activity of transport ships in the Dardanelles area. At 7:20 a.m. on 25 August, having passed Gelibolu and entered the strait, Nasmith saw several ships through the periscope anchoring in Akbaş Bay, located on the eastern shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula. They were being protected by the gunboat “Durak Reis,”⁹⁸ and it was she that was chosen by the command-

93 Ertem, *Gelibolu*, 190–195. British sources agree that only one barge sank.

94 With the exception of a German mechanic, all were former crew of the “Mesudiye” battleship, sunk on 13 December 1914 by “B11” (Ertem, *Gelibolu*, 188–190). Reportedly, a director of a German bank from Istanbul was also among the survivors from the convoy attacked by “E11.” He was sailing to Çanakkale with a significant sum of money, which he threw into the sea in panic. Wemyss, *The Navy*, 160; Osborne, *Smoke on the Horizon*, 236.

95 Ertem, *Gelibolu*, 198–201.

96 COA, cat. no. DH.ŞFR./53-185-1.

97 Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 125.

98 Displacement 413 t; launched in 1911 in Granville; machinery: 2 SAFC Granville 850 hp turbines; speed: 11 kts; armament: 3 x 75 mm quick-firing gun, 2 x 47 mm quick-firing gun, 2 x 7.6 mm machine gun; crew: 12 officers and 48 seamen. Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 166. Besbelli

er of “E11” as his first target, although the torpedo passed under her keel and hit the transport ship “Kios” (3304 GRT), which had already run aground on 17 August after an attack by British aircraft. Thus, Nasmith only completed the work of destruction, causing the ship to lie on the port side and sink in shallow water, with a portion of her stern and starboard protruding above the surface.⁹⁹ After this attack, “E11” had to lurk for a while to avoid being destroyed by “Durak Reis,” which was tracking her. When the gunboat gave up, Nasmith attacked again at 10:25 a.m., hitting the midships of the “Haleb” passenger-transport ship (3648 BTR) with a torpedo – the same vessel that had already fallen prey to him just 20 days earlier. She sank with a slight tilt to the starboard. The entire stern and much of the midship remained above the surface. The third and last victim of “E11” in Akbaş Bay was “Tenedos” (3564 GRT),¹⁰⁰ which must have arrived from Istanbul with a load of artillery ammunition shortly before the British submarine turned up, because the torpedo detonated the entire contents of the front hold, leading to the quick loss of the ship. As she had 13.5 m under her keel in this place, only the ends of her two masts protruded above the surface after she sunk (fig. 10).




Figure 10. Ships sunk by “E11” in Akbaş Bay on 25 August 1915: 1. “Tenedos,” 2. “Haleb,” 3. “Kios”

Source: Piotr Nykiel’s collection.

(*Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 285) incorrectly claims it was the “Burak Reis” gunboat. It also says, although it is the only source to do so, that the protection of ships was provided, along with her, by the “Hamidabad” torpedo boat. Osborne (*Smoke on the Horizon*, 237) in turn writes that in addition to the transport vessels, there was also a gunboat and a destroyer in Akbaş Bay.

⁹⁹ Rudenno, *Gelibolu*, 244.

¹⁰⁰ Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 125; Langensiepen and Güleriyüz, *The Ottoman*, 39–40.

The events that took place in Akbaş Bay on 25 August still arouse controversy and negative emotions today, especially in Turkey, because about 200 wounded soldiers who were to be transported to the reserve hospital in Selimiye barracks in Istanbul were killed on the “Haleb” ship (fig. 11).



Figure 11. Cemetery in Akbaş where the Ottoman wounded soldiers, killed in the “Haleb” ship, were buried

Source: a photo © Piotr Nykiel.

In some publications, as well as in media materials that appear every year on the anniversary of the landings on the Gallipoli Peninsula, accusations against Capt. Nasmith of committing the war crime of sinking the “hospital ship” “Haleb” are still articulated¹⁰¹ – although it must be admitted that in recent years this happens less and less frequently. Therefore, it is worth considering here the legitimacy of such serious allegations. “Haleb” was a passenger/transport ship¹⁰² which, like the other two victims of “E11” from Akbaş Bay, brought ammunition and other war materials from Istanbul, probably soldiers too, and on the way back was to take the wounded. Thus, she was not

101 For example, in the article entitled *Haleb Vapuru 105 Yıl Sonra Çanakkale’de Hatırlandı*, published on the news portal ViraHaber.com (accessed 20.07.2022, <https://www.virahaber.com/haleb-vapuru-105-yil-sonra-canakkalede-hatirlandi-57970h.htm>), Gökhan Karakaş writes of “200 wounded soldiers and medical personnel in «Haleb» steamer belonging to the Red Crescent and sunk by «E11».” In a press release titled *Haleb Vapuru’ndaki 200 şehit* (accessed: 20.07.2022, https://www.sabah.com.tr/kultur_sanat/2014/03/18/haleb-vapurundaki-200-sehit) a journalist from the *Sabah* newspaper writes on the one hand about the sinking of “the «Haleb» steamer used as a hospital ship,” but on the other hand, objectively admits that this vessel did not have the emblems of the Red Crescent.

102 Launched in 1881 as “Aberdeen” at the Robert Napier & Sons shipyard in Glasgow, she was the first steam-powered Aberdeen Line ship, and had a load capacity of 3616 GRT, length 110.5 m, width 13.5 m, 45 first class passenger cabins and 650 third class. In 1906, she was sold to the Ottoman Empire and renamed “Haleb” (Aleppo). Ertem, *Gelibolu*, 205–206.

formally a hospital ship, which is clearly confirmed by the lack of an appropriate marking on the side of the wreck significantly protruding from the water and photographed between 25 August 1915 and 1919 (figs. 12 and 13).




Figure 12. The wreck of "Haleb" in a picture taken in 1923 by a member of HMS "Royal Sovereign"'s crew

Source: Piotr Nykiel's collection.



Figure 13. The official Ottoman Red Crescent postcard showing the way regular hospital ships were marked

Source: Piotr Nykiel's collection.

We must note, however, that just 20 days before “Haleb”'s second sinking, the deputy director of the Ottoman Red Crescent, Dr. Basim Ömer, asked his Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inform the Entente states through the U.S. Embassy in Istanbul that the “Akdeniz” steamer, adapted into a hospital ship, would be anchored in Akbaş Bay, in order to be used, if necessary, to transport the wounded.¹⁰³ So the same could have been true of “Haleb.” However, there is no evidence that the British were separately notified about this particular ship.¹⁰⁴ Even if they had received such information, it would be hard to expect Nasmith to approach each of the ships anchoring in Akbaş Bay and try to read their names (written in decorative Arabic calligraphy) through the periscope, due to lack of formal red crescent markings on the vessels. Thus, the Turks consciously took the risk of transporting the wounded in unmarked ships, knowing that they could be exposed to attack from an enemy submarine. It is enough to recall that “Haleb” herself had been sunk in the same place by “E11” just 20 days earlier. It cannot be ruled out that the above-mentioned letter of Dr. Basim Ömer was a direct reaction to this event. It only mentioned the “Akdeniz” steamer, because “Haleb” had just sunk, and probably no one knew yet whether it would be possible to salvage her and return her to service. On 30 August (five days after the second sinking of “Haleb”) Dr. Basim Ömer appealed again to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry¹⁰⁵ to make the enemy aware (again through the U.S. Embassy) that the merchant and passenger ships that bring soldiers and war materials to the Gallipoli Peninsula were taking the wounded on their way back. It is clear, however, from the content of this letter that these vessels were still not being properly marked, and it was very naive to expect that the British submarines, acting quickly and taking the enemy by surprise, would be able to distinguish a ship that had just arrived with supplies but had not yet had time to unload them, from one that was about to set out with the wounded on board. The accusations made against Nasmith up to the present day are therefore unfounded in this particular case.

It is worth mentioning here that Akbaş Bay was explored during the “First Polish Diving Expedition – Gallipoli, September 2011” project by Polish divers from the Shipwreck Expeditions Association.¹⁰⁶ Virtually all the wrecks in the Dardanelles area

103 Ibid., 294–295.

104 A document found by the author in the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul (COA, cat. no. HR.HMŞ. İŞO./67-14-1-9) says only that on 23 June, 1915 the Ottoman Foreign Ministry notified the Entente states (through the U.S. Embassy) on the conversion of the “Gülñihal” steamer and passenger ferries No. 61 and 62, belonging to Şirket-i Hayriyye to hospital vessels. This document does not mention “Haleb,” which of course does not exclude that in her case the note could have been sent at a later date, but for some reason was not preserved.

105 COA, cat. no. HR.SYS./2179-3.

106 The project was carried out by: Piotr Wytykowski (expedition leader, camera operator), Roman Zajder (expedition leader, underwater photographer), Piotr Nykiel (academic leader of the expedition), Tomasz and Anna Stopyra (expedition equipment providers), Aleksander Ostasz (camera operator),

which partially protruded above the water were cut up for scrap after 1918, and what remained of them under water was carried away over the following decades by storm waves and strong bottom current. This must have been the fate of the wrecks of the “Kios” and “Haleb” ships too, but the exploration of the places where they sank was prevented by the fact that they are currently located in a restricted area, belonging to a small harbour located in the southern part of Akbaş Bay (fig. 14).¹⁰⁷



Figure 14. The wooden plaque with the “Haleb”’s name that was on her stern

Source: Istanbul Naval Museum, photo © Piotr Nykiel.

Arkadiusz Kasjański (leader of underwater works, artistic setting of the expedition), Dariusz Pietruszka (medical protection, underwater photographer), Katarzyna Pietruszka (camera operator), Grzegorz Frass (underwater works), Jakub Trębacz (photographer, underwater works), Robert Piąsta (computer scientist, underwater works).

¹⁰⁷ Before the wreck of the last of those ships was cut up for scrap, which took place no earlier than in 1923 (cf. the handwritten caption on a photographic print in Piotr Nykiel’s collection – picture No. 11), a British soldier who participated in inventory work in the Dardanelles area dismantled a wooden plaque with the vessel’s name that was on her stern. He took this “trophy” to England and handed it over to Capt. Nasmith. In 2006, the latter’s son Prof. James Dunbar-Nasmith and grandson Duncan Dunbar-Nasmith gave it to a distinguished Turkish scuba diver Selçuk Kolay, who in turn donated the plaque to the collection of the Maritime Museum in Istanbul. Ertem, *Gelibolu*, 208; documentary *Çanakkale Şehitleri – Halep Vapur*, accessed 20.07.2022, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MUwykx0EyiA>.

So, the Polish team only had the opportunity to examine and inventory the wreck of “Tenedos,”¹⁰⁸ lying on her keel at a depth of 13.5 m. This vessel, unlike “Kios” and “Haleb,” sank with the stern facing the strait, which confirms her arrival in the bay shortly before the attack carried out by “E11” (ships moored in this place to wooden piers aft towards the Gallipoli Peninsula). The hull between the midship superstructure and the bow (which has only survived in the section from the stem to the hawses), on a length of over 40 m, is practically non-existent, which undoubtedly proves that the contents of the front hold exploded. The fact that artillery ammunition was transported in it is also confirmed by some artillery shells scattered around the wreckage. On the section from amidships to the stern, the hull, at a length of 49 m, although heavily overgrown with marine organisms, is relatively well preserved, including the main deck and remnants of the captain’s bridge, the glazing of some portholes, and the rudder blade. The screw, probably still preserved, is already buried in the seabed. Until the exploration of “Tenedos” by the Shipwreck Expeditions team, the Turkish diving community was convinced that it was the wreck of “Haleb.” Although the arguments presented by the Polish side (the depth at which the ship rests and its position aft towards the strait) exclude such a possibility, many Turks still insist on their version of events (figs. 15–18).¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ This ship was built by Armstrong, Mitchell & Co, Walker-on-Tyne. In the years 1889–1890 she sailed under the name “Italia” for the Hamburg America Line on the route from Hamburg to New York. From 1890, she operated for three years (for the same shipowner) on the Szczecin–New York route, and in the years 1894–1898 on the Hamburg–Boston–Baltimore line. In 1898, she was chartered for about a year by the Red Star Line shipowner, for which she operated on the routes Antwerp–New York and Antwerp–Philadelphia. In the years 1899–1900 she was chartered by the American Line; under whose flag she sailed on the routes Liverpool–Philadelphia and Hamburg–New York. In 1900, the ship was bought by the Sloman Line and renamed “Milano.” Under this name, the vessel operated the Hamburg–New York line. In 1903, the ship was sold to Deutsche Levante, which gave her her last name – “Tenedos.” Until the acquisition by the Ottoman Navy in 1914 the vessel operated connections between the Black Sea ports and New York and the Aegean ports. *The Ships List*, theshipslist.com, accessed 20.07.2022, <http://www.theshipslist.com/ships/descriptions/ShipsI-J.shtml>.

¹⁰⁹ The report from the “First Polish Diving Expedition – Gallipoli, September 2011” was not only published in Polish (Piotr Nykiel, Piotr Wytykowski and Roman Zajder, “Raport z ekspedycji Gallipoli 2011,” *Okrety Wojenne* 2 (2012), 112: 32–40), but also in English on Piotr Nykiel’s website *Naval Operations in the Dardanelles*, navyingallipoli.com, accessed 20.07.2022, <http://www.navyingallipoli.com/nurki2011.html>. It was also presented by Piotr Wytykowski and Roma Zajder during the meeting of The Explorers Club in New York in 2012. cf. *The Explorers Log* 44 (2012), 4: 19.



Figure 15. The bow of “Tenedos” as seen from the blasted out-front hold. Photograph taken in 2011



Figure 16. A preserved part of “Tenedos”'s starboard in 2011



Figure 17. Stern deck of “Tenedos” in 2011



Figure 18. Stern of “Tenedos” in 2011

Source (Fig. 15–18): Dariusz Pietruszka, Zachodniopomorskie Stowarzyszenie Dziedzictwo Morza.

After the action in Akbaş Bay, "E11" turned back towards the Sea of Marmara and in the afternoon attacked the ship "Şam" (3662 GRT), near Gelibolu. However, the torpedo did not hit its target, and Nasmith's would-be victim headed for the nearest port, which was Çardak, located on the Asian shore of the Dardanelles, opposite Gelibolu. There, her captain hastily unloaded his cargo, which was most likely to have originally reached the harbour in Akbaş. Shortly after unloading had been completed, "E11" appeared at the approach to Çardak. The second attack on "Şam" ended with only moderate damage.¹¹⁰ On the same day, Nasmith's submarine came across an "old acquaintance" from her first patrol – the ship "Lilly Rickmers" (4081 GRT) – which was taken by surprise while unloading in the port on the island of Burgaz in the Princes' Islands archipelago.¹¹¹ This time the torpedo fired by him hit the target, but the damaged vessel managed to reach the Bosphorus, where she saved herself from sinking by running aground near the shore.¹¹² Let us recall here that according to Serkan Ertem, "Lilly Rickmers" was marked as a hospital ship during her first meeting with "E11," which took place on 1 June. Describing the second attack on this vessel, the aforementioned author does not explicitly write that this was still the case, but in support of his thesis that "E11" used to attack hospital ships, he quotes *in extenso* the official protest of the Ottoman Minister of War Enver Pasha.¹¹³ However, this document only refers to the "Biga" and "Haliç" ships.¹¹⁴ In the case of the former, the crime committed by the commander of the British submarine was a torpedo attack in the port of Mudanya on a vessel transporting mail, and in relation to the latter it was the gun shelling of a ship whose crew was just evacuating after running aground. Thus, none of these incidents concerned the hospital ship. Moreover, these events took place on 6 and 7 July 1915 respectively, i.e. at a time when "E11" was not even in the Sea of Marmara! The submarine condemned by Enver Pasha must have been the "E7." Therefore, it is difficult to fathom what Ertem wanted to achieve by publishing false information, "supported" by a document that had no connection with what he was writing about. Apparently, this author, for reasons known only to himself, decided to join the group of Turkish historians and journalists trying at all costs to turn Capt. Nasmith into a war criminal. In his next monograph, however, Ertem abandoned such insinuations.¹¹⁵

110 On 30 August, the ship, escorted by a destroyer, was towed to Istanbul by the tugboat "Kudret." Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 125–126.

111 *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*, 28.

112 Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 126; Langensiepen and Güteryüz, *The Ottoman*, 40.

113 Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 126, document from the collection of the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul with the cat. no. HR.SYS./2099-5.

114 After some time, however, it turned out that one of these ships was not "Haliç" but "İntizam," cf. Güteryüz and Langensiepen, *Osmanlı Donanması*, 50.

115 Cf. Ertem, *Gelibolu*, 209.

On the same day, “E11” met “E2” near Doğanaslan. On 28 August, both British submarines shelled the Mudanya railway station for the third time. This time they had to retreat once again, after the Turks responded with fire from the shore.¹¹⁶

On 2 September, Nasmith established radio contact with the base at Mudros and obtained permission to end the patrol. The next day, before “E11” dived in the Dardanelles, she sank several sailing ships with her gun. Having crossed the strait without any problems, the submarine reached Imroz at 10:30 a.m. on the same day. During her 29-day-long second patrol in the Sea of Marmara and in the Dardanelles, “E11” sank a battleship, three merchant ships (one of them twice!), a tugboat and over 20 sailing ships. She also severely damaged a torpedo cruiser and five merchant ships. The outcome of the second patrol was therefore incomparably more favourable than the first one, both in terms of losses inflicted on the Ottoman Navy and on the transport fleet. In the case of the latter, the total tonnage of definitively sunken steam-powered vessels amounted to 10,640 GRT, what was more than 470 percent higher. However, the number of vessels erroneously considered by Nasmith as sunk increased from 1 to 3.

Table 2. Ottoman and German vessels (except sailing ships) sunk or damaged by “E11” during her second patrol (5 August – 3 September 1915)

NAME OF THE VESSEL	CLASS	DISPLACEMENT (t)	TONNAGE (GTD)	FATE OF THE VESSEL ACCORDING TO BRITISH SOURCES		FATE OF THE VESSEL ACCORDING TO TURKISH SOURCES	
				SUNK	DAMAGED	SUNK	DAMAGED
“Haleb”	transport ship	–	3,648	x			x
“Peyk-i Şevket”	torpedo cruiser	775	–		x		x
“Barbaros Hayreddin”	battleship	10,670	–	x		x	
“Mahmud Şevket Paşa”	guard ship	–	2,690		x		x
“İsfahan”	transport ship	–	843	x			x
“Dofen”	tug	–	124	x		x	
“Kios”	transport ship	–	3,304	x		x	
“Haleb”*	transport ship	–	3,648	x		x	
“Tenedos”	transport ship	–	3,564	x		x	
“Şam”	transport ship	–	3,662	x			x

¹¹⁶ Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 126; Ertem, *Gelibolu*, 209.

NAME OF THE VESSEL	CLASS	DISPLACEMENT (t)	TONNAGE (GTD)	FATE OF THE VESSEL ACCORDING TO BRITISH SOURCES		FATE OF THE VESSEL ACCORDING TO TURKISH SOURCES	
				SUNK	DAMAGED	SUNK	DAMAGED
"Lilly Rickmers" (G)	transport ship	–	4,081		x		x
IN TOTAL			25,555	8	3	5	6

Note: In the table, the vessels damaged according to Turkish sources also include those salvaged and restored to service. * – second and final sinking; (G) – a vessel under the German flag. Source: compiled by the author.

On 6 November, "E11" departed Kephalo Bay for her last patrol in the Sea of Marmara. After a smooth passage through the minefield and anti-submarine nets laid in the Dardanelles, she emerged around noon in the vicinity of Gelibolu. The next day, Nasmith achieved his first success near Karaburun, sinking the sailing ship "Evliyadifis." On the same day, "E11" headed for Bandırma Bay, where she was supposed to let a Greek agent disembark. However, a sudden deterioration of the weather made this task impossible.¹¹⁷

On 9 November, after the storm had subsided, the British submarine attacked two ferries operating between the two shores of the Bosphorus.¹¹⁸ In both cases, the torpedoes launched by Nasmith missed, probably because the surface current was still stronger than usual, and perhaps even reversed by the storm. On the same day, however, the seamen from "E11" boarded the sailing ship "Hildon," which was carrying barrels of olive oil. The vessel was sunk with explosives. On the night of 9/10 November, the Greek spy finally disembarked from the submarine near Edincik (about 10 km west of the town of Bandırma).¹¹⁹

Between 10 and 11 November, "E11" sank two sailing ships, one near Tekirdağ, the other near Türkeli Island.¹²⁰

On 12 November, Nasmith intended to attack the Ottoman torpedo boats anchoring off Haydarpaşa, but eventually gave up, presumably considering such an action too

117 Langensiepen and Güteryüz, *The Ottoman*, 43; Ertem, *Gelibolu*, 231. As Rudenno claims (*Gelibolu*, 269), a strong wind swept away the folding boat on which the spy was supposed to get ashore.

118 As the activities of British submarines in the straits and in the Sea of Marmara intensified, the Turks increasingly began to use passenger ferries for military purposes (primarily to transport war materials and soldiers, including wounded). In peacetime, those vessels used to operate between the two shores of the Bosphorus and on the Sea of Marmara. This decision was taken not only due to the increasing losses in the very modest number of transport ships, but also to the fact that these ferries had a small draught, thanks to which they could operate in shallow coastal waters, the depth of which did not allow submarines to carry out their torpedo attacks safely. Besbelli, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 280.

119 Ibid.; Ertem, *Canakkale*, 127.

120 Ertem, *Canakkale*, 127.

risky, given that it was the middle of the day and, as always, the waters were crowded. For some time, he also used the periscope to watch the ferries plying between the two banks of the Bosphorus and the hospital ship “Gülnihal” but did not take any offensive action. The next day he sank several small sailing ships near the island of Sivri (the westernmost of the Princes’ Islands).¹²¹

Two days later, “E11” reappeared in Akbaş Bay, where this time she came across the Austro-Hungarian ship “Arimatea” (3891 GRT), which she sunk with a torpedo hit to the bow. Since this vessel went down in shallow water, and her damage turned out to be not very extensive, she was salvaged a few weeks later and, after the necessary repairs, restored to service. The third encounter of “E11” with “Lilly Rickmers” took place in the same location too. However, the explosion of the torpedo fired in her direction was mitigated by the torpedo net, so the ship reached Istanbul on her own and was repaired there.¹²² Incidentally, it is bizarre that one merchant ship was attacked three times by the same submarine over a few months, and each time the ship got away unscathed, even though the submarine was commanded by an outstanding officer. From Akbaş Bay, “E11” headed for Çardak, where on the same day she torpedoed the ship “Despina” (774 GRT), which was carrying wheat, causing it to sink. Three crew members of the aforementioned vessel were killed as a result of the attack.¹²³

Between 16 and 25 November, despite the adverse weather conditions, Nasmith managed to sink two sailing ships near Tekirdağ.¹²⁴ On 26 November, in still stormy weather, he directed his submarine to Erdek Bay, where, having surfaced at noon, he used his gun to attack the ships “Gelibolu” (284 GRT) and “Edremit” (414 GRT), as well as the Ottoman Navy’s tug “Sa’na.” However, Turkish land artillery forced him to dive before long. Around 4:00 p.m., “E11” surfaced again and continued to fire on these vessels until dark. As a result, “Gelibolu” sank along with two crew members, but was most likely salvaged the next day (which was certainly not difficult, given the size of the ship and the fact that she was sunk by fire from a 76 mm gun, not a torpedo). “Edremit” and the “Sa’na” tug suffered damage. Two seamen were wounded on board the former vessel.¹²⁵ From 27 November to 2 December, Nasmith was unable to carry out any action, due to stormy weather.¹²⁶

121 Langensiepen and Güleriyüz, *The Ottoman*, 43.

122 Ibid.; *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*, 35; Ertem, *Gelibolu*, 232.

123 Langensiepen and Güleriyüz, *The Ottoman*, 43; Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 127.

124 One of them was presumably the barge No. 58 registered in Istanbul Yağkapanı harbour and leased by the Kayacıoğlu Hasan and Osman Aga brothers. COA, cat. no. BEO/4385-328835-1-2.

125 COA, cat. no. DH. EUM. VRK./25-52. Ertem (*Çanakkale*, 128) and Langensiepen and Güleriyüz (*The Ottoman*, 43) mention neither the casualties among the crews of the above-mentioned ships, nor that “Gelibolu” was salvaged. In their opinion, the “Sa’na” tugboat did not receive a single hit.

126 Langensiepen and Güleriyüz, *The Ottoman*, 43; Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 128.

At 12:30 p.m. on 3 December, "E11" attacked the destroyer "Yarhisar" near Yalova. The explosion of the torpedo at the level of the rear boiler tore the ship in two. The surviving crew members (43 men) were taken by the British both into the submarine and on her upper deck and then transferred on board a sailing ship that the submarine encountered a little later. Six officers (including one German), two German NCOs, a ship's medic and 29 sailors (including six Germans) were killed.¹²⁷

The next day, "E11" spotted the German steamer "Bosporus" (2995 GRT), which was heading towards Bandırma, under the protection of the Ottoman torpedo boat "Berk-i Efşan."¹²⁸ The British submarine tracked both vessels for some time. When the escorting ship disappeared into the fog,¹²⁹ Nasmith decided to take the opportunity to attack "Bosporus" with his gun. The shelling caused a fire on board the ship and alerted the torpedo boat, which emerged from the fog and tried to ram the aggressor. However, "E11" managed to dive at the last moment, thereby avoiding a collision with "Berk-i Efşan." By now in flames and tilting considerably, "Bosporus" was abandoned by her German crew. Despite the help that came after some time from the port of Bandırma, the ship could not be saved.¹³⁰

On 5 December, "E11" sank a barge named "Elenora" near Kemer. At 8:20 p.m., the submarine came across the passenger steamer "Rehber" (287 GRT) near the island of Yumurta, sailing from Gelibolu (before the outbreak of the war she operated connections on the Bosphorus). When the shelled ship began to sink, the British submarine picked up five crew members from her deck, including the captain, who revealed that another steamer was to leave the port of Erdek the following day.¹³¹

So, the next day, Nasmith directed his submarine towards Erdek, where, thanks to the testimony of the "Rehber"'s captain, he used his gun to sink the passenger ship

127 Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 128.

128 Displacement 230 t; launched in 1892 in Istanbul; machinery: 2 Germania 3500 hp turbines; speed: 17 kts; armament: 2 x 47 mm L/50 quick-firing gun, 2 x 47 mm L/30 quick-firing gun, 2 x 428 mm torpedo tubes; crew: 8 officers and 42 seamen (in 1915 58 Turks and 4 Germans). Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 155.

129 The authors of *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915* (36) are the only ones who claim that it was not fog, but smoke from the "Bosporus" funnels.

130 Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 128; Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 43.

131 Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 43; *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*, 36. In addition, the French-speaking captain revealed a lot of other information, including on the methods of delivering reinforcements to the Gallipoli Peninsula, on the number of German submarines and Turkish transport ships in Istanbul and on the activity of the Ottoman aviation in the Istanbul, Tekirdağ and Gelibolu areas, Rudenko, *Gelibolu*, 273. It seems that most of the "Rehber"'s crew was abandoned by the captain and his officers. A similar example of the low morale of officers of the Ottoman merchant fleet was previously witnessed on 7 November 1914 in the Dardanelles, cf. Nykiel, *Wyprawa*, 121.

“Eser-i Merhamet” (230 GRT).¹³² A day later, “E11” rammed a small sailing ship in the same area, then headed towards Gelibolu and, at about 8:00 p.m., fired her gun at the minelayer “İntibah,” near Şarköy.¹³³ However, the Ottoman ship returned fire and attempted to ram the submarine, forcing the aggressor to dive. The damage sustained by “İntibah” turned out to be insignificant, but one of her crew members died from his wounds. The next day, the two vessels encountered each other again near Palatya (a village on the northern shore of Marmara Island). This time, the Ottoman minelayer was hit in the front superstructure, its gun was also damaged, and a fire broke out on board. However, the crew managed to master the situation quickly, preventing the ship from being eliminated from service.¹³⁴

Also on 8 December, the surfaced “E11” had to fight with an Ottoman plane which tried to hit her twice with bombs, while the submarine was on the way to the port of Bandırma. The commander of the submarine, standing on the navigation bridge of the conning tower, responded himself to the attack, firing at the enemy with a rifle. In the end, however, he decided not to tempt fate and gave the order to dive.¹³⁵ At about 8:00 a.m. the next day, when Nasmith was leaving the Bandırma area and, fortunately for him, was still at periscope depth, he saw the periscope of another submarine. He initially identified her as “E2,” which he was expecting to meet shortly in the Sea of Marmara. However, it was the German “UB14,” the recent slayer of “E20,” which saw “E11” from a long distance at 1:30 p.m. while she was already surfaced. However, Nasmith, unaware of the danger, continued his cruise on the surface, which gave him a safe speed advantage over the submerged German submarine. As a result, after some time, her commander Lieutenant Albrecht von Dewitz had to stop tracking the British vessel.¹³⁶

On 10 December, “E11” met “E2” in the Sea of Marmara and received ammunition and provisions from her.¹³⁷ Thanks to these replenishments, Nasmith was able to sink

132 In 1916, however, this vessel was salvaged and, after an overhaul, restored to service. Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 128–129; Ertem, *Gelibolu*, 237; *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*, 36; Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 43.

133 Displacement 82 t (full: 616 t); launched in 1886 in Glasgow as a tugboat, purchased by the Ottoman Empire in 1912 and in 1914 converted to a minelayer; machinery: 2 Rank & Blackmore 1670 hp turbines; speed: 12 kts; armament: 1 x 76 mm quick-firing gun, 2 x 47 mm quick-firing gun, 50 sea mines; crew: 12 officers and 46 seamen, Langensiepen and Gülerüz, *The Ottoman*, 189.

134 Only Rudenno (*Gelibolu*, 274) states that “İntibah” suffered any damage during her second clash with “E11.” It is indirectly confirmed by Besbelli (*Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 288), according to whom two seamen from “İntibah” were killed at that time, which clearly indicates that the ship must have been hit. Meanwhile, Langensiepen and Gülerüz (*The Ottoman*, 43) and Ertem (*Çanakkale*, 129) claim the two sides did not score any hits during this exchange of fire.

135 Rudenno, *Gelibolu*, 274.

136 *Ibid.*, 274–275.

137 Gülerüz and Langensiepen, *Osmanlı Donanması*, 56; Besbelli, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 288.

the barge “Ceylan-ı Bahri” and the tug “Memo” (GRT Unknown) two days later in the Gulf of İzmit.¹³⁸

The last event of this patrol was an attack on targets in the Istanbul area, launched on 14 December. First, “E11” caught the ship “Leros” (247 GRT), which had just arrived from the harbour in Karaköy and was landing towards the Haydarpaşa quay with the help of tugboats. The vessel, torpedoed in her bow, managed however to stay afloat, thanks to the tugboats and hastily brought barges, while the submarine, trying to make a quick retreat, hit the breakwater (also with her bow). As it turned out, the damage that “E11” suffered as a result of this collision was not serious, but the incident prompted Nasmith to go to a safer area, which at that time was the Gulf of İzmit. Heading in this direction, the submarine surfaced in the vicinity of Tuzla, where she fired her gun at the Istanbul–İzmit train. Nasmith thought he was attacking a military transport, but it was the passenger express No. 1678, reportedly carrying only civilians. One of the shells hit the train, but there is no information about possible victims of this incident.¹³⁹

On 19 December, Nasmith was ordered to return to base. Four days later, “E11” passed through the Dardanelles without any trouble and arrived at the quay in the bay of Mudros on the island of Lemnos in the early morning of December 24.¹⁴⁰

The greatest success of the submarine's third patrol was undoubtedly the sinking of the destroyer “Yarhisar.” Although the overall quantity of eliminated and damaged transport and passenger ships was slightly more favourable than in the case of the second patrol, the tonnage of the definitively sunken vessels was only 4,286 GRT (not counting the tugboat, whose data we do not have), so it was as much as 60 percent worse.¹⁴¹ The lack of major successes was undoubtedly influenced by weather conditions, which at best made an effective torpedo attack difficult to be carried out, and at worst forced Nasmith to stay idle for several days. However, the British, who had been operating in the Dardanelles since the autumn of 1914, should have known that strong storms were the norm at this time of year. It was therefore necessary to consider whether planning the patrol of “E11” during this period made sense at all. It should also be noted that in November and December 1915, the Gallipoli Campaign had lost much of its intensity, mainly due to the fact that the Entente troops were already finalising their – as they thought – secret retreat from this front. Thus, the Turks no longer

138 *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*, 37; Langensiepen and Güteryüz, *The Ottoman*, 43.

139 Langensiepen and Güteryüz, *The Ottoman*, 43; Ertem, *Çanakkale*, 129; *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*, 37. Besbelli (*Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 611) as the only one claims that the “Leros”'s tonnage was as much as 1699 GRT which seems to be a mistake.

140 Langensiepen and Güteryüz, *The Ottoman*, 43.

141 Nasmith, however, was convinced that he sank a total of 11 steamers, 5 large sailing ships and 30 small ones during the third patrol. (Rudenno, *Gelibolu*, 276.

needed to supply their units so regularly by sea, which obviously translated not only into the tonnage of merchant ships, but also into the number and class of warships supporting combat operations in this area which “E11” could attack.

TABLE 3. Ottoman Austro-Hungarian and German vessels (except sailing ships) sunk or damaged by “E11” during her third patrol (6 November – 24 December 1915)

NAME OF THE VESSEL	CLASS	DISPLACEMENT (t)	TONNAGE (GRT)	FATE OF THE VESSEL ACCORDING TO BRITISH SOURCES		FATE OF THE VESSEL ACCORDING TO TURKISH SOURCES	
				SUNK	DAMAGED	SUNK	DAMAGED
“Arimatea” (A–H)	transport ship	–	3,891	x			x
“Lilly Rickmers” (G)	transport ship	–	4,081		x		x
“Despina”	transport ship	–	774	x		x	
“Gelibolu”	transport ship	–	284	x			x
“Edremit”	transport ship	–	414		x		x
“Yarhisar”	destroyer	284	–	x		x	
“Bosporus” (G)	transport ship	–	2,995	x		x	
“Rehber”	passenger ship	–	287	x		x	
“Eser–i Merhamet”	passenger ship	–	230	x			x
“İntibah”	minelayer	616	–		x		x
“Memo”	tug	–	N/D	x		x	
“Leros”	transport ship	–	247		x		x
IN TOTAL			at least 13,203	8	4	5	7

Note: In the table, the vessels damaged according to Turkish sources also include those salvaged and restored to service. (A–H) – a vessel flying the Austro-Hungarian flag. (G) – a vessel under the German flag. Source: compiled by the author.

The adventures of Captain Nasmith in the Dardanelles and in the Sea of Marmara could easily serve as the basis for the script of an epic film production. His example also shows that sometimes only chance decides whether one goes down in history as a war hero or as a criminal. This officer received the highest British war decoration for his first patrol – the Victoria Cross. However, if the two defective torpedoes fired by him during this mission had exploded after hitting their targets, the world would have remembered him as a villainous corsair, who, without squinting, sank a hospital ship with several hundred wounded on board, and a ferry carrying about 7,000 civilians, including women and children. Similarly, during the last patrol on 9 November, his two torpedoes missed two Bosphorus ferries, doubtlessly carrying mostly civilians, and five days later, only due to the deteriorating visibility at dusk, he did not manage

to deal with the passenger train. If they had not failed, history would have certainly remembered him for these attacks too.

The case of Nasmith likewise compels us to reflect on the unequal “weight” of the Victoria Crosses. In order to receive it, the commander of “E11” had to break through the entire length of the Dardanelles in both directions and sink (according to his own assessment) six enemy vessels (including one warship), and damage four. Six months earlier, in order to receive the same decoration, his colleague Lt. Norman Holbrook, had only needed to sail “B11” about a third of the length of the strait (and thus only half of the minefield) and sink a single battleship (“Mesudiye”) which even for the Turks themselves did not present great combat value anymore, due to her age, technical condition and lack of main artillery armament.¹⁴² Another representative of the Royal Navy on the Dardanelles front, Lt. Cdr. Eric Gascoigne Robinson, was awarded the Victoria Cross for a demolition landing in the Kumkale area, during which he blew up two anti-aircraft guns and one coastal gun cal. 240 mm L/35 (at Fort Orhaniye). Although he showed unquestionable courage during this action, his achievement had no practical significance, because the gun in the fort, although loaded, had already been severely damaged before he appeared there, and a few hours earlier all the fortifications around Kumkale had been abandoned by the artillery units, for tactical reasons.¹⁴³ It is also worth noting that shortly after being recommended for the Victoria Cross, both Nasmith and Robinson carried out operations that overshadowed their previous achievements.


The status of Captain Martin Eric Nasmith as the most effective commander of a British submarine during WW1 is unassailable, although our knowledge of his achievements, built so far almost exclusively on the basis of his own ship log and reminiscences of “E11”’s crew, certainly needs to be clarified. This officer claimed that he had sunk at least 122 Ottoman vessels including a battleship, a torpedo cruiser, a destroyer and a torpedo gunboat.¹⁴⁴ Meanwhile, Turkish sources indicate that the total number of warships and steam-powered transport ships definitively destroyed by him did not exceed fifteen! All the rest, which during all three patrols could actually have

142 Cf.: Nykiel, *Wyprawa*, 121–127; Snelling, *VCs of the First World War*, 8–18.

143 Cf.: Nykiel, *Wyprawa*, 207–211; Snelling, *VCs of the First World War*, 19–24.

144 Rudenko, *Gelibolu*, 276. The second best British submarine commander on the Sea of Marmara Lt. Cmdr. Edward Courtney Boyle (“E14”) sank a gunboat and a ferry, while a large transport ship – contrary to the statements of the western historiography – only damaged. Besbelli, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde*, 219, 279, 610. The best British submarine commander on the Baltic Sea, Lt. Cmdr. Max Horton, heavily damaged one armoured cruiser and sank a light cruiser, a destroyer and a number of merchant vessels. Ian Sumner, *British Commanders of World War II* (Oxford: Botley, 2003), 22–24; Werner Rahn, “The Naval war in the Baltic 1914–1918: A German Perspective,” in: *The Danish Straits and German Naval Power 1905–1918*, ed. Michael Epkenhans, Gerhard P. Groß (Potsdam: Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes, 2010), 87.

reached approximately one hundred in total, were of various sizes, but usually small sailing ships, barges or even boats, mainly carrying food products (with a few exceptions). As it is unclear who was to be the recipient of their loads, we cannot assume that Nasmith had a significant impact on the provisions supply of the Ottoman troops fighting on the Gallipoli Peninsula. However, the psychological effect of his raids on the Sea of Marmara, particularly in Istanbul, was tremendous. On the one hand, the Turks lost their sense of security in their internal waters and on the coast (including the capital); on the other hand, the raids provided a significant boost to British morale – both to civilians reading about the exploits of “E11” in their newspapers, and to soldiers themselves, especially those fighting on the Gallipoli Peninsula.



Map 1. The sea of Marmara and places related to “E11”’s patrols in 1915

Source: drawn by © Piotr Nykiel.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival sources

Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, Directorate of State Archives, Ottoman Archives (COA)

Ciphertext of the Directorate of Public Security of 31 May 1915 on the capture of the Haçadorian and Dikran brothers, who secretly delivered supplies to the enemy submarines (cat. no. DH.ŞFR./53-185-1).

Letter of the Minister of War Enver Pasha of 10 August 1915 to the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs on cases of violations of international law by the British (cat. no. HR.SYS./2099-9).

Letter of 30 August 1915 from the Deputy Director of the Ottoman Red Crescent Dr. Besim Ömer to the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs (cat. no. HR.SYS./2179-3).

Note of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 23 June 1915 on the conversion of the *Gülnehal* steamer and passenger ferries No. 61 and 62 into hospital ships (cat. no. HR.HMŞ.İŞO. /67-14-1-9).

Protocol on the sinking of barge No. 58 leased by the Kayacıoğlu Hasan and Osman Ağa brothers by an enemy submarine (cat. no. BEO/4385-328835-1-2).

Report of the Head of the Ottoman Intelligence Department of the General Staff, Maj. Seyfi, of 23 May 1915 (cat. no. DH. EUM. VRK./14-102-1).

Report of the Head of the Ottoman Intelligence Department of the General Staff, Maj. Seyfi, of 2 June 1915 (cat. no. DH. EUM. VRK./25-24-2).

Report of the Head of the Ottoman Intelligence Department of the General Staff, Maj. Seyfi, of 28 November 1915 (cat. no. DH. EUM. VRK./25-52).

Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum (PISM)

Correspondence regarding the decoration of Adm. Sir Martin M. Dunbar Nasmith with the Order of Polonia Restituta I class (cat. no. MAR.A.V.12/680).

Books and articles

Avcı, Cenk. *Çanakkale Cephesi'nde Hava Savaşları*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2009.

Avcı, Cenk. *The Skies of Gallipoli*. İstanbul: Nart Yayıncılık, 2003.

Besbelli, Saim. *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi*. Vol. 8: *Deniz Harekâtı*. Ankara: Gnkur. Basımevi, 1976.

Çanakkale Boğaz Komutanlığı, *Çanakkale Deniz Savaşları 1915*. İstanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 2008.

Ertem, Serkan. *Çanakkale Denizaltı Harekâtı*. İstanbul: Denizler Kitabevi, 2011.

Ertem, Serkan. *Gelibolu Korsanı. Çanakkale Denizaltı Savaşının Gizli Tarihi*. İstanbul: AZ Kitap, 2014.

The Explorers Log, 44 (2012), 4.

Frame, Thomas R., and Greg J. Swinden. *First in, Last out. The Navy at Gallipoli*. Kenthurst: Kangaroo Press, 1990.

Gray, Randal, ed. *Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships: 1906–1921*. London: Conway Maritime Press, 2006.

Güleryüz, Ahmet, and Bernd Langensiepen. *Osmanlı Donanması 1828–1923*. İstanbul: Denizler Kitabevi / Kaptan Yayıncılık, 2007.

- Kanal, Hümmet. "Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Çanakkale Muharebelerinin Harp-Harekât Hukuku Açısından İncelenmesi." In: *100'üncü Yılında Çanakkale Zaferi Sempozyumu, Ulusal Sempozyum*, 28–29 Nisan 2015, İstanbul, ed. Zekeriya Türkmen, 503–525. İstanbul: Harp Akademileri Basımevi, no date of publication.
- Kondracki, Tadeusz. *Stowarzyszenie Marynarki Wojennej 1945–1992*. Gdynia: Muzeum Marynarki Wojennej w Gdyni, 2003.
- Langensiepen, Bernd, and Ahmet Gülerüz. *The Ottoman Steam Navy 1828–1923*. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1995.
- Lloyd's Register of British and Foreign Shipping*. Vol. II: 1989–99. *Sailing Vessels 1899*. London: Committee Lloyd's Register, 1989.
- Mütercimler, Erol. *Korkak Abdul'den Coni Türk'e. Gelibolu 1915*. İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2005.
- Nykiel, Piotr. *Wyprawa do Złotego Rogu. Działania wojenne w Dardanelach i na Morzu Egejskim (sierpień 1914 – marzec 1915)*. Kraków-Międzyzdroje: Arkadiusz Wingert, 2008.
- Nykiel, Piotr. "Pancerniki typu «Brandenburg» w służbie tureckiej." Part 1. *Okrety Wojenne* 5 (2012), 115: 20–29.
- Nykiel, Piotr. "Pancerniki typu «Brandenburg» w służbie tureckiej." Part 2. *Okrety Wojenne* 6 (2012), 116: 9–13.
- Nykiel, Piotr, Piotr Wytykowski, and Roman Zajder. "Raport z ekspedycji Gallipoli 2011." *Okrety Wojenne* 2 (2012), 112: 32–40.
- Rahn, Werner. "The Naval war in the Baltic 1914–1918: A German Perspective." In: *The Danish Straits and German Naval Power 1905–1918*, ed. Michael Epkenhans, Gerhard P. Groß, 75–96. Potsdam: Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes, 2010.
- Rudenko, Victor. *Gelibolu. Denizden Saldırı*. Translated by Cençiler Dilek. Ankara: ODTÜ Yayıncılık, 2009.
- Shankland, Peter, and Anthony Hunter. *Dardanelles Patrol*. London: Mayflower Books, 1971.
- Snelling, Stephen. *The Naval VCs: VCs of the First World War*. Thrupp-Stroud-Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing – Phoenix Mill, 2002.
- Sumner, Ian. *British Commanders of World War II*. Oxford: Botley, 2003.
- Usborne, Cecil Vivian. *Smoke on the Horizon. Mediterranean Fighting 1914–1918*. London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1933.
- Wilson, Michael. *Destination Dardanelles*. London: Leo Cooper, 1988.
- Wemyss, Rosslyn Erskine, Baron Wester Wemyss. *The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign*. London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1924.

Internet sources

- Çanakkale Şehitleri – Halep Vapuru*. Documentary film. Youtube.com. Accessed 20.07.2022. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MUwykx0EyiA>.
- Halep Vapuru'ndaki 200 şehit*. Sabah.com.tr. Accessed 20.07.2022. https://www.sabah.com.tr/kultur_sanat/2014/03/18/halep-vapurundaki-200-sehit.
- Karakaş, Gökhan. *Halep Vapuru 105 Yıl Sonra Çanakkale'de Hatırlandı*. Virahaber.com. Accessed 20.07.2022. <https://www.virahaber.com/halep-vapuru-105-yil-sonra-canakkalede-hatirlandi-57970h.htm>.
- Nykiel, Piotr. *Naval Operations in the Dardanelles. First Polish Diving Expedition – Gallipoli, September 2011*. Navyingallipoli.com. Accessed 20.07.2022. <http://www.navyingallipoli.com/nurki2011.html>.
- Royal Navy [RN] Officers 1939–1945*. Unithistories.com. Accessed 20.07.2022. https://www.unithistories.com/officers/RN_officersD6.html.
- The Ships List*. Theshipslist.com. Accessed 20.07.2022. <http://www.theshipslist.com/ships/descriptions/ShipsI-J.shtml>.
- The Ships List*. Theshipslist.com. Accessed 20.07.2022. <https://www.theshipslist.com/ships/lines/rickmers.shtml>.

English version: Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

The article is devoted to the early phase of the career of Martin Eric Nasmith (1883–1965) and is an attempt to summarise his achievements during three underwater patrols in the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara in 1915. Those missions brought him the appellation of the most effective British submariner of WW1. In Anglophone historiography, all the books and articles related to this subject constitute a one-sided narrative based solely on British sources. Thus, the author has made the first attempt in western historiography to compare the British and Turkish points of view. Although a few such efforts have been made in Turkey, their results are not widely known to western historians, and in some cases, they raise objections. The decision to take up this challenge came from an awareness that Nasmith's view of the situation at the moment when he was personally observing the effects of his attacks could not be complete and entirely objective. He could not have known that some of the vessels he had sunk in shallow coastal waters were salvaged by the Turks and restored to service. The article gives detailed coverage of the attacks conducted by Nasmith on Ottoman warships, steam-powered merchant ships and land targets, during all three patrols of the "E11" submarine. As a result of his research, the author was able to draw attention to the fact that the results of "E11"'s second patrol were incomparably more favourable than those of the first one (for which Nasmith was awarded the Victoria Cross), both in terms of losses inflicted on the Ottoman Navy and on the transport fleet. In the case of the latter, the total tonnage of definitively sunken steam-powered vessels was more than 470 percent higher. While Nasmith claimed that he had sunk at least 122 Ottoman vessels during all

three patrols, Turkish sources indicate that the total number of warships and steam-powered transport ships definitively destroyed by him did not exceed fifteen.

Intruz w haremie, albo orientalne awantury komandora Martina Erica Nasmitha

Słowa kluczowe: Martin Eric Dunbar-Nasmith, "E11," pierwsza wojna światowa, Dardanele, Gallipoli, Morze Marmara

STRESZCZENIE

Niniejszy artykuł poświęcony jest początkowemu okresowi kariery adm. Martina Erica Dunbar-Nasmitha (1883–1965) i stanowi próbę podsumowania jego osiągnięć podczas trzech podwodnych patroli w Dardanelach i na Morzu Marmara w 1915 r. Misje te przyniosły mu miano najskuteczniejszego brytyjskiego "podwodniaka" pierwszej wojny światowej. W anglosaskiej historiografii wszystkie publikacje poświęcone działaniom Nasmitha na wodach tureckich stanowią jednostronną narrację, opartą wyłącznie na źródłach brytyjskich. Autor podjął więc pierwszą w zachodniej historiografii próbę skonfrontowania brytyjskiego i tureckiego punktu widzenia. Podobnej konfrontacji podejmowano się kilkakrotnie w Turcji, ale jej efekty nie są powszechnie znane zachodnim historykom i w kilku przypadkach budzą zastrzeżenia. Decyzja o podjęciu się niniejszego wyzwania wynika ze świadomości tego, że ocena sytuacji dokonywana przez Nasmitha, w chwili, gdy osobiście obserwował efekty swych ataków, nie mogła być pełna i całkowicie obiektywna. Nie miał prawa wiedzieć, że niektóre z zatopionych przez niego na płytkich wodach przybrzeżnych jednostek zostały przez Turków podniesione z dna i przywrócone do służby. Artykuł ten stanowi szczegółowe omówienie ataków na osmańskie okręty wojenne, statki handlowe o napędzie parowym i cele lądowe, podjętych przez Nasmitha podczas wszystkich trzech patroli okrętu podwodnego "E11." W rezultacie swoich badań autor zwraca uwagę na to, iż bilans drugiego patrolu, zarówno pod względem strat zadanych osmańskiej marynarce wojennej, jak i flocie transportowej był bez porównania lepszy niż pierwszego (za który Nasmith odznaczony został Krzyżem Wiktorii). W przypadku strat floty transportowej łączny tonaż definitywnie zatopionych jednostek o napędzie parowym był o ponad 470 procent większy. Choć Nasmith twierdził, że podczas wszystkich trzech patroli zatopił co najmniej 122 osmańskie jednostki pływające, to według źródeł tureckich liczba okrętów i parowców, które definitywnie unieszkodliwił nie przekroczyła piętnastu.

Citation

Nykiel, Piotr. "Intruder in the Harem, or Captain Martin Eric Nasmith's Oriental Adventures." *Studia Maritima* 35 (2022): 41–84. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2022.35-02.



Jordan Siemianowski

Institute of History
University of Szczecin
jordan.siemianowski@usz.edu.pl
ORCID 0000-0001-9276-366X

The Circumstances of the Establishment of “Żegluga Polska” in 1926

Keywords: the Second Polish Republic, maritime economy of the Second Republic, maritime policy of the Second Republic, Polish shipowners, “Żegluga Polska,” Polish merchant fleet

In the first half of the 1920s, many unsuccessful attempts were made in Poland to establish an efficient shipping company. In fact, the only Polish shipping company that operated for several years, between 1919 and 1926, was “Towarzystwo Żeglugi Morskiej «Sarmacja» S.A.” (hereinafter “Sarmacja”), in which the casting vote was with the Norwegian management associated with the shipping company “Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab” from Bergen (BDS), a co-owner of the Polish firm.

As the Scandinavian and Baltic markets saw a coal mining boom in 1926, the ports of Gdańsk and Gdynia, through which Polish coal was to be shipped from Silesia, became a perfect place for the establishment and development of shipping companies. However, “Sarmacja” was unable to take advantage of this conducive economic situation. The company collapsed in the same year and was replaced by “Żegluga Polska” [Polish Shipping],¹ which, unlike its predecessor, was a shipping company funded solely by domestic capital. Interestingly, these events were closely related to one another and initiated the process of creating a number of new Polish shipping companies which survived until the outbreak of World War II.

In the literature to date, little space has been devoted to the foundation of “Żegluga Polska.” Wanda Czerwińska, whose research focused on the more general topic of the Polish merchant fleet in the interwar period, limited herself only to listing

1 In 1932, “Żegluga Polska” was transformed into “Żegluga Polska S.A.”

the company's vessels and characterising its capital.² Incidentally, she determined the wrong date of the establishment of the company (13 May 1927).³ Slightly more light on the issue in question was shed by Jerzy Miciński, who provided a short description of the shipowner's vessels.⁴ Other authors, such as Donald Steyer,⁵ Andrzej Piskozub,⁶ Jan Piwowoński,⁷ Kazimierz Mika⁸ and Janusz Czechowski⁹ merely enumerated the ships operated by "Żegluga Polska." A similarly small amount of information about the establishment of "Żegluga Polska" can be found in the second volume of Zbigniew Landau and Jerzy Tomaszewski's book *Gospodarka Polski międzywojennej* [The Economy of Interwar Poland]¹⁰ and also in publications by Zbigniew Machaliński¹¹ and Bogusław Dopierała.¹²

Some scanty facts about the foundation of "Żegluga Polska" are provided in publications from the interwar period by authors such as Julian Rummel,¹³ Leonard Możdżeński,¹⁴ Jan Korwin-Kamieński¹⁵ and Zygmunt Jan Tyszel¹⁶. Memoirs by Ma-

-
- 2 Wanda Czerwińska, *Rola państwa w polskiej gospodarce morskiej 1919–1939* (Gdańsk: Uniwersytet Gdański, 1975), 90; Eadem, *Polska żegluga morska w latach II Rzeczypospolitej* (Gdańsk: Uniwersytet Gdański, 1971), 32–33.
 - 3 Wanda Czerwińska, *Rola*, 90; Eadem, "Na morzu i zapleczu," in: *Dzieje Gdyni*, ed. Roman Wapiński (Wrocław: National Institute Ossolińskich, 1970), 43.
 - 4 Jerzy Miciński, *Księga statków polskich 1918–1945*, Vol. 1 (Gdańsk: Polnord-Oskar, 1996), 177–178.
 - 5 Donald Steyer, *Półwiecze Polski na morzu* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1970), 110; Idem, "Polish Merchant Navy 1926–1939," *Acta Poloniae Historica* 23 (1971): 120.
 - 6 Andrzej Piskozub, *Polska morska. Czyn XX wieku* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1986), 76–77.
 - 7 Jan Piwowoński, *Flota spod biało-czerwonej* (Warszawa: Nasza Księgarnia, 1989), 17–18.
 - 8 Kazimierz Mika, "Gospodarka morska," in: *Problemy gospodarcze Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, ed. Kazimierz Kozłowski (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1989), 234.
 - 9 Janusz Czechowski, *Gdynia i Wolne Miasto Gdańsk w politycznej, gospodarczej i kulturalnej perspektywie II Rzeczypospolitej* (Słupsk: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pomorskiej, 2018), 125.
 - 10 Zbigniew Landau, Jerzy Tomaszewski, *Gospodarka Polski międzywojennej 1918–1939*, Vol. 2: *Od Grabskiego do Piłsudskiego. Okres kryzysu poinflacyjnego i ożywienia koniunktury 1924–1929* (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1971), 250.
 - 11 Zbigniew Machaliński, *Gospodarcza myśl morska II Rzeczypospolitej 1919–1939* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1975), 226–238.
 - 12 Bogdan Dopierała, *Wokół polityki morskiej Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1978), 269–270.
 - 13 Julian Rummel, "P.P. Żegluga Polska," in: *Kronika o polskim morzu. Dzieje walk, zwycięstw i pracy*, ed. Czesław Peche (Warszawa: Polska Gospodarcza, 1930), 224; Idem, *Morskie zagadnienia Polski* (Gdynia: Instytut Wydawniczy Państwowej Szkoły Morskiej, 1934), 34; Idem, "Polska marynarka handlowa," in: *XV lat polskiej pracy na morzu*, ed. Aleksy Majewski (Gdynia: Instytut Wydawniczy Państwowej Szkoły Morskiej, 1935), 150.
 - 14 Leonard Możdżeński, "Polityka morska Polski odrodzonej," in: *XV lat*, 20.
 - 15 Jan Korwin-Kamieński, "Zagadnienia morskie w Polsce," *Przegląd Techniczny* 4–5 (1929): 174–178.
 - 16 Zygmunt Jan Tyszel, *Pod ojczyzną banderą* (Katowice: Liga Morska i Kolonialna, 1930), 101–102.

mert Stankiewicz,¹⁷ Bolesław Kasprowicz¹⁸ and Stanisław Darski¹⁹ merely make mention of the company's establishment.

Rummel, the first director of "Żegluga Polska," was the only author to include a little more information in his memoirs,²⁰ in which he suggested that the creation of the fully Polish shipping company had been significantly affected by the experiences associated with the activity of "Sarmacja." His valuable remark has not so far been examined in the broader context of data found in the documents available in the fonds of "Żegluga Polska S.A." in the State Archives in Gdańsk (ref. no. 146).

Apart from the sources mentioned above, the present study is also based on documents available in the Polish Archives of New Records (Poselstwo RP w Kopenhage, ref. no. 5, Państwowy Urząd Zakupów Artykułów Pierwszej Potrzeby, National Archives in Kraków (Oddział II, RHB VI 88), State Archives in Gdańsk (Rada Portu i Dróg Wodnych, microfilm 64211), State Archives in Katowice (Polska Konwencja Węglowa, ref. no. 132), Archives of the Maritime Museum in Bergen (Bergens Sjøfrtmsmuseum Arkiv, Polish Coal Charter, ref. no. 3689), the State Archives in Oslo, the fonds of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Riksarkivet Utenriksdepartementet, ref. no. 2507) and the Collection of Manuscripts at the University Library in Bergen (Universitetsbibliotek i Bergen, Manuskriptsamlingen, ref. no. 1570/24–2).

The aim of the present article is to determine, on the basis of the archival sources mentioned above and other data, the causes of the establishment of "Żegluga Polska," taking into account the role that the company "Sarmacja" and the coal mining boom of that time played in this process. The paper also examines the circumstances of the Polish state authorities' decision to fund "Żegluga Polska" exclusively by domestic capital. Importantly, the present study organises numerous existing, often contradictory, findings, as well as collecting and systematising facts scattered in different scientific publications.

First attempts at creating the Polish merchant fleet

The first steps to creating the Polish merchant fleet were taken right after Poland had regained independence, when Józef Piłsudski, under the decree of 28 November 1918, established the "Polish Navy," with Bogumił Nowotny²¹ as head of the Naval Section at

17 Mamert Stankiewicz, *Z floty carskiej do polskiej* (Warszawa: Iskry, 2007), 272–280.

18 Bolesław Kasprowicz, *Byłem juniorem* (Gdynia: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1965), 156.

19 Stanisław Darski, *W służbie żeglugi* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1978), 46.

20 Julian Rummel, *Narodziny żeglugi* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1980), 85–90.

21 Bogumił Nowotny (1871–1960) enlisted in 1890 as midshipman in the Austro-Hungarian Navy. Quickly earning promotions, he became commander of a half-flotilla of torpedo boats in Trieste in

the Ministry of Military Affairs.²² The actions initiated at that time did not yet result in the creation of a merchant fleet and were rather part of propaganda aimed at obtaining for Poland the most convenient access to the Baltic Sea. As a matter of fact, the Polish state was then experiencing numerous difficulties associated with the post-war reconstruction of the country, which made it difficult to establish a Polish shipping company. It is noteworthy that the newly independent Poland did not have, for all practical purposes, a single ship or a single seaport. Further problems in creating a maritime policy were due to the Polish industry having negligible connections with overseas markets, a complete lack of commercial agents at destination ports²³ as well as the uncertain status of the city of Gdańsk.

The beginnings of the formation of the Polish merchant fleet did not follow a rational course: the first few ships flying the Polish flag appeared in the Black Sea, the Middle East and the Far East at a time when Poland did not yet have its own seaport capable of handling tramp and liner services. These undertakings should only be considered symbolic because, apart from the Polish flag, the vessels had no other relations with Poland. It is also worth noting that in the years 1919–1920, the Polish diaspora in the USA founded the Polish–American Navigation Corporation, which operated several ships. The first half of the 1920s saw the emergence of other ephemeral companies, namely: “Lechia” and “Biały Orzeł.”²⁴ The Act on Polish sea-going merchant ships of

1908, and in November 1912, he received the rank of second lieutenant commander. From 24 July 1914 he was commanding officer of the destroyer *Scharfschütze*, and the outbreak of the First World War found him holding this position. The most important military operations he participated in included shelling of the Montenegrin coast, a successful foray into the Montenegrin port of Antivari (1914), a night invasion of the Corsini Canal leading to Ravenna (1915), the battle against Italian torpedo boats near Porto Corsini (1916), as well as the Battle of the Strait of Otranto (1916). His success in this last battle earned him a promotion to the rank of lieutenant commander. From February to the end of April 1918, Nowotny was commanding officer of the battleship *Erherzog Karl* and, simultaneously, squadron commander. Cf. Jerzy Pertek “Nowotny Bogumił,” in: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, Vol. 23 (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1983), 392–393; Maria Babnis, “Kronika Polskiej Marynarki Wojennej (październiki 1918–marzec 1947),” in: *Kadry Morskiej Rzeczypospolitej*, Vol. 2: *Polska Marynarka Wojenna*, pt. 1: *Korpus oficerów 1918–1947*, ed. Jan Kazimierz Sawicki (Gdynia: Wyższa Szkoła Morska, 1996), 5; Jan Przybylski, “90 lat polskiej marynarki, plany i rzeczywistość,” in: *Marynarka Polska (1918–2008)*, ed. Jan Kazimierz Sawicki (Gdynia: Wyższa Szkoła Morska, 2009), 48; Marek Twardowski, “Kiedy powołano polską marynarke?” in: *Marynarka Polska (1918–2008)*, Vol. 1, ed. Jan Kazimierz Sawicki (Gdynia: Pracownia Historii i Studium Wojaskowej Akademii Morskiej w Gdyni, 2009), 168.

22 Rozkaz do Ministerstwa Spraw Wojskowych Józefa Piłsudskiego [Józef Piłsudski’s order to the Ministry of Military Affairs], *Monitor Polski*, no. 217, 30/11/1918, 20. The decree, however, does not make it clear what type of navy, military or merchant, Piłsudski had in mind. Cf. Daniel Duda, Stanisław Kołaczyński, Wojciech Żurawski, “Początki polskiej administracji morskiej,” *Nautologia* 131 (1999), 2: 18.

23 *Bandera Polska. Księga pamiątkowa poświęcona rozwojowi i rozbudowie polskiej floty handlowej*, ed. Radosław Krajewski (Warszawa: Liga Morska i Kolonialna, 1926), 55.

24 Czerwińska, *Polska*, 32–34.

28 May 1920 was supposed to aid the formation of the Polish merchant fleet²⁵ but, for a long time, it failed to deliver tangible results. It was only after several unsuccessful attempts to create the country's own merchant fleet that a fully independent port in Gdynia began to be built.

Experiences of "Sarmacja"

The only shipowner of a Polish character that operated for a longer while in the first half of the interwar period was the aforementioned Polskie Towarzystwo Żeglugi Morskiej "Sarmacja" S.A., which was supported in a large part by foreign capital invested in it by one of the largest Norwegian shipowners Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab (BDS).²⁶

The first director of "Sarmacja" was B. Nowotny, who on 9 November 1919 became a co-founder of "Towarzystwo Żeglugi Morskiej «Sarmacja» Spółka z o.o." with its seat in Kraków²⁷ (this was the company's first name, which was used until 13 November 1921). Initially, the firm's capital amounted to 3 million Polish marks (mp),²⁸ with a notable 80% of these funds belonging to Polish shareholders in 1921.²⁹ Already at the time of its establishment, a decision was made that the company would be engaged in shipping and trade activities in Poland and abroad,³⁰ as well as providing goods reloading and storage services.³¹

25 Ustawa z 28.05.1920 o polskich statkach handlowych morskich, Dz.U. 1920, nr 47, poz. 285 [Act of 28 May 1920 on Polish Sea-going Merchant Ships, Journal of Laws 1920, no.47, item 285]

26 BDS was founded in Bergen on 12 December 1851 and was the first Norwegian steam shipping company. In the interwar period, it conducted its activities mainly in the Baltic and English ports.

27 National Archives in Cracow (Archiwum Narodowe w Krakowie, hereinafter: ANK), Oddział II, RHB VI 88, Akta firmy spółkowej Polskie Towarzystwo Żeglugi Morskiej "Sarmacja," Wpis do rejestru handlowego firmy spółkowej Polskie Towarzystwo Żeglugi Morskiej Sarmacja Spółka z o.o., 23.12.1919, Branch II, RHB VI 88, Files of the company Polskie Towarzystwo Żeglugi Morskiej "Sarmacja," Entry into the company register of the company Polskie Towarzystwo Żeglugi Morskiej Sarmacja Spółka z o.o., 23 Dec. 1919 (no pagination).

28 Andrzej Matla, "Polsko-norweskie kontakty żeglugowe w latach 1919–1926," *Komunikaty Instytutu Bałtyckiego* 23/24 (1986/1987), 38/39: 50.

29 Polish Archives of New Records (Archiwum Akt Nowych, hereinafter: AAN), Poselstwo RP w Kopenhadze, sygn. 5 [Diplomatic Mission in Copenhagen, ref. no. 5] Sytuacja ekonomiczna w Polsce, główne sprawy finansów, handlu i żeglugi handlowej. Texts of articles, Lidt om den polske Handelsmarine, 12.

30 Matla, "Polsko-norweskie," 50.

31 AAN, State Office for the Purchase of Basic Necessities (Państwowy Urząd Zakupów Artykułów Pierwszej Potrzeby, hereinafter: PUZAPP), Branch in Gdańsk, Korespondencja z Polskim Towarzystwem Żegluga Morskiej "Sarmacja," sygn. 2464, Pismo PUZAPP do Polskiego Towarzystwa Żeglugowego "Sarmacja" z 15.01.1921, 20.01.1921 [Correspondence with Polskie Towarzystwo Żegluga

In 1922, BDS established a branch in Gdańsk – Bergenske Baltic Transports Ltd. (hereinafter: “Bergenske” or BBT), which associated itself with “Polskie Towarzystwo Żegluga Morskiej «Sarmacja» S.A.”³² among others, by providing brokerage services for it. More importantly, BBT was an executor of the decisions made in Bergen, the headquarters of BDS. A new statute of “Sarmacja” was also passed. Under the new statute, the Polish shipping company was authorised to establish branches both at home and abroad to do business on a larger scale. The seat of the company was soon moved to Warsaw. In February 1922, the shipowner’s new statute was approved by the Treasury. At that time, the company’s capital was 66,000,000 mp divided into 66,000 shares. Sixty percent of the shares³³ could be owned by Polish citizens only, which confirms that an attempt was made to give the company a Polish character. BDS, and individuals associated with the Norwegian shipowner, owned a total of 26,320 shares in “Sarmacja” worth 26320,000 mp, which constituted a significant part (about 39.8%) of the 66,000,000 mp capital.

This large contribution of foreign capital posed a serious image problem for “Sarmacja,” which was additionally blown up by the Polish press. On 9 February 1922, articles were published in “Gazeta Gdańska” and “Żeglarz Polski” in which the company was accused of employing German sailors.³⁴ In 1923, further accusations were made about the hiring of German crews on the Polish shipowner’s vessels. This time, the daily “Słowo Pomorskie” stressed that the ships operated by “Sarmacja” were Polish in name only and that the officers and crews employed on them spoke German. The newspaper admitted that, of course, some seamen did have Polish citizenship, but only for the sheer purpose of being able to sail the Polish shipowner’s vessels.³⁵

The fact that B. Nowotny hired foreigners was a result of a severe shortage of trained sailors of Polish nationality; the director of “Sarmacja” recruited Austrian sailors, whom he knew from his own military service in the Austro-Hungarian Navy. It should be remembered that this personnel policy, though strongly criticised, complied with

Morskiej “Sarmacja,” ref.no. 2464, Letters of 15 Jan 1921 and 20 Jan 1921 from PUZAPP to Polskie Towarzystwo Żegluga Morskiej “Sarmacja”, 72, 67.

32 Jordan Siemianowski, *Działalność norweskich armatorów w Gdańsku i Gdyni w latach 1919–1939* (Szczecin: Uniwersytet Szczeciński, 2020), 100.

33 ANK, Oddział II, RHB VI 88, Akta firmy spółkowej Polskie Towarzystwo Żegluga Morskiej “Sarmacja,” Wypis aktu notarialnego z 28.03.1922 r. [ANK, Division II, RHB VI 88, Files of the company Polskie Towarzystwo Żegluga Morskiej “Sarmacja,” Extract from a notarial deed of 28 March 1922] [no pagination].

34 *Gazeta Gdańska*, 9/02/1922; Jerzy Klejnot-Turski, “W sprawie załogi Krakowa,” *Żeglarz Polski* 3 (1922): 45. Władysław Milewski lists in his memoirs, among the fifteen members of the crew of SS “Wisła,” four Poles from central Poland, and officers from the former Austrian Navy, Germans from Gdańsk and Kashubians. The language spoken on board was German. Cf. Władysław Milewski, *Na morzu i lądzie* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1976), 35.

35 *Słowo Pomorskie*, 13/06/1923.

the Polish Ships Act of 20 May 1920, which allowed for crews on Polish ships to consist of fewer than three quarters of officers and sailors with Polish citizenship within the first five years of operation.³⁶

Much more serious criticism of the cooperation between "Sarmacja" and BDS was associated with the one-sided financial benefits that the Norwegian partner derived from selling its used ships to the Polish company. At that time, this policy was hard to change, especially since the key decisions regarding the activities of the Polish shipowner were made in Bergen. Of course, B. Nowotny also participated in the general meetings of BDS, but, being an observer only,³⁷ he had no influence on the fact that "Sarmacja" had an outdated fleet, lacked appropriate business connections and, above all, did not have financial resources to provide regular shipping services,³⁸ improve the quality of its existing services or expand its fleet.

From 1923 on, the attitude of BDS towards "Sarmacja" began to stiffen even more. This is evidenced by the fact that in that year the Norwegian company took away from the Polish shipowner the exclusive right to represent "Bergenske" in Gdańsk, giving this right to "Polski Lloyd S.A."³⁹ An attempt to buy a ship was also unsuccessful, as the price of £19,000 for a 1600 BRT vessel built at the Schichau Shipyard was too high, and the offer was rejected by B. Nowotny.⁴⁰

A chance to improve the condition of "Sarmacja" appeared in April 1925, when the vessels of the Polish shipowner began to provide freight transport services between London and Gdańsk⁴¹ and other Baltic ports. Since the Norwegian partner did not offer any major support, in mid 1925, the Polish Ministry of Industry and Trade (hereinafter: MI&T) came up with a proposal to engage "Sarmacja"'s ships in the transport of hard coal to the northern regions of Europe through the port in Gdynia. The Ministry also wanted to use the ships to deliver other goods, including grain and sugar. In this way, on 1 July 1925, "Sarmacja" received a subvention from the Polish government.⁴²

36 Act of 28 May 1920, Art.47, para. 285.

37 Feliks Rostkowski, *Sześć lat polskiej polityki handlowo-morskiej* (Warszawa: [n.p.] 1926), 4. The Norwegians' position in "Sarmacja" was so strong that they went as far as forbidding director J. Korwin-Kamieński to enter the company's ships or inspect the books of accounts. Cf. Matla, "Polsko-norweskie," 58.

38 Matla, "Polsko-norweskie," 58.

39 Andrzej Matla, "Działalność norweskiego koncernu Bergenske w portach polskiego obszaru celnego w latach 1919–1939," *Komunikaty Instytutu Bałtyckiego* 29 (1992), 41: 51.

40 Bergens Sjøfartsmuseum Arkiv (hereinafter: Bsj) Aa–Forhandlingsprotokoll III 1921–1927, Report from a meeting with BDS of 9 Oct. 1923 r. [no pagination].

41 Bsj, Ms 26 (BDS): Aa–Forhandlingsprotokoll III 1921–1927, Report from a meeting of the management of BDS of 21 Apr. 1923 r. [no pagination].

42 Probably, "Sarmacja" received a monthly government subsidy of £ 150 each for SS "Wisła" and SS "Wawel." Cf. Władysław Milewski, "Trudne początki morskiego żywota," in: *Na morze po chleb i przygodę*, ed. Wincenty Bartosiak (Warszawa: Pax, 1972), 314.

Unfortunately, in October 1926, after the failure of the ship SS “Wisła,” which was no longer fit for further exploitation, the collapse of “Sarmacja,” which now had only one operational vessel, was inevitable.

The Norwegians’ devastating policy also led to the suspension of the opening of the branch of BDS in the developing city of Gdynia as well as putting in limbo the appointment of a new director of “Sarmacja” (among others, the candidacy of J. Rummel fell through⁴³).⁴⁴ One should agree with Stankiewicz and Matla, who negatively assessed the involvement of the Norwegians in the company’s operations. According to the former author, the company’s executives wanted the ships of “Sarmacja” to enjoy the privileges of the Polish flag and at the same time maintain the not-fully-Polish character of the firm.⁴⁵ The latter author noted that the Norwegian policy was to beat off Polish competition, on the one hand, and, on the other, to ensure that the Norwegian side made relatively high profits by concealing their actual revenue, part of which was invested as a write-off of shares in “Sarmacja.”⁴⁶ Also, the government’s press service “Przemysł i Handel” (Industry and Trade) emphasised that the foreign capital invested in “Sarmacja” put a brake on its development.⁴⁷ At that time, the company needed radical changes as its heavily outdated and worn vessels, which were not even suitable for renovation,⁴⁸ made it fairly uncompetitive.⁴⁹

To make matters worse, the above-mentioned factors had a negative impact on the relations between “Sarmacja” and the Polish government⁵⁰ which, despite many efforts, not so much failed to improve the company’s situation, as did not prevent its collapse. In this connection, one should mention the government’s act of 25 November 1925 on supporting maritime shipping⁵¹ and the decision of the Polish Ministry of the Treasury

43 Rummel, *Narodziny*, 71–72.

44 Matla, “Działalność,” 51.

45 Stankiewicz, *Z floty*, 246.

46 Matla, “Polsko-norweskie,” 59.

47 Feliks Rostkowski, “Sześć lat polskiej polityki handlowo-morskiej,” *Przemysł i Handel* 9 (1926): 244.

48 Rostkowski, *Sześć*, 3.

49 Stanisław Wojciechowski, *Flota handlowa w Polsce. Rozwój i jej znaczenie* (Warszawa: Liga Morska i Kolonialna, 1927), 12.

