

KOMITET NAUK HUMANISTYCZNYCH
POLSKIEJ AKADEMII NAUK
UNIWERSYTET SZCZECIŃSKI

STUDIA MARITIMA

Redakcja naukowa Edward Włodarczyk

VOLUME XXVII/1

SZCZECIN 2014

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Wersja elektroniczna czasopisma/The electronic version of the journal: www.smp.am.szczecin.pl
Wersja papierowa jest wersją pierwotną/Paper version of the journal is an original version

Abstracts of articles published in *Studia Maritima* are available in
The Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities <http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl>

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and Uniwersytet Szczeciński 2014

ISSN 0137-3587

WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU SZCZECIŃSKIEGO

Nakład 50 egz. Ark. wyd. 15,5. Ark. druk. 14,6. Format B5. Oddano do druku i druk ukończono w grudniu
2014 r.

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*MARIAN REBKOWSKI**

Szczecin

**STONE HOUSES, GLAZED JUGS AND PILGRIM BADGES.
AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION
TO THE PROBLEM OF THE CULTURAL UNITY
OF THE HANSEATIC TOWNS IN THE BALTIC REGION**

Keywords: Hanseatic towns, archaeology, the Middle Ages

Summary

Archaeological research on the Hanseatic towns established in the Middle Ages in the Baltic region has been conducted on a large scale since the 1980's. Discoveries made since then allow to formulate a thesis about the cultural unity among the inhabitants of towns situated on the South Baltic coast between the 13th and 15th centuries. Based on selected instances of the urban culture, widely discussed in archaeological sources, the paper is an attempt to prove that a number of similarities can be revealed in various spheres of life led by the inhabitants of towns located in the Baltic region, often situated far away from one another. The analysis covered the following aspects: architecture – quoting the example of tenements with entrance halls which in the 14th century became a common element of the cultural landscape in towns located in the Baltic region; pottery – quoting the example of popular in this part of Europe stoneware and red glazed jugs; and, last but not least, devotional objects – quoting the example of pilgrim badges that revealed evident preferences demonstrated by the pilgrims as to their pilgrimage destinations, paying special attention to supra-regional sanctuaries located in German-speaking area, particularly on the Rhine and the Moza rivers.

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As for reasons underlying the development of the cultural unity of the Hanseatic towns, archaeologists mention similar legal and economic factors contributing to their development, much the same cultural and ethnical origin of the townspeople the majority of whom came from German territory, and, last but not least, business contacts (particularly distant ones) which, after all, embodied the essence of the Hanseatic League since they were aimed at exchanging not only goods, but also ideas.

Introduction

The Hanseatic League was finally developed in the 13th century as a confederation of towns, merchants of which were involved in a far-distance trade. One of the basic factors of establishing the League was a need of protection of the merchants and their privileges in the regions situated far away of the home towns. According to a broadly accepted opinion the range of the activity of the League is marked by the position of the four Hanseatic “kontors” situated in London, Bergen, Brügge and Novgorod. Among the members of the Hanseatic League located within the area, the port towns located on the southern coast of the Baltic Sea were of special importance. These were the towns chartered mostly in the 13th century according to the so-called “German Law” and situated in areas inhabited by different people, namely the Elbe Slavs, Slavic inhabitants of Pomerania, the Balts and the Finno-Ugric peoples.

The chartered towns were founded in the entire area under discussion on the initiative of local feudal authority, including rulers of the Slavic duchies as well as knightly orders conquering the eastern part of the region. All along the coast, from Lübeck in the west to Tallin (Reval) in the east, the founding of the chartered towns was a breakthrough point in the urbanization process of the region. This was reflected in a number of changes introduced such as new legal regulations under which the towns were to function, new rules governing the delimitation and organization of urban area and the influx of German settlers who would later on compose a majority of the town inhabitants. The aforementioned factors were common for towns situated far away from one another. Moreover, the towns were tied with a net of the trade connections which were the essence of activities undertaken by Hanseatic merchants and a driving force not only behind the flow of goods, but also behind the exchange of practices or ideas. Therefore, one may

expect that the culture of the Hanseatic towns located on the South Baltic coast shared a number of similarities. Results of archaeological research conducted in the towns in the area under discussion over the last decades shed a new light on the problem.

The archaeology of late medieval towns, including those belonging to the Hanseatic League, is a relatively young and at the same time very specific area of science. The first archaeological observations indicating the exceptional importance of archaeological sources to research on medieval history of towns founded in the Baltic region were made shortly after the Second World War. It is worth citing the example of Lübeck in the case of which such observations were made while reconstructing the parts of town destroyed during the war. The actual excavations were, however, carried out at the beginning of the 1970's. These fairly long beginnings of urban archaeology had to do with a comparably long time it took the late medieval archaeology to emerge in Europe. The situation was even more difficult outside Lübeck, i.e. in other towns situated on the South Baltic coast which, during the post-war period, belonged to the former Eastern Bloc, namely in GDR, Poland and Baltic republics of the USSR. One of reasons behind such a state of affairs was the lack of interest in archaeological research which stemmed not only from the advancement of urban archaeology, but also from unwillingness to examine "German", as it was then assumed, cultural heritage. Therefore, it came as no surprise that a breakthrough in archaeological research into towns in the Baltic region coincided with a political breakthrough achieved at the turn of the 1980's and 1990's. Already in the 1980's, archaeological research was carried out on a large scale, mainly as a result of the then initiated reconstruction of old city centres, e.g. in Elbląg, Kołobrzeg, and on a smaller scale also in Riga or Rostock. From the beginning of the 1990's, the studies under discussion flourished and in the majority of cases had a "rescue" character.¹

¹ On the overview of state of the research two decades ago cf. *Lübecker Kolloquium zur Stadtarchäologie im Hanseraum*, vol. I: *Stand, Aufgaben und Perspektiven*, ed. M. Gläser, Lübeck 1997; also remarks made by M. Rębkowski: *Pierwsze lokacje miast w księstwie zachodniopomorskim. Przemiany przestrzenne i kulturowe* [The first chartered towns in the Duchy of Pomerania. Spatial and cultural transformations], Kołobrzeg 2001, pp. 7–18, and *Ratować przeszłość? O uwarunkowaniach i znaczeniu badań archeologicznych prowadzonych przy odbudowie Starówki* [Save the past? On circumstances and significance of archaeological research accompanying the reconstruction of the old town], in: *Kołobrzeg i okolice poprzez wieki. Studia i szkice* [Kołobrzeg and its environs over the centuries. Studies and Sketches], ed. R. Ptaszyński, Szczecin 2010, pp. 45–47. On towns situated in Estonia: E. Russow, H. Valk, A. Haak, A. Pärn, A. Mäesalu: *Medieval Archaeology in the European Context: Towns, Churches, Monasteries and Castles*, in: *Archaeological Research in Estonia 1865–2005*, eds. V. Lang, M. Laneman, Tartu 2006, pp. 164–175.

Consequently, a number of unique sources allow to look at the history of the Hanseatic towns and the culture of their medieval and postmedieval inhabitants in a brand new way.² Some studies, based on the aforementioned sources, suggest that a number of evident similarities can be revealed in the cultural development of the Hanseatic towns located at a certain distance. Some researchers are inclined to believe that specific and coherent culture existed there for a certain period of time.³ The problem requires further analysis, yet cannot be thoroughly discussed in the present paper which is, after all, aimed at presenting and comparing selected examples of the common elements of the urban culture visible in archaeological sources and shared by the Hanseatic towns situated on the South Baltic coast. These instances refer to different aspects of townspeople's life at the end of the Middle Ages, i.e. between the 13th and 15th centuries, and to be more specific – architecture, private life (indoor sphere) and religious practices.

“Dielenhaus”

In German literature on the subject, one may come across the term “Dielenhaus” used for describing a characteristic type of burgher's stone house which have appeared in the Hanseatic towns situated on the Baltic coast since the end of the 13th century. In order to understand its origin, form and commonness in some parts of northern Europe, one should at the very beginning pay attention to certain features typical of the spatial organization of late medieval towns. What was characteristic about their layouts was a division into regular quarters that consisted of single parcels in the shape of rectangle the shorter side of which adjoined the street and the longer side marked the boundary between the adjacent plots. Such a piece of land was a private property of a townsman who had to pay

² Cyclical scientific conferences organized over the recent years prove that the Hanseatic towns continue to attract archaeologists' attention. One of the most prestigious is Lübecker Kolloquium zur Stadtarchäologie im Hanseraum held since 1995 in Travemünde, vol. I–VIII, ed. M. Gläser, Lübeck 1997–2012. Worth mentioning are conference papers published in the following volumes: *The Medieval Town in The Baltic: Hanseatic History and Archaeology*, vol. I–II, eds. R. Vissak, A. Mäesalu, Tartu 1999 and 2002; *Archaeologia Elbingensis*, vol. I, eds. A. Czacharowski, T. Nawrołski, Gdańsk 1992, vol. II, eds. G. Nawrołska, J. Tandecki, Gdańsk 1997; *The Hansa Town Riga as Mediator between East and West*, eds. A. Caune, I. Ose, Riga 2009.