50 Jan Korwin-Kamieński, “Zagadnienia morskie w Polsce,” *Przegląd Techniczny* 4–5 (1929): 177.

51 Ustawa z 25.11.1925 o popieraniu polskiej żeglugi morskiej, Dz.U. 1925, nr 125, poz. 891 [Act of 25 November 1925 on supporting Polish maritime shipping, Journal of Laws 1925, no.125, item. 891]. The worsening of the position of the Norwegian merchant fleet in servicing the ports of the Polish customs area was also pointed out by Jan Szymański. Cf. Jan Szymański, “Kapitał norweski wobec gospodarki Polski międzywojennej (1919–1939),” *Zapiski Historyczne* 52 (1987), 2: 68.

of September 1926 to exempt "Sarmacja" for five years from paying income, industrial and property taxes.⁵²

There are many indications that the financial aid "Sarmacja" received multiple times from the Polish state authorities had a counterproductive effect and was one of the causes of the company's collapse. BDS preferred to liquidate "Sarmacja" to allow it to be strengthened with government subsidies and thus create competition for the Norwegian shipowner's vessels. The weakness of "Sarmacja" is also evidenced by the fact that the company never had its own shipping liner service that would provide it with steady income. So the question arises whether BDS was capable of turning "Sarmacja" into a reliable shipping company. Considering that BDS operated more than 15 shipping liner services at that time⁵³ and was also one of the largest Norwegian shipping companies, the answer is affirmative.

The coal boom

As already mentioned, the process of liquidating "Sarmacja" was taking place at the time of an upturn in international trade that created advantageous conditions for the transport of coal, and thus also for the activities of shipping companies which transported this raw material from Gdańsk and Gdynia. Before this upswing in coal trade, traffic in the ports of the Polish customs area had not been very busy, which was the consequence of Poland having a negligible share in international maritime trade (for example, in 1922 it was only 7.3%). It was widely believed that in order to change this situation, the country's economic structure should be reorganised along with a change in the transport system from latitudinal (east–west) to meridian (north–south). At that time, the following slogan became the motto of the Polish state authorities: "Polish goods, through Polish ports, on Polish ships." This meant that it was necessary not only to build an independent seaport which, together with the port of Gdańsk, could handle the increasing trade turnover, but also to create a Polish merchant fleet that would allow Poland to free itself from the costly brokerage of companies operating under foreign flags.⁵⁴

In May 1926, English miners started a strike which threatened the supply of coal to the Baltic and Scandinavian states – the natural trading partners of the Second

52 Hugon Pistel, "Polska flota handlowa," in: *Polityka gospodarcza. Zagadnienia administracyjne*, Vol. 1 (Warszawa: Ministerstwo Przemysłu i Handlu, 1928), 435.

53 *Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab Bergen. Beretning og Regnskap 1926*, 6–8.

54 State Archives in Gdańsk (Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku, hereinafter: APG), Żegluga Polska, ref. no. 146, "Żegluga Polska" S.A. Jedenaście lat pracy na morzu, 4.

Republic of Poland.⁵⁵ It is interesting that the Norwegians had known about the impending strike already in December 1925, and had ordered 560 tons of Polish coal on a trial basis.⁵⁶ Unfortunately, the coal base of the port in Gdańsk, which included Polish Silesia (Śląsk), was still poorly communicated with the coast. Also, the ports of the Polish customs area (Gdańsk and Gdynia) were not properly adapted to the efficient shipment of larger cargoes. In 1925, the port of Gdańsk still had an insufficient number of reloading cranes and warehouses. At that time, the Polish government had a large enough budget to finance the extension of the port, but the government's attempts to invest were thwarted by objections from Gdańsk authorities, who feared Gdańsk would be Polishised.⁵⁷

Apart from the port in Gdańsk, Poland had a port in Gdynia, the construction of which had officially begun in the spring of 1921. Unfortunately, the Act on the construction of the port passed by the Sejm (Lower House of the Polish Parliament), which provided a legal basis for the construction works, was merely a piece of propaganda. The grand opening of the port under the name "Temporary Military Port and Shelter for Fishermen" took place on 29 April 1923. In August of the same year, the first ship – the French SS "Kentucky," called at the Port of Gdynia.

During the term of office of the Minister of Industry and Trade, Józef Kiedroń (December 1923–May 1925), the implementation of the construction plans for the port of Gdynia speeded up a little. This became possible, among others, due to the resolution passed by the Sejm on 21 March 1924 which set a six-year deadline on the completion of the construction works in the port in Gdynia. In December of the same year, the Sejm passed another resolution, this time on the construction of new railway lines that significantly shortened the travel distance from Silesia to the Polish coast. The construction was commissioned to "Francusko-Polskie Konsorcjum dla Budowy Portu w Gdyni" [French-Polish Consortium for the Construction of the Port in Gdynia], which in practice coincided with the commencement of the actual expansion of the port. The subcontractors were a Danish company "Højgaard & Schultz AS" and a Dutch-Belgian company "Ackerman & van Haaren." In February 1925, the French consortium signed an additional agreement with the MI&T, which was to speed up the works, but the French party terminated it in January of the following year. Owing to the intervention of the MI&T, the works were resumed soon, but the pace was still slow.

After the May coup, the then Minister of the Treasury, Czesław Klarnier, outlined the main directions of Poland's economic policy, whose main focus was the construction

55 Dopierała, *Wokół*, 207.

56 Jan Szymański, *Stosunki gospodarcze Polski z Norwegią w latach 1918–1929* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2005), 228.

57 Dopierała, *Wokół*, 207.

of the port in Gdynia and the improvement of railway connections between Poland's main industrial centres and the Polish coast. These efforts were made to bypass the intermediary role of foreign ports in Polish maritime trade so that Poland could send goods to recipients directly as an independent exporter.⁵⁸ A deeper tone to the development of the Polish coast was given by Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, who was appointed Minister of Industry and Trade in June 1926. In his opinion, apart from the port of Gdynia, it was necessary for Poland to use the ports in Gdańsk⁵⁹ and Tczew. Moreover, the minister wanted a comprehensive expansion of the port in Gdynia that covered its reloading facilities for coal and iron ore; he planned the construction of a fishing port, an expansion of cargo warehouses and, above all, the construction of Poland's own fleet.⁶⁰ Minister Kwiatkowski's idea was for the three ports to handle 10 to 12 million tons of goods annually, with Gdańsk specialising in bulk cargo handling, and Gdynia specialising in the handling of food and perishable goods. Gdynia was also supposed to be the seat of Polish shipping lines.⁶¹ The Polish tariff, rail and fiscal policies were to be adapted to using access to the sea, also with regard to foreign trade.⁶² Moreover, wanting, on the one hand, to maintain good relations with the French economic circles, and, on the other, to accelerate the construction of the port in Gdynia, Minister Kwiatkowski concluded a new contract with the "French-Polish Consortium for the Construction of the Port in Gdynia" in October 1926.⁶³ Despite all these efforts, however, in 1926, Gdynia still remained a small fishing town with a railway station.

The coal boom generated not only the need to expand the ports of the Polish customs area, but also to improve the extraction of coal and its delivery to these ports. Until 1925, under the Treaty of Versailles and the Geneva Convention of 15 May 1922, large amounts of Polish coal had been exported to Germany.⁶⁴ For example, in 1923,

58 Dopierała, *Wokół*, 298–299; Bolesław Hajduk, "Działalność spółki duńskiej Højgaard & Schultz AS w Polsce w latach 1924–1949," in: *Polska – Dania w ciągu wieków*, ed. Jan Szymański (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, OPTIMA s.c., 2004), 178.

59 Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski expressed the need for Poland to use both the port in Gdynia and in Gdańsk, among others in *Dysproporcje*. Cf. Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, *Dysproporcje. Rzecz o Polsce przeszłej i obecnej* (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1989), 299.

60 Małgorzata Łapa, *Modernizacja państwa. Polska polityka gospodarcza 1926–1929* (Łódź: Ibidem, 2002), 197.

61 Dopierała, *Wokół*, 234, 267–269, 297–299.

62 Feliks Hilchen, "Problem morski," in: *Pięć lat na froncie gospodarczym 13 V 1926–1931*, Vol. 1 (Warszawa: Droga, 1931), 494.

63 Mieczysław Widernik, *Porty Gdańska i Gdyni w życiu gospodarczym II Rzeczypospolitej* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1991), 40–43.

64 Karol Józef Błahut, *Polsko-niemieckie stosunki gospodarcze w latach 1919–1939* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1975), 11, 58; Jerzy Krasuski, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1919–1932* (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1975), 37, 69–70; Barbara Ratyńska, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w okresie wojny gospodarczej 1919–1930* (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1968), 42.

the sales of this raw material from Upper Silesia to German markets amounted to as many as 8 million tons, which accounted for about 35% of the total mining sales and 67% of exports. When Article 224 of the Geneva Convention, which provided for duty-free export of Polish coal to Germany, expired on 15 June 1925, Berlin closed the domestic market to Silesian coal, forcing the Polish coal mining industry to find new export routes.⁶⁵ This situation caused a decrease in coal production to 67% of the amount produced in 1913.⁶⁶ Because the Polish government had not considered exporting coal via Gdańsk and Gdynia until the summer of 1925, the ports were practically unprepared to export this raw material.⁶⁷ Matters were complicated even further by the large distance (600 km) that separated the ports of the Polish customs area from Silesian mines.⁶⁸ Ships carrying freights of Polish coal were more often forced to pay fees for downtime than was the case with shipments of English coal.⁶⁹

It was only as late as 1925 that the Polish state authorities undertook a series of actions aimed at increasing the capacity of existing railway lines and creating new connections between Silesia and the coast.⁷⁰ Even before Article 224 of the Geneva Convention was no longer in force, the Polish government had decided, pursuant to the Act of 13 May, to build a railway line from Kalety to Podzamcze, which permitted to bypass the so-called Kluczbork corridor,⁷¹ which belonged to Germany, and thus make savings on coal transports.⁷² In response to this decision, on 15 May 1925, German state railways introduced a discount of up to 60% of the tariffs applied inside Germany, called *Seehafendurchfuhrtarif – SD5*.⁷³ Germans took this step to encourage the use of the port in Szczecin (Stettin) at the expense of the ports in Gdańsk and Gdynia.

65 State Archives in Katowice (Archiwum Państwowe w Katowicach, hereinafter: APK), Polish Coal Charter (Polska Konwencja Węglowa, hereinafter: PKW), ref.no. 132, Eksport węgla – dane statystyczne 1928–1939. Wywóz drogą morską, 3–4; Krasuski, *Stosunki*, 370; Idem, *Polska-Niemcy. Stosunki polityczne od zarania po czasy najnowsze* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 2009), 253.

66 Natalia Gąsiorowska, *Górnictwo i hutnictwo w Polsce* (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1949), 102.

67 APG, Rada Portu i Dróg Wodnych [Harbour and Waterways Council], microfilm 64211, Eksport węgla [Coal exports], Vol. 1: 1925–1938, Pismo M. Borowskiego do MPiH z 2.12.1928 r. [Letter of 2 Dec. 1928 from M. Borowski to MI&T], 87.

68 APK, PKW, ref.no. 132, Eksport węgla – dane statystyczne 1928–1939. Wywóz drogą morską [Coal exports – statistical data 1928–1939. Export by sea], 4.

69 Bsj, Polish Coal Charter, ref.no. 3689.

70 APK, PKW, ref.no. 132, Eksport węgla – dane statystyczne 1928–1939. Wywóz drogą morską, 4.

71 Dopierała, *Wokół*, 269.

72 Józef Roguszcak, *Dynamika kierunków rynków zbytu górnośląskiego rynku węglowego* (Katowice: Księgarnia i Drukarnia Katolicka, 1938), 160.

73 Dopierała, *Wokół*, 261; Alfred Siebeneichen, “Konkurencja portów bałtyckich,” in: *Kronika o polskiem*, 357.

Germany's policy prompted Polish coal companies to also take decisive steps by starting the construction of reloading facilities in Gdynia, and by granting long-term loans to the Polish government. In addition, these firms started running promotional activities on the Scandinavian markets to demonstrate the high quality of Polish coal.⁷⁴ In order to create conditions for getting into foreign markets, the "Dąbrowa-Kraków Convention" (Konwencja Dąbrowsko-Krakowska) and the "Upper Silesian Coal Convention" (Górnośląska Konwencja Węglowa) were merged into the "National Coal Convention" (Ogólnopolska Konwencja Węglowa, OKW)⁷⁵ on 1 July 1925. The newly-established organisation concentrated as much as 94% of the nationwide coal production. Moreover, it regulated the shipment of coal by rail within the Polish customs area, including Wolne Miasto Gdańsk (the Free City of Danzig).⁷⁶ At that time, in view of the closure of the German market to Polish coal, Scandinavia became a convenient export destination.⁷⁷

The development and expansion of the ports in Gdańsk and Gdynia and their supply base, combined with the coal boom, corroborate the conclusion that in 1926 having a stable and predictable shipping company was, to say the least, desirable for the Second Polish Republic. Given the maritime trade turnover of 6 million tons, as well as the genuine prospects of further expansion of the port in Gdynia, the size of the then Polish merchant fleet was clearly insufficient.⁷⁸ The extensive work carried out in Polish ports could have provided a chance for the development of "Sarmacja," but only on the condition that BDS's policy had undergone a radical change. Otherwise, it was impossible for the Polish shipowner to cope with the competition from other shipping companies interested in transporting coal from the ports of the Polish customs area.

74 APK, PKW, ref.no. 132, Eksport węgla – dane statystyczne 1928–1939. Wywóz drogą morską [Coal exports – statistical data 1928–1939. Export by sea], 4–5.

75 Jerzy Jaros, *Historia górnictwa węglowego w Zagłębiu Górnośląskim w latach 1914–1945* (Katowice: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1970), 347; Zenon Szmidtke, "Skarboferm" 1922–1939. *Związki polityki z gospodarką* (Opole: Instytut Śląski, 2005), 193.

76 Roguszczyk, *Dynamika*, 165–166; Aldona Podolska-Meducka, *Polskie ustawodawstwo kartelowe w latach 1918–1939* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2003), 67.

77 Cybulski, "Eksport węgla morzem," in: *Kronika o polskiem*, 272.

78 The Polish merchant fleet of that time consisted of the training sailing ship "Lwów," the military transport ship "Warta," the port tugboat "Ursus," two vessels operated by "Sarmacja," the motorboat "Józef English" belonging to the company "Biały Orzeł," as well as several tugboats belonging to the company "Wisła-Bałtyk," not counting smaller boats, barges, etc. See: APG, Żegluga Polska, ref. no. 146, "Żegluga Polska" S.A. Jedenaście lat pracy na morzu, p. 6.

Establishment of “Żegluga Polska”

At the time when “Sarmacja” collapsed and the coal boom started, Poland practically had no single ship it could use to take advantage of the new favourable business circumstances. Meanwhile, at the end of 1924, even before the strike of English miners, an idea had been conceived in the circles of the National Economic Bank of launching a liner service connecting Poland with major ports in the Middle East; it was described by Feliks Rostowski in the pages of “Przemysł i Handel.” The originators of this initiative secured a share of foreign capital and got in touch with an Italian shipyard, which agreed to grant a loan for the purchase of four ships. According to the author of the article, it was reasonable then to use older, not necessarily large vessels, which the newly created shipping company could use to “learn the shipping business.”⁷⁹ A year later, a government initiative was launched, supported by a rich programme, which aimed at establishing the joint stock company “Spółka Akcyjna Polska Żegluga Morska.”⁸⁰

In April 1926, also in “Przemysł i Handel,” J. Rummel⁸¹ called for the establishment of a Polish shipping company that would provide passenger and cargo services to English, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian and North-French ports. These liner services were to be coordinated with rail services to Gdańsk and Gdynia. That author also emphasised that the Polish government should take initiative to establish a shipping company.⁸²

All the above-mentioned ideas fell through as there were no favourable conditions at that time to engage in setting up a fully Polish shipping company. This fact was not changed even by the disastrous situation of “Sarmacja” and the necessity to replace it with another shipowner. Even in the first months of 1926, the establishment of a Polish shipping company was not an obvious option, as evidenced, among others, by a proposal made by the barrister Emil Waydel for the Polish shipping activist J. Rummel to

79 Rostkowski, “Sześć,” 245.

80 Mika, “Gospodarka,” 233.

81 Julian Rummel (1878–1954) was born in Liepaja. He graduated from St. Petersburg Commercial School, where he studied in the years 1892–1899. In the year of his graduation from the school in St. Petersburg, Rummel signed on a ship. After Russia’s defeat in the war with Japan in 1905, Rummel became involved in the work of the Fleet Revival League, of which he was secretary and then vice-president. At the same time, he was a member of the Russian Imperial Technical Society, a world-renowned scientific institution which gave opinions on and inspired the development of technology and science. Rummel, as secretary of the Maritime Section, participated in the work of the 4th Technical Division of this organisation. In July 1918, during an economic conference in St. Petersburg, he delivered a paper on the project of the Polish maritime economy and the tasks of the future Polish merchant fleet in the reborn Polish state. In 1922, he became director of the Maritime League Office (Biuro Ligi Morskiej), working in which, he developed a maritime programme for Poland. See: Maciej Rdesiński, introduction to *Narodziny żeglugi* by Julian Rummel (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1980), vi–xvi.

82 Julian Rummel, *Gdynia, port polski* (Toruń: Ministerstwo Żeglugi i Handlu Zagranicznego. Departament Morski, 1926), 446.

take over as director of "Sarmacja." Waydel was a shareholder in the company. Rummel did not make an immediate decision, but he assured Waydel that he would respond to the offer after carefully examining the company's situation and inspecting its ships. He also made a provision that as the person in charge he wanted to be completely independent and take full responsibility for the company. This clearly shows that he did not allow any possibility of the company he was asked to manage to be pure fiction, as it had been until that moment.

After looking into the company's situation, J. Rummel came to the conclusion that its fate had already been sealed and he also believed that, in the event that "Bergenske" did not have adequate financial resources, it was going to liquidate the Polish enterprise. To make matters worse, the Maritime Department aired a critical opinion of the Norwegians' activity in "Sarmacja," which indicated that the shipowner could expect problems in receiving subsidies from the Polish government in the near future. J. Rummel, who was extremely influential in the Polish shipping milieu, believed that the Norwegians wanted a fictitious shipping business to operate in Poland, which would prevent the establishment of another, much more efficient, Polish shipping company.

Waydel fully shared Rummel's opinion. He also declared that the Polish group in "Sarmacja" wanted no one else but Rummel to manage this company. One of the few controversies between the two activists was their attitude towards the Norwegians' personnel policy. While Waydel thought that the foreign owners of "Sarmacja" expected the company to be run by a highly-qualified person, such as J. Rummel, the latter was of the opposite opinion that, due to his high qualifications, the Norwegians would view him as an undesirable candidate. In the same year, it turned out that Rummel was right and the company had to be liquidated because the Polish state authorities did not think it made sense to continue subsidising a business they had no say in. The situation was all the more embarrassing as the Norwegian management refused to pay dividends to shareholders. It was at this point that J. Rummel decided it was necessary to create "Żegluga Polska," because, as he claimed, "Sarmacja" practically no longer existed.⁸³

The first news of the Polish state authorities taking decisive steps to establish a shipping company appeared in October 1926 in "Przemysł i Handel," which announced a purchase of five merchant ships intended mainly for the transport of coal.⁸⁴ The following month, "Żegluga Polska" was founded as a company operating under its own statute and according to its own commercial principles. Taught by the experiences with "Sarmacja," the Polish state wanted to avoid the interference of foreign capital and

83 Rummel, *Narodziny*, 73.

84 *Przemysł i Handel*, 1926, 1348.

create a fully Polish shipping enterprise.⁸⁵ Hugo Pistel, head of the Shipping Division in the Maritime Department of the MI&T, was entrusted with the task of purchasing the shipping fleet for “Żegluga Polska.” A decision was made to buy bulk carriers which were to be engaged in tramp trade, mainly the transport of coal in the Baltic Sea and in the North Sea region, with the possibility of calling at secondary, relatively small and shallow, ports.⁸⁶

Invitations to tender were issued for the purchase of the ships, which generated approximately 700 offers. A special commission, composed of H. Pistel, Cdr Eng. Ksawery Czernicki, Eng. Aleksander Jezierski and Master Mariner Tadeusz Stecki, was appointed to review the offers. This tender was also associated with Norwegian shipping circles, which were interested in building ships for the Polish shipowner. According to C. Robertson, an employee of Det Kongelige Departement Handel, Sjøfart, Industri og Fiskeri (Royal Department of Trade, Shipping, Industry and Fisheries), in September 1926, the Polish government planned to purchase ten 1 500 DWT ships and four 3 500 DWT ships for “Żegluga Polska.” These vessels were to be ready between 1927 and 1929 and were to be engaged in trade to and from the ports of the Baltic Sea and the North Sea. The Norwegian shipyards that showed particular interest in the Polish offer included “Nylands Verksted A/S” and “Akers Mekaniske Verksted A/S”; they both sought financial support in the amount of NOK 500 000 from local governments in order to be able to fulfil the order. The two shipyards were to divide the construction work between themselves. At the beginning of November 1926, however, the Polish Ministry decided to purchase French ships instead, and the plans to buy 14 Norwegian vessels were postponed.⁸⁷ It is worth adding here that at the end of October 1927, the Polish MI&T turned to the Norwegian chargé d'affaires in Warsaw, Niels Christian Ditleff, with a request to mediate in the execution of another order, for two passenger ships, to be placed with Norwegian shipyards. The relevant documents show, however, that none of the Norwegian shipyards was interested in the Polish offer this time.⁸⁸

The example of the Norwegian proposal shows that at that time the Polish side had no choice but to give up on this type of offer, which was mainly due to the urgency of the matter. The delivery of ships between 1927 and 1929 was not an option since the coal export boom could end at any moment. It is interesting that, also in 1926, an offer

85 APG, Żegluga Polska, ref. no. 146, “Żegluga Polska” S.A. Jedenaście lat pracy na morzu, 6.

86 Miciński, *Księga*, 177.

87 Riksarkivet i Oslo (hereinafter: RA), Utenriksdepartementet (hereinafter: UD), ref. no. 2507, H2-B2, Polen. Understøttelse av handelsflåten, Letter of 18 Sept. 1926 from C. Robertson to UD [no pagination].

88 RA, UD, Polen. Understøttelse av handelsflåten, Letter of 28 Oct. 1927 from N.C. Ditleff to UD [no pagination].

was made to the future Polish shipowner for the sale of "Sarmacja"'s ship SS "Wisła."⁸⁹ According to Norwegian sources, "Żegluga Polska" did not have sufficient financial resources to buy this vessel at that time.⁹⁰ On the other hand, the fact that, a while later, the Polish shipowner purchased five new ships seems to demonstrate that the Polish side no longer wanted to do business with BDS.

The aforementioned commission with H. Pistel selected the offer made by the French shipyard "Chantiers Navals Français" in Blainville near Caen. The French company offered to sell five nearly identical 3,000 DWT steam coal carriers on favourable credit terms. Initially, the purchase of six ships had been considered, but one of them had been sold in the meantime. The vessels were built in the years 1925–1926 to the order of the French shipowner "Compagnie Nationale de Navigation" in Paris (later "Société Annexe d'Armements Maritimes" in Rouen). Originally, they were intended to carry coal freights between English and French ports, but the French shipowner was experiencing financial problems at the time due to the long strike of English miners.

When the offer was placed, three of the vessels had already been engaged in transport, and the remaining two were under construction. The total cost of the ships was £ 150,000, with each vessel valued at £ 30,000. The Polish shipowner was to pay 20% of the total amount upon conclusion of the contract, and the remainder of the sum was to be spread over four instalments.⁹¹

The ships were purchased in November 1926. "Żegluga Polska" was established in the same month⁹² and was given a legal base on 13 May 1927⁹³ (see below). During the establishment of the company, strong pressure was exerted by the German-Gdańsk circles, according to which this type of undertaking could not be successfully accomplished without any foreign aid.⁹⁴ Actually, some members of the Board of the Polish shipowner, such as Commander Stanisław Witkowski, supported cooperation with German companies, but J. Rummel firmly opposed any interference by external capital in the creation of the Polish shipping company.⁹⁵ Interestingly, the trend towards Polonisation of enterprises was also manifest in the Polish government's attitude towards "Sarmacja." And so, on 13 November 1926, the Norwegian side, not wanting to

89 Universitetsbiblioteket i Bergen, Manuskriptsamling (hereinafter: UBB), ref. no. 1570/24–2, Konsul Einar Nielsen, Privat von 1 Januar 1927 bis 31 Desember 1928, Letter of 7 Jan. 1927 from Bergen Agent AS. to E. Nielsen [no pagination].

90 UBB, ref. no. 1570/24–2, Konsul Einar Nielsen, Privat von 1 Januar 1927 bis 31 Desember 1928, Letter of 7 Jan. 1927 from Bergen Agent AS. to E. Nielsen [no pagination].

91 Miciński, *Księga*, 178.

92 One of the documents stored in the State Archives in Gdańsk points to the date of 20 December 1926. See: APG, Żegluga Polska, ref. no. 146, "Żegluga Polska" S.A. Jedenaście lat pracy na morzu, p. 24.

93 *Ibidem*.

94 *Bandera Polska*, 60.

95 Rummel, *Narodziny*, 87.

allow the Polish share in “Sarmacja” to increase under pressure from the Polish MI&T, decided to liquidate the company.⁹⁶ It was the last attempt by the Polish state authorities – who apparently thought it was possible for two Polish shipping companies to operate side by side – to save “Sarmacja.”

“Żegluga Polska” was established on the basis of the Act on commercialisation of state-owned enterprises. J. Rummel believed that it was not the best solution for the company to be run by the state, especially since state bureaucracy was not conducive to managing businesses so highly sensitive to international economic conditions. At that time, however, no Polish capitalist would take it upon themselves to pioneer the organisation of a private shipping company based solely on Polish capital. J. Rummel was also concerned that the establishment of a fully Polish shipping company could be obstructed by companies with foreign capital,⁹⁷ as had been the case with “Sarmacja.” In this situation, it was necessary for the Polish government to take over the initiative in setting up and running the shipping company.

Another person who committed himself directly to the formation of “Żegluga Polska” was E. Kwiatkowski, who appointed the company’s Administrative Board consisting of the president of the Polish shipping company and Mayor of the city of Poznań, Cyryl Ratajski, as well as Gabriel Chrzanowski, Władysław Gieysztor, Antoni Olszewski, J. Rummel and Mariusz Zaruski. The members of this body offered the position of director to J. Rummel, who, according to many specialists, had the greatest knowledge of running shipping companies in Poland at that time. E. Kwiatkowski himself appointed him to the position of managing director of the Polish shipowner on 20 November 1926.⁹⁸ The first office of “Żegluga Polska” was rented in December 1926 and was located at ulica 10 lutego [street] in Gdynia and was then moved to ulica Starowiejska. At the same time, the construction of a new building was started at ulica Waszyngtońska.⁹⁹

On 4 January 1927, the first ship purchased in France, SS “Vilnius,” arrived in Gdynia, followed by the four remaining ships,¹⁰⁰ also intended for the transport of coal, wood and scrap (SS “Katowice,” SS “Kraków,” SS “Poznań” and SS “Toruń”).¹⁰¹ It was planned that these ships would be transporting coal to the Baltic States, timber to England, Belgium, France and the Netherlands, grain to England, Belgium, the

96 Siemianowski, *Działalność*, 139.

97 Julian Rummel, “Problem polskiej floty handlowej,” in: *Akademicki Kurs dla Publicystów i Dziennikarzy o Pomorzu* (Toruń: Instytut Bałtycki, [c.1930]), 1–2.

98 Miciński, *Księga*, 178.

99 APG, Żegluga Polska, ref. no. 146, “Żegluga Polska” S.A. Jedenaście lat pracy na morzu, 32.

100 Ibidem, 10.

101 *Żeglarz Polski* 42 (1926), 152: 236.

Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway, and sugar to England.¹⁰² The crews of the ships consisted mainly of Kashubians, but the German press initially maintained that they were German sailors.¹⁰³ It turns out that many of the seamen who used to work on "Sarmacja"'s vessels were now employed by "Żegluga Polska,"¹⁰⁴ including two captains – Zdenek Knoetgen and Adolf Münzel.¹⁰⁵

On 6 January 1927, a flag-raising ceremony was held on the ships of "Żegluga Polska" in the presence of the Minister of Industry and Trade E. Kwiatkowski, Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Franciszek Doleżał, Mayor of Poznań C. Ratajski, General Commissioner for the Republic of Poland in Gdańsk Minister Henryk Strassburger, as well as a large audience of spectators.

As predicted earlier by Rummel, the beginning of the company's activity coincided with a period of prosperity. Initially, bulk goods such as coal and wood were carried by tramp shipping, to test the economic possibilities and the conditions for the future operation of liner services. In accordance with the earlier assumptions, from the very start, the company was run primarily using state capital.¹⁰⁶

As already mentioned, on 13 May 1927, the Council of Ministers approved the statute of "Żegluga Polska." According to the statute, the company's seat was Gdynia, and its mission was to provide maritime transport services with particular emphasis on the needs of Polish industry and trade, including the transport of goods and people on the company's own and leased ships. "Żegluga Polska" was also responsible for forwarding, brokerage and other activities related to the transport and storage of goods, as well as building its own marinas and warehouses.

In addition, the company was authorised to set up offices and agencies both at home and abroad. Two important decisions by the Polish state were to exempt "Żegluga Polska" from all state taxes and fees for a period of 15 years and to give it priority in transporting freight owned by the state or serving state purposes. The authorities of "Żegluga Polska" included the Administrative Board (composed of nine members appointed by the Minister of Industry and Trade), the Directorate, and the Audit Committee. The Administrative Board was responsible for the general supervision and control over the activities of the enterprise. The Board took decisions by a majority vote, and tie

102 *Żeglarz Polski* 44 (1926), 154: 250.

103 *Bandera Polska*, 60.

104 Cf. Stefan Ciundziewicki, "Lata wojny na m/s Lewant," in: *Na morze po chleb i przygodę*, ed. Wincenty Bartosiak (Warszawa: Pax, 1972), 72; Michał Kisielewski, "W awangardzie," in: *Na morze po chleb i przygodę*, ed. W. Bartosiak (Warszawa: Pax, 1972), 134; Szymon Kupis, "Na polskich «pasażerach» w latach pokoju i wojny," in: *Na morze po chleb i przygodę*, ed. Wincenty Bartosiak (Warszawa: Pax, 1972), 264; Milewski, "Trudne początki," 282, 314.

105 Stankiewicz, *Z floty*, 274.

106 APG, Żegluga Polska, ref. no. 146, "Żegluga Polska" S.A. Jedenaście lat pracy na morzu, 7–8.

votes were resolved by the president, who had the casting vote. The tasks of the Directorate included keeping the company's books and preparing its business plan, budget and annual balance sheets. The Audit Committee carried out financial audits of the enterprise.¹⁰⁷

J. Rummel, as the person in charge of "Żegluga Polska," was entrusted with a broad scope of competencies. As director of the company, he answered solely to the Administrative Board.¹⁰⁸ The company's accounts were overseen by the Audit Committee and the Supreme Audit Office.¹⁰⁹ All these factors meant that the management of "Żegluga Polska" depended on good relations of its director with the ministries mentioned, which had the greatest impact on subsidising the Polish shipowner and supported it by concluding contracts with state and foreign contractors.

Also in 1927, new vessels were added to the company's fleet: the military transport ship SS "Warszawa" – in May, and SS "Tczew" and SS "Zagłoba" – in November.¹¹⁰ Crews were trained and new staff were recruited in cooperation with the Polish Navy and the State Maritime School in Tczew (Państwowa Szkoła Morska w Tczewie). The company's business was hampered by the fact that the seaport in Gdynia had not been completed yet and there were not enough reloading facilities and repair workshops, which meant that the shipowner had to use the port in Gdańsk. Since Poland did not have much experience in operations associated with maritime trade and transport, such as brokerage, forwarding and marine insurance, "Żegluga Polska" was forced to cooperate with the Polish Maritime Agency (Polska Agencja Morska)¹¹¹ – a broker established in June 1926¹¹² operating under the auspices of the Polish government.

In June 1927, "Żegluga Polska" launched its first coastal shipping liner service, operated by the chartered ship SS "Sachsen," and in August and July, two new ships ordered by the Polish government in the previous year and handed over to the company – SS "Gdynia" and SS "Gdańsk" – were placed in the passenger liner service. The total turnover of the Polish shipowner in the tramp shipping market in 1927 was

107 Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 13 maja 1927 r. w sprawie zatwierdzenia statutu przedsiębiorstwa "Żegluga Polska" [Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 13 May 1927 on the approval of the statute of the company "Żegluga Polska"], *Monitor Polski*, no. 127, 4/06/1927, 1–2.

108 Rummel, *Narodziny*, 89.

109 Rummel, "P. P. Żegluga Polska," 223.

110 APG, Żegluga Polska, ref. no. 146, "Żegluga Polska" S.A. Jedenaście lat pracy na morzu, 10.

111 *Ibidem*, 11.

112 "1937 czerwiec [2], Gdynia – Informacje Inspektoratu Straży Granicznej Gdynia dla Pomorskiego Inspektoratu Okręgowego Straży Granicznej w Bydgoszczy o firmie «Polska Agencja Morska» w Gdyni" ["1937 June [2], Gdynia – Information from the Inspectorate of the Border Guard in Gdynia for the Pomeranian District Inspectorate of the Border Guard in Bydgoszcz about the company «Polska Agencja Morska» in Gdynia"], in: *Wywiad gospodarczy Straży Granicznej wobec firm gdańsko-gdyńskich w latach 1932–1938*, compiled by Piotr Kołakowski and Ryszard Techman (Słupsk: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pomorskiej, 2010), 164.

PLN 303,467. The ships of "Żegluga Polska" transported 40,049 tons of imported cargo and 211,653 tons of exported cargo, and carried 51,585 tons of cargo between foreign ports, which in total amounted to 303,647 tons. In the same year, the company transported 78,840 passengers.¹¹³

Conclusions

The facts discussed in this study indicate that the coal boom was the main factor that contributed to the establishment of "Żegluga Polska," as it brought about an increase in ship traffic in Gdańsk and Gdynia, and heralded an accelerated expansion of the ports of the Polish customs area, the creation of a cartel of Polish coal mines and the construction of a connecting route between the Polish coast and Silesia. In such circumstances, establishing a Polish shipping company was a must since it gave Poland a unique opportunity to start the process of creating the Polish merchant fleet. In this light, it was not a matter of coincidence that the Polish government purchased ships for "Żegluga Polska" which were perfectly suited for the transport of coal and other bulk goods in the Baltic Sea.

The lesson Poland learned from the history of the Polish-Norwegian shipping company "Sarmacja" – especially its poor financial standing and the lack of possibilities of further development, which was compounded by the ruinous attitude of the Norwegian co-owner BDS – was the reason why so much emphasis was put this time on making "Żegluga Polska" a Polish company. Having learned from this experience, the Polish government could not allow representatives of foreign capital to make decisions on the financial status and strategy of the newly-created shipowner. Moreover, the Polish state authorities ensured they could supervise "Żegluga Polska" by granting the Minister of Industry and Trade the right to appoint the company's executives. If one is to believe J. Rummel's words that no Polish private entrepreneur would have ventured to set up a shipping company on their own at that time, the establishment of a shipping company under the auspices of the Polish government was not only an additional guarantee of proper operation of the firm, but simply a condition for its establishment.

The history of the establishment of "Żegluga Polska" shows that in the young Polish state, which had no major shipping traditions and whose society was not interested in maritime affairs, it was difficult to take full advantage of the access to the sea and there were no solid foundations for establishing a shipping company. It turns out that the laborious creation of the Polish merchant navy required not only legal and financial support from the state, but also favourable external conditions.

113 APG, Żegluga Polska, ref. no. 146, "Żegluga Polska" S.A. Jedenaście lat pracy na morzu, 9, 11, 40, 71.

BIBLIOGRAPHY**Archival sources**

- Archiwum Akt Nowych, Poselstwo RP w Kopenhadze, sygn. 5 [Archives of New Records, Diplomatic Mission in Copenhagen, ref.no.5].
- Archiwum Akt Nowych, Państwowy Urząd Zakupów Artykułów Pierwszej Potrzeby, Oddział w Gdańsku, Korespondencja z Polskim Towarzystwem Żegluga Morskiej "Sarmacja," sygn. 2464 [Archives of New Records, State Office for the Purchase of Basic Necessities, Branch in Kraków, Correspondence with Polskie Towarzystwo Żegluga Morskiej "Sarmacja," ref.no. 2464].
- Archiwum Narodowe w Krakowie, Oddział II, RHB VI 88, Akta firmy spółkowej Polskie Towarzystwo Żegluga Morskiej "Sarmacja," Wpis do rejestru handlowego firmy spółkowej Polskie Towarzystwo Żegluga Morskiej Sarmacja Spółka z o.o., 23.12.1919 [National Archives in Kraków, Branch II, RHB VI 88, Files of the company Polskie Towarzystwo Żegluga Morskiej "Sarmacja," Entry into the company register of the company Polskie Towarzystwo Żegluga Morskiej Sarmacja Spółka z o.o.].
- Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku [State Archives in Gdańsk], Żegluga Polska, ref.no. 146, "Żegluga Polska" S.A.
- Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku [State Archives in Gdańsk], Rada Portu i Dróg Wodnych, microfilm 64211.
- Archiwum Państwowe w Katowicach, Polska Konwencja Węglowa, sygn. 132 [State Archives in Katowice, Polish Coal Charter, ref.no. 132].
- Bergens Sjøfartsmuseum Arkiv, Ms 26 (BDS): Aa-Forhandlingsprotokoll III 1921-1927.
- Bergens Sjøfartsmuseum Arkiv, Polish Coal Charter, ref.no. 3689.
- Riksarkivet i Oslo, Utenriksdepartementet, ref.no. 2507, H2-B2, Polen. Understøttelse av handelsflåten.
- Universitetsbiblioteket i Bergen, Manuskriptsamling, ref.no. 1570/24-2, Konsul Einar Nielsen, Privat von 1 Januar 1927 bis 31 Desember 1928.

Printed sources

- Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab Bergen. Beretning og Regnskap 1926.*
- Dziennik Ustaw 1920, nr 47, poz. 285 [Official Journal of Laws of 1920 No. 47, item 285].
- Dziennik Ustaw 1925, nr 125, poz. 891 [Official Journal of Laws of 1925 No. 125, item 891].
- Rozkaz do Ministerstwa Spraw Wojskowych Józefa Piłsudskiego, *Monitor Polski*, nr 217, 30.11.1918 [Józef Piłsudski's order to the Ministry of Military Affairs, *Monitor Polski*, no. 217, 30 Nov. 1918], 20-23.

Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 13 maja 1927 r. w sprawie zatwierdzenia statutu przedsiębiorstwa "Żegluga Polska." *Monitor Polski*, nr 127, 4.06.1927 [Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 13 May 1927 on the approval of the statute of the company "Żegluga Polska." *Monitor Polski*, no. 127, 4 June 1927], 1–8.

"1937 czerwiec [2], Gdynia – Informacje Inspektoratu Straży Granicznej Gdynia dla Pomorskiego Inspektoratu Okręgowego Straży Granicznej w Bydgoszczy o firmie «Polska Agencja Morska» w Gdyni" ["1937, June [2], Gdynia – Information from the Inspectorate of the Border Guard in Gdynia for the Pomeranian District Inspectorate of the Border Guard in Bydgoszcz about the company «Polska Agencja Morska»] in Gdynia." In: *Wywiad gospodarczy Straży Granicznej wobec firm gdańsko-gdyńskich w latach 1932–1938*, compiled by Piotr Kołakowski and Ryszard Techman, 164–165. Słupsk: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pomorskiej, 2010.

Newspapers and magazines

Gazeta Gdańska (9.02.1922)

Przemysł i Handel (1926)

Słowo Pomorskie (13.06.1923)

Żeglarz Polski 42 (1926), 152: 236

Żeglarz Polski 44 (1926), 154: 250

References

Babnis, Maria. "Kronika Polskiej Marynarki Wojennej (październiki 1918–marzec 1947)." In: *Kadry Morskiej Rzeczypospolitej*. Vol. 2: *Polska Marynarka Wojenna*. Pt. 1: *Korpus oficerów 1918–1947*, ed. Jan Kazimierz Sawicki, 173–181. Gdynia: Wyższa Szkoła Morska, 1996.

Błahut, Karol Józef. *Polsko-niemieckie stosunki gospodarcze w latach 1919–1939*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1975.

Ciundziejewski, Stefan. "Lata wojny na m/s Lewant." In: *Na morze po chleb i przygodę*, ed. Wincenty Bartosiak, 71–88. Warszawa: Pax, 1972.

Cybulski, Julian. "Eksport węgla morzem." In: *Kronika o polskim morzu. Dzieje walk, zwycięstw i pracy*, ed. Czesław Peche, 269–274. Warszawa: Polska Gospodarcza, 1930.

Czechowski, Janusz. *Gdynia i Wolne Miasto Gdańsk w politycznej, gospodarczej i kulturalnej perspektywie II Rzeczypospolitej*. Słupsk: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pomorskiej, 2018.

Czerwińska, Wanda. "Na morzu i zapleczu." In: *Dzieje Gdyni*, ed. Roman Wapiński, 42–74. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1970.

Czerwińska, Wanda. *Polska żegluga morska w latach Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*. Gdańsk: Uniwersytet Gdański, 1971.

Czerwińska, Wanda. *Rola państwa w polskiej gospodarce morskiej 1919–1939*. Gdańsk: Uniwersytet Gdański, 1975.

- Darski, Stanisław. *W służbie żeglugi*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1978.
- Dopierała, Bogdan. *Wokół polityki morskiej Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1978.
- Duda, Daniel, Kołaczyński Stanisław, and Żurawski Wojciech. "Początki polskiej administracji morskiej." *Nautologia* 131 (1999), 2: 18–32.
- Gąsiorowska, Natalia. *Górnictwo i hutnictwo w Polsce*. Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1949.
- Hajduk, Bolesław. "Działalność spółki duńskiej Højgaard & Schultz AS w Polsce w latach 1924–1949." In: *Polska – Dania w ciągu wieków*, ed. Jan Szymański, 175–197. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, OPTIMA s.c., 2004.
- Hilchen, Feliks. "Problem morski." In: *Pięć lat na froncie gospodarczym 13 V 1926–1931*, 493–507. Vol. 1. Warszawa: Droga, 1931.
- Jaros, Jerzy. *Historia górnictwa węglowego w Zagłębiu Górnśląskim w latach 1914–1945*. Katowice: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1970.
- Kasprowicz, Bolesław. *Byłem juniorem*. Gdynia, Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1965.
- Kisielewski, Michał. "W awangardzie." In: *Na morze po chleb i przygodę*, ed. Wincenty Bartosiak, 133–218. Warszawa: Pax, 1972.
- Klejnot-Turski, Jerzy. "W sprawie załogi Krakowa." *Żeglarz Polski* 3 (1922): 45
- Korwin-Kamieński, Jan. "Zagadnienia morskie w Polsce." *Przegląd Techniczny* 4–5 (1929): 174–178.
- Krajewski, Radosław, ed. *Bandera Polska. Księga pamiątkowa poświęcona rozwojowi i rozbudowie polskiej floty handlowej*. Warszawa: Liga Morska i Kolonialna, 1926.
- Krasuski, Jerzy. *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1919–1932*. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1975.
- Krasuski, Jerzy. *Polska-Niemcy. Stosunki polityczne od zarania po czasy najnowsze*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 2009.
- Kupis, Stefan. "Na polskich «pasażerach» w latach pokoju i wojny." In: *Na morze po chleb i przygodę*, ed. Wincenty Bartosiak, 263–279. Warszawa: Pax, 1972.
- Kwiatkowski, Eugeniusz. *Dysproporcje. Rzecz o Polsce przeszłej i obecnej*. Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1989.
- Łapa, Małgorzata. *Modernizacja państwa. Polska polityka gospodarcza 1926–1929*. Łódź: Ibidem, 2002.
- Landau, Zbigniew. Tomaszewski Jerzy. *Gospodarka Polski międzywojennej 1918–1939*. Vol. 2: *Od Grabskiego do Piłsudskiego. Okres kryzysu poinflacyjnego i ożywienia koniunktury 1924–1929*. Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1971.
- Machaliński, Zbigniew. *Gospodarcza myśl morska II Rzeczypospolitej 1919–1939*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1975.
- Miciński, Jerzy. *Księga statków polskich 1918–1945*. Vol. 1. Gdańsk: Polnord-Oskar, 1996.

- Mika, Krzysztof. "Gospodarka morska." In: *Problemy gospodarcze Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, ed. Krzysztof Kozłowski, 223–250. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1989.
- Matla, Andrzej. "Polsko-norweskie kontakty żeglugowe w latach 1919–1926." *Komunikaty Instytutu Bałtyckiego* 23/24 (1986/1987), 38/39: 39–70.
- Matla, Andrzej. "Działalność norweskiego koncernu Bergenske w portach polskiego obszaru celnego w latach 1919–1939." *Komunikaty Instytutu Bałtyckiego* 29 (1992), 41: 35–66.
- Milewski, Władysław. "Trudne początki morskiego żywota." In: *Na morze po chleb i przygodę*, ed. Wincenty Bartosiak, 281–344. Warszawa: Pax, 1972.
- Milewski, Władysław. *Na morzu i lądzie*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1976.
- Możdżeński, Leonard. "Polityka morska Polski odrodzonej." In: *XV lat polskiej pracy na morzu*, ed. Aleksy Majewski, 17–22. Gdynia: Instytut Wydawniczy Państwowej Szkoły Morskiej, 1935.
- Pertek, Jerzy. "Nowotny Bogumił". In: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, 392–393. Vol. 23. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1983.
- Piskozub, Andrzej. *Polska morska. Czyn XX wieku*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1986.
- Pistel, Hugon. "Polska flota handlowa." In: *Polityka gospodarcza. Zagadnienia administracyjne*, 432–450. Vol. 1. Warszawa: Ministerstwo Przemysłu i Handlu, 1928.
- Piwowoński, Jan, *Flota spod biało-czerwonej*. Warszawa: Nasza Księgarnia, 1989.
- Podolska-Meducka, Aldona. *Polskie ustawodawstwo kartelowe w latach 1918–1939*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2003.
- Przybylski, Jerzy. "90 lat polskiej marynarki, plany i rzeczywistość." In: *Marynarka Polska (1918–2008)*, ed. Jan Kazimierz Sawicki, 48–73. Gdynia 2009.
- Ratyńska, Barbara. *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie w okresie wojny gospodarczej 1919–1930*. Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1968.
- Rdeśniński, Maciej. Introduction to *Narodziny żeglugi* by Julian Rummel, v–xx. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1980.
- Roguszcak, Józef. *Dynamika kierunków rynków zbytu górnośląskiego rynku węglowego*. Katowice: Księgarnia i Drukarnia Katolicka, 1938.
- Rostkowski, Feliks. *Sześć lat polskiej polityki handlowo-morskiej*. Warszawa: [n.p.], 1926.
- Rostkowski, Feliks. "Sześć lat polskiej polityki handlowo-morskiej." *Przemysł i Handel* 9 (1926): 243–250.
- Rummel, Julian. *Gdynia, port polski*. Toruń: Ministerstwo Żeglugi i Handlu Zagranicznego. Departament Morski, 1926.
- Rummel, Julian. "P.P. Żegluga Polska". In: *Kronika o polskim morzu. Dzieje walk, zwycięstw i pracy*, ed. Czesław Peche, 223–228. Warszawa: Polska Gospodarcza, 1930.

- Rummel, Julian. "Problem polskiej floty handlowej". In: *Akademicki Kurs dla Publicystów i Dziennikarzy o Pomorzu*, 1–15. Toruń: Instytut Bałtycki, [c. 1930].
- Rummel, Julian. *Morskie zagadnienia Polski*. Gdynia: Instytut Wydawniczy Państwowej Szkoły Morskiej, 1934.
- Rummel, Julian. "Polska marynarka handlowa". In: *XV lat polskiej pracy na morzu*, ed. Aleksy Majewski, 147–164. Gdynia: Instytut Wydawniczy Państwowej Szkoły Morskiej, 1935.
- Rummel, Julian. *Narodziny żeglugi*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1980.
- Siebeneichen, Alfred. "Konkurencja portów bałtyckich." In: *Kronika o polskim morzu. Dzieje walk, zwycięstw i pracy*, ed. Czesław Peche, 355–360. Warszawa: Polska Gospodarcza, 1930.
- Siemianowski, Jordan. *Działalność norweskich armatorów w Gdańsku i Gdyni w latach 1919–1939*. Szczecin: Uniwersytet Szczeciński, 2020.
- Stankiewicz, Mamert. *Z floty carskiej do polskiej*. Warszawa: Iskry, 2007.
- Steyer, Donald. *Półwiecze Polski na morzu*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1970.
- Steyer, Donald. "Polish Merchant Navy 1926–1939." *Acta Poloniae Historica* 23 (1971): 118–135.
- Szmidtko, Zenon. "Skarboferm" 1922–1939. *Związki polityki z gospodarką*. Opole: Instytut Śląski, 2005.
- Szymański, Jan. "Kapitał norweski wobec gospodarki Polski międzywojennej (1919–1939)," *Zapiski Historyczne* 52 (1987), 2: 65–85.
- Szymański, Jan. *Stosunki gospodarcze Polski z Norwegią w latach 1918–1929*. Gdańsk: Uniwersytet Gdański, 2005.
- Twardowski, Marek. "Kiedy powołano polską marynarkę?" In: *Marynarka Polska (1918–2008)*, ed. Jan Kazimierz Sawicki, 168–175. Gdynia: Pracownia Historii i Studium Wojskowej Akademii Morskiej w Gdyni, 2009.
- Tyszel, Jan Zygmunt. *Pod ojczystą banderą*. Katowice: Liga Morska i Rzeczna, 1930.
- Widernik, Mieczysław. *Porty Gdańska i Gdyni w życiu gospodarczym II Rzeczypospolitej*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1991.
- Wojciechowski, Stanisław. *Flota handlowa w Polsce. Rozwój i jej znaczenie*. Warszawa: Liga Morska i Kolonialna, 1927.

SUMMARY

The aim of this paper is to show the impact of the activities of the Polish-Norwegian sea shipping company "Towarzystwo Żegluga Morskiej «Sarmacja» SA" and the events in the international coal market on the establishment of the Polish shipowner "Żegluga Polska" in 1926. The investigations are based on the analysis of documents available mainly in the Polish Archives of New Records, the State Archives in Gdańsk, and Riksarkivet in Oslo, as well as the literature of the subject, including memoirs and scientific publications. The study provides evidence that the collapse of "Sarmacja" and the high demand for Polish coal were the key impulses for the establishment of "Żegluga Polska." The final conclusion is that in 1926, a solid Polish shipping company could not be created without the full financial support of the Polish state authorities. The present article also sorts out contradictory literature findings and organises already-known facts into a coherent whole.

Kulisy założenia Żegluga Polskiej w 1926 r.

Słowa kluczowe: Druga Rzeczpospolita, gospodarka morska Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, polityka morska Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, polscy armatorzy, "Żegluga Polska," polska flota handlowa

STESZCZENIE

Celem artykułu jest ukazanie wpływu działalności polsko-norweskiego Towarzystwa Żegluga Morskiej "Sarmacja" S.A. oraz międzynarodowego rynku węglowego na powstanie w 1926 r. polskiego armatora Żegluga Polska. Opracowanie sporządzono na podstawie analizy dokumentów dostępnych głównie w Archiwum Akt Nowych, Archiwum Państwowym w Gdańsku, Riksarkivet w Oslo, jak również literatury przedmiotu – wspomnień oraz publikacji naukowych. Podjęte badania dowodzą, że upadek "Sarmacji" oraz koniunktura na polski węgiel wywarły decydujący wpływ na powstanie Żegluga Polskiej. Zwieńczeniem dokonanej analizy jest udowodnienie, że utworzenie solidnego polskiego przedsiębiorstwa żeglugowego w 1926 r. bez całkowitego wkładu finansowego polskich władz państwowych było niemożliwe. Artykuł porządkuje ponadto obowiązujące w nauce sprzeczne ustalenia oraz scala obowiązujące fakty.

Citation

Siemianowski, Jordan. "The Circumstances of the Establishment of «Żegluga Polska» in 1926." *Studia Maritima* 35 (2022): 85–111. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2022.35-03.



Jarosław Drozd

Institute of History
University of Gdańsk
jaroslaw.drozd@ug.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0001-5577-5696

Establishment and Activity of the Jewish Marine School for Officers in Civitavecchia (1934–1938) in the Pages of the Revisionist Zionist Press

Keywords: Jews, Beitar, Zionism, Revisionism, fascism, maritime education

In my work on the organisation of sailing and fisherman courses for Polish Jews associated in the “Zebulun” Society in the 1930s in both Gdynia and Palestine, I emphasised the need for a detailed inquiry into the participation of Polish Revisionist Zionists in maritime training courses conducted by the Marine School for Officers (also referred to as Naval Academy) in the Italian town of Civitavecchia.¹ This paper is based on press material published by organs of right-wing Zionist organisations (primarily the weekly “Trybuna Narodowa” issued in Cracow, Lviv and Warsaw) and foreign monographs examining the cooperation of the youth movement Beitar (also spelled Betar)² with Italian fascists. I wanted to discuss the history of this

-
- 1 Jarosław Drozd, “Kursy portowe i rybackie dla Żydów w Gdyni w okresie międzywojennym,” *Nautologia* 142 (2005): 37–41; Idem, *Lost in the Whirlwind of War: The Jewish Community in Gdynia, Poland* (Gdynia: Oficyna Verbi Causa, 2008); Idem, “Gdynia to Neve-Yam: The Jewish fisherman’s courses within the Bays of Gdańsk and Puck in the interwar period,” *Studia Maritima* 26 (2013): 55–68; Idem, “Idea «palestyńskiego morza». Działalność Związku «Zebulun» w l. 30. XX w.,” *Nautologia* 158 (2021): 24–32.
 - 2 Beitar was established in 1923 in Riga on the initiative of the Revisionist Zionist Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky. During the inaugural meeting of Jewish youth, Jabotinsky delivered a lecture on Arab attacks on Tel Hai and other Jewish settlements in Galilee. He believed that these incidents could only be dealt with by recreating the ancient Jewish state of Israel, stretching across the entirety of Palestine and Jordan. He proposed an organisation called Beitar should be created to raise a new generation of Jews by instilling in them nationalist ideals and training them for military action against the enemies of Judaism. In 1931, during the First World Conference held in Gdańsk (Danzig), Jabotinsky was officially elected head of Beitar. The organisation quickly gained support in Poland, Palestine, Latvia, Lithuania, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany and, to a lesser extent, in other countries. It was especially popular in Poland, which in 1934 was home to approximately 40,000 of the movement’s 70,000 members. Their role model was Josef Trumpeldor, the leader of

extraordinary institution, its character, the scope of maritime education it offered, and the participation of Polish Jews in it, as well as to present people who contributed the most to its development. This is a completely new topic in Polish historiography and one that is difficult to assess, as it can mainly be analysed based on ideologically-tinted, often extremely biased, press material (accounts, reports, propaganda articles). Despite these difficulties, this article makes an important step towards showing the actual role Beitar played in the process of “conquering the Palestinian sea.”

The establishment of the Jewish Marine School for Officers in Civitavecchia was first mentioned in public on 6 January 1935 in Warsaw, during the Second World Conference of Beitar. After an emotional speech by Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, dressed for the first time in the organisation’s brown uniform, several speakers took the floor, including Dr. Alexander Lubotzky, Aharon Cwi Propes, Isaac Remba, Joseph Chrust, Otto Seidmann, Akiba Brunn (Akiva Brun) and Captain Yirmiyahu Halperin (Jeremiah Halpern).³ In a special paper, the last of these speakers not only discussed the matter of training the members of Beitar in sailing skills, but also showed, competently using statistical data, the benefits that seamanship could bring to the reconstruction of the Jewish state. At the same time, he presented facts regarding the actual work that had already been done toward educating marine crews, i.e. the organisation of the school in Civitavecchia. Apart from Capt. Halperin, this matter was also addressed by the Lithuanian commander of the naval squad, Yehezkel Dilion, who spoke to the delegates about the details of the support Beitar had received from the Italian authorities and the help it had been offered by the director of the Naval School for Officers, Capt. Nicola Fusco.⁴ Halperin and Dilion’s campaign was successful, and one of the fruits the conference bore was the announcement of the slogan: “The road to Palestinian

the Jewish settlers, who had been killed at Tel Hai in 1920, the same one who during World War I, together with Jabotinsky, had participated in the creation of the Jewish Legion (modelled on the Polish Legions), fighting on the side of the British Army in the Battle of Gallipoli. The name Beitar was a slightly altered abbreviation of the organisation’s Hebrew name “Brith Trumpeldor.”

- 3 Yirmiyahu Halperin (1901–1962), a Revisionist Zionist, member of Beitar and Haganah. Born in Smolensk, in 1913, he emigrated to Palestine, and after graduating from a gymnasium in Tel Aviv, he enrolled in a naval academy in Italy, and then a school for captains and engineers in Great Britain. He was a co-founder of the organisation Haganah in Jerusalem, where in 1920, as commander of the Old City and *aide de camp* to Jabotinsky, he fought against Arab rioters. In 1927 he joined Beitar, becoming the commander of the organisation’s brigades in Tel Aviv. In 1932 he was appointed Director of the Maritime Department in Beitar.
- 4 Capt. N. Fusco was the administrative secretary of the local branch of the fascist party and a co-proponent of the idea of establishing an institution operating within the Consortium of Vocational Schools of Maritime Economy (*Consorzio della Scuole Professionali per la Maestranza Marittima*), which he then enthusiastically put into life (Norbert Ochs, “Nicola Fusco,” *Trybuna Narodowa* 11, 13/03/1936, 5. The history of the school goes back to April 1932, when Jabotinsky wrote a letter addressed to the Italian Zionist, prof. Yitzhak Schiach from *Liceo Classico Galileo* in Florence, in which he presented the project of establishing a central school for military instructors of Jewish youth. See: Eric Salerno, *Mossad base Italia. Le azioni intrighi, le verita nascoste* (Milano: Il Saggiatore S.P.A., 2010), 106.

land leads through the Jewish sea.”⁵ After extensive training courses for farmers and industrial workers who were supposed to work in Palestine had been launched, a decision was made to start courses for Jewish sailors. An article published in “Trybuna Narodowa” [National Tribune] on 14 June 1935, said:

We see from the heroic example of the Polish nation, which makes the most severe sacrifices to maintain its position in the Baltic Sea, how important it is for a nation to have its own maritime apparatus, its own ports, ships and its own seamen. And we too won't become a power without the sea. The idea of naval education might seem alien to the Jewish spirit, but the impressive development of the marine school in Civitavecchia puts an end to all such fears. We want to create more marine schools so that you understand that national chaluc [lit. “pioneer,” the name of the first Jewish settlers who came to Palestine – author's note JD] must man all workplaces in Palestine. Marine schools will be set up in each country to train future heads of the Jewish fleet. The first step toward implementing this idea of marine training will be sailing camps organised to train staff for the marine school in Civitavecchia.⁶

The fact that marine training was to be conducted in Italy was surprising to many. So far, the Jewish press (including Revisionist Zionist organs) had viewed any variety of fascism as a synonym of evil, brutality and anti-Semitism, but a characteristic turn was made in this perception. In the opinion of Beitar's leaders, philo-Semitic Italy negated racism. Revisionist Zionists did not see Italian fascism as a movement of hatred, but only as an egocentric, eminently a national front, rooted in the views of Giuseppe Garibaldi. Italy in the mid-1930s was perceived as a “happy island” in the sea of European anti-Semitism.⁷ The ties linking Jewish Revisionists with fascist Italy date back to 1922, when Jabotinsky sent a letter to Benito Mussolini (to which he probably did not receive a reply), in which he tried to get Italy's support for the Zionist idea. He started the letter by declaring that he was perfectly aware of Mussolini's prejudice against Zionism, which, in his opinion, led to the erroneous belief that Zionists were enemies of Italy. He then tried to persuade Mussolini to abandon pan-Arab politics, arguing that a strong Jewish presence in the Mediterranean was the only way to ensure the hegemony of the Italian language in the region. He argued that if Italy were to ally with the Jews, the new Jewish state would adopt the Italian language and culture and establish its dominance throughout the region. He argued that Arabs and Italians would soon confront one another eyeball to eyeball in a “cultural war” for the control of the Middle East, and that the Jewish state could create a buffer zone, in this war, between Europe, Asia and Africa. Jabotinsky concluded his letter by observing that the vitality of the

5 “Betarowcy obradują,” *Nowy Dziennik* 7, 07/01/1935, 9; “Przegląd obrad kinusu Bejtaru,” *Trybuna Narodowa* 6, 08/02/1935, 6.

6 *Trybuna Narodowa* 24, 14/06/1935, 2.

7 Jecheskiel (Yehezkel) Dilion, “Żydzi w Italii,” *Trybuna Narodowa* 15, 12/04/1935, 3.

Jewish people and the Italian fascists had many things in common, and by expressing an interest in Mussolini's personality and his movement. Nevertheless, for the next 10 years, Jabotinsky saw an alliance with Great Britain as the only international option for the Zionist movement. He changed his mind as late as the beginning of the 1930s. Other Revisionists also showed interest in Italy as a potential state model and partner. Ze'ev Shem-Tov, one of the leaders of Beitar in Warsaw, believed that for the good of the Jewish nation, his organisation, modelled on the Czech Society for Gymnastics "Sokół" [Falcon], but influenced by the Italian organisation "Balilla" (*Opera Nazionale Balilla*), should adopt the fascist model and follow its only leader, Jabotinsky, with full dedication. In 1928, Abba Haimeir, a leading Palestinian Revisionist, openly called on the leader of Beitar to declare himself the Duce of Palestine. In the second half of the 1920s, Revisionism became a growing force also among Italian Zionists. In 1930, the first issue of "L'Idée Sionistica," edited by the local Revisionist leader Leone Carpi, was published, which promoted cooperation between the Italian government and the Zionist movement.⁸

Less than three weeks after the end of the Second World Conference of Beitar, on 27 January 1935, the Jewish Marine School in Civitavecchia was officially inaugurated in the presence of eminent representatives of Jewish communities of Italy, including Prof. Angelo Sacerdoti (Chief Rabbi of Rome), Dr. Sergio-Izhak Minerbi (chairman of the Jewish Religious Community in Rome), attorney Bassano (president of the Jewish Sports Club in Rome), Gen. Prof. Guido Aronne Mendes (director of the tuberculosis clinic), his son Dr. Maurizio Maor Mendes (deputy commander of Beitar in Italy), chairmen of Italian Jewish communities and representatives of the local government.⁹ The ceremony held at the university was hosted by Capt. N. Fusco, who welcomed the guests together with the school's professors Scalabrina and Pavane. Then, the assembled company went to the newly-opened premises of Beitar, where they were greeted by cadets wearing sailor jackets, lined up in a row. The ceremony was led by Y. Dilion, appointed commander of the local troop by the Beitar World Headquarters (*Shilton*), and his deputy Zwi Kolitz.¹⁰ After an opening speech by Dr. M. M. Mendes, Prof. A. Sacerdoti first welcomed the cadets and then announced that the town of Civitavecchia was

8 On the impact of Italian fascism on Beitar: Eran Kaplan, *The Jewish Radical Right: Revisionist Zionism and Its Ideological Legacy* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 151–152, 155; Cristina M. Bettin, *Italian Jews from Emancipation to the Racial Laws* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 28; Joseph Heller, *The Stern Gang. Ideology, Politics and Terror, 1940–1949* (London-New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2004), 4–5; Colin Shindler, *The Triumph of Military Zionism. Nationalism and the Origins of the Israeli Rights* (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd., 2005), 13, 125–126.

9 "Italy Opens Its First Jewish Marine School," *Jewish Daily Bulletin* 3059, 28/01/1935, 1; "Uroczyste otwarcie Żydowskiej Szkoły Morskiej," *Nowy Dziennik* 30, 30/01/1935, 1; "Jüdische Marine-Schule in Italien," *Jüdische Wochenspost* 4, 01/02/1935, 2; "Feierliche Eröffnung der ersten jüdischen nautischen Schule," *Jüdisches Volksblatt* 5, 01/02/1935, 4; *Ceirim* 5 (Feb. 1935): 88; *The Sentinel* 6, 07/02/1935, 25.

10 Dan Tamir, *Hebrew Fascism in Palestine 1922–1942* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 136–137.

admitted to the Union of Jewish Religious Communities. Next, Prof. G. A. Mendes thanked the Italian government for their help in establishing the school, and, at the end of the ceremony, the rabbi symbolically nailed a mezuzah to the door of Beitar's house. An article describing the opening of the school appeared on 31 January 1935 in "Il Giornale d'Italia," a semi-official journal of the Italian government. It featured a photo of the Beitarists with Capt. Fusco, with a note saying that the marine school was a turning point for Jews, who had set it as their goal to work for the "Palestinian sea" and that the institution brought "a breath of fresh air" to the small port town. The Italian government was apparently satisfied with the establishment of the school, as evidenced by the fact that, ten days after its opening, the Harbour Master's Office in Civitavecchia received a letter from the Minister of Communications, which read as follows:

Benito Mussolini and the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Navy, and Communications gladly welcome the new Revisionist Zionist students who have come to study at the Marine School in Civitavecchia.¹¹

It is worth mentioning that the classes of the first course began more than two months before the official inauguration, on 10 November 1934. Thirty cadets were to participate in the course (on the day of the inauguration, the school was attended by 12 cadets and was waiting for the arrival of another 18).¹² The Maritime Department of the Beitar World Headquarters issued an instruction in which it delegated the organisation of Beitar training courses to Y. Dilion, his deputy, and assistant instructors (*madrichs*), who were supposed to arrive from Poland in the near future.¹³ In mid-April 1935, the school was visited by Capt. Y. Halperin, who expressed thanks to Capt. N. Fusco for the effort put in to the organisation of the school so far. He also met the mayor of Civitavecchia, Ilario Cordelli, to thank the local community of 40,000 people for the assistance and hospitality they had offered to the Revisionist Zionists. Cordelli, for his part, assured that he was happy to host the students of the Jewish Marine School in his town and that he would do everything in his might to help develop this institution.¹⁴ In June 1935, the first graduates received their diplomas for completing the theoretical part of the course. The final exam, consisting of an oral and a written part, was held on 10–12 June 1935 before a commission composed of representatives of the Italian

11 "Bejtár morski," *Trybuna Narodowa* 9, 01/03/1935, 5; "Rząd włoski o szkole morskiej Bejtaru," *Trybuna Narodowa* 8, 22.02.1935: 7.

12 Jecheskiel (Yehezkel) Dilion, "Zdobycie morza żydowskiego warte jest ofiar... (z dziennika)," *Trybuna Narodowa* 52, 27/12/1935, 8; Norbert Ochs, "Grób chaluca morza," *Trybuna Narodowa* 23, 12/06/1936, 7. The course was completed by 26 students, which suggests that three participants dropped out while it lasted. One of the students, Abraham Strausberg from Gdańsk, died tragically on 19 May 1935 and was buried in the Jewish cemetery in Civitavecchia.

13 "Morska Szkoła Oficerska w Civita Vecchia," *Trybuna Narodowa* 46, 28/12/1934, 7.

14 "Ku zdobyciu morza. J. Halperin w Civita-Vecchia," *Trybuna Narodowa* 19, 10/05/1935, 7.

Ministry of the Navy (Commanding Officer of the port of Bologna Capt. Pier Luigi Fiori, Capt. Federico Ferrari-Orsi and Capt. Giulio Bonamico), Captain of the port in Civitavecchia (Capt. Arezo) and professors of the Marine School (Captains Fusco, Faone and Scalabrino). The exam included seven compulsory subjects: Italian, navigation, shipbuilding, cartography, shipping regulations, captain's pragmatics and ship manoeuvring. In addition, each student was required to write an essay in Italian on one of the four topics: "What impression has fascist Italy had on you?", "How do you envision the future of the «Palestinian sea»?", "How do you envision your own future?", and "What impressions did you have on your first journey by ship." All 26 students completed the theoretical course (including five who completed it with honours), but this did not mean they were already qualified to work at sea. They still had six months of seagoing practice ahead of them to earn the rank of "master in medium-length voyages" i.e. inshore captain. Capt. Y. Halperin took the examination together with the students (passing it with a very good grade). He had spent two and a half months in Civitavecchia especially for this purpose, raising the students' morale with his presence.¹⁵

However, Halperin's stay in Civitavecchia was mainly related to the plan of buying a training ship, on board of which the graduates of the first course could sail on the waters of the Tyrrhenian, Adriatic, Aegean and Mediterranean seas, also calling at Palestinian ports.¹⁶ Having consulted the purchase with Capt. Fusco, Halperin chose the sailing ship "Quattro Venti" owned by Ferdinand Menconi (from Viareggio in Tuscany).¹⁷ The money for the purchase (approx. 105,000 lire) came from the self-defence fund *Keren Tel Chaj*¹⁸ and a donation from Ephraim and Sara Kirschner, Belgian Zionists who lived in Paris.¹⁹ The sailing ship was named "Sara I" (also spelled Sarah I) in honour of the donor's wife, and, since it was the first Jewish training ship in the world,

15 Zwi Kolitz, "Tam, gdzie się szkolą żydowski marynarze," *Trybuna Narodowa* 29, 19/07/1935, 8, 10; *Haneszer* 2 (1935): 2.

16 "Mittelmeer-Segelfahrt eines jüdischen Schulschiffes," *Die Neue Welt* 439, 16/02/1935, 4.

17 "Einweihung der neuen Marinefahne," *Das Jüdische Volk* 14, 01/10/1937, 6. This motorised (two engines, 200hp) four-master was built in 1898 by the American company "Hall Brothers" in Port Blakeley (Washington). First launched as "Eric," she was then renamed "Crusader A" and "Four Winds." Under this last name and the British flag, she travelled twice around the world and circumnavigated the Cape of Good Hope eleven times. She was 62 m long, 11.52 m wide, 34 m tall, and had a capacity of 635 t.

18 The *Keren Tel Chaj* self-defence fund was established in 1929 after the riots in Palestine. Its purpose was to collect funds for the purchase of weapons, organisation of military training, support of professional training, defence sports and settlement, and other forms of aid and support to those fighting for an independent Jewish state.

19 "Okręć szkolny Bejtaru," *Trybuna Narodowa* 20, 17/05/1935, 4. See also: Kaplan, *The Jewish Radical Right*, 156.

it was also referred to as the “mother” of Jewish ships.²⁰ She set off on her first cruise under the new name and a new Italian flag (it was the ship’s third flag) from Livorno on 23 June 1935 and arrived in Civitavecchia the next evening after 20 hours at sea. There it underwent the necessary renovation, which included building a compartment in the front part of the ship serving as living quarters for the cadets and the ship’s crew. In the compartment, there was a place for prayer, with an altar cabinet (*Aron Kodesh*) and two Torah scrolls, donated by the Jewish communities of Rome and Livorno. Next to the sleeping compartment, there was a dining room and a kitchen and, in the rear part, cabins for the captain and officers, a spacious meeting room, bathrooms and a small ship hospital were built.²¹ The middle part of the ship was to be used as storage space for luggage. In addition to two regular lifeboats, the “Sara I” was equipped with a third, motor lifeboat. To compensate for the lack of a Palestinian flag and to clearly emphasise the crew’s nationality, the hull was painted white and blue.²² In August 1935, after a short stay in Paris, Y. Halperin returned to Civitavecchia to take charge of the preparations for the vessel’s first cruise to Seville.²³ She departed in a ceremonious atmosphere in the presence of government, city, port and school authorities.²⁴ The ship easily completed her trip, but the voyage showed that she was still unfit to be used for a six-month practical training course. Therefore, the graduates of the first course, owing to the efforts of the school authorities, were given the opportunity to complete their practical training on ships flying the Polish, Romanian and Italian flags.²⁵

The opening of the Jewish Marine School in Civitavecchia and the fact that the cadets had completed the first course kindled an interest in maritime affairs in the Revisionist Zionist circles. As part of a large-scale action to popularise the “idea of the Palestinian sea,” the Beitar World Headquarters prepared a plan for the establishment of the Jewish Maritime League, whose task was to create local maritime training facilities and raise the funds for this purpose. Prep and selection camps for applicants to the school in Civitavecchia were held among others in southern Poland. The first six-week camp, which started on 2 July 1935, was organised near Oświęcim, on the River Soła by the Beitar Headquarters in Poland and the District Headquarters for Małopolska Zachodnia (Western Little Poland) and Silesia in Cracow. During the camp, the participants took swimming, sailing, kayaking and rescue courses as well as an instructor’s

20 The Italian name of the vessel was “Sarah I-o,” I-o being an abbreviation of the Italian word “primo.” She was also known as “Sarah A” and “Sarah haRishonah,” which was a translation of the ship’s name into Hebrew.

21 Jechezkiel (Yehezkiel) Dilion, “Betarim zur See,” *Das Jüdische Volk* 13, 24/09/1937, 3–4.

22 Lazer Kurzer, “Frontem ku morzu! Pierwsi żydowscy absolwenci szkoły morskiej udają się w wędrówkę po szerokich szlakach,” *Chwila* 5848, 03/07/1935, 5.

23 “W komendzie światowej,” *Trybuna Narodowa* 33, 16/08/1935, 6.

24 *Haneszer* 5 (1935): 82.

25 Edmund Schachter, “Walka o żydowskie morze,” *Trybuna Narodowa* 22, 05/06/1936, 4.

course.²⁶ Candidates were invited to submit their applications for the second course from 15 May to 1 August 1935. The course was scheduled to start on 1 September 1935.²⁷ Due to its great popularity among the Jewish youth, the Maritime Department of the World Beitar Headquarters decided to increase admissions to 100. The efforts were only partially successful, and the classes of the second course, which, for financial reasons, was inaugurated as late as March 1936, were attended by 48 cadets, of which 25 came from Poland, 8 from Czechoslovakia, 5 from Germany, 4 from Lithuania, 3 from Austria and 1 each from Hungary, the Free City of Danzig and Rhodesia.²⁸ The basic fee was 200 lire per month, but each student had to pay an additional 225 lire for uniforms (a sailor's uniform to be worn during lectures, and a training uniform for practical classes). After completing the theoretical course, the graduates were to receive uniforms of water officers of the Beitar unit. Y. Dilion, who had been delegated to take care of other tasks, was replaced in the position of the school's commander by Abraham Blass, a graduate of the first course, who came from Poland. At the same time, *Keren Tel Chaj* announced a 5-year work programme, which included the establishment of a maritime unit of Beitar in Haifa or Tel Aviv in the second year, the core of which (20%) was to consist of the best graduates from Civitavecchia.²⁹

The atmosphere in the school on the day of the inauguration of the second course shows the ideological change in the consciousness and behaviour of Beitar's young sailors. They cheered for Italy: "Long live Italy! Long live the king! Long live the Duce!", and then, after a blessing by Rabbi Aldo Lattes, they sang "Giovanezza," the official anthem of the Italian National Fascist Party.³⁰ Their uniforms were decorated with patches depicting an anchor joined with a menorah (the symbol of Beitar), above which there was a small Star of David, and *fascies* badges pinned to the lapels, which symbolised the fascist movement.³¹ The management of Beitar was aware of the potential negative propaganda connected with the opening of the school in Italy, and therefore insisted that the cadets should not get involved in local politics. In November 1934, Jabotinsky asked the participants of the first course to remember that they were guests both at the school and in Italy. He advised them to be polite, not to take part in political disputes

26 "Beitar morski," *Trybuna Narodowa* 31, 02/08/1935, 6; Lazzaro Cohen, "S/s Sarah," *Israel. Hebdomadaire Juif Indépendant* 38, 18/09/1935, 3. *Trybuna Narodowa* 40, 09/10/1936, 2.

27 "Okręć szkolny Bejtaru," *Trybuna Narodowa* 20, 17/05/1935, 4; *Haneszer* 3–4 (1935): 50.

28 *Judisk Krönika* 4 (1936): 8; Shindler, *The Triumph*, 132. Some sources say that the second course was attended by 50 students, of whom 39 studied navigation (a "captaincy" programme) and 11 studied mechanics (a "mechanical" programme). During the first course, 24 students obtained a captaincy diploma and two a diploma in mechanics. See: Abraham Blass, "Civitavecchia-dwulecie," *Trybuna Narodowa* 44, 06/11/1936, 6–7.

29 Nachum ben Hajam, "Zdobycie Morza Żydowskiego," *Trybuna Narodowa* 29, 24/07/1936, 5–6.

30 Marco Pizutti, *Biografia non autorizzata della Seconda Guerra Mondiale* (Milano: Mondadori, 2018), 26.

31 Salerno, *Mossad base Italia*, 106.

over Italian affairs, not to express their opinion on political issues in public, and not to criticise the Italian regime, which had given them the opportunity to study at Civitavecchia. Y. Halperin recalled that, despite the objections of their superiors, the cadets had publicly supported Mussolini's regime. During the Italian campaign in Ethiopia, they marched alongside Italian soldiers in a demonstration of support for the war and collected scrap metal and shipped it to Italian armament factories. Eran Kaplan draws attention to an event that shows how the Italian authorities perceived Beitar's cadets. He refers to a press article published on 28 May 1935 in "Popolo di Roma," which described the mourning ceremony held on the occasion of the tragic death of A. Strausberg from Gdańsk, who participated in the first course. The ceremony confirmed the fraternal relations between the Revisionists and the authorities of fascist Italy. The Jewish cadets, Capt. Halperin and Capt. Fusco, the administrative secretary of the local branch of the fascist party, representatives of the mayor and port authorities, as well as Italian cadets from the Naval School for Officers, all stood on board the training ship "Domenico," whose flag was lowered to half-mast. At the scene of the accident, the comrades of the deceased said the Kaddish and held a military ceremony during which they threw a bouquet of flowers into the sea. At the end, everyone made the "Roman salute" with their hats off.³² As observed by Bowyer Bell, Beitar satisfied the needs of poor young Jews from Eastern Europe, by giving them the chance to "enter the world" of ceremonial processions, parades, banners, rituals, patriotic poetry, uniforms and training camps and to learn how to handle weapons, march, fly aircraft and sail.³³

Theoretical exams (for sailors and mechanics) of the second course were held in August 1936. This time, the state examination commission was composed of the commander of the local port, Col. P. L. Fiori (chairman of the commission), the port officers Capt. Arezo and Lieut. Petralese, and the lecturers Captains Fusco, Scalabrino, and Zenalini and Prof. Furi.³⁴ After completing the theoretical exams, the graduates of the second course, together with Commander A. Blass, set off on board "Sara I" on a cruise through Italian ports. They were seen off in Civitavecchia by the Commander of Italian Beitar, Dr. Gersh (Zwi) Roifer, General Prof. G. A. Mendes, Dr M. M. Mendes, Capt. Fusco and Prof. Yitzhak Schiach.³⁵ During the voyage, the ship called, among others, to Genoa, where the local Jewish community gave the crew a cordial welcome. After disembarking, the cadets marched in a tight line to the synagogue, where they were greeted by the local rabbi, Riccardo Reuven Pacifici. The ceremony was attended

32 Kaplan, *The Jewish Radical Right*, 156–157.

33 J. Bowyer Bell, *Terror out of Zion: Irgun Zvai Leumi, LEHI, and the Palestine Underground 1929–1949* (New York: Avon Books, 1977), 25.

34 Nachum ben Hajam, "Oficerowie marynarki żydowskiej," *Trybuna Narodowa* 33, 21/08/1936, 7; "Zakończenie kursu teoretycznego w Civitavecchia," *Trybuna Narodowa* 41, 16/10/1936, 8.

35 Nachum ben Hajam, "Sara I-o po brzegach Italii. Wyjazd z Civitavecchia," *Trybuna Narodowa* 43, 30/10/1936, 5.

by Rabbi Gustavo Castelbolognesi and the chairman of the local Jewish community Frederico Jarach, who came for the ceremony especially from Milan.³⁶

Before the start of the third course, the rules for recruiting candidates for the Jewish Marine School in Civitavecchia were reviewed. It was decided to accept applications not only from Beitarists, but also from Jabotinsky's Brit he-Chaial (also known as the "Union of Reservists" or the "Union of Soldiers") and other Revisionist youth organisations. Candidates were required to have been members of the above-mentioned organisations for at least a year (although priority was given to those who had completed Palestinian or Beitar military training), have a good command of spoken and written Hebrew (a language exam certificate), have a valid ID card, a general certificate of good health (particularly, good sight), and a graduation certificate from a six-grade gymnasium or another secondary school. The eligible age was 17 years to 23 years (a special form for younger people aged 14–16 was planned to be organised). Candidates had to submit two application forms, one in Hebrew and one in Italian, signed by the commander of the branch of the organisation they were members of, providing comprehensive answers to all questions. The applications had to include two ID-format photos of the candidate wearing the Beitar uniform or the uniform of another organisation, and the applicants had to pay an official fee of 7 English shillings (or an equivalent in Polish zlotys), which was not reimbursed in the event the candidate was rejected. Applications for which the fee had not been paid were not processed. Each candidate also had to send in a medical certificate, although they had to appear before the medical board again after arriving at Civitavecchia. Those who were not considered fit to attend the school at this stage had to return home. Each candidate was obliged to send in a letter of commitment from their parents or legal guardians to pay the tuition fee regularly every month by the deadline set by the school. The Maritime Department of the World Beitar Headquarters, however, reserved the right to change the terms of payment and to increase the tuition fee during the school year, in accordance with the school's current needs. The school's admission regulations also required that the candidate apply through the World Headquarters for a confirmation of admission, which was necessary for them to obtain a passport or an Italian visa. Upon receipt of these documents, the candidate had to immediately pay for the first month of study and for the fare from Civitavecchia to their place of residence in order to be able to return home. They could depart for Italy only after receiving a special order from the World Headquarters. Candidates who would appear before the school authorities without such an order would be immediately returned to their place of residence and deprived of the right to study at the school. Upon receipt of the confirmation of admission, the students had to pay their first monthly tuition fee, cover the travel costs and pay an amount of 50 lire for the sailor's uniform. After completing the theoretical course, graduates had to buy

36 "Żydowski statek szkolny odwiedza Genuę," *Chwila* 6353, 26/11/1936, 8.

officer uniforms. The deadline for submitting applications was set for 1 December 1936. The processing time was short, as the students heard back about their acceptance or rejection within 10 days of applying. Those accepted received their acceptance letters by mail and were obliged to appear in Civitavecchia between 25 and 31 December 1936. Latecomers could be sent back home. During the entire instruction period (theoretical and practical courses), each cadet had to pay a tuition fee of 250 lire no later than on the 3rd day of each month. The fee covered instruction, housing, maintenance and health care. However, the World Headquarters reserved the right to increase this fee if need be. There was no discount and they all had the same obligations. The only exception was instructors, who could get a rebate.³⁷

Theoretical classes of the third course began on 1 January 1937. The large number of applications sent to the Maritime Department of the World Beitar Headquarters demonstrated that the members of this organisation attached increasing importance to marine education and training. In order to meet their expectations, a decision was made to accept a larger number of students than before (no fewer than 50 and no more than 100), but quantity did not always go hand in hand with quality, and not all of those who came to Civitavecchia managed to complete their marine training and become seamen. Y. Halperin assessed this situation in harsh words:

a great part, perhaps the greater part [of the students], remain dilettanti content with having received a certificate of completion of the theoretical course, and return home to go back to their old life. These young men regret their effort, they regret the lost several months, advising their friends not to preoccupy themselves with maritime matters. But this is a perfectly natural thing, just as it was natural for hundreds or even thousands of Jewish youths to go bankrupt at a time when the type of Jewish farmer in Palestine was only in its formation stage. Only some of them continued their conquering work until they managed to create cadres of Jewish farmers. Education for life at sea must go the same way. Some will discontinue their efforts, some will leave the marine school, etc., but each course will also produce those who will stubbornly continue their work and overcome all major and minor difficulties that inevitably await every man who wants to devote himself to the maritime profession.³⁸

This is probably why the Revisionist Zionist press postulated that the selection and training criteria should be raised for new courses. Dr. G. Roifer wrote:

we need a lot of seamen and excellent seamen at that. Therefore, our immediate task will be to mobilise as many Beitarists as possible for the task of conquering the sea, while constantly keeping in mind the matter of selecting candidates for training. Let me explain this with an example: we mobilise 200 Beitarists to Civitavecchia. They will be admitted

37 "Warunki przyjęcia do szkoły morskiej w Civitavecchia," *Trybuna Narodowa* 45, 13/11/1936, 8.

38 Jirmejahu (Yirmeyahu) Halperin, "U progu trzeciego roku," *Trybuna Narodowa* 47, 27/11/1936, 5.

in compliance with the conditions we set. (...) It will be only after several months spent at the school that a proper selection can be made. (...) Our motto in the school year 1937 will be: as many Beitarists as possible trained in the maritime profession.³⁹

In this way, the plan to “conquer the Palestinian sea” was consistently implemented. The model was the Second Polish Republic and its maritime policy. The intention was to use the state (subsidies) to build navy, merchant and fishing fleets, establish marine schools, construct and expand Palestinian ports, establish trade relations, organise immigration, tourism and defence of the Palestinian coasts, and at the same time promote a wide social movement among the diasporas, modelled on the Maritime and Colonial League, which was at the peak of popularity in Poland and earned public support for the Polish government regardless of the public’s political sympathies.

Before the start of the third course, Capt. Y. Halperin came to Civitavecchia. During a week’s stay in Italy, he visited the port of Genoa, where the training ship “Sara I” had been moored since the second half of October 1936, after arriving from Livorno.⁴⁰ Probably with Halperin on board, the ship made a voyage to Elba and Corsica at the end of December 1936 and in the first days of January 1937, from which she returned to Livorno, greeted enthusiastically by Italian Zionists, including Dr.G. Roifer. The next day, on the day of departure to Genoa, Rabbi Elio Toaff and the chairman of the Jewish Community of Livorno, Shlomo Belforte appeared on board the ship.⁴¹ It was still impossible to run a fully-fledged seagoing training course on the “Sara I,” which is why ten graduates were urgently employed on a different vessel, flying the Hungarian flag. After completing the second course, six other graduates decided to stay in Civitavecchia for the next six months to take part in a training course for fishermen. They were given the ambitious task of setting up the first Beitarist fishing unit in Palestine.⁴² The Maritime Department of the World Beitar Headquarters officially announced the opening of the special fishing course at the end of May 1937. Graduates of the school, who showed appropriate progress in their education, were to be engaged on fishing vessels of the “Society of the Friends of the Jewish Navy” and work as fishermen at the shores of Palestine for a monthly salary.⁴³ The course, the full programme for which had been developed by Cpt. Fusco, was launched at the beginning of June 1937 in Civitavecchia, a town that was prospering mainly due to fishing.⁴⁴ The place was perfect for this for another reason – the natural marine conditions of Palestine and Italy were

39 Gersh Roifer, “Dokąd?,” *Trybuna Narodowa* 47, 27/11/1936, 4.

40 “Brith Hechajal,” *Trybuna Narodowa* 47, 27/11/1936, 8.

41 Nachum Ben Hajam, “Sarą I-o brzegami Italii. Livorno,” *Trybuna Narodowa* 51, 25/12/1936, 7; Idem, “Sarą I-o brzegami Italii. Genua,” *Trybuna Narodowa* 2, 08/01/193, 4–5.

42 Dawid Gross, “Zdobycie morza,” *Trybuna Narodowa* 48, 04/12/1936, 7.

43 “Komunikat w sprawie kursu dla rybołówstwa w Civitavecchia,” *Trybuna Narodowa* 21, 28/05/1937, 7.

44 “Rybołówstwo żydowskie,” *Trybuna Narodowa* 22, 04/06/1937, 7.

quite similar, so the Italian fishing methods and the experiences gained from applying those methods could be used directly in Palestine. Twelve students took part in the fishing course, for whom two fishing boats were purchased with funds donated by E. Kirschner and Dr. G. Roifer. The larger of the boats, the "Nekha," with a displacement of 35 tons, equipped with a motor and sails, was suitable for long fishing voyages, while the smaller "Lea" was used for inshore activities. Practical training was supervised by local fishermen who taught the cadets how to steer a boat, fish, prepare and repair nets, salt and preserve fish, etc. Interestingly, the Jewish fishermen were self-sufficient, as they sold their catch every time. After a few months of training and hard work, only the four toughest and most indomitable of the 12 students continued their education. The fact that they were stout-hearted was evidenced by the events of 13 December 1937, when the Beitarists were fishing 30 miles from Civitavecchia on board the "Nekha." At 2 p.m., seeing the barometer dropping rapidly, they decided to immediately take shelter from the storm in the port. Then they saw in the distance the Italian fishing boat "Madonna di Loreto," which was calling for help due to a failure. The Jewish fishermen instantly rushed to the rescue, fighting the wind and the high waves while towing the cutter. After 9 hours, they overcame the element, reaching the port, where Capt. Fusco and the fishermen's families were awaiting them. The cadets impressed everyone not only with their heroic attitude, but also with selflessness, as they refused to receive any money for their rescue operation. As a token of appreciation, the commanding officer of the port invited them for a glass of wine.⁴⁵

In the second half of the 1930s, Palestine was an object of everyday interest to almost every Jew (including those who were not Zionists), and tens of thousands of Jewish youth were looking for an opportunity to emigrate to it. The idea of conquering the sea was then one of the most important foci of political Zionism. The leaders of Beitar, Jabotinsky and Halperin, saw it as a priority to organise a propaganda cruise for cadets to Palestine on board the training ship, which they believed could be the first step towards creating the Jewish Maritime League. As more courses began to be offered, more and more of those who completed them sailed under foreign flags, as Palestine was still unable to provide them with a job. Only a few were employed on the SS "HarZion" and the SS "HarCarmel" owned by the Jewish shipping company "Lloyd Eretz Yisrael" in Haifa ("Palestine Maritime Lloyd Ltd.").⁴⁶ Jabotinsky reassured the graduates who were disappointed with this state of affairs, repeating that: "a man who wants to devote himself to the cause of conquering the sea must forget about Zionism and Palestine for

45 Nachum Ben Hajam, "Żydowsky rybacy morscy," *Trybuna Narodowa* 7, 18/02/1938, 3–4.

46 Drozd, "Idea «palestyńskiego morza»,» 25. These ships cruised visiting the ports in Haifa, Istanbul and Constance, and were mainly used for the carriage of goods, with the transport of passengers treated as a secondary task.

a while.⁴⁷ Kaplan wrote that the first trip the “Sara I” made to Palestine was more than just a training cruise. For Revisionists, it symbolised a return to the ancient origins of the Hebrew people, a Mediterranean society that had been developing for centuries as a maritime civilisation. The voyage was also proof of the Revisionists’ commitment to the heroic struggle for the nation’s past as a regional power, as well as an expression of Beitariests’ desire to bring Italians and Jews closer together to create a Mediterranean alliance and thereby to push the Atlantic powers away from Palestine and restore Latin domination there.⁴⁸ The cruise was preceded by thorough preparations. The organisers had to overcome major financial and technical difficulties, but the largest obstacle was the position of the Palestinian authorities, who did not want to allow the ship to enter their ports. This is why the flag was changed from Italian to French, but this also proved to be insufficient. The Palestinian authorities (the Assembly of Representatives) demanded a deposit of 60 pounds from each Jewish sailor, which was an unprecedented measure, not used in any port in the world. After long disputes, E. Kirschner, the co-donor of “Sara I,” lost his patience and paid the deposit the British demanded, for the entire crew. The largest sailing ship navigating in the Mediterranean Sea, with 51 people on board (including 37 or 44 officers and cadets), left the port of Genoa for Palestine on 18 August 1937. Most of the crew members came from Poland, but there were also Jews from Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and such exotic countries as South Africa, Egypt, Somalia and Libya. The crew members were speakers of as many as 17 mother tongues, but during the voyage they were only allowed to speak Hebrew.⁴⁹ The school under sails was commanded by Capt. Halperin and his deputy J. Dilion, who reappeared among the cadets after two years of absence. Since the flag was changed to the French one, the position of Captain was given to the Corsican Anton Bianki, who had 37 years of experience working at sea. The following crew members also had special positions on the ship: A. Blass (group leader since the time he had completed the first course), Aron Steinberger (first

47 Jecheskiel (Yehezkel) Dilion, “Myśl o zdobyciu morza realizuje się,” *Trybuna Narodowa* 19, 14/05/1937, 6. One of them was Yehuda Leon Stark, who completed the first or the second course in the school in Civitavecchia, and then returned to his hometown in the spring of 1937. Next, he moved to Gdynia (on 22 August 1938) and sailed the trawlers of the Pomeranian Fishing Society. During World War II, after release from the Polish Army in exile, he graduated from The King Edward VII Nautical School (1944), was transferred to the army reserves in London or Liverpool, and then in the period from 1 April 1944 to 31 May 1945, he sailed as second mate on the MS “Okseywie”. After World War II, he lived in Haifa, where he was promoted to the rank of Master Mariner of Israeli seafaring vessels (State Archives in Gdańsk, Gdynia Branch, *Kartoteka mieszkańców Gdyni 1926–1939*, APG OG 124/kartoteka). See also: Wadim Konstanty Taniewski-Elliott, *Spis personelu zatrudnionego na statkach Polskiej Marynarki Handlowej w latach 1939–1945* (Gdańsk: Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Centralnego Muzeum Morskiego), 308–309.

48 Kaplan, *The Jewish Radical Right*, 158.

49 O. Barzeli, “Wizyta na Sarze. List z Italii,” *Trybuna Narodowa* 34, 27/08/1937, 3–4. “Sara I w drodze do Palestyny,” *Trybuna Narodowa* 35, 03/09/1937, 8.

mechanic), Alexander Bloch (ship writer) and Dr. A. Hebbenstreit from Lviv, who performed the duties of the ship's doctor.⁵⁰

The first Palestinian port visited by the "Sara I," in September 1937, was Haifa. Later, the ship called at Tel Aviv, but due to the Arab revolt (the Great Arab Revolution) which had lasted since April 1936, and the ban on entry which the British had introduced trying to pursue a balanced policy in this explosive region, the crew was not allowed to come ashore.⁵¹ They had to return to Haifa and take the train from there to Tel Aviv. They were greeted during a welcoming ceremony in the local town hall by Mayor Israel Rokach, Chief Rabbi Moshe Avigdor Amiel, the historian and Zionist Prof. Josef Klausner and many other leading figures. The mayor voiced his deep regret that the ship had not received the permission to moor in the local small port and expressed his hope that it would be allowed to do so during Beitarists' next visit. It was on that occasion that Capt. Halperin received the Palestinian flag for the ship (this was only a symbolic gesture since the "Sara I" still had to fly French colours). In the following days, the sailors travelled to Tel Hai to pay tribute to the patron of their organisation, Josef Trumpeldor.⁵² Then, they returned to Haifa, from where, after the eventful journey, the vessel left for Thessaloniki. The American film company "Fox Movietone News," the producer of the popular newsreel, sent a cameraman there to film the ship's entry into the port and the Beitarists' visit. The filmmakers and the press were mostly interested in Y. Halperin, who was eager to give interviews, in which he declared, among others, that Greek Jews could play an important role in organising the Jewish merchant navy and fishery in the near future. In his opinion, it was a mistake to send to Palestine Jewish fishermen who had so far been learning their trade and sailing in the waters of northern Europe and knew nothing about the conditions in the Mediterranean Sea. He believed that it was only experiences from Italy and Greece that could have a decisive influence on the development of fishery in the future Jewish state. Halperin was touched by the warm welcome that he and the cadets received in Thessaloniki, and perhaps that is why he stayed in the city for as long as seven days. Plans for the ship's further voyage included a visit to Marseille, where registration formalities were to be completed, and to London, from which the "Sara I" was to set sail towards

50 Dilion, "Betarim zur See," 3.

51 When the "Sara I" had left for Palestine, the Revisionists proudly emphasised that it was the first Jewish ship in modern times and that its arrival in Tel-Aviv would be, on the one hand, a clear symbol of the revival of Jewish sailing traditions, and on the other, an impulse to open up immigration routes to Palestine, to which, parenthetically, the British reacted in a negative way.

52 "Das Schulschiff «Sara» in Palästina," *Die Neue Welt* 688, 14/09/1937, 7; "Das Schulschiff «Sara I» in Palästina," *Das Jüdische Volk* 12, 17/09/1937, 7. See also: "Das Schulschiff «Sara I» in Palästina," *Jüdisches Gemeindeblatt für den Verband der Kultusgemeinden in Bayern* 19, 01/10/1937, 340; *Chadness* 1 (1937): 11.

the ports of South America.⁵³ In January 1938, the ship reached Tunisia, where a series of armed clashes broke out between the cadets and local Arab groups.⁵⁴ After several days of riots, the sailing ship continued its journey. Unfortunately, a tragic accident happened on the coast of Corsican Bastia, as a result of which the ship sank during a sudden and strong storm and some of her crew drowned. Allegedly, the last man on board was Y. Halperin, who left the ship only when he decided that the chances of saving her were zero.⁵⁵

The catastrophe hampered the development of the Jewish Marine School in Civitavecchia. In February 1938, Jabotinsky stopped in Rome, on his way to South Africa, to hold a conference with Capt. Fusco, Dr. Roifer and Dr. Mendes on the resumption of instruction at the school.⁵⁶ It turned out that with the loss of the “Sara I,” the school’s three-year achievements had gone to waste, because although the ship was lifted from the sea bottom and towed to the port in Livorno, there were no funds for her renovation. Soon, resumption of the school’s activities turned out to be impossible for political reasons (as King Victor Emmanuel III signed Mussolini’s racial laws which discriminated against Jews).⁵⁷ In October 1939, Louis Brodsky became chairman of the Jewish Maritime League, one of the goals of which was to organise maritime education in Palestine. On this occasion, the weekly “The Sentinel” announced that the Jewish Marine School had been moved from Civitavecchia to Netanya in Palestine, which was probably partly related to the outbreak of World War II.⁵⁸ Halperin, who had arrived in the USA as the 3rd officer on a transatlantic ship shortly before Jabotinsky’s death, was no longer in charge of the school. Moshe Arens, a later Israeli politician and diplomat who had attended Halperin’s Beitar course for instructors, recalled that he was a colourful figure, albeit a strict judge, who put emphasis on firm drill, discipline, punctuality and accuracy. He taught infantry tactics, Morse code and semaphore signalling, and lectured on the history of Jews and Zionists. At Jabotinsky’s funeral (he died on 3 August 1940), he appeared in the uniform of a Palestinian navy captain,

53 “Sarah I w Salonikach,” *Nowy Dziennik* 318, 19/11/1937, 6. *Nasz Przegląd* 331, 21/11/1937, 10; Jacques Pilo, “Le navire-école Sarah I à Thessalonique,” *L’Aurore* 303, 25/11/1937, 4.

54 Kaplan, *The Jewish Radical Right*, 157.

55 “Nowaczyński o opanowywaniu morza przez Żydów,” *5ta Rano* 72, 13/03/1938, 6. The details of this disaster or its scale (the degree of damage to the sailing ship and the number of victims) are unknown. Information about this event was most likely deliberately omitted by the Jewish press, even that unrelated to the Revisionist Zionist movement, which was pointed out by Adolf Nowaczyński.

56 “Ze szkoły morskiej w Civitavecchia,” *Chad-ness* 7 (1938): 1.

57 Norbert Ochs, “Walka Bejtaru o Morze Żydowskie,” *Trybuna Narodowa* 36, 09/09/1938, 7; Colin Shindler, *The Hebrew Republic. Israel’s Return to History* (Lanham-Boulder-New Yor-London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 49.

58 *The Sentinel* 4, 26/10/1939, 12.

made according to his own design.⁵⁹ In 1948 he returned to Israel, and in 1951 he developed a plan to reorganise the local merchant and military navy.

The Jewish Marine School in Civitavecchia was not the only institution of this type set up by Beitar before the outbreak of World War II. In Riga, Jabotinsky's hometown, a more modest marine school was established in 1935 on the initiative of local Zionists.⁶⁰ It is unknown whether it had been inspired by the Italian Beitar school, but it had its own ship, which was used for naval training. The schooner "Theodor Herzl" had previously sailed under the Estonian flag as a merchant ship. She had been purchased for 15,000 Latvian lats, half of which was donated by the *Keren Tel Hai* fund, and the other half by Rudolf Kaplan and Jakob Hoff, wealthy Jewish merchants from Riga.⁶¹ The ship's crew consisted of apprentices and professional sailors – a total of 12–14 people coming from Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. Initially, a Latvian became the captain of the schooner, but in 1936 this function was taken over by Capt. Abraham Yitzhak Ross (a 1911 graduate of one of Western European marine schools), who was Jewish and had previously commanded ships that operated liner services from Liepaja to New York.⁶² In September 1937, the "Theodor Herzl" docked at Wismar, and on 28 October 1937, she visited Gdynia. Representatives of the entire local Jewish community participated in a special banquet in honour of the crew at the premises of the Jewish Club. The atmosphere was solemn and festive at the same time. Especially poignant was the moment when the crew members sang the so-called "Anthem of the Jewish seaman." During a stay in Gdynia, Capt. A. I. Ross and the helmsman Shul Rutror inspected the schooner "Elemka" owned by the Maritime and Colonial League.⁶³ Almost the entire crew (except for one of the steersmen, who was a Latvian), consisted of Jews who communicated with each other in Hebrew. The average age of the 12 seamen who came to Gdynia was 18 years. They were sons of both wealthy industrialists and small merchants and craftsmen.⁶⁴ In total, within a few years (until October 1937), 40 seamen were trained on board the "Theodor Herzl."⁶⁵

The Jewish Marine School in Civitavecchia operated in the years 1934–1938. It was established with the consent of Benito Mussolini on the initiative of Beitar, the Revisionist Zionist organisation led by Vladimir Jabotinsky. During three courses run

59 Moshe Arens, *In Defense of Israel. A Memoir of a Political Life* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2018), 17.

60 Shindler, *The Triumph*, 131.

61 "Ein jüdisches Schulschiff," *Israelitisches Familienblatt* 37, 14/09/1937, 11.

62 K. Landau, "Okręt szkolny Bejtaru lotewskiego," *Trybuna Narodowa* 24, 18/06/1937, 8.

63 Drozd, *Lost in the Whirlwind of War*, 197.

64 Teodor Hatalgi, "Teodor Herzl w Gdyni," *Trybuna Narodowa* 44, 12/11/1937, 7; "Łotewski Teodor Herzl i jakaś Sara," *Chad-ness* 1 (1937): 14–15.

65 Pilo, "Le navire-école Sarah I à Thessalonique," 4; "Marynarze słodkich wód," *Trybuna Narodowa* 8, 25/02/1938, 4.

under the supervision of Capt. Nicoli Fusco and the head of the Maritime Department of the World Beitar Headquarters, Capt. Yirmeyahu Halperin, Jewish youth from Europe, Palestine and Africa received maritime training. Despite suggestions from Beitar leaders that the students should not interfere with local politics, the Jewish cadets expressed public support for Mussolini's regime. They used fascist symbols in their behaviour and clothing. They viewed fascism, similarly to Zionism, as a return to the roots of the national culture and the historical past. Jewish Beitarist sailors did not conceal their admiration for fascists and for Mussolini. They were impressed by the Italian nationalist pride built in an atmosphere of heroism, militarism, and the will to regain dominance of the Mediterranean Basin. In January 1938, the "Sara I," Beitar's training ship, called at the port of Haifa and its crew then visited Tel Aviv, officially greeted by Mayor Israel Rokach. On the way back, off the coast of Corsica, the vessel sank, and this catastrophe largely contributed to the closure of the school just before the start of the fourth course. In the years 1934–1938, a total of nearly 150 students (trained as sailors, mechanics, and fishermen) graduated from the Italian school; at least half of them were Polish citizens. In addition to the school in Civitavecchia, Beitar also set up a smaller marine education centre in Riga, which trained local Revisionist Zionists on the training ship "Theodor Herzl." This vessel made cruises on the Baltic Sea, calling in port, among others, at Wismar and Gdynia. During these visits, the crew popularised the slogan of the Beitar naval unit: "The road to Palestinian land leads through the Jewish sea."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival sources

Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku Oddział w Gdyni (sygn. APG OG 650/S–3301).–
Komisariat Rządu w Gdyni, Kartoteka mieszkańców Gdyni 1926–1939 [State Archives in Gdańsk, Gdynia Branch (ref. no. APG OG 650/S–3301). *Government's Office in Gdynia. Files of Gdynia residents 1926–1939*]

Printed sources

Arens, Moshe. *In Defense of Israel. A Memoir of a Political Life*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2018. (DOI: 10.1080/23739770.2019.1598675).

Taniewski-Elliott, Wadim Konstanty. *Spis personelu zatrudnionego na statkach Polskiej Marynarki Handlowej w latach 1939–1945* [List of personnel employed on the ships of the Polish Merchant Navy], Gdańsk: Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Centralnego Muzeum Morskiego, 1981.

Newspapers and magazines

- 5 ta Rano* (1938)
Chad-ness (1937)
Chwila (1935–1936)
Das Jüdische Volk (1937)
Die Neue Welt (1935–1937)
Haneszer (1935)
Israel. Hebdomadaire Juif Indépendant (1935)
Israelitisches Familienblatt (1937)
Jewish Daily Bulletin (1935)
Judisk Krönika (1936)
Jüdische Wochenspost (1935)
Jüdisches Gemeindeblatt für den Verband der Kultusgemeinden in Bayern (1937)
Jüdisches Volksblatt (1935)
L'Aurore (1937)
Nasz Przegląd (1937)
Nowy Dziennik (1935)
The Sentinel (1935–1939)
Trybuna Narodowa (1935–1938)

References

- Bell, J. Bowyer. *Terror out of Zion: Irgun Zvai Leumi, LEHI, and the Palestine Underground 1929–1949*. New York: Avon Books, 1977. (DOI: 10.2307/2536327).
- Bettin, Cristina M. *Italian Jews from Emancipation to the Racial Laws*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010. (DOI:10.1080/13532944.2012.754980).
- Drozd, Jarosław. “Kursy portowe i rybackie dla Żydów w Gdyni w okresie Międzywojennym.” *Nautologia* 142 (2005): 37–41.
- Drozd, Jarosław. *Lost in the Whirlwind of War: The Jewish Community in Gdynia, Poland*. Gdynia: Oficyna Verbi Causa, 2008.
- Drozd Jarosław. “Gdynia to Neve-Yam: The Jewish fisherman’s courses within the Bays of Gdańsk and Puck in the interwar period.” *Studia Maritima* 26 (2013): 55–68.
- Drozd, Jarosław. “Idea palestyńskiego morza. Działalność Związku Zebulun w latach 30-tych XX wieku.” *Nautologia* 158 (2021): 24–32.
- Heller, Joseph. *The Stern Gang. Ideology, Politics and Terror, 1940–1949*. London-New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2004. (DOI: 10.4324/9780203043868).
- Kaplan, Eran. *The Jewish Radical Right: Revisionist Zionism and Its Ideological Legacy*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005.

Pizutti, Marco. *Biografia non autorizzata della Seconda Guerra Mondiale*. Milano: Mondadori, 2018.

Salerno, Eric. *Mossad base Italia. Le azioni intrighi, le verita nascoste*. Milano: Il Saggiatore S.P.A., 2010.

Shindler, Colin. *The Triumph of Military Zionism. Nationalism and the Origins of the Israeli Rights*. London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd., 2005. (DOI: 10.5040/9780755609383).

Shindler, Colin. *The Hebrew Republic. Israel's Return to History*. Lanham-Boulder-New York-London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.

Tamir, Dan. *Hebrew Fascism in Palestine 1922–1942*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. (DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-73679-2).

English version: Radosław Dolecki, Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

The Jewish Marine School was established in 1934, with the consent of Benito Mussolini, on the basis of the Italian Naval School for Officers in Civitavecchia. It was set up on the initiative of Beitar, a Revisionist Zionist movement led by Vladimir Jabotinsky. The three courses organised by the main lecturer, Capt. Nicola Fusco and the head of the Maritime Department of the World Beitar Headquarters, Capt. Yirmeyahu Halperin, were attended by 17 to 23-year-old cadets from Europe (mainly Poland, Czechoslovakia, Latvia and Germany) as well as Palestine and Africa (Egypt, Somalia and Rhodesia). Despite suggestions from Beitar leaders not to interfere with local fascist politics, the cadets expressed public support for Benito Mussolini's regime by marching alongside Italian soldiers and supporting the Italo-Abyssinian war as well as collecting scrap metal for the Italian arms industry. They saw Italian nationalism as a perfect contemporary example of a formerly great culture gradually regaining its role in the world through the affirmation of national power and pride. In January 1938, the training ship "Sara I," a four-master purchased with the funds obtained from "Keren Tel Hai" and a private donation of the Kirschners from Paris, entered the Haifa port, and its crew then visited Tel Aviv, officially greeted by Mayor Israel Rokach. On the way back, off the coast of Corsica, the vessel sank, and this catastrophe largely contributed to the closure of the school just before the start of the fourth course. In the years 1934–1938, the institution educated nearly 150 graduates (seamen, mechanics and fishermen). In addition to the school in Civitavecchia, Beitar also established a smaller educational facility in Riga, which offered courses to local Revisionist Zionists on the training vessel "Theodor Herzl." The ship made cruises on the Baltic Sea, touching in, among others, at the ports in Wismar and Gdynia.

Powstanie i działalność Żydowskiej Szkoły Morskiej w Civitavecchia (1934–1938) na łamach prasy syjonistów-rewizjonistów

Słowa kluczowe: Żydzi, Bejtaru, syjonizm, rewizjonizm, faszizm, szkolnictwo morskie

STRESZCZENIE

Żydowska Szkoła Morska powstała w 1934 r., za zgodą Benito Mussoliniego, na bazie włoskiej Oficerskiej Szkoły Marynarki Wojennej w Civitavecchia. Była inicjatywą Bejtaru, syjonistyczno-rewizjonistycznej organizacji, kierowanej przez Włodzimierza Żabotyńskiego. W III kursach, zorganizowanych przez głównego wykładowcę kpt. Nicolę Fusco i szefa Wydziału Morskiego Komendy Światowej Bejtaru, kpt. Jeremjahu Halperina, wzięli udział kadeci (w wieku 17–23 lat) pochodzący z Europy (głównie Polski, Czechosłowacji, Łotwy i Niemiec) oraz Palestyny oraz Afryki (Egiptu, Somalii i Rodezji). Mimo sugestii ze strony liderów Bejtaru, by nie mieszać się do lokalnej polityki faszystowskiej, kadeci wyrażali publiczne poparcie dla reżimu Benito Mussoliniego, maszerując u boku włoskich żołnierzy i wspierając wojnę włosko-abisyńską oraz zbierając złom metalowy dla włoskiego przemysłu zbrojeniowego. Włoski nacjonalizm był przez nich postrzegany jako doskonały, współczesny przykład wspaniałej dawniej kultury, która stopniowo odzyskiwała swoją rolę w świecie poprzez afirmację władzy i dumy narodowej. W styczniu 1938 r. statek szkolny „Sarah I-o,” czteromasztowy żaglowiec, zakupiony ze środków funduszy „Keren Tel Chaj” i prywatnej donacji małżeństwa Kirschnerów z Paryża, zawinął do portu w Hajfie a jego załoga odwiedziła następnie Tel Awiw, witana uroczystie przez burmistrza Ji’sraela Rokacha. W drodze powrotnej, u wybrzeży Korsyki, statek zatonął, przyczyniając się w sporej mierze do zamknięcia szkoły tuż przed rozpoczęciem IV kursu. W sumie w latach 1934–1938 placówkę ukończyło niespełna 150 absolwentów (marynarzy, mechaników i rybaków). Oprócz szkoły w Civitavecchia, Bejtaru zorganizował również mniejszą placówkę w Rydze, gdzie szkolili się miejscowi syjoniści-rewizjoniści, mając do dyspozycji statek szkolny „Theodor Herzl,” który pływał po Morzu Bałtyckim, odwiedzając m.in. porty w Wismarze i Gdyni.

Citation

Drozd, Jarosław. "Establishment and Activity of the Jewish Marine School for Officers in Civitavecchia (1934–1938) in the Pages of the Revisionist Zionist Press." *Studia Maritima* 35 (2022): 113–133. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2022.35-04.



Maciej Franz

Department of History
Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan
franz@amu.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0002-9075-605X

An Unknown Account of the September Engagements Fought by ORP “Wicher”

Keywords: Polish campaign of 1939, ORP “Wicher,” memoirs, Witold Hubert, destroyer

WAR!

The events of the 1939 Polish campaign still remain a living part of Polish history. Probably, it will never be possible for Poles to fully come to terms with this episode in the history of their state. In social awareness, but also in historical memory, it is a defeat more bitter than all others, a wound that never heals.

This may be due to the immense importance that the Polish people attached to the revival of Polish statehood in 1918 after over 120 years of partitions. The Second Polish Republic was a long-awaited and longed-for state. For the generation that had struggled for and secured the country’s independence, it was a good greater than any other. For the generation brought up in the Second Republic, it had become a symbol of power, something to be proud of. Of course, state propaganda played a huge role in building this image. Unfortunately, the reality behind this image, which came to light in September and October 1939, was dramatically painful. A state that had had colonial ambitions and had fancied itself a European power, was defeated in a little over a month, attacked by its three neighbours, and was left completely alone, without any real support from any of its allies. It is hard to imagine a more dramatic case of crushed dreams and ideas.

Historians have been trying to evaluate those events and this extremely painful turn of fate for the Polish state since the end of World War II. To assist their efforts, it is extremely important to introduce into historical discourse every preserved source of reminiscence even if it was created many years after the events and is burdened with the sin of knowledge and experience of the following years. Such accounts still

constitute a record of how much the notion of Polish power was incompatible with Poland's actual combat potential in the Polish campaign of 1939.

The Polish Navy, established pursuant to Józef Piłsudski's decree of November 1918, was built with a huge effort of the entire society since it was one of the types of armed forces which were particularly costly to create and maintain. In 1939, it was formally very impressive, given that it had been built in only 20 years, and especially when its potential was compared to that of the fleets of other Baltic states. It is true that it was inferior in tonnage to both the German and the Soviet fleet, as well as the Swedish and the Finnish fleets, but it was also much younger than any of them. Compared to the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian naval forces, however, it proved that a lot had been achieved during those 20 years. With its four modern destroyers, one minelayer, six minesweepers, five submarines and a dozen auxiliary ships, the Polish Navy was more than just a representation of Poland's flag.¹ This did not mean, however, that it did not have its weaknesses. Firstly, it had no safe wartime base for its vessels. Neither the military port in Gdynia-Oksywie nor the port in Hel could perform such a function. Despite the fact that both of these ports had been expanded at a large cost, still no security arrangements had been made for the country's fleet. The narrow coast and the lack of a strong air force condemned the Polish fleet to defeat, especially in the clash with the Kriegsmarine.² In addition, the fate of the fleet depended on the command, whose headquarters were located in Warsaw and not on the coast. One could even go so far as to say that the fleet was abandoned, in a slightly similar way to Land Coastal Defence, which had no chance of getting support from the forces of The Pomeranian Army (Armia "Pomorzanie").³ The outbreak of World War II was a dramatic moment for the Polish Navy. Some of the vessels would go to Great Britain, some would be interned in Sweden, some would eventually fall into German hands, and the rest would sink while defending their own coast. Such was the fate of the first Polish destroyer ORP "Wicher" (Republic of Poland's Ship "Gale").

-
- 1 I wrote about this in more detail in an article on the Polish Navy in the interwar period, Maciej Franz, "Polska Marynarka Wojenna w dwudziestolecu międzywojennym – próba oceny," in: *Morze nasze i nie nasze*, eds. Piotr Kurpiewski and Tadeusz Stegner (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2011), 291–304. An attempt at a full discussion can be found in the first part of Józef Wiesław Dyskant's unfinished monograph on the Polish Navy, see Józef Władysław Dyskant, *Polska Marynarka Wojenna w 1939 roku*, part 1. *W przededniu wojny* (Gdańsk: AJ-Press, 2000).
 - 2 The Command of the Navy asked the Command of the Air Force to establish an air force group in the area of the Polish coast, consisting of eight PZL P-11C fighter planes and six PZL P-23B Karaś bombers. Unfortunately, even this combat group was never formed due to the lack of equipment in Polish military aviation, Ryszard Kaczkowski, *Lotnictwo w działaniach na morzu* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo MON, 1986), 88.
 - 3 Vice Admiral Jerzy Świrski, the then head of the Naval Command was in Warsaw between 1 and 5 September, and then began the evacuation to the south, to finally get to Romania. In such conditions, he was unable to command the fleet, and yet he was formally responsible for it, Marcin Graczyk, *Admirał Świrski* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Finna, 2007), 188–189.

ORP "WICHER" AND ITS COMMANDER

ORP "Wicher" was the first Polish warship in the class of torpedo boat destroyers, which were later simply called destroyers. It was placed into service under the Polish white and red flag as an effect of political and economic decisions.⁴ The plans for the expansion of the Polish Navy, which had been drawn up during the term of office of Vice-Admiral Kazimierz Porębski, were never implemented. Rear Admiral Jerzy Świrski, who had taken over as head of the Polish Navy in 1925, following the so-called mine scandal,⁵ supported a much more modest vision of the development of the Polish fleet, a vision that better matched the country's economic potential.⁶ As a result of this and the political and military alliance formed with France in 1921, Poland placed orders for three submarines/submarine minelayers and two TBD's at French shipyards.⁷ The construction of the first two Polish destroyers was commissioned to the shipyard "Chantiers Navals Français" in Blainville. Their design was based on that of the "Bourrasque-Simoun" class ships built at that time by French shipyards.⁸ ORP "Wicher" began to be built on 19 February 1927. Despite difficulties, including delays caused by strikes that were consuming the French shipbuilding industry at that time, the ship was launched on 10 July 1928. The launch was not perfect as the hull of the ship got stuck in the middle of the slipway and she had to be pulled into the water by French tugs.⁹ The process of equipping the ship took as long as the process of building her. As a result, it was not until 10 July 1930 that the Polish war flag was raised on the

4 An important factor that influenced the choice of the French shipyards was that Poland obtained a loan from France in April 1925 to provide the Polish Army with more arms, Mariusz Borowiak, "ORP «Wicher». Pierwszy kontrtorpedowiec II RP," *Morze* 9 (2018): 31.

5 Maciej Franz, *Sprawa o honor. Przypadek wiceadmirała Kazimierza Porębskiego*, in press.

6 In 1924, the then Polish government formally approved the fleet expansion plan submitted by Vice Admiral Kazimierz Porębski, which included the purchase of 3 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, 12 submarines and 36 small coastal vessels. See: *Zarys historii i kronika dywizjonu niszczycieli Marynarki Wojennej PRL* [History outline and chronicle of the destroyer squadron of the Navy of the Polish People's Republic]. *Rozpoczęto 20.06.1963. Zakończono 13.04.1971 r. Arkuszy 195. Kategoria "A."* [Started on 20.06.1963. Ended on 13.04.1971 r. 195 Sheets. Category "A"], 7.

7 The three Polish submarines which were planned to be built as part of the order placed with the French shipyards, were the later ORP "Wilk," "Ryś" and "Żbik."

8 Jerzy Pertek, *Niszczyciele "Wicher" i "Burza"* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo MON, 1971), 4–5.

9 Already at the launch, the first voices (or "initial concerns were raised saying that...") were heard saying that the event was a bad omen for the ship. Considering that the twin ship "Burza" (the "Tempest") was launched without any problems, these opinions turned out to be somewhat true. The "Wicher" was already sunk on the 3rd day of the war, while the "Burza" survived wartime, returned to Poland and served in the Polish Navy until 1960, and was used for the next 17 years as a museum ship. Its scrapping in 1977 along with the scrapping of the submarine ORP "Sęp" were some of the most flawed decisions of the military authorities of the Polish People's Republic, as the two vessels were among Poland's most meritorious combat ships.

“Wicher”. Five days later, the ship entered the naval port in Gdynia for the first time. It was commanded at that time by Lieutenant Commander Tadeusz Podjazd-Morgestern.

ORP “Wicher” was at that time a modern warship, a classic representative of her type. She displaced 1,540 tons standard and 2,100 tons full load. Measuring 107x10.2x3.1 metres, she was armed with four 130 mm main artillery guns, two water-cooled 40 mm Vickers–Armstrong 2 automatic anti-aircraft guns (model 1928/1930), and two twin-mount 13.2mm heavy machine guns. The ship was additionally armed with torpedo tubes, depth-charge launchers and side throwers and could place up to 60 sea mines. Engines with a power of 33,000 HP allowed the ship to accelerate to a speed of 33 knots. All this made ORP “Wicher” a modern, well-armed destroyer. Together with the twin warship “Burza,” they added new combat value to the Polish Navy and raised its aspirations in the Baltic region.¹⁰

For nearly a decade, the ship was not only home to a crew of 155 sailors, but also an important element of the Polish state’s maritime policy. Her subsequent visits to ports of the Baltic states were to be a sign of Poland’s growing importance in the region, a testimony to its economic and military potential and political aspirations.¹¹ At the same time, during all these years, intense training was conducted for successive classes of marines, who gained their spurs on the “Wicher.” The “Wicher” was famous for providing good training, as evidenced by the fact that its artillerymen always placed first in the whole fleet in annual ratings. Some historians have pointed out that this factor was the reason why the authorities made the decision for the “Wicher” to stay in Poland in September 1939.

The imminent threat of war made it necessary to take decisions with regard to the destroyer squadron. The circles close to the Navy Command had had no doubt for several years now that no adequate defence could be provided for these ships in Polish ports. Despite substantial expansion, neither the war port in Gdynia¹² nor the military port of Hel could be used as a safe base for the destroyers. This was clearly pointed out by Second Lieutenant Commander Rafał Czczott in one of his speeches.¹³ In this situation, a decision was made to send three destroyers to Great Britain as part of the

10 Witold Supiński and Mieczysław Lechowski, *Torpedowce i niszczyciele* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1971), 49–50.

11 Such a role was certainly played by the visits to Stockholm in 1932, or Kiel in 1935.

12 State Archives of Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast (Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Ivano-Frankivskoy Oblasti), *Stanisławskij okryżnij komitet towaristwa “Liga morská i kolonialna,” m. Stanisław Stanisławskiego powitu Stanisławskiego wojewódstwa, Liga Morska i Kolonialna. Okręg Stanisławowski*, fond 414, description 1, case 4, page 31.

13 Rafał Czczott, “Działania marynarki wojennej,” in: Maciej Franz, Mariusz Kardas, *I wojna światowa na morzach w opiniach polskich teoretyków i praktyków* (Oświęcim: Wydawnictwo Napoleon V, 2018), 102.

Peking Plan.¹⁴ The ORP "Wicher" stayed in Poland to provide artillery cover for the minelayer "Gryf" and the minesweepers which were to set mine barriers to prevent access to the Polish coast and ports by the enemy.¹⁵ This decided the fate of the ship, which was to be sunk in an engagement with the future enemy, since no attempt whatsoever was made to provide at least partial cover for the fleet from the air.

The commander of the ship at that time, Lieutenant Commander Stefan de Walden, surely harboured no illusions about the possibility of carrying out the tasks set for him and his crew. He was too experienced an officer to believe that the "Wicher" would be able to make a real contribution to the defence of the Polish coast if it were to be attacked by the Third Reich. He was born on 27 December 1896 in Vilnius. He gained his naval experience in the Imperial Russian Navy, in which he served from 1917, after completing his training in the Marine Cadet Corps in St. Petersburg. Initially, he served on small minelaying vessels, to be recruited, at the end of the war, on the cruiser "Askold," where he took up the position of deputy commander. The events of the revolution of 1917 elevated him to the rank of ship commander. Thus, he came from the tsarist fleet, like many future officers of the Polish Navy.¹⁶

The disintegration of the existing political system spurred his decision to leave the service in the tsarist fleet and to come in 1918 to the nascent Poland. He joined the newly built navy and was assigned to the Naval Battalion in Modlin.¹⁷ Navy lieutenant Stefan de Walden took part in the Polish–Bolshevik war, fighting in the ranks of the Pinsk Flotilla against Bolshevik ships, as the commander of the armoured motor boat "MP-1" and then the ammunition tug "Leon."¹⁸ In the second half of 1920, he commanded the monitor "Mozyr," and then even became the commander of the Vistula Flotilla. The end of the Polish–Bolshevik war found him again on board the ships of

14 To this day the opinion persists that by sending these three vessels to Great Britain, Polish authorities wanted to protect Poland's most valuable surface ships from destruction, see Walter Pater, "Udział Marynarki Wojennej w wojnie obronnej Polski w 1939 roku," *Bandera* 9 (2019), 10: 13. This makes one wonder to what extent the ORP "Wicher" was less valuable than the other three Polish destroyers. I am much more inclined to agree with the opinion presented by Andrzej Drzewiecki and the views of the then Polish Navy officers he quotes, Andrzej Drzewiecki, *Polska Marynarka Wojenna od Drugiej do Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej. Studium bezpieczeństwa morskiego państwa* (Gdynia–Oświęcim: Wydawnictwo Napoleon V, 2016), 414–415.

15 Piotr Stawecki, ed., *Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej w latach 1864–1939* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo MON, 1990), 715.

16 Jerzy Będźmirowski, "Współpraca polsko-brytyjska a bezpieczeństwo morskie polski w okresie międzywojennym," *Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Marynarki Wojennej* 49 (2008), 3: 77.

17 Tadeusz Kondracki and Jan Tarczyński, "Polskie flotylle rzeczne w wojnie polsko-bolszewickiej (1919–1920)," *Biuletyn Informacyjny. Miesięcznik Światowego Związku Żołnierzy Armii Krajowej* 30 (2020), 8: 47.

18 Stefan de Walden, Krystyna de Walden-Gałuszko, Władysław Szarski, *ORP "Wicher" i jego dowódca* (Hel: Muzeum Obrony Wybrzeża/Stowarzyszenie Przyjaciół Helu, 2013), 22.

the river flotilla.¹⁹ In recognition of his merits and heroism, he was awarded the Polish military decorations of Silver Cross of the Military Order of Virtuti Militari²⁰ and the Cross of Valour. He received particular appreciation for his services in the defence of Płock during the Bolshevik offensive, during which the armoured ship “Minister”²¹ he commanded successfully engaged in artillery duels with Bolshevik artillery batteries.²² It was already then that his personal commitment and the ability to control his crew, which allowed him to achieve the goals set, were appreciated.

In his further military career he trained new generations of marines and worked in the Command of the Navy. In 1932 he was appointed Second Lieutenant Commander. On 1 April 1938 he was reappointed commander of the ORP “Wicher”²³ on which he was to serve until the outbreak of World War II. It was on this ship that he was promoted to Lieutenant Commander on 19 March 1939.

He was a good, experienced officer, and had no doubt that the war would be a huge challenge for him and his crew. His command in those three difficult days at the beginning of September did not raise any objections. He fulfilled his duty with the dignity of an officer. The ship entrusted to him completed her tasks well but succumbed to the power she could not resist – the German air force. During the Second World War, aerial forces turned out to be the greatest threat to warships of all the world’s navies.

On 1–3 September, Lieutenant Commander Stefan de Walden was one of the most important Polish naval officers. After the death of Lieutenant Commander Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, the commander of the ORP “Gryf” on 1 September 1939, he was next in line to become commander of the Polish Navy’s surface fleet. Apart from the night patrol of the “Wicher” on the night of 1 September 1939, however, there was no opportunity for de Walden to command the surface naval force. Both the destroyer he was in charge of and the “Gryf” were converted into floating artillery batteries based at the naval port in Hel.²⁴ He still managed to contribute to the success of the Polish side in an artillery clash with German destroyers on the morning of 3 September, although

19 Kondracki and Tarczyński, “Polskie flotylle rzeczne,” 47.

20 Dziennik Personalny of 26.01.1922, Vol. 3, no. 1, 10.

21 Grzegorz Gołębiowski, *Obrona Płocka przed wojskami bolszewickimi 18–19 sierpnia 1920 r.* (Płock: Towarzystwo Naukowe Płockie, 2015), 179.

22 Lech Trawicki, “Marynarze w wojnie 1920 roku,” *Po wachcie*, 2 (2010): 7.

23 He commanded this vessel for the first time from June 1934 to June the following year, Jan Kazimierz Sawicki, ed., *Kadry Morskie Rzeczypospolitej*, Vol. V, *Polska Marynarka Wojenna. Dokumentacja organizacyjna i kadrowa oficerów, podoficerów i marynarzy (1918–1947)* (Gdynia: Polskie Towarzystwo Nautologiczne, 2011), 301.

24 This was an effect of the decision made by Rear Admiral Józef Unrug, who believed that, given the enemy’s clear advantage, the ships would do more good as artillery support for the defence of the Fortified Region Hel than as part of a freely-operating fleet, Pater, “Udział Marynarki Wojennej,” 14. Years later, after the end of World War II, Rear Admiral Józef Unrug considered his decision wrong. Drzewiecki, *Polska Marynarka*, 454.

the decisive role in forcing the enemy ships to break off the engagement was played by 152.4 mm guns which were used as the Heliodor Laskowski headland battery entered into combat.²⁵ He could not save the "Wicher" from sinking in the German bomber raid on Hel on 3 September.

Deprived of his ships, he was appointed Head of Communications of the Fortified Region of Hel.²⁶ He remained in this position until the decision to capitulate was made. With the personal consent of Rear Admiral Józef Unrug, he attempted to escape from Hel. He took command of the fishing boat "HEL-117," nicknamed "Adela" and, together with a quickly recruited crew, set out to sea on 1 October 1939. Unfortunately, the vessel was spotted by two German patrol ships, the "Nautilus" and the "Pelikan," which were part of the naval blockade that the Germans had set up around the Hel Peninsula.²⁷ He was taken prisoner by the Germans.

In the summer of 1945, after release, he decided to return to the Polish Navy. He became the Chief of the Navy Division at the General Staff in Warsaw. This probably was the reason why in 1947 he led a military mission to Great Britain, which was to arrange the return of the Polish warships to the country. He returned to Gdynia on board the ORP "Błyskawica." In the same year, he was promoted to the rank of commander.

Still actively engaged in the matters of the Navy, Commander Stefan de Walden also took on the duties of the head of the Historical Department of the Main Staff of the Navy in 1947–1949.²⁸ Unfortunately, shortly afterwards he was transferred to the reserve. He was never to return to service in the Navy. Until his death on 17 January 1976, he actively participated in the life of marine circles in a variety of ways. He particularly appreciated his visits to the new "Wicher" and the opportunity to pay tribute to the vessel he used to command. The wreck of the first "Wicher" had been lifted by the Germans from the bottom of the port of Hel. Despite plans to renovate her and incorporate her into the Kriegsmarine, she was eventually towed beyond the breakwater and laid aground in the harbour roadstead. After the war, nobody was interested in retrieving the wreck from the sea. Towed further into the Bay of Puck, it became a training target for naval aviation. Finally, partially dismantled, the wreck disappeared under the surface of the bay's waters where it remains to this day.²⁹

25 Commander Stefan de Walden, in his memoirs, presented this dramatic moment of the September campaign, emphasising that it ended with the success of the Polish side, Stefan de Walden, "Walka artyleryjska z niszczycielami niemieckimi w dniu 3.09.1939 r.," *Przełęcz Morski*, 7 (1974), 8: 115–123.

26 S. de Walden, et.al., *ORP "Wicher"*, 23.

27 Piotr Sykut, "Próba przedzierania się drogą morską przez niemiecką blokadę polskiego wybrzeża 1 IX – 2 X 1939," *Saeculum Christianum*, 23 (2016): 287–289.

28 Jerzy Przybylski, "Działalność publicystyczna, promocyjna i edukacyjna w zakresie polskiej Marynarki Wojennej oraz polityki morskiej państwa," *Studia Gdańskie. Wizje i rzeczywistość*, 15 (2018): 172.

29 I had this special honour of going to sea on the hydrographic vessel of the Polish Navy, the ORP "Heweliusz" and laying a wreath at the eternal resting place of the ORP "Wicher" in 2011.

As it was written in one of the documents:

Only the “Wicher,” after a desperate fight against the overwhelming power of the Nazi air force, having repelled numerous attacks by the enemy’s planes, die[d] on 3 September 1939, remaining faithful to the white and red flag.³⁰

This is also why every preserved account from those days is so precious.

WITOLD HUBERT

In the interwar period, the Polish Navy trained hundreds of ratings and officers, thus building its personnel and expanding its combat potential. For many of these sailors, the Polish campaign of 1939 was to be the most important event in their military career.

One of them was the author of memoirs from the three September days of combat on the destroyer ORP “Wicher,” the then mate, acting as a non-commissioned signal officer, and ultimately a navy captain, Witold Hubert. He was born on 7 October 1916 in Lviv, still under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but already in the atmosphere of the ongoing world war and the dreams of Poland’s independence, which were becoming more and more of a reality. He came from a working-class family. His father, Jan Hubert was a steelworker, and his mother, Eleonora née Kostecka, took care of the house and family with a prudence characteristic of Polish women from the Eastern Borderlands. Having completed his schooling, at the age of only 17, he decided to run away from home and join the Polish Navy.³¹ After just two years, he began his military service.³² He served on several Polish ships, including the destroyer ORP “Błyskawica.”

News of the growing threat of the outbreak of a new world war found him on board one of only four of the Polish destroyers that had been kept in the country to defend the coast. Accordingly, on the morning of 1 September 1939, he was in the port of Gdynia and not in the waters of the North Sea. The three dramatic days of fighting on the ORP “Wicher,” on the one hand, were a source of pride, as the crew successfully repulsed the enemy’s attack in the first air-sea battle of World War II, i.e. the clash with German planes in the Gulf of Gdańsk and the artillery duel with German destroyers on the morning of 3 September. At that time, Hubert’s ship was in the port of Hel and served

30 Stawecki, *Zarys historii*, 17.

31 On the role of the activities of the Maritime and Colonial League and its predecessors in creating maritime propaganda and instilling in a generation of young Poles a love of the sea and the desire to serve in the Polish Navy, see my article, Maciej Franz, “Tylko propaganda czy także «szkolnictwo podstawowe»». *Liga Morska i Kolonialna a aspekt szkolenia przyszłych kadr dla Polskiej Marynarki Wojennej*,” *Biuletyn Historyczny MMW*, in press.

32 Leszek Walkiewicz, *Patron darłowskiego portu*, accessed 26.01.2022, <http://www.infodarlowo.pl/echo,artykul1512.html>.

merely as a floating artillery battery. The advantage of the enemy, especially in the air, was so great that the risk of losing the ship in open waters was almost certain, and so she was held in port to avoid the loss of many lives. However, it was in the port of Hel, that the "Wicher" was sunk, hit by air bombs on 3 September 1939. Leading seaman Witold Hubert was one of the last sailors to leave the ship.

On 4 September, he was included in the crew of the Fortified Region Hel and put in charge of the anti-landing defence squad in the sector commanded by Second Lieutenant of the Navy Julian Czerwiński and, in mid-September, he came under the command of Lieutenant Commander Jan Wiśniewski as he and his squad were moved to the first line of defence in the area of Chałupy to relieve the marines from the Navy Aircraft Squadron of Puck, who had been defending this part of the front line until then.³³ He stayed there till 2 October, the day of the capitulation of Polish troops. Just like the vast majority of Polish soldiers and sailors,³⁴ he was taken prisoner by the Germans.



Photo 1. Witold Hubert as a sailor of ORP "Błyskawica" before 1939

Source: Leszek Walkiewicz, "Patroni Darłowskich ulic, rond i mostów," *70 Lat Polskiego Darłowa*, maj 2015, no. 3, accessed 11 November 2022, <https://archiwum.darlowo.pl/gazeta/201505.pdf>.

After the war ended, he returned to Pomerania. This time, however, fate did not lead him to Gdynia, but to Czołpin, where he got a job from the Maritime Office in Szczecin as a lighthouse keeper. At the same time, he was sent off to a course for naval pilots, and his working class background allowed him to find his place more easily in the new "people's" homeland. In 1949, after completing the course, he was transferred to the Harbour Master's Office in Ustka, on the middle coast, with the rank of

³³ Piotr Derdej, *Westerplatte – Okrywie – Hel 1939* (Warszawa: Bellona, 2009), 179.

³⁴ Small parties attempted to escape on a few small vessels, hoping to penetrate the German naval blockade around the Hel Peninsula and escape into neutral Sweden, Sykut, "Próba przedzierania," 276–293.

a lieutenant mariner. However, he could not dream of returning to the Polish Navy. His reliability at work was appreciated by his superiors. In 1955, based on the decision of the Maritime Office in Słupsk, he was appointed the captain of the port in Darłowo. It was this port and town that he devoted the rest of his life to. For nearly 20 years, he worked for the development of the port. He sent numerous letters and project proposals to authorities, dreaming of its modernisation and increasing its handling capacity. Unfortunately, most of his plans were not implemented, and Darłowo remained a fishing port and a charming town on the Polish coast, visited in the summer months by thousands of tourists who wanted to spend their holidays on beautiful Polish beaches.

Even after he had retired, in crisis situations, he still participated in piloting ships into the ports of Darłowo and Ustka. He was highly respected by many captains, including the great Polish traveller Krzysztof Baranowski, who always gladly visited him in his port, or Leonid Teliga. In his free time, he wrote poems, always thinking with affection of his beloved sea.³⁵ He died on 15 March 1999 and was buried in the cemetery in Darłowo. In 2002, at the request of his former long-time subordinate and associate, Jerzy Druchal, supported by Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Ziemi Darłowskiej (the Society of Friends of the Darłowo Land), the City Council in Darłowo named the extendable bridge in Darłówko after Captain Witold Hubert.³⁶

Though born in the faraway city of Lviv, he dedicated his life to the Baltic Sea and the Polish coast, becoming a permanent part of its history.

THE MEMOIRS

When conducting research, historians base their findings on evidence from historical sources. In their work, they use the widest possible range of such sources. Memoirs, similarly to accounts, are a highly subjective category of historical sources that require careful scrutiny. However, when no other data are available, they play a very important role, allowing one to look at past events from the perspective of an individual. A look at the past, not through formal documents, but through the memory of an individual person, gives history a more individual, human-related context. For this reason, it is worth introducing memoirs into historiographic circulation, also those relating to the history of the Second World War, including the Polish campaign of 1939.

The memoirs presented in this article were written down as late as 1970. As a consequence, they lack accuracy when it comes to the timing of the events they are describing

35 Some of them were published in the collection of poems, Leszek Walkiewicz, ed., *Utwory poetyckie o Darłowie i wiersze darłowskich poetów* (Darłowo: Sagittarius Wydawnictwo, 2014).

36 Leszek Walkiewicz, „Patroni Darłowskich ulic, rond i mostów,” *70 Lat Polskiego Darłowa*, maj 2015, No. 3, accessed 11 November 2022, <https://archiwum.darlowo.pl/gazeta/201505.pdf>.

and adequate detail that could be expected of an account written shortly after the end of the war. We owe the memoirs to the efforts of the employees of the Naval Museum in Gdynia, who, most likely in 1969, asked the then captain of the navy, Witold Hubert, to write down his memories of the Polish campaign of 1939. As a result, two documents were created. The first one contains Captain Hubert's recollections of his service as a mate and a non-commissioned signal officer on the destroyer ORP "Wicher" on 1–3 September.³⁷ This record has never been published before and so is unknown to Polish historiography. The second document, parts of which are already known and used, includes Hubert's memories of the period from 4 September to 2 October 1939, when he participated in the defence of the Fortified Region of Hel.³⁸

The memoirs were typed, and then the author made corrections on the typescript with a pen, certifying them with his signature.

The time the memoirs were written was so distant from the actual events that it is impossible to clearly separate the author's opinions presented by him in the text of the memoirs from those that he added while working in the Polish People's Republic, especially the critical views of the preparation of the Polish state for the outbreak of the war, or the opinions presented by members of the crew of the ORP "Wicher." This raises some doubts, because they were, after all, propaganda clichés, quite intensively used in the historical policy of the "people's" Homeland. Of course, it is difficult to say for sure that Witold Hubert had not had a critical view of the authorities before September 1939, but there is no evidence for it. He came from a working-class family. He escaped from his family home in Lviv and volunteered to join the Polish Navy. If he had lost his illusions about Poland's power at sea in such a short time, this would mean that the educational and patriotic activity of the Polish Navy at that time was of a really low quality. This, in turn, strongly contradicts popular assessments of the activities carried out by the naval authorities of the Second Polish Republic.

It is worth adding that these doubts relate in particular to the critical evaluation of the actions taken by the command of the Navy, and not the general criticism of the preparations of the Second Polish Republic for the war in 1939. It cannot be unequivocally stated from the current time perspective to what extent the reflections expressed in the memoirs were Witold Hubert's views from 1939 or 1969. The thirty years separating the events from the time when they were written down may have mattered in this case.

As a result, some of Hubert's opinions, especially his political assessments, should be considered with caution. What is undoubtedly valuable about his account is the

37 The Naval Museum in Gdynia – Archival Fonds, ref. no. 231R, *Witold Hubert, Wspomnienia z ORP "Wicher" z dni września 1939 r.* [Memoirs from the ORP "Wicher" from September 1939].

38 The Naval Museum in Gdynia – Archival Fonds, ref. no. 300R, *Witold Hubert, Obrona Helu 3.09.1939 – 2.10.1939 r.* [The defence of Hel /3.09.1939–2.10.1939].

attempt he made at showing the atmosphere on board the ORP “Wicher” in the first days of the war. Of course, it still needs to be remembered that the author wrote down his recollections more than 30 years after the events. This is an important perspective, because the influence of post-war naval literature, especially Jerzy Pertek’s books, is manifest in the descriptions of the events of the night patrol of 1–2 September or the morning duel with German destroyers on 3 September.

Of course, one cannot say for sure what opinions prevailed on board the Polish destroyer, which, being placed in a covering position to shield the operation in which the “Gryf” and the minesweepers were to lay a mine barrage, spotted the silhouette of an unknown, probably German combat vessel. In his memoirs, Hubert mentions a cruiser, but the ship could not have been one since there were no German cruisers in these waters at that time. The ship that was spotted from the “Wicher” was most likely the German Z-2 destroyer “Georg Thiele” or possibly the Z-4 destroyer “Richard Beitzen.”³⁹ Both of these identifications, however, are quite uncertain. It was difficult to clearly identify the vessel in the dark of the night. There is no doubt that the “Wicher” came into contact with an unrecognised enemy ship, but the vessel was misidentified. Similarly far from the truth is Hubert’s assessment of the ship’s commander’s decision not to open fire at the enemy ship. The author of the memoirs presents a logically rather odd interpretation, while the reason was prosaic. Lieutenant Commander Stefan de Walden was convinced that the mine operation was underway as no one informed him that it had never been started.⁴⁰ Not wanting to reveal Polish operations, in compliance with his orders, he neither opened artillery fire nor launched a torpedo salvo. Following the orders he had received, he decided that keeping the mine operation secret was a priority. Of course, a non-commissioned signal officer did not have to know this and so his deliberations could have been as distant from the truth as those presented in the memoirs.

Similar doubts are raised by the description of the encounter with German destroyers on the morning of 3 September since it is certain that no German vessel of this class was sunk in the Baltic Sea in 1939.⁴¹ It is possible that one of the two German destroyers was damaged in the course of this duel. However, this matter remains uncertain to this day. The fact that the enemy laid a smoke screen and broke off combat was the effect of the headland battery entering the fight, and not a success of the Polish ships berthed in the port of Hel. Witold Hubert, in his memoirs, presents a version which may have been common among the sailors on board the “Wicher,” but it may equally likely have become part of his picture of the events as an effect of reading the marine books by

39 Borowiak, “ORP «Wicher»,” 41.

40 Mariusz Borowiak, “Trzy dni wojny ORP Gryf,” *Historia. Wojsko i Technika*, 5 (2019): 83.

41 Polish historians articulated this finding with conviction only in the second half of the 1980’s, Edmund Kosiarz, *Działania floty w drugiej wojnie światowej* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1989), 92.

Jerzy Pertek.⁴² They were not only suggestive, but also the first editions clearly pointed to the victory of the Polish side, which was due to the sinking of one German destroyer and the damaging of another. These "findings" of the Polish marine writer were verified many years later.⁴³ Witold Hubert does not mention in his memoirs that the German side was astonished by the presence of the Polish ships at the Hel base, meanwhile the truth is that the headland battery engaged in the battle came as a surprise to the enemy. The Germans hoped that the intense bombing of the previous day had excluded it from the combat. Seeing that this was not the case, on 3 September they mounted heavy raids on both the hypothetical positions of the headland battery as well as the military port of Hel, in which the "Gryf" and the "Wicher" were sunk.⁴⁴

The reminiscences from his service on the ORP "Wicher" end with a description of the ship sinking in the German air raid. Part of the information contained therein is not found in other reports or historical studies. Therefore, it can be concluded that in this respect the account makes a valuable supplement to the existing knowledge. The commander of the ship wrote down his reminiscences, which initially appeared as a short report in the magazine "Przegląd Morski,"⁴⁵ and were then published in a larger volume, already quoted here. The perspective of the ship's commander is different from that of a sailor, but they both complement historians' knowledge of the events of 1–3 September 1939.

Witold Hubert was only a non-commissioned officer; though he held an important deck position, close to the ship's command centre, he was still too low in the ship hierarchy to be aware of all the nuances of the decisions made by those in charge.⁴⁶ The state of knowledge about the events in the military port of Hel taking place between 1 and 3 September was incomplete also among the officers in the highest ranks of the Polish Navy, who formally should have complete knowledge of what was happening

42 The description of the artillery duel on the morning of 3 September 1939 changed in the successive editions of Jerzy Pertek's book. The certainty that a German destroyer was sunk slowly eroded. In the 7th edition published in 1972, the author adopts the stance that both German ships were damaged, Jerzy Pertek, *Wielkie dni malej floty*, 7th ed. (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1972), 79–81. Jerzy Pertek based his initial description of the events on the conceptions adopted during the war by the Polish side, W.A.K.L., "Morski czyn Polski," *Poland on the Seas*, 5 (1945), 1: 2.

43 The commander of the ship, Lieutenant Commander Stefan de Walden, questioned about this artillery duel by the German commission, supposedly also insisted that one German destroyer was sunk and the other was damaged, de Walden, et. al., *ORP "Wicher"*, 76.

44 It is difficult to agree with the idea that it was only during the artillery fight on the morning of 3 September that the German side learned the position of the Polish warships, Tadeusz Górski, *Polska flota wojenna 1939–1945 na tle flot europejskich* (Gdańsk: Civitas Christiana, 2001), 62.

45 Stefan de Walden, "Ostatnie dni «Wichra» 30 VIII – 3 IX 1939 r.," *Przegląd Morski*, 5 (1948): 19–33; idem, "Walka artyleryjska," 115–123.

46 A motif that runs through various stories about Witold Hubert is that he was the last sailor to disembark the ORP "Wicher". Without questioning these opinions, it should be stated that the entire crew was successfully evacuated, except for the Signalmann Able Seaman Edward Kwiatkowski, Edmund Kosiarz, *Wojna na Bałtyku 1939* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1988), 212.

in their area of responsibility. Meanwhile, Vice Admiral Jerzy Świrski received highly distorted information, as evidenced by the records contained in the report of 7 October 1939.⁴⁷

The reminiscences discussed here are part of the memoir trend associated with the 1939 campaign. They provide valuable historical material as each such recollection expands our knowledge about the emotions and the events of the past. Documents alone say too little, because they do not show human emotions. Only when backed up by personal reminiscences and accounts do they bring us closer to what those days really looked like.