³ In such a way e.g. D. Gaimster: *A parallel history: the archaeology of Hanseatic urban culture in the Baltic c. 1200–1600*, “World Archaeology” 2005, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 408–423. Cf. critical comments by U. Müller, *Hanse und Archäologie – Vom Konstrukt zur Vielfalt kulturellen Praxen*, in: *Hansegeschichte als Regionalgeschichte*, ed. O. Auge, Frankfurt a. Main 2013, pp. 127–168.

rent for it, which was probably the main reason behind the necessity to determine the surface area of the parcels in the then units of measurement.⁴

In port towns, where merchants carried on long-distance trade, roofed-over sites were an absolute must since they allowed to store bulk goods safely. Since the area of the parcel was limited and houses were “densely packed” in the quarters, necessity arose to put up storied and, as a rule, multifunctional buildings which combined utility and residential functions. Perhaps this was the main reason behind the popularity of the so-called timber-framed houses in the first period of existing of the chartered towns founded in the Baltic region. These houses were built on a timber-frame which consisted of upper and lower part connected to one another with vertical poles. The poles were embedded in pockets carved in ground beams and sometimes supported by angle struts. Empty space of a wall was filled in a number of ways.⁵ This method of constructing houses had been invented in the region west of the Elbe river and spread to the East with German settlers. Needless to say, the popularity of such houses stemmed from newcomers’ sentiment for their culture and tradition. The functional advantages of the

⁴ B. Zientara: *Przemiany społeczno-gospodarcze i przestrzenne miast w dobie lokacji* [Socio-economic and spatial transformation in the age of chartering of towns], in: *Miasta doby feudalnej w Europie środkowo-wschodniej. Przemiany społeczne a układy przestrzenne* [Towns of the feudal age in east-central Europe. Social change and spatial development], eds. A. Gieysztor, T. Rosłanowski, Wrocław–Poznań–Toruń 1976, pp. 93–94; R. Czaja: *Socjotopografia miasta Elbląga w średniowieczu* [Socio-topography of Elbląg in the Middle Ages], Toruń 1992, pp. 24–25; W. Schich: *Zur Größe der area in den Gründungsstädten im östlichen Mitteleuropa nach den Aussagen der schriftlichen Quellen*, in: *Vera Lex Historiae. Studien zu mittelalterlichen Quellen*, eds. S. Jenks, J. Sarnowsky, M.-L. Laudage, Köln–Wien–Weimar 1993, pp. 81–115; C. Buško: *Stan badań nad parcelą mieszcząską w średniowiecznych miastach śląskich* [Research on an urban parcel in medieval Silesian towns], “Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej” [Quarterly of the History of Material Culture] 1995, Ch. 43, No. 3, pp. 343–350; M. Rębkowski: *The Size of Original Plots in Pomeranian Port Charter Towns*, “Studia Maritima” 2004, vol. XVII, pp. 5–21.

⁵ G. Fehring: *Städtischer Hausbau in Norddeutschland von 1150 bis 1250*, “Zeitschrift für Archäologie des Mittelalters” 1986, Beiheft 4, p. 275 f.; M. Scheffel: *Mittelalterlicher Holzbau in den Städten des niederdeutschen Raumes und der angrenzenden Küstengebiete*, “Lübecker Schriften zur Archäologie und Kulturgeschichte” 1990, Vol. 20, pp. 64–65; G. Legant-Karau: *Mittelalterlicher Holzbau in Lübeck an der Schwelle vom ländlichen zum städtischen Siedlungsgefüge*, “Archäologisches Korrespondenzblatt” 1994, Vol. 24, 1994, p. 339 f.; J. Piekalski: *Początki budynków o konstrukcji szkieletowej na terenie Środkowej Europy* [The origin of timber-frame housing in central Europe], “Archaeologia Historica Polona” 1996, vol. 3, pp. 76–77; idem: *Wczesne domy mieszczan w Europie Środkowej. Geneza – funkcja – forma* [Early burgher’s houses in central Europe. Origin - function - form], Wrocław 2004, p. 87 f.; M. Rębkowski: *Pierwsze lokacje...* (The first chartered towns...), pp. 121–143; Z. Polak: *Zabudowa lokacyjnego Kołobrzegu* [Housing in the chartered town of Kołobrzeg], in: *Salsa Cholbergiensis. Kołobrzeg w średniowieczu* [Medieval Kołobrzeg], eds. L. Leciejewicz, M. Rębkowski, Kołobrzeg 2000, pp. 161–170. Cf. also papers published in vol. III of Lübecker Kolloquium zur Stadtarchäologie im Hanseraum, ed. M. Gläser, Lübeck 2001.

timber-framed houses should be, however, highlighted once more. The construction did not impose any limitations as to the shape of building and allowed to put up storied ones, which was essential for high-density housing typical of urban space.