EDITING SOURCE DOCUMENTS

Principles

THE NAVAL MUSEUM IN GDYNIA, ARCHIVAL FONDS

REF. NO. 231R

Witold Hubert, *Wspomnienia z ORP "Wicher" z pierwszych dni września 1939 r.*

[Memoirs from the ORP "Wicher" from early September 1939]

31.08.1939

I act as a signalling non-commissioned officer on the ORP "Wicher," which is anchored, along with other war vessels, at the roadstead of the Gdynia-Oksywie naval port. War is "in the air." The crew's mood is heavy but not depressing. There are quite large differences of opinion. Some believe that we are "all locked and loaded" and that "we will not give up a single button," there are those who believe that should war break out "they will be in Berlin in two weeks" because [Adolf] Hitler "has tanks made of butter." Others, among whom I count myself, see the seriousness of the situation, but still delude ourselves that it will all end up with threats. Knowing [Adolf] Hitler's war machine, strengthened by the bloodless conquests of Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Rhineland and part of Lithuania, we still believe in our own strength backed by the English-French alliance. But why do I have reservations about the departure of the remaining ships of the destroyer squadron, which left for England a few days ago?! I remember us moving in a line-ahead formation, the ORP "Grom," "Błyskawica," "Burza" and "Wicher." I see their silhouettes in the last rays of the setting sun, and then a radio and optical signal from the Hel o[bservation] p[ost]; The ORP "Wicher" remains at the disposal of the fleet command. Signed by Fant 8 /Time 22.00 Acting Chief of Staff/. And a farewell signal from the Commander of the squadron: "God bless for the glory of the homeland" – farewell flag signals from the "Grom," "Błyskawica" and "Burza" and our return to the port in Gdynia. Did they not believe in victory at that time and

47 Tadeusz Kondracki, "Polska Marynarka Wojenna w początkowym okresie II wojny światowej – meldunek kontradmirała Świrskiego z 7.X.1939 r.," *Zeszyt Naukowy Muzeum Wojska* 7 (1993): 150.

did they not want to doom the three best warships the same way they sentenced us, the "Gryf" and the other vessels?!

Time 22.00; Navy o[bservation] p[ost] Gdynia-Oksywie Fleet Command transmits a light signal to all units: "On 1 September 1939 at 05.00, 3 planes will be passing from WEST to EAST. Hold fire. Signed by Fant 8. I ordered to report the signal immediately to the officer on duty Lieutenant [Zbigniew] Kowalski, who, confirming the receipt of the signal, commanded the signalman who had passed the signal to increase vigilance. No wind, a calm night, Good visibility."

1.09.1939

Time 05.00 a.m. – a growing noise of aircraft engines can be heard from the west; they are getting closer, the watchkeepers are at their stations prepared for battle. At one point we see 3 planes / as in the signal / coming from WEST towards us at an altitude of 300 to 500 m[etres]. They are already above us. And only then do we notice the sinister black crosses on the wings. Battle stations! Artillery pieces from the "Wicher," "Gryf" and the trawlers in action. To no avail. The planes passed over us, turned over Gdynia, and flew over Oksywie. They disappeared on the west side. All hands are on board, the engines are running. Comments: where did this signal about planes come from and why" hold fire?! Is it a provocation – after all, the war has not started yet?!

Time 09.00 a.m. – on the west side, from the Puck Bay comes a rising secondary noise of working airplane engines. The ships in the roadstead have raised anchor – waiting. They pass in waves – several dozen aircraft, presumably "Junkers," pass from the starboard and port side, approaching the Oksywie naval port. Whistling noise and bomb blasts, columns of smoke in Oksywie. The anti-aircraft artillery from the ships and from land repels the attack. An unexpected and treacherous attack. Bombs are raining down on the port, on the positions of the submarines, which were led out of the port by the squadron commander between 5.00–9.00 a.m., on torpedo boats, the diving base, on all objects that have been selected as a target presumably by the Nazi command after they inspected the photos taken by the first three, reconnaissance aircraft. End of bombing, enemy planes have disappeared on the horizon. The engines of the "Wicher" are running "slow ahead," we are in the bay.

Time 11.00 a.m. – a trawler pulls in to a side of the "Wicher." The commander of the trawler passes to the commander of the ORP "Wicher" Second Lieutenant Commander [Stefan] de Walden, a large sealed envelope, presumably containing orders.

Time 12.00 [noon] – The envelope has been handed over, first messages have been handed over – the ORP "Nurek" sunk, the ORP "Mazur" sunk, heavy casualties. During the bombing of the port, no bomb was dropped on the ships in the roadstead. Again people are commenting. The trawler is still at the side of the "Wicher," when an ominous noise of incoming machines is heard from the direction of the Puck Bay

again. The trawler takes off, engines “half ahead,” course – the Hel headland. On the left side, the “Gryf” is sailing about 300 m[eters] from us – farther away are some scattered trawlers. Aircraft. I’ve counted up to 40. They were flying in squadrons dipping above us. A hellish chuckle of bombs falling on us and the “Gryf” and again on the “Gryf” and on us. All anti-air artillery pieces of all ships in action. The enemy is using on-board arms, especially against the defenceless trawlers, which, with their insignificant anti-aircraft weapons only make Nazi pilots more insolent. The commanding officer of the ship Commander [Stefan] de Walden is cool, composed and resolute. Short commands to the helm: “Bring her to starboard!”, “Bring her to port!”, and so over and over again. The ship is zigzagging, bombs – fountains and water columns are bursting from starboard and port side, and again I hear the commander’s voice “Bring her to starboard”, “Bring her to portside,” we are going “full ahead” in a zigzag. Bombs on the starboard side, bombs on the port side, in front of the bow and behind the stern. Those falling farther away and those almost rubbing against the sides. Explosions, columns of dirty water flooding sailors at their combat stations on board. Thousands, tens of thousands of dead, stunned fish. I can see their white bellies next to the ship’s sides, we are breaking through a mass of dead fish. And in the distance I can see the “Gryf.” It sails heavily with several hundred mines on board; the slow speed and the wide hull do not allow her to make quick turns. Bomb after bomb falls behind the stern of the “Gryf.” I can see scattered trawlers, they ineffectively try to “snap back” at the bombing planes, which are at the same time decimating the trawlers’ crews with machine gun fire. End of attack. The enemy planes are gone. We count the enemy’s losses and our own losses. I do not know the enemy’s losses; as for our own losses: a dozen or so sailors from the “Gryf” killed, a dozen wounded. Commander of the “Gryf” killed. A dozen or so seamen from the trawler “Mewa” killed and wounded, and there are losses on other ships, too. We were lucky. The speed and good manoeuvrability of the ship, and the commander’s decision to zigzag saved us from losses – one man slightly wounded with a ricochet shrapnel, and black, muddy uniforms. These are the only effects of the bombing of the “Wicher.” We receive additional sad news, the Commander of the Naval Aviation Squadron in Puck – killed. Casualties. War.

A criminal attack on a defenceless nation. Combat alert called off – combat watch in positions. The ship is moving very slowly forward, we are in the bay. In the distance, our other military units, each on its own course. On the horizon, the last merchant ship flying Greek or Swedish colours, which left the port of Gdynia already during the bombing. From the direction of Gdańsk you can hear distant detonations of exploding bombs and you can see smoke. It is Westerplatte fighting. Twilight is coming. The ship is located on the route Hel – Gdańsk. I am in the forward room with almost all of the free watch deck crew. The mood is unhappy. Despondency and rage and

regret. A certain period of life that was interrupted by the war will end. From the radio speaker we hear continuous: Attention, attention incoming. Attention, attention arrived. I start:

We won't forsake the land we came from
 We won't let our speech be buried.
 We are the Polish nation, the Polish people
 From the royal line of Piast.
 The crew carries on the words of the song.
 With the words:

No German will spit in our face
 I hear the voice of the ship's boatswain:
 You're right son – but the motherfucker is spitting!

I go out on deck. Night. The ship glides slowly on the water. Change of the combat watch. I take up my post on the navigation bridge. Nearby, there is the commander, deputy commander captain [Radosław] Nowakowski, commander of underwater weapons, Lt. [Tadeusz] Okoński and the artillery commander, Lt. [Zbigniew] Kowalski, steersman, signalmen / mate Jędrzejewski Edward, able seaman Tomaszuk Leopold /.

1.09.1939 – Time 23.00

Peaceful and quiet night. I am in position, we are still in the bay area. We sail slowly forward, from the stern the rising or setting moon is visible, illuminating the silver surface of the water behind us. Combat blackout – on the horizon of the waterways – nothing. From a distance you can only see the glow over Westerplatte, which is still fighting, and you can hear the murmurs of distant, sinister squadrons attacking the Polish shore. At one point, the signalman's muted report: course 170o, silhouette of a warship! Report handed over to the commander – everyone on the wings of the bridge. Yes, you can clearly see beyond the stern of our ship a few miles from us, the silhouette of a sailing German cruiser as it passed the aft from WEST to EAST. She is visible in the moonlight – we are floating in the shadow, invisible. Crew's tension, commander's voice: rangefinder – distance? Rangefinding mate Kukiełka tracks her with a rangefinder from the battle bridge. We all hear "distance 11,000 m[etres], distance 10,500 m[etres] (...), distance 9,000 m[etres] Torpedoes in launchers, commander of submarine weapons on the bridge. Do we torpedo her? The crew is waiting. The crew wants revenge. For the sunken ships, for the brothers in arms killed, for the treacherous attack, for Poland. The crew is waiting. In the dark, we hear a voice: I don't know whose voice, laconically stating" WE HAVE NO ORDER TO START WAR! Absolute silence, you can see beyond the stern the shadow of the cruiser, and our torpedoes in their launchers. And she glides calmly, sailing towards Gdańsk. Rangefinder's voice: distance 10,000 m[etres] (...), distance 11,000 m[etres]. The cruiser moves away (...)

“We have no order to start war” – despite the “Mazur” and “Nurek” having been sunk by the Nazi “Luftwaffe.” Bombing of Puck, Westerplatte, the entire coast, all of Poland. It is incomprehensible to me – tragic. I hear the voice again, this time from the commander: “Probably the “Gryf” has laid mines on the cruiser’s course.” We are going on our own course, at some point I see a calling light signal, transmitted by a blinker signal lamp: X-3, X-3, X-3. It’s us. I report with a blinker, I get the identification signal of the “Gryf.” Commander’s order – transmit the signal “Did you lay any mines?” Immediate response “Dropped mines but unarmed.” The chance was lost, the enemy cruiser sailed away unharmed, not hit by our torpedoes and not torn by mines that “were dropped unarmed.” There were no comments, just stinging bitterness rising to the throat.

2.09.1939 – morning

We enter the naval port of Hel. Torpedoes disembarked. In the naval port, on the other side of the basin, ORP “Gryf” has moored; behind the stern of the “Wicher” – ORP “Mewa.” A sunny, warm, cloudless day. Breather. The day passes calmly, interrupted by several attacks by diving “Junkers.” Bombs have missed. From the radio loudspeaker constantly: attention, attention incoming, attention, attention passed and news: our troops are fighting with the overwhelming force of the enemy, retreating. England’s ultimatum to [Adolf] Hitler for the suspension of hostilities in Poland (...) And where is the alliance with England and France? We bleed, and where is their aerial power? Where’s the help, where’s the second front on the French side? Doubt sneaks into our hearts, but we are ready to make a sacrifice of our lives, because the Love of the Homeland is not an empty phrase in each of us, it has probably been “sucked with mother’s milk.” This is what each of us, from the Commander to the mess specialist, feels. Evening and night come. Throughout the night, at 15-minute intervals, our ships are bombed by single enemy planes diving. Anti-aircraft artillery of the “Wicher” and the “Gryf” and batteries located in Hel successfully fight the attacking aircraft. I see one of the burning enemy machines, which, hit in the air and burning, fell onto land or into the sea, on the other side of the Hel peninsula. A restless night, the entire crew in their positions.

3. 09.1939 – Time 9.00

On the horizon, from Gdańsk, there are three German TBD’s of the “Leberecht Mass” type, distance of about 13,000 m[etres]. Battle stations. German ships show their sides, flashes from the broadsides, and in a moment the roar of exploding missiles. The first ones that are too short hit us like shrapnel, because in front of us on the water – like a rain of bullet fragments bursting at the water. Our main artillery in action. Artillery of the “Gryf”, too. I am on the battle bridge, next to the artillery relay telephone, on

the bridge there is also the Artillery Commander, Lt [Zbigniew] Kowalski, rangefinder, signalman, as well as Second Lieutenant [Julian] Czerwiński and two non-commissioned officers operating particular apparatus. Lt [Zbigniew] Kowalski communicates in a controlled voice at first: single fire, bursts of fire, the rangefinder states: too short, too short (...), on target. Lieutenant's orders: continuous fire. Shells from the "Wicher" and the "Gryf" fired from our guns at an increasing pace towards the enemy. Shells from the enemy ships with a hellish whistle fly over us, one of them hitting the side of the "Mewa" berthed behind the stern – it tore her hull, creating a hole with a cross-section of more than 1 m[etre] above the waterline. That "Mewa," whose crew suffered the most during the air raids, with the highest number of casualties and the wounded. One shell struck the side of the "Gryf" above the waterline, killing an officer and two seamen. We are still lucky. The shells are flying over us, they are in front of us, they are next to us, but they do not hit the "Wicher." The roar of our guns is mixed with the whistle of passing enemy shells so I do not know who is firing or when. The smell of burnt gunpowder, dozens of discarded shell casings on deck and in the water beside the ship's side. Due to the shocks caused by our own artillery, the failure of the telephone transmitters, combat paint peels off the voice pipes. I see the faces of my companions on the bridge, feverish, sweaty, with hard, fierce features – acknowledging with an automatic move every whistle of a passing shell. And then the German ships in a smokescreen. And again the voice of Lt [Zbigniew] Kowalski "Continuous fire into the smokescreen! Rangefinding mate's voice: on target!" Report: warships go about – escape. We are the winners. Apparently, one ship has sunk and one has been damaged. This artillery duel revived our hearts and restored our faith in our modest strength. Apart from the "Wicher" and the "Gryf," the [Heliodor] Laskowski battery from Hel took part in the artillery duel. Whose shells were on target was unimportant, we fought together, we were the winners in the first (...) and last sea battle in the Hel region. End of the combat alert, hours of respite and then the radio message "England and France declared war on Germany". Joy, restored faith in the alliance (...), faith in victory, and then around 2 p.m. a raid of enemy squadrons sent to sink the "Wicher" and the "Gryf" by the Nazi command enraged by the defeat of their TBD's. And the already known facts: bombs on the "Wicher," bombs on the "Gryf." The "Gryf" is on fire, the "Wicher" is sinking by the wharf, the ship topples over on its side. Suspended on the yard, the body of a colleague Able Seaman Kwiatkowski Edward, thrown onto the yard by a bomb explosion hitting the part of the bridge on which he was standing. Torn side, sailors jump onto the quay and into the water, the commander's order to abandon the ship, uniforms floating on the water and low-flying enemy planes, firing machine guns on the crew saving their lives. The end of ORP "Wicher," but not the end of our fight, nor the end of the war. The "Wicher," for us – defence of Hel.

Note: the given hours should be treated as approximate hours, because the time has blurred the exact terms, as it has blurred some names and some faces, fixing others.

Darłowo – 12.02.1970. Hubert Witold.

Bibliography

Archival sources

Naval Museum in Gdynia [Muzeum Marynarki Wojennej w Gdyni] Fonds, ref. no. 231R, *Witold Hubert, Wspomnienia z ORP „Wicher” z pierwszych dni września 1939 r.* ref. no. 300R, *Witold Hubert, Obrona Helu /3.09.1939–2.10.1939r.*

State Archives of Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast [Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Ivano-Frankivskoy Oblasti] Fonds 414, description 1, case 4, *Stanisławskij okryżnij komitet towaristwa „Liga morska i kolonialna,” m. Stanisław Stanisławskiego powitu Stanisławskiego wojewodstwa, Liga Morska i Kolonialna. Okręg Stanisławowski.*

Printed sources

Dziennik Personalny z 26.01.1922, r. 3, nr 1 [Personal diary of 26.01.1922, year 3, no. 1].

W.A.K.L., “Morski czyn Polski,” *Poland on the Seas*, 5 (1945), 1: 1–7.

Zarys historii i kronika dywizjonu niszczycieli Marynarki Wojennej PRL. Rozpoczęto 20.06.1963. Zakończono 13.04.1971 r. Arkuszy 195. Kategoria „A,” k. 7.

References

Będźmirowski, Jerzy. “Współpraca polsko-brytyjska a bezpieczeństwo morskie polski w okresie międzywojennym.” *Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Marynarki Wojennej* 49 (2008), 3: 73–95.

Borowiak, Mariusz. “ORP «Wicher». Pierwszy kontrtorpedowiec II RP.” *Morze*, 9 (2018): 30–42.

Borowiak, Mariusz. “Trzy dni wojny ORP Gryf.” *Historia. Wojsko i Technika*, 5 (2019): 78–89.

Derdej, Piotr, *Westerplatte – Okrywie – Hel 1939*. Warszawa: Bellona, 2009.

Dyskant, Józef Władysław. *Polska Marynarka Wojenna w 1939 roku*, cz. 1. *W przededniu wojny*. Gdańsk: AJ-Press, 2000.

Drzewiecki, Andrzej. *Polska Marynarka Wojenna od Drugiej do Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej. Studium bezpieczeństwa morskiego państwa*. Gdynia – Oświęcim: Wydawnictwo Napoleon V, 2016.

Franz, Maciej. “Polska Marynarka Wojenna w dwudziestoleciu międzywojennym – próba oceny.” W: *Morze nasze i nie nasze*, edited by Piotr Kurpiewski, Tadeusz Stegner, 291–304. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2011.

- Franz, Maciej. "Tylko propaganda czy także «szkolnictwo podstawowe». Liga Morska i Kolonialna a aspekt szkolenia przyszłych kadr dla Polskiej Marynarki Wojennej." *Biuletyn Historyczny MMW*, in press.
- Franz, Maciej. *Sprawa o honor. Przypadek wiceadmirała Kazimierza Porębskiego*, in press.
- Franz, Maciej, and Mariusz Kardas. *I wojna światowa na morzach w opiniach polskich teoretyków i praktyków*. Oświęcim: Wydawnictwo Napoleon V, 2018.
- Gołębiowski, Grzegorz. *Obrona Płocka przed wojskami bolszewickimi 18–19 sierpnia 1920 r.* Płock: Towarzystwo Naukowe Płockie, 2015.
- Górski, Tadeusz. *Polska flota wojenna 1939–1945 na tle flot europejskich*. Gdańsk: Civitas Christiana, 2001.
- Graczyk, Marcin. *Admirał Świrsk*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Finna, 2007.
- Kaczkowski, Ryszard. *Lotnictwo w działaniach na morzu*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo MON, 1986.
- Kondracki, Tadeusz. "Polska Marynarka Wojenna w początkowym okresie II wojny światowej – meldunek kontradmirała Świrskiego z 7.X.1939 r." *Zeszyt Naukowy Muzeum Wojska*, 7 (1993): 148–154.
- Kondracki, Tadeusz, and Jan Tarczyński. "Polskie flotylle rzeczne w wojnie polsko-bolszewickiej (1919–1920)." *Biuletyn Informacyjny. Miesięcznik Światowego Związku Żołnierzy Armii Krajowej*, 30 (2020): 8, 43–51.
- Kosiarz, Edmund. *Wojna na Bałtyku 1939*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1988.
- Kosiarz, Edmund. *Działania flot w drugiej wojnie światowej*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1989.
- Pater, Walter. "Udział Marynarki Wojennej w wojnie obronnej Polski w 1939 roku." *Bandera*, 9 (2019), 10: 12–15.
- Pertek, Jerzy. *Niszczyciele "Wicher" i "Burza"*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo MON, 1971.
- Pertek, Jerzy. *Wielkie dni małej floty*. wyd. VII, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1972.
- Przybyłski, Jerzy. "Działalność publicystyczna, promocyjna i edukacyjna w zakresie polskiej Marynarki Wojennej oraz polityki morskiej państwa." *Studia Gdańskie. Wizje i rzeczywistość*, 15 (2018): 163–181.
- Sawicki, Jan Kazimierz, ed. *Kadry Morskie Rzeczypospolitej*, t. V, *Polska Marynarka Wojenna. Dokumentacja organizacyjna i kadrowa oficerów, podoficerów i marynarzy (1918–1947)*. Gdynia: Polskie Towarzystwo Nautologiczne, 2011.
- Stawecki, Piotr, ed. *Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej w latach 1864–1939*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo MON, 1990.
- Supiński, Witold, and Mieczysław Lechowski. *Torpedowce i niszczyciele*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1971.
- Sykut, Piotr. "Próba przedzierania się drogą morską przez niemiecką blokadę polskiego wybrzeża 1 IX – 2 X 1939." *Saeculum Christianum*, 23 (2016): 276–293.

- Trawicki, Lech. "Marynarze w wojnie 1920 roku." *Po wachcie*, 2 (2010): 1–10.
- Walden, Stefan de. "Ostatnie dni «Wichra» 30 VIII – 3 IX 1939 r." *Przegląd Morski*, 5 (1948): 19–33.
- Walden, Stefan de. "Walka artyleryjska z niszczycielami niemieckimi w dniu 3.09.1939 r." *Przegląd Morski*, 7 (1974): 8, 115–123.
- Walden, Stefan de, and Krystyna de Walden-Gałuszko, Władysław Szarski. *ORP "Wicher" i jego dowódca*. Hel: Muzeum Obrony Wybrzeża/Stowarzyszenie Przyjaciół Helu, 2013.
- Walkiewicz, Leszek, ed. *Utwory poetyckie o Darłowie i wiersze darłowskich poetów*. Darłowo: Stagittarius Wydawnictwo, 2014.
- Wolbek, Krzysztof, and Wiktor Podolski. "Okręty polskiego września." *Biuletyn Historyczny Muzeum Marynarki Wojennej*, 11 (1989): 18–50.

Internet sources

- Walkiewicz, Leszek. *Patron darłowskiego portu*. Accessed 26.01.2022. <http://www.infodarlowo.pl/echo,artykul1512.html>.
- Walkiewicz, Leszek. "Patroni Darłowskich ulic, rond i mostów." *70 Lat Polskiego Darłowa*, maj 2015, no. 3. Accessed 11 November 2022. <https://archiwum.darlowo.pl/gazeta/201505.pdf>

English version: Radosław Dolecki, Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

The memoirs of Witold Hubert, a non-commissioned officer from the destroyer ORP "Wicher," were written down in 1970. They cover three days of combat in September 1939. The account has never been published before. It supplements in an important way the existing knowledge on the engagements of the Polish Navy in the Polish campaign of 1939. The publication of the memoirs reminds readers of the tragic days of September 1939 and the figure of Witold Hubert.

Nieznana relacja z wrześniowych walk ORP "Wicher"

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: kampania polska 1939, ORP "Wicher," wspomnienia, Witold Hubert, niszczyciel.

STRESZCZENIE

Wspomnienia Witolda Huberta, podoficera z niszczyciela ORP "Wicher," spisane zostały w 1970 roku. Obejmują trzy dni walk we wrześniu 1939 roku. Nigdy nie były publikowane.

Stanowią ważne uzupełnienie wiedzy o walce Polskiej Marynarki Wojennej w 1939 roku, w toku kampanii polskiej. Ich publikacja przypomina tragiczne dni września 1939 roku i postać Witolda Huberta.

Citation

Franz, Maciej. "An Unknown Account of the September Engagements Fought by ORP «Wicher»." *Studia Maritima* 35 (2022): 135–157. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2022.35-05.



Wojciech Wichert

Institute of National Remembrance
Branch in Szczecin
wojciech.wichert@ipn.gov.pl
ORCID: 0000-0003-1335-592X

Nazi Indoctrination of the Kriegsmarine and its Relations with the NSDAP in the Years 1935–1945 – Outline of Subject Matter

Keywords: Kriegsmarine, NSDAP, indoctrination

Introduction

Relations between the Kriegsmarine (War Navy) as one of the main three components of the Wehrmacht and the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) after Adolf Hitler's rise to power in 1933 has been, until now, a relatively less-occupied topic in the historiography of the Third Reich. Scientific literature about Kriegsmarine in Nazi Germany tends towards omitting it from the general development of the regime as well handling the topic in the margin of the Wehrmacht as the main military organisation in the Nazi state. Rather the naval forces are in many cases reduced to the history of German rearmament since 1935¹ and sea campaigns (especially the Battle of the Atlantic²) during World War II. Furthermore, there is still a deficit of research concerning the impact of NSDAP and its indoctrination apparatus on

-
- 1 Michael Salewski, *Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945*, vol. 1–3 (Frankfurt am Main/München: Bernard&Graefe, 1970–1975); Jost Dülffer, *Weimar, Hitler und die Marine. Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920–1930* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1973).
 - 2 Vide Dan van der Vat, *Schlachtfeld Atlantik* (München: Heyne, 1988); John Costello and Terry Hughes, *Atlantikschlacht. Der Krieg zur See 1939–1945* (Bergisch Gladbach: Bastei Lübbe, 1995); Jürgen Rohwer, *Der Krieg zur See* (Würzburg: Urbes, 2004); Lothar-Günther Buchheim, *U-Boot-Krieg* (München: Piper, 1997); Marc Milner, *Bitwa o Atlantyk*, trans. Grzegorz Siwek (Warszawa: Muza, 2012); Werner Rahn, "Der Seekrieg im Atlantik und Nordmeer," in: *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, vol. 6: *Der globale Krieg: Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiative, 1941–1943*, ed. Horst Boog, Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1990), 273–425.

Kriegsmarine (and overall on the Wehrmacht).³ This is complemented by the neglected topic of mutual relations between the Party and Wehrmacht or visible dominance of explorations about ground forces (*Heer*), Waffen-SS and aerial warfare (*Luftwaffe*) over navy.⁴ For the last branch of the armed forces there is still particularly one question unanswered, namely to what extent officers, non-commissioned officers and crews internalised Nazi ideology, and what the seamen really thought of the regime or its specific political leaders. Apart from interesting single examples that as a rule regard predominantly biographical episodes,⁵ such empirical analysis still is not fully carried out in the subject literature.⁶

The aim of the article is an attempt at considering only a part of the above complex problem, namely institutional mechanics and willingness for acquisition of the Nazi worldview in Kriegsmarine. In the centre of the reflections remains a crucial question: how the indoctrination process in the navy took place during the time after 1935. Moreover, there are analysed the organisational interactions between the NSDAP and the Kriegsmarine, as well as motives and limits of the Party's endeavours to ideologically impact the attitudes of the sailors.⁷ How this development of indoctrination efforts was carried out and what results it brought is described on the basis of the pseudo-pedagogic concept of "military-spiritual leadership" (*wehrgeistige Führung*) in the Kriegsmarine. Two institutions are in this context of special importance: the High Command of the Navy or Upper Command of the Navy (*Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine*, OKM) under commander-in-chief of the German Navy (*Oberbefehlshaber der Marine*) Erich Raeder (subsequently *Großadmiral* Karl Dönitz), and the Office of Deputy Führer (*Dienststelle des Stellvertreters des Führers*, StdF) under Rudolf Heß

3 Vide Rolf Dieter Müller, Hans-Erich Volkmann, eds. *Die Wehrmacht. Mythos und Realität* (München: Oldenbourg, 1999); Andreas Kunz, *Wehrmacht und Niederlage. Die bewaffnete Macht in der Endphase der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft 1944 bis 1945* (München: Oldenbourg, 2005).

4 Vide Christoph Rass, "Menschenmaterial." *Deutsche Soldaten an der Ostfront. Innenansichten einer Infanteriedivision, 1939–1945* (Paderborn/München/Wien: Schöningh, 2003); Bernd Lemke, *Luftschutz in Großbritannien und Deutschland 1923 bis 1939. Zivile Kriegsvorbereitungen als Ausdruck der staats- und gesellschaftspolitischen Grundlagen von Demokratie und Diktatur* (München: Oldenbourg, 2005); René Rohrkamp, "Weltanschaulich gefestigte Kämpfer." *Die Soldaten der Waffen-SS 1933–1945. Organisation–Personal–Sozialstruktur* (Paderborn/München/Wien: Schöningh, 2010).

5 Lothar Walmrath, "Iustitia et disciplina." *Strafgerichtsbarkeit in der deutschen Kriegsmarine 1939–1945* (Frankfurt am Main, et.al.: Lang, 1998); Timothy P. Mulligan, *Die Männer der deutschen U-Bootwaffe 1939–1945* (Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 2001); Dieter Hartwig, *Großadmiral Karl Dönitz. Legende und Wirklichkeit* (Paderborn/München/Wien: Schöningh, 2010).

6 Armin Nolzen, "Kriegsmarine, NSDAP und "wehrgeistige Führung" im Zweiten Weltkrieg," in: *Die Kriegsmarine. Eine Bestandsaufnahme*, ed. Stephan Huck (Bochum: Verlag Dr. Dieter Winkler, 2016), 173.

7 Vide Robert O'Neill, *The German Army and the Nazi Party* (London: Heineman, 1966); Manfred Messerschmidt, *Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat. Zeit der Indoktrination* (Hamburg: R. v. Decker, 1969); Klaus-Jürgen Müller, *Das Heer und Hitler. Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime 1933–1940* (Stuttgart: Dt. Verlag-Anst., 1988).

(after May 1941 he was succeeded by Martin Bormann as Chief of the Party Chancellery). Both authorities can be perceived as the representative instances for the Wehrmacht and the NSDAP.⁸ The text is based mainly on German and Anglo-Saxon scientific literature concerning the Kriegsmarine, the Wehrmacht and the Third Reich overall. It is only an outline of the matter, which is still absent in the historiography and requires further, deeper research, especially of the documental sources. Therefore, the article does not pretend to be a full presentation of the topic or its specific parts. Hopefully in the future its exhaustive analysis will be published.

Erich Raeder and Nazi indoctrination of the Kriegsmarine until 1939

After 30 January 1933, the German army (then the Reichswehr) started following a course of “intellectual assimilation” into National Socialism.⁹ The process included the whole “internal work” (*innerer Dienst*)¹⁰ in land, aerial forces and in the Reichs-/Kriegsmarine. Its aim was total absorption of the Nazi ideology by the officers and crews. So-called ideological education was here extremely vital, and especially cooperation in this field between the Wehrmacht and the NSDAP, during which more and more soldiers were attending special lectures and courses involving Nazi pseudo-doctrines, which turned out to be very fruitful.¹¹ Particularly after 1935 it became clear the old Christian values associated with seafaring could not prevent the violent intrusion of the National Socialist worldview into the navy. Even though the Kriegsmarine pursued its own course, as always, its commander in chief Erich Raeder left no doubt about his loyalty to Hitler (let alone his reservations about the Führer’s views on the

8 Armin Nolzen, “Von der geistigen Assimilation zur institutionellen Kooperation. Das Verhältnis zwischen NSDAP und Wehrmacht 1943–1945,” in: *Kriegsende 1945 in Deutschland*, ed. Jörg Hillmann and John Zimmermann (München: Oldenbourg, 2002), 71 ff.

9 Messerschmidt, *Die Wehrmacht*, 482.

10 Vide Heinfried Voss, “Das neue Haus der Reichswehr.” *Militärische Sozialisation im politischen und militärischen Übergang. Der Aufbau der vorläufigen Reichswehr 1919–1920 und ihre politische Funktion in der Republik, dargestellt an ihren badischen Truppenteilen* (St. Katharinen: Scripta Mercaturae, 1992), 73–118.

11 See Jürgen Förster, “Geistige Kriegführung in Deutschland 1919 bis 1945,” in: *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Die deutsche Kriegsgesellschaft 1939 bis 1945*. Section 1: *Politisierung, Vernichtung, Überleben*, ed. Jörg Echternkamp, vol. 9 (München: DVA, 2004), 484–505.

role of the navy¹²) and his commitment to the regime.¹³ Even before 1933 Raeder adopted a more pro-Nazi attitude as he recognised the potential the brown movement had for rearmament and rebuilding of the fleet. As a former Imperial Navy officer and Head of the Naval Command (from 1928) he supported a call for a “unified *Volk*” and a strong leader who would undertake the responsibility to “protect the interests of all classes and occupations” –important prerequisites for a strong navy and victory in war. Obviously, his strong anti-communist beliefs also influenced his support for Hitler as in the midst of the Great Depression and increasing support for the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). Like many others, he treated the Nazis as the final bulwark against Bolshevism.¹⁴ Raeder also personally supported a number of former naval officers who had become members of the NSDAP (like Wilhelm Busse¹⁵), which earned him “strong trust” within the Nazi movement. Nevertheless, he still feared that the extremists in the NSDAP under Gregor Strasser would push the leftist tendency agenda of the party at the expense of its nationalism and revisionist policies.¹⁶

The eagerness on the part of Raeder and his officers to integrate what they saw as the positive aspects of Hitler and his movement was genuine, reflecting the navy’s affinity

-
- 12 Raeder remained wary of Hitler’s views about the navy. In “*Mein Kampf*” he criticised the German grand admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and the navy’s prewar policies. Hitler’s rejection of the idea of Germany as a world naval power (*Seemacht*) and colonial policies in favour of an alliance with Great Britain threatened Raeder’s goals. He wanted to secure the long range “world political role” of the navy and its battleship program. Furthermore, the NSDAP’s leader rejected “the perverse and calamitous statement” that “Our future lies on the water.” According to him, the country’s fate would always be determined on land, in Europe, because of its “disastrous” military–geographic position. In late October 1932, Hitler shocked Raeder with sharp criticism regarding the government’s support for his proposed naval program, especially the building of large battleships. Hitler argued it would harm Anglo–German relations, and the high cost of construction would take money away from the army. The navy’s focus should be in the Baltic, which didn’t require battleships. He also faulted the Kriegsmarine for not sufficiently taking into account new technology. See Keith W. Bird, *Kriegsmarine i Raeder*, trans. Aleksandra Górska (Warszawa: Bellona, 2012), 134–135; Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf. Zwei Bände in einem Band. Ungekürzte Ausgabe* (München: Franz Eher Verlag, 1943), 299–301; Gerhard L. Weinberg, ed. *Hitler’s Second Book. The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf* (New York: Enigma Books, 2006), 167. Vide Jost Dülffer, “Wilhelm II. und Adolf Hitler. Ein Vergleich ihrer Marinekonzeptionen,” in: *Kiel, die Deutschen und die See*, ed. Jürgen Elvert (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992), 49–69; Michael Epkenhans, “Tirpitz und das Scheitern der Kaiserlichen Marine im Ersten Weltkrieg,” in: *Personen – soziale Bewegungen – Parteien. Beiträge zur Neuesten Geschichte. Festschrift für Hartmut Soell*, ed. Oliver von Mengersen (Heidelberg: Manutius, 2004), 15–36; Rolf Hobson, *Maritimer Imperialismus. Seemachtideologie, seestrategisches Denken und der Tirpitzplan 1875 bis 1914* (München: Oldenbourg, 2004), 231 ff.
- 13 Rolf Dieter Müller, *Hitler’s Wehrmacht 1935–1945*, trans. Janice W. Ancker (Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2016, Ebook), 53, 71.
- 14 Vide Michael Salewski, *Die Deutschen und die See. Studien zur deutschen Marinegeschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Jürgen Elvert and Stefan Lippert, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002), 135.
- 15 See Dermot Bradley, Hans H. Hildebrand, Ernest Henriot, eds. *Deutschlands Admirale 1849–1945. Die militärischen Werdegänge der See-, Ingenieur-, Sanitäts-, Waffen- und Verwaltungsoffiziere im Admiralsrang*, vol. 1: A–G (*Ackermann bis Gygas*) (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1988), 194–196.
- 16 Bird, *Kriegsmarine*, 136.

to Fascism.¹⁷ With Hitler's appointment as chancellor, the officers celebrated the rekindled enthusiasm of the masses, which they had not witnessed since 1914 and regarded Hitler as the culmination of the work of Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and even Tirpitz. The Nazis' national goals resonated with the Kriegsmarine's *Seemacht* ideology and its traditions as well as bitter experiences with the Weimar Republic and democracy. Moreover, it reflected their relationship with the "cultural Bolshevism" and moral decay that revolution had brought to Germany. The social goals of the movement, that is the promised creation of a true people's community (*Volksgemeinschaft*), were congruent with the navy's role in social integration or the "national feeling" required to support fleet building.¹⁸

Raeder's views can be portrayed as strictly conservative, authoritarian and nationalist. His concept of an "outward and inward navy style," with his emphasis on leadership, discipline and a strict moral code reflected a patriarchal tone that also conformed to the goals of the Nazi movement.¹⁹ As a paternalistic stern he expected from sailors unconditional loyalty, high Christian morals and total obedience.²⁰ The accent on patriotism and a belief in the national mission of the officer corps strengthened the compatibility with the "pseudo military" (*pseudosoldatisch*) aspects of National Socialism, as did the officers' concept of "internal leadership" (*innere Führung*), accentuating teamwork, *esprit de corps* and tolerance among officers and men.²¹

Within the Kriegsmarine, as well as to Hitler, Raeder's support for the Nazis was obvious. In the Third Reich, Raeder could therefore count on the dictator's respect for the professional competence of the naval leadership and his support of their proposals. The naval leadership needed direct access to the Führer (from 1938 the supreme commander of the army) to assert itself against the more dominating influence of the Wehrmacht. Even so, during the First World War, the naval leadership of Wilhelmine Germany had had the Kaiser's support and had been able to conduct a war that was independent to a large extent. But in view of its geographic defence situation, its share of armaments, and its personnel strength, the Kriegsmarine after 1935 had to be satisfied with the role of the smallest Wehrmacht branch.²² Moreover, the navy had to

17 Rolf Benschel, *Die Deutsche Flottenpolitik von 1933 bis 1939. Eine Studie über die Rolle des Flottenbaus in Hitlers Außenpolitik*. Beiheft 3 der "Marine-Rundschau" (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1958), 20.

18 Bird, *Kriegsmarine*, 137. Vide Adolf von Trotha, *Volkstum und Staatsführung. Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1915–1920* (Berlin: Grossdeutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1928), 184–186.

19 Charles S. Thomas, *The German Navy in the Nazi Era* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 54–56.

20 In this context Raeder is also well known for dismissing Reinhard Heydrich from the Reichsmarine in April 1931 for "conduct unbecoming to an officer and a gentleman." Heydrich had a baby with his girlfriend and afterwards he fled to marry another woman. Soon he became chief of the Security Service (*Sicherheitsdienst*, SD) and in the next years he wanted to avenge his alleged dishonour by conducting often petty harrasing against Raeder. See Thomas, *The German Navy*, 55, 92–93.

21 Bird, *Kriegsmarine*, 137–138.

22 Müller, *Hitler's*, 53.

make do with compromises regarding the displacement and armament of its future capital ships. However, in view of the anticipated long-term build-up of the fleet, those compromises seemed acceptable for Raeder.²³ Nevertheless, until the outbreak of war, Raeder continued to believe that he was leading the navy in a “frictionless” coordination into the Führer state without identifying himself with the criminal ideological implications of National Socialism like virulent antisemitic policy measures. He believed in Hitler’s backing to rebuild fleet in the tradition of Tirpitz and the goals of Nazi foreign policy (he even accepted a possibility of war with Great Britain). Raeder’s myth that the Kriegsmarine had been allowed to develop independently in the Third Reich was a pure illusion, as well as his claims of keeping navy apolitical. The reality, however, is that the navy’s sea power ideology had allowed it to be seduced by the appeal of the National Socialist worldview and goals, both consciously and unconsciously.²⁴

The “national-political education” embraced by the Kriegsmarine after 1933, notwithstanding Raeder’s preoccupation with discipline, loyalty and paternalistic tradition, had, in his eyes, isolated his service morally and intellectually from the world around it, even as the navy moved to accommodate itself to National Socialism.²⁵ Raeder mostly opposed attempts by the Party to gain any influence in Kriegsmarine. He preferred mutual understanding and compromise, however, rather than open conflict in that field. On 28 August 1933, Raeder instructed Kriegsmarine to answer the greeting *Heil Hitler* in a similar manner, and on 6 September 1933 he gave the order that the “German greeting” would be performed by the navy only in certain formal situations. Moreover, he firmly resisted absorbing any rituals of Nazi neo-paganism into Kriegsmarine by making chaplains members of the German Faith Movement (*Deutsche Glaubensbewegung*).²⁶

On the other hand, within preparations for the future mobilisation, which began in the Party in 1937, the Office of Deputy Führer and the Reich Ministry of War (*Reichskriegsministerium*) ensured that regional and local leaders of the NSDAP take on “spiritual care” (*seelische Betreuung/Truppenbetreuung*) of the soldiers in the case of

23 Werner Rahn, “German Navies from 1848 to 2016. Their Development and Courses from Confrontation to Cooperation,” *Naval War College Review* 3 (2017): 34.

24 Bird, *Kriegsmarine*, 152.

25 See Thomas, *The German Navy*, 154; Keith W. Bird, *Weimar, the German Naval Officer Corps and the Rise of National Socialism* (New York: Grüner, 1977), 294–297.

26 Thomas, *The German Navy*, 83, 155–157. On German Faith Movement see more Kurt Hutten, “Die Deutsche Glaubensbewegung,” in: *Die Nation vor Gott. Zur Botschaft der Kirche im Dritten Reich* (1933), ed. Walter Künneht and Helmuth Schreiner (Berlin: Wichern Verlag, 1934), 506–533; Hans Buchheim, *Glaubenskrise im Dritten Reich. Drei Kapitel nationalsozialistischer Religionspolitik* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1953), 157–202; Karla Poewe and Irving Hexham, “Jakob Wilhelm Hauer’s New Religion and National Socialism,” *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 20 (2005): 195–215; Horst Junginger, “Die Deutsche Glaubensbewegung als ideologisches Zentrum der völkisch-religiösen Bewegung,” in: *Die völkisch-religiöse Bewegung im Nationalsozialismus. Eine Beziehungs- und Konfliktgeschichte*, ed. Uwe Puschner and Clemens Vollhals (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, 2012), 65–102.

a military situation.²⁷ The main executors of those measures were the inland department in the High Command of the Armed Forces (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*, OKW²⁸), the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (*Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda*) or the German Labour Front (*Deutsche Arbeitsfront*, DAF) and its free time organisation Strength through Joy (Kraft durch Freude, KdF). OKW demanded efficiency of the NSDAP's and the state's civil offices in *Truppenbetreuung*, also in the navy. The High Command of the Armed forces, however, did not have further rights to issue instructions concerning specific Wehrmacht's branches. Furthermore, possibility of interference by the Party had also no effect whatsoever due to the fact that in those branches the respective commander was responsible for the indoctrination process.²⁹

In Kriegsmarine there was a complete autonomy concerning "inner service" (*innerer Dienst*) as Raeder worked to promote Nazi ideology in opposition to NSDAP.³⁰ He ordered that all his officers read a book by Kriegsmarine Commander Siegfried Sorge³¹ called "The Naval Officer as a Guide and Educator" ("Der Marineoffizier als Führer und Erzieher"³²) about what it took to be a good officer.³³ The tract includes ideological contents mainly in chapter: "Officer Lesson" (*Offizierunterricht*).³⁴ According to Sorge, a good and reliable naval officer must obediently believe in National Socialist values. He complimented Hitler for the Night of the Long Knives – a bloody purge of his own political party from June 30 to July 2, 1934, for assassinating hundreds of Nazis

27 See Frank Vossler, *Propaganda in die eigene Truppe. Die Truppenbetreuung in der Wehrmacht 1939–1945* (Paderborn/München/Wien, Schöningh, 2005), 55 ff.; Alexander Hirt, "Die deutsche Truppenbetreuung im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Konzeption, Organisation und Wirkung," *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift* 2 (2000): 407–434.

28 Created in February 1938, it replaced the Reich War Ministry in the field of formal oversight over the army (*Heer*), navy (*Kriegsmarine*) and air force (*Luftwaffe*). See Geoffrey Megargee, *Hitler und die Generäle. Das Ringen um die Führung der Wehrmacht 1933–1945*, trans. Karl Nicolai (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006), 47–79.

29 Nolzen, "Kriegsmarine," 174; Stephan Lehnstaedt and Kurt Lehnstaedt, "Der Angriff der "Schleswig-Holstein" auf die Westerplatte. Aus dem Logbuch des Seekadetten Hans Buch," in: *80 Jahre danach. Bilder und Tagebücher deutscher Soldaten vom Überfall auf Polen 1939*, ed. Svea Hammerle, Hans-Christian Jasch and Stephan Lehnstaedt (Berlin: Metropol, 2019), 135–172.

30 Even though Raeder never joined the NSDAP, claiming always that his service was "above politics" and he worked "disinterested (...) to the State," on 30 January 1937, Hitler awarded him the Golden Party Badge to credit him for his effective activities in promoting Nazi ideology in the German navy. See Bird, *Kriegsmarine*, 144–154; Charles E. Pfannes and Victor A. Salamone, *The Great Admirals of World War II. The Germans*, vol. 2 (New York: Zebra Books, 1984), 22–23; Erich M. Raeder, *My Life*, trans. Henry W. Drexel (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1960), *passim*; Kurt Fischer, "Großadmiral Dr. phil. h. c. Erich Raeder," in: *Hitlers militärische Elite. Von den Anfängen des Regimes bis Kriegsbeginn*, ed. Gerd R. Ueberschär, vol. 1 (Darmstadt: Primus-Verl., 1998), 185–194.

31 See Bradley, Hildebrand, Henriot, eds. *Deutschlands Admirale*, vol. 3: P–Z, 345–346.

32 Siegfried Sorge, *Der Marineoffizier als Führer und Erzieher* (Berlin: E. S. Mittler&Sohn, 1937).

33 See Salewski, *Die Deutschen*, 115–116; T. Mulligan, *Die Männer*, 234.

34 Lehnstaedt, "Der Angriff," 138.

(especially from the leadership of the Nazi Storm Troopers, SA), whom he believed had the potential to become political enemies in the future.³⁵ Sorge insisted that if Hitler had been state leader in 1918, then the mutiny of the High Seas Fleet would have been swiftly destroyed just like the Führer's determination had crushed the alleged SA rebellion. For Sorge, the humble veteran of the trenches, Adolf Hitler, became the link between the soldierly virtues of the past and National Socialist ones for the present. Admittedly, Sorge went on to say not every officer could be Ferdinand Magellan, Julius Caesar, Alfred von Tirpitz, Frederick the Great or Adolf Hitler, but one could still learn an important lesson from these masters: only fearless determination and clear dedication transformed men into leaders who, when necessary, can use extreme violence to maintain discipline.³⁶

Sorge emphasised in his writing that combating "Jewish materialism" and "Marxist agitation" was the then generation's real mission and therefore one of a good officer's main obligations. As Sorge expressed it: "There is no better means [than this recognition] of making the Germans energetic and thankful followers of the Führer and of helping them understand that the Führer also had to use a heavy hand and sometimes must continue to do so in order to accomplish his fantastic aim." According to him, the officer must be conscious of the benefits that resulted from the unity with his nation (*Volk*), perceived by him as a "blood-and-fate community" (*Blut- und Schicksalgemeinschaft*). To do so he must accept the new political order without any question and "immerse himself in the depths of National Socialist ideology."³⁷ Sorge argued that a navy officer should be taught not only about the soldierly duties but also about German history to fully comprehend the elements of the Nazi worldview. Moreover, as important teaching material he recommended that the officers read Hitler's "Mein Kampf" and his speeches published by Franz Eher Verlag. It is evident that Sorge planted the Kriegsmarine in the National Socialist camp as a totally obedient instrument of the brown regime. It is, of course, impossible to determine precisely how much influence Sorge's work exerted upon the Kriegsmarine officers. Nevertheless, the book was a crucial counsellor for young officers of the navy for leadership that became very popular not only among them (in 1943 the fifth edition was published). Interesting, however, is the fact that the tract was banned in 1944. Raeder mentioned that its undertone was too "humanistic." He left unsaid the book's decidedly pro-Nazi content and rhetoric.³⁸

35 History.com Editors, *Hitler purges members of his own Nazi party in Night of the Long Knives*, accessed 19 November 2021, <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/night-of-the-long-knives>.

36 Sorge, *Der Marineoffizier*, 60–67, 138–141; Thomas, *The German Navy*, 150–152.

37 Sorge, *Der Marineoffizier*, 144–148.

38 See Thomas, *The German Navy*, 152–153; Bird, *Kriegsmarine*, 156; Nolzen, "Kriegsmarine," 156.

In the second half of the 1930's Kriegsmarine, wanting to maintain its traditional "state within the state" status and in order to prevent the "coordination" (*Gleichschaltung*) from above, the navy more and more engaged itself in a process of so-called self-*Gleichschaltung*.³⁹ Nevertheless, not until 1939 and during the war the concept of "military intellectual leadership" (*wehrgeistige Führung*) in the Kriegsmarine was formally institutionalised. There were of course some personal contacts between the NSDAP and the Kriegsmarine before, as well as some elements of Nazi indoctrination in the professional education of naval officers.⁴⁰ At the top stand the section of "military

39 Thus, it might seem odd that Martin Niemöller, a leading representative of the Confessional Church (*Bekennende Kirche*), an amalgamation of dissenting pastors, reported voluntarily for duty in the navy in 1939, after imprisonment in a concentration camp. Niemöller had been a daring U-boat officer during the First World War. In 1934 his memoirs appeared under the title: "Vom U-Boat zur Kanzel" ("From the U-Boat to the Pulpit"). As a theologian, he took a firm stand against Reich minister for church affairs Hanns Kerrl and the assemblage of German Christians (*Deutsche Christen*) he supported. Hitler looked upon the Confessional Church and its interchurch struggle. Niemöller, although a National Conservative, now belonged to the NSDAP. Even as a member, he attacked the party's chief ideologue, Alfred Rosenberg, which quickly led his arrest in 1935. As of 1938, Niemöller was considered a "personal prisoner" of Hitler, who intended to have him hanged and declined his request to serve the Fatherland again as a U-boat commander. After 1945 and his experiences as an outcast in the Dachau concentration camp, Niemöller adopted radical pacifistic views, holding that participation in military service was irreconcilable with Christian belief. But his surprising request to the dictator at the start of the war in 1939 epitomised his dominant theological stance, which was "service to the nation" and therefore supported a legitimate national order and national defence to an unlimited degree. This was particularly so for chaplains in the Kriegsmarine, and overall in the Wehrmacht, who saw themselves mostly as a symbiosis of officers of the traditional mould, this did not preclude their critical distance from the conduct of the army and its leadership. Their renouncing of open criticism was intended to keep institutional opportunities for pastoring open. Their service provided encouragement in the face of the hardships of battle, and it limited itself to offering comfort in medical stations, in prisons, and at mass graves. See Müller, *Hitler's*, 76–77; Harald Bendert, *Die UC-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine 1914–1918. Minenkrieg mit U-Booten* (Hamburg/Berlin/Bonn, Mittler Verlag, 2001), 171; Helga Grebing, *Der Nationalsozialismus. Ursprung und Wesen* (München: Isar-Verl., 1964), 133; Clemens Vollnhals, "Die Evangelische Kirche zwischen Traditionsbewahrung und Neuorientierung," in: *Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland*, ed. Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans Woller (München: Oldenbourg, 1990), 118 ff.; Dagmar Pöpping, *Kriegspfarrer an der Ostfront Evangelische und katholische Wehrmachtseelsorge im Vernichtungskrieg 1941–1945* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, 2017), 18 ff.; Omer Bartov, "Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich," in: *The Third Reich. The Essential Readings*, ed. Christian Leitz (London: Blackwell, 1999), 129–150.

40 During the war there were educated about 12,700 candidates for navy officers. Four months of infantry basic training with aims like self-discipline, hardship and subordination, were followed by six months of fleet practice, then six months theoretical education in navy officers' school in Mürwik, which ended with the naval officer main exam. After that began firearm training that lasted from six to eight months, for instance ship's artillery, torpedoes, mines, intelligence service as well as another six months of fleet practice as petty officer, where cadets already exercised officer's functions. Altogether the education lasted a maximum of 30 months (in 1944 it was shortened to 23 months). The prospective officers needed to have Abitur (school-leaving examination) and the right fitness for military service with a minimum height of 1.65 metres and 6/8 eyesight. Maximum age for service was 24 years. Until the start of the war there were training sailing boats ("Gorch Fock", "Horst Wessel" and "Albert Leo Schalgeter") and boats for the education system's inspection ("Emden", "Schlesien", "Schleswig-Holstein"). After September 1939 practice took place only on ships of the fleet, whereas

care” (*Referat Wehrbetreuung*) in the department “principles and organisation of military education” (*Grundsätze und Organisation der militärischen Ausbildung*) of the navy military office in the OKM. In June 1940 so-called military care officers were appointed to the staff. They were accountable to commanding officers and commanders “for the military spiritual state of the squad.”⁴¹ To the term *Wehrbetreuung*, which was also used in the *Luftwaffe*,⁴² belonged *geistige Führung* und free time organisation for sailors.⁴³

Wartime “national–political education”

Semantic affinity to the NSDAP that was hiding in the term *Wehrbetreuung* was fully explained at a conference of navy officers, which took place in Berlin in December 1940. It was closely connected to practical aspects of the service in the *Kriegsmarine*. Erich Frühling, a corvette captain and employee of the Navy Main Office (*Allgemeines Marinehauptamt*), saw the aim of “military care”⁴⁴ in “finding a new style of life, even

training for engineers was different from that for sea officers. They were all, however, integrated during day-to-day duties, for instance at preparing meals and operating guns, like on “Schleswig-Holstein.” The battleship opened fire with its main battery at the Polish positions on the Westerplatte on 1 September 1939; those were the first shots of World War II. Firing at Westerplatte was afterwards evaluated by the cadets with an artillery officer. Introduction of Nazi ideology to discuss the meaning of such military actions with the crew was sometimes present, but it depended on the decision of the current commander. Explicit trainings were carried out, especially ashore, in Mürwik, where history and political education (*Staatskunde*) were taught on the syllabus. At the marine school cadets attended five hours of classes in the morning and four hours in the afternoon. Moreover, they had two days of working hours till 21.30. The exam results, also in propaganda-like subjects, were the basis for the later order of promotion as precise reception of contents was of considerable relevance. At the end of the marine education the selection of officers was carried out. In order to become sub-lieutenant there had to be a positive vote of all the ship’s officers. See Lehnstaedt, “Der Angriff,” 138–139; Christian Jentsch, “Die Ausbildung zum Marineoffizier während der Kriegsjahre 1939–1945,” in: *Die Kriegsmarine*, 161–172.

41 Förster, “Geistige,” 548–549.

42 Vide Horst Boog, *Die deutsche Luftwaffenführung 1935–1945. Führungsprobleme, Spitzengliederung, Generalstabsausbildung* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1982), 596 ff.

43 Nolzen, *Kriegsmarine*, 175.

44 After all, *betreuen* (to look after) is an expression which has always been in common usage in the language in the Third Reich, and the Civil Code recognised the trustee (*Treuhänder*). The word was used inordinately and excessively back then. According to Victor Klemperer, a German scholar and author of the classic book: “LTI – Lingua Tertii Imperii”, in Nazi Germany the term *Betreuung* replaced in some way the word *Bedienung* (service). When someone looks after a person, he/she should be grateful for it, and aren’t allowed to put high demands on or distrust towards the helper. In the First World War, German students in the army were equipped with teaching materials and their education was continued on a course-by-course basis. During the next war they were “remotely looked after” (*fern-betreut*) and incorporated into a certain indoctrination system. Zob. Victor Klemperer, *Language of the Third Reich. LTI: Lingua Tertii Imperii. A Philologist’s Notebook*, trans. Martin Brady (New York: A&C Black, 2000), 222.

to a certain degree a new content of life for the soldiers” and in creating “a new social gathering” in the navy.⁴⁵ His remarks represented a clear connection to the activities of DAF, which for him were exemplary, because their ambition was to take care of the “racial comrade” (*Volksgenosse*) from the cradle to the grave. In the following years the *Referat Wehrbetreuung* in the OKM also tended towards this direction. At its disposal were more than 70 qualified employees, including 20 officers, 15 naval warrant officers and non-commissioned officers each and members of other crew ranks, 20 musicians and the same number of the Hitler Youth (*Hitlerjugend*, HJ) or the Reich Labour Service’s (*Reichsarbeitsdienst*, RAD) play groups, 4 theatre groups, 6 glove puppet stages, 8 student groups and 10 single artists were in Kriegsmarine on active service to entertain the seamen. Beside the “cultural care” (*kulturelle Betreuung*) the navy also took over the antisemitic indoctrination that was practiced in the NSDAP within the framework of the so-called training (*Schulung*).⁴⁶ An explanatory leaflet (*Wehrbetreuungsmerkblatt*) from 1 April 1941 obliged the unit commanders and their propaganda officers (*Wehrbetreuungs-offiziere*) to teach the sailors about the “Jewish question.”⁴⁷ Soldiers were to be informed that for a thousand years Jews had succeeded in penetrating “the healthy host nations” (*gesunde Wirtsvölker*) and harming them. As essential reading were such books as Alfred Rosenberg’s “Die Spur des Juden im Wandel der Zeiten”, Walther Brewitz’s “Von Abraham bis Rathenau Viertausend Jahre jüdischer Geschichte” and Hans F.K. Günther’s “Rassenkunde des deutschen Volkes.” The racial and antisemitic literature of the Nazi party was included, henceforth, also in the reading canon in the navy.⁴⁸

At the semantic level OKM always differentiated between *geistige Führung und Wehrbetreuung*. At a meeting for the navy commanders in Berlin in November 1941, for instance, vice admiral Walter Warzecha,⁴⁹ chief of the Navy Main Office, stressed that propaganda officers should only support Kriegsmarine’s commanders in the *geistiger Führung* process.⁵⁰ Apparently, in that matter, traditional leadership understanding crossed over for a long time, which still originated from the imperial navy, and a rather Nazi concept concerning indoctrination basics. “Military spiritual leadership” (*wehrgeistige Führung*) and total Nazification was in full implementation in

45 Förster, “Geistige,” 549–550.

46 Carl-Wilhelm Reibel, *Das Fundament der Diktatur. Die NSDAP-Ortsgruppen 1932–1945*. (Paderborn/München/Wien: Schöningh, 2002), 177–228; Phillip Wegehaupt, “Wir grüßen den Hass!": *Die ideologische Schulung und Ausrichtung der NSDAP-Funktionäre im Dritten Reich* (Berlin: Metropol, 2012), 15 ff.

47 Vossler, *Propaganda*, 128–129.

48 Mulligan, *Die Männer*, 237 ff.; Nolzen, “Kriegsmarine,” 175–176.

49 Klaus D. Patzwall and Veit Scherzer, *Das Deutsche Kreuz 1941–1945. Geschichte und Inhaber*, vol. 2 (Norderstedt: Patzwall, 2001), 559.

50 Förster, “Geistige,” 551–552.

the army, especially in the ground forces and aerial warfare from the beginning of 1942, namely after the crisis on the Eastern Front.⁵¹ In the navy, however, the terms *geistiger Führung und Wehrbetreuung* were in use for a longer time. They were even institutionalised as specific marine tasks, which were not the responsibility of officers of certain services, for example from Ic-department (observation of the enemy, espionage, sabotage defence and spiritual care),⁵² but a holistic leadership concept. Meanwhile, on 30 January 1943, following Hitler's outrage over the Battle of the Barents Sea (31 December 1942) with the British forces, Karl Dönitz, up to then Commander of the U-boats (*Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote*, BdU), was promoted to Grand Admiral, and replaced Raeder as Supreme Commander of the Navy.⁵³ Nevertheless, the appointment of Dönitz as the highest figure in the OKM changed a little in the institutional structure of the Kriegsmarine. Undoubtedly, he was unconditionally devoted to National Socialism and Hitler.⁵⁴ Although Dönitz only joined the NSDAP in 1944, Hitler fully appreciated how he developed the Nazi indoctrination program for German seamen and his confidence that U-boats could still defeat Great Britain.⁵⁵ Dönitz's loyalty, patriotism and ability soon won him the confidence of the Führer.⁵⁶

In the next weeks and months after the Stalingrad and Tunis defeats, Nazification of the navy and other Wehrmacht branches became more acute than ever. Employees of the section of *Referat Wehrbetreuung* in the OKM were urged to become more self-critical, obviously under the effect of some encouraging appeals from the new Supreme Commander of the Navy. Erich Frühling, at a speech during a course in the officers' school in Mürwik at the beginning of 1943 asked them to keep in mind that the Soviet marine fleet consisted of more or less a quarter of political commissioners. In his view, it meant that they were "therefore educated in the greatest extent as political and leaders of men."⁵⁷ Consequently, the main task of *geistige Führung* had to be strengthened as it was crucial for the war. The High Command of the Armed Forces and the Party

51 Vide M. Messerschmidt, *Die Wehrmacht*, 264–276, 443–446; Volker R. Berghahn, "NSDAP und "geistige Führung" der Wehrmacht 1939–1943," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1 (1969): 33–36; Waldemar Besson, "Zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialistischen Führungsoffiziers," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1 (1961): 84–85; Arne W.G. Zoepf, *Wehrmacht zwischen Tradition und Ideologie. Der NS-Führungsoffizier im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Frankfurt am Main/Bern/New York: Lang, 1988), 47–67, 125–128.

52 Felix Römer, *Der Kommissarbefehl. Wehrmacht und NS-Verbrechen an der Ostfront 1941/42* (Paderborn/München/Wien: Schöningh, 2008), 318 ff.

53 See Pfannes, Salamone, *The Great*, 64–66, 225–252.

54 See Nolzen, *Kriegsmarine*, 176–177; Salewski, *Die Deutschen*, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1998), 326–327; Hartwig, *Großadmiral*, 158–199.

55 Tyler Bamford, *Nazi Germany's Last Leader: Admiral Karl Dönitz*, accessed 22 November 2021, <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/nazi-germanys-leader-admiral-karl-donitz>.

56 John Terraine, *Business in Great Waters. The U-Boat Wars, 1916–1945* (London: Pen&Sword, 1989), 520–522.

57 J. Förster, "Geistige," 583–585.

Chancellery (*Partei-Kanzlei*) in the spring of 1943 were also very concerned about the lacking ideological firmness of German soldiers. Hermann Reinecke, the head of the Main Army Office (*Allgemeines Wehrmachtamt*, AWA) in the OKW, and Martin Bormann from *Partei-Kanzlei*, were in permanent contact with each other.⁵⁸ On their initiative in the Party's fortress of the order (*Ordensburg*) Sonthofen in Allgäu⁵⁹ an orientation and indoctrination course for the representatives of Wehrmacht took place between 31 May and 5 June 1943. At the training conference there were 300 party speakers present, who were each assigned to one of the army branches. The aim of the meeting was, in Reinecke's words, to "to also make the last man in the German army trusting."⁶⁰ Three hundred selected soldiers, all of them so-called political leaders (*Politische Leiter*⁶¹) of the NSDAP, were supposed to carry "faith" in the "end victory" (*Endsieg*) into the respective units. The members of the High Command of the Navy who took part in the course later ordered Nazi propaganda periodical magazines from the SS Main Office (*SS-Hauptamt*, SS-HA), i.e. "SS-Leithefte"⁶² and "Germanische Leithefte" as exemplary teaching materials for their commanders.⁶³ The SS as a role model of discipline and indoctrination for the Kriegsmarine was all in all a bit peculiar as both formations of the officer corps were different in regard to origin, social profile and self-image. The topic regarding mutual ideological interactions between the SS and the navy still needs to be profoundly researched.⁶⁴

The assumption of practice and contents of the NSDAP's *Schulung* in the navy was continued after the second indoctrination course for military personnel organised by the OKW and Party Chancellery in Bad Schachen on 11–14 October 1943. The meeting was attended by 60 generals and admirals who were to be "stimulated" by the speeches of Nazi leaders, including Joseph Goebbels, Heinrich Himmler, Alfred Rosenberg and also by a few Gauleiters. The soldiers were to be "educated with regard to military spirituality just the same as Party members."⁶⁵ Every army officer had to know Hitler's "Mein Kampf" very well and become "political commissioner." On 16 October Hitler's speech ended the course. Inspired by its results Dönitz, who was also present

58 See Christian Streit, "General der Infanterie Hermann Reinecke," in: *Hitlers militärische Elite*, 203–209; Peter Longerich, *Hitlers Stellvertreter. Führung der Partei und Kontrolle des Staatsapparates durch den Stab Heß und die Partei-Kanzlei Bormann* (München/London/New York: Saur, 1992), 125.

59 See more Franz A. Heinen, *NS-Ordensburgen. Vogelsang, Sonthofen, Krösingsee* (Berlin: Links, 2011).

60 Förster, "Geistige," 57–571.

61 Willi Dreßen, "Politische Leiter," in: *Enzyklopädie des Nationalsozialismus*, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2007), 708.

62 Hans-Christian Harten, *Himmlers Lehrer. Die Weltanschauliche Schulung in der SS 1933–1945* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2014), 421 ff.

63 Berghahn, "NSDAP," 56–57; Vossler, *Propaganda*, 129; Förster, "Geistige," 586.

64 Mulligan, *Die Männer*, 225–228; Nolzen, "Kriegsmarine," 177.

65 Förster, "Geistige," 576–577; Zoepf, *Wehrmacht*, 69–70.

in Bad Schachen, decided to fundamentally reorganise *Wehrbetreuung* in the Kriegsmarine. On 18 October 1939 he launched the Military Spiritual Staff (*Wehrgeistiger Führungsstab*, WF) located in the Navy Main Office, headed by rear-admiral Friedrich Hüffmeier, a fanatical National Socialist.⁶⁶ This post, which could be compared to that of political commissar in the Red Army, was responsible for maintaining fighting morale and Nazi spirit among sailors. The staff comprised three command departments (*Führungabteilungen I, II, III*) under corvette captain Hans Drenckhan, marine captain Alfred Hans Symons and captain second lieutenant Herbert Just. The average age of the heads of departments and sections in the WF was just 46 years old. The most important part of that institutional process in the navy, however, was the visible change from the concept of *Wehrbetreuung* to a “total war” (*totaler Krieg*) attitude. Within the bounds of *wehrgeistige Führung* members of the Kriegsmarine from that time on were to be systematically penetrated by Nazi ideology and not only be “looked after” (*betreut*).⁶⁷

National Socialist Leadership Officers

Meanwhile, in autumn and winter 1943, the way was paved for a fundamental reorganisation of *wehrgeistige Führung* in the whole Wehrmacht. Driving forces behind the process were the Main Army Office, which wanted to systematise the “military spiritual leadership” in all army branches, and *Partei-Kanzlei*, insisting on stronger participation of the NSDAP in those matters. Regardless of the fact, Reinecke, Bormann and their employees aimed simultaneously at centralising *wehrgeistige Führung* in the offices of army and Party. Thanks to their initiative, on 22 December 1943 Hitler signed a decree, prepared by the AWA, that took the “military spiritual leadership” to another level.⁶⁸ The Führer ordered to establish the Nazi Leadership Staff in the OKW (*NS-Führungsstab*, NSF-OKW) and assigned it a task to secure “formation of political objectives [*Willensbildung*] and activation necessary for the units.”⁶⁹ Reinecke was appointed the overall head of NSF-OKW and was obliged to engage the NSDAP as a “bearer of political will” more in the process of military indoctrination. Moreover,

66 Förster, “Geistige,” 586–589; Rudolf Absolon, *Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich. 19. Dezember 1941 bis 9. Mai 1945*, vol. 6 (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1995), 212 ff.

67 Nolzen, “Kriegsmarine,” 177–178.

68 Dokument 289, in: “Führer-Erlasse” 1939–1945. *Edition sämtlicher überlieferter, nicht im Reichsgesetzblatt abgedruckter, von Hitler während des Zweiten Weltkrieges schriftlich erteilter Direktiven aus den Bereichen Staat, Partei, Wirtschaft, Besatzungspolitik und Militärverwaltung*, ed. Martin Moll (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1997), 381–382.

69 Vide Peter Joachim Lapp, *Hitlers NS-Führungsoffiziere 1944/45. Die letzten Propagandisten des Endsieges* (Aachen: Helios, 2019), 11 ff.

he was supposed to propose suitable officers who had to take over the further Nazification of each army's branch. Those officers were named National Socialist Leadership Officers (*Nationalsozialistische Führungsoffiziere*, NSFO) and they were subordinate to respective unit commanders. They were responsible for both military command and political education/instruction. Therefore, the NSFO were not like the political commissars of the Soviet Army, who were deprived of any military command. The NSFO were installed in land, aerial forces and in the navy up to division level on a full-time basis, as well as in regiments, battalions and companies as voluntary workers.⁷⁰ When necessary they replaced previous indoctrination officers in military units who proved themselves to be unsuitable or not ardent enough for the task of *Schulung*. Reinecke's officers above all had to bring soldiers much closer to Nazi ideology through lectures, courses and discussions; the main task was to induce strong conviction so as to reinforce fanatic fighting spirit and morale, and therefore change Germany's critical military situation.⁷¹

Initially in the army besides the *NS-Führungsstab* there were also new leadership staff established, mostly on the basis of the previous personnel of *Wehrgeistige Führungsstäbe*.⁷² Dönitz established *NS-Führungsstab* in the OKM on 10 January 1944.⁷³ On the same day the first workshop for commanders and leaders of units of indoctrination courses in the Weimar began, the two next seminars for U-boat commanding officers and flotilla medics took place in Danzig and in Angers in western France. The events were still planned within the bounds of *wehrgeistige Führung* in the Kriegsmarine. In three Wehrmacht branches the activity of *NS-Führungsstäbe* began very slowly and soon proved itself to be time-consuming. At first a working team in the Party Chancellery (*Arbeitsstab für NS-Führungsfragen der Parteikanzlei/Gruppe II F der Parteikanzlei*) was launched, whose task was to coordinate the *Truppenbetreuung* of other party offices and to adapt to the new requirements.⁷⁴ Wilhelm "Willi" Ruder was appointed as head of the working team as he was for a long time active in the ideological training apparatus in the NSDAP.⁷⁵ *Partei-Kanzlei* had the right of nomination of the NSFO. The officers were regular Wehrmacht officers, but they had to be approved by Ruder's commission. Its members had to be checked in terms of political "flawlessness" and application to Nazi criteria. In order to tackle selection and training Ruder turned to the Party's district personnel offices (*Gaupersonnlämter*), which as a rule nominated for the NSFO only those candidates who had been members of the

70 Messerschmidt, *Die Wehrmacht*, 452

71 Nolzen, *Kriegsmarine*, 178.

72 Förster, "Geistige," 590–601.

73 Zoepf, *Wehrmacht*, 130–131.

74 *Ibidem*, 137–138.

75 Longerich, *Hitlers*, 181.

NSDAP or its organisational associations.⁷⁶ The most vital criterion was the necessity to be “militarily and politically tried and tested.”⁷⁷

The proposals of *Gaupersonlämter* were transferred then by *Partei-Kanzlei* to the NSF-OKW and from there to *NS-Führungsstäbe* in land, air forces and the navy. In general the proposed NSFO could take up his duties only after consent given by the respective commander’s unit. *Partei-Kanzlei* had to wait for the crucial decision to be made by the military authority.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, that was mutual because implementing regulations for Hitler’s decree from 22 December 1943 enabled the commanders to let certain officers of *wehrgeistige Führung* continue their work as NSFOs. The appointment was possible after the positive evaluation of the candidate by the Party’s district personnel offices. All in all, the selection process could be seen as a mutual suggestion and assessment exchange of rights between the Wehrmacht and the NSDAP.⁷⁹ In the Kriegsmarine it lasted until 13 March 1944 when Dönitz finally announced binding criteria for selection of the future Nazi Leadership officers. Those had to fulfil such conditions as: “1) being an unconditional National Socialist, 2) special personal skills, 3) outstanding probation at the front, 4) experience and practical competences in the political and ideological leadership and education: membership in the Party and active political activity as political leader are desired (...).”⁸⁰ The NSF officers in the OKM, under the overall leadership of Friedrich Hüffmeier, seemed to fulfil all those requirements. According to the OKW in autumn 1944 the personnel of the NSFO consisted of 32 officers and teachers.⁸¹ Among them there were 6 active and 26 officers in the reserve status. Nineteen out of 32 employees (59%) were members of the NSDAP, and likewise 19% of them were “believing in God” (*gottgläubig*). The percentage share of *Parteigenossen* lay exactly between the figures of the NSF-OKW (77%) and NSF-OKH (45%). By the end of 1944, approximately 47,000 secondary NSFO and 1,100 primary NSFOs took part in political courses.⁸²

In the navy as far as the appointment of the NSFO is concerned, Hüffmeier and his employees required from lower marine authorities staff proposals. After evaluating them they handed the candidatures further to the NSF-OKW, which consulted the Party Chancellery. Only after the candidature was agreed by both sides, such a person could finally be appointed as an NSFO (initially on a temporary basis). The time-consuming procedure meant that before 1 April 1944 there was not a single NSFO active

76 See Besson, “Zur Geschichte,” 104–112.

77 Nolzen, “Kriegsmarine,” 179.

78 See Messerschmidt, *Die Wehrmacht*, 449.

79 Zoepf, *Wehrmacht*, 151–168.

80 Hartwig, *Großadmiral*, 181, 365.

81 Zoepf, *Wehrmacht*, 129.

82 Nolzen, *Kriegsmarine*, 179.

in the Kriegsmarine.⁸³ What is interesting, frequently the *Gaupersonlämter* rejected the candidates from land, aerial forces and from the navy because of their alleged “reactionary attitude.” Three branches of the Wehrmacht, however, often disagreed with the proposals coming from the NSDAP.⁸⁴ In addition, there was even an example of a marine officer who, with reference to his critical attitude towards National Socialism, refused to accept the post.⁸⁵

The regular activity of the NSFO in the Wehrmacht war further delayed them, by necessity of the candidates, to take part beforehand in an educational course (*Schulungslehrgang*) organised in Ordensburg Krössinsee in Pomerania (today Złocieniec in Poland), the first of three Nazi educational centres constructed in Germany for cadres of the NSDAP.⁸⁶ The initial indoctrination seminar started on 8 March 1944. It lasted 10 days and was followed by the same standard scheme. At first Reinecke or one of his employees had an introductory lecture about the aims of the NSFO’s apparatus.⁸⁷ In the next days all those present had to endure 30 lectures, whose topics were agreed between *Partei-Kanzlei* and the NSF-OKW. The NSDAP’s representatives like Ruder gave, for example, lengthy talks about “the historical position of the NSDAP” or “the relation between the NSDAP and the Wehrmacht.” The courses re-educated hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of German soldiers with virulent antisemitic propaganda, like the notion of Jewish people as parasites or rats to be exterminated.⁸⁸ The lectures, with which the officers should be instructed and fanaticised, were accompanied also by a rich supporting programme. It included morning appeal, hoisting the swastika flag, performances of opera plays, puppeteering, comedies or watching films and participation in “evenings of comradeship” (*Kameradschaftsabende*). The leisure activities were to be organised in an unsuspecting and “unpolitical” manner of “cultural work” (*Kulturarbeit*), which was already present in the army in the form of *Truppenbetreuung* from September 1939. The supporting programme of *Schulung* in Ordensburg Krössinsee had two main tasks. On the one hand it should give the prospective NSFO practical instructions how to effectively indoctrinate soldiers in the Nazi spirit. On the other hand, the NSDAP and the NSF-OKW had the opportunity to check in detail the individual stance and character of the participants. In order to do so they were

83 Walmrath, “*Iustitia*,” 336–337.

84 J. Förster, “Geistige,” 610–613.

85 Zoepf, *Wehrmacht*, 167.

86 See more Rolf Sawinski, *Die Ordensburg Krössinsee in Pommern. Von der NS-Ordensburg zur polnischen Kaserne* (Aachen: Helios, 2008).

87 Zoepf, *Wehrmacht*, 169–202.

88 Saul Friedländer, *Die Jahre der Vernichtung. Das Dritte Reich und die Juden, 1933–1939*, vol. 1 (München: C.H. Beck, 1998), 799; Werner Rahn, “Dönitz, die Marineführung und die Verteidigung der ‘Festung Europa,’” in: *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, vol. 10/1: *Die militärische Niederwerfung der Wehrmacht*, eds. Horst Boog and Rolf Dieter Müller (München: DVA, 2008), 42.

assigned to work communities (*Arbeitsgemeinschaften*) that had to fill the supporting programme with content. Every community was headed by a Party functionary and an officer from the NSF–OKW. They assessed the candidates in writing. Together with positions of *Gaupersonl amter* the assessments were the basis for the final selection decision.⁸⁹

After the unsuccessful assassination attempt on Hitler on 20 July 1944 the regime intensified its efforts to thoroughly penetrate soldiers with Nazi ideology and to strengthen the ties between the army and the NSDAP. Such demands were also present in Reinecke’s appeal concerning “the rescue of the F uhrer” on 21 July 1944. D onitz made that suggestion his own and during the conference of the Kriegsmarine’s commanders on 24–25 July 1944 he explained long-windedly the alleged contexts of the assassination attempt. He said that the “fanatical fight” was “our vocation and our fate” and therefore every navy commander had to “fanatically stand behind the Nazi state and unconditionally educate and set the units appropriately.”⁹⁰ Militant fanaticism in the Kriegsmarine, however, was far below the expectations of the NSDAP, which was evident for instance at a meeting between Ruder and D onitz on 17 October 1944.⁹¹ Ruder stressed that the indoctrination work of the NSFO needed a “clear, ideological declaration of belief” and henceforth it was contested by the “denominationally bound” (*konfessionell Gebundene*) Christian officers in the navy, especially by the younger ones. He gave an example of a lay priest who was sent by a captain of a certain ship to one of the NSFO’s courses. While having a lecture the priest was repeatedly interrupted by Party hecklers and eventually had to leave the seminar. In response, D onitz promised in future not to propose as NSFO officers anyone who was “denominationally controlled” and to prepare the relevant decree. Otherwise he was content with *wehrgeistige F uhrung* in his sphere of command. In his opinion, Hitler’s decree of 22 December 1943 was not necessary for the navy because its “fighting spirit” could not be more outbid.⁹²

The Party Chancellery, however, viewed work of the NSFO in the Kriegsmarine clearly in a more negative light, which showed an internal document of the NSDAP from the end of the year 1944. At that point in time there were 1074 full-time (*hauptamtlich*) and 47,332 secondary/additional (*nebenamtlich*) NSFOs active in the three branches of the Wehrmacht.⁹³ In the navy there were only 37 full-time and 900 additional NSFOs. In the first category there were 11 active officers (29.7%) and 26 suspended officers (70.3%). Twenty-seven of the full-time NSFOs were members

89 Nolzen, “Kriegsmarine,” 180.

90 Salewski, *Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung*, 645; Hartwig, *Gro admiral*, 170–178.

91 Zoepf, *Wehrmacht*, 307–310.

92 Nolzen, “Kriegsmarine,” 181.

93 Vide Zoepf, *Wehrmacht*, 207–208.

of the NSDAP (73%), whereas 18 of them described themselves as “believing in God” (48.6%); so in Ruder’s terms they got rid of a burden of the “denominational bond.” The numbers were far under average in the land forces, where out of 624 full-time NSFOs 556 were *Parteigenossen* (89.2%) and 389 were *gottgläubig* (62.4%). In 13 indoctrination courses held in Ordensburg Krössinsee 2435 candidates participated for NSFOs from the three Wehrmacht branches. Among them were 462 persons from the navy, so overall only 5 percent. They were assessed on four levels: “exceptionally suitable”, “full-time suitable”, “additionally suitable” and “unsuitable.” In the Kriegsmarine conspicuous was the average low number of full-time NSFOs (4%). It was under the analogical number in *Heer* and therefore the NSDAP saw it as unsatisfactory. The result could be explained on the one hand by further existence of Christian traditions and, in terms of the NSDAP, “reactionary forces” in the navy, which were “unsuitable” for the future cooperation with the Party.⁹⁴ In that context Ruder explained in February 1945 in a lecture that, in the view of the Party, the directive of “political soldiers” had been widely disregarded and correcting it would secure the inner force of the army: “To the revolutionary will of the enemy (...), we must as of now oppose the full revolutionary power of National Socialism. (...) Wehrmacht, Party, Volkssturm: all of them are the National Socialist revolution. The German soldier thus fights as an armed National-Socialist. Waging war in a purely military fashion is not enough.”⁹⁵ In the last days of the “Thousand Year Reich” such appeals only fell on deaf ears and even Dönitz was no longer very interested in the continuation of the NSFO’s work.

After 20 April 1945, facing the destruction of the Third Reich, Hitler appointed Dönitz as his successor as president of the country, minister of war and supreme commander of the Wehrmacht.⁹⁶ After Hitler’s suicide on 30 April, Dönitz opened negotiations for surrender. After the capitulation of Germany in Reims on 7 May 1945 (to the Soviets two days later) he remained as head of the Flensburg Government, as it became known.⁹⁷ Dönitz and his administration were permitted to stay in Flensburg for another two weeks, until their arrest on May 23.⁹⁸ During cabinet meetings they debated meaningless issues, for example whether portraits of Hitler should be removed. That fact can be seen as a total retreat from Nazi propaganda, not only in the army. After

94 Nolzen, “Kriegsmarine,” 181–182.

95 Kunz, *Wehrmacht*, 240–241.

96 Walter Baum, “Marine, Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand,” *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1 (1963): 17–18, 39.

97 Vide Michael Jones, *After Hitler. The Last Days of the Second World War in Europe* (London: Hachette UK, 2015), 88 ff.; Ian Kershaw, *The End. Hitler’s Germany 1944–45* (London: Allen Lane, 2011), 360 ff.; Herbert Kraus, “Karl Dönitz und das Ende des ‘Dritten Reiches’ in Flensburg 1945,” in: *Lange Schatten. Ende der NS-Diktatur und frühe Nachkriegsjahre in Flensburg*, eds. Broder Schwensen, et.al. (Flensburg: Stadtarchiv Flensburg, 2000), 14 ff.

98 Peter Padfield, *Dönitz – des Teufels Admiral* (Berlin, et.al.: Ullstein, 1984), 503 ff.

that period Dönitz was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1946.⁹⁹ He was released from prison ten years later. In the next years, Dönitz portrayed himself as a professional soldier who allegedly knew nothing of Hitler's expansionist plans and crimes. In reality, he was totally devoted to Hitler.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, Dönitz wilfully ignored the genocidal nature of the Nazi regime and later claimed ignorance of the Holocaust.¹⁰¹

Conclusions

In summary, it must be stressed that between the navy under Erich Raeder and the NSDAP there was no institutionalised communication, which could be gathered from the relations between the OKM and *Partei-Kanzlei* in the years 1935–1943. In a way it was not necessary because, as part of the Wehrmacht in the Nazi state, the navy acted within the bounds of political guidelines. There were, though, some personal connections between the Kriegsmarine and the Party as many of its members belonged to the NSDAP.¹⁰² Bormann developed regular contacts, however, with the OKM since 1941/1942. When Dönitz took up the post of the commander-in-chief of the German navy that formal structure was loosened a bit. Nonetheless, what showed the example of the “military spiritual leadership,” there was the development of an extensive adaptation of institutional practice in the Kriegsmarine and the NSDAP. That process could not only be put down to a causal model of cause and effect, but it could be described rather as “institutional isomorphism.”¹⁰³ Institutional isomorphism is a concept of institutional theory “to explain the homogeneity of organisations in a field.” In another words it is “a similarity of the processes or structure of one organisation to those of another, be it the result of imitation or independent development under similar constraints.” American sociologists Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell developed in 1983 a pioneering framework that analysed the “different mechanisms, including

99 Hartwig, *Großadmiral*, 42 ff. Erich Raeder was also taken to Nuremberg to stand trial on the counts of conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; planning, initiating, and waging wars of aggression; and crimes against the laws of war. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Due to his ill health Raeder was released in September 1955. See Bird, *Kriegsmarine*, 283 et. seqq.

100 Hartwig, *Großadmiral*, 192.

101 Terraine, *Business*, 520–522.

102 Lehnstaedt, “Der Angriff,” 138.

103 The term comes from a book by an American sociologist Amos H. Hawley, *Human Ecology. A Theoretical Essay* (Chicago: Chicago Press, 1968). See also Richard W. Scott, *Institutions and Organizations. Ideas and Interests* (Los Angeles, et.al.: Sage, 2008), 151–158.

coercive, mimetic and normative, through which isomorphism occurs.”¹⁰⁴ The institutional adaptation of the navy and the NSDAP began with *wehrgeistige Führung*, then with imitation. In that context the High Command of the Kriegsmarine imitated at first the activities of DAF and KdF so as to “look after” (*betreuen*) its members, and also by incorporating semantics used in the NSDAP. In the second step the normative pressure played an important role, which resulted from “general compulsory military service” (*Allgemeine Wehrpflicht*). It manifested itself primarily in the growing number of *Parteigenossen* and *Politische Leiter*, who were also active in the navy. Their specific competences included, from spring 1943, the “internal leadership” indoctrination component. Finally institutional isomorphism between the Kriegsmarine and the Party was accelerated by the *Führererlass* from 22 December 1943 and after 20 July 1944. Then came a stronger dependence of the Wehrmacht on the other Nazi organisations. The autonomy of the army in the Third Reich began at that time to systematically erode.¹⁰⁵

Previous research concerning *wehrgeistige Führung* in the war years has been implicitly interested in its short- and medium-term implications. On the one hand it tries to explain the relatively long resistance of German soldiers to excessive ideological fanaticism; on the other some explorations indicate the military points of view, especially an oath of loyalty to Hitler, sometimes referred in as the Soldier’s Oath, taken by soldiers and officers in the Third Reich after 1934, so a vital psychological element to follow orders (as well as for justifying war atrocities).¹⁰⁶ Another factor in this case could be primary group bonds among soldiers.¹⁰⁷ The mentioned interpretations, which are present also in the research regarding the Kriegsmarine, are obviously logical, but they contain a major methodical problem. They are lacking an analytical framework necessary to assess the impact of mental dispositions on individual behaviour. In many studies there is an insufficient distinction between education and socialisation. *Wehrgeistige Führung* is the question of education, namely an intentional change of persons

104 Vide Paul J. DiMaggio, Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited. Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” *American Sociological Review* 48 (1983): 147–160; Ana Krajnović, “Institutional theory and isomorphism: limitations in multinational companies,” *Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management* 5 (2018): 1–7; Konstanze Senge, *Das Neue am Neo-Institutionalismus. Der Neo-Institutionalismus im Kontext der Organisationswissenschaft* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften in GWV Fachverlage, 2011), 99–135.

105 Nolzen, “Kriegsmarine,” 182–183.

106 See more Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint, Robert J. Pritchard, *Total War. The Causes and Courses of the Second World War* (Harmondsworth: Viking, 1989), 57; Marc Cogen, *Democracies and the Shock of War. The Law as a Battlefield* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016), 187; Müller, *Das Heer*, 135–136.

107 Vide Thomas Kühne, *Kameradschaft. Die Soldaten des nationalsozialistischen Krieges und das 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, 2006).

by other persons.¹⁰⁸ The same concerns military education in the Wehrmacht, which was of course an intentional process within the organisation. Factors like bonds of camaraderie, pressure of a group, expectations, nationalism or internalisation of military values and norms, however, are undoubtedly phenomena of socialisation, which takes place in all social processes and cannot be controlled because it is unintentional by nature.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, in order to fully explain the situational behaviour of German soldiers, not only during the war, education and socialisation had to always be taken into consideration, as well as the internal organisational perspective of the certain Wehrmacht's branch. The most vital part for military scholars is the analysis of connection or interdependence between education and socialisation of soldiers, preferably in the form of the social history of the army. The Wehrmacht as a specific type of organisation needs to be examined also on the basis of organisation–sociological methods.¹¹⁰

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Absolon, Rudolf. *Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich*, vol. 6: 19. Dezember 1941 bis 9. Mai 1945. Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1995.
- Admiral Karl Dönitz (1891–1980). Accessed 22 November 2021. https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/donitz_karl_admiral.shtml.
- Bamford, Tyler. *Nazi Germany's Last Leader: Admiral Karl Dönitz*. Accessed November 22, 2021. <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/nazi-germanys-leader-admiral-karl-donitz>.
- Bartov, Omer. "Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich." In: *The Third Reich. The Essential Readings*, edited by Christian Leitz, 129–150. London: Blackwell, 1999.
- Baum, Walter. "Marine, Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand, *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1 (1963): 16–48.
- Bendert, Harald. *Die UC-Boote der Kaiserlichen Marine 1914–1918. Minenkrieg mit U-Booten*. Hamburg/Berlin/Bonn, Mittler Verlag, 2001.

108 Vide Niklas Luhmann, *Das Erziehungssystem der Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), 48–81.

109 In the Kriegsmarine the expressions of education and socialisation, mental perceptions and interpretation patterns of behaviour could be found in the notes of cadets. They all had to keep a logbook (*Logbuch*) of important events, operations and navigation of a ship, which was controlled by a superior. Such logbooks during the war were often heavily impacted by Nazi propaganda and ideology as the cadets were mainly the generation of twenty-year-old men; their socialisation as adolescents had already taken place under Hitler's rule. They were saturated with racial stereotypes or taught that violence and force were normal political means. Zob. S. Lehnstaedt, K. Lehnstaedt, "Der Angriff," pp. 139–170; Jentzsch, "Die Ausbildung," 163; Michael Buddrus, *Totale Erziehung für den totalen Krieg. Hitlerjugend und nationalsozialistische Jugendpolitik*, vol. 1–2 (München: Saur, 2003).

110 Nolzen, "Kriegsmarine," 183; Lehnstaedt, "Der Angriff," 139.

- Bensel, Rolf. *Die deutsche Flottenpolitik von 1933 bis 1939. Eine Studie über die Rolle des Flottenbaus in Hitlers Außenpolitik.* Beiheft 3 der "Marine-Rundschau." Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1958.
- Berghahn, Volker R. "NSDAP und "geistige Führung" der Wehrmacht 1939–1943." *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1 (1969): 17–71.
- Besson, Waldemar. "Zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialistischen Führungsoffiziers." *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 1 (1961): 76–116.
- Bird, Keith W. *Weimar, the German Naval Officer Corps and the Rise of National Socialism.* New York: Grüner, 1977.
- Bird, Keith W. *Kriegsmarine i Raeder.* Translated by Aleksandra Górska. Warszawa: Bellona, 2012.
- Boog, Horst. *Die deutsche Luftwaffenführung 1935–1945. Führungsprobleme, Spitzengliederung, Generalstabsausbildung.* Stuttgart: DVA, 1982.
- Bradley, Dermot. Hans H. Hildebrand, and Ernest Henriot, eds. *Deutschlands Admirale 1849–1945. Die militärischen Werdegänge der See-, Ingenieur-, Sanitäts-, Waffen- und Verwaltungsoffiziere im Admiralsrang.* Vol 1: A–G (Ackermann bis Gygas). Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1988.
- Buchheim, Hans. *Glaubenskrise im Dritten Reich. Drei Kapitel nationalsozialistischer Religionspolitik.* Stuttgart: DVA, 1953.
- Buchheim, Lothar–Günther. *U-Boot-Krieg.* München: Piper, 1997.
- Buddrus, Michael. *Totale Erziehung für den totalen Krieg. Hitlerjugend und nationalsozialistische Jugendpolitik,* Vol. 1–2. München: Saur, 2003.
- Calvocoressi, Peter, Guy Wint, and Robert J. Pritchard. *Total War. The Causes and Courses of the Second World War.* Harmondsworth: Viking, 1989.
- Cogen, Marc. *Democracies and the Shock of War. The Law as a Battlefield.* Farnham: Ashgate, 2016.
- Costello, John, and Terry Hughes. *Atlantikschlacht. Der Krieg zur See 1939–1945.* Bergisch Gladbach: Bastei Lübbe, 1995.
- DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. "The Iron Cage Revisited. Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields." *American Sociological Review* 48 (1983): 147–160. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2095101>.
- Dreßen, Willi. "Politische Leiter." In: *Enzyklopädie des Nationalsozialismus*, edited by Wolfgang Benz, 708. Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta, 2007.
- Dülffer, Jost. *Weimar, Hitler und die Marine. Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920–1930.* Düsseldorf: Droste, 1973.
- Dülffer, Jost. "Wilhelm II. und Adolf Hitler. Ein Vergleich ihrer Marinekonzeptionen." In: *Kiel, die Deutschen und die See*, edited by Jürgen Elvert, 49–69. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992.

- Epkenhans, Michael. "Tirpitz und das Scheitern der Kaiserlichen Marine im Ersten Weltkrieg." In: *Personen – soziale Bewegungen – Parteien. Beiträge zur Neuesten Geschichte. Festschrift für Hartmut Soell*, edited by Oliver von Mengersen, 15–36. Heidelberg: Manutius, 2004.
- Fischer, Kurt. "Großadmiral Dr. phil. h. c. Erich Raeder." In: *Hitler's militärische Elite*, Vol. 1: *Von den Anfängen des Regimes bis Kriegsbeginn*, edited by Gerd R. Ueberschär, 185–194. Darmstadt: Primus-Verl., 1998.
- Förster, Jürgen. "Geistige Kriegführung in Deutschland 1919 bis 1945." In: *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, vol. 9: *Die deutsche Kriegsgesellschaft 1939 bis 1945*. Section 1: *Politisierung, Vernichtung, Überleben*, edited by Jörg Echternkamp. 484–505. München: DVA, 2004.
- Friedländer, Saul. *Die Jahre der Vernichtung. Das Dritte Reich und die Juden*, Vol. 1: 1933–1939. München: C.H. Beck, 1998.
- Grebing, Helga. *Der Nationalsozialismus. Ursprung und Wesen*. München: Isar-Verl., 1964.
- Harten, Hans-Christian. *Himmlers Lehrer. Die Weltanschauliche Schulung in der SS 1933–1945*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2014.
- Hartwig, Dieter. *Großadmiral Karl Dönitz. Legende und Wirklichkeit*. Paderborn/München/Wien: Schöningh, 2010.
- Hawley, Amos H. *Human Ecology. A Theoretical Essay*. Chicago: Chicago Press, 1968.
- Heinen, Franz A. *NS-Ordensburgen. Vogelsang, Sonthofen, Krösinsee*. Berlin: Links, 2011.
- Hirt, Alexander. "Die deutsche Truppenbetreuung im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Konzeption, Organisation und Wirkung." *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift* 2 (2000): 407–434.
- History.com Editors, *Hitler purges members of his own Nazi party in Night of the Long Knives*. Accessed 19 November 2021. <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/night-of-the-long-knives>.
- Hitler, Adolf. *Mein Kampf. Zwei Bände in einem Band. Ungekürzte Ausgabe*. München: Franz Eher Verlag, 1943.
- Hobson, Rolf. *Maritimer Imperialismus. Seemachtideologie, seestrategisches Denken und der Tirpitzplan 1875 bis 1914*. München: Oldenbourg, 2004.
- Hutten, Kurt. "Die Deutsche Glaubensbewegung." In: *Die Nation vor Gott. Zur Botschaft der Kirche im Dritten Reich (1933)*, edited by Walter Künneht, Helmuth Schreiner, 506–533. Berlin: Wichern Verlag, 1934.
- Jentzsch, Christian. "Die Ausbildung zum Marineoffizier während der Kriegsjahre 1939–1945." In: *Die Kriegsmarine. Eine Bestandsaufnahme*, edited by Stephan Huck, 161–172. Bochum: Verlag Dr. Dieter Winkler, 2016.
- Jones, Michael. *After Hitler. The Last Days of the Second World War in Europe*. London: Hachette UK, 2015.

- Junginger, Horst. "Die Deutsche Glaubensbewegung als ideologisches Zentrum der völkisch-religiösen Bewegung." In: *Die völkisch-religiöse Bewegung im Nationalsozialismus. Eine Beziehungs- und Konfliktgeschichte*, edited by Uwe Puschner, Clemens Vollhals, 65–101. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, 2012.
- Kershaw, Ian. *The End. Hitler's Germany 1944–45*. London: Allen Lane, 2011.
- Klemperer, Victor. *Language of the Third Reich. LTI: Lingua Tertii Imperii. A Philologist's Notebook*. Translated by Martin Brady. New York: A&C Black, 2000.
- Krajnović, Ana. "Institutional theory and isomorphism: limitations in multinational companies." *Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management* 5 (2018): 1–7.
- Kraus, Herbert. "Karl Dönitz und das Ende des "Dritten Reiches" in Flensburg 1945." In: *Lange Schatten. Ende der NS-Diktatur und frühe Nachkriegsjahre in Flensburg*, edited by Broder Schwensen, Gerhard Paul, Peter Wulf, 6–19. Flensburg: Stadtarchiv Flensburg, 2000.
- Kühne, Thomas. *Kameradschaft. Die Soldaten des nationalsozialistischen Krieges und das 20. Jahrhundert*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, 2006.
- Kunz, Andreas. *Wehrmacht und Niederlage. Die bewaffnete Macht in der Endphase der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft 1944 bis 1945*. München: Oldenbourg, 2005.
- Lapp, Peter Joachim. *Hitlers NS-Führungsoffiziere 1944/45. Die letzten Propagandisten des Endsieges*. Aachen: Helios, 2019.
- Lehnstaedt, Stephan. Lehnstaedt, Kurt. "Der Angriff der "Schleswig-Holstein" auf die Westerplatte. Aus dem Logbuch des Seekadetten Hans Buch." In: *80 Jahre danach. Bilder und Tagebücher deutscher Soldaten vom Überfall auf Polen 1939*, edited by Svea Hammerle, Hans-Christian Jasch, Stephan Lehnstaedt. 135–172. Berlin: Metropol, 2019.
- Lemke, Bernd. *Luftschutz in Großbritannien und Deutschland 1923 bis 1939. Zivile Kriegsvorbereitungen als Ausdruck der staats- und gesellschaftspolitischen Grundlagen von Demokratie und Diktatur*. München: Oldenbourg, 2005.
- Longerich, Peter. *Hitlers Stellvertreter. Führung der Partei und Kontrolle des Staatsapparates durch den Stab Heß und die Partei-Kanzlei Bormann*. München/London/New York: Saur, 1992.
- Luhmann, Niklas. *Das Erziehungssystem der Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002.
- Megargee, Geoffrey. *Hitler und die Generäle. Das Ringen um die Führung der Wehrmacht 1933–1945*. Translated by Karl Nicolai. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006.
- Messerschmidt, Manfred. *Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat. Zeit der Indoktrination*. Hamburg: R. v. Decker, 1969.
- Milner, Marc. *Bitwa o Atlantyck*. Translated by Grzegorz Siwek. Warszawa: Muza, 2012.

- Moll, Martin, ed. "Führer-Erlasse" 1939–1945. *Edition sämtlicher überlieferter, nicht im Reichsgesetzblatt abgedruckter, von Hitler während des Zweiten Weltkrieges schriftlich erteilter Direktiven aus den Bereichen Staat, Partei, Wirtschaft, Besatzungspolitik und Militärverwaltung*. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1997.
- Mulligan, Timothy P. *Die Männer der deutschen U-Bootwaffe 1939–1945*. Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 2001.
- Müller, Klaus-Jürgen. *Das Heer und Hitler. Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime 1933–1940*. Stuttgart: Dt. Verlag-Anst., 1988.
- Müller, Rolf Dieter, and Hans-Erich Volkmann, eds. *Die Wehrmacht. Mythos und Realität*. München: Oldenbourg, 1999.
- Müller, Rolf Dieter. *Hitler's Wehrmacht 1935–1945*. Translated by Janice W. Ancker. Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2016, Ebook.
- Nolzen, Armin. "Kriegsmarine, NSDAP und "wehrgeistige Führung" im Zweiten Weltkrieg." In: *Die Kriegsmarine. Eine Bestandsaufnahme*, edited by S. Huck, 173–188. Bochum: Verlag Dr. Dieter Winkler, 2016.
- Nolzen, Armin. "Von der geistigen Assimilation zur institutionellen Kooperation. Das Verhältnis zwischen NSDAP und Wehrmacht 1943–1945." In: *Kriegsende 1945 in Deutschland*, edited by Jörg Hillmann, John Zimmermann, 173–188. München: Oldenbourg, 2002.
- O'Neill, Robert. *The German Army and the Nazi Party*. London: Heineman, 1966.
- Padfield, Peter. *Dönitz – des Teufels Admiral*. Berlin/Frankfurt am Main/Wien: Ullstein, 1984.
- Patzwall, Klaus D., Scherzer, Veit. *Das Deutsche Kreuz 1941–1945. Geschichte und Inhaber*. Vol. 2. Norderstedt: Patzwall, 2001.
- Pfannes, Charles E. Salamone, Victor A. *The Great Admirals of World War II*. Vol. 2: *The Germans*. New York: Zebra Books, 1984.
- Poewe, Karla, and Irving Hexham, "Jakob Wilhelm Hauer's New Religion and National Socialism." *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 20 (2005): 195–215.
- Pöpping, Dagmar. *Kriegspfarrer an der Ostfront Evangelische und katholische Wehrmachtseelsorge im Vernichtungskrieg 1941–1945*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, 2017.
- Raeder, Erich M. *My Life*. Translated by Henry W. Drexel. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1960.
- Rahn, Werner. "Der Seekrieg im Atlantik und Nordmeer." In: *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, vol. 6: *Der globale Krieg. Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiative, 1941–1943*, edited by Horst Boog, Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 273–425. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1990.

- Rahn, Werner. "Dönitz, die Marineführung und die Verteidigung der "Festung Europa." In: *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, vol. 10/1: *Die militärische Niederwerfung der Wehrmacht*, edited by Horst Boog and Rolf Dieter Müller, 5–68. München: DVA, 2008.
- Rahn, Werner. "German Navies from 1848 to 2016. Their Development and Courses from Confrontation to Cooperation." *Naval War College Review* 3 (2017): 1–35.
- Rass, Christoph. "Menschenmaterial." *Deutsche Soldaten an der Ostfront. Innenansichten einer Infanteriedivision, 1939–1945*. Paderborn/München/Wien: Schöningh, 2003.
- Reibel, Carl-Wilhelm. *Das Fundament der Diktatur. Die NSDAP-Ortsgruppen 1932–1945*. Paderborn/München/Wien: Schöningh, 2002.
- Rohrkamp, René. "Weltanschaulich gefestigte Kämpfer." *Die Soldaten der Waffen-SS 1933–1945. Organisation- Personal- Sozialstruktur*. Paderborn/München/Wien: Schöningh, 2010.
- Rohwer, Jürgen. *Der Krieg zur See*. Würzburg: Urbes, 2004.
- Römer, Felix. *Der Kommissarbefehl. Wehrmacht und NS-Verbrechen an der Ostfront 1941/42*. Paderborn/München/Wien: Schöningh, 2008.
- Salewski, Michael. *Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945*. Vol. 1–3. Frankfurt am Main/München: Bernard&Graefe, 1970–1975.
- Salewski, Michael. *Die Deutschen und die See. Studien zur deutschen Marinegeschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, edited by Jürgen Elvert and Stefan Lippert, Vol. 1–2. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1998–2002.
- Sawinski, Rolf. *Die Ordensburg Krössinsee in Pommern. Von der NS-Ordensburg zur polnischen Kaserne*. Aachen: Helios, 2008.
- Scott, Richard W. *Institutions and Organizations. Ideas and Interests*. Los Angeles/London/New Delhi: Sage, 2008.
- Senge, Konstanze. *Das Neue am Neo-Institutionalismus. Der Neo-Institutionalismus im Kontext der Organisationswissenschaft*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften in GWV Fachverlage, 2011.
- Sorge, Siegfried. *Der Marineoffizier als Führer und Erzieher*. Berlin: E. S. Mittler&Sohn, 1937.
- Streit, Christian. "General der Infanterie Hermann Reinecke." In: *Hitlers militärische Elite*, vol. 1: *Von den Anfängen des Regimes bis Kriegsbeginn*, edited by Gerd R. Ueberschär, 203–209. Darmstadt: Primus-Verl., 1998.
- Terraine, John. *Business in Great Waters. The U-Boat Wars, 1916–1945*. London: Pen&Sword, 1989.
- Thomas, Charles S. *The German Navy in the Nazi Era*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990.
- Trotha, Adolf, von. *Volkstum und Staatsführung. Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1915–1920*, Berlin: Grossdeutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1928.

- van der Vat, Dan. *Schlachtfeld Atlantik*. München: Heyne, 1988.
- Vollnhals, Clemens. "Die Evangelische Kirche zwischen Traditionswahrung und Neuorientierung." In: *Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland*, edited by Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans Woller, 113–168. München: Oldenbourg, 1990.
- Voss, Heinfried. "Das neue Haus der Reichswehr." *Militärische Sozialisation im politischen und militärischen Übergang. Der Aufbau der vorläufigen Reichswehr 1919–1920 und ihre politische Funktion in der Republik, dargestellt an ihren badischen Truppenteilen*. St. Katharinen: Scripta Mercaturae, 1992.
- Vossler, Frank. *Propaganda in die eigene Truppe. Die Truppenbetreuung in der Wehrmacht 1939–1945*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005.
- Walmrath, Lothar. "Iustitia et disciplina." *Strafgerichtsbarkeit in der deutschen Kriegsmarine 1939–1945*. Frankfurt am Main, et.al.: Lang, 1998.
- Wegehaupt, Phillip. "Wir grüßen den Hass!": *Die ideologische Schulung und Ausrichtung der NSDAP-Funktionäre im Dritten Reich*. Berlin: Metropol, 2012.
- Weinberg, Gerhard L., ed. *Hitler's Second Book. The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf*. New York: Enigma Books, 2006.
- Zoepf, Arne W.G. *Wehrmacht zwischen Tradition und Ideologie. Der NS-Führungsoffizier im Zweiten Weltkrieg*. Frankfurt am Main, et.al.: Lang, 1988.

English version: Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

The article deals with the problem of institutional mechanics and willingness for acquisition of the Nazi worldview in the Kriegsmarine. In the centre of the reflections remains a crucial question: how the indoctrination process in the German navy took place during the time after 1935. Furthermore, the organisational interactions between the NSDAP and the Kriegsmarine are analysed, as well as motives and limits of the Party's endeavours to ideologically impact the attitudes and views of the sailors. How this development of indoctrination efforts was carried out and what results it brought is described on the basis of the Nazi pseudo-pedagogic concept of "military spiritual leadership" (*wehrgeistige Führung*). As part of the measures to preserve its "state within the state" status, the navy, especially during World War II, began to systematically Nazify itself in a paradoxical aim to show Adolf Hitler that it was not necessary to put an end to its traditional independence. In order to prevent the "coordination" (*Gleichschaltung*) from above, the Kriegsmarine engaged itself more and more in a process of self-indoctrination. The text is an outline of the subject matter.

Indoktrynacja nazistowska w Kriegsmarine i jej relacje z NSDAP w latach 1935–1945 – zarys problematyki

Słowa kluczowe: Kriegsmarine, NSDAP, indoktrynacja

STRESZCZENIE

Artykuł traktuje o problemie mechanizmów instytucjonalnych i gotowości przyswojenia ideologii nazistowskiej w Kriegsmarine. W centrum refleksji pozostaje kluczowe pytanie, w jaki sposób przebiegał proces indoktrynacji w niemieckiej marynarce wojennej po 1935 r. Ponadto, analizowane są organizacyjne interakcje między NSDAP i Kriegsmarine, jak również motywy i ograniczenia zabiegów partii nazistowskiej, by wpłynąć w sposób ideologiczny na postawy i poglądy marynarzy. Na jakiej zasadzie przebiegały te starania oraz jakie przyniosły rezultaty ukazano na podstawie nazistowskiego pseudopedagogicznego konceptu “duchowego przywództwa bojowego” (*wehrgeistige Führung*). Elementem zabiegów korpusu oficerskiego Kriegsmarine, by zachować tradycyjny status “państwa w państwie” paradoksalnie była postępująca nazyfikacja marynarki wojennej, szczególnie w okresie II wojny światowej, której celem miało być udowodnienie Adolfowi Hitlerowi, że nie było konieczne ograniczanie jej tradycyjnej autonomii w ramach sił zbrojnych. W celu uniknięcia odgórnego gwałtownego podważenia autonomii Kriegsmarine ulegała jednak sama coraz bardziej procesowi narodowosocialistycznej indoktrynacji. Niniejszy tekst stanowi zarys omawianej problematyki.

Citation

Wichert, Wojciech. “Nazi Indoctrination of the Kriegsmarine and its Relations with the NSDAP in the Years 1935–1945 – Outline of Subject Matter.” *Studia Maritima* 35 (2022): 159–187. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2022.35-06.



Bolesław Hajduk

The Polish-Scandinavian Institute in Copenhagen
boleslaw.hajduk@gmail.com

Administration and Operation of the Commercial Seaports in Gdańsk and Gdynia During the Second World War

Keywords: war, economy, port, administration, operation

The outbreak of World War II, the incorporation of the former Free City of Gdańsk (*Danzig*) into the Third Reich on 1 September 1939 and the occupation of Gdynia (*Gotenhafen*) by the German army led to considerable changes in the organisational and administrative structure and the economic functions of the seaports in Gdańsk and Gdynia. At the beginning of September 1939, the Harbour and Waterways Council (*Rada Portu i Dróg Wodnych*), which had so far administered the port in Gdańsk, was dissolved, and its powers were transferred to the State Commissioner for the Harbour and Waterways (*Staatskommissar für den Hafen und die Wasserwege*), who worked under the Reich Governor of Gdańsk, Gauleiter Albert Forster. The position of Commissioner was offered to Senator Dr. Albert Frank, and Senate Counsellor Kurt Hoffman was appointed his deputy. The Commissioner's duty was to keep the port operational and to extend its operations after the end of hostilities. He was also responsible for the administrative matters related to the functioning of the port in Gdańsk. Apart from that, the Commissioner was temporarily in charge of the Water Construction Offices (*Urzędy Budownictwa Wodnego*) in Tczew, Grudziądz and Chełmno. The former Gdańsk Delegation (*Gdańska Delegacja*) to the Harbour and Waterways Council was transformed into an advisory body at the office of the State Commissioner, and the officials of the Polish Delegation of the Harbour Council and port workers of Polish nationality were dismissed and some of them were arrested. Further changes in the administration of the port took place at the end of 1939. Pursuant to the Ordinance of 22 December, the responsibility for the management of waterways in the former Polish territories incorporated into the Reich was taken over by the Reich Waterways Administration. As a result of these transformations, the

State Commissioner now administered the waters that were part of the port in Gdańsk extending between the lock in Płonia Wielka and the entrance to the port in Wisłoujście, including the River Motława and the so-called Emperor's Harbour *Kaiserhafen* (see map of the port of Gdańsk – Fig. 1).¹




Figure 1. Map of the port of Gdańsk from 1920 showing investments planned for the years 1921–1945

Explanations to the map: ● Investments made until 1937, ● Investments made during WWII

Source: map edited by Bolesław Hajduk and drawn by Alojzy Data based on Otto Schulze's work *Danzig und sein Hafen* (Hamburg: Hafentechnische-gesellschaft, [1920]), 1.

¹ Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku [State Archives in Gdańsk], Danziger Hafengesellschaft GmbH (hereinafter APG, DHg), 1, 112–114; Ordinance of 22 December 1939; APG, DHg, 2, 115–116; Governor of the Waterways Directorate in Gdańsk to the Management of the Harbour and Waterways in Gdańsk, January 1940; APG, DHg, 136; Governor of the Reich Waterways to the State Commissioner for the Harbour and Waterways in Gdańsk, 15 February 1940; APG, DHg, 137–138, 148–150; Protocol draft, 19 February 1940; Reichsgesetzblatt 259 (30 December 1939): 2501.

The Reich Commissioner was ordered to temporarily take over the administration of the port of Gdynia, which was to become a military port. This decision was approved by the Council of Ministers for the Reich on 29 December 1939. As part of implementing this decision, an agreement was concluded in January 1940 between the Governor of the Reich District (*Reichsgau*) of Danzig–West Prussia and the command of the German Navy, on the basis of which a part of the port of Gdynia was sectioned off for the needs of the civilian economy. The “economic sector” in the port of Gdynia included the Silesian, Danish, Dutch and Fishing Quays (*Nabrzeże Śląskie, Duńskie, Holendersie, Rybackie*) and from 1942 also part of the Polish Quay (*Nabrzeże Polskie*)² (see map of the port of Gdynia – Fig. 2).




Figure 2. Map of the port in Gdynia with the civilian zone marked in navy blue

Source: Map prepared by Bolesław Hajduk based on the work *Port Gdynia* (Gdynia: Instytut Wydawniczy Państwowej Szkoły Morskiej, 1936), map 1.

² APG, DHg, Introduction to the inventory, 2–4; APG, DHg, Harbour and Waterways Council in Gdańsk (*Rada Portu i Dróg Wodnych w Gdańsku*, hereinafter RPDW), 1335, 725–727; State Commissioner for Maritime Shipping to the Port’s Naval Construction Office, 27 July 1942; *Danziger Wirtschaftszeitung* 17/18 (15/09/1939): 494; *Danziger Wirtschaftszeitung* 20 (15/10/1939): 561.

At the beginning of 1940, a decision was made to hand over the management of the port of Gdańsk and the civilian part of the port of Gdynia to a specially-established joint-stock company called “Danziger Hafengesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung” – “Dahag” (“Gdańsk Port Company Limited”). The founding contract was signed on 15 March 1941. The founders were the Reich Governor for the District of Danzig–West Prussia and the City of Gdańsk. A separate Ordinance of the Reich Ministry of Transport of 24 March 1941 specified the organisational structure of “Dahag,” and the firm was registered in the Company Register. The company’s main tasks included the acquisition, operation and maintenance of port facilities, waterways, warehouses, granaries, yards, and similar transshipment facilities. The company’s share capital was set at 1 million marks. Each party forming the company held half of its share capital. Possible losses threatening the company’s existence were to be liquidated by both shareholders. The storage yards, buildings, warehouses and handling facilities handed over to the company for use in the founding contract remained the property of the city. The company was entitled to collect port, handling and storage fees. However, it was obliged to pay 4% of the proceeds to the city, if it generated surplus revenue.³

The company also obtained the right to use designated quays in the port of Gdynia, i.e. the Silesian, Danish, Swedish, Fishing, and Dutch Quays as well as a section of the Polish Quay. Since the company also used a part of the port of Gdynia, its name was changed accordingly to “Danziger Hafengesellschaft mbH Danzig–Gotenhafen” (“Gdańsk Port Company Ltd. Gdańsk/Gdynia”). To be able to use the civilian part of the naval port in Gdynia (*Kriegshafen Gotenhafen*), the company’s management board concluded an agreement with the command of the German Navy which allowed it to carry out trade and service activities in this zone for a period of five years. The company undertook to pay the Navy 20% of its revenue from port fees annually for the use of the quays and handling facilities. In addition, the company paid for the maintenance of the handling equipment, warehouses and storage yards. The Navy, on the other hand, was responsible for renovating the quays, maintaining the navigability of the port basins and marking the fairways. Ultimately, however, the company was not given control over the fishing port in Gdynia, which had previously been leased to “Danziger Fischzentrale GmbH,” a fish processing and trading business. The contract with the Command of the Gdynia Naval Port allowed “Danziger Fischzentrale” to use an office building, a warehouse, a yard for the storage of boxes with fish and a part of a cold

3 APG, DHg, 1, 1–5: Reich Commissioner for the Harbour and Waterways in the District of Danzig–West Prussia to the Reich Ministry of Transport, 20 April 1940; idem, 14–18: Appendices to the draft agreement (15 January 1940), no. 2, 33; *Danziger Wirtschaftszeitung* 10 (15/May/1941): 248–251; *Danziger Wirtschaftszeitung* 17 (1/09/1941).

store located in the port of Gdynia for a rent of 8,000 marks. The remaining area of the fish cold store was used by “Dahag.”⁴

The company’s governing bodies included the shareholders’ assembly, the supervisory board and the management board. The shareholders’ assembly was attended by representatives of the parties forming the company, i.e. representatives of the Reich Governor’s office and Gdańsk city authorities. The use of the port was overseen by the company’s management board, which had been established by creating a separate Port Department in the State Commissioner’s Office. It consisted of the following organisational units: the Administrative Office, the Technical Directorate, the Commercial Directorate, the Financial Department, the Main Cashier’s Office, the Payment Office, Construction Offices in Nowy Port and Przegalin, as well as the Quay Management Office and the Pilots’ Office.⁵

The clerical staff of “Dahag” consisted of civil servant officers formerly employed at the Gdańsk Delegation to the Harbour Council taken over by the State Commissioner. They still remained municipal civil servant officers of the City of Gdańsk, but they were granted leave from the civil service for the duration of their employment in “Dahag.” Eighty-three civil servant officers and fifty-one retirees who were still in service were transferred to “Gdańsk Port Company.” For handling operations in the Gdańsk–Gdynia port complex, the company’s management board hired Germans and people of “foreign” origin either as free or forced workers. The hired workers recruited after 22 June 1941 in the western regions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics occupied by the Third Reich, who were called “Eastern workers” (*Ostarbeiter*), were treated as temporary workers and were therefore paid lower wages. Among the prisoners of war working in the port of Gdańsk, the largest group were Russians. The share of *Ostarbeiters* and prisoners of war employed in freight handling operations at the ports of Gdańsk and Gdynia grew as the military situation of the Third Reich deteriorated and more and more German workers were directed to military service. Due to the rapid increase in the number of foreign workers in the port of Gdańsk, the camp in Wisłoujście they were living in was enlarged. In 1941 and 1942, two new barracks for 192 people were built there. It is worth noting that, in 1944, workers from abroad constituted the majority of the staff of skilled workers employed in the port of Gdańsk, i.e. crane operators, locksmiths, electricians and maintenance technicians. They had been trained to do these jobs already at the port with the company’s money.⁶

4 APG, Gdynia Branch, Oberfischmeisteramt (hereinafter APG, OG, Obf), 17, 14: Report on the activities of Danziger Fischzentrale GmbH for 1940.

5 *Danziger Wirtschaftszeitung* 11 (1/07/1941): 285.

6 APG, DHg, 1, 49–51: Annex no. 5 – regulation on civil service officers of the former Harbour and Waterways Council, 26 March 1940; *ibidem*, 52–56: Factsheet nos. 1 and 2 on transferred civil service officers, dated to April 1940; *idem*, 39, 25: Reich Federation of German Civil Servants to the Federation of German Civil Servants in the District of Danzig–West Prussia, 15 April 1942; *ibid.*, 23, 51:

The employment situation in the civilian zone of the port of Gdynia was slightly different, as the workforce there consisted to a greater extent of forced labourers. Labour camps were organised at ulica Polska (*Kielerstrasse*) and ulica Czechosłowacka (*Weselerstrasse*) [streets] for *Ostarbeiters* and forced labourers of French, Belgian and Polish nationalities involved in transshipment operations and working at the warehouses. Moreover, a large labour camp with 146 barracks was built for them; some of the workers were employed in a shipyard opened in Gdynia, which was a branch of “Deutsche Werke Kiel AG” (later the Gdynia shipbuilding company “Stocznia Gdynńska SA”). Prisoners of war also worked in the port of Gdynia: Russians, French, Slovaks, Italians and others, all placed in barracks in the camp located at the intersection of Polska, Czechosłowacka and Janka Wiśniewskiego (*Wikingerstrasse*) streets. In addition, prisoners of the Stutthof concentration camp confined in sub-camps located in Gdynia were forced to work in the port.⁷

The organisational structure of “Dahag” also included the company guard, which was established on 16 January 1940. It consisted of 61 people working in a three-shift system. Most of the guards were elderly people, mostly invalids, who were entrusted with auxiliary tasks. For this reason, the responsibility for the security of the commercial part of the port was devolved to the headquarters of the German Navy, which in 1942 was also put in charge of the Gdynia branch of the Pilots’ Office.⁸

Reich Commissioner for Maritime Shipping to Rear Admiral Coupette, 21 April 1944; *ibidem*, 29, 140–141: Port’s Naval Construction Office to the technical directorate of “Dahag,” 27 August 1941; *Verordnungsblatt des Reichsstatthalters in Danzig–Westpreussen* 87 (27 December 1940), items 406 and 407; APG, RPDW, 457, 717: Note for the Technical Directorate of “Dahag,” 11 September 1944.

7 APG, Marine Hafengebäudeamt Gotenhafen (hereinafter MHG), 1091, no pagination: Situation maps of the camps, 1941; *idem*, 1082, 1: Plans for the reconstruction of the barracks, 1942; *idem*, 1092, no pagination: Invoice from the construction company Erich Tuchel, 22 April 1942; *idem*, no pagination: Zarząd Gródek S.A. do Portowego Urzędu Budowlanego Marynarki [Board of “Gródek S.A.” to the Port’s Naval Construction Office], 13 November 1942; see: *Oboz hitlerowski na ziemiach polskich 1939 – 1945: Informator encyklopedyczny*, edit. Czesław Pilichowski, et.al. (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1979), 173–175; Czesław Jeryś, *Budownictwo okrętowe w Gdyni w latach 1920–1945* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1980), 252–253; Jadwiga Michałowska, “Gospodarka Gdyni w okresie okupacji hitlerowskiej,” in: *Dzieje Gdyni*, ed. Roman Wapiński (Wrocław, et.al.: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1980), 234; Mirosław Gliński, “Podobozy i większe komanda zewnętrzne KL Stutthof (1939–1945),” in: *Stutthof. Hitlerowski obóz koncentracyjny*, ed. Konrad Ciechanowski (Warszawa: Interpress, 1988), 245–249; Hans Pfahmann, *Fremdarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene in der Deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1945* (Darmstadt: Wehr & Wissen Verlagsgesellschaft MBH, 1968); Gabriel Kozłowski, “Niektóre dane do statystyki zatrudnienia jeńców wojennych w gospodarce Okręgu Gdańsk – Prusy Zachodnie w latach 1939–1942,” in: *Stutthof. Zeszyty Muzeum* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1976), 191–203; Hajduk, Bolesław. “Cywilna strefa ekonomiczna w porcie wojennym w latach 1940–1945,” in: *Marynarka Wojenna w dziejach Gdyni. Materiały z sympozjum naukowego 26 czerwca 1996 r.*, eds. Jerzy Przybylski, and Bogdan Zalewski (Gdynia: Akademia Marynarki Wojennej im. Bohaterów Westerplatte, 1997), 100; Marek Orski, “Obóz jeńców słowackich (listopad 1944–marzec 1945),” *Rocznik Gdyni* 10 (1991): 129–135.

8 APG, DHg, 39, 4 and 6: Memo from a council meeting of 16 January 1940, dated to 16 January, 3 February 1940, *idem*, 45–48: State Commissioner for the Harbour and Waterways to the Pilots’ Office,

To execute the tasks imposed on it during the war by the governing structures of the German state, "Dahag" needed not only sufficient workforce but also tools and machinery. The technical equipment of the port in Gdańsk during the war was not worse than before. "Dahag" received a total of 91 pieces of various types of mechanical material handling devices, such as portal and bridge cranes, conveyor belts for ore and coal, wagon tippers, weighing containers, etc. In addition, the company had at its disposal warehouses, granaries and equipment for unloading wood. However, the machines handed over to the company were not enough to allow it to carry out in full the handling tasks imposed on the port. In particular, the port of Gdańsk suffered from a lack of 100-tonne and 50-tonne crawler cranes, 15-tonne self-propelled cranes, two-tonne general cargo handling cranes, and 200-tonne conveyor belts. There was also a shortage of all kinds of vans, lifts and electric trucks. Traffic in the port was negatively affected by the scarcity of tugs, pilot boats, ferries and other vessels. The company's authorities tried to solve these problems by purchasing or taking over material handling equipment and vessels from Western European ports occupied by Germany. Courtesy of the State Commissioner for Shipping in Hamburg, the company obtained two portal cranes from Rotterdam and Antwerp. In addition, the company bought two bridge cranes for ore handling in Le Havre, two motor boats and two coal ferries in the Netherlands, and a bunker tug with a handling capacity of 800 tonnes in Hamburg.⁹

One should also mention the technical equipment that "Dahag" received to perform its tasks in the civilian economic zone of the port of Gdynia. In total, the company was supplied with 17 different types of loading and unloading devices. Compared to the pre-war port, however, the civilian economic zone managed by "Dahag" had a lower handling capacity for materials such as coal. This was partly due to the fact that the German Navy had seized and used parts of the port's quays, handling facilities, warehouses and storage yards. It is also important to mention the damage that allied air attacks inflicted on the Gdańsk-Gdynia port complex. In Gdańsk, the crane purchased in Antwerp, the Navy's fuel depot, barracks of the emigration camp "Etap Emigracyjny" and barracks in Nowy Port were all destroyed in attacks by the American air force in October and December of 1943 and then again in 1945. In the port of Gdynia, American bombers destroyed three docks, one warehouse, thirteen merchant

13 June, July 1940; idem, 231-233: The Pilots' Office to the State Commissioner's Administrative Directorate, 9 October 1941; idem, 337: The Administrative Directorate of "Dahag" to the military headquarters of District XX - Naval Department, 14 May 1943; idem, 289: The Commercial Directorate of "Dahag" to the Pilots' Office, 19 September 1944.

9 APG, RPDW, 1335, 715, 717, 719-720: State Commissioner for the Harbour and Waterways to the Technical Directorate, 9 April 1940; idem, 23, 28, 29: State Commissioner for Shipping to Director Speth, 1 June, 26 July 1943; idem, 31: Technical Directorate of "Dahag"-list of necessary handling equipment, June 1943. For more information on the handling equipment figures for the port of Gdańsk, see: Hajduk Bolesław, "Port gdański w latach II wojny światowej 1939-1945," *Zapiski Historyczne* 1 (1991), 56: 53-57.

ships and one warship in an air strike on 9 October 1943. They also damaged the submarine-building hall, three outfitting halls and the marine station.¹⁰

During the war, various investments were made in the Gdańsk–Gdynia port area managed and operated by “Dahag.” Taking into account the sources of funding and the functioning of the Third Reich’s centralised system of rationing of construction materials, one can distinguish two forms of port investments: those which the central authorities deemed essential from the point of view of the ongoing war and which were, therefore, financed from the state budget and guaranteed to receive construction materials, and those that were made with private funds without any material guarantees. The first category of investments included routine maintenance of the port facilities operated by “Dahag” in the Gdańsk–Gdynia port complex in the years 1941–1942 and the dredging of the port basins. Other investment tasks funded by the state were the reconstruction of the wharf, dredging works in the duty free zone, and the completion of the construction of the bulk-cargo basin in Wisłoujście in the port of Gdańsk.¹¹

A number of investments that did not feature in the central programme of planned works were made by municipal and military authorities and private companies. By order of the High Mayor of the city of Gdańsk, the construction of a cold store over the so-called Port Channel (*Hafenkanal*) in Nowy Port was completed. On the initiative of the municipal authorities, the marina for steamboats in the western basin was rebuilt, and the left bank of the river Martwa Wisła (*Tote Weichsel*) was reinforced with a sheet pile wall over a length of 21.9 km in order to protect the sewage collector.¹²

Expansion of the basin on Wyspa Ostrów (*Holm*) was carried out by the Navy, which also ordered the construction of a new power line with a transformer station and a sewage collector and commissioned the deepening of the fairway. More serious hydraulic engineering works were carried out with the participation of various companies. The state shipyard company “Reichswerft” built a 2.3 km long outfitting quay along the left bank of the river Martwa Wisła. Another shipyard company “Schichauwerft” repaired the damaged wharf in the outfitting base, mended and modernised four slipways and built a mooring pier for ships. Similarly, the grain trading company

10 APG, DHg, 3, 11: List of mechanical devices supplied to “Dahag,” 27 February 1943; Hajduk, “Cywilna strefa, 100–101; Aleksy Kaźmierczak, “Port gdyński w latach wojny,” *Rocznik Gdyński* 1 (1977): 111–113; Aleksy Kaźmierczak, “Samoloty nad Gotenhafen,” *Rocznik Gdyński* 10 (1991): 120–127; Bogdan Chrzanowski and Andrzej Gąsiorowski, “Port i stocznie Gdyni 1940–1944 (w świetle meldunków wywiadowczych KG AK),” *Rocznik Gdyński* 10 (1991): 119.

11 APG, DHg, 29, 73: General Plenipotentiary for the regulation of the construction economy–Reich Minister Todt to the General Plenipotentiary in the military district, part I, 22 April 1943; idem, 99: State Commissioner for the Harbour and Waterways to the Reich Ministry of Transport, 2 August, 1940; idem, 104: List no. 2 of newly-registered war investments, 2 August 1940; idem, 107: Important war investments in the second fiscal year, 8 February 1941; Hajduk, “Port gdański,” 58.

12 APG, DHg, 28, 1135: Waterways Office to “Dahag,” 25 November 1941; idem, 141, 221: building permit, 28 February 1942; 4 June 1942.

“Speicherei AG” reinforced and modernised a pier along with an unloading device. The Danish–Gdańsk company “Baltisch Amerikanische Petroleum Import GmbH” reinforced and enlarged the existing mooring pier for tankers and built an additional oil pipeline for the transshipment of Romanian oil to Scandinavia. Similarly, the oil trading company “Naphta Industrie und Handelsgesellschaft mbH” rebuilt a loading bridge with mooring dolphins on the right bank of the river Martwa Wisła. Fuel tanks were expanded and new fuel handling equipment was added by the above-mentioned companies as the Reich Ministry of Transport designated the port of Gdańsk to handle the exports of Romanian crude oil to Denmark, Sweden, Norway and later also Finland. The German import and export company “Rumänien-Mineralöl GmbH” based in Romania dealt with commercial matters and organised transports to the port of Gdańsk. The investments that large companies made in the port of Gdańsk all served the military purposes of the Third Reich. Other, smaller Gdańsk companies, whose activity was limited by financial and material constraints, e.g. the rationing of construction materials, only performed some indispensable works, such as the construction of oil tanks, office barracks, and sanitary and sewage disposal facilities or laying high-voltage cables at the bottom of the port channels.¹³

The management board of “Dahag” also tried to enhance the handling capacity of the zone of the Gdynia port it used, but due to the earlier-mentioned financial and material difficulties, the investments were limited to those commissioned to the Command of the Gdynia Naval Port. On a commission from the German Navy, investments were made in the construction of Y-booms and mooring dolphins in the newly-built shipyard – a branch of “Deutsche Werke Kiel,” and in the expansion of quays in the basin of the naval port in Oksywie. Moreover, eleven wooden piers were built, the eastern breakwater was expanded, several warehouses and storage yards were rebuilt, and residential buildings (barracks) for prisoners of war, prisoners and forced labourers were erected. However, the authorities of “Dahag” did not manage to obtain any major support to invest in the civil zone of the Gdynia port itself, apart from help in current repairs.¹⁴

The volume and structure of cargo turnover in the Gdańsk–Gdynia port complex depended on many factors during the war. The war interrupted the ties that had linked Gdańsk and Gdynia with the ports in Western Europe and outside Europe before its outbreak. Hence, the management of “Dahag” focused on maintaining and expanding

13 Hajduk, “Port gdański,” 64–65.

14 APG, MHG, 1005, 1: Cost estimates for the construction of 2 office buildings and the reconstruction of barracks, 15 June 1941; idem, 1009, 1: Facilities erected on a commission from the Navy Arsenal (*Kriegsmarinearsenal*), 15 October 1943; idem, 1041, 405, 406: High Command of the Baltic Sea Navy to the Admiral of Submarines, 30 December 1944; Kaźmierczak, “Port gdyński,” 106–109; Bohdan Szermer, “Koncepcje i struktura przestrzenna portu gdyńskiego–zarys przemian (part 2: 1939–1965),” *Rocznik Gdyński* 5 (1984), 86–90.

relations with the former Polish hinterland and ensuring that the ports participated as much as possible in the transit of goods between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Romania, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and Ukraine) and Scandinavia. It can be observed that the company's management pursued a two-pronged policy aiming at, first, securing the position of Gdańsk and Gdynia in transit transport and, second, defending the ports' interests against competition from other German ports, especially Szczecin. To strengthen the position of the Gdańsk–Gdynia port complex in transit transport, the management of “Dahag” opened commercial agencies in Stockholm, Oslo, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Budapest and Bucharest. At the same time, the company engaged in a propaganda war with the authorities of the port of Szczecin, who had launched a hostile information campaign against the Gdańsk–Gdynia port complex. As part of this war, articles inspired by the management of the Gdańsk company were published in German magazines and brochures were distributed abroad. Also, “Dahag” participated in fairs and exhibitions and joined the German Chambers of Commerce operating in Scandinavian countries.¹⁵

The turnover of the Gdańsk–Gdynia port complex during the war was lower than the transshipment volumes handled before its outbreak (Table 1).

Table 1. Transshipment volumes in the Gdańsk–Gdynia port complex in the years 1938–1945 [in tonnes]

Year	Gdańsk–Gdynia in total	Port of Gdańsk		Port of Gdynia	
		Import	Export	Import	Export
1938	16 300 631	1 563 958	5 563 236	1 526 535	7 646 902
1939 (Jan–Aug)	10 511 821	932 108	4 590 400	792 718*	4 196 595*
1940	7 250 000	1 070 000	2 666 000	104 000	3 410 000
1941	5 861 000	1 982 000	1 186 000	271 000	2 422 000
1942	6 486 660	1 501 218	1 889 022	153 091	2 933 329
1943	7 484 000	1 426 841	2 984 974	120 740	2 951 445
1944	6 474 252	829 615	2 598 126	88 216	2 958 295
1945 (I)	208 638	**	104 705	**	103 933

* Turnover in the port of Gdynia for the first half of 1938, ** No data.

Source: APG, RPDW, 1349, pp. 588–596, 873, 882; Statistiek des Deutschen Reichs, Bd. 588 (Berlin 1942), 6; Bd. 593 (1943), 7; *Amtsblatt des Militärfehlschabers Danzig–Westpreussen* 3 (4/10/1939): 49–51; *Wiadomości Portu Gdańskiego* 7 (July 1939): 24–26, 34, 35; *Żegluga-the Navigation* 3–4 (1939): 27; *Rocznik Rady Interesantów Portu w Gdyni* 8 (1938): 35.

15 APG, DHg, 9, 1135: State Commissioner for the Harbour and Waterways to the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Gdańsk, 23 June 1941; idem, 128: Chamber of Industry and Commerce to the State Commissioner for the Harbour and Waterways, 24 June 24 1941; idem, 47: State Commissioner for the Harbour and Waterways to the German Chambers of Commerce in Oslo and Copenhagen, 6 December 1940; idem, 11, 103–104: Chamber of Industry and Commerce to “Dahag,” 7 October 1941; idem, 111: Commercial Directorate of “Dahag” to “Deutsche Verkehrs Nachrichten,” 17 January 1942; idem, 132: Press Department of Auswartiges Amt to “Dahag,” 19 March 1942; idem, 206: “Dahag” agency in Finland to the Management Board of “Dahag,” 31 August 1942; idem, 9, 254, 257: letters from “Dahag” to the Hungarian and Romanian consulates in Gdańsk, 28 January 1942; see: Bolesław Hajduk, *Gospodarka Gdańska w latach 1920–1945* (Gdańsk: IH PAN, 1998), 233–234.

In 1938, a total of 16,300,631 tons were transhipped at these ports, including 7,127,194 tons in Gdańsk, and 9,173,437 tons in Gdynia. To compare, in 1943, which was the best year of the war in terms of transshipment volumes, the total turnover reached 7,484,000 tonnes, of which 4,411,815 tonnes were handled in Gdańsk, and 3,072,185 tonnes in Gdynia. In the remaining years of the war, the turnover of the Gdańsk–Gdynia port complex was between 6 and 7 million tonnes. The handling capacity of the port in Gdynia and the volumes of cargo handled there were negatively affected by the fact that “Dahag” used only some of the port facilities controlled by the German Navy for commercial purposes. The turnover of the port complex managed by “Dahag” in 1940–1941 was higher than the turnover of Królewiec, but lower than the cargo volumes handled in Szczecin, Hamburg or Bremen. Overall, the total turnover of German ports in the Baltic Sea increased from the 16,879,000 tonnes handled in 1939 to 21,630,000 tonnes in 1940 and 18,552,000 tonnes in 1941. At the same time, German ports in the North Sea registered a fall from 37,681,000 tonnes in 1939 to 23,085,000 tonnes in 1940 and 21,285,000 tonnes in 1941.¹⁶ The war hostilities led to changes in the structure of goods that had been transported through the ports of Gdańsk and Gdynia until 1939 (Table 2).

Table 2. Major goods delivered to and shipped from the Gdańsk–Gdynia port complex in 1938–1945 (in tonnes)

Year	Coal and coke		Ore		Cereals and legumes		Timber and wood products		Building materials	
	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export
1938 Gdańsk	103,355	4,030,318	986,767	–	–	335,292	7,066	813,410	–	547 a
1938 Gdynia	–	6,525,903	207,574	–	–	33,644	3,784	402,591	–	53,583
1939 Gdańsk					–					
(Jan–Apr)	5,830	2,303,963	336,369	–	–	418,782	1,771	423,494	–	264
Gdynia										
(I–VI)	–	3,550,433	166,605	–	–	48,219	2,725	196,289	–	31,042
1940	21,000	5,894,000	711,000		54,000	167,000	129,000	20,000	83,000	–
1941	72,000	347,000	1,155,000	–	60,000	106,000	158,000	15,000	375,000	b
1942	2,000	4,257,000	1,019,000	–	5,000	113,000	90,000	20,000	291,000	–
1943	23,000	5,473,000	925,000	–	40,000	124,000	13,000	22,000	261,000	–
1944	25,553	4,614,208	469,267	–	26,492	161,029	40,687	17,433	185,000	21,139
1945 (I)	b	208,638	–	–	b	b	b		b	b

a – Applies to cement exports in 1938–1939, b – No data.

Source: AP Gd., RPDW/1349, 587–590, 862–865, 873, 882 and 883; *Rocznik Rady Interesantów Portu w Gdyni*, 8 (1938): 36–41; *Wiadomości Portu Gdańskiego* 1/2 (1939): 27–29; 38–39; *Wiadomości Portu Gdańskiego* 7 (1939): 24–26, 34–35; *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches* (Berlin 1941–1943), Bd. 576, H. 1, 80–89; 588, H. 1, 92–101; 593, 92–98.

16 Bolesław Hajduk, “Gospodarka Gdańska w okresie drugiej wojny światowej 1939–1945,” in: *Historia Gdańska*, Vol. IV, part 2: 1920–1945, eds. Edmund Cieślak and Marek Andrzejewski (Sopot: Wydawnictwo Lex, 2000), 218–219.

From the point of view of quantity, the key goods imported to Gdańsk in the years 1937–1938 were fertilisers, metal ores and ore products, rubber, cork, colonial commodities and tannins. Exports through this port, on the other hand, were dominated by coal, timber and wood products, cereals and grain mill products, and fertilisers. Until 1939, the port of Gdynia had imported large volumes of metal ores, pig iron, scrap and textile raw materials. The most important goods shipped from Gdynia were coal, wood, petroleum products and metallurgical products.

During the war, iron ore, construction materials (stones, lime, gravel, cement, etc.) and building wood were the leading imports to the Gdańsk–Gdynia port complex. As regards the shipment of ore from abroad, “Dahag” managed, with a great deal of effort, to procure for the ports in Gdańsk and Gdynia an appropriate share in the German quota for the import of ore from Scandinavia. From 1943, the Gdańsk–Gdynia port complex received the same amount of ore import quotas as the port of Szczecin. Starting from September 1944, as a result of the Swedish government’s blockade of the territorial waters against foreign ships, the transshipment of ore through the ports of Gdańsk and Gdynia significantly decreased in favour of other German ports.¹⁷ One should also mention the large imports of sea fish to the Gdańsk port handled by the deep sea fishing union “*Norddeutsche Hochseefischerei AG*” from Wesermünde, based in the port’s free zone. In September 1942, an independent fish transport company called “*Ostdeutsche Hochseefischerei Löschung und Abfertigung GmbH*” with headquarters in Westerplatte was registered. Fresh fish were also brought to the port of Gdynia to be stored in the civil zone.¹⁸

Coal, grain, crude oil and oil products, sugar and timber were the chief materials shipped from the Gdańsk–Gdynia port complex. Fuel transports to Scandinavia, however, passed mainly through the port of Gdańsk, as this port had been earmarked by the Reich Ministry of Transport for handling the transports of Romanian oil to Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland.¹⁹

The efficiency with which cargo traffic was handled in the Gdańsk–Gdynia port complex managed by “Dahag” depended on the performance of the brokerage and forwarding companies operating in the ports. After the outbreak of the war, the existing brokerage and freight forwarding system was radically rebuilt. The Polish brokerage

17 Bundes Archiv Berlin, Reichsfinanzministerium, B 8735, 101, 102: German-Swedish economic protocols, 22 December 1929; idem, 107–108: A confidential additional report, 22 December 1939; idem, 123–124, 128 129: An execution report, 12 January 1940; idem, 10554, 19, 57, 59: Reich Minister of Finance to Oberpräsidenten [Prefects] for Finance in Królewiec, Hamburg, Szczecin and Gdańsk, 3 February, 29 November 1941; idem, Statistische Reichsamt, 6040, 3–6: Germany’s foreign trade in the years 1040–1944; APG, RPDW, 1349, 589–592: Trade in goods in Gdańsk and Gdynia in 1940–1945; Statistik des Deutschen Reichs (Berlin 1943), Bd 576, Heft 1, 80–89; 588, Heft 1, 92–101; 593, Heft 1, 92–93.

18 Hajduk, “Port gdański,” 69–71; Hajduk, *Gospodarka Gdańska*, 249–250.

19 Hajduk, “Cywilna strefa,” 106–107.

and shipping companies, which had dominated the customs clearing business in the ports before the war, and some foreign firms of this type were seized and liquidated. As a result, the number of brokerage companies dropped, with 35 brokerage firms operating in 1937/1938, 32 in 1939, 22 in 1940/1941 and 24 in 1942. A similar decrease was observed in the shipping industry, from 96 companies in 1938 to 63 companies in 1942. The well-known Gdańsk brokers, such as: "Behnke&Sieg", "F.G. Reinhold", "F. Prowe", "H. Olschewski" (Oldendorf) and "Artus A.G" increased in significance. Brokerage services were also provided by a few foreign, mainly Norwegian, companies, such as "Bergtrans Schiffahrt AG" and "Worms & Cie."²⁰

In general, the location of the port of Gdańsk and the part of the port of Gdynia connected with it was less favourable during World War II than in the interwar period, when they had been part of the Polish customs area. Though the ports had access to their natural hinterland, i.e. the territory of the Polish state and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which had been subordinated to the Third Reich, they made little use of it due to Germany's military economy and the restrictions it imposed on production and trade. The investments made during the war and the newly-acquired technical equipment improved the operation of these ports, increasing to some extent their handling capacity, however the actual needs were much greater. The Gdańsk-Gdynia port complex, despite the efforts on the part of "Dahag" and the local economic circles, never became a hub for transit transport services in the Baltic zone, which was partly due to the war and partly due to the competition from other German ports.

Bibliography

Archives

Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku (fonds):
 Danziger Hafengesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung;
 Marine Hafenbauamt Gotenhafen;
 Rada Portu i Dróg Wodnych w Gdańsku. Oddział w Gdyni:
 Oberfischmeisteramt.
 Bundes Archiv Berlin:
 Reichsfinanzministerium;
 Statistisches Reichsamt.

20 Danziger Einwohnerbuch mit Zoppot und Ohra, Part 4 (1937/1938): 73; (1939): 66, 73; (1940/1941): 62-72; (1942): 56, 57, 62, 63.

Published sources

- Danziger Einwohnerbuch mit Zoppot und Ohra, Part 4 (1937/1938, 1939, 1940/1941, 1942).
Reichsgesetzblatt 259 (30 December 1939)
Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Berlin, Bd. 576, 588, 593 (1941–1943)
Verordnungsblatt des Reichsstatthalters in Reichsgau Danzig-Westpreussen 87
(2 December 1940)

Newspapers and magazines

- Amtsblatt des Militärfehlshabers Danzig–Westpreussen* 3 (4 /10/1939)
Danziger Wirtschaftszeitung 17/18 (15/09/1939), 20 (15/10/1939), 10 (15 /05/1941), 11
(1/07/1941), 17(1/09/1941)
Rocznik Rady Interessantów Portu w Gdyni 8 (1938)
Wiadomości Portowe 1/ 2 (1939); 7 (1939)
Żegluga-the Navigation 3–4 (1939)

References

- Chrzanowski Bogdan, Andrzej Gąsiorowski. “Port i stocznie Gdyni 1940–1944: (w świetle meldunków wywiadowczych KG AK).” *Rocznik Gdyniński* 10 (1991): 111–119.
- Gliński, Mirosław. “Podobozy i większe komanda zewnętrzne KL Stutthof (1939–1945).”
In: *Stutthof. Hitlerowski obóz koncentracyjny*, ed. Konrad Ciechanowski, 245–253.
Warszawa: Interpress, 1988.
- Hajduk, Bolesław. “Port gdański w latach II wojny światowej 1939–1945. *Zapiski Historyczne* 1 (1991), 56: 47–74.
- Hajduk, Bolesław. “Cywilna strefa ekonomiczna w porcie wojennym w latach 1940–1945.”
In: *Marynarka Wojenna w dziejach Gdyni*. Materiały z sympozjum naukowego
26 czerwca 1996 r., eds. Jerzy Przybylski, and Bogdan Zalewski, 97–108. Gdynia:
Akademia Marynarki Wojennej im. Bohaterów Westerplatte, 1997.
- Hajduk, Bolesław. *Gospodarka Gdańska w latach 1920 – 1945*. Gdańsk: IH PAN, 1998.
- Hajduk, Bolesław. “Gospodarka Gdańska w okresie drugiej wojny światowej 1939–1945.”
In: *Historia Gdańska*, Vol. IV, part 2: 1920–1945, eds. Edmund Cieślak and Marek
Andrzejewski. Sopot: Wydawnictwo Lex, 2000.
- Jeryś, Czesław. *Budownictwo okrętowe w Gdyni w latach 1920–1945*. Gdańsk:
Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1980.
- Kaźmierczak, Aleksy. “Port gdyński w latach wojny.” *Rocznik Gdyniński* 1 (1977): 105–116.
- Kaźmierczak, Aleksy. “Samoloty nad Gotenhafen.” *Rocznik Gdyniński* 10 (1991):
120–128.

- Kozłowski, Gabriel. "Niektóre dane do statystyki zatrudnienia jeńców wojennych w gospodarce Okręgu Gdańsk – Prusy Zachodnie w latach 1939–1942." In: *Stutthof. Zeszyty Muzeum*, 191–205. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1976.
- Michałowska, Jadwiga. "Gospodarka Gdyni w okresie okupacji hitlerowskiej." In: *Dzieje Gdyni*, edited by Roman Wapiński, 230–236. Wrocław, et.al.: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1980.
- Obozy hitlerowskie na ziemiach polskich 1939–1945: Informator encyklopedyczny*, edit Czesław Pilichowski, et.al. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1979.
- Orski, Marek. "Obóz jeńców słowackich (listopad 1944–marzec 1945)." *Rocznik Gdyński* 10 (1991): 129–135.
- Pfahlmann Hans, *Fremdarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene in der Deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1945*. Darmstadt: Wehr & Wissen Verlagsgesellschaft MBH, 1968. *Port Gdynia 1936*. Gdynia: Instytut Wydawniczy Państwowej Szkoły Morskiej, 1936.
- Schulze, F.W. Otto. *Danzig und sein Hafen*. Hamburg: Hafenbautechnische-Gesellschaft, [1920].
- Szermer, Bohdan. "Koncepcje i struktura przestrzenna portu gdyńskiego – zarys przemian (part 2: 1939–1965)." *Rocznik Gdyński* 5 (1984): 86–109.

English version: Radosław Dolecki, Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

The study presents the functioning and operation of the port of Gdańsk and the civilian-economy zone of the port of Gdynia during World War II. After the outbreak of the war, in September 1939, the Harbour and Waterways Council, which had so far administered the port of Gdańsk, was dissolved, and its powers were entrusted to the State Commissioner for Harbours and Waterways working under the Reich Governor of Gdańsk. The State Commissioner also took over the administration of the so-called economic sector at the naval port of Gdynia. At the beginning of 1940, the management of the port of Gdańsk and the civilian part of the port of Gdynia was handed over to the joint stock company "Danziger Hafengesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung" – "Dahag" established by the Reich Governor and the city of Gdańsk. The investments made in the two ports and the new technical equipment they received improved their operations and cargo handling capacity. However, the cargo turnover of the Gdańsk–Gdynia port complex during the war was smaller than the volumes handled before the outbreak of the war. Despite the efforts made by the authorities of "Dahag," the Gdańsk–Gdynia port complex never became a hub for transit transport from Scandinavia to Central Europe in the southern part of the Baltic Sea, which, apart from the war, was due to competition from other German ports.