As for prosperous towns, such as Lübeck, it was already in the first half of the 13th century that first secular buildings were made of brick.⁶ They, however, did not contribute significantly to the eventual shape of urban architecture on the south coast of the Baltic. High-density housing together with timber framing posed a serious risk of being consumed by fire. In order to prevent from such a situation, since the middle of the the 13th century town councils began to issue regulations obliging inhabitants to put up brick firewalls along boundaries between particular parcels. The Lübeck council was the first to announce such a decision. As a result of closing the front and back sides, at first by erecting framed and subsequently brick walls, a single-room lofty space was created, referred to in German as ground-floor hall (“Diele”). Consequently, a number of characteristic brick buildings were put up. Their tops faced the street and their longer sides were shared by two neighbouring parcels and hence their owners. What is interesting, the side walls had characteristic niches. Therefore, the width of such stone houses equalled the width of parcels on which they were built and, as a rule, amounted to several metres. They were several dozen metres long, i.e. a single tenement covered greater part of the parcel. Every building could be entered from the street, and in the back wall there was a passage to the backside of the plot. These were two- or three-storeys buildings with a high-pitched roofs and large storage capacity, however at first without any cellars.⁷ According to some estimations, tens of thousands of bricks were used for the construction of one house under discussion.⁸

Originally, the ground floor of tenements had a wooden ceiling and was not divided into smaller rooms. It was used mainly as a working place and storehouse, while the residential part was probably on another storey; with time it was moved

⁶ M. Gläser: *Archäologisch erfaßte mittelalterliche Hausbauten in Lübeck*, in: *Lübecker Kolloquium...*, Vol. III, p. 296.

⁷ W. Erdmann: *Entwicklungstendenzen des Lübecker Hausbaus 1100 bis um 1340 – eine Ideenskizze*, “Lübecker Schriften zur Archäologie und Kulturgeschichte” 1983, Vol. 7, p. 24 f.; G. Fehring: *Städtischer Hausbau...*, p. 56 f. As for Polish literature on the subject, cf. Z. Polak: *Uwagi archeologa do historii kamienicy gdańskiej* [Archaeological remarks on the history of the Gdansk tenement], in: *Stan badań archeologicznych miast w Polsce* [Archaeological research on Polish towns], eds. H. Paner, M. Fudziński, Z. Borowski, Gdańsk 2005, pp. 245–255; J. Piekalski, *Wczesne domy...* [Early burgher’s houses...], p. 121 f.

⁸ *Hus un Hoff. Wohnbauten im mittelalterlichen Stralsund*, Stralsund 2008, p. 15.

to annexes built on the tenement in the backside of the parcel. In other words, the utility function of buildings was much more important than their residential function.⁹

The first stone houses of such a kind were built in Lübeck, probably soon after the middle of the 13th century. The results of the post-war archaeological excavations prove that it was there that at the turn of the 13th and 14th centuries such tenements became a construction standard, and before 1320 most parcels in Lübeck were developed in such a way.¹⁰

The process of replacing timber houses with brick tenements with ground-floor halls was the case with all Hanseatic towns on the South Baltic coast, and archaeological research continues to provide new information as to where and how fast they were built. In Rostock, likewise in Lübeck, the oldest brick tenements, discovered during archaeological excavations, date back to the second half of the 13th century.¹¹

No later than in the fourth quarter of the 13th century the first firewalls were appeared in Stralsund, and at the end of the aforementioned century first tenements were built there to become a dominant element of the urban landscape within the next 100 years.¹² It was also then that such buildings were put up in Greifswald.¹³ In Kołobrzeg, a town which has undergone relatively comprehensive research, the earliest registered brick houses date back to the first quarter of the 14th century. It can be assumed that it was then that housing boom was the case with Kołobrzeg, as a result of which over the following several dozen years such stone houses were built in most parcels.¹⁴

⁹ J. Piekalski: *Wczesne domy...* [Early burgher's houses...], p. 131.

¹⁰ W. Erdmann: *Entwicklungstendenzen...*, p. 22; G. Fehring: *Städtischer Hausbau...*, p. 56; M. Gläser: *Archäologisch erfaßte...*, p. 298.

¹¹ G. Schmitt: *Der städtebauliche Wandel Rostocks im. 13. Jahrhundert*, in: *777 Jahre Rostock. Neue Beiträge zur Stadtgeschichte*, ed. O. Pelc, Rostock 1995, p. 15 f.

¹² J.Ch. Holst: *Stand und Aufgaben der Hausforschung des Mittelalters in der Hansestadt Stralsund. Beobachtungen eines Lübeckers*, in: *Archäologie des Mittelalters und Bauforschung im Hanseraum*, ed. M. Gläser, Rostock, 1993, pp. 398–399; *Hus un Hoff...*, pp. 10–19, 29 f.

¹³ H. Schäfer: *Früher Holz- und Steinbauten in der Hansestadt Greifswald*, in: *Lübecker Kolloquium...* 2001, Vol. III, p. 428.

¹⁴ Z. Polak: *Budownictwo i architektura* [Building and architecture], in: *Archeologia średniowiecznego Kołobrzegu* [Archaeology of medieval Kołobrzeg], vol. 2, ed. M. Rębkowski, Kołobrzeg 1997, p. 156; idem: *Zabudowa mieszkalna i gospodarcza. Typy konstrukcji, przemiany przestrzenne, datowanie* [Housing and commercial development. Types of buildings, spatial development, dating], in: *Archeologia średniowiecznego Kołobrzegu* [Archaeology of medieval Kołobrzeg], vol. 4, ed. M. Rębkowski, Kołobrzeg 1999, p. 187 f.; idem: *Zabudowa lokacyjnego Kołobrzegu...* [Housing in the chartered town of Kołobrzeg], pp. 163–169.