Administracja oraz eksploatacja morskich portów handlowych w Gdańsku i Gdyni podczas II wojny światowej

Słowa kluczowe: wojna, gospodarka, port, administracja, eksploatacja

STRESZCZENIE

W opracowaniu przedstawiono funkcjonowanie oraz eksploatację portu gdańskiego i wydzielonej dla potrzeb gospodarki cywilnej części portu gdyńskiego w czasie II wojny światowej. Po wybuchu wojny, we wrześniu 1939 r. rozwiązano Radę Portu i Dróg Wodnych, sprawującą dotąd administrację nad portem gdańskim, a jej kompetencje powierzono komisarzowi państwowemu dla portów i dróg wodnych przy namiestniku Rzeszy Niemieckiej w Gdańsku. Komisarz państwowy przejął także administrację nad wyodrębnionym w styczniu 1940 r. dla potrzeb gospodarki cywilnej tzw. sektorem ekonomicznym w porcie wojennym Gdynia. Z początkiem 1940 r. oddano zarząd nad portem gdańskim i częścią cywilną w porcie gdyńskim utworzonemu przez namiestnika Rzeszy Niemieckiej oraz miasto Gdańsk towarzystwu akcyjnemu Gdańska Spółka Portowa z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością (*Danziger Hafengesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung* – „Dahag”). Realizowane podczas wojny inwestycje oraz uzupełnianie wyposażenia technicznego w obydwu portach usprawniły ich działalność oraz poprawiły zdolność przeładunkową. W sumie obroty towarowe wspólnoty portowej Gdańsk-Gdynia w okresie wojny były jednak mniejsze od wielkości przeładowywanych do momentu jej wybuchu. Pomimo wysiłków, podejmowanych przez władze spółki „Dahag,” zespół portowy Gdańsk-Gdynia nie stał się dominującym w południowej strefie Bałtyku ośrodkiem przewozów tranzytowych ze Skandynawii do państw Europy środkowej do czego, poza sytuacją wojenną, przyczyniła się także konkurencja innych portów niemieckich.

Citation

Hajduk, Bolesław. "Administration and Operation of Commercial Seaports in Gdańsk and Gdynia During the Second World War." *Studia Maritima* 35 (2022): 189–204. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2022.35-07.



Anna Szczepańska-Dudziak

Institute of History
University of Szczecin
anna.szczepanska-dudziak@usz.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0003-4596-0956

Szczecin as the Home Port for Inland Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak Presence in Szczecin from 1945–1989

Keywords: Polish–Czechoslovak relations, foreign policy, consular offices, port in Szczecin

“Szczecin: a city that was partly Czechoslovak for 38 years. What do we (not) know about Szczecin, the seventh largest city in Poland?” – in 2013, under this title Lidovky.pl published a short article about the capital of Western Pomerania and its relations with Czechoslovakia.¹ The author, traveller and photographer Tomáš Pigula, called the Czechoslovak region in the port of Szczecin “Czechoslovak Hong Kong.” In this way he referred to the decisions made at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, when the First Republic was granted the possibility of creating free zones in the ports of Szczecin and Hamburg for 99 years, which evokes associations with the special status of Hong Kong governed by Great Britain. The article completely ignored the ties between Czechoslovakia and Polish Szczecin after World War Two, and although its title sounded promising, the readers of “*Lidových novin*” unfortunately did not learn much about the Czechoslovak presence in Szczecin, which was so multifaceted and interesting.

In retrospect, we know that the Adolf Warski Szczecin Shipyard contributed to the expansion of Czechoslovakia’s merchant fleet, which flourished from 1948–1998, by constructing 11 ships for it. Polish–Czechoslovak cooperation in the port of Szczecin–Świnoujście also developed at a great pace and lasted longer than the

1 Tomáš Pigula, *Štětín: město, které bylo 38 let částečně československé*, Lidovky.cz, 10/10/2013, accessed 02 July 2022, https://www.lidovky.cz/cestovani/stetin-mesto-ktere-bylo-38-let-castecne-ceskoslovenske.A130109_080439_cestopisy_ape. The article is a reprint from the travel portal HedvabnaStezka.cz, which published information about the Czechoslovak presence in Szczecin in 1919–1957, see: *Štětín: Věděli jste, že byl v letech 1919–1957 částečně československý?* accessed 02 July 2022, <https://www.hedvabnastezka.cz/stetin-vedeli-jste-ze-byl-v-letech-1919-1957-castecne-ceskoslovensky>.

38 years mentioned in the article and was additionally strengthened by the activities of the Consulate General, the Centre for Culture and Information, and the presence of Czechoslovak students at the Maritime School of Higher Education in Szczecin and Bohemistics at the University of Szczecin. Czechoslovak tourists rested at the Baltic seaside and young people stayed in summer camps. Most often, such trips were mostly organised by the Čedok travel agency and, for example, in 1959, 200 tourists rested in Międzyzdroje, 1,300 in Darłówek, 1,300 in Cetniewo, 340 in Jurata, 250 in Sopot and 80 in Szczecin.² However, a question arises whether after all these years the Czechs and Slovaks know anything about this shared time in history. Do the older generations of the residents of former Czechoslovakia remember their trips to summer camps and youth camps or family holidays by the Baltic Sea?³

The analysis of border traffic from the Czech Republic to Poland shows that in recent years Czechs most often have been coming to Poland for a day to visit their families or do some shopping.⁴ Tourism, and certainly a one-day stay by the Baltic Sea, is not an option. According to a survey commissioned by the Polish Tourist Organisation, 43% of Czechs declare a desire to visit Poland but also half of Czechs associate Poland with shopping and only 28% with the sea and beaches, and over 56% have never stayed overnight during their visit to Poland.⁵ These data are corroborated by the publications of the Statistical Office of the Czech Republic, which indicate that since 2012 the list of the most frequently visited countries by Czechs for holidays include: Croatia, Slovakia, Italy, Greece, Spain and Austria with Poland nowhere to be found.⁶

Based on the 2015 report on tourism in the West Pomerania Province carried out by the Marshal's Office of that region, it can be concluded that only a small percentage

-
- 2 Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí, Teritoriální Odbor-Tajne Polsko (hereinafter AMZV, TO-T, Polsko) 1955–1959, carton 5, Report of the Consulate General on entries organised by Čedok, Szczecin 11 September 1959.
 - 3 Popular programmes broadcast on Czech Radio 2 in June and July 2022 featured topics related to tourism and promoting travel destinations popular among Czechs. Unfortunately, Poland was not listed among the destinations. Croatia was the most popular – 800,000 Czechs wanted to visit this country. What is more, the listeners did not mention Polish beaches in the context of their memories of their first stay at the seaside and they only associated the Baltic Sea with holiday trips to the GDR.
 - 4 In July 2021, 16,228 Czechs used Polish tourist infrastructure, while in August their number was 19,475, see: *Tourists in Tourist Accommodation Establishments* (Warszawa: GUS, August 2021), accessed 04.07.2022, <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/kultura-turystyka-sport/turystyka/turysci-w-bazie-noclegowej-sierpien-2021-roku,5,110.html>. For more on tourism to Poland, see: *Turystyka w 2020 r. Analizy statystyczne* (Warszawa–Rzeszów: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2021), 80–90, accessed 30 July 2022, <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/kultura-turystyka-sport/turystyka/turystyka-w-2020-roku,1,18.html>.
 - 5 *Wizerunek Polski i Polaków w Czechach*, Raport ARC Rynek i Opinia na zlecenie Polskiej Organizacji Turystycznej (Warszawa: listopad 2021), 5–27, accessed 30 July 2022, https://zarabiamynaturystyce.pl/fileadmin/user_upload/badania_analizy/RAPORT_wizerunek_Polski_w_Czechach.pdf.
 - 6 *Kam Češi v roce 2019 ve volném čase cestovali?* (Statistical Office of the Czech Republic Prague, 7 April 2020), accessed 04 July 2022, https://www.czso.cz/documents/11256/141467230/VSCR_2019.pdf.

of the surveyed tourists visiting the province were Czechs – 7 people, i.e. 1.33% of all respondents.⁷ Therefore, when developing new strategies for the promotion of the West Pomeranian Province and Szczecin, it is worth recalling the Czechoslovak presence in this region in order to encourage Poland's southern neighbours to visit the lost "Czechoslovak Hong Kong."

The aim of the article is to present the multifaceted Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation – political, economic and cultural, which took place in Szczecin over several decades – from the city's takeover by the Polish authorities, until 1989, when the process of systemic changes began in both countries the consequence of which were changes to the existing forms of cooperation. In the 1990s, contracts regulating the issues of transit and rail transport expired, the importance of Szczecin as a port for Czechoslovak goods declined as those were sent to ports on the Black Sea coastline and in Germany, so the Consulate General in Szczecin was closed and the Czechoslovak merchant fleet was slowly being sold off. It is crucial to answer the following question. What place did Szczecin take in the Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation after World War Two and on what issues was the focus of interest placed in this city?

The undertaken research topic was the subject of researchers' interest, which resulted in publications that cover the Czechoslovak presence in Szczecin after World War Two in the context of communication cooperation, transit through the port, the Czechoslovakia region in the port, the involvement of the Szczecin shipbuilding industry in the creation of the Czechoslovak sea fleet and also the activities of the Czechoslovak Consulate General.⁸ The vast majority of Polish-language studies are based on

7 *Badanie ruchu turystycznego w województwie zachodniopomorskim 2015*, accessed 4 July 2022, <https://turystyka.wzp.pl/badania-ruchu-turystycznego/badania-struktury-ruchu-turystycznego-2015>.

8 Among the studies on the Czechoslovak presence in Szczecin and the economic cooperation of the Consulate General's activities, the following works deserve attention: Alina Hutnikiewicz, *Szczecin w polskiej polityce morskiej w latach 1945–1950* (Szczecin: Polskie Pismo i Książka: 1991); eadem, "Szczecin w stosunkach polsko-czechosłowackich 1945–1950," in: *Historia lux Veritatis. Księga pamiątkowa dedykowana profesorowi Zdzisławowi Chmielewskiemu z okazji 60. rocznicy urodzin*, eds. Radosław Gaziński and Agnieszka Gut (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2002); Ryszard Techman, "Adolf Kania – pierwszy konsul Czechosłowacji w Polsce w latach 1949–1951," *Śląskie Studia Historyczne* 11 (2004); idem, "Czechosłowacka Żegluga na Odrze w latach 1947–1957," part 1, *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 33 (2018); idem, "Czechosłowacka Żegluga na Odrze w latach 1947–1957," part 2, *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 34 (2019); idem, "Czechosłowacka sieć konsularna w Polsce w latach 1947–1992," *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny* 1 (2006); idem, "Kalendarium wydarzeń Szczecin–Czechosłowacja w latach 1945–1992," in: *Polsko-czeskie kontakty dyplomatyczne, gospodarcze i kulturalne w XX–XXI wieku*, ed. Anna Szczepańska-Dudziak (Szczecin: Volumina, 2017); idem, "Szczecin w aktach polskiej służby dyplomatycznej 1945–1950," in: *50 lat Polski na Pomorzu Zachodnim. Polityka – Społeczeństwo – Kultura. Materiały z sesji naukowej (19–20 maja 1995)*, eds. Kazimierz Kozłowski and Edward Włodarczyk (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Archiwum Państwowego w Szczecinie, 1996); idem, "Udział szczecińskiego przemysłu okrętowego w rozbudowie floty handlowej Czechosłowacji po II wojnie światowej," in: *Polsko-czeskie kontakty dyplomatyczne, gospodarcze i kulturalne w XX–XXI wieku*; idem, "Tranzyt czechosłowacki w portach ujścia Odry po II wojnie światowej," *Studia Maritima* 28 (2015); idem, "Pierwsze szkoły morskie w Szczecinie," in: *Szkolnictwo morskie Szczecina w latach 1947–1997*, eds. Izabela Dunin-Kwinta, Aleksander Walczak

Polish archival sources such as monumental publications by Ryszard Techman devoted to Czechoslovak shipping on the Oder or Czechoslovak transit in the Oder estuary ports. The archives of Czechoslovak diplomacy and materials gathered in one fonds of Úřad předsednictva vlády, the former Státní ústřední archiv, and today the National Archives in Prague, served as the basis for this author's publication on the activities of the Czechoslovak consulate in Szczecin, especially in the first years of its operation.

The deliberations in this article not only focus on the more well-known threads of economic cooperation – transit or cooperation with the Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping but go beyond these issues and are also aimed at a wider presentation of the activities of the Czechoslovak consular post in Szczecin whose presence had a very strong impact on all forms of Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation – from the economy, through politics, to cultural cooperation and social relations. The operation of this institution in Szczecin expressed the fullest interest of Prague in the presence on the Polish Baltic coast which was visible in the consulate's activities related to transport and commercial cooperation as well as in various forms of presenting the culture of Poland's southern neighbour. In the latter field, the consulate was supported by a branch of the Warsaw Centre for Culture and Information of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR), established in 1981.

The research postulate, which was only briefly mentioned in the article, is to recreate the fate of Czechoslovak graduates of Szczecin maritime schools and to find the records of the course of their studies and professional work, which was initiated by Lenka Krátká on the basis of Czech archival sources and the oral history method.⁹ On the other hand, Zdeněk Bastl introduces the readers of his book and the enthusiasts

and Stanisław Kuszmider (Szczecin: Wyższa Szkoła Morska w Szczecinie, 1997); Radek Novák, *Námořní přeprava*, Praha: ASPI 2005); Zdeněk Bastl, *Padesát let Československé Návní Plavby* (Praha: Mare Czech 2009); Anna Szczepańska, "Rejon czechosłowacki w Porcie Szczecińskim w latach 1949–1956," *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 21 (2006); eadem, "Port Szczeciński w polsko-czechosłowackich stosunkach gospodarczych w świetle dokumentów Archiwum Ministerstwa Sprawy Zagranicznych w Pradze (1949–1956)," *Studia Maritima* 19 (2006); eadem, *Warszawa–Praga 1948–1969. Od nakazanej przyjaźni do kryzysu* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2011); Anna Szczepańska-Dudziak, "Działalność Ośrodków Kultury i Informacji PRL i CSRS w okresie kryzysu i normalizacji relacji polsko-czechosłowackich w latach osiemdziesiątych XX w.," in: *Polsko-czeskie kontakty dyplomatyczne, gospodarcze i kulturalne*; eadem, "Szczecin czechosłowackim oknem na morza i oceany." *Szczecin w stosunkach polsko-czechosłowackich 1945–1989* (Szczecin-Warszawa: IPN, 2021).

- 9 Lenka Krátká, "«Byłem ciekawy, czy morze jest słone!» Czechosłowacka Žegluga Morska we wspomnieniach marynarzy czechosłowackich (1959–1989)," *Wrocławski Rocznik Historii Mówionej* 3 (2013): 187–204; eadem, *Domovský přístav Praha. Československá námořní plavba v letech 1948 až 1989* (Praha: Univerzita Karlova Nakladatelství Karolinum, 2016); eadem, "Czechoslovak Seafarers' Memories of Polish Ports as their «Second Home» during the State Socialism Period (1949–1989)," *History in Flux* 2 (2020): 31–48.

of this subject to the history, activity, state of the Czechoslovak merchant fleet and the sailors on the website *Historie námořní plavby*.¹⁰

The article uses archival materials collected in Polish and Czech archives, thus extending the scope of the research carried out by Ryszard Techman. As for the sources produced in Czechoslovakia, they are the collections of the Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí in Prague, especially the following fonds: Zastupitelský úřad Polsko 1945–1955, Dokumentace teritoriálních odborů 1945–1989, Generální sekretariát a Kabinet J. Masaryka, V. Clementise, Konzulární odbor, Politické zprávy Varšava 1945–1977 and Teritoriální odbory Polsko both tajné and obyčejné, which relate to the said period. In Národní archiv České republiky the following fonds: Úřad předsednictva vlády (hereinafter ÚPV) 1917–1956–1959 (1962), ÚPV tajná spisovna, Ústřední výbor KSČ 1945–1989 (hereinafter NA ČR, ÚV KSČ), Praha-zasedání 1945–1989, KSČ ÚV 1945–1989, Kancelář generálního tajemníka Gustáva Husáka. Fonds not shared or only partially are of the Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping and the Ministry of Foreign Trade 1957–1963 to which Lenka Krátká obtained access and in her book she quotes the financial information and minutes of meetings. The research was also conducted in the Archiv bezpečnostních složek, where, among many, there is the document cited in the article from the fonds – Denní situační zprávy FMV. Informace k PLR (for the period 1980–1984).

Due to the lack of access to some of the unfinished source materials from the 1970s and 1980s collected in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, it was necessary to fill this gap with documents of Polish diplomacy from the resources of the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw – Department I, Political Department, Diplomatic Protocol, Fonds Telegrams, Economic Department, Cabinet of the Minister. The collections of the National Archives of the Czech Republic and the Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw are worth noting as they house documents on the activities of divisions of foreign communist parties, minutes of government meetings, documents produced in the offices of the first secretaries and fonds of Ministries of Economy, Foreign Trade and Culture. Among the Archives of Modern Records files, the research was carried out in the following fonds of: Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), Central Committee in Warsaw 1948–1990, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Maritime Economy. The research was also conducted at the State Archives in Szczecin and the resources came from the fonds of: Szczecin Maritime Office, Szczecin Provincial

10 Bastl, *Padesát let Československé*; The “Historie Námořní Plavby” website is run by Zdeňek Bastl, former economic head of Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping, author of the book *Padesát*, which was published to celebrate the company's 50th anniversary, see: <http://www.namorniplavba.cz> (currently: <http://www.bastl.cz/cnp>).

Office, the Szczecin-Świnoujście Port Complex, the City Board and the City National Council.

Czechoslovakia region – transit cooperation

Independent Czechoslovakia's interest in access to the sea and inland shipping to reach the port of Szczecin dates back to the First Republic. It was then that the Treaty of Versailles made it possible to create a duty-free zone in the port the location of which closest to the industrial centres of Czechoslovakia was an opportunity for the development of transit and trade for the reborn state. Similarly, after World War Two following the changes to the international situation and establishing Potsdam's borders, the importance of Szczecin and Poland grew as a partner for Czechoslovak foreign trade, shipping, and, in the future, also for the shipbuilding industry that would construct ships for the needs of its southern neighbour. Szczecin was the closest transit port for the Czechoslovak partner and its industrial manufacturing centres, which, however, was recovering from the war damage and had to compete for the possibility of Czechoslovak transit with Gdańsk, Gdynia and Hamburg.¹¹ Nonetheless, until the treaty settlement of Polish-Czechoslovak relations in 1947, all manifestations of economic cooperation, including the issue of Czechoslovakia's access to a transit port, were used as an instrument of pressure in the Polish-Czechoslovak territorial dispute.¹²

The Polish-Czechoslovak friendship treaty was signed on 10 March 1947 as dictated by Moscow and it did not solve the most important problems such as the issue of the border and the location of national minorities but its finalisation opened the way to the normalisation of mutual relations on the economic, commercial and cultural levels. The latter issues were formally settled by signing a number of agreements defining the principles of economic, commercial and scientific-technical cooperation in Prague on 2–4 July 1947.¹³ The transport arrangement concluded at the time allowed for extensive use of Polish ports, mainly Szczecin, and ports on the Danube, as well as the

11 Techman, "Tranzyt," 229–272.

12 Marek Kazimierz Kamiński, *Polsko-czechosłowackie stosunki polityczne 1945–1948* (Warszawa: PWN, 1990), 347–348; Techman, "Szczecin w aktach," 65–66.

13 Archives of Modern Records, Ministry of Industry and Trade, ref. no. 3489, 15–19, Konwencja o zapewnieniu współpracy gospodarczej między Polską a CSR; Sbirka Zakonu Republiky Československe 1949, č. 9; Wiesław Balcerak et al., ed., *Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-czechosłowackich w latach 1944–1960* vol. 1, part 1 (Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków: Ossolineum, 1985), 227–228, 232–253; Jerzy Poznański, "Polsko-czechosłowacka współpraca gospodarcza," *Sprawy Międzynarodowe* 1 (1948): 5–7; Květa Kořalková, "Dvacet let československo-polského spojení," in: *Československo-polské vztahy v nejnovějších dějinách: sborník ref. a diskusních příspěvků z vědecké konference Ústavu pro mezinárodní politiku a ekonomii v Praze (2.3.1967)*, ed. Květa Kořalková (Praha: Praha: Ústav pro mezinárodní politiku a ekonomii, 1967), 41–44; Szczepańska, *Warszawa–Praga*, 183–199.

construction of the Oder-Danube Canal and reservoirs to improve the navigability of the Oder as well as energy facilities and other canals. In the field of transport, navigation and communication, plans were drawn up for rail connections, extension of the waterway to Ostrava, creation of joint port service companies, Szczecin-Prague telecommunication connection, training and exchange of professionals, manpower and assistance in the preparation of technical staff.¹⁴

The creation of the Czechoslovakia Area in the Duty Free Zone of the Port of Szczecin became one of the most interesting forms of economic cooperation between Poland and Czechoslovakia, which does not mean that it was entirely successful and effective. The Polish side was interested in close cooperation in this port for economic and political reasons. Such an opportunity was given by the aforementioned communication system of 1947, which provided for the signing of an agreement specifying the terms of the lease of part of the port of Szczecin and the creation of a duty-free zone for Czechoslovak enterprises.¹⁵ These provisions should be considered as mutually beneficial. They opened a “window” to the Baltic Sea for Prague and allowed for the development of trade. On the other hand, they brought tangible economic and political benefits to the Polish side due to the corroboration of the Polish character of Szczecin. Czechoslovakia was also ready to send its youth brigades to participate in the reconstruction of the port of Szczecin. The contract for the exchange of youth labour brigades was signed on 5 February 1948 in Prague, and already in July a group of 150 young people from the Volunteer Brigade came to Szczecin to work on the construction of the Czechoslovak quay.¹⁶

In May 1948, Vladimír Clementis, CSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, paid a visit to Szczecin to see for himself the usefulness of the port of Szczecin. In an interview with PAP, Clementis called Szczecin an old Slavic port – a symbol of the change of the border of the entire Slavic region.¹⁷ However, despite the good atmosphere of this visit and its outcome, the sight of the “Ewa” wharf covered with grass did not fill anyone with optimism.¹⁸ On 7–10 September 1948, the representatives of the Port Committee of the Polish-Czechoslovak Commission held talks in Szczecin on a framework agreement

14 Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter AMFA), fond 6, bundle 15, folder 215, 80–89, Sprawozdanie Wydziału Handlowego Ambasady RP w Pradze. For more on Czechoslovak shipping on the Oder, see: Techman, “Czechosłowacka żegluga,” part 1, 145–168; idem, “Czechosłowacka żegluga,” part 2, 5–28. More about the concept of building a transport connection in Central and Southern Europe in the form of the Danube-Oder-Elbe canal, which was to be transformed from a gate to three seas into a gate to the USSR, see: Jiří Janáč, *European Coasts of Bohemia: negotiating the Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal a Troubled Twentieth Century* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012).

15 Hutnikiewicz, “Szczecin w stosunkach,” 378–379.

16 *Kurier Szczeciński*, 13/02/1948, 19/07/ 1948.

17 *Głos Ludu*, 15/05/1948.

18 *Kurier Szczeciński*, 14–18/05/1948; Piotr Zaremba, *Pierwszy szczeciński rok 1945* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1966), 90–91; Zaremba emphasised the importance of this visit for the Polish

on the lease of the Czechoslovak region in the duty-free zone of the Port of Szczecin. The talks were then continued on 9–15 October in Prague.¹⁹

Before the above-mentioned agreements were signed, however, from 2 May 1947, non-contractual Czechoslovak transit through the port of Szczecin was carried out, which constituted nearly 5% of the overall transshipment turnover with an upward trend, to reach 557,000 tonnes (10.7%) in 1950. However, in the opinion of the Polish side, it was still insufficient.²⁰ In the structure of transshipments in 1947, bulk goods and coal as well as ore from Sweden prevailed in imports, which, like general cargo, was the dominant commodity in the following years. Wood dominated in exports.

From March 1949, Szczecin had an advocate of its interests in Prague, a supporter of Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation, in the person of the new ambassador in CSR i.e. Leonard Borkowicz. As he himself mentioned, it was not without reason that he agreed to undertake such mission precisely in order to solve the problems that stood in the way of making the port of Szczecin a transit and communication base for Czechoslovakia.²¹ However, on the basis of the available sources and literature, it is difficult to say to what extent he was actually able to implement his intentions and have a real impact on the state of cooperation in these areas during the diplomatic mission lasting only one year. He was in office at a time when there were no spectacular events in mutual relations and in Czechoslovakia, Stalinist purges and repressions at the top of the government were approaching.

On 15 July 1949, an agreement was signed in Prague on the lease of land in the port of Szczecin.²² The Czechoslovak region, located at the northern end of the eastern part of the Ewa Peninsula, was the total area of 30,000 m². What is more, at the request of the lessee an area in Ostrów Grabowski was to be devoted for the construction of the wharf and buildings with facilities. The exploitation of the area included

port city of Szczecin; idem, *Wspomnienia prezydenta Szczecina 1945–1950* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1977), 664–665, 709–719.

- 19 State Archives in Szczecin, Szczecin Maritime Office (hereinafter SAS SMO), ref. I/107, 7–10, Minutes of the proceedings in Szczecin; *ibid.*, 33–35, Report on a business trip to Czechoslovakia by A. Bonarski.
- 20 SAS, Szczecin-Świnoujście Port Authority (hereinafter SAS S-SPA), ref. no. 876, Confidential letter of the Director of the Operational Service of November 30 November 1950; Hutnikiewicz, “Szczecin w stosunkach,” 213–214.
- 21 For more on the circumstances of the departure of the first Szczecin provincial governor from Szczecin, see: Katarzyna Rembacka, “«Praski epizod» szczecińskiego wojewody Leonarda Borkowicza,” in: *Polsko-czeskie kontakty dyplomatyczne*, 30–43; eadem, *Komunista na peryferiach władzy. Historia Leonarda Borkowicza 1912–1989* (Szczecin-Warszawa: IPN, 2020), 365–392; Marek Kazimierz Kamiński, *Kształtowanie się stosunków polsko-czechosłowackich 1948–1960* (Warszawa: Neritorn, 2012), 42–43.
- 22 AMFA, fond 15, bundle 17, folder 150; Balcerak, *Dokumenty i materiały*, vol. 1, part 1, 103–108; Waclaw Jastrzębowski, “Rejon czechosłowacki w Szczecinie,” *Gospodarka Morska* 3 (1949): 304–310; Szczepańska, “Rejon,” 47–60; eadem, “Port,” 179–193.

the transshipment and storage of goods by the Czechoslovak side and gave rights to the use of the area by ships and other means of transport which pursued Czechoslovak interests. At the same time, the agreement imposed an obligation to comply with the provisions of the lease agreement as well as the provisions of Polish law and government orders in the duty-free zone of the Port of Szczecin. The lessee, which was specified in the contract as the Czechoslovak Freight Forwarding Joint Stock Society in Prague ("Metrans"), obtained the right to employ Czechoslovak citizens with the consent of the Polish authorities. The framework lease agreement the parties to which were the Szczecin Maritime Office and the aforementioned Forwarding Society created conditions for the implementation of detailed lease agreements. The Czechoslovak side obtained the right to use the water areas 35m wide and adjacent to the quays. The rent and payment terms were also established. All port fees due from sea-going ships and goods on those ships in the port of Szczecin were to be collected by the Polish side. The lessee, on the other hand, was entitled to set and collect fees for the use of the Czechoslovakia region by third parties. Detailed agreements were also to define the investment plans that the lessee should implement. The Polish party was responsible for the economic infrastructure i.e. road and rail communication facilities, water supply, sewage and electricity networks.²³

Meanwhile, work on the construction of the Czechoslovakia region, and thus its release to the Czechoslovak side, dragged on in time. As part of the reconstruction, the wharf, warehouses and transshipment facilities were renovated, port basins were cleaned of shipwrecks and debris, roads and flyovers as well as communication infrastructure were repaired.²⁴ On 11 August 1951, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland adopted a resolution on the Regulations for the Czechoslovak Region in the Port of Szczecin.²⁵ The area was partially handed over for use in 1952, which was preceded by talks in which the Czechoslovak side was represented by consul Jan

23 SAS SMO, ref. no. 108, 16–16, Agreement on the establishment of a telephone and telegraph cable connection between the port of Szczecin and Czechoslovakia, Warsaw, 2 September 1948.

24 AMZV Zastupitelský Úřad Polsko 1945–1955 (hereinafter AMZV ZÚ Polsko) carton 129, Report of the CSR Consulate General in Szczecin, Szczecin, 11 October 1949; Ryszard Łangowski and Henryk Salmonowicz, "Gospodarka morska w estuarium Odry," in: *Dzieje Szczecina*, vol. 4: 1945–1990, eds. Tadeusz Białecki and Zygmunt Silski (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo "13 Muz," 1998), 308–309; Szczepańska, "Rejon," 50–59.

25 SAS S-SPA, ref. no. 1177, 53–58.

Stareček and the Polish side by Jan Biliński.²⁶ Ultimately, the area was released to the Czechoslovak side in 1953, while in 1952 the first ships moored to the quay.²⁷

As agreed, the administration and operation of the region was carried out by the “Mettrans” company until the end of 1955. From the beginning of its operation, there were problems with exploiting the full potential of the region. Likewise, the level of Czechoslovak trade through the port of Szczecin did not inspire optimism. A significant obstacle to the development of trade was the shortage of storage space in the port of Szczecin.²⁸ “Mettrans” also pointed out other difficulties related to transport through Poland such as high reloading costs compared to German ports, high surcharges to ocean rates, low frequency and regularity of line ships departures. Szczecin was an important port for handling bulk goods, and to a much lesser extent general cargo, and could not boast of a sufficient number of connections with other ports of the world, nor did it have the appropriate warehouses, lifting or transport equipment.²⁹

Economic cooperation in the port area, although not without difficulties, continued to develop, and Czechoslovakia was the main transit contractor for the port of Szczecin. The Czechoslovak transit in Polish ports increased from 0.8 million tonnes to 2.7 million tonnes in the first half of the 1950s and the exchange of transport services became an important element of the payment balance.³⁰ The lease of the duty-free zone in the port of Szczecin lasted until 13 January 1956 when a new communication system was signed along with the Protocol on the takeover of the Czechoslovak region (in fact, it happened on 1 January) by the Szczecin Port Authority. There was a merger into a unified communication, technological and organisational system with the constructed “Ewa” area. It was economic reasons that decided to hand over the Czechoslovakia region to Poland for financial compensation.³¹ The Polish side under-

26 SAS S-SPA, ref. no. 1177, 59, Instructions of the Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Shipping of 18 January 1952, also, the minutes of the conference on cooperation between “Mettrans” and S-SPA April-May 1952; Ibid, ref. no. 871, Cooperation with the Czechoslovak Joint Stock Company “Mettrans” in 1952.

27 Kazimierz Czaplinski, Jan Chabowski and January Buksak, “Działalność inwestycyjna PRL w Porcie Szczecińskim,” in: *Port Szczeciński. Dzieje i rozwój do 1970 r.*, ed. Bronisław Dziedziul (Warszawa-Poznań: PWN, 1975), 160–166.

28 SAS S-SPA file ref. 876, Confidential letter of the Head of the Operational Service of 30 November 1950.

29 AMFA, fond 7, bundle 49, folder 454, 26–30, Report of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Prague for March 1949. For more on the exploitation of the Czechoslovak region, see: Techman, “Tranzyt czechosłowacki,” 242.

30 Bohumil Lehár, “Stosunki gospodarcze PRL–CSRS w latach 1945–1975,” in: *Stosunki polsko-czechosłowackie a rewolucje ludowo-demokratyczne*, ed. Wiesław Balcerak (Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków: Ossolineum 1980), 194.

31 Národní Archiv, Úřad předsednictva vlády – tajná spisovna, tajná spisovna, 16.33.1–75, carton 2031, Information from Minister David on the agreement of 13 January 1956; *Umowy graniczne PRL*, ed. Franciszek Jarzyna (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Prawnicze, 1974), 314–321; Władysław Gnat and

took to create the best possible conditions for the use of the port by Czechoslovak sea ships. On the other hand, ships with the Czechoslovak flag could use Polish seaports as their shipping and technical base. Both sides ensured the right to use inland waterway transport for shipping companies. They also undertook to improve rail connections in transit communication.

The takeover of the Czechoslovak region did not mean the end of the cooperation between the two states in the port of Szczecin as Czechoslovak transit grew and this trend continued until 1965 making Czechoslovakia the largest transit contractor and an important factor in the development of the port and Polish-Czechoslovak economic contacts. After the modernisation of the Czechoslovak Quay in 1956, it became one of the best general cargo handling facilities in the Szczecin-Świnoujście Port Complex.

In order to improve Czechoslovak transit and encourage it to develop, new investments were announced in the port of Szczecin. It was hoped that imports of Czechoslovak transit goods would increase by 85% and exports by 15%. Unfortunately, the Czechoslovak side had numerous reservations about the shortcomings in the operation of the port such as the lack of reloading space at the quays, a small number of employees in the port, few regular shipping lines, poor connections between Szczecin and the Far East and delayed delivery of carriages by the Polish Railway.³²

The deterioration of transit cooperation was already visible in 1962. Czechoslovak transit became less attractive to the Port Authority. The Polish party terminated the agreement on the payment of fees for the transport of Czechoslovak goods by Polish ships to European ports.³³ In 1963, difficulties in agreeing on the conditions on which the transit was to take place caused serious problems in cooperation and resulted in interruption of negotiations between the Ministry of Shipping of CSSR and the Ministry of Shipping of the Polish People's Republic. The Czechoslovak side did not want to agree to any changes in the rates or terms of payment for sea freight to be made before 1 January 1964. The serious threat of lowering the balance of services in Polish ports made it impossible to settle the payments for 1963 and resulted in signing the communication protocol with a delay i.e. on 24 August due to the conditions of the Polish side demanding an increase in foreign currency fees for sea transport and an increase in fees for the use of Polish ports.³⁴ The Czechoslovak side, on the other hand, threatened to move its transit to the Yugoslav and German ports.

Stanisław Sala, "Obroty ładunkowe i ruch statków w Porcie Szczecińskim w latach 1945–1970," in: *Port Szczeciński*, 335.

32 *Kurier Szczeciński*, 27/02/1958.

33 AMZV, TO Polsko 1960–1964, carton 1, Report of the CSSR consulate in Szczecin on the fulfilment of the Czechoslovak transit plan through Polish seaports in 1962, 5 April 1963.

34 AMZV, TO Polsko 1960–1964, carton 1, Report of the CSR consulate in Szczecin on the Czechoslovak transit through Polish seaports in 1963, 20 March 1964.

In the late 1960s, the port of Szczecin handled 25% of Czechoslovak foreign trade by sea and on 28 January 1970, the transshipment of the 50th million tonne of Czechoslovak goods transported in transit through the port of Szczecin was rightly celebrated. The importance of Szczecin for the Czechoslovak merchant fleet was mentioned in the press interview given by Antonín Gregor, CSSR ambassador in Warsaw, who attended the ceremony.³⁵ Despite such symbolic gestures, the already-signalled problems that effectively hindered the transit of Czechoslovak goods through Polish ports remained unsolved also in the 1970s. The Czechoslovak side unsuccessfully pointed out the lack of railway carriages and the fact that the tonnage of the Polish sea fleet did not meet the needs of transporting Czechoslovak goods. Problems were also caused by the method of currency settlements of Polish transit through the territory of the CSSR.³⁶ The Polish side saw the need to change the transit policy towards the Czechoslovak partner, the aim of which was to increase communication and transit cooperation. The aforementioned problems and the lack of acceptance of the proposed terms by Prague led to a crisis in the early 1970s. Transport contracts and agreements were not signed, and full tariff rates and service charges were introduced. As a consequence, Polish ports were losing their position as the most important partner for Czechoslovak transit which was moved to the ports of East Germany, Yugoslavia, the USSR, Bulgaria and Hamburg. From then on, it was Hamburg and Rostock, with their technical and organisational capabilities, that were to take over the role that Szczecin had played for Czechoslovak sea transit. This situation lasted until the late 1980s, when 24.3% was handled in the Szczecin-Świnoujście Port Complex, which was due to more favourable financial conditions offered to Czechoslovak forwarders than in the case of services in other ports.³⁷ The favourable financial conditions offered to the Czechoslovak side with the low quality of the services provided, allowed the port of Szczecin to maintain Czechoslovak transit; however, no investments in the port infrastructure and, on the other hand, the construction of communication routes – road and rail from Scandinavia to southern Europe and from Rostock to Prague and Bratislava – were potential threats to the position of Szczecin as a convenient transit port.

35 *Kurier Szczeciński*, 28/01/1970; *Kurier Szczeciński* 1/03/1970; Interview with Ambassador Antonín Gregor held at the Decade of Czechoslovak Culture organised on 1–10 March. NA ČR, ÚV KSČ 1945–1989,

36 Kancelář generálního tajemníka Gustáva Husáka, carton 422, Information on the management of freight carries of the Common Freight Car Pool in the Polish railway network, appendix to the Information of the State Planning Commission on Czechoslovakia-Polish economic relations, January 1971. AMFA, Department I, 4/79, v. 2, Information materials from the party and professional meeting held at the Embassy on 26 November 1975, Prague, 4 December 1975. Current problems of trade and Polish-Czechoslovak economic and scientific-technical cooperation.

37 Techman, “Tranzyt czechosłowacki,” 258–267. As Techman notes, in 1976, Szczecin lost its place as the most important port for Czechoslovak transit. In the port of Szczecin-Świnoujście, the Czechoslovak transit in 1970 amounted to 2,131,000 tonnes and in 1979 it fell to 1,501,000 tonnes.

Czechoslovak graduates of Szczecin's maritime schools

One of the less known and researched aspects of the Czechoslovak presence in Szczecin is the training of seafarers in the maritime schools of Szczecin. Meanwhile, as Lenka Krátká, who interviewed former Czechoslovak sailors, recalls that in her conversations with them sooner or later there was a mention of sea shipping in Poland, not only because Gdynia, Gdańsk and Szczecin served as “native” ports for Czechoslovak ships but also because many seamen, especially officers and captains, were graduates of the State Maritime School and the Maritime School of Higher Education in Szczecin.³⁸

Integration of Szczecin with Poland also took place at the level of culture and education created in Western Pomerania, including maritime education providing training for seafarers for Polish shipping. The political will in this matter, already declared at the end of 1945, was realised in 1946 when Capt. Konstanty Maciejewicz was entrusted with putting together a team of people responsible for creating the infrastructure necessary to open the school located at ul. Piastów 19. In this difficult post-war reality, it was even more challenging to provide students with a qualified group of educators and administrative staff of the State Maritime School.³⁹ The first academic year at the State Maritime School in Szczecin began on 5 November 1947 and already among its first students were Czechoslovak students. Obviously, the provincial authorities supported this form of Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation and during his visit to Prague, Szczecin provincial governor, Leonard Borkowicz, promised to award five three-year-long scholarships at the Szczecin State Maritime School to Czechoslovak students.⁴⁰

38 Lenka Krátká writes more on this in an article which was written thanks to the use of the oral history method based on interviews with seventeen Czechoslovak sailors. As in the monograph published a few years later, the author in the first part of the article discussed the historical and methodological part, then presented fragments of conversations and memories of seafarers, often including personal and family threads, Lenka Krátká, “Byłem ciekawy,” 187–204; eadem, Domovský, 183–229. A new approach to the issue was presented by the author in the article “Czechoslovak Seafarers’ Memories of Polish Ports as their «Second Home» during the State Socialism Period (1949–1989)” in which she used not only the aforementioned interviews with seafarers but also, based on archival sources, showed the place of Szczecin in the official policy of the communist authorities in Prague and in the activities of the Czechoslovak secret police, see: Krátká, “Czechoslovak Seafarers’ Memories” 38–45.

39 For more on the organisation and provision of maritime education in Szczecin in the first post-war years, see Techman, “Pierwsze,” 15–40.

40 *Dziennik Zachodni*, 19/04/1948. In August 1948, provincial governor Leonard Borkowicz requested the chairman of the Provincial National Council in Brno to select five candidates for studies at the State Maritime School in Szczecin and, with some delay, he received a reply in October with an attached list of candidates, AP Szczecin, Urząd Wojewódzki Szczeciński, ref. no. 142, 31–43, letter from the chairman of the Provincial National Council in Brno to L. Borkowicz, Brno 7 October 1948.

Czechoslovak sailors and ship captains were educated at many schools of the Eastern Bloc countries, including Gdynia and Szczecin.⁴¹ One of the first Czechoslovak shipping captains educated after World War Two was Antonín Fojtů, who graduated from the State Maritime School in Szczecin.⁴² The memoirs he published describe the Szczecin School and its first head, Jerzy Maciejewicz. The author recalls his studies as a very good time for learning, working and making friends, thus he reflects the atmosphere that prevailed at the school in the first years of operation of maritime higher education in Szczecin. And literally, because Fojtů graduated from the State Maritime School in 1950, therefore he remembers how the school infrastructure was built. He recalls with nostalgia the uniforms and sailor's hats with the name of the school on; he remembers the school's duty hours, morning gymnastics and the legendary annual balls when the ballroom and other lecture halls were decorated with ornaments resembling the prow of a school sailing ship or port taverns. At the same time, two women studied at the State Maritime School i.e. Danuta Kobylińska and Halina Sobierajska, which Fojtů especially emphasises, thus reflecting the atmosphere created by head Maciejewicz who was favourable to students and who looked after young people who had experienced war in a way contrary to the ideological and political conditions of the Stalinist period.⁴³ Also Eugeniusz Daszkowski and Milan Rusňák, the captain who sailed many Czechoslovak ships, including MS "Blaník" built in Szczecin, which he commanded in the years 1969–1970 while sailing the Szczecin-Cuba line.⁴⁴ During the interview with Lenka Krátka, Rusňák admitted that during his stay in Szczecin he received a solid classic education for which he thanked the Poles very much. He found the studies

41 In addition to Polish maritime schools, the commanders of the Czechoslovak fleet graduated from universities in Varna, Odessa, Leningrad, Kaliningrad, Rostock, and also in Yugoslavia – in Bakar and Dubrovnik. In the years 1975–1989, 168 graduates from Czechoslovakia graduated from maritime schools, 153 of whom started working on ČNP ship, Bastl, *Námořní školy*, accessed 6 July 2022, <http://www.bastl.cz/cnp/2436.html>.

42 Antoni Fojtů, *Moře milované, moře proklínane*, part I i II (Praha, Mare-Czech, 2006). Parts of those memoirs devoted to studies at the State Maritime School were published at *Námořní školy*, <http://www.bastl.cz/cnp/2436.html>. Fojtů graduated from the Szczecin school in 1950. He was the captain of, among others, MS "Republika I" together with Capt. Milan Rusňák, also one of the first Czechoslovak students in Szczecin: "Absolwenci szkół morskich w Szczecinie," in: *Szkolnictwo morskie Szczecina*, Annex II, Wykazy Urzędowe.

43 For more on the teaching staff, students and the operation of the State Maritime School in its first years, see Eugeniusz A., Daszkowski, "Moja szkoła morska na Piastów," in: *Szkolnictwo morskie Szczecina*, 41–52. Daszkowski, like Fojtů, graduated from the Navigation Department of the State Maritime School in Szczecin in 1950, and what is more, they remembered similar events and the atmosphere of their student years.

44 One of the first graduates of the Szczecin school were Antoni Kantner and Jaroslav Putna, see: Captain M. Rusňák's memoirs on Captain Jan Hekel and his meeting in Szczecin with a friend from Pula, *Antoni Ledóchowski professor of the State Maritime School*, accessed 20 July 2022, www.namorniplayba.cz/cnp/363.html.

very demanding but also giving a sense of uniqueness and elitism.⁴⁵ According to the findings of the Czech researcher, Szczecin was perceived by Czechoslovak sailors as their home port, almost a second home, from which they set off on long journeys and which they called at on their way back home.⁴⁶ They experienced kindness in Szczecin, felt comfortable in that port city which was struggling with problems similar to those that Czechoslovak sailors experienced themselves as citizens of a socialist country. The feeling of closeness was facilitated by linguistic and cultural similarities.

It is difficult to determine exactly how many graduates of Szczecin maritime schools were citizens of Czechoslovakia without a query in the Archives of the Maritime University of Szczecin, where only a few personal files of students containing their CVs, personal questionnaires, secondary school-leaving certificates and final examination records have survived.⁴⁷ In the appendix to the book *Szkolnictwo morskie Szczecina*, cited in the footnote, there is a list of graduates but due to the often Polish-language spelling of surnames and their wording, it is difficult to say which of the graduates came from Czechoslovakia.⁴⁸

After the liquidation of the Czechoslovak sea fleet, which was first a victim of coupon privatisation and then a series of transformations into subsidiaries that successively sold the ČNP assets in the form of ships (the last of them, MS “Jan Želivský,” was sold in 1998), a large number of employees, including highly qualified ship captains, became unemployed and lost their main source of income.⁴⁹ After 1998, the Mare-Czech publishing house published fifteen diaries of members of Czechoslovak crews occupying various levels of the service hierarchy from the engine room, through deck personnel, doctors to ship captains, who recalled with nostalgia their professional experiences, unforgettable cruises and daily struggles on ships. Among them were the memories of one of the first graduates of the State Maritime School in Szczecin, Antoni Fojtů and Vlastislav Ringel, member of the on-board staff of several ships built at the Adolf Warski Szczecin Shipyard and Pavel Braňka, and the cook who recalled his stay in Szczecin, which, to his surprise, turned out to be a river port, not a seaport.⁵⁰

45 Krátká, “Byłem ciekawy,” 196.

46 Krátká, “Czechoslovak Seafarers’ Memories,” 38–41.

47 Such documents make up the file of Milan Rusňák, graduate of the State Maritime School from 1950. Information obtained on the basis of e-mail correspondence with employees of the Archives of the Maritime University in Szczecin in July 2022.

48 “Absolwenci szkół morskich w Szczecinie,” in: *Szkolnictwo morskie Szczecin*, Annex II.

49 See: Bastl, *Padesát*, 11–12, 149.

50 Antoni Fojtů, *Moře*; Vlastislav Ringel, *Vůně a krása okamžiku. Šťastný čtyřlístek Blaník, Sitno, Radhošť, Kriváň* (Praha; Mare-Czech, 2014); Jaroslav Pacovský, *Mořští vlci na Blaníku* (Praha: Albatros, 1976); Pavel Braňka, *Kuchařem na lodích Československé Plavby – kniha I. Od kuchtíka k šéfkuchařovi* (Praha: Mare-Czech, 2012). For more on Czechoslovak sailors’ diaries, literature on the subject and propaganda films, see Krátká, *Československý*, 183–229.

Czechoslovak sea fleet

Since granting the duty-free zone to Czechoslovakia in Hamburg and Szczecin in 1919, the country, through private entrepreneurs such as Baťa, began operating ships for which Prague was the home port. After World War Two, in 1951, shipping was taken over by “Metrans,” which, following discussions with the Greek consul in Marseille, purchased the ship manufactured in the UK called MS “Republika I,” originally named MS “Evanthia,” for 10.2 million crowns which was initially intended to develop trade with the Far East and later with Cuba. The CSR sea fleet activity certainly served the implementation of the economic interests of the country and brought profits, but in the centrally controlled economy, political and party interests as well as international conditions were also important as evidenced by the type of cargo transported e.g. arms or strong ties with the People’s Republic of China after signing in 1952–1953 agreements that allowed China to maintain a merchant fleet under the Czechoslovak flag.⁵¹ From 1959, the Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping company was engaged in the operation of ships as an international joint-stock company. The Czechoslovak side, taking advantage of the state monopoly on foreign trade by educating its citizens in socialist countries and employing its own ship’s crews and by purchasing ships mainly in socialist countries, was able to obtain a double reimbursement of the cost of their purchase within 15 years of operating the ships.⁵² Apart from Polish Ocean Lines in Gdynia, Polsteam in Szczecin was one of the shipowners providing commercial transport to Czechoslovakia. Soon, in 1962, Szczecin and the Adolf Warski Szczecin Shipyard also

51 Krátká, *Československý*, 17. The author presents new views on the operation of the Czechoslovak fleet and puts forward the thesis that its reconstruction after World War Two had strong political conditions resulting from the Czechoslovak communists’ efforts to strengthen their position in relation to Moscow and the Eastern Bloc. However, over time it turned out that Czechoslovak shipping was able to bring financial benefits. Loosening cooperation with China, establishment and operation of the ČNP enterprise, purchase of new ships and good management of the company led to record profits in the 1970s and brought the economy an inflow of convertible currencies, cf. Krátká, *Československý*, 54–55, 235–237. Until 1960, the joint Sino-Czechoslovak fleet consisted of seven ships, the crews of which were mixed Sino-Czechoslovakia and Czechofracht dealt with forwarding and transport, see: Krátká, *Československý*, 54–55. Krátká refers to materials in the unfinished fonds of the Ministry of Foreign Trade at the National Archives in Prague. After the purchase of MS “Republika I,” which, according to the author, was a cover for the development of cooperation with China; the next ship was bought by Czechoslovakia only in 1959, and the Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping, established in the same year, was a company owned by Czechoslovakia in 51% while the remaining shares belonged to Beijing. Cooperation with China was being limited from the beginning of the 1960s and officially ended in 1967. During the period of strengthening Sino-Czechoslovak cooperation in 1953, the Polish side offered Prague participation in the Chinese-Polish Enterprise of Shipbrokers but Czechoslovakia rejected such an unprofitable proposal – high shipping rates three times higher than on world markets – for fear that it would be the weaker party to the project because of an inadequate fleet at that time and it would be forced to co-finance the partners’ fleet, see: Bastl, *Padesát*, 9, 15–16.

52 *Stručný přehled vývoje námorní dopravy v Československu a České republice*, accessed 20 April 2020, www.namorniplavba.cz/cnp/121.html; Techman, “Udzial,” 47.

became the place of ship production for Czechoslovakia. The first ship was flagged in March 1964 – B512 MS “Republika II,” the next was the twin “Brno,” launched in 1965 which sailed mostly to Cuba and Iraq. In 1967, MS “Blaník” was launched, which until 1990 was used to develop trade in goods with Cuba but it also sailed with general cargo and iron to India. MS “Sitno” put into service in 1969 was the last ship to be produced in the 1960s. In the next decade, the importance of the Szczecin shipbuilding industry increased with shipyards building or repairing ships for the Czechoslovak shipowner.⁵³ In 1970, the general cargo vessels MS “Radhošť” and MS “Křiváň” were put into operation. The latter, which transported bauxite from India to Poland, also sailed to Iraq with general cargo, took soybean meal from Barcelona to Tripoli and throughout its lifetime earned its fivefold value. In 1972, MS “Praha” sailed with its first transport from Newfoundland to the USA, serving both the CSSR fleet and a foreign shipowner. In 1974, a highly-automated ship MS “Bratislava” was built in the Szczecin shipyard, initially rented, sailed between Europe and South America and its Polish equipment during the ship’s lifetime had to be changed to Norwegian automation, which turned out to be more reliable. Using the experience of MS “Bratislava,” its twin ship MS “Třinec” launched in 1975 was immediately equipped, among many, with devices manufactured by a Swedish company Jengner, which lowered their failure rate compared to those installed by the Polish manufacturer in older vessels. The ship was operated for several years in South America under a three-year contract and transported iron ore and steel industry products. As the entire loading area was not used, a tennis court and a football pitch were installed in the remaining rooms. One of the last ships built at Adolf Warski Szczecin Shipyard was the MS “Danube” which sailed in the years 1989–1997 and was used to transport containers and bulk cargo. Already during the design phase, it underwent major changes to its construction such as adjusting cargo spaces, introducing changes to the split stern superstructure, installing an integrated automation system with a computer and satellite communication and four 25-tonne on-board cranes for loading and unloading containers. The sister and the last ship to be built in Szczecin for a CSSR shipowner was MS “Łaba,” put into service in 1989, which was part of the Czechoslovak sea fleet until it was sold to a Dutch shipowner in 1997.⁵⁴

53 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1970–1974, carton 3, Embassy information about F. Vacuik and J. Pospíšil’s visit to Szczecin to celebrate hoisting the flag on the mast of the MS “Praha” ship, Szczecin, 27 June 1972. On 4 June 1972, the seventh ship for Czechoslovakia, MS “Praha,” was launched. The ceremony in Szczecin was attended by the delegation from Prague – the embassy representative and the consul. Warski’s Shipyard had been building ships since 1963/1964, when MS “Republika II” was built for the Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping. Szczecin press published reportage from every launching ceremony for ships built at the Warski Szczecin Shipyard, “Warski buduje statki dla Czechosłowacji,” *Kurier Szczeciński*, 14 June 1972. More on this topic: Techman, “Udział,” 55–58.

54 *Historie ČNP*, accessed 13 June 2021, www.namorniplavba.cz/cnp/35315.html; also namornidenik.cz website with an encyclopedia of terminology, artifacts and photos and videos from cruises by members of the ship’s crews.

The holds of Czechoslovak ships often carried weapons for the so-called third world countries whose regimes were generously supported by Moscow. Czechoslovak or Soviet weapons, through the CSSR, were sent to India, Iraq, Syria, and North Yemen. In the years 1970–1990, Czechoslovakia was one of the five largest suppliers of weapons to Iraq, while Poland was the fourth. Although the logs on board lack data or provide only partial information on this subject, one can learn that the MS “Kladno” transported explosives from the port of Szczecin to Cuba.⁵⁵

Another well-known practice was the black market trade the seafarers were engaged in. Czechoslovak sailors bought alcohol in Szczecin’s “Baltona,” which, apart from wigs, Crimplene, razor blades, perfumes and clothes bought in Germany, were smuggled on ships and sold at a profit, for example in Cuba and India. It was not always possible to smuggle goods across the border and in such cases seafarers were detained and goods were requisitioned as happened in 1975 with the crews of the MS “Blaník” sailing from Szczecin to Cuba or with the MS “Mír II.”⁵⁶

Activities of the Consulate General of Czechoslovakia in Szczecin

In order to secure the economic interests of Czechoslovakia on the Polish coast, the consulate general of this country was established in 1949 and Szczecin was chosen as its seat even though at that time it seemed more convenient to locate it in Gdańsk or Gdynia. Giving the highest rank of general representation to a consular office not inhabited by many Czechs and Slovaks seems to have a political dimension and serve to emphasise, on the one hand, the affiliation of Szczecin to Poland, and on the other hand, the importance of the city in bilateral economic relations.

On 17 January 1949, the exequatur of the President of the Republic of Poland was granted to the first Consul General of the CSR in Szczecin, Adolf Kania, a doctor of law, who spoke Polish, was familiar with Polish literature and was well versed in economic issues, which was important due to the plans to create a Czechoslovak duty-free zone and the need to protect economic interests.⁵⁷ Therefore, the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia František Pišek, visiting Szczecin on 21–22 August 1949, recommended increasing employment and allocating more funds to the needs of the consulate.⁵⁸

55 Krátká, *Československý*, 122–123. The author found the resources of unfinished archival fonds in the National Archives in Prague – Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping, logbook of MS “Kladno,” No. 15 of 1964.

56 Krátká, *Československý*, 127–128.

57 Techman, “Adolf Kania,” 147–167; idem “Czechosłowacka sieć,” 145–168.

58 AMZV, TO Polsko 1945–1959, carton 1, č. 1, Report of the Embassy CSR in Warsaw to the MZV on a business trip to Szczecin and Gdańsk.

The consulate did not focus its activities on the implementation of the protective function due to the small number of Czechs and Slovaks living in the consular district. According to the data included in the list of foreigners residing in Szczecin of 27 September 1945, only fourteen of them – nine men and five women – lived there.⁵⁹ A small group, nine people, of Czechoslovak citizens lived in the vicinity of Gorzów Wielkopolski, Drezdenko, Wałcz, Lębork, Dolice and Chojna.⁶⁰ Consulate employees looked after a growing group of fitters, “Spedrapid” or “Metrans” employees as well as holidaymakers resting at the Baltic seaside and children resting in summer camps.⁶¹

Once a month, consulate employees met with employees of Czechoslovak companies employed in the consular district, took care of their living conditions and – to an equally high degree – their ideological training and participation in cultural events.⁶² From the beginning of their work in Szczecin, the consuls underlined good contacts with the local authorities, as well as with the authorities of the provinces in the consular district: Gdańsk, Koszalin, Poznań and Zielona Góra, with whom they met during their business trips.⁶³ Permanent contacts with representatives of provincial and municipal authorities in the district, as well as with consuls of the USSR, constituted the basic source of information on the situation in Poland and the region, apart from, of course, media reports.

In 1951, commission letters were received by Jan Stareček, an employee of the Witkowice plant, party and trade union activist, and from 1950 employed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague.⁶⁴ His appointment to replace the educated and economically-knowledgeable Adolf Kania was a clear manifestation of the ideologisation of the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia and the entire Eastern Bloc. Successively in the Stalinist period, the Czechoslovak consular post in Szczecin carried out more and more political, information and propaganda activities. Consulate employees organised

59 SAS, City Board and the City National Council 1945–1950 (hereinafter CBCNC in Szczecin), ref. no. 149.

60 AMZV, Konzulární odbor (hereinafter AMZV KO) 1945–1959, carton 187, Reports of the CSR Consulate General in Szczecin of 10 and 21 June 1951.

61 APS, CBCNC in Szczecin, ref. no. 149, List of foreigners residing in Szczecin of 27 September 1945; AMZV, KO 1945–1959, carton 187, Report of the Consulate General in Szczecin of 10 and 21 June 1951; ZÚ Polsko, carton 90, Letter from the Consulate General in Szczecin to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade in Prague of 17 April 1954 regarding flats for the heads of “Spedrapid.”

62 AMZV, Teritoriální odbor-obyčejné (hereinafter TO-O) Polsko 1945–1959, carton 2, Report of the CSR Embassy in Warsaw to the MZV of 3 July 1953.

63 AMZV, TO-O Polsko 1945–1959, carton 2, Report of the CSR CG in Szczecin on the implementation of the plan for the second quarter of 1952; AMZV, TO-O Polsko 1945–1959, carton 5, Report of the consul in Szczecin on a trip to the Gdańsk Province, 12 October 1960.

64 AMZV, DP 1945–1959, carton 14, Consular Commission for J. Stareček; AMZV, ZÚ Polsko, carton 132, Report of the CSR CG on the farewell dinner in connection with the departure and completion of the Stareček’s mission, Szczecin, 18 November 1955.

many cyclical, occasional events devoted to Polish-Czechoslovak and Polish-Soviet friendship, anniversaries of the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Red Army or the anniversary of the creation of the Czechoslovak army. They also took part in many local celebrations organised by the authorities of Szczecin and provinces located in the consular district, theatre performances and concerts, May Day parades and events held during the Sea Days in Szczecin and Gdańsk.

However, the most important area of activity of the consulate in Szczecin were economic interests in the port and those related to shipping on the Oder River. Consulate employees watched over the proper course of the transit of goods through ports, supervised the construction and operation of the Czechoslovak region, cooperated and supported the activities of shipping and communication companies operating in the consular district and looked after Czechoslovak employees. Unfortunately, the actions taken to implement the concluded agreements were often perceived by Polish local authorities as interference in the work of the port administration. This is one of the reasons why consular officials critically assessed the work of the Port Authority and the discriminatory treatment of the Czechoslovak quay, which, in their opinion, resulted in delays in unloading goods. In 1953, a Czechoslovak consul protest in 1953 was triggered by the decision of the Minister of Finance of the People's Republic of Poland to pay the turnover tax for the use of the "Ewa" wharf. Finally, the consulate was concerned about the insufficient use of transshipment and transit capacities on the Czechoslovak quay, bureaucratic procedures and the efforts of the Polish side to limit the influence of CSR on the activities of the Czechoslovak region.⁶⁵

The hope for a solution to problems in cooperation in the port area was associated with the appointment of Václav Macura, graduate of an industrial school, former employee of the Ministry of Trade and a foreign trade enterprise, as consul in Szczecin (in September 1955), whose competences could help protect the economic interests of the CSR. Meanwhile, the consul faced completely new challenges caused by the liquidation of the Czechoslovak region and the need to secure economic interests.⁶⁶

Due to the location of the consular district covering part of the Baltic Coast, the specific nature of the care functions of the consulate in Szczecin consisted in taking care of persons temporarily staying in Poland on holiday or of Czechoslovak seafarers. Consular employees visited crews of ships anchored in Polish ports in Szczecin, Gdynia or Gdańsk, supervised the employment of ship crews, extended the validity of on-board books and assisted in the efficient customs clearance of crews departing to the

65 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1945–1959, carton 2, Report of the Czechoslovak Embassy in Warsaw on consultations with consuls on 26 September 1953.

66 AMZV, DP 1945–1959, carton 14, Consular patent and commission letter for V. Macura; Information on the course of the reception, 9 May 1956, Szczecin, May 15, 1956; Information of the CSR CG in Szczecin on social contacts in September 1956, Szczecin, 4 October 1956.

CSSR.⁶⁷ With regard to the holidaymakers resting at the Polish seaside, support was provided to people who fell ill, were robbed or did not have proper living conditions during their vacation. What is more, consular employees oversaw people who were engaged in cultural and ministerial exchanges. The largest group of holidaymakers participated in trips organised by the Čedok travel agency, then by young people associated in the Czechoslovak Youth Union. The consulate called for detailed information about the dates of stay in order to be able to provide proper care and plan visits to places where the holidaymakers were staying.⁶⁸ Consul Macura personally welcomed the first group of holidaymakers who came to Darłowo and checked the conditions of stay and accommodation, which was an act of extraordinary dedication considering the modest staffing of the consulate, employing three people, including only one with diplomatic status.⁶⁹ The Poznań International Fair and the Sea Days celebrations were an opportunity for many meetings with Polish and foreign representatives in the district under the authority of the Szczecin facility. Especially the participation in an event such as the fair created an opportunity for the consul to meet with representatives of Western countries and not only with delegations from the USSR, Bulgaria and the GDR, and with the authorities of Poznań.⁷⁰ An important form of work were social contacts developed during annual parties on the anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia and cyclical cultural events such as the Days of Culture or the Decade of Czechoslovak Culture. A festival of Czechoslovak films was organised in Świnoujście and scientific conferences devoted to Polish-Czechoslovak relations were held at the Institute for Western Affairs in Poznań.⁷¹

The challenge for the Czechoslovak foreign service in 1968 was to counteract the negative assessment of the situation during the Prague Spring, which was maintained by the PZPR management. What is more, it was necessary to take steps to change the attitude of public opinion in Poland subjected to the propaganda of the authorities and the media subordinate to them.⁷² Consul Alois Tvardík felt reserved in personal con-

67 AMZV, KO 1955–1964, carton 36, Report of the Consulate General of the CSSR in Szczecin for the first half of 1961.

68 AMZV, KO 1955–1964, carton 36, Report of the Consulate General of the CSSR in Szczecin for the second half of 1960.

69 AMZV, DP 1955–1964 – secret, carton 10, Social contacts of the CSR Consulate General in Szczecin for May 1959.

70 AMZV, DP 1955–1964 – secret, carton 10, Report of the Consulate General of the CSR in Szczecin for June 1959.

71 AMZV, TO Polsko 1960–1964, carton 3, Report on the celebration of the 16th anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia, 3 June 1961; AMZV, TO Polsko 1960–1964, carton 3, Report of the Consulate General of the CSSR in Szczecin on the celebration of the anniversary of the liberation of CSSR, Szczecin, 5 May 1961.

72 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1965–1969, carton 9, Work plan of the CSSR CG in Szczecin for the second half of 1968, Szczecin on 18 July 1968.

tacts with party officials and the editors of “Kurier Szczeciński” and “Głos Szczeciński” who, according to the consul, stopped publications on Czechoslovakia. On 23 August, a delegation of Czechoslovak workers employed in the city, accompanied by the consul general Tvardík himself, went to the PZPR Provincial Committee in Szczecin to submit a letter of protest against the unlawful intervention. Faced with the refusal to accept the letter, it was sent by post to the PZPR Provincial Committee and the Provincial National Council, but no written reply was received. When confronted with the position of the local authorities, the consul assessed the behaviour of common city-dwellers and party activists in a completely different way, who during the conversation with him, in the letters of support sent and during his visit to the consulate, showed support to the Czechs and Slovaks and condemned the intervention against the Prague Spring. Ending his information note sent to the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the consul gave another example of courage in expressing support for the CSSR, which was the inscription placed on one of Szczecin’s quays frequently visited by residents – “We demand freedom for the CSSR.”⁷³

In October 1968, the exhibition “Graphics from Prague” was opened at the National Museum in Szczecin, which also gained a political dimension precisely due to the evaluation of the processes taking place in Czechoslovakia and, in the consul’s opinion, could contribute to a change of opinion on Czechoslovakia-Polish relations. It is difficult to assess whether this actually happened but the cultural event certainly gave hope to clear the atmosphere of distrust and was a pretext for the consul’s conversation with the First Secretary of the PZPR Provincial Committee, which took place during a football match because Antoni Walaszek did not come to the opening of the exhibition.⁷⁴ The basic tasks that the embassy and consulate in Szczecin faced in the following months were to bring about a further normalisation of relations with Poland on the political, economic, social and cultural levels and to strengthen the position of Czechoslovakia in the Eastern Bloc, which was the implementation of the assumptions adopted in the autumn of 1968 by the authorities of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) already after the suppression of the Prague Spring.⁷⁵

The events of December 1970 on the Polish coast became the subject of interest of the Czechoslovak authorities not only due to their potential influence on public opinion in the CSSR but also due to economic interests related to transit through the Baltic

73 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1965–1969, carton 1, Information from the CSSR CG in Szczecin on the position of the Polish authorities and residents of the Szczecin Province on the situation in the CSSR on 21–28 August 1968, Szczecin, 29 August 1968.

74 AMZV, TO-O, 1965–1968, carton 2, Information from the CSSR CG in Szczecin for the MZV in Prague about the exhibition of Czechoslovak graphics in Szczecin, Szczecin, 9 October 1968.

75 AMZV, TO-T 1965–1969, carton 9, Work plan of the CSSR Embassy in the People’s Republic of Poland for the first half of 1969; *ibid.*, Work plan of the CSSR CG in Szczecin for the first half of 1969, Szczecin 22 January 1969.

ports. Based on the analysis of the collected research material, it can be concluded that the main source of information on the situation in Szczecin in December 1970 were reports and information sent by Consul General Alois Tvardík, which then served as a starting point for the preparation of brief notes by the CSSR Embassy in Warsaw and FMZV, passed on to the KSČ Central Committee.⁷⁶ Reading the source makes one reflect on the detailed record of the events that took place on the streets of Szczecin, especially on 17 and 18 December and on the following days, with the exact times, topography of the city, number of participants, time of passage of combat vehicles and tanks used against the demonstrators. The consul made his own observations while walking around the city on 20 December when he also met people calling for support for the strikers. During those days, the Czechoslovak consul was deprived of contact with representatives of the Executive Committee of Provincial National Council, while through the employees of the PZPR Provincial Committee in Szczecin he obtained only general information. However, he remained in constant contact with the USSR consul. The source of information for the consul could have been the Czechoslovak agency operating in Poland and information obtained from the KGB, which is confirmed by the note on the events in Gdańsk provided to G. Husák, the source and author of which are unfortunately unknown. Information on the situation in Poland was diligently followed through the Western media.⁷⁷ The briefing note in question, sent from Szczecin, has the character of a journalistic report and does not contain the standard diplomatic analysis or forecasts of developments. This is somewhat surprising in the context of performing consular functions but it shows the lack of independence in making judgments, especially political ones. On the other hand, the note contains terms that are not to be found in official media reports – strike, strikers' demands or price increases.

In the 1970s, the matters of the maritime economy remained an important aspect of the work of the CSSR CG in Szczecin and the standard functions of the consulate also included the implementation of reporting, propaganda, economic and cultural tasks.⁷⁸ Periodically, every year, events related to the following anniversaries of the liberation of the CSR by the Red Army, the “Victorious February” of 1948 and the presentation of Czech and Slovak cultures were celebrated. Local media were involved in the promotion of these activities – the press, radio and television, Czechoslovak propaganda

76 NA, KSČ ÚV 1945–1989, Kancelář generálního tajemníka Gustáva Husáka, carton 420, Information from the CSSR CG in Szczecin on the reaction of employees of Szczecin workplaces to price changes sent by FMZV to the First Secretary of ÚV KSČ G. Husák, Szczecin 21 December 1970. Two days later the information was passed on to G. Husákov; Szczepańska-Dudziak, *Szczecin czechosłowackim oknem*, 141–144.

77 NA, KSČ ÚV 1945–1989, Kancelář generálního tajemníka Gustáva Husáka, carton 428, Note on the events in Gdańsk in December 1970; Extraordinary report of Czechoslovak Radio for G. Husák on the reaction of Western media to the events in Poland on 16–18 December 1970.

78 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1975–1979, carton 12, Work plan of the CSSR CG in Szczecin for 1977; Szczepańska-Dudziak, *Szczecin czechosłowackim oknem*, 159–172.

materials, film screenings were used, and press conferences were organised. The consuls visited workplaces in Szczecin in person (Warski Shipyard, repair shipyard, Huta Szczecin, Port Authority, Dolna Odra Power Station) and other cities of the consular district. Consulate employees with the support of the Czechoslovak Culture and Information Centre in Warsaw and cultural institutions in Szczecin organised the Day of Culture or the Decade of Czechoslovak Culture.⁷⁹ Cultural events were accompanied by the sale of gifts and Czechoslovak jewellery and folk art as was the case in 1973 in the hall of the Pomeranian Dukes' Castle.⁸⁰ Concerts as part of the Year of Czech Music were held in the halls of the Pomeranian Dukes' Castle and the Philharmonic in Szczecin to celebrate the 150th anniversary of Bedřich Smetana's birthday and the 101st anniversary of Josef Suk's birthday. The music of Czech composers was broadcast on the Szczecin radio station.⁸¹

The activity and the manner of carrying out the tasks of the consular office in Szczecin depended on the low staffing status and support from the CSSR embassy and employees of Czechoslovak shipping and transport companies with their headquarters in Szczecin. It should be remembered that in the mid-1970s, after the administrative reform in Poland, the consular district encompassed 12 Provinces: from Szczecin, Gdańsk and Elbląg to Poznań, Gorzów, Konin, Piła, which entailed the necessity to establish contacts with new authorities, pay periodic visits to the most important city centres, conduct information activities or develop cultural cooperation, social contacts with schools and workplaces. In 1975, the activities of the consulate were almost paralysed, at which time Alois Král had terminated his mission and one of the consular staff, Consul Jan Wróbel, was injured in a car accident and could not perform his duties for over a month. At the same time, Vice-Consul Ladislav Flégr was delegated to work at the Embassy in Warsaw for several months. In January 1976, the head of the mission, Consul General Miroslav Vinš, also came.⁸² At that time, two consular

79 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1970–1974, carton 10, Report on the meeting of diplomatic employees of the CSSR Embassy in Warsaw, devoted to, inter alia, preparations for the Decade of Czechoslovak Culture and Art, 9 February 1970. Events attended by consul Tvardík were documented by *Kurier Szczeciński* in the issues of 6–7 March and 5 May 1970.

80 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1970–1974, carton 4, Information of the CG in Szczecin on the Days of Czechoslovak Culture in Poznań and Szczecin, 21 March 1973; AMZV, Dokumentace TO 1945–1989, carton 45, Report of the CSSR CG in Szczecin on the presence of Czechoslovakia issues in the press and regional radio and television stations in the consular district, Szczecin, 28 January 1975. Attention was drawn to 5 reports by an Interpress journalist accredited in Prague which appeared in the *Kurier Szczeciński* and *Głos Szczeciński*. Their substantive and political value was highly appreciated.

81 AMZV, Dokumentace TO 1945–1989, carton 45, Information of the CSSR CG in Szczecin on cultural events organised in the consular district as part of the Year of Czech Music, Szczecin, 17 February 1975.

82 Miroslav Vinš was a consul in Szczecin from January 1976 to April 1980. A pedagogue by education, he started working at MZV in 1956 as a teacher in schools operating at embassies including in the Hague, Moscow and Stockholm. In the years 1961–1963 he worked in the Human Resources

officials were supported by two administrative employees and two local service employees. Often, support also came from less official sources e.g. from the consuls' wives who looked after the garden at the consulate and helped organise meetings to celebrate Czechoslovakia's national holiday, which allowed to save money in the institution's budget. In connection with the drastic increase in rental fees for the consulate building, planned from April 1978, the possibility of constructing its own office with apartments for employees of the consulate and Czechoslovak enterprises – Czechofracht, ČNP, ČSPLO and phytosanitary services was considered.⁸³

The growing crisis in Poland and its manifestations were observed by Czechoslovak diplomats who reported to Prague in July 1980 on deteriorating work discipline and interruptions in manufacturing caused by electricity or raw material cuts. The blame for the decline in agricultural production was put on the private form of land ownership in Poland, the shortages in supply on the market and housing and the responsibility for this state of affairs was placed on the PZPR management with emphasis laid on the negative influence of the Church and the opposition.⁸⁴ The economic crisis and supply shortages also affected the situation of the consulate employees, and the unrest caused by the wave of strikes limited their social contacts. Nevertheless, brief notes were prepared once a week based on the local press and information obtained during meetings with provincial governors, party secretaries, journalists and Security Service (SB) officers. The opinions of people representing other circles were much less frequently referred to.⁸⁵

Consul Vasil Suchý,⁸⁶ who had been in Szczecin for only a few weeks, certainly took over the network of contacts created by his predecessors; however, a few months later

Department and the East European Department of MZV, Jindřich Dejmek, *Diplomacie Československa*, vol. II: *Biografický slovník diplomatů (1918–1992)* (Praha: Academia, 2013), 652.

- 83 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1975–1979, carton 12, Information on the employment status and activities of the CSSR CG in Szczecin, 19 August 1976; Work plan of the CSSR CG in Szczecin for 1979. That year the budget of CG in Szczecin was 50,000 CZK for social contacts and 92,000 CZK for current expenses.
- 84 AMZV, Dokumentace TO 1945–1989, carton 50, Collection of information on the current situation in the Polish People's Republic, July 1980, August 1, 1980, 21 August. The archival unit in question contains analyses of the situation in Poland from July to October 1980. They were based on reports from the embassy, consulates, *Trybuna Ludu*, but also the West German press: *Die Zeit*, *Die Welt* and BBC broadcasts.
- 85 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 16, Report of the CSSR CG in Szczecin on the political situation in the north-western provinces of Poland after the 7th plenary session of the PZPR Central Committee, Szczecin, 29 December 1980; AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 17, Letter from FMZV to the CSSR CG in Szczecin – Assessment of the activities of the consulate in 1980, Prague, 9 February 1981; *Szczepańska-Dudziak, Szczecin czechosłowackim oknem*, 197–223.
- 86 Consul Suchý began his mission in Szczecin in April 1980. He came from a family of Ukrainian farmers and was a teacher and an agricultural engineer by education. From March 1971, he worked at FMZV and held a diplomatic mission in North Korea. On 24 March 1983, he died of a heart attack in Szczecin, see: Dejmek, *Diplomacie*, 588.

there were changes in managerial positions in the PZPR Provincial Committees in the consular district, where nine First Secretaries and six provincial governors out of 12 provinces located within the district lost their jobs. Most of the analysed Czechoslovak sources on the situation in Szczecin and the consular district focused on two issues – the internal party situation in connection with personnel changes in PZPR, the 9th Congress of PZPR and the more widespread practice of handing over party ID cards as well as on the activities of the opposition as seen through the eyes of the security service. However, it should be emphasised that no reports or brief notes sent from Szczecin included assessments of those personnel changes. The information layer was still dominant in the institution's reporting activities. The consul passed on to Prague, among other things, information obtained from the SB deputy commander in Szczecin about possible preparations on the part of the opposition to use force and the eavesdropping techniques used by them. Noteworthy is the information on the lists of "Solidarity" activists prepared by the SB, in the event of the "X" day. As one might guess, it was about a list of opposition activists who were to be arrested. The discussed report of December 1980 includes neither analyses nor in-depth information on the activities of "Solidarity" in Poland and in the region. There was only information about the opposition magazine – "Jedność." The consular reports mentioned the names of Jacek Kuroń, Marian Jurczyk and Leszek Moczulski, but one gets the impression that it was only to discredit them and show how divided the opposition in the Polish People's Republic was. The ideological differences between Kuroń and Moczulski, who was then awaiting trial, were clearly emphasised. This way of presenting the opposition remained unchanged and after the introduction of martial law, the tendency to diminish the role of the anti-communist opposition in the People's Republic of Poland was reinforced.

In the performance of consular functions, there was a noticeable change in the previous focus of the consuls' activities, who provided less information about the economic situation in the region and limited reporting on transport and communication cooperation. Due to the deepening of the social and economic crisis in Poland, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was interested in up-to-date information on the activities of the PZPR authorities after the extraordinary 9th Congress and the actions of the opposition supported by the Church.⁸⁷ Looking for alternative sources of information that would allow the verification of official government reports, the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague pointed to the "Solidarność" weekly, government independent press and expected embassy employees and consuls to periodically

87 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 17, Work plan of the CSSR Embassy in Warsaw for 1981, Warsaw, 4 February 1981; FMZV letter to the CSSR Embassy in Warsaw – Assessment of the activities of the Embassy and CSSR consulates in Szczecin and Katowice for the first half of 1981; AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 17, Assessment of the implementation of the activity plan of the CSSR Embassy in Warsaw and consulates general in Szczecin and Katowice, FMZV Prague, 10 February 1983.

analyse collective press materials. The source of information completely ignored by the consuls were Czechoslovak sailors and employees of Czechoslovak enterprises, who had their own contacts and private acquaintances in various environments.

At the same time, talks were being finalised on the creation of a centre popularising Czech and Slovak culture and language, second to the one in Warsaw. The choice of the place, as argued by Prague diplomats, was justified by the necessity of cultural, information and propaganda services for the tourist traffic of CSSR citizens arriving at the Baltic seaside and ship crews and young people studying at the Maritime School of Higher Education in Szczecin.⁸⁸ The official opening of the Czechoslovak Culture and Information Centre in Szczecin, which was a branch of Culture and Information Centre in Warsaw, was held on 28 April 1981 and was overshadowed by the tragedy related to the fire of the “Kaskada” restaurant, which claimed many lives. The opening of the Culture and Information Centre in Szczecin coincided with the stagnation in Polish-Czechoslovak political, cultural and scientific relations.⁸⁹ Scholarship exchanges and cultural events were few. In October 1981, as part of the Days of Czechoslovak Culture, Szczecin residents could see exhibitions of works by 30 artists from the collection of the West Bohemian Gallery in Plzeň. The works of artists and painter Pavel Maur were displayed at the National Museum. The Pomeranian Dukes’ Castle exhibited the works of such artists as Cyril Bouda and a surrealist painter, graphic artist, famous designer of postage stamps – Josef Liesler.⁹⁰

After the introduction of martial law, the Culture and Information Centre in Warsaw and Szczecin carried out some tasks only in the circle of “selected friends” and organised meetings and film screenings in cooperation with other centres of socialist countries or established new contacts. It was only on 4 February 1982 that the Polish side allowed for standard activity to be undertaken. The exhibition “Czechoslovakia through the eyes of a child” was launched, preparations for the celebration of the 35th anniversary of the signing of the Polish-Czechoslovak agreement of 1947 were made,

88 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 9, Information from the CSSR embassy in Warsaw on the conversation between the deputy ambassador and the head of the culture department at the Department of Cultural and Scientific Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Polish People’s Republic, Warsaw, 9 January 1980.

89 Anna Szczepańska-Dudziak, “Działalność Ośrodków Kultury i Informacji PRL i CSRS w okresie kryzysu i normalizacji relacji polsko-czechosłowackich w latach osiemdziesiątych XX w.,” in: *Polsko-czeskie kontakty dyplomatyczne*, 67–86. From an interview with an employee and translator of Culture and Information Centre in Szczecin, Ms Halina Potemkowska, it appears that the managers of the Centre were: Oldřich Karas, Josef Gruber, Jaroslav Sládek, Jindřich Jirásek, the functions of economic specialists were performed by Magdaléna Hricová, Josef Kunc, Jan Bundzňak, and the cultural specialists were Joanna Czaplínska and Barbara Dąbrowska.

90 *Kurier Szczeciński*, 22, 25–26/10/1981.

a commemorative bulletin was issued and an exhibition, concerts and a seminar on cultural cooperation were organised.⁹¹

The introduction of martial law and the related travel restrictions did not prevent consul V. Suchý from taking business trips to several cities within the consular district, although it is difficult to call it a routine due to the possibility of direct social contact.⁹² In the prepared report on the situation in the district, many issues were raised, including those related to unfavourable phenomena such as the increase in crime, illegal trafficking and illegal production of alcohol. However, the analysis of internal purges in the PZRP and personnel changes, which went hand in hand with the great passivity of party activists remaining in the shadow of the Polish army, comes to the fore. Despite the slow return to normal economic and social life, the consul negatively assessed the excessively liberal actions of the party authorities, which created conditions for illegal activities of the opposition, such as leaflet campaigns in Szczecin, inciting passive resistance to the authorities and organising material aid for the families of internees. There were also far-reaching accusations against the opposition, which was credited with preparing terrorist operations.⁹³

With each month after the imposition of martial law, the social contacts of the consulate in the district gradually expanded but, due to the small workforce, they were mainly made by the Consul General, who had regular meetings with the USSR, GDR and Cuba consuls and commanders of Polish and Soviet military units in Szczecin.⁹⁴ The propaganda activities of the institution as well as the implementation of cooperation or cultural exchange still encountered obstacles due to difficulties in reaching cul-

91 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 7, Information on Czechoslovak-Polish cultural, scientific, educational and health relations in the years 1980–1981.

92 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 7, Information of the CSSR CG in Szczecin on the development of the current political situation in the provinces located in the consular district, Szczecin, 1 February 1982; Archiv bezpečnostních složek, Information on the situation in the People's Republic of Poland, 4/5, vol. III, Appendix to Information no. 32 on the situation in the Polish People's Republic, 1982.

93 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 7, Information from the CG in Szczecin for the FMZV and the CSSR embassy on the situation in the consular district, the work of the consulate and the Culture and Information Centre in the third quarter of 1983. The consulate employed three consular officials and a secretary and, after the death of consul Suchý, the office was headed by consul Miroslav Vinš. Apart from the consular office in Szczecin, there was also the Culture and Information Centre headed by Miroslav Horych from 16 April 1981 and a group of employees of "Spedrapid," ČNP, ČSPL and phytosanitary services. Many activities were carried out jointly, although the centre had its own action plan; AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 17, FMZV guidelines for the work plan of the CSSR embassies and consulates in Poland for 1984; AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 7, Information from the CSSR CG in Szczecin on the political situation in the consular district on 28–31 August 1984.

94 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 16, Information from the CSSR CG in Szczecin on the meeting of consuls of socialist countries, Szczecin, 27 June 1986; carton 7, Information from the CG in Szczecin from an interview with consul of Cuba H. G. Sepúlveda, 7 November 1988; Information from the CG in Szczecin on a conversation with the consul of the GDR Heinz Hanisch, 11 November 1988.

tural milieus who remained in internal exile during martial law while the government media were publicly boycotted.

In its activities, the Szczecin branch of the Culture and Information Centre closely cooperated with the Consulate General in Szczecin by organising press conferences, exhibitions and concerts. Like Polish missions, Czechoslovak partners also used the anniversary celebrations to present their country's achievements.⁹⁵ The centres in Warsaw and Szczecin organised film screenings and press conferences, visits to workplaces, Czech and Slovak music competitions and exhibitions. The performances of the National Theatre in Prague marking the 100th anniversary of its establishment enjoyed great popularity. The works of Jaroslav Hašek were presented on TVP and Polish Radio; his works were also exhibited. Similarly to Warsaw, also in Szczecin and the Centre's operating district, the Panorama of Culture and performances of the National Theatre from Prague were organised and cooperation with local radio and TV stations was established. As part of the trade activities of the facility, Jablonex jewellery, valued on the Polish market during the period of shortage of goods, was presented and sold. An example of cyclical cultural and propaganda events may be the Czechoslovak Day at the Pomeranian Dukes' Castle in Szczecin with the participation of not only consulate and the Culture and Information Centre employees but also Czechoslovak workers who came to Szczecin on 26 April 1987 to mark the anniversary of the Red Army's entry into the city. An exhibition entitled "Anti-War Graphics" was presented in Szczecin and Poznań, a film screening was held at the Centre's premises, and jazz concerts were organised in Gorzów and Szczecin. The cultural events were accompanied by propaganda activities, especially through radio and television. The media provided information on the internal situation in Czechoslovakia, common experience of the People's Republic of Poland and the CSSR in the construction of socialism was highlighted, meetings with party authorities as well as film screenings in military units were organised and, in an effort to maintain contact with young people and children, video cassettes were rented.⁹⁶

According to the Czechoslovak consulate, the situation in the mid-1980s was still far from normal not only because of government-imposed price increases and apparent shortages of supplies but also because of the activity of the opposition, recurring protests and demonstrations organised to mark the anniversary of the signing of the Gdańsk Agreement and the registration of Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity." In Szczecin, the Church and Metropolitan Kazimierz Majdański were accused of supporting the opposition for strengthening its position among the society by organising charitable package shipping. The Church was seen as one of the best organised

95 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 57, Information on the activities of the Czechoslovak Culture and Information Centre in Warsaw and the branch in Szczecin in 1983.

96 Ibid, Report from the deliberation at the CSSR GS in Szczecin, Szczecin, 17 December 1987.

opposition forces which boycotted all activities of the authorities aimed at improving the political and economic situation and, for this reason, the information and reporting activities of the consulate clearly increased in 1987 during the pastoral visit of the Pope to Poland, when John Paul II visited Szczecin.⁹⁷

Consul Zoltán Kramec, like his successor, presented to his superiors the image of the anti-communist opposition in the People's Republic of Poland as a force losing social support, discredited by unrealistic social demands and unable to carry the masses into revolt against the government. According to the consul, the breaking of the resistance to the reaction that was attempted during the martial law did not mean that the struggle for the socialist character of the political system in Poland was over and, what is more, he believed that the fraternal help of the socialist states would still be needed.⁹⁸ The opposition was perceived as a broken environment, without the moral power of social influence and such an assessment dominated the reports of the Szczecin consular post. In 1987, Consul Kramec reported on the opposition's readiness to confrontation and direct terror during John Paul II's stay in Szczecin. To confirm his fears, Kramec could quote the words of the First Secretary of the PZPR Provincial Committee, Miśkiewicz, who warned against the threat posed by the opposition in Poland to all socialist countries.⁹⁹ Soon Kramec was recalled to Prague and, in October 1988, the post of Consul General was taken over by Imrich Sedlák, who began his term by talking to the consul of the USSR about the situation in Poland, who assessed the PZPR's activity very badly, accusing its management of revisionism and right-wing opportunism.¹⁰⁰ Perhaps such evaluation of the situation in the consular district meant that during the meeting in the CG a decision was made not to hold a party at the consulate to celebrate

97 AMZV, Dokumentace TO 1945–1989, carton 57, CSSR CG in Szczecin, Assessment of contact and reporting activities for the second half of 1987, Szczecin, 28 December 1987.

98 AMZV, TO-T, Polsko 1980–1989, carton 7, Information from the CSSR CG in Szczecin on the course of the celebrations on 1 May. The Solidarity leaflet is attached, Report of the CSSR CG in Szczecin on the assessment of the internal situation in the consular district, Szczecin, 21 November 1985; AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 16, Report on the activity of the CSSR CG in Szczecin for 1985, Szczecin 2 January 1986; Z. Kramec took over the management of the consulate in Szczecin from January 1984. A forester by profession, he worked in the State Forests and from 1983 he was employed with FMZV. As Dejmek writes, the ministry was not satisfied with its mission in Szczecin. Immediately after returning to Prague in August 1988, he left diplomacy, see: Dejmek, *Diplomacie*, 445.

99 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 7, Information from the CSSR CG in Szczecin about a meeting with the First Secretary of PZPR Miśkiewicz on the subject of reactionary circles in the city, 24 October 1988.

100 AMZV, Dokumentace TO 1945–1989, carton 65, Information on the conversation between I. Sedlák and Jurij Iwanow, consul of the USSR in Szczecin on 10 October 1988; Report of the CSSR CG in Szczecin for 1988. Similar meetings to discuss the situation in Poland were held by CSSR consuls with their counterparts from East Germany and Cuba, see: AMZV, Dokumentace TO 1945–1989, carton 65, Report on the conversation with the Consul General of the GDR in Szczecin H. Hanisch, Szczecin, 17 November 1988; Report on the conversation with the Consul General of Cuba, Jose Antalo Vilanueva, Szczecin, 21 November 1988.

the 70th anniversary of the founding of Czechoslovakia because, due to the explosive situation in the consular district, it was not certain whether the provincial authorities would want to attend it.¹⁰¹

The changes that took place in Poland in the second half of the 1980s, economic reforms and government policy were not understood by the hard-line circles of power in Prague. A clear example of misunderstanding of the market reforms undertaken in the People's Republic of Poland was the personal confession with which Z. Kramec ended his last report from Szczecin on the days when the city was engulfed in a wave of strikes and, on 18 August 1988, the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee was established in the Port of Szczecin.¹⁰² The social protests that swept Poland in 1988 were considered by Z. Kramec as a well-thought-out and financed action organised by anti-socialist reaction forces. Such assessments seem to be confirmed by the information sent to the CSSR embassy and FMZV by the successor of Z. Kramec, I. Sedlák, who, in January 1989, informed the Headquarters of the negative effects of economic reforms carried out in Poland – the weakening of the Polish currency, increasing corruption and a rapidly growing number of private enterprises as well as the so-called dollar era in Poland. All such phenomena worried the consul because, as he emphasised, they took place in a member state of Comecon and the Warsaw Pact – in a country which bordered Czechoslovakia.¹⁰³

The brief note, which was written during the ongoing election campaign in Poland, before the first round of the parliamentary elections scheduled for 4 June 1989, included a faithful account of the pre-election meeting with the candidates of the Solidarity Citizens' Committee in Szczecin, which took place at the Summer Theatre on 1 May 1989.¹⁰⁴ In his commentary to the discussion, the consul emphasised that the election campaign was marked by the unilateral activity of "Solidarity" and other opposition groups which managed to distance the PZPR together with poorly-coordinated communication activities of the government media.¹⁰⁵ The June elections, called the plastic ones, were to be one of the stages of the "Solidarity" militant road, to which the PZPR management gave way.

101 AMZV, Dokumentace TO 1945–1989, carton 65, Information from the deliberation at the CSSR GS in Szczecin, 19 October 1988.

102 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 7, Information from the CSSR CG in Szczecin on the political situation in the consular district in recent months, Szczecin, 25 August 1988.

103 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 7, Information from the CSSR CG in Szczecin on devaluation of the national currency of the People's Republic of Poland, Szczecin, 23 January 1989.

104 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 7, Information from the CSSR CG in Szczecin for FMZV and the embassy in Warsaw on the course of the election campaign in the consulate district in Szczecin, Szczecin, 11 May 1989.

105 AMZV, TO-T Polsko 1980–1989, carton 7, Information from the CSSR CG in Szczecin on political and economic situation in the consular district, Szczecin, 25 August 1989.

The rhetoric used by consuls in the reports sent from Szczecin completely ruled out the possibility of a gradual transformation of the system or at least an attempt to heal the economy in a way other than in accordance with the principles of communism. In line with the thick-headed wing in the KSČ, defending the old order, the concept of transforming the political system based on a compromise between the PZPR and the opposition was rejected. It is also worth considering who the consuls sent to work in Szczecin were. What substantive preparation and competence did they have? In the period in question, a total of 12 consuls held their office in Szczecin. Apart from Adolf Kania, they had always been loyal to the authorities; they were often graduates of party schools, active participants of the February 1948 coup dedicated to carrying out the tasks assigned to the foreign service by their superiors on the basis of resolutions of successive KSČ plenums. The criteria for employment in the foreign service included social origin, party affiliation as well as work at various levels of the party hierarchy. Education, its level and character did not guarantee that officials sent to the Szczecin post would be prepared to work in the foreign service. Only one of the consuls studied at the diplomatic academy in Moscow; few of them had higher education, which, however, did not interfere with their careers and work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Among the consuls were printers, weavers, bricklayers, foresters and two teachers. Most of them were Czechs; it was only in the 1980s when three consuls from Slovakia were delegated to this service. The consulate faced many difficulties, resulting not only from the lack of substantive preparation of officials but also from the shortage of employees who were not able to properly perform their duties in such a large consular district considering the enormity of tasks to be performed by the facility with a very modest budget.

Conclusions

To sum up, it should be stated that in the discussed period, the most important areas of Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation in Szczecin covered economic and political issues. What essentially determined the place of Szczecin in Polish-Czechoslovak relations was, with varying intensity, the cooperation in the port of Szczecin consisting in the creation of a special duty-free zone or enabling Czechoslovakia to use the port of Szczecin as a shipping and transit base for commercial seagoing vessels of this country. The transit of Czechoslovak goods constituted an important part of transshipment in the port, the Szczecin Shipyard built ships at the request of the Czechoslovak shipowner, future Czechoslovak sailors were educated at the Maritime School of Higher Education, and political, social and cultural contacts were developed by the Consulate General in Szczecin and a branch of the Warsaw Czechoslovak Culture and

Information Centre. Szczecin was extremely rarely visited by high-ranking representatives of the Czechoslovak authorities and government. Scientific conferences with the participation of Polish, Czech and Slovak scientists were held here sporadically. Three years after the establishment of the school, in 1988, the University of Szczecin opened studies in the field of Bohemistics, supported by Brygida Božko and Jindřich Jirásek, and from 1991 Joanna Czaplińska.¹⁰⁶ Similarly to other cities, Szczecin participated in the cooperation of partner cities with Plzeň, which, however, was of a different nature than the cross-border contacts carried out on the Polish-Czech-Slovak borderland.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival sources

Archives of Modern Records, Warsaw

Ministry of Industry and Trade in Warsaw [1946–1991] 1991–1996 [1997]

Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw

Department I 1949–1960 (fond 7)

Department I 1968–1978

Political Department 1945–1948 (fond 6)

State Archives in Szczecin

Szczecin Maritime Office 1945–1992

Szczecin Provincial Office 1945–1950

City Board and the City National Council in Szczecin 1945–1950

Szczecin-Świnoujście Port Authority 1949–2000

Archiv bezpečnostních složek – Prague

Denní situační zprávy FMV. Informace k PLR (for the period of 1980–1984)

Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí České republiky

Československé Zastupitelské Úřady – ZŮ Polsko 1945–1955

Diplomatický Protokol 1945–1959

Diplomatický Protokol 1955–1964

Diplomatický Protokol – obyčejně, 1954–1964

Diplomatický Protokol - tajné, 1945–1954

Diplomatický Protokol – tajné, 1955–1966

¹⁰⁶ Klaudia Koczur-Lejk, “Bohemistyka na Uniwersytecie Szczecińskim”, *Bohemistyka* 1–4 (2008): 505–506.

Dokumentace teritoriálních odborů 1945–1989

Generální Sekretariát a Kabinet J. Masaryka, V. Clementisa

Konzulární odbor 1945–1954

Konzulární odbor 1955–1964

Teritoriální odbor – Polsko, 1945–1959

Teritoriální odbor-tajné, Polsko, 1955–1959

Teritoriální odbor-tajné, 1965–1969

Teritoriální odbor-tajné, Polsko, 1960–1964

Teritoriální odbor-tajné, Polsko, 1970–1974

Teritoriální odbor-tajné, Polsko, 1975–1979

Teritoriální odbor-tajné, Polsko, 1980–1989

Národní archiv České republiky

Gustáv Husák (Kancelář generálního tajemníka ÚV KSČ)

Ministerstvo dopravy I

Úřad předsednictva vlády – tajná spisovna, 1917–1945–1959 (1962)

Published sources

Balcerak, Wiesław et al., ed. *Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-czechosłowackich 1944–1960*. Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków: Ossolineum, 1985.

Sbirka Zakonu Republiky Československe 1949.

Umowy graniczne PRL. Edited by Franciszek Jarzyna. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Prawnicze, 1974.

Diaries and memoirs

Braňka, Pavel. *Kuchařem na lodích Československé Plavby – kniha I. Od kuchtika k šéfkuchařovi*. Praha: Mare-Czech, 2012.

Daszkowski, Eugeniusz. A. “Moja szkoła morską na Piastów.” In: *Szkolnictwo morskie Szczecina w latach 1947–1997*, ed. Izabela Dunin-Kwinta, Aleksander Walczak, and Stanisław Kuszmider, 41–52. Szczecin: Wyższa Szkoła Morska w Szczecinie, 1997.

Fojtů, Antoni. *Moře milované, moře proklínané*. Part 1 and 2. Praha: Mare-Czech, 2006.

Pacovský, Jaroslav. *Mořští vlci na Blaníku*. Praha: Albatros, 1976.

Ringel, Vlastislav. *Vůně a krása okamžiku. Šťastný čtyřlístek Blaník, Sitno, Radhošť, Kriváň*, Praha: Mare-Czech 2014.

Zaremba, Piotr. *Pierwszy szceciński rok 1945*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1966.

Zaremba, Piotr. *Wspomnienia prezydenta Szczecina 1945–1950*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1977.

Newspapers, magazines and other periodicals

Dziennik Zachodni (1948).

Głos Ludu, a body of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) (1948).

Kurier Szczeciński (1948, 1958, 1962, 1963, 1968, 1970, 1972).

References

- “Absolwenci szkół morskich w Szczecinie.” In: *Szkolnictwo morskie Szczecina w latach 1947–1997*, ed. Izabela Dunin-Kwinta, Aleksander Walczak, and Stanisław Kuszmider. Szczecin: Wyższa Szkoła Morska w Szczecinie, 1997, Annex II, Wykazy Urzędowe.
- Bastl, Zdeňek. *Padesát let Československé námořní plavby*. Praha: Mare-Czech, 2009.
- Czapliński, Kazimierz, Jan Chabowski, and January Buksak. “Działalność inwestycyjna PRL w Porcie Szczecińskim.” In: *Port Szczeciński. Dzieje i rozwój do 1970 r.*, ed. Bronisław Dziedziul, 160–166. Warszawa–Poznań: PWN, 1975.
- Dejmek, Jindřich. *Diplomacie Československa*. Vol. II: *Biografický slovník československých diplomatů (1918–1992)*. Praha: Academia, 2013.
- Daszkowski, Eugeniusz. “Moja szkoła morska na Piastów.” In: *Szkolnictwo morskie Szczecina w latach 1947–1997*, ed. Izabela Dunin-Kwinta, Aleksander Walczak, and Stanisław Kuszmider, 41–52. Szczecin: Wyższa Szkoła Morska w Szczecinie, 1997.
- Gnat, Władysław, and Stanisław Sala. “Obroty ładunkowe i ruch statków w Porcie Szczecińskim w latach 1945–1970.” In: *Port Szczeciński. Dzieje i rozwój do 1970 r.*, ed. Bronisław Dziedziul, 281–354. Warszawa–Poznań: PWN, 1975.
- Hutnikiewicz, Alina. *Szczecin w polskiej polityce morskiej w latach 1945–1950*. Szczecin: Polskie Pismo i Książka, 1991.
- Hutnikiewicz, Alina. “Szczecin w stosunkach polsko-czechosłowackich 1945–1950.” In: *Historia lux veritatis. Księga pamiątkowa dedykowana profesorowi Zdzisławowi Chmielewskiemu z okazji 60. rocznicy urodzin*, eds. Radosław Gaziński, and Agnieszka Gut, 378–379. Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu go, 2002.
- Janáč, Jiří. *European Coasts of Bohemia. Negotiating the Danube–Oder–Elbe Canal a Troubled Twentieth Century*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012.
- Jastrzębowski, Waclaw. “Rejon Czechosłowacki w Szczecinie.” *Gospodarka Morska* 3 (1949): 304–310.
- Kamiński, Marek Kazimierz. *Polsko-czechosłowackie stosunki polityczne 1945–1948*. Warszawa: PWN, 1990.
- Kamiński, Marek Kazimierz. *Kształtowanie się stosunków polsko-czechosłowackich 1948–1960*. Warszawa: Neritorn, 2012.
- Koczur-Lejk, Klaudia. “Bohemistyka na Uniwersytecie Szczecińskim.” *Bohemistyka* 1–4 (2008): 505–506.

- Kořalková, Květa. "Dvacet let československo-polského spojení." In: *Československo-polské vztahy v nejnovějších dějinách: sborník ref. a diskusních příspěvků z vědecké konference Ústavu pro mezinárodní politiku a ekonomii v Praze (2.3.1967)*, ed. Květa Kořalková, 41–44. Praha: Ústav pro mezinárodní politiku a ekonomii, 1967.
- Krátká, Lenka. "«Byłem ciekawy, czy morze jest słone!» Czechosłowacka Żegluga Morska we wspomnieniach marynarzy czeskosłowackich (1959–1989)." *Wrocławski Rocznik Historii Mówionej* 3 (2013): 187–204. <https://doi.org/10.26774/wrhm.49>.
- Krátká, Lenka. "Czechoslovak Seafarers' Memories of Polish Ports as their «Second Home» During the State Socialism Period (1949–1989)." *History if Flux* 2 (2020): 31–48. <https://doi.org/10.32728/flux.2020.2.2>.
- Krátká, Lenka. *Domovský přístav Praha. Československá námořní plavba v letech 1948 až 1989*. Praha: Univerzita Karlova Nakladatelství Karolinum, 2016.
- Lehár, Bohumil. "Stosunki gospodarcze PRL–CSRS w latach 1945–1975." In: *Stosunki polsko-czechosłowackie a rewolucje ludowo-demokratyczne*, ed. Wiesław Balcerak, 181–208. Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków: Ossolineum, 1980.
- Łangowski, Ryszard, and Henryk Salmonowicz. "Gospodarka morska w estuarium Odry." In: *Dzieje Szczecina*, Vol. IV: 1945–1990, ed. Tadeusz Białecki and Zygmunt Silski, 308–309. Szczecin: Wydawnictwo "13 Muz." 1998.
- Poznański, Jerzy. "Polsko-czechosłowacka współpraca gospodarcza." *Sprawy Międzynarodowe* 1 (1948): 5–7.
- Rembacka, Katarzyna. *Komunista na peryferiach władzy. Historia Leonarda Borkowicza 1912–1989*. Szczecin–Warszawa: IPN, 2020.
- Rembacka, Katarzyna. "«Praski epizod» szczecińskiego wojewody Leonarda Borkowicza." In: *Polsko-czeskie kontakty dyplomatyczne, gospodarcze i kulturalne w XX–XXI wieku*, ed. Anna Szczepańska-Dudziak, 30–43. Szczecin: Volumina, 2017.
- Szczepańska, Anna. "Port Szczeciński w polsko-czechosłowackich stosunkach gospodarczych w świetle dokumentów Archiwum Ministerstwa Sprawa Zagranicznych w Pradze (1949–1956)." *Studia Maritima* 19 (2006): 179–193.
- Szczepańska, Anna. "Rejon czechosłowacki w Porcie Szczecińskim w latach 1949–1956." *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 21 (2006), 3: 47–60.
- Szczepańska, Anna. *Warszawa–Praga 1948–1969. Od nakazanej przyjaźni do kryzysu*. Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2011.
- Szczepańska-Dudziak, Anna. "Morze nas pojedna" – Szczecin w stosunkach polsko-czechosłowackich." In: *Szczecin z oddali*, ed. Katarzyna Rembacka. Szczecin: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej: 2014.

- Szczepańska-Dudziak, Anna. "Działalność Ośrodków Kultury i Informacji PRL i CSRS w okresie kryzysu i normalizacji relacji polsko-czechosłowackich w latach osiemdziesiątych XX w." In: *Polsko-czeskie kontakty dyplomatyczne, gospodarcze i kulturalne w XX–XXI wieku*, ed. Anna Szczepańska-Dudziak, 67–86. Szczecin: Volumina, 2017.
- Szczepańska-Dudziak, Anna. "Szczecin czechosłowackim oknem na morza i oceany." *Szczecin w stosunkach polsko-czechosłowackich 1945–1989*. Warszawa-Szczecin: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2021.
- Techman, Ryszard. "Szczecin w aktach polskiej służby dyplomatycznej 1945–1950." In *50 lat Polski na Pomorzu Zachodnim. Polityka – Społeczeństwo – Kultura. Materiały z sesji naukowej (19–20 maja 1995)*, eds. K. Kozłowski, and E. Włodarczyk, 65–66. Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Archiwum Państwowego w Szczecinie, 1996.
- Techman, Ryszard. "Pierwsze szkoły morskie w Szczecinie." In: *Szkolnictwo morskie Szczecina w latach 1947–1997*, eds. Izabela Dunin-Kwinta, Aleksander Walczak, and Stanisław Kuszmider, 15–40. Szczecin: Wyższa Szkoła Morska w Szczecinie, 1997.
- Techman, Ryszard. "Adolf Kania – pierwszy konsul Czechosłowacji w Polsce w latach 1949–1951." *Słupskie Studia Historyczne* 11 (2004): 147–167.
- Techman, Ryszard. "Czechosłowacka sieć konsularna w Polsce w latach 1947–1992." *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny* 1 (2006): 145–168.
- Techman, Ryszard. "Tranzyt czechosłowacki w portach ujścia Odry po II wojnie światowej." *Studia Maritima* 28 (2015): 229–272.
- Techman, Ryszard. "Kalendarium wydarzeń Szczecin–Czechosłowacja w latach 1945–1992." In: *Polsko-czeskie kontakty dyplomatyczne, gospodarcze i kulturalne w XX–XXI wieku*, ed. Anna Szczepańska-Dudziak, 115–237. Szczecin: Volumina, 2017.
- Techman, Ryszard. "Udział szczecińskiego przemysłu okrętowego w rozbudowie floty handlowej Czechosłowacji po II wojnie światowej." In: *Polsko-czeskie kontakty dyplomatyczne, gospodarcze i kulturalne w XX–XXI wieku*, ed. Anna Szczepańska-Dudziak, 55–58. Szczecin: Volumina, 2017.
- Techman, Ryszard. "Czechosłowacka Żegluga na Odrze w latach 1947–1957." part. 1, *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 33 (2018), 1: 145–167.
- Techman, Ryszard. "Czechosłowacka Żegluga na Odrze w latach 1947–1957." part 2, *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 34 (2019), 1: 5–27.

Internet sources

- Antoni Ledóchowski professor of the State Maritime School. Accessed 20 July 2022. www.namorniplavba.cz/cnp/363.html.
- Badanie ruchu turystycznego w województwie zachodniopomorskim 2015. Accessed 4 July 2022. <https://turystyka.wzp.pl/badania-ruchu-turystycznego/badania-struktury-ruchu-turystycznego-2015>.
- Bastl, Zdeňek. *Námořní školy*. Accessed 6 July 2022. <http://www.bastl.cz/cnp/2436.html>.

- Kam Češi v roce 2019 ve volném čase cestovali?* Statistical Office of the Czech Republic Prague, 7 April 2020. Accessed 04 July 2022. https://www.czso.cz/documents/11256/141467230/VSCR_2019.pdf.
- Pigula, Tomáš. *Štětín: město, které bylo 38 let částečně československé*. Lidovky.cz, 10/10/2013. Accessed 02 July 2022. https://www.lidovky.cz/cestovani/stetin-mesto-ktere-bylo-38-let-castecne-ceskoslovenske.A130109_080439_cestopisy_ape.
- Štětín: Věděli jste, že byl v létech 1919–1957 částečně československý?* Accessed 02 July 2022. <https://www.hedvabnastezka.cz/stetin-vedeli-jste-ze-byl-v-letech-1919-1957-castecne-ceskoslovensky>.
- Stručný přehled vývoje námořní dopravy v Československu a České republice*. Accessed 20 April 2020. www.namorniplavba.cz/cnp/121.html.
- Tourists in Tourist Accommodation Establishments*. Warszawa: GUS, August 2021. Accessed 04 July 2022. <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/kultura-turystyka-sport/turystyka/turysci-w-bazie-noclegowej-sierpien-2021-roku,5,110.html>.
- Turystyka w 2020 r. Analizy statystyczne*. Warszawa–Rzeszów: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2021. Accessed 30 July 2022. <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/kultura-turystyka-sport/turystyka/turystyka-w-2020-roku,1,18.html>.
- Wizerunek Polski i Polaków w Czechach*. Raport ARC Rynek i Opinia na zlecenie Polskiej Organizacji Turystycznej. Warszawa: listopad 2021. Accessed 30 July 2022. https://zarabiajnaturystyce.pl/fileadmin/user_upload/badania_analizy/RAPORT_wizerunek_Polski_w_Czechach.pdf.

Websites

<https://www.lidovky.cz>

<http://www.namorniplavba.cz/>

www.psp.cz, Národní Shromáždění (NS RČS) 1960–1964, 1964–1968

<https://www.czso.cz>

<https://stat.gov.pl>

<https://turystyka.wzp.pl>

English version: Radosław Dolecki, Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

The article presents Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation on the political, economic, and cultural levels which took place in Szczecin over several decades – from the city’s takeover by the Polish authorities in 1945 until 1989. Its aim is to answer the questions: what place Szczecin took in the Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation after World War Two and on what issues was the focus of interest placed in this city. In addition to the literature on the subject, the article uses archival materials collected in Polish and Czech archives – in Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věci in Prague, Národní archiv České republiky and Archiv bezpečnostních

słożeń. Among the Polish archives, the documents collected in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, the Archives of Modern Records and the State Archives in Szczecin turned out to be invaluable. During the work on the article, the method of examining documents and elements of the statistical method and the press analysis were used. They proved to be helpful in analysing the archival materials of communist parties and the security apparatus which, as sources with superstructure, require specific criticism and special caution in assessing their credibility.

The interest in Szczecin on the part of the Czechoslovak authorities was high due to the economic and shipping interests in the port and it was this platform of cooperation that determined the place of Szczecin in Polish-Czechoslovak relations throughout the entire period in question. The article presents a few selected aspects of the Czechoslovak presence in Szczecin starting with the creation of a special duty-free zone which allowed Czechoslovakia to use the port as a shipping and transit base for commercial seagoing vessels of that country. A less known thread of the post-war reports, discussed in the article, is the fate of Czechoslovak sailors, graduates of Szczecin's maritime schools, emotionally connected with this home port and the place where as many as 11 ships were built at the request of the Czechoslovak shipowner. The contribution of Szczecin's shipbuilding industry to the expansion of the southern neighbour's sea fleet was analysed by researchers and was mentioned in this article, just like political, social, and cultural contacts, developed through the Consulate General and the Warsaw branch of the Culture and Information Centre. The Czechoslovak presence in Szczecin was best expressed through the wide range of activities carried out by the consular post which operated continuously until the end of 1992 and performed not only economic but also information, cultural and protective functions in relation to Czechoslovak sailors and employees of Czechoslovak enterprises whose branches operated in the consular district.

Szczecin macierzystym portem dla śródlądowej Czechosłowacji. Czechosłowacka obecność w Szczecinie w latach 1945–1989

Słowa kluczowe: stosunki polsko-czechosłowackie, polityka zagraniczna, urzędy konsularne, port w Szczecinie

STRESZCZENIE

W artykule zaprezentowano współpracę polsko-czechosłowacką realizowaną na płaszczyźnie politycznej, gospodarczej i kulturalnej w Szczecinie przez kilkadziesiąt lat – od przejęcia miasta przez polskie władze w 1945 r. aż do 1989 r. Jego celem jest odpowiedź na pytanie – jakie miejsce zajmował Szczecin w polsko-czechosłowackiej współpracy po II wojnie światowej oraz wokół jakich kwestii koncentrowało się zainteresowanie strony czechosłowackiej tym miastem? W artykule wykorzystano poza literaturą przedmiotu, materiały archiwalne zgromadzone w polskich i czeskich archiwach – w Archiwu Ministerstva zahraničních věcí w Pradze, Národním archivum České Republiky oraz Archivum bezpečnostních složek. Wśród polskich archiwów nieocenione okazały się dokumenty zgromadzone w Archiwum MSZ w Warszawie, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Archiwum Państwowym w Szczecinie. Podczas

pracy nad artykułem wykorzystano metodę badania dokumentów, elementy metody statystycznej, pomocna okazała się także analiza prasoznawcza, które posłużyły do analizy materiałów archiwalnych partii komunistycznych i aparatu bezpieczeństwa, wymagających, jako tzw. źródła z nadbudową, specyficznej krytyki źródeł i szczególnej ostrożności w ocenie ich wiarygodności.

Zainteresowanie Szczecinem ze strony władz czechosłowackich było duże z uwagi na gospodarcze i żeglugowe interesy Czechosłowacji w porcie i to właśnie ten aspekt współpracy decydował o miejscu Szczecina w polsko-czechosłowackich relacjach w całym omawianym okresie. Współpraca ta była realizowana z różnym natężeniem i polegała na utworzeniu specjalnej strefy wolnocłowej oraz umożliwieniu Czechosłowacji wykorzystania portu jako bazy żeglugowej i tranzytowej dla handlowych statków morskich tego kraju. Port w Szczecinie oraz zespół portowy Szczecin-Świnoujście realizowały przez kilkadziesiąt lat funkcje tranzytowe wobec południowego sąsiada. Czechosłowacja nie rezygnowała z obecności w Szczecinie nawet po oddaniu rejonu wolnocłowego w porcie, wręcz przeciwnie, przez kolejne lata tranzyt czechosłowackich towarów stanowił ważną część przeładunków w porcie, stocznia im. Warskiego budowała statki na zamówienie czechosłowackiego armatora, przyszli czechosłowaccy marynarze kształcili się w Wyższej Szkole Morskiej, a kontakty polityczne, społeczne i kulturalne były rozwijane za pośrednictwem konsulatu generalnego oraz filii warszawskiego Ośrodka Kultury i Informacji. Czechosłowacka obecność w Szczecinie najpełniej wyrażała się poprzez szeroki zakres działań realizowanych właśnie przez placówkę konsularną. Konsulat w Szczecinie istniał nieprzerwanie do końca 1992 r., realizując nie tylko funkcje gospodarcze, ale także informacyjne, promował czechosłowacką kulturę, otaczał opieką czechosłowackich marynarzy i pracowników czechosłowackich przedsiębiorstw, których filie znajdowały się w okręgu konsularnym. Dzięki działalności sprawozdawczej placówki, napływały do władz czechosłowackich informacje na temat bieżącej sytuacji politycznej, gospodarczej i społecznej w okręgu konsularnym. Gdyby nie sprawozdania i notatki informacyjne przesyłane przez pracowników szczecińskiego konsulatu do ambasady CSRS w Warszawie i MSZ w Pradze, Szczecin pozostałby w cieniu innych miast Polski, w których rozgrywały się tragiczne wydarzenia grudnia 1970 r., rodził się protest społeczny latem 1980 r. a w latach 1988–1989 zachodziły zmiany systemowe, których czechosłowaccy urzędnicy konsularni nie akceptowali.

Citation

Szczepańska-Dudziak, Anna. "Szczecin as the Home Port for Inland Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak Presence in Szczecin from 1945–1989." *Studia Maritima* 35 (2022): 205–244. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2022.35-08.



Jacek Buko

Institute of Spatial Management and Socio-Economic Geography
University of Szczecin
jacek.buko@usz.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0002-9804-9835

Tomasz Norek

Institute of Spatial Management and Socio-Economic Geography
University of Szczecin
tomasz.norek@usz.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0001-9651-6295

Iwona Windekilde

Faculty of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
iwona.windekilde@ntnu.no
ORCID: 0000-0001-8084-6695

Gas Supplies by Sea and Biogas as Elements of Ensuring Energy Security: The Example of Poland

Keywords: energy security, gas supply diversification, LNG, biogas

Introduction

Nowadays, almost every country is able to produce electricity and heat, but only a few of them have deposits of fossil fuels in their territories in an amount that allows them to freely meet their own needs in this area. The primary energy demand in Poland is covered in over 80% by hard coal, lignite, crude oil and natural gas.¹ Poland has resources of all the above-mentioned raw materials, but only with regard to coal they are sufficient to ensure full coverage of the demand. The domestic demand for lignite is fully satisfied by own extraction, and the exploitable lignite resources are sufficient

¹ *Sprawozdania z działalności Prezesa URE za lata 2012–2020* (Warszawa: Urząd Regulacji Energetyki, 2021–20), accessed 15 June 2022, <https://www.ure.gov.pl/pl/urzed/informacje-ogolne/edukacja-i-komunikacja/publikacje/sprawozdania-z-dzialaln/2916,Sprawozdania-z-dzialalnosci-Prezesa-URE.html>.

for two decades.² With regard to hard coal, Polish mines would be able to fully meet the domestic demand for this resource for six decades.³ In terms of natural gas, domestic extraction is able to meet no more than 20% of demand, and in the case of crude oil, less than 2%.⁴

The purpose of the considerations in this study is an attempt to identify whether the gas fuel supply by sea is capable of ensuring the security supply of this raw material to Poland. The premise for taking up this issue is the new geopolitical situation after the Russian attack on Ukraine, which radically intensified the discussion on making the European Union countries independent from the import of energy resources from Russia and other sanctioned countries. The international effects of the above-mentioned armed conflict have dramatically demonstrated the extent to which energy resources and their uninterrupted transmission constitute a key element of both national security and economic stabilisation, and are at the same time becoming the subject of international competition.⁵

The analysis of the security of gas fuel supplies to Poland in the situation of an armed conflict in the neighbouring countries having a direct impact on this supply has not been the subject of direct literature considerations so far. The literature on the subject presents only the content relating to selected aspects of the described issue. Among the items that deserve distinction, one can mention the study by Piekarski, who focuses on the military aspects of ensuring the security of raw material supplies by sea.⁶ Then Donaj, Kucenko⁷ and Podraza⁸ describe the issues of Russia's imperial resource policy. Al-Masny analyses the political aspects of energy security from a regional and global

2 Sławomir Mazurek and Marcin Tyimiński, *Węgiel brunatny*, Państwowy Instytut Geologiczny – Państwowy Instytut Badawczy, accessed 21 June 2022, http://geoportal.pgi.gov.pl/surowce/energetyczne/wegiel_brunatny.

3 *Węgle kamienne – zasoby w Polsce we stanu na 31.12.2019*, Państwowy Instytut Geologiczny – Państwowy Instytut Badawczy, accessed 28 June 2022, http://geoportal.pgi.gov.pl/css/surowce/images/2019/tabele/wegle_kamienne_zasoby.pdf.

4 Marcin Tyimiński, *Eksport i import surowców mineralnych*, Państwowy Instytut Geologiczny – Państwowy Instytut Badawczy, accessed 18 June 2022, http://geoportal.pgi.gov.pl/surowce/export_import.

5 Of course, it should be pointed out that not only armed conflicts, but also political decisions, terrorist activities and natural circumstances can lead to serious disruptions in the supply of energy resources.

6 Michał Piekarski, "Bezpieczeństwo dostaw surowców energetycznych do Polski drogą morską," *Wschodnioznawstwo* 14 (2020): 177–197, DOI: 10.4467/20827695WSC.20.010.13338.

7 Łukasz Donaj and Anastazja Kucenko, "Gazprom i jego wpływ na współczesne bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Unii Europejskiej. Wybrane problemy," *Przegląd Strategiczny* 2 (2011): 335–350, <https://doi.org/10.14746/ps.2011.2.17>.

8 Andrzej Podraza, "Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Polski w kontekście neoimperialnej polityki Rosji oraz współpracy europejskiej i transatlantyckiej: Polska jako hub gazowy," *Sprawy Międzynarodowe* 73 (2020), 1: 135–61, <https://doi.org/10.35757/SM.2020.73.1.10>.

perspective.⁹ Przymuszewski considers the possibilities of increasing energy security through the diversification of oil and gas supplies to Europe.¹⁰ Ruszel¹¹ and Skrzyński,¹² on the other hand, evaluate the policy of the Polish authorities in the field of ensuring gas security in Poland in a several-year and long-term perspective.




Figure 1. Sources of natural gas supply to Poland in the decade of 2012–2021

Source: own elaboration based on: *Sprawozdania z działalności Prezesa URE za lata 2012–2020* (Warszawa: Urząd Regulacji Energetyki, 2012–2020), accessed June 26, 2022, <https://bip.mos.gov.pl/energetyka/sprawozdania-z-wynikow-monitorowania-bezpieczenstwa-dostaw-paliw-gazowych/>.

- 9 Nebras Al-Masny, “Aktualne wyzwania i trendy w zapewnieniu bezpieczeństwa energetycznego w układzie globalnym i regionalnym,” *Zarządzanie innowacyjne w gospodarce i biznesie* 29 (2019), 2: 13–29, https://doi.org/10.25312/2391-5129.29/2019_01nam.
- 10 Adam Przymuszewski, “Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne – dywersyfikacja źródeł i dróg dostaw gazu ziemnego i ropy naftowej do Europy,” in: *Ochrona środowiska jako kluczowy problem Polski XXI wieku*, ed. Jacek Cheda (Warszawa: Fundacja Lus Medicina, 2012), 39–46.
- 11 Mariusz Ruszel, “Ocena bezpieczeństwa dostaw gazu ziemnego do Polski – stan obecny i perspektywa do 2025 r.,” *Polityka Energetyczna – Energy Policy Journal* 20 (2017), 1: 5–22, <https://epj.min-pan.krakow.pl/pdf-96155-28931?filename=Evaluation%20of%20the.pdf>.
- 12 Tomasz Skrzyński, “Zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa energetycznego Polski odnośnie gazu ziemnego według projektu Polityki energetycznej Polski do 2040 Roku,” *Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis, Studia de Securitate* 9 (2019), 3: 31–36, DOI 10.24917/26578549.9.3.3.

According to the Energy Outlook 2019 report published by the BP concern¹³ and the assumptions of Poland's Energy Policy until 2040 (PEP2040),¹⁴ Poland will belong to the oil and gas importing countries for at least the next 20 years. It will not be changed significantly by the increase in the share of renewable energy sources, as they will, in principle, replace coal in the first place. It is important because the exploitation of hard coal and lignite deposits owned by Poland may turn out to be pointless in the future, especially for ecological and economic reasons. Despite the efforts declared by the Polish government to further exploit these deposits, contrary to the firm expectations of the European Union, it should be considered a probable scenario in which the use of coal for energy production will gradually decrease.

The current dominant share of coal in domestic energy production is a consequence of the historical conditions in which the Polish economy developed and the Polish state functioned in the 20th century. Starting the transformation of its economy towards a free market model, in the face of mounting structural, financial, and social problems, Poland could not consider a radical change in the structure of energy generation sources as a priority objective. Despite this, over the last 30 years it has been possible to significantly reduce the dominance of coal in the energy sector, improve the energy efficiency of the entire economy and, above all, significantly reduce its emission intensity. The deep transformation of the Polish energy sector, initiated in recent years, is assumed to assign a significant role to fuel gas. The nationwide consumption of natural gas in Poland is systematically increasing, which in relation to the past decade, broken down into groups of significant gas sources, is shown in Figure 1.

The increased demand for natural gas in Poland is related to the increasing use of it in cogeneration (simultaneous production of heat and electricity) and gas and steam power plants, primarily as back-up, regulatory and peak powers.¹⁵ Therefore, apart from investments in gas production infrastructure, investments in transmission infrastructure¹⁶ will be of significant importance for balancing the power system. According to the estimates presented by the Gas Transmission Operator Gaz-System S.A.,

13 *BP Energy Outlook 2019 edition*, BP, accessed 25 June 2022, <https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/energy-outlook/bp-energy-outlook-2019.pdf>, 12–19.

14 *Założenia do aktualizacji PEP2040-wzmocnienie bezpieczeństwa i niezależności energetycznej* (Warszawa: Ministerstwo Klimatu i Środowiska, marzec 2022), Portal Gov.pl, accessed 11 June 2022, <https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/zalozenia-do-aktualizacji-polityki-energetycznej-polski-do-2040-r-pep2040--wzmocnienie-bezpieczenstwa-i-niezaleznosci-energetycznej>.

15 The current energy system in Poland, based mainly on coal power plants, is inflexible, which results from the lack of technical adaptation of coal-fired units to sudden changes in the loads in their operation.

16 *Krajowy plan na rzecz energii i klimatu na lata 2021–2030* (Warszawa: Ministerstwo Klimatu i Środowiska, 2019), Załącznik 2, accessed 24 June 2022, <https://www.gov.pl/web/klimat/krajowy-plan-na-rzecz-energii-i-klimatu>.

which dominates the Polish market, the demand for natural gas in the energy sector is to increase from the level of 4.2 billion cubic metres in 2020 to the maximum level of 13.4 billion cubic metres in 2036, and then slightly decrease.¹⁷ In the light of the presented assumptions, the strategic importance of gas for the creation of economic development and the functioning of Poland cannot be questioned.

In 2021, natural gas consumption in Poland reached the historic maximum of approximately 21.1 billion cubic metres, of which 9.7 billion cubic metres was imported via pipelines from Russia and 2.3 billion cubic metres from the west and south (including 1.42 billion cubic metres from PGNiG's own deposits¹⁸ in Norway), 5.5 billion cubic metres was obtained in the form of liquefied gas delivered by sea, and 3.7 billion cubic metres constituted the domestic production of natural gas.¹⁹ The geographical distribution and technical transmission capacity of all cross-border entry points to the Polish gas system are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Cross-border entry points to the Polish gas transmission system, as of 1 August 2022

Entry point	Direction	Technical capacity in billion cubic metres/year
Mallnow	West/Germany	5.4
GCP GAZ System Ontras	West/Germany	1.5
Cieszyn	South/ the Czech Republic	0.5
LNG Terminal/Świnoujście	Northwest/LNG worldwide market	6.2
GIPL/ Poland-Lithuania	Northeast/ Lithuania	1.9
Poland-Slovakia Interconnector	South/ the Czech Republic	5.7
Kondratki (Yamal)	East/ Belarus	30.7
Teterovka	East/ Belarus	0.2
Vysokoye	East/ Belarus	5.5
Drozdovici	East/ Ukraine	4.4

Source: *Połączenia międzysystemowe*, Gaz-System S.A., accessed 27 June 2022, <https://www.gaz-system.pl/ea/tr2015/polaczenia-miedzysystemowe.html>.

17 *Krajowy dziesięcioletni plan rozwoju systemu przesyłowego. Plan rozwoju w zakresie zaspokojenia obecnego i przyszłego zapotrzebowania na paliwa gazowe na lata 2022–2031* (Warszawa: Gaz-System S.A., kwiecień 2021), accessed 5 June 2022, https://www.gaz-system.pl/fileadmin/centrum prasowe/Aktualnosci/20210413_KDPR_2022_2031_wyciag_do_konsultacji.pdf, 12–16; *Wnioski z analiz prognostycznych dla sektora energetycznego Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2040 r.* (Warszawa: Ministerstwo Klimatu i Środowiska, 2020), Portal Gov.pl, accessed 3 June 2022, https://bip.mos.gov.pl/fileadmin/user_upload/bip/strategie_plany_programy/Polityka_energetyczna_Polski/za1_2_do_PEP2040_-_Wnioski_z_analiz_prognostycznych_2021-02-02.pdf, 36–47.

18 The share of Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo (PGNiG) in the exploitation of domestic and foreign gas fields by Polish economic entities is 98.8%. The long-range forecast of PGNiG concerns the year 2024 and assumes obtaining 3.9 billion m³ from Polish deposits and 2.9 billion m³ from Norwegian deposits.

19 *Sprawozdania z działalności Prezesa URE za lata 2012–2020*.

After Russia unilaterally halted the supply of natural gas to Poland in April 2022, the total domestic supply gap for the annual demand, at the level of 2021, could reach nearly 5 billion cubic metres throughout 2022 (assuming that the already satisfied demand for gas from the east was proportionately higher in the first, winter quarter of 2022). The coverage of this shortage may be partially from domestic natural gas reserves, the amount of which amounts to 3.2 billion cubic metres.²⁰ Supplementing the rest may be problematic, because a large part of Europe is struggling with limited access to natural gas. With a high probability, however, it can be assumed²¹ that the demand for natural gas in 2022 in Poland will not reach the level of 2021 due to a drastic increase in the price of this fuel, resulting in a decrease in demand. In the long-term perspective, the problem of access to a significantly larger amount of gas than today, mainly due to the needs of the previously mentioned modernisation investments in the energy sector, becomes critically important for Poland's energy security.

The concept of energy security of Poland in relation to fuel gas

Ensuring energy security is a complex process influenced by many factors. Decisions taken in this area are mostly both strategic and political in nature, and obviously generate serious consequences for the entire economy and society. In scientific terms, energy security is one of the interdisciplinary theoretical concepts. Due to its specificity, it is located between political science, economics and technical sciences.²² In the political science sense, energy security is related to ensuring the continuity of energy supplies in an economically- and technically-justified manner, while respecting the environment. In economic terms, energy security refers to the energy market, its structure and connections that enable effective counteracting of the impact of external factors that may weaken the development of this market.²³ Security of supply can therefore be considered in two dimensions: internal, which aims to balance energy demand and supply – while maintaining environmental standards, and external, which is related to filling the gap between domestic energy production and domestic demand for energy. Thus, the internal dimension includes the management of energy available

20 *Sprawozdania z działalności Prezesa URE za lata 2012–2020.*

21 The state-owned company Gaz-System S.A., which is responsible for the transmission of natural gas in Poland, estimates this year's Polish gas consumption at 18 billion cubic metres.

22 Krzysztof Tomaszewski, "Wpływ inwestycji infrastrukturalnych w sektorze gazowym na bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej," *Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne*, 3 (2017): 73–96, accessed 26 May 2022, DOI 10.14746/ssp.2017.3.4.

23 Tomasz Kaźmierczak, *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne – uzależnienie Polski od importu gazu ziemnego* (Warszawa: Promotor, 2008), 23–41; Krzysztof M. Książopolski, *Ekonomiczne zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa państw. Metody i środki przeciwdziałania* (Warszawa: Elipsa, Warszawa 2007), 33–39.

in the country, coming both from domestic production and imports, and the external dimension – supplementing domestic energy needs with imports.²⁴ The purpose of energy security understood in this way is to ensure an adequate and reliable level of supply of affordable energy carriers in a way that does not threaten the fundamental values and goals of the state.²⁵

Based on the so-called negative formulation of the issue of energy security, it can be assumed that a breach of energy security occurs when, as a result of a change in the continuity of energy supplies and its carriers, there is a loss of prosperity, understood as a slowdown in the growth rate, or even a decrease in Gross Domestic Product (GDP).²⁶ Measures of security of supply are based on concentration or dispersion indicators, which can be supplemented with elements related to the geopolitical stability of the supplier and its raw material base.²⁷

The Polish Act on Energy Law²⁸ defines energy security as the state of the economy in which it is possible to cover the current and future customer demand for fuels and energy in a technically- and economically-justified manner, while maintaining environmental protection requirements. Undisturbed access to carriers is considered to be of decisive importance for the material standard and quality of life of the population as well as for the functioning and development of enterprises. Therefore, energy security also has a significant impact on maintaining the socio-political stability of the state. The methods of ensuring energy security include: energy self-sufficiency, diversification of energy supplies, rationalisation of energy consumption, expansion of storage space and introduction of new energy sources to the energy balance sheet.²⁹

Increasing the share of natural gas in energy production must go hand in hand with the guarantees of gaseous fuel availability on the market. These guarantees should result from solutions of a systemic nature, neutralising internal and external threats to the continuity of gaseous fuel supplies. The official list of possible causes of

24 Paweł Czerpak, “Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne,” in: *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Teoria i praktyka*, eds. Katarzyna Żukrowska et al., 121–136 (Warszawa: Szkoła Główna Handlowa, 2006).

25 Daniel Yergin, “Energy Security in the 1990s,” *Foreign Affairs*, 67 (1988), 1: 6–9. accessed 30 June 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1988-09-01/energy-security-1990s>, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20043677>.

26 Douglas R. Bohi and Michael A. Toman, *The Economics of Energy Security* (Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), accessed 25 May 2022, <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-94-009-1808-5.pdf>, 12–16.

27 Andreas Löschel, et al., “Indicators of energy security in industrialised countries,” *Energy Policy* 38 (2010), 4: 1665–69, accessed 27 May 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.03.061>; Bert Kruyt, et al., “Indicators for energy security,” *Energy Policy* 37 (2009), 6: 2166–72, accessed May 26, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.02.006>.

28 Ustawa z dnia 10 kwietnia 1997 r., Prawo energetyczne, Dz. U. Nr 54 z 2019 r. poz. 348 z późn. zm.

29 Honorata Nyga-Łukaszewska, “Czy bezpieczeństwo energetyczne oznacza konkurencyjność w skali międzynarodowej?,” *International Business and Global Economy* 35 (2016), 1: 390–401, <https://doi.org/10.4467/23539496IB.16.028.5609>.

disturbances in the proper functioning of the gas system in Poland is included in the National Crisis Management Plan, prepared by the Government Centre for Security.³⁰ One of the 10 discussed reasons indicated in the above-mentioned document is the possibility of unfavourable events in the international environment, i.e. political and economic conflicts in the countries supplying natural gas or transit countries, resulting in restrictions or interruptions in natural gas supplies.

Measures to remove or mitigate risks and hazards in natural gas supplies are included in the Preventive Action Plan³¹. As included in this document, in the event of risk materialisation in the form of disruptions in the supply of imported gas (reduction or cessation of supplies), the state has two categories of remedial measures, i.e. market and non-market measures. Market measures include launching additional natural gas supplies from other sources or directions and reducing the consumption of natural gas by consumers, in accordance with the contracts concluded with them. The use of non-market measures covers the administrative possibilities of limiting the consumption of natural gas and activating the obligatory reserves of natural gas, which are required to be maintained by energy companies conducting economic activity in the field of foreign trade in natural gas and entities importing natural gas.

With regard to the supply of natural gas to Poland, starting from the 1990s, the risk of interruptions in supplies from the East was identified as the greatest risk. Events of this type occurred several times after 1990, but never on a scale that would pose a real threat to the energy security of the country. The shortages were each time fully compensated by the natural gas reserves maintained by Poland.³² As a result of the current intensification of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, initiated in 2014, to a full-scale war, the resignation from gas supplies (and other energy resources) from the east has become a priority for Poland, as for most EU countries. The previously indicated anticipation by Poland of the threat of cessation of supplies of strategic raw materials from Russia has for many years resulted in taking actions aimed at radically increasing Polish capacity to diversify natural gas supply sources. The domestic production of natural gas has limited capacity in this respect, which has been gradually declining for many years due to objective technical and geological reasons, despite the fact that the

30 *Krajowy Plan Zarządzania Kryzysowego, Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa* (Warszawa: Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa, n.d.), accessed 3 June 2022, <https://www.gov.pl/web/rcb/krajowy-plan-zarzadzania-kryzysowego>.

31 Plan na wypadek sytuacji nadzwyczajnej opracowany na podstawie art. 8 ust 2 lit. B, Rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) Nr 2017/1938 z 25 października 2017 r., dot. środków zapewniających bezpieczeństwo dostaw gazu ziemnego i uchylające rozporządzenie (UE) Nr 994/2010, Dz.U.UE.L.2017.280.1 (Warszawa: Minister Energii, 2019), 15–17.

32 Ustawa z Dnia 16 Lutego 2007 r. o zapasach ropy naftowej, produktów naftowych i gazu ziemnego oraz zasadach postępowania w sytuacjach zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa paliwowego państwa i zakłócegniach na rynku naftowym, Dz.U. 2007, nr 52, poz. 343 z późn. zm., 3198–3200.

state of recoverable natural gas resources in Poland is close to 140 billion cubic metres.³³ It should be added that PGNiG holds interests in 59 licences on the Norwegian Continental Shelf and produces from fourteen fields, from which approximately 40 billion cubic metres of natural gas can be exploited.³⁴

Efforts made by Poland so far to diversify natural gas supplies include five strategic projects: new interconnections with Slovakia, LNG (*liquefied natural gas*) terminals in Świnoujście and Gdańsk, and the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline. The construction and commissioning of interconnectors as part of the first two projects were completed in May and July 2022, respectively. Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania (GIPL) allows Poland access to the LNG terminal, which is located in Lithuania in Klaipėda, which is very important in the context of gasification of the north-eastern regions of Poland. Thanks to this connection, Poland gains access to the Floating Storage Regasification Unit (FSRU), which is located in Klaipėda, Lithuania. The Klaipėdos Nafta operating FSRU is considering the possibility of expanding the terminal's regasification capacity from the current 3.75 billion cubic metres to 5 billion cubic metres in the long term.³⁵

As regards the implementation of the interconnection with Slovakia, it should be noted that this connection, on the one hand, provides Slovakia and the countries of the region with direct access to new sources of gas supplies from the north, and on the other hand, it enables the Polish market to access gas from the so-called Southern Gas Corridor (the Trans-Adriatic Gas Pipeline), which transports the raw material extracted in the Caspian Sea region and in the eastern part of the Mediterranean basin (Cyprus gas fields).³⁶

The third of the indicated strategic projects to diversify gas supplies to Poland is the LNG terminal in Świnoujście, which started operating in 2016. The construction of the LNG terminal made it possible to receive liquefied natural gas by sea from anywhere in the world. The initial regasification capacity of the terminal was 5 billion cubic metres per year. Starting from 2022, the terminal in Świnoujście can already provide up to 6.2 billion cubic metres of natural gas, and in the years 2024–2038, as a result of the planned expansion, this value is to reach 8.3 billion cubic metres.³⁷ It should be indicat-

33 *Gaz ziemny, zasoby i wydobycie*, Państwowy Instytut Geologiczny – Państwowy Instytut Badawczy, accessed 25 June 2022, http://geoportal.pgi.gov.pl/surowce/energetyczne/gaz_ziemny/2020.

34 *Prognozy operacyjne i finansowe*, PGNiG, accessed 24 June 2022, <https://pgnig.pl/relacje-inwestorskie/informacje-gieldowe/prognozy-finansowe>.

35 *Gaz z Litwy płynie do Polski*, Parkiet.com, accessed 2 July 2022, <https://www.parkiet.com/surowce-i-paliwa/art36218571-gaz-z-litwy-plynie-do-polski>.

36 *Gazowe Połączenia Międzysystemowe Polska-Słowacja*, Gaz-System S.A., accessed 2 July 2022, <https://www.gaz-system.pl/dam/jcr:f8f093d0-6a46-4465-b40f-0322738f9e68/160808-os-pl-sk-project-description.pdf>.

37 *Sprawozdanie MKiŚ z wyników monitorowania bezpieczeństwa dostaw paliw gazowych za okres od dnia 1 stycznia 2020 r. do dnia 31 grudnia 2020 r.* (Warszawa: Ministerstwo Klimatu i Środowiska, czerwiec

ed that liquefied gas, due to its characteristics,³⁸ is one of the most promising methods of ensuring security of supply through the diversification of raw material sources, because it enables the use of large reserves of this fuel that are available in distant parts of the world. The development of this project is also stimulated by the depletion of the capacity of the existing transmission gas pipelines. LNG can be delivered in tanks to places where there is no pipeline infrastructure; it is also used as a quick replenishment in the event of a local pressure drop in gas pipelines, or as an alternative source in the event of renovation or reconstruction of the gas network.

In principle, LNG is to play a key role in the process of diversifying supplies to the EU. There are 28 LNG terminals in Europe, 24 of which are located within the countries belonging to the European Union. The current LNG import capacity in the EU is over 200 billion cubic metres, of which more than half has been used in the last three years. The most developed LNG infrastructure is on the Iberian Peninsula. Spain has the possibility of receiving 60 billion cubic metres in its terminals, France over 30 billion cubic metres, and Italy about 15 billion cubic metres. However, the existing gas pipeline connection of the countries of southern Europe with the rest of the continent is limited, for example Spain has only less than 7 billion cubic meters of land cross-border transmission capacity.³⁹

The fourth of the listed strategic projects to diversify gas supplies to Poland is the construction of the Floating Storage Regasification Unit (FSRU) in the Bay of Gdańsk. The choice of location results from the forecasted increase in gas demand in the Gdańsk agglomeration and its vicinity and the need to properly shape gas flows in the transmission system, taking into account large volumes of gas that will be injected into the gas system in the western part of the country, through the LNG terminal in Świnoujście and the Baltic Pipe. The first stage, ensuring a capacity of at least 4.5 billion cubic metres, is planned for commissioning after 2025. The expansion of the FSRU will depend on the development of the market in the region and the increase in demand for natural gas in the country.⁴⁰

The last discussed project in the field of diversification of natural gas supplies is the partly offshore Baltic Pipe gas pipeline, which is to connect the Polish transmission

2021), accessed 4 June 2022, <https://bip.mos.gov.pl/energetyka/sprawozdania-z-wynikow-monitorowania-bezpieczenstwa-dostaw-paliw-gazowych/>.

38 LNG is a liquid obtained in the cooling process at a temperature of about – 162 degrees Celsius. Liquefied natural gas has a volume 600 times smaller than the raw material in its natural state. A conventional gas carrier transports approx. 70 thousand tonnes of LNG, which after regasification gives approximately 95 million cubic metres of natural gas.

39 Kamil Lipiński, Magdalena Maj and Maciej Miniszewski, *Unia Europejska niezależna od Rosji? Alternatywne źródła dostaw surowców energetycznych* (Warszawa: Polski Instytut Ekonomiczny, 2022), 25–26.

40 See: *Krajowy dziesięcioletni plan*.

system with the Europipe II pipeline, allowing access to gas from Norwegian fields through the North Sea, Denmark and the Baltic Sea. The construction of the Polish-Norwegian gas pipeline in Poland was an important element of the political debate related to the issue of energy security. One of the key aspects raised by the supporters of the project was the assessment that the investment would lead to a real diversification of the sources and directions of natural gas supplies. The opponents of this concept pointed to the high price of Norwegian gas, which in the future may have an impact on the pace of economic growth and the competitiveness of Polish enterprises.⁴¹

In September 2001, PGNiG SA and Statoil signed a contract called the Norwegian trade contract for gas supplies to Poland for the amount of 5 billion cubic metres annually through a direct connection with the supplier's deposits.⁴² The first gas supplies (mostly using a 1,400-kilometre-long offshore gas pipeline) were to reach Poland in 2008.⁴³ This project was rejected due to the higher prices of Norwegian gas in relation to the Russian gas contracted at that time.

In 2015, the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline was considered a project of strategic importance for Poland's energy security. Its implementation is planned as part of the investment program for the years 2015–2025. The aim of the project was to build a new gas supply corridor from Norway to the Danish and Polish markets. In 2017, a memorandum on cooperation between Poland and Denmark was signed, and the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline was granted the status of *Project of Common Interest* granted by the European Commission to infrastructure projects aimed at strengthening the European internal energy market, as part of the implementation of the EU energy policy objectives as part of the North-South Gas Corridor. In a strategic assumption, the Baltic Pipe is part of a wider Three Seas Initiative – a strategy for integrating the energy systems of Central and Eastern European countries.

The actual implementation of the project began in the spring of 2021, when the Polish operator of the gas transmission system Gaz-System S.A., in cooperation with the Danish operator Energinet, started the construction of a new gas pipeline from Norway to Poland via Denmark. On the basis of strategic assumptions, Poland has started construction of over 2,000 km of gas pipelines in the west, east and south of the country, and the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline is to fill the gaps in the transport of natural

41 Michał Paszkowski, "Gazociąg Baltic Pipe w koncepcjach zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa energetycznego Polski w myśli politycznej Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej oraz Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego," *Studia i analizy nauk o polityce* 1(2022): 49–61, <https://doi.org/10.31743/sanp.13556>.

42 *Spotkanie w sprawie dostaw norweskiego gazu do Polski*, PGNiG S.A., accessed 5 June 2022 <https://pgnig.pl/aktualnosci/-/news-list/id/spotkanie-w-sprawie-dostaw-norweskiego-gazu-do-polski/newsGroupId/10184>.

43 Dariusz Malinowski, *Wraca idea gazowego łącznika ze Skandynawią*, WNP. PL, Portal Gospodarczy, accessed 4 June 2022, <https://www.wnp.pl/artykuly/wraca-idea-gazowego-lacznika-ze-skandynawia,270204.html>.

gas in the north of the country. The expansion of the Polish transmission network related to the implementation of the Baltic Pipe project, covering 2,000 km of gas pipelines, will strengthen the country's energy security and will allow the diversification of gas supplies to neighbouring countries of Lithuania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Ukraine, which are still heavily dependent on gas supplies from Russia.

The Baltic Pipe gas pipeline will consist of five key elements, two of which are offshore: a gas pipeline connecting the Norwegian and Danish gas transmission systems, and a gas pipeline connecting the Danish and Polish transmission systems. The above-ground part will consist of three parts – the expansion of the Danish and Polish transmission systems and the construction of a gas compressor station in Denmark. Like the Nord Stream gas pipeline system, part of the Baltic Pipe route will run along the seabed of the Baltic Sea.⁴⁴

The pipeline with a planned capacity of 10 billion cubic metres is expected to be put into operation by the end of 2022.⁴⁵ In the fourth quarter of 2022, the capacity of 0.7 billion cubic metres will be available in the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline, which will increase to 2.5 billion cubic metres per quarter in 2023.⁴⁶

The assumption is that the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline is primarily intended to eliminate Poland's dependence on short-term gas supplies from Russia, accelerate energy integration in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, and give Poland a chance to become a gas hub for Eastern Europe.⁴⁷ The weaknesses and threats to the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline include its low capacity, the actual lack of an extensive transmission infrastructure in the region and the depletion of Norwegian gas resources in the North Sea (probable lack of necessary gas volumes in the medium-term).⁴⁸

The last three of the described projects should be considered essential for ensuring the security of gas supplies to Poland. Without diminishing the importance of the first two investments, it should be noted that the interconnector capacity with Lithuania is currently relatively low, which may cover less than 10% of the current domestic gas fuel demand. In turn, the connection with Slovakia, according to the statement of the Polish government,⁴⁹ is dedicated primarily to the transmission of gas to Slovakia;

44 Oksana Voytyuk, "The Baltic Pipe and its impact on energy security in Central and Eastern Europe," *Polityka Energetyczna – Energy Policy Journal* 25 (2022), 1: 89–108, DOI: 10.33223/epj/145554.

45 Umowa między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Królestwem Danii w sprawie projektu Baltic Pipe, podpisana w Katowicach dnia 11 grudnia 2018 r., Dz.U.2019.1263, accessed 5 June 2022, <https://sip.lex.pl/akty-prawne/dzu-dziennik-ustaw/dania-polska-umowa-w-sprawie-projektu-baltic-pipe-katowice-2018-12-11-18872716>.

46 Piekarski, "Bezpieczeństwo dostaw."

47 Voytyuk, "The Baltic Pipe."

48 *Export of Norwegian gas and oil 2021*, Norwegian Petroleum, accessed 10 June 2022, <https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/production-and-exports/exports-of-oil-and-gas/>.

49 Wojciech Jakóbiak, *Gaz z Południa dla Polski*, Biznes Alert, accessed 30 May 2022, <https://biznesalert.pl/jakobik-gaz-z-poludnia-dla-polski-analiza/>.

moreover, the raw material from the Trans-Adriatic Gas Pipeline, with a capacity of 10 billion cubic metres per year, goes to recipients from Southern Europe, mainly to Italy, Greece and Bulgaria.⁵⁰

Policy of the EU and Poland with regard to the use of gas in the energy sector

A long-term vision of the EU is to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. In line with the EU's ambition to decarbonise the EU, in December 2020 the European Council endorsed a binding EU target to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 by at least 55%, compared to the 1990 level. Thus, the current 40% reduction target was increased.⁵¹ The new EU ambition has been defined as a collective goal for the entire Union, i.e. implemented on the basis of contributions from member states, taking into account national conditions, specific starting points, reduction potential, the principle of sovereignty in shaping the national energy mix, the need to guarantee energy security; in the most cost-effective manner possible in order to maintain affordable energy prices for households and the competitiveness of the EU, as well as taking into account the principle of fairness and solidarity. The Strategy for the Integration of the European Union's Energy System,⁵² published in July 2020, set out that for two decades gas was to be an intermediate fuel on the way to decarbonise the European Union. By 2050, its share in energy production is to be gradually reduced to the level of 20%, the remaining 80% are to be renewable energy sources. The European Commission treats natural gas as a fossil fuel, contributing to the emission of greenhouse gases.