In Elbląg, situated to the east, the earliest tenements were also put up as a consequence of taking fire protection measures, i.e. erecting firewalls. The process began after the fire that consumed great part of the town in 1288. Based on the analysis of both written sources and archaeological findings, brick architecture had been flourishing in Elbląg since c.a. 1330.¹⁵ Scant attention, which is quite surprising, is paid to its origin in Gdańsk, though there as well the process had probably taken place in the same manner as in other large port towns.¹⁶ On the other hand, in Riga, established in 1201, relicts of earliest brick houses, including the most popular tenements with ground-floor halls, discovered during excavations date back to the 13th and 14th centuries.¹⁷ It is assumed that in a similar period and in a similar way the stone houses were developed in the Hanseatic towns located in the eastern part of the southern coast of the Baltic. As a matter of fact, they mark the eastward frontier of the region where this type of brick houses have been spread in the Middle Ages.¹⁸

The above discussion indicates that in the course of the 14th century, “Dielenhäuser” became a dominant element of cultural landscape in the towns situated on the southern coast of the Baltic. They obviously were subjected to further development and changes, like e.g. appearing of differentiated front walls, dividing the hall into smaller rooms, appearing characterising perrons in the front and annexes in the back sides, etc. These, however, are not of major importance to issues addressed in the present paper.

¹⁵ T. Nawrołski: *Gebäude und topographische Strukturen des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts in Elbing*, “Lübecker Kolloquium zur Archäologie und Kulturgeschichte” 1990, Vol. 20, p. 159 f.; R. Czaja: *Socjotopografia...* [Socio-topography...], p. 82 f.; A. Kašinowski: *Ein Blick auf die mittelalterliche Raumdisposition von Elbing und ihre Realisierung: Stadt-Baukomplexe-Bauparzelle*, in: *Archaeologia Elbingensis...*, Vol. 1, pp. 67–78; idem: *Średniowieczna kamienica mieszczńska: Elbląg, Ryga, Kołobrzeg* [Medieval burgher’s tenement: Elbląg, Ryga, Kołobrzeg], in: *Archaeologia Elbingensis...*, Vol. 2, pp. 51–52.

¹⁶ Z. Polak: *Uwagi archeologa...* [Archaeological remarks...], pp. 245–253.

¹⁷ A. Caune: *Zilišča Rigi XII–XIV vv. Po dannym archeologiczeskich raskopok*, Riga 1984, p. 175; idem, *Typen der Wohnhäuser Rigas im 12. bis 14. Jahrhundert aufgrund der archäologischen Ausgrabungen*, in: *Lübecker Kolloquium...*, vol. III, 2001, p. 358; A. Kašinowski: *Średniowieczna kamienica...* [Medieval burgher’s...], p. 49 f.

¹⁸ E.g. Mäesalu: *Die Haustypen im hansezeitlichen Tartu (Dorpat)*, in: *Lübecker Kolloquium...*, Vol. III, pp. 586–587. Cf. remarks made by J. Piekalski: *Wczesne domy...* [Early burgher’s houses...], p. 133.

Luxury table ware

The commonness of tenements with ground-floor halls illustrates nicely how the cultural unity of the Hanseatic towns developed, at least as far as urban architecture is concerned. As an example of a similar process taking place indoors, one may cite pottery used in every household at that time. The fragments of pottery belong to the category of the most common archaeological finds and, due to their mass character, are a solid basis for conducting extensive research. As for the late Middle Ages, such sources enable archaeologists to address a number of issues such as e.g. technological advancement of the potters, production techniques, trade contacts, pottery market, consumer tastes and their social status, etc.¹⁹ Excavations conducted in the Hanseatic towns of the region have produced millions of pottery shards. Studies based on such fragments of ceramics have revealed a number of very characteristic tendencies and similarities.

As far as the entire region under analysis is concerned, the so-called greyware was the main kind of pottery used in the chartered towns. It was produced locally from ferrous clay, kilned in reducing atmosphere, which prevented it from oxidation, and differentiated considerably in terms of functionality. Across large regions of central Europe, including the Baltic coast, greyware were spread simultaneously to the process of colonization and influx of new settlers in the 12th and 13th centuries. In other regions, however, it became popular only because new technologies were adopted.²⁰ Pottery used in the Middle Ages in the Hanseatic towns of the Baltic region, specially tableware, had one more prominent feature, namely the significant shares of high quality vessels produced in other parts

¹⁹ Of numerous publications see: S.A. Moorhouse: *The medieval pottery industry and its market*, in: *Medieval Industry*, "CBA Research Report", vol. 40, ed. D.W. Crossley, London 1981, pp. 96–125; P.J. Davey: *Theory and Practise in Medieval Ceramic Studies*, "Medieval Ceramics" 1988, vol. 12, pp. 3–13; D.H. Brown: *Pottery and Archaeology*, "Medieval Ceramics" 1988, vol. 12, pp. 15–21. As for Polish literature on the subject cf. A. Buko: *Ceramika wczesnopolska. Wprowadzenie do badań* [Early Polish pottery. Introduction to research], Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź 1990, p. 26 f.

²⁰ Of numerous publications see: J. Kruppé: *Garncarstwo późnośredniowieczne w Polsce* [Late medieval pottery in Poland], Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź 1981; G. Mangelsdorf: *Untersuchungen zur Formenkunde spätmittelalterlicher Keramik im westlichen Brandenburg*, Frankfurt am Main 1994; idem: *Zur mittelalterlichen Keramik des 12. bis 15. Jahrhunderts in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern – ein Bericht zur Forschungslage*, in: *Z pravěku do stredověku. Sborník k 70. narozeninám Vladimira Nekudy*, ed. P. Michna, R. Nekuda, J. Unger, Brno 1997, pp. 230–236; T. Nawrołski, M. Rębkowski: *Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung mittelalterlicher Keramik in Pommern*, "Offa" 1995, Vol. 52, pp. 166–167; H. Lüdtkke: *Grauware des 12. bis 15. Jahrhunderts*, in: *Handbuch zur mittelalterlichen Keramik in Nordeuropa*, eds. H. Lüdtkke, K. Schietzel, Neumünster 2001, pp. 83–174.

of Europe and imported to the Baltic. This was mainly the case of the so-called red glazed ware and stoneware.

In all towns where excavations were conducted, in the cultural deposits dated to the 13th century and the first half of the 14th century there were found shards of the vessels kilned in red colour, the outer surfaces of which were covered with lead glaze with a green, brown or yellow tint. Some of the red-glazed vessels, frequently referred to as high decorated pottery, were ornamented also with white slip, engobes, plastic applications made of white clay which after enamelling added to the range of colours, as well as engraved or stamped motifs. Such products are represented mainly as tableware, first of all jugs and drinking vessels. According to the estimates made for a few towns of the region under discussion, during the period of its greatest popularity, i.e. in the second half of the 13th century, red glazed ware was a very characteristic element of the pottery used by townspeople.²¹ Its share in the whole pottery sets was never less than a few per cents. In the case of Kołobrzeg it was 7–8%.²²

Imported from western Europe, luxury glazed ware eventually reached towns on the South Baltic coast by sea. It was at first produced in Flanders where it gained enormous popularity in the 13th century. At that time, it was a phenomenon related to urban communities, both in terms of production and use.²³ With time, migrating Flemish potters started the production in the towns of the Low Countries. It was also in the 13th century that the pottery was copied by craftsmen in southern Denmark, Lübeck and the environs of Rostock.²⁴ The phenomenon was connected with a need for bringing the production sites closer to the market

²¹ D. Gaimster: *The Baltic Ceramic Market c. 1200–1600: An Archaeology of the Hanse*, “Fennoscandia Archaeologica” 1999, vol. XVI, pp. 59–69; idem: *Die Keramikmarkt im Ostseeraum 1200 bis 1600: Exportkeramik als Indikator für Fernhandelsbeziehungen und die Wanderung des hansischen Handwerks und der Wohnkultur*, in: *Lübecker Kolloquium...* 1999, Vol. II, esp. Abb. 1. See also: P.K. Madsen, H. Stielke: *Bleigliasierte Irdenware*, in: *Handbuch...*, pp. 539–612.

²² M. Rębkowski: *Średniowieczna ceramika miasta lokacyjnego w Kołobrzegu* [Medieval pottery in the chartered town of Kołobrzeg], Kołobrzeg 1995, Tab. 1, p. 20 and Fig. 8. It seems that red glazed ware was hardly ever redistributed from the port towns to towns situated at a certain distance from the coast.

²³ F. Verhaeghe: *La céramique tres décorée du Bas Moyen Age en Flandre*, in: *Actes du Colloque de Lille (26–27 Mars 1988)*, ed. G. Blicq, Lille 1989, pp. 19–113.

²⁴ D. Mayer: *Glasurkeramik des Mittelalters von einer Töpfereiproduktion aus der Kleinen Burgstrasse zu Lübeck – ein Vorbericht*, “Lübecker Schriften zur Archäologie und Kulturgeschichte” 1993, Vol. 23, pp. 277–282; H. Schäfer: *Zur Keramik des 13. bis 15. Jahrhunderts in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern*, “Bodendenkmalpflege in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern” 1997, Jb. 1996, p. 302; U. Braun: *Eine Produktionsstätte der antropomorph verzierten mittelalterlichen roten Irdeware*, “Zeitschrift für Archäologie des Mittelalters” 2002, Jg. 30, pp. 165–171.

of consumers in the new founded and chartered towns in the Baltic region. It was there that a growing demand for luxury products could be noticed.²⁵ Such a pottery, highly decorated in particular, was characterized by a superior aesthetic value thus meeting special needs expressed by its users and enhancing their social prestige.