Russia's military aggression against Ukraine in 2022 resulted in the EU adopting the REPowerEU plan⁵³ aimed at accelerating the reduction of dependence on Russian fossil fuels. This plan sets out to achieve a reduction of at least 55% net greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 and the EU to be climate neutral by 2050. The accelerated pathway

50 *Południowy korytarz osiągnie przepustowość w przyszłym oku*, Energetyka24, accessed 23 May 2022, <https://energetyka24.com/gaz/poludniowy-korytarz-gazowy-osiagnie-pelna-przepustowosc-w-przyszlym-r>.

51 *Fit for 55*, Rada Unii Europejskiej, accessed 17 June 2022, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/policies/green-deal/fit-for-55-the-eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/>.

52 *Komunikat Komisji do Parlamentu Europejskiego, Rady Europejskiej, Rady, Komitetu Ekonomiczno-Społecznego i Komitetu Regionów, Europejski Zielony Ład*, EUR-Lex (Bruksela: Komisja Europejska, 11.12.2019), accessed 4 June 2022, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2019%3A640%3AFIN>.

53 *Komunikat Komisji do Parlamentu Europejskiego, Rady Europejskiej, Rady, Europejskiego Komitetu Ekonomiczno-Społecznego i Komitetu Regionów. REPowerEU: Wspólne europejskie działania w kierunku bezpieczniejszej i zrównoważonej energii po przystępnej cenie*, EUR-Lex (Strasburg: Komisja Europejska, 8.03.2022), accessed 7 June 2022, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0108>.

of decarbonisation is therefore based on the goal of completely eliminating natural gas by 2050.

As of the end of 2020, the EU countries with the highest share of renewable energy in the energy mix are: Sweden (60%), Finland (44%) and Latvia (42%), Poland ranks twenty-second (16%) and Malta (11%) is the last.⁵⁴ These results show how challenging the assumptions of the EU's energy policy are for us and how distant the goal is to achieve climate and energy neutrality by 2050.

Natural gas availability on the global market

In recent years, an average of 150 billion cubic metres of Russian gas has been imported to EU countries, and the EU intends to reduce this volume by two-thirds by the end of 2022. The average annual own production of the European Union countries, accounting for 1/9 of the total demand, amounted to approximately 50 billion cubic metres. The possibilities of increasing this extraction are problematic for technological, geological and social reasons.⁵⁵ In 2021, 25% of natural gas imported by the EU was obtained from Norway.⁵⁶ In 2022, sales of Norwegian gas to the EU may increase by no more than 8%, to 122 billion cubic metres.⁵⁷

To replace Russian gas, the EU plans to import most of the natural gas it needs in the form of LNG. This may be problematic, as the global demand for LNG in 2022 is estimated at approximately 436 million tonnes, and the supply is 410 million tonnes.⁵⁸ It is impossible to compensate for this disproportion in the short term. The implementation of new export terminals and transport infrastructure requires several years to balance supply and demand in the global LNG market.

54 *Renewable energy statistics*, Eurostat Statistics Explained, accessed 28 June 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Renewable_energy_statistics.

55 Half of the EU's gas production is in the Netherlands, but this production is causing regular earthquakes in the region. Their frequency increases with depletion of the deposit. The initiatives taken by the Dutch government to increase production are strongly opposed by the local community. Barbara Rogala, *Nie tylko Rosja – gdzie w Europie są złoża gazu ziemnego*, 300Gospodarka, accessed 31 June 2022, <https://300gospodarka.pl/analizy/nie-tylko-rosja-gdzie-w-europie-sa-zloza-gazu-ziemnego>.

56 *EU imports of energy products – recent developments*, Eurostat Statistics Explained, accessed 17 June 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_imports_of_energy_products_-_recent_developments#Member_States.27_trade_in_petroleum_oils_and_natural_gas.

57 Kate Abnett and Nora Buli, *EU, Norway agree to increase gas deliveries as Russian cut deepen*, Reuters, accessed 17 June 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/eu-norway-agree-increase-gas-deliveries-russian-cuts-deepen-2022-06-23/>.

58 Sanja Pekic, *Rystad: European LNG supply crisis expected in winter 2022*, Offshore Energy, accessed 27 June 2022, <https://www.offshore-energy.biz/rystad-european-lng-supply-crisis-expected-in-winter-2022/>.

Europe and Asia are primarily competing for LNG, as Japan, China and South Korea are among the largest LNG importers. The recovery of Asian economies after pandemic restrictions caused Asian countries to increase their demand for LNG in 2022, and they are ready to pay more for this gas than consumers in Europe. Power plants in South Korea and Japan, anticipating that Europe, which would abandon Russian gas, would accumulate more gas than in previous years, made an attempt to secure their own needs by contracting the maximum possible number of LNG loads. In 2022, mainly supplies ordered under long-term contracts flow to Europe. An additional problem is that there is no spare shipping capacity in the global gas industry. Although nearly 500 LNG tankers are available worldwide, demand exceeds supply.

There are no cryogenic gas tankers in the Polish merchant fleet that would allow the transport of LNG. In the first half of 2022, PGNiG used short-term charter agreements for three vessels, two of which had previously delivered LNG loads to the terminal in Świnoujście. PGNiG has also signed long-term charter contracts (10-year period) for eight newly-built units, the first two of which will come into use in 2023, another two in 2024, and the remaining four in 2025. According to the target-unloading needs, Poland needs a fleet of 20 gas tankers in the following years.⁵⁹

The Polish gas market is part of the European common market, which, in addition to numerous benefits in terms of fuel trading, also means that supply crises (and related price shocks) in Europe affect the Polish market. PGNiG is not able to completely fill the new pipeline with gas, i.e. contract a sufficient amount of gas from Norwegian or Danish partners. The Polish company reserved the vast majority of the Baltic Pipe capacity. Based on the contracts signed, as at the end of the second quarter of 2022, PGNiG has 4.5 billion cubic metres of gas at its disposal in 2023 for transmission by Baltic Pipe, which is less than half of the transmission capacity. The Baltic Pipe gas pipeline draws gas from the Europipe II pipeline connecting Norway with Germany and in the current crisis situation in Western Europe there are so many people willing to buy Norwegian gas that in practice it may make it impossible to fully use the Baltic Pipe capacity.

It should be added that while the ongoing energy transformation essentially obstructs the EU countries from reducing gas demand by returning to coal-based energy, it is different in most Asian countries, where the rigours of decarbonisation do not apply. Problems with access to LNG may slow down the growth of demand in Asia, where it is likely to partially restore the energy based on coal and fuel oil. There are signs of such a return to coal on a large scale in China and India. This, in turn, is likely to reduce the demand pressure, which will lead to a decline in LNG prices. Current

59 Przemysław Ciszak, *Polsce potrzebna jest własna flota gazowców. Na razie nie mamy żadnego*, Money.pl, accessed 31 June 2022, <https://www.money.pl/gielda/polsce-potrzebna-jest-wlasna-flota-gazowcow-na-razie-nie-mamy-zadnego-6789643539901056a.html>.

estimates for 2023, however, predict an increase in demand for LNG by around 5%. The global gas crisis strengthens the position of LNG in the global gas market, and perhaps also its importance in the energy transformation.⁶⁰

Biogas as an alternative to natural gas

The EU's planned reduction of the share of gas in energy production to 20% in 2050 requires reflection: what will happen with the existing gas infrastructure and power plants, which currently require natural gas? Hydrogen is the favoured alternative to gas in the EU, but the technologies associated with its wide use are still being developed and, in practice, there is currently no possibility of transporting and burning hydrogen using the classic gas infrastructure. The concept of replacing part of the natural gas in gas networks with purified biogas, i.e. biomethane, seems to be much more realistic.⁶¹ From the point of view of chemical composition, biomethane does not differ much from methane-rich natural gas,⁶² therefore, from the technological point of view, it can be mixed in any proportions with natural gas and sent through distribution networks to consumers.⁶³ According to researchers from the University of Life Sciences in Poznań, the annual potential of biomethane production in Poland ranges from 7 to 8 billion cubic metres.⁶⁴

It should be pointed out that biogas plants are the most stable source of renewable energy – even more than hydroelectric power plants, for the operation of which the decrease in river levels as a result of insufficient rainfall is a serious threat. Regardless of the production of electricity and heat, biogas plants can also operate as biomethane plants that produce methane pumped into the gas network with parameters better than natural gas. According to the report of the European Biogas Association, the development of this sector has the potential to bring biomethane production to 22% of the natural gas currently consumed in the EU, by 2050.⁶⁵

60 Teresa Wójcik, *RAPORT: Czy światu zabraknie LNG?* BiznesAlert.pl, accessed 2 June 2022, <https://biznesalert.pl/raport-czy-swiatu-zabraknie-lng/>.

61 The methane content in biogas may range from 50 to 75%. Anneli Petersson, "Biogas cleaning," in: *The Biogas Handbook: Science, Production and Applications*, ed. Arthur Wellinger (Cambridge: Woodhead Pub, 2013), 329–34, <https://doi.org/10.1533/9780857097415.3.329>.

62 Alex J. Dunnett and Nilay Shah, "Prospects for Bioenergy," *Journal of Biobased Materials and Bioenergy* 1 (2007), 1: 1–18, <https://doi.org/10.1166/jbmb.2007.1975>.

63 Krzysztof Biernat and Izabela Samson-Bręk, "Przegląd technologii oczyszczania biogazu do jakości gazu ziemnego," *Chemik* 65 (2011), 5: 435–444.

64 *Biogaz w Polsce – raport 2022*, Magazyn Biomasa, accessed 30 June 2022, <https://magazynbiomasa.pl/biogaz-w-polsce-2022-pobierz-za-darmo-nasz-raport/>.

65 Ana Maria Jaller-Makarewicz and Arjun Flora, *Gas in Spain: Oversupplied and Overcompensated. High Premium Paid by Customers for Security and Diversity of Supply* (Institute for Energy Economics

Poland's biogas potential is hidden in the wealth of unused organic waste, such as from agricultural production, animal husbandry as well as from sewage sludge and landfills.⁶⁶ The environmental and economic characteristics of Poland clearly indicate bioenergetics as a potential area of technological specialisation of our country. The first premise is the strongly agricultural character of Poland, as agricultural land covers over 40% of the country's territory. It should be noted that out of nearly 14.7 million ha constituting the total area of agricultural land used for economic purposes in 2019, 10.9 million ha were used for agrarian purposes.⁶⁷ There is, therefore, a large amount of space that can be used for the cultivation of biogas plants, without prejudice to the existing crops.

At the end of 2021, there were approximately 350 biogas plants in operation in Poland,⁶⁸ which per number of inhabitants was the weakest result in the EU. Out of all installations, 219 are facilities operating in landfills or at sewage treatment plants. The remaining ones are agricultural biogas plants, where nearly 90% of biogas production was based on waste from food processing. The remaining part of the raw materials used came from special purpose crops.⁶⁹ According to the national guidelines for energy, by 2020, on average, in each of nearly 2.5 thousand municipalities one agricultural biogas plant was to be built.⁷⁰ This goal has not been achieved so far, inter alia, due to delays in the legislative process, which resulted in difficulties in obtaining sources of financing from banks, suspension of building permits, as well as protests of the population in the locations of planned investments.⁷¹

In Poland, biogas plants with a capacity of approximately 1 MW are the most numerous. The investment budget for the construction of such a biogas plant is close to EUR 4 million.⁷² The operating period of the biogas plant is estimated at about fifteen years. As economic practice shows, despite the possibility of selling surplus electrici-

and Financial Analysis, September 2021), accessed 17 June 2022, http://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Gas-in-Spain-Oversupplied-and-Overcompensated_September-2021.pdf.

66 Ilona Olsztyńska, "Biomass in the fuel mix of the Polish energy and heating sector," *Polityka Energetyczna – Energy Policy Journal* 22 (2019), 3: 7–9, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.33223/epj/111916>

67 Ibidem.

68 The number of biogas plants in the EU is estimated at approximately 19 thousand. See: *Biogaz w Polsce – raport 2022*.

69 Adam Juszcak and Magdalena Maj, *Rozwój i potencjał energetyki odnawialnej w Polsce* (Warszawa: Polski Instytut Ekonomiczny, grudzień 2020), accessed 3 July 2022, https://pie.net.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/PIE-Raport_OZE.pdf.

70 *Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2030 r. Dokument przyjęty przez Radę Ministrów w dniu 10 listopada 2009 r.* (Warszawa: Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 2009), 13–26.

71 Ewa Woźniak, "Stan biogazowni w Polsce," *Czysta Energia* 1 (2017): 54–55, accessed 14 May 2022, <https://www.portalkomunalny.pl/plus/artykul/stan-biogazowni-w-polsce/>.

72 *Branża: liczba biogazowni rolniczych rośnie w Polsce zbyt wolno*, Portal Komunalny, accessed 30 June 2022, <https://portalkomunalny.pl/branza-liczba-biogazowni-rolniczych-rosnie-w-polsce-zbyt-wolno-432057/>.

ty or heat from such an installation, this type of investment remains on the verge of profitability, despite the fact that the current provisions of the Polish Act on Renewable Energy Sources provide for support for cogeneration biogas plants (producing both heat and electricity).

As of the beginning of July 2022, Poland did not have a single biomethane plant, while in the years 2020–2021 in the EU the total number of biomethane plants increased by 50% to the level of almost 1 thousand. The largest number of such installations is located in Germany, France, the Netherlands and Scandinavia. In 2020, approximately 25 million MWh was produced (approx. 30 thousand Mwh, i.e. approx. 3 million cubic metres on average per one installation), i.e. approximately 2.57 billion cubic metres of biomethane in total.⁷³

In the current legal status, there is no system support in Poland dedicated to plants producing biomethane intended for injection into gas networks. The legal regulations in force in Poland do not oblige gas distributors to purchase biogas or agricultural biogas produced in a biogas plant and introduced into the gas distribution network, nor do they define specific rules for settlements between a producer and such entities.⁷⁴ As at the end of August 2022, Poland also failed to adjust its national regulations to the RED II directive.⁷⁵ The above information indicates, on the one hand, the gap between the regulatory and financial support system, and thus the level of development of the biomethane production sector between Poland and good European practices (e.g. German), but on the other hand, they indicate the enormous development potential of the Polish energy sector in terms of this fuel.

PGNiG estimates that it can accept approximately 4 billion cubic metres of biomethane for use, which is a volume similar to the annual production of domestic natural gas. Such a plan would require the construction of approximately 2,000 biomethane plants in the next 10 years and capital expenditure of EUR 15 billion.⁷⁶ Considering the presented conditions, however, it seems unrealistic; therefore the implementation of 10% renewable gases in the Polish gas network by 2030, assumed in PEP2040, is also questionable.

73 Biernat and Samson-Bręk, “Przegląd technologii.”

74 Juszczak and Maj, *Rozwój i potencjał energetyki; Branża: liczba*.

75 Directive (EU) 2018/2001, also known as RED II, allows consumers to produce their own electricity, either alone or as part of the energy community operating in the field of renewable energy, without unjustified restrictions. It also grants them the right to disconnect from inefficient heating and cooling systems and third-party access for suppliers of renewable energy and waste heat and cooling to district heating and cooling networks See: Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources.

76 Magdalena Skłodowska, *Biometanownia w każdej gminie?* Portal Wysokie Napięcie, accessed 14 May 2022, <https://wysokienapiecie.pl/31337-biometanownia-w-kazdej-gminie/>.

Conclusions

The European gas crisis in 2022 destabilised the entire global natural gas market. In view of the global LNG shortage; in the short term, this means gas shortages in the EU during the winter of 2022/2023, while in the longer term the global market, will be confronted with a shortage of supply, high prices, and probably collapses in some regional markets. Ensuring gas supplies for the economy and the population is an element of building the national security of the state in the strategic dimension. This approach is determined by the lack of self-sufficiency of Poland in terms of natural gas extraction and the need to obtain most of the necessary raw material from foreign suppliers.

The problem of the security of the Polish gas market comes down to the development and adoption of optimal regulatory, organisational and technical solutions, guaranteeing end users uninterrupted access to infrastructure and fuel gas. The Polish state, being aware of the threats occurring on both of these levels, took a number of actions aimed at systemic regulation of the security of the energy market. In the light of the considerations presented in this text, they should be considered, at least in part, not only as too late, but also as still insufficient. At this point, the operational risk related to the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline project, which is crucial for ensuring the current and future gas safety of Poland, should be emphasised. In principle, the gas pipeline was supposed to balance the amount of gas obtained from Russia with its capacity. However, it is problematic that Baltic Pipe is not directly connected to the Norwegian Shelf, but (as previously indicated) is connected to the Euro Pipe II gas pipeline, the annual capacity of which is 24 billion cubic metres of gas. In the conditions of the drastic gas shortage in the European Union caused by the war, it is obvious that Poland will not be able to participate in the planned nearly 40% of Europipe II's capacity.

It is highly probable that the Polish energy sector will have to rely on an energy mix based mainly on hard coal and lignite for much longer than originally assumed. It is therefore important that Poland undertakes negotiation efforts to reform the mechanisms of the European Union's climate policy, so that it is possible to carry out a low-emission and ambitious transformation, contributing to the achievement of the EU goals, taking into account the temporary increased use of conventional generation capacities, without incurring excessive costs resulting from the climate policy. In the context of Poland's potential in the field of biogas production, it is also recommended to launch research programs for projects consisting in the development of technologies allowing to increase the share of decarbonised gases in distribution and transmission networks. It is also crucial to develop effective support mechanisms aimed at increasing the attractiveness of biomethane as an energy carrier.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abnett, Kate, and Nora Buli. *EU, Norway agree to increase gas deliveries as Russian cut deepen*. Reuters. Accessed 17 June 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/eu-norway-agree-increase-gas-deliveries-russian-cuts-deepen-2022-06-23/>.
- Al-Masny, Nebras. "Aktualne wyzwania i trendy w zapewnieniu bezpieczeństwa energetycznego w układzie globalnym i regionalnym." *Zarządzanie innowacyjne w gospodarce i biznesie* 29 (2019), 2: 13–29. https://doi.org/10.25312/2391-5129.29/2019_01nam.
- Biernat, Krzysztof and Izabela Samson-Bręk. "Przegląd technologii oczyszczania biogazu do jakości gazu ziemnego." *Chemik* 65 (2011), 5: 435–444.
- Biogaz w Polsce – raport 2022*. Magazyn Biomasa. Accessed 30 June 2022. <https://magazynbiomasa.pl/biogaz-w-polsce-2022-pobierz-za-darmo-nasz-raport/>.
- Bohi, Douglas R, and Michael A. Toman. *The Economics of Energy Security*. Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996. Accessed 25 May 2022. <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-94-009-1808-5.pdf>, 12–16.
- BP Energy Outlook 2019 edition*. BP. Accessed 25 June 2022. <https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/energy-outlook/bp-energy-outlook-2019.pdf>.
- Branża: liczba biogazowni rolniczych rośnie w Polsce zbyt wolno*. Portal Komunalny. Accessed 30 June 2022. <https://portalkomunalny.pl/branza-liczba-biogazowni-rolniczych-rosnie-w-polsce-zbyt-wolno-432057/>.
- Ciszak, Przemysław. *Polsce potrzebna jest własna flota gazowców. Na razie nie mamy żadnego*. Money.pl. Accessed 31 June 2022. <https://www.money.pl/gielda/polsce-potrzebna-jest-wlasna-flota-gazowcow-na-razie-nie-mamy-zadnego-6789643539901056a.html>.
- Czerpak, Paweł. "Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne." In: *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Teoria i praktyka*, edited by Katarzyna Żukrowska et al., 121–136. Warszawa: Szkoła Główna Handlowa, 2006.
- Donaj, Łukasz, and Anastazja Kucenko. "Gazprom i jego wpływ na współczesne bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Unii Europejskiej. Wybrane problemy." *Przegląd Strategiczny* 2 (2011): 335–350. <https://doi.org/10.14746/ps.2011.2.17>.
- Dunnett, Alex J., and Nilay Shah. "Prospects for Bioenergy." *Journal of Biobased Materials and Bioenergy* 1 (2007), 1: 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1166/jbmb.2007.1975>.
- EU imports of energy products – recent developments*. Eurostat Statistics Explained. Accessed 17 June 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_imports_of_energy_products_-_recent_developments#Member_States.27_trade_in_petroleum_oils_and_natural_gas.

- Export of Norwegian gas and oil 2021*. Norwegian Petroleum. Accessed 10 June 2022. <https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/production-and-exports/exports-of-oil-and-gas/>.
- Fit for 55*. Rada Unii Europejskiej. Accessed 17 June 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/policies/green-deal/fit-for-55-the-eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/>.
- Gazowe Połączenia Międzysystemowe Polska-Słowacja*. Gaz-System S.A. Accessed 2 July 2022. <https://www.gaz-system.pl/dam/jcr:f8f093d0-6a46-4465-b40f-0322738f9e68/160808-os-pl-sk-project-description.pdf>.
- Gaz ziemny, zasoby i wydobywcy*. Państwowy Instytut Geologiczny-Państwowy Instytut Badawczy. Accessed 25 June 2022. http://geoportal.pgi.gov.pl/surowce/energetyczne/gaz_ziemny/2020.
- Gaz z Litwy płynie do Polski*. Parkiet.com. Accessed 2 July 2022. <https://www.parkiet.com/surowce-i-paliwa/art36218571-gaz-z-litwy-plynie-do-polski>.
- Jakóbik, Wojciech. *Gaz z Południa dla Polski*. Biznes Alert. Accessed 30 May 2022. <https://biznesalert.pl/jakobik-gaz-z-poludnia-dla-polski-analiza/>.
- Jaller-Makarewicz, Ana M., and Arjun Flora. *Gas in Spain: Oversupplied and Overcompensated. High Premium Paid by Customers for Security and Diversity of Supply*. Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, September 2021. Accessed 17 June 2022. http://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Gas-in-Spain-Oversupplied-and-Overcompensated_September-2021.pdf.
- Juszczak, Adam, and Magdalena Maj. *Rozwój i potencjał energetyki odnawialnej w Polsce*. Warszawa: Polski Instytut Ekonomiczny, grudzień 2020. Accessed 3 July 2022. https://pie.net.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/PIE-Raport_OZE.pdf.
- Każmierczak, Tomasz. *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne – uzależnienie Polski od importu gazu ziemnego*. Warszawa: Promotor, 2008.
- Komunikat Komisji do Parlamentu Europejskiego, Rady Europejskiej, Rady, Komitetu Ekonomiczno-Społecznego i Komitetu Regionów, Europejski Zielony Ład*. EUR-Lex. Bruksela: Komisja Europejska, 11/12/2019. Accessed 4 June 2022. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2019%3A640%3AFIN>.
- Komunikat Komisji do Parlamentu Europejskiego, Rady Europejskiej, Rady, Europejskiego Komitetu Ekonomiczno-Społecznego i Komitetu Regionów. REPowerEU: Wspólne europejskie działania w kierunku bezpiecznej i zrównoważonej energii po przystępnej cenie.* EUR-Lex. Strasburg: Komisja Europejska, 8/03/2022. Accessed 7 June 2022. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0108>.
- Krajowy dziesięcioletni plan rozwoju systemu przesyłowego. Plan rozwoju w zakresie zaspokojenia obecnego i przyszłego zapotrzebowania na paliwa gazowe na lata 2022–2031*. Warszawa: Gaz-System S.A., kwiecień 2021. Accessed 5 June 2022. https://www.gaz-system.pl/fileadmin/centrum_prasowe/Aktualnosci/20210413_KDPR_2022_2031_wyciag_do_kosultacji.pdf.

- Krajowy plan na rzecz energii i klimatu na lata 2021–2030*. Warszawa: Ministerstwo Klimatu i Środowiska, 2019. Załącznik 2. Accessed 24 June 2022. <https://www.gov.pl/web/klimat/krajowy-plan-na-rzecz-energii-i-klimatu>.
- Krajowy Plan Zarządzania Kryzysowego, Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa*. Warszawa: Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa, n.d. Accessed 3 June 2022. <https://www.gov.pl/web/rcb/krajowy-plan-zaradzania-kryzysowego>.
- Kruyt, Bert, Detlef P. van Vuuren, Hage J.M. de Vries, and Heleen Groenenberg. “Indicators for energy security.” *Energy Policy* 37(2009), 6: 2166–72. Accessed 26 May 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.02.006>.
- Książopolski, Krzysztof M. *Ekonomiczne zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa państw. Metody i środki przeciwdziałania*. Warszawa: Elipsa, 2007.
- Lipiński, Kamil, Magdalena Maj, and Maciej Miniszewski. *Unia Europejska niezależna od Rosji? Alternatywne źródła dostaw surowców energetycznych*. Warszawa: Polski Instytut Ekonomiczny, 2022.
- Löschel, Andreas, Ulf Moslener, and Dirk Riibelke. “Indicators of energy security in industrialised countries.” *Energy Policy* 38 (2010), 4: 1665–69. Accessed 27 May 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.03.061>.
- Malinowski, Dariusz. *Wraca idea gazowego łącznika ze Skandynawią*. WNP. PL, Portal Gospodarczy. Accessed 4 June 2022. <https://www.wnp.pl/artykuly/wraca-idea-gazowego-lacznika-ze-skandynawia,270204.html>.
- Mazurek, Sławomir, and Marcin Tymiński. “Węgiel brunatny.” Państwowy Instytut Geologiczny – Państwowy Instytut Badawczy. Accessed 21 June 2022. http://geoportal.pgi.gov.pl/surowce/energetyczne/wegiel_brunatny.
- Nyga-Łukaszewska, Honorata. “Czy bezpieczeństwo energetyczne oznacza konkurencyjność w skali międzynarodowej?” *International Business and Global Economy* 35 (2016), 1: 390–401. <https://doi.org/10.4467/23539496IB.16.028.5609>.
- Olsztyńska, Ilona. “Biomass in the fuel mix of the Polish energy and heating sector.” *Polityka Energetyczna – Energy Policy Journal* 22(2019), 3: 7–9. <https://doi.org/10.33223/epj/111916>.
- Paszkowski, Michał. “Gazociąg Baltic Pipe w koncepcjach zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa energetycznego Polski w myśli politycznej Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej oraz Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego.” *Studia i analizy nauk o polityce* 1 (2022): 49–61. <https://doi.org/10.31743/sanp.13556>.
- Pekic, Sanja. *Rystad: European LNG supply crisis expected in winter 2022*. Offshore Energy. Accessed 27 June 2022. <https://www.offshore-energy.biz/rystad-european-lng-supply-crisis-expected-in-winter-2022/>.
- Petersson, Anneli. “Biogas cleaning.” In: *The Biogas Handbook: Science, Production and Applications*, edited by Arthur Wellinger, 329–34. Cambridge: Woodhead Pub, 2013. <https://doi.org/10.1533/9780857097415.3.329>.

- Piekarski, Michał. "Bezpieczeństwo dostaw surowców energetycznych do Polski drogą morską." *Wschodnioznawstwo* 14 (2020): 177–197. DOI:10.4467/20827695W SC.20.010.13338.
- Podraza, Andrzej. "Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Polski w kontekście neoimperialnej polityki Rosji oraz współpracy europejskiej i transatlantyckiej: Polska jako hub gazowy." *Sprawy Międzynarodowe* 73 (2020), 1: 135–61. <https://doi.org/10.35757/SM.2020.73.1.10>.
- Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2030 r. Dokument przyjęty przez Radę Ministrów w dniu 10 listopada 2009 r. Warszawa: Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 2009.
- Południowy korytarz osiągnie przepustowość w przyszłym oku.*" *Energetyka24*. Accessed 23 May 2022. <https://energetyka24.com/gaz/poludniowy-korytarz-gazowy-osiagnie-pelna-przepustowosc-w-przyszlym-r>.
- Prognozy operacyjne i finansowe*. PGNiG. Accessed 24 June 2022. <https://pgnig.pl/relacje-inwestorskie/informacje-gieldowe/prognozy-finansowe>.
- Przymuszewski, Adam. "Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne – dywersyfikacja źródeł i dróg dostaw gazu ziemnego i ropy naftowej do Europy." In: *Ochrona środowiska jako kluczowy problem Polski XXI wieku*, edited by Jacek Cheda, 39–46. Warszawa: Fundacja Lus Medicina, 2012.
- Renewable energy statistics*. Eurostat Statistics Explained. Accessed 28 June 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Renewable_energy_statistics.
- Rogała, Barbara. *Nie tylko Rosja – gdzie w Europie są złoża gazu ziemnego*. 300Gospodarka. Accessed 31 June 2022, <https://300gospodarka.pl/analizy/nie-tylko-rosja-gdzie-w-europie-sa-zloza-gazu-ziemnego>.
- Rozporządzenie Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) Nr 2017/1938 z 25 października 2017 r., dot. środków zapewniających bezpieczeństwo dostaw gazu ziemnego i uchylające rozporządzenie (UE) Nr 994/2010. Dz.U.UE.L.2017.280.1. [Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010]. Warszawa: Minister Energii, 2019.
- Ruszel, Mariusz. "Ocena bezpieczeństwa dostaw gazu ziemnego do Polski – stan obecny i perspektywa do 2025 r." *Polityka Energetyczna – Energy Policy Journal* 20 (2017), 1: 5–22. <https://epj.min-pan.krakow.pl/pdf-96155-28931?filename=Evaluation%20of%20the.pdf>.
- Skłodowska, Magdalena. *Biometanownia w każdej gminie?* Portal Wysokie Napięcie. Accessed 14 May 2022. <https://wysokienapiecie.pl/31337-biometanownia-w-kazdej-gminie/>.

- Skrzyński, Tomasz. "Zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa energetycznego Polski odnośnie gazu ziemnego według projektu Polityki energetycznej Polski do 2040 Roku." *Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis, Studia de Securitate* 9 (2019), 3: 31–36. DOI 10.24917/26578549.9.3.3.
- Spotkanie w sprawie dostaw norweskiego gazu do Polski. PGNIG S.A. Accessed 5 June 2022. <https://pgnig.pl/aktualnosci/-/news-list/id/spotkanie-w-sprawie-dostaw-norweskiego-gazu-do-polski/newsGroupId/10184>.
- Sprawozdanie MKiŚ z wyników monitorowania bezpieczeństwa dostaw paliw gazowych za okres od dnia 1 stycznia 2020 r. do dnia 31 grudnia 2020 r. Warszawa: Ministerstwo Klimatu i Środowiska, czerwiec 2021. Accessed 4 June 2022. <https://bip.mos.gov.pl/energetyka/sprawozdania-z-wynikow-monitorowania-bezpieczenstwa-dostaw-paliw-gazowych/>.
- Sprawozdania z działalności Prezesa URE za lata 2012–2020. Warszawa: Urząd Regulacji Energetyki, 2012–2020. Accessed 15 June 2022. <https://www.ure.gov.pl/pl/urząd/informacje-ogolne/edukacja-i-komunikacja/publikacje/sprawozdania-z-dzialaln/2916,Sprawozdania-z-dzialalnosci-Prezesa-URE.html>.
- Tomaszewski, Krzysztof. "Wpływ inwestycji infrastrukturalnych w sektorze gazowym na bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej." *Środkoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne* 3 (2017): 73–96. Accessed 26 May 2022. DOI 10.14746/ssp.2017.3.4.
- Tymiński, Marcin. *Eksport i import surowców mineralnych*. Państwowy Instytut Geologiczny – Państwowy Instytut Badawczy. Accessed 18 June 2022. http://geoportal.pgi.gov.pl/surowce/export_import.
- Umowa między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Królestwem Danii w sprawie projektu Baltic Pipe, podpisana w Katowicach dnia 11 grudnia 2018 r., Dz.U.2019.1263. Accessed 5 June 2022. <https://sip.lex.pl/akty-prawne/dzu-dziennik-ustaw/dania-polska-umowa-w-sprawie-projektu-baltic-pipe-katowice-2018-12-11-18872716>.
- Ustawa z dnia 10 kwietnia 1997 r. Prawo energetyczne. Dz.U. Nr 54 z 2019 r. poz. 348 z późn. zm. [Act of 10 April 1997 Energy Law. Official Journal of Laws No. 54 of 2019, item 348 with later changes].
- Ustawa z dnia 16 Lutego 2007 r. o zapasach ropy naftowej, produktów naftowych i gazu ziemnego oraz zasadach postępowania w sytuacjach zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa paliwowego państwa i zakłóceniach na rynku naftowym. Dz.U. 2007, nr 52, poz. 343 z późn. zm. [Act of 16 Februar 2007 on stock of crude oil, petroleum products and gas and rules of conduct in situations of threat to the fuel security of the state and disturbances on the oil market. Official Journal of Laws No. 52, item 343 with later changes].
- Voytyuk, Oksana. "The Baltic Pipe and its impact on energy security in Central and Eastern Europe." *Polityka Energetyczna – Energy Policy Journal* 25 (2022), 1: 89–108. DOI: 10.33223/epj/145554.

- Węgle kamienne – zasoby w Polsce we stanu na 31.12.2019.* Państwowy Instytut Geologiczny – Państwowy Instytut Badawczy. Accessed 28 June 2022. http://geoportal.pgi.gov.pl/css/surowce/images/2019/tabele/wegle_kamienne_zasoby.pdf.
- Wnioski z analiz prognostycznych dla sektora energetycznego Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2040 r.* Warszawa: Ministerstwo Klimatu i Środowiska, 2020. Portal Gov.pl. Accessed 3 June 2022. https://bip.mos.gov.pl/fileadmin/user_upload/bip/strategie_plany_programy/Polityka_energetyczna_Polski/zal._2_do_PEP2040_-_Wnioski_z_analiz_prognostycznych_2021-02-02.pdf.
- Woźniak, Ewa. “Stan biogazowni w Polsce.” *Czysta Energia* 1 (2017): 54–55. Accessed 14 May 2022. <https://www.portalkomunalny.pl/plus/artykul/stan-biogazowni-w-polsce/>.
- Wójcik, Teresa. *RAPORT: Czy światu zabraknie LNG?* BiznesAlert.pl. Accessed 2 June 2022. <https://biznesalert.pl/raport-czy-swiatu-zabraknie-lng/>.
- Yergin, Daniel. “Energy Security in the 1990s.” *Foreign Affairs* 67 (1988), 1: 6–9. accessed 30 June 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1988-09-01/energy-security-1990s> <https://doi.org/10.2307/20043677>.
- Założenia do aktualizacji PEP2040-wzmocnienie bezpieczeństwa i niezależności energetycznej.* Warszawa: Ministerstwo Klimatu i Środowiska, marzec 2022. Portal Gov.pl. Accessed 11 June 2022. <https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/zalozenia-do-aktualizacji-polityki-energetycznej-polski-do-2040-r-pep2040--wzmocnienie-bezpieczenstwa-i-niezaleznosci-energetycznej>.

English version: Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

Ensuring energy security is a complex process influenced by many factors. Decisions taken in this area are mostly of a strategic and political nature and cause serious consequences for the entire economy and society. Countries that want to take advantage of the achievements of civilisation, in the absence of their own adequately efficient energy fuel resources, are forced to import them. On the example of Poland, the following have been identified: the causes and level of dependence of the economy on natural gas, threats to the availability of this raw material and formal restrictions on its use as well as its substitutes and energy alternatives. The approach applied in the article is the rational approach to the energy policy issues, and factor analysis including system analysis were used. The authors verified whether the diversified supply of natural gas by sea and the use of biogas can ensure strategic security of supply with this raw material to Poland. The conclusions resulting from the considerations indicate that having the infrastructure necessary for the diversification of gas supplies is no longer sufficient to ensure Poland's gas security. In 2022, the objective deviation of natural gas on the international market also became a critical factor in this regard.

Dostawy gazu drogą morską i biogaz jako elementy zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa energetycznego na przykładzie Polski

Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo energetyczne, dywersyfikacja dostaw gazu, LNG, biogaz

STRESZCZENIE

Zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa energetycznego jest procesem złożonym, na który wpływa wiele czynników. Decyzje zapadające w tej sferze mają przeważnie charakter strategiczny oraz polityczny i rodzą poważne następstwa dla całej gospodarki i społeczeństwa. Kraje chcące korzystać ze zdobyczy cywilizacyjnych, przy braku własnych odpowiednio wydajnych zasobów paliw energetycznych, zmuszone są do ich importu. Na przykładzie Polski dokonano identyfikacji: przyczyn i poziomu uzależnienia gospodarki od gazu ziemnego, zagrożeń dostępności tego surowca i formalnych ograniczeń w zakresie jego wykorzystywania oraz jego substytutów i alternatyw energetycznych. W artykule zastosowano racjonalne podejście do problematyki polityki energetycznej, a także wykorzystano metodę analizy czynnikowej, w tym również systemowej. Autorzy dokonali weryfikacji, czy zdywersyfikowane dostawy gazu ziemnego drogą morską oraz wykorzystanie biogazu może zapewnić Polsce strategiczne bezpieczeństwo zaopatrzenia w ten surowiec. Konkluzje wynikające z podjętych rozważań wskazują, że posiadanie infrastruktury koniecznej dla dywersyfikacji dostaw gazu nie jest już wystarczające dla zapewnienia zabezpieczenia gazowego Polski. Krytycznym czynnikiem w tym zakresie stała się w 2022 r. również obiektywna dostępność gazu ziemnego na rynku międzynarodowym.

Citation

Buko, Jacek, Norek, Tomasz, Windekilde, Iwona. "Gas Supplies by Sea and Biogas as Elements of Ensuring Energy Security: the Example of Poland." *Studia Maritima* 35 (2022): 245–270. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2022.35-09.



Recenzje/Reviews

Karol Łopatecki

Faculty of History and International Relations

University of Białystok

k.lopatecki@uwb.edu.pl

ORCID: 0000-0002-7921-9421

The Results of the Dynastic War in Sweden (1597–1660): Swedish and Finnish Refugees^{1,2}

Keywords: Sweden in the 1st half of the 17th century, Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, Finns, Swedes, refugees in the early modern period, spatial mobility, estates in the Kingdom of Sweden, Sigismund III, Charles of Södermanland

Wojciech Krawczuk is a historian specialising in the history of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Polish royal chancellery, as well as an outstanding editor and translator of historical sources. The reviewed book presents the problem of refugees in the early modern era. Currently, the issue is one of the main problems of the present-day world. The author poses a question about an analogous phenomenon, but in the historical perspective of the 17th century.³ In the history of the Commonwealth its inhabitants had to seek refuge in other countries many times. Reverse situations occurred just as often, when the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania hosted various types of groups of people, who can be classified as refugees. The

1 This paper was written as part of a research project funded by the National Science Centre, Poland, OPUS-16 (contract no. UMO-2018/31/B/HS3/00846), entitled “Social and economic importance of military camps and garrisons in the Polish–Lithuanian state (16th–18th cc.).”

2 Wojciech Krawczuk, *Wierni królowi. Szwedzi i Finowie na uchodźstwie w Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów, w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku* (Kraków: Historia Jagellonica, 2019), 1–292.

3 An interesting link between these two perspectives is the fact that UN General Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld’s (1953–1961) ancestor was Per Mikaelsson, who left the country with Sigismund III. Eventually, however, he returned to Sweden and was ennobled in 1610.

Commonwealth became a home for Tatars,⁴ Jews,⁵ Armenians,⁶ Scots,⁷ but also fleeing residents of the Tsardom of Muscovy,⁸ or the Kingdom of Sweden. The latter issue is the subject of Wojciech Krawczuk's new monograph.

The circumstances of the refugees living in the Commonwealth were truly dramatic. The death of Stephen Báthory (1576–1586) was followed by a stormy election of the next ruler. Archduke Maximilian Habsburg (supported by the magnates) and Sigismund III, the son of John III of Sweden, were elected simultaneously. The latter candidate was far more popular since the House of Vasa had blood bonds with the ancient dynasty of the Jagiellons. Sigismund August's sister, Catherine Jagiellon, was Sigismund's mother; moreover, he was brought up in the Catholic tradition.⁹ Finally, the Battle of Byczyna (24 January 1588), which Vasa's supporters won, decided on the fate of the throne.¹⁰

After the death of John III Vasa on 27 November 1592, the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Kingdom of Sweden found themselves in a personal union. The solemn coronation took place in the cathedral of Uppsala on 1 March 1594. Soon afterwards, without solving the fundamental problems of the kingdom, Sigismund had to return to the Commonwealth. His attempt at playing political forces between the regent, Charles of Södermanland, and the Council of the Kingdom ended in a fiasco. Against the king and the council, Sigismund's uncle decided to summon a convention of the estates in the town of Arboga. Afterwards, using the support of free peasants, despite the king's objection, he summoned the Riksdag (parliament) in Uppsala. This triggered Sigismund's reaction, who headed for Sweden in July 1598 trying to regain control over the kingdom. As soon as August, Samuel Łaski captured Stockholm on behalf of the king. However, a terribly passive attitude resulted in the failure of the undertaking. The Battle of Stångebro of 4 October 1598 was of key importance; it brought the king great humiliation: he had to give away to the regent his closest collaborators (who were shortly executed). The dynastic dispute transformed into a state conflict

4 Jan Tyszkiewicz, *Tatarzy na Litwie i w Polsce: Studia z dziejów XIII–XVIII w.* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1989).

5 Daniel Tollet, *Historia Żydów w Polsce od XVI wieku do rozbiorów*, trans. Dorota Zamojska (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1999).

6 Krzysztof Stopka, *Ormianie w Polsce dawnej i dzisiejszej* (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2000).

7 David Worthington, "« Unfinished work and damaged materials»: historians and the Scots in the Commonwealth of Poland–Lithuania (1569–1795)," *Immigrants & Minorities* 34 (2016), 3: 276–296.

8 Aliaksandr Kazakou, "Muscovites among the Courtiers of the Lithuanian Grand Duke Sigismund the Old. Evidence from the Census of 1509," in: *The Fifth International Congress of Belarusian Studies. Working Papers*, vol. 5 (Kaunas: Vytautas Magnus University Press, 2016), 63–66.

9 See: Przemysław Szpaczyński, *Mocarstwowe dążenia Zygmunta III w latach 1587–1618* (Kraków: Universitas, 2013), 54–78.

10 Marek Plewczyński, "Bitwa pod Byczyną 24 I 1588," *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości* 17 (1971), 1: 125–170.

along with the incorporation of Estonia into the Commonwealth in 1600, which consequently resulted in the Rigsdag depriving Sigismund of his rights to the throne.

After the dramatic events of 1598, Sigismund III Vasa still controlled some supportive provinces being part of the Kingdom of Sweden. It was primarily the Duchy of Finland, but also Estonia and the fortress Kalmar. The governor of Finland was Klas Eriksson Fleming, who supported the king. However, until 1595 a war was waged on this territory with the Tsardom of Muscovy. Overwhelmed with duties, the peasants raised a rebellion called “the Cudgel War” (Finnish: *Nuijasota*), which lasted from November 1596 to February 1597. It was obviously inspired by Charles of Södermanland, since the civil war in Finland weakened the supporters of the Polish–Lithuanian king. It ended with the slaughter of the desperate peasants, which led to Sigismund III being portrayed as a bloody ruler in the Finnish and Swedish historiography. In 1597, Governor Klas died, and was replaced by Arvid Stalarm, less dynamic in action. Swedish attacks broke the duchy on 29 August 1599 in the Battle of Sankt Martens. Meanwhile, on 12 May 1599, the key powerful fortress of Kalmar collapsed. The increasingly hesitant Estonia stayed with Sigismund.

The aforementioned events described in the book (pp. 17–23) constitute an introduction to further considerations referring to the refugees from the Kingdom of Sweden. The book under review consists of the introduction, five chapters, conclusions, and a very extensive source appendix, comprising over a third of the book (pp. 147–243).¹¹ Chapter I (pp. 37–46) presents the sources written in the years 1600, 1609, 1617 and 1620, which mentioned refugees from the Kingdom of Sweden.

Chapter II (pp. 47–88) presents the operational strategy and the structure of the group. It describes in detail the independent Swedish court functioning in the Commonwealth existing beside the Polish and Lithuanian court. The author describes the plans for regaining the Swedish throne by building a fleet, conducting land operations in Livonia, and finally the role of the refugees in propaganda, diplomatic and spying activities. Interestingly, a subchapter elaborates on women in the group under analysis, with particular emphasis on Anna Vasa, Sigismund III’s sister, who also migrated from Sweden. As a Swedish princess, she had an independent and very strong position, second to the king (she was an ardent Lutheran). She took particular care of the Swedish women; she cared for their education, financial needs and helped them get married. Wojciech Krawczuk also noted the fact that the women of the refugees often stayed in Sweden, trying to protect the real estate as well as the movable property from confiscation.

¹¹ The six appendices concern a list of: persons summoned at the Riksdag in Linköping to return to their homeland (Sweden); Swedes serving in the Polish–Lithuanian army in 1600; Swedes and Finns exiled or sentenced to death between 1597 and 1616; Swedish refugees from the years 1609 and 1620; and the approval of rights for Swedes living in the Republic issued by Władysław IV in 1636.

The author also notices the religious problem among the Swedes and the Finns living in the Commonwealth (chapter 3: pp. 89–98). Those of them who did not live in Royal Prussia changed their confession to Roman–Catholic. Besides, an important group of the refugees were Catholics, who existed in Sweden peacefully in the tolerant days of John III Vasa. Reaching the Commonwealth without a livelihood, a big group of them decided to join a seminary. Some of them even gained prominent positions of canons. The climax of ecclesiastical careers of five people was a place in the Ermland Chapter.¹² The situation was similar for women, who found shelter and basic subsistence in convents, and nuns from the Swedish Vadstene settled in the convent of the Bridgettines in Gdańsk. The complexity of the situation is evidenced by the fact that even until 1613 over a dozen Swedish families sent their children to the Jesuit school in Braniewo. This hardly ever happened after that date.

The author also focuses on the financial (and not only financial) aid extended to the refugees by the Vasas (chapter 4: pp. 99–118). Sigismund III and his sons, Ladislaus IV and John II Casimir felt attached to the group and willingly used the refugees for diplomatic, military or office work. A great number of immigrants could count on salaries from tariff revenues from the ports in Gdańsk and Elbląg. They were also bestowed with small land properties. The royal agent residing in Gdańsk, Szymon Bahr, played a particular role; he was in fact the most important official with executive power in the residual administration of the Swedish state operating on the territory of the Commonwealth.¹³ A systemic plan of aid was not developed until 1636, but, as demonstrated, permanent financial aid addressed to individuals had been provided since 1608.

Finally, the last chapter (pp. 119–130) is devoted to the further fate of this group. A thesis was formulated that most refugees returned to their homeland after many years. The returns intensified after Charles IX of Södermanland's death and assumption of the throne by Gustav II Adolf (1611–1632). A small group of those most loyal stayed in the Commonwealth and were assimilated; some were even granted an indigene (i.e. they were recognised as Polish–Lithuanian nobles). The last important

12 The Ermland Chapter was a collegiate institution attached to the Bishop of Warmia and was located in Frombork. At that time, it exercised secular power over the third part of Warmia. Andrzej Kopiczko, "Warmińska kapituła katedralna. Zarys dziejów," *Studia Elbląskie* 19 (2018): 11–27.

13 The only office operating after Sigismund III escaped from Sweden was the royal chancellery. Between 1598 and 1600, this administration administered the areas still loyal to the king (Finland, Estonia, Kalmar), but the military successes of Charles IX of Suderman, led to Sigismund III ruling only over a group of refugees and taking diplomatic action. See: Wojciech Krawczuk, ed., *Protokół i regesty kancelarii szwedzkiej ekspedycji niemieckiej króla Zygmunta III z lat 1597–1600. Riksregistraturet vol. 87 Riksarkivet w Sztokholmie* (Kraków: Historia Jagellonica. Towarzystwo Wydawnicze, 2020).

representative of the Swedish diaspora in Poland was Sigismud Gyllenstierna (1598–1666), who even became a Gdańsk castellan in 1656.¹⁴

The book depicts a not very numerous, but surprisingly influential, group of inhabitants of Scandinavia, who found their temporary or permanent home in the Commonwealth. It is one of the best works analysing prosopographic groups, constituting a collective biography of a certain community. The success of the monograph results from perfectly-conducted research, reliable source criticism, and undoubtedly an inspiring research problem. Moreover, the author uses the studies of Polish, Swedish and Finnish historians, combining them in a coherent whole.

The author decided to present in the book not only the population migrating from Sweden and Finland, but also their descendants (primarily the second generation). I greatly appreciate the clear distinction of the people of Finnish origin, who were more attached to Sigismund III Vasa as the king of a Scandinavian country. Chronologically, the issue was reduced to the first half of the 17th century. This is due to the fact that Jerzy Michałowicz dealt with an earlier period (his research concerned the years 1587–1600).¹⁵ First and foremost, however, from 1600 onwards the Commonwealth was in a long-lasting military conflict with Sweden. The inhabitants of Sweden had to make a choice in the new reality, to remain faithful to the king or to their fatherland. Being loyal to Sigismund Vasa meant the need to leave their country and head south. The closing date is the “Swedish Deluge,” or the war against Sweden of 1655–1660. The Peace of Oliva (1660) puts a definite end to the Vasa dynasty’s policy seeking to regain the Swedish throne.

Unfortunately, the book lacks quantitative analyses. I wish the author had calculated the number of the refugees staying in Europe and demonstrated the process of return in quantitative terms. In addition, there is a certain inconsistency in this matter. In one place it is noted that at the end of the 16th century, ca 500 people fled from Sweden (primarily men), out of whom ca 100 persons left ten years later. In the Conclusion the author mentions 383 people as the initial number of the refugees (pp. 37–38, 131).

I complete this fundamental question for the years of Sigismund III’s reign (the king died in 1632). For this purpose I use a propaganda work against Charles IX of Södermanland titled *Slaktarebenck*.¹⁶ The aim of the book was such that its authors showed a huge number of refugees faithful to their legitimate king. Therefore, the text also includes representatives of lower classes, as well as figures who stayed outside the

14 For more about the further fate of this family, which unfortunately was not presented in the book – Stanisław Achremczyk, “Spory i konflikty szlachty malborskiej w drugiej połowie XVII wieku,” *Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie* 4 (2010): 418–421.

15 Jerzy Michalewicz, “Dwór szwedzki Zygmunta III w latach 1587–1600,” *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* 11 (1986): 161–180.

16 Wojciech Krawczuk, ed., *Slaktarebenck czyli Krwawe jatki księcia Karola Sudermańskiego* (Kraków: Historia Jagellonica, 2017).

Kingdom of Sweden for even a short time. These drawbacks are simultaneously an advantage of the source, primarily because people of lower strata are also included. The nobility was probably still overrepresented, but there are plenty of different data, and the proportions in the status of the refugees can be assessed.

I have collated a database of 385 people on the basis of source appendices and biographies compiled by Wojciech Krawczuk (the reviewed book mentions 383 people). Jointly there were 115 knights (including 24 aristocrats and members of the Royal Council); the highly-qualified staff consisted of 93 people, and representatives of lower classes (burghers, peasants and soldiers) made a group of as many as 177 people. However, they do not make the entire community. It should be borne in mind that reiters served with two or even three horses, so apart from 84 reiters mentioned in the source at least the same number of servants should be added. Moreover, the full number of military men is not presented, which we know on the basis of the list of reiters serving for Sigismund III from 1600.¹⁷ Hence, every fourth soldier failed to be mentioned in the analysed source. Additionally, on the basis of two more registers of refugees prepared in 1609 and 1620, out of 162 people recorded, 37 cannot be identified with the list placed in *Slaktarebenck*, which constitutes 22.8% (it concerns both the nobility and the lower strata). Thus, I believe that the estimation for all the groups (apart from the aristocracy, for whom there are precise scientific findings) should be adjusted upwards by 23%, and the group of soldiers by 25%.

According to this methodology, there are 576 people, and 18 students of the Jesuit College in Braniewo not mentioned in other lists should be added to this number. Having subtracted the people who were arrested by Charles of Södermanland in the years 1598–1599, and then executed, we obtain 583 people really staying outside the borders of the Kingdom of Sweden (at least briefly) in the years 1599–1632. Few of them lived in Denmark and the German Reich. Therefore, it is important to state that at the beginning of the 17th century about five hundred adult men found refuge on the territory of the Commonwealth.

17 See: Appendix 2 (pp. 159–165), where in 29 reiters serving in Livonia in 1600, 22 (75.8%) are recorded in *Slaktarebenck*.




Figure 1. Proportions of refugees from the Kingdom of Sweden in the years 1599–1632

Source: on the basis of Wojciech Krawczuk, ed., *Slaktarebenck czyli Krwawe jatki księcia Karola Sudermańskiego* (Kraków: Historia Iagellonica, 2017), 91–124; Wojciech Krawczuk, *Wierni królowi. Szwedzi i Finowie na uchodźstwie w Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów, w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku* (Kraków: Historia Iagellonica, 2019), 92–96, 159–240.

The aforementioned numbers are obviously only a rough estimate. Women (children, at least partly as adults, appeared in the subsequent lists of the refugees of 1609 and 1620) who left their country as nuns and wives should be added to them.¹⁸ Thus, probably at the turn of the 17th century at least 700 people left, including 126 male nobles (although 10 people were captured and killed immediately after the rebellion in the years 1598–1599). In conclusion, the group was much larger than assessed by the author of the reviewed publication (p. 131).

Above, Figure 1 represents the participation of social and professional groups in the process of seeking refuge. The data, however, may be misleading. A few military commanders, officials, or even reiters might not have been noblemen. The term “nobility” should be understood as covering the people who possessed real estates and were not classified into other professional groups. This results from the imperfectness of the source and the lack of sufficient biographical studies referring to those who were not so socially prominent. The material gathered by Wojciech Krawczuk allows us to enlarge the noble group by 8–10 persons who were included in the other groups; thus, these

¹⁸ Determining its number is impossible, but we know that women were quite numerous among the refugees. Estimating them as 20% seems a minimum percentage if we take into account, that the Bridgettine nuns from Vadstene had to go into exile.

would not be important changes. A conclusion can be drawn that the privileged group constituted merely a quarter of the refugees. What is worth noting is the emphasis on the number of soldiers (45% and including the commanding staff it makes even 50%), which results from their considerable mobility. Interestingly, the vast majority of them were Lutherans.

In the context of a community of ca a million people in the Kingdom of Sweden, the aforementioned numbers are of no significance. However, taking into account the fact that in the whole country, the nobility consisted of ca 500–600 adult men, the loss of 130 people was a huge shock (20–25%).¹⁹ To understand it, it is worth noting that October 1601 saw the death of the last active member of the Royal Council, Nils Gyllerstierna. Duke Charles had to recover the loss in the following year in order to restore the proper operation of the administration and diplomacy. For this purpose he appointed a new council of 15 people.²⁰ Moreover, the scale of the return is not entirely convincing. Indeed, the sources from 1609 and 1620 are modest in terms of estimating the number of people within the group, yet it embraced prominent people. Moreover, the process of assimilation, translocation and natural mortality could be observed. Out of 108 reasonably complete biographies of the Swedish nobility, 96 people have been isolated, about whom we know whether they stayed abroad or returned to their homeland. The biographies show that merely 38% returned of their own free will to their homeland (cf. Figure 2). This is to emphasise that the return of the other social groups made much less sense due to the considerably smaller property left, which made people ask for forgiveness.

The data presented by the author in the appendices make it possible to conduct considerably more complicated quantitative studies referring to spatial mobility, life expectancy and religious relationships in the group, and, most importantly, to carry out an assessment of the returns to Sweden, as well as the scale of later migrations after 1600. The work provides excellent material for future studies.

19 Jan Samuelson, *Aristokrat eller förädlad bonde?: det svenska frälsets ekonomi, politik och sociala förbindelser under tiden 1523–1611* (Lund: Lund Univ Press, 1993), 47.

20 Marko Hakanen and Ulla Koskinen, “The Gentle Art of Counselling Monarchs (1560–1655),” in: *Personal Agency at the Swedish Age of Greatness 1560–1720*, eds., Petri Karonen and Marko Hakanen (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2017), 58.




Figure 2. Proportions of refugees from the Kingdom of Sweden in the years 1600–1620

Source: on the basis of Wojciech Krawczuk, ed., *Slaktarebenck czyli Krwawe jatki księcia Karola Sudermańskiego* (Kraków: Historia Iagellonica, 2017), 91–124; Wojciech Krawczuk, *Wierni królowi. Szwedzi i Finowie na uchodźstwie w Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów, w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku* (Kraków: Historia Iagellonica, 2019), 159–240.

For example, this group can be shown through the lens of time (see Figure 3). The target group is the Swedish nobility, whose fate I traced in 108 cases. The inaccurate biographies of 21 individuals are an issue, as the date of their death is unknown. Therefore, between 1609 and 1610 in particular, a sharp decline can be seen. This is due to the fact that in 1609 there was a detailed census of refugees and for some people this is the last presence evidenced in the sources. Probably this decline included in the graph was not so steep, but the target point after 3–4 years should coincide with the obtained data (therefore graph 3 shows the 3-year moving average). In my opinion this graph can be interpreted with some caution as trends in other social groups that moved to the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the Kingdom of Sweden.

The graph shows that this group was the most numerous in 1598–1608, with a peak in 1600 and 1603. Afterwards, a steady erosion of this group was noticeable – newcomers were unable to replace those returning from or leaving for other countries. The returns to the homeland after Gustav II Adolf's accession to the throne could certainly be observed, and natural mortality was partly responsible. Before Ladislaus IV Vasa began his reign (the coronation took place on 6 February 1633), there was a symbolic number of six people of noble origin in these lands. Of course, it is impossible to estimate the number of Swedish–Finnish refugees in the second and third generations.




Figure 3. Number of refugees from Sweden and Finland in the Commonwealth

Source: The author's own study based on 108 biographies of the nobility (dark grey line) and 14 additional biographies of persons of non-noble origin (light grey line). 3-year moving average (black line).

Except for the reservations, the book is a must-read for all those interested in the domination on the Baltic Sea in the 17th century, where the competitors were the Tsardom of Russia, the Kingdom of Sweden and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It is also an important voice in the debate on migrations in the early modern era.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Achremczyk, Stanisław. "Spory i konflikty szlachty malborskiej w drugiej połowie XVII wieku." *Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie* 4 (2010): 417-434.
- Hakanen, Marko, and Koskinen Ulla, "The Gentle Art of Counselling Monarchs (1560-1655)." In: Petri Karonen, and Marko Hakanen, eds. *Personal Agency at the Swedish Age of Greatness 1560-1720*, 47-82. Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society.
- Kazakou, Aliaksandr. "Muscovites among the Courtiers of the Lithuanian Grand Duke Sigismund the Old. Evidence from the Census of 1509." In: *The Fifth International Congress of Belarusian Studies. Working Papers*, 63-66. Vol. 5. Kaunas: Vytautas Magnus University Press, 2016.
- Kopiczko, Andrzej. "Warmińska kapituła katedralna. Zarys dziejów." *Studia Elbląskie* 19 (2018): 11-27.

- Krawczuk, Wojciech, ed. *Slaktarebenck czyli Krwawe jatki księcia Karola Sudermańskiego*. Kraków: Historia Iagellonica, 2017.
- Krawczuk, Wojciech. *Wierni królowi. Szwedzi i Finowie na uchodźstwie w Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów, w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku*. Kraków: Historia Iagellonica, 2019.
- Krawczuk, Wojciech, ed. *Protokół i regesty kancelarii szwedzkiej ekspedycji niemieckiej króla Zygmunta III z lat 1597–1600. Riksregistraturet vol. 87 Riksarkivet w Sztokholmie*. Kraków: Historia Iagellonica, 2020.
- Michalewicz, Jerzy. “Dwór szwedzki Zygmunta III w latach 1587–1600.” *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* 11 (1986): 161–180.
- Plewczyński, Marek. “Bitwa pod Byczyną 24 I 1588.” *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości* 17 (1971), 1: 125–170.
- Samuelson, Jan. *Aristokrat eller förädlad bonde?: det svenska frälsets ekonomi, politik och sociala förbindelser under tiden 1523–1611*. Lund: Lund Univ Press, 1993.
- Stopka, Krzysztof. *Ormianie w Polsce dawnej i dzisiejszej*. Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2000.
- Szpaczyński, Przemysław. *Mocarstwowe dążenia Zygmunta III w latach 1587–1618*. Kraków: Universitas, 2013.
- Tollet, Daniel. *Historia Żydów w Polsce od XVI wieku do rozbiorów*. Translated by Dorota Zamojska. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1999.
- Tyszkiewicz, Jan. *Tatarzy na Litwie i w Polsce: Studia z dziejów XIII–XVIII w*. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1989.
- Worthington, David. “« Unfinished work and damaged materials»: historians and the Scots in the Commonwealth of Poland–Lithuania (1569–1795).” *Immigrants & Minorities* 34 (2016), 3: 276–296.

English version: Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

The subject of the publication is a review of the book “Wierni królowie. Szwedzi i Finowie na uchodźctwie w Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku” [Faithful Kings. Swedes and Finns in Exile in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in the First Half of the 17th Century] written by Wojciech Krawczuk. In his monograph, the author characterised a medium-sized collectivity made up of Swedes and Finns fleeing their country as a result of the dynastic war between Sigismund III and his uncle Charles of Södermanland. A considerable part of the group settled in the Commonwealth and the kings (Sigismund III, as well as his sons) felt attachment to those people, which manifested itself in taking special care over them. The community, especially noblemen, was of great political importance, reaching in the Crown even senatorial positions. The article presents new

calculations of the diaspora connected with the results of the dynastic war. The calculations demonstrate that in the years 1600–1620 there were jointly c. 583 male refugees. Some of them spent abroad merely a few years and returned home; consequently, the number of the refugees was systematically falling (Figure 2 & 3). The social structure of people who left Sweden was presented in the form of Figure 1. It turned out that the nobility made up merely a quarter of the refugees, but it was almost 23% of all noblemen of the kingdom.

Skutki wojny dynastycznej w Szwecji (1597–1660): szwedzcy i fińscy uchodźcy

Słowa kluczowe: Szwecja w 1. połowie XVII wieku, Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów, Finowie, Szwedzi, uchodźcy w okresie wczesnonowożytnym, mobilność przestrzenna, szlachta szwedzka, Zygmunt III, Karol IX Sudermański

STRESZCZENIE

Artykuł recenzyjny dotyczy zagadnień poruszanych w książce Wojciecha Krawczuka „Wierni królowie. Szwedzi i Finowie na uchodźctwie w Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku.” W swojej monografii autor scharakteryzował średniej wielkości zbiorowość, którą tworzyli Szwedzi i Finowie uciekający ze swojego kraju w wyniku wojny dynastycznej między Zygmuntem III a jego wujem Karolem Sudermańskim. Znaczna część tej grupy osiedliła się w Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów, a królowie (Zygmunt III oraz jego synowie) czuli przywiązanie do tych ludzi, co przejawiało się w sprawowaniu nad nimi szczególnej opieki. Społeczność ta, zwłaszcza szlachta, miała duże znaczenie polityczne, osiągając w Koronie nawet stanowiska senatorskie. W artykule przedstawiono nowe obliczenia diaspory Szwedzkiej i Fińskiej na ziemiach polsko-litewskich przy wykorzystaniu metod kwantytatywnych. Ze zgromadzonych przez Wojciecha Krawczuka danych wynika, że w latach 1600–1620 przebywało w państwie Zygmunta III co najmniej 583 uchodźców płci męskiej. Część z nich przebywała za granicą zaledwie kilka lat i wracała do kraju, w związku z czym liczba uchodźców systematycznie spadała (Wykres 2 i 3). Struktura społeczna osób, które opuściły Szwecję, została przedstawiona w formie Wykresu 1. Okazało się, że szlachta stanowiła zaledwie jedną czwartą uchodźców, ale była to prawie 23% całej szlachty królestwa.

Citation

Łopatecki, Karol. "The Results of the Dynastic War in Sweden (1597–1660): Swedish and Finnish Refugees." *Studia Maritima* 35 (2022): 271–282. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2022.35-10.



Życie naukowe / Academic Chronicle

“Baltic Ports. Exchange, Conflicts, Entanglements” / “Bałtyckie miasta portowe. Wymiana, konflikty, historia powiązana,” Kulice, 24–26 March 2022

In the years 2020–2022, the University of Szczecin and the Institute of History of the University of Greifswald jointly implemented the research project “Dwa uniwersytety nad wspólnym morzem” / “Zwei Universitäten, ein gemeinsames Meer” [Two universities by the common sea] (FMP-0349-20). The project was co-financed by the European Union under the European Regional Development Fund as well as the state budget from the Small Project Fund under the Cooperation Programme Interreg V A Mecklenburg-Vorpommern / Brandenburg / Poland in the Pomerania Euroregion. One of the elements of the project was the international conference “Baltic Ports. Exchange, Conflicts, Entanglements,” which took place on 24–26 March 2022 at the International Centre for Interdisciplinary Research of the University of Szczecin in Kulice. The idea of the conference corresponded with the awarding of the honorary doctorate of the University of Szczecin to Professor Michael North, an outstanding researcher and promoter of studies on the Baltic zone. The organisers of the event were Professor Jörg Hackmann and Dr Paweł Migdalski (project coordinator).

The originator and ardent advocate of granting the honorary degree to the German researcher was Professor Edward Włodarczyk, the then rector of the University of Szczecin, and at the same time one of the most distinguished Polish historians of the Baltic region and the Baltic countries. He also advocated the dedication of the Kulice conference to Professor North. Unfortunately, during the preparatory works for the conference, Professor Włodarczyk passed away, and his students decided to dedicate the event to both outstanding figures. Due to the pandemic, its date had to be postponed and finally the meeting took place almost on the anniversary of the rector’s death. Unfortunately, Professor M. North could not participate in the session due to illness. The official media partner of the conference was the annual journal “Studia Maritima,” which was in the past edited by Professor Edward Włodarczyk for 16 years.

The ceremonial opening was made by Prof. Andrzej Skrendo – vice-rector of the University of Szczecin and Prof. Agnieszka Szudarek – director of the Institute of History at the University of Szczecin. The substantive introduction was made by Dr Paweł Migdalski and Prof. Jörg Hackmann, who pointed to the goals of the

conference as well as the significance of both the session itself and the centre in which it was held.

The first panel was devoted to the presentation of the achievements of Professors M. North and E. Włodarczyk. Dr. habil. Robert Riemer (Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr in Potsdam) presented Prof. M. North's research on the history of the Baltic Sea, while Prof. Dariusz Chojecki from the University of Szczecin discussed the research and publications by Prof. E. Włodarczyk and his studies on the Baltic ports in Szczecin, then Prof. Adam Makowski also from the University of Szczecin explored the activities of Edward Włodarczyk as the editor of the journal "Studia Maritima."

Subsequent papers were then devoted to the subject of the Baltic ports, and chronological order was applied. Carina Damm (Leibniz Institute for the History and Culture of Eastern Europe – GWZO Leipzig) discussed early medieval trade emporia on the Baltic Sea. Lecturers who followed continued their deliberations on the history of ports in this period based on specific cases – Dr Wojciech Filipowiak (laboratory of the Institute of Archeology and Ethnology of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Wolin) considered the example of the port and early medieval contacts of Wolin, while Prof. Christian Lübke (Leibniz Institute for the History and Culture of Eastern Europe – GWZO Leipzig) delivered his paper on Veliky Novgorod. The latter speaker not only focused on trade, but also touched upon the issues of cultural exchange. After listening to the presentations, a discussion followed, and a particularly intriguing issue proved to be the importance of the Vikings in the development of these centres. The first day of the conference ended with a lecture by Dr Jordan Siemianowski on the Levantine line of Żegluga Polska S.A. [Polish Shipping jsc] in the interwar period.

On the second day, the chronological presentation of the port issues continued. Professor Roman Czaja (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń) presented the activities of the port of Elbląg (German: Elbing), then Prof. Juhan Kreem from the University of Tallinn showed the functioning of the port in Tallinn at the beginning of the 16th century, using the example of its handling of the Danish ship "Maria" in the years 1518–1519. On the basis of the analysis of the visit of the royal ship, he demonstrated how the states adjacent to the sea tried to limit the position of the Baltic port cities. The next two papers focused on the importance of port cities for the new powers in the Baltic region – Sweden in the 16th–18th centuries (Ralph Tuchtenhagen – Humboldt University in Berlin) and Russia in the 18th century on the example of foreign merchants operating in Riga and Saint Petersburg (Dr Tilman Plath – University of Greifswald). The discussion after the papers concerned mainly the threats to the functioning of port cities in the modern era.

The end of the 19th century was featured in the paper by Bert Becker (University of Hong Kong) dealing with the enterprise of M. Jebsen from Apenrade / Aabenraa in

Schleswig. Using this example, the author discussed the realities of coastal shipping in Europe and East Asia. For Doctor Marta Grzechnik (University of Gdańsk), the interwar Gdynia was a pretext for reflection on the modernisation processes of the Baltic ports, while Prof. Bolesław Hajduk presented the history of the ports in Gdynia and Gdańsk during the Second World War.

The last two papers were devoted to the creation and consolidation of the maritime ideology. Sociologists Prof. Maciej Kowalewski and Dr Robert Bartłomiejski presented their research on the phenomenon of the Days of the Sea in Szczecin, while Dr Paweł Migdalski (all speakers representing the University of Szczecin) showed the use of sea themes in creating the mythology of the Recovered Territories, especially in the used examples of Szczecin, Wolin and Kołobrzeg.

The conference was a very good platform not only for the familiarisation of the audience with the subject of the Baltic ports and honouring two important researchers of the Baltic zone – Professors Michael North and Edward Włodarczyk, but above all constituted an opportunity to discuss the role and transformation of port centres on the Baltic Sea in a historical perspective, based on various examples. The meeting of Kulice showed that this subject still proved to be a strong source of inspiration in contemporary research, generating new questions and seeking answers to them. International and interdisciplinary research teams are particularly suited to them. It is sad and regrettable that Professor Edward Włodarczyk will not be part of them, and the illness will limit the participation of Professor Michael North.

Paweł Gliźniwicz, Szczecin

Citation

"Baltic Ports. Exchange, Conflicts, Entanglements" / "Bałtyckie miasta portowe. Wymiana, konflikty, historia powiązana," Kulice, 24–26 March 2022. *Studia Maritima* 35 (2022): 283–285. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2022.35-11.



Życie naukowe / Academic Chronicle

“Sustainable Development and Innovations in Space. E-economy” / “Zrównoważony rozwój a innowacje w przestrzeni. E-gospodarka,” Szczecin-Copenhagen, 28–30 September 2022

On 28–30 September 2022, the international scientific conference “Sustainable development and innovation in space. E-economy” took place. The conference was organised by the Institute of Spatial Management and Socio-Economic Geography of the University of Szczecin, with the support of the Polish Economic Society Branch in Szczecin. The official media partner of the conference was the annual journal “Studia Maritima.”

The thematic areas of the conference focused on global issues which affected local coastal communities. These were particularly issues, such as:

- innovativeness of cities and regions, with particular emphasis on coastal and cross-border areas in economic and spatial terms;
- spatial development of cities and coastal regions versus modern technologies (transport infra- and suprastructure);
- creating innovative tourism products in the tourism space of cities and regions, with particular emphasis on coastal areas;
- innovative aspects of territorial marketing;
- digital infrastructure as a factor in regional and local development, with particular emphasis on coastal areas.

The conference began with plenary sessions featuring speakers from academic centres of coastal countries, such as:

- University of Economics, Varna, Bulgaria,
- Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway,
- Aalborg University, Denmark,
- University of Szczecin, Poland.

Representatives of these research centres referred to the problems of cities, with particular emphasis on coastal cities. A new approach to tourism was also presented, through the prism of Tourism 4.0. It should be pointed out that tourism is a key area of activity in coastal regions.

The next part of the conference consisted of panel sessions devoted to the following issues:

- The city and the idea of sustainable development.
- Sustainable development and regional development.
- Sustainable development in tourism.

The panel discussions on the idea of sustainable development in the context of a coastal city focused on the possible future of coastal cities, where modern technology will primarily be used. The considerations concerned the development of coastal cities while taking into account the digital economy index, smart city 3.0 or cyberspace. The solutions related to the flights of autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles were indicated, and the discussion not only considered economic opportunities and threats, but also paid attention to social aspects, with particular emphasis on acceptance or lack of it by the society. The issues of coastal cities of the future have been widely considered, with attention being paid to real, extended and virtual cities.

In the panel devoted to regional development, the starting point was the issue of financing selected regions, with particular emphasis on the region of Western Pomerania. The discussion included the problem of limitation of financial support in the context of the cohesion policy for 2022–2027. Then, the participants discussed maritime issues and focused on Regional Business Communities. Support procedures for building these communities were presented.

Panel sessions devoted to sustainable development in tourism, on the other hand, focused on the challenges faced by coastal tourism. Thus, particular attention was paid to overtourism and undertourism in coastal regions, as well as thematic routes such as the wine route. The focus was also on innovation in the tourism space of regions serving spa functions. The discussion also revealed the problems and challenges faced by tourist guides and managers of tourist facilities in coastal regions.

During the conference, a study trip was also carried out to the capital of Denmark, Copenhagen, which is one of the leading coastal cities developing in accordance with the sustainable development formula. The highlight of this study trip was visiting the Amager Bakke waste incineration plant (also known as Copenhill and Amager Slope). This building is 124 metres high and 200 metres long, and has been developed in a very creative way. It should be noted that Denmark aims to achieve climate neutrality by 2025. The modernised incineration plant in Copenhagen is one of the most advanced and ecological facilities of this type in the world. The incinerator's energy efficiency is 99%, and the reduction of sulphur emissions is 99.5%. The "waste to energy plant"-type building processes high-energy waste (e.g. paper, plastics, wooden products) from households into electricity. Amager Bakke generates energy from 400,000 tonnes of waste per year. The energy generated supplies electricity to 50,000 households and heats 120,000 homes. The modernisation of this facility contributed to savings of 100 million litres of water per year. The incinerator recovers 90% of the metals passing through the plant, as well as 100 tonnes of slag and ashes, which are reused for road

construction and repair. Moreover, Copenhill Urban Mountain is a public space. The roof of the facility has been designed to create a ski slope on it, while in the summer the structure is to guarantee biodiversity and become a shelter for birds and insects. The Copenhagen waste incinerator is also equipped with a climbing wall, a cable car, a jogging path, a café and an outdoor gym.

Agnieszka Budziewicz-Guźlecka
Anna Drab-Kurowska

Citation

"Sustainable Development and Innovations in Space. E-economy" / "Zrównoważony rozwój a innowacje w przestrzeni. E-gospodarka," Szczecin-Copenhagen, 28–30 September 2022. *Studia Maritima* 35 (2022): 287–289. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2022.35-12.