However, in the course of the first half of the 14th century, the most common kind of tableware used in the Hanseatic towns became stoneware which eventually eliminated red glazed ware from the market. The stoneware, a very typical ceramic product made of clay that could be kilned in high temperatures, was the hardest pottery of the highest quality produced in the Middle Ages only in few regions of Europe, mainly in central and northern Germany.²⁶ In the second half of the 13th century large amounts of the so-called early stoneware produced in the Rhineland were imported to towns on the Baltic coast. These were mainly medium-sized jugs with a characteristic shape of neck.

From the beginning of the 14th century, classical, fully fused stoneware produced in Siegburg (Rhineland) was imported on a mass scale to the Baltic region.²⁷ These were unique top quality jugs and drinking vessels that flooded the Baltic pottery market in the 14th and 15th centuries. In other words, it was then that stoneware pushed red glazed ware and early stoneware jugs out from the Hanseatic towns of the region. For the sake of understanding the role of goods produced in Siegburg, it is worth presenting estimates made for Kolobrzeg. According to them, at the end of the 14th century even every fifth vessel used by inhabitants of the town was produced on the Sieg river.²⁸ Also in other towns situated in the Baltic region stoneware from Siegburg represented in this period a greater part of the pottery used throughout the period under analysis. Apart from the Siegburg vessels, stoneware produced in southern Lower Saxony was

²⁵ D. Gaimster: *The Baltic Ceramic Market...*, p. 62.

²⁶ H.-G. Stephan: *The development and production of medieval stoneware in Germany*, in: *Ceramics and Trade. The production and distribution of later medieval pottery in north-west Europe*, eds. P. Davey, R. Hodges, Sheffield 1983, pp. 95–120; D.R.M. Gaimster: *German Stoneware 1200–1900. Archaeology and Cultural History*, London 1997; M. Roehmer: *Steinzeug*, in: *Handbuch zur mittelalterlichen Keramik in Nordeuropa*, eds. H. Lütke, K. Schietzel, Neumünster 2001, pp. 465–538.

²⁷ B. Beckmann: *The main types of the first four production periods of Siegburg pottery*, in: *Medieval pottery from excavations*, eds. V.I. Evison, H. Hodges, J.G. Hurst, London, pp. 183–220; E. Hähnel: *Siegburger Steinzeug, Bestandskatalog*, Köln 1987; D.R.M. Gaimster: *German Stoneware...*, pp. 163–185; M. Rohmer: *Steinzeug...*, pp. 471–483.

²⁸ M. Rębkowski: *Średniowieczna ceramika...* [Medieval pottery...], Tab. 1, p. 20, 72 and Fig. 6.

also discovered in the Hanseatic towns of the Baltic, yet not on such a mass scale. These were very characteristic tableware, usually covered with brown engobe.²⁹

Stoneware from Rhineland and Lower Saxony reached the Baltic by sea from ports of western Europe, e.g. from Utrecht, Bremen or Bergen op Zoom. The pottery was floated from the manufacturing sites down the great rivers, namely the Rhine and the Weser. It is very likely that other types of stoneware like the Waldenburg stoneware and the so-called “Falke Group” stoneware, distributed in the Baltic region since the end of the 14th century, were imported down the Oder river directly from the regions of the production. The former imitated Siegburg pottery in certain aspects and was produced in the town of Waldenburg situated in Saxony. As for the latter, the production sites have not been discovered yet, though researchers are inclined to believe they were located probably somewhere in Lausitz.³⁰ Nevertheless, they both lost competition with Siegburg pottery and relatively few of them were found in the towns located on the Baltic coast.

Treating as a whole, stoneware was a dominant element of tableware used by the inhabitants of the Baltic region towns. In fact, it was the most significant and characteristic element of the medieval households, which is confirmed by the analysis of pottery sets discovered in Lübeck, towns situated in Mecklenburg, Kołobrzeg or Gdańsk as well as Prussian and Livonian towns.³¹ Based on its commonness, one may assume that stoneware in some way embodied the culture of Hanseatic towns in the 14th and 15th centuries.³² At the same time, it is worth

²⁹ H.-G. Stephan: *Coppengrave. Studien zur Töpferei des 13. bis 19. Jahrhunderts in Nordwestdeutschland*, Hildesheim 1981; idem: *The development...*, p. 105 f.; D.R.M. Gaimster: *German Stoneware...*, pp. 300–302; M. Roehmer: *Steinzeug...*, pp. 517–527.

³⁰ On Waldenburg pottery cf. D. Scheidemantel, Th. Schifer: *Waldenburger Steinzeug. Archäologie und Naturwissenschaften*, Dresden 2005. On finds in the the Baltic region: H. Schäfer, “*Siegburger Steinzeug*” des 14. bis 16. Jh. aus Sachsen, “Mitteilungen zur Ur- und Frühgeschichte für Ostmecklenburg und Vorpommern” 1993, No. 40, pp. 118–122; M. Rębkowski: *Nowe znaleziska kamionki waldenburskiej w północnej Polsce* [New finds of Waldenburg stoneware in northern Poland], in: *Archaeologia et historia urbana*, eds. R. Czaja, G. Nawrońska, M. Rębkowski, J. Tandecki, Elbląg 2004, pp. 421–428. On the so-called Falke-Group stoneware recently H.-G. Stephan: *Badania nad ceramiką “grupy Falkego”. Bogato zdobiona gotycka kamionka lużycka i jej środowisko archeologiczno-historyczne* [Research on the Falke-Group stoneware. High decorated pottery from Lausitz and its archaeological background], in: *Wrocław na przełomie średniowiecza i czasów nowożytnych. Materialne przejawy życia codziennego* [Wrocław in medieval and modern times. Material aspects of everyday life], eds. J. Piekalski, K. Wachowski, Wrocław 2004, pp. 293–330.

³¹ See: D.R.M. Gaimster: *German Stoneware...*, pp. 74–78 and papers in Vol. II *Lübeck-er Kolloquium...* 1999; on Estonian towns see E. Russow: *Importleraamika Lääne-Eesti linnades 13.–17. sajandi*, Tallin 2006, pp. 41–55.

³² D. Gaimster: *The Baltic Ceramic Market...*, p. 63.

highlighting that, likewise in the case of red glazed ware, on a definitively smaller scale these products were imported to towns located at a certain distance from the Baltic coast.³³

Pilgrimage

The last aspect discussed in the present article has to do with religious practices. In the literature on the subject it has been already noticed that the parish churches of the chartered towns founded on the southern coast of the Baltic were dedicated to specific holy patrons. Particularly popular were namely Blessed Virgin Mary, St Nicolas and St James to whom churches in the newly located towns had been most frequently dedicated. In large towns, divided into two or three parish districts, all the churches were under the invocation of one of the abovementioned patrons, an example of which is for example Greifswald.³⁴ This is said to reflect religious and cultural unity of the Hanseatic towns and their influence in the Baltic region.³⁵ Such an unity has also been proven by comprehensive research on pilgrimage conducted over recent years and based on the already discovered archaeological pilgrim badges.

At the end of the Middle Ages Europe was covered with network of roads leading to hundreds of sanctuaries. The role of this network was exceptionally important since pilgrimage to sacred places (“ad loca sancta”) was a typical and most common form of expressing religious beliefs. It was in such places that very characteristic devotional souvenirs had been produced since the second half of the 12th century. These items were mainly tinned and leaden casts of the size of several centimetres presenting the images of saints or their holy relics adored in

³³ Situated in Pomerania town of Stargard is a good example. The share of red glazed ware was there estimated to less than 10%, see: P. Romanowicz: *Standardy luksusu – naczynia kamionkowe w późnośredniowiecznym Stargardzie* [Signs of luxury – stoneware vessels in late medieval Stargard], in: *Ekskluzywne życie – dostojny pochówek. W kręgu kultury elitarnej wieków średnich* [Exclusive life – dignified burial. In the sphere of elite culture of the Middle Ages], ed. M. Rębkowski, Wolin 2011, pp. 280–281.

³⁴ H. Heyden: *Kirchen Pommerns und ihre Weihetitel*, “Baltische Studien” N. F. 1958, Vol. 45, p. 66; J. Petersohn: *Der südliche Ostseeraum im kirchlich-politischen Kräftespiel des Reichs, Polens und Dänemarks vom 10. bis 13. Jahrhundert. Mission – Kirchenorganisation – Kultpolitik*, Köln–Wien 1979, pp. 435–436; M. Rębkowski: *Pierwsze lokacje...* [The first chartered towns...], 2001, pp. 113–116.

³⁵ K. Blaschke: *Nikolaikirchen und Stadtentstehung im pommerschen Raum*, “Greifswald-Stralsunder Jahrbuch” 1970–1971, Nr. 9, p. 26.

respective sanctuaries.³⁶ The devotional objects were bought by pilgrims once they reached their destinations and provided evidence of their presence in the sacred places. On their way back, the pilgrims in a way distributed them all over Europe. For some time now, they are discovered in different regions of the continent, usually while deepening river channels and during archaeological excavations carried out mainly in urban areas.³⁷ A series of such discoveries have already been made on the South Baltic coast. A decade ago researchers examined nearly 70 of such objects found from Lübeck in the west to Pärnu in the east.³⁸ In recent years, new and remarkable discoveries have been made, e.g. several dozen pilgrim signs in Stralsund and Wismar,³⁹ and what still partly awaits publication is the largest in this part of Europe the collection of badges finds from Gdańsk. The set consists of hundreds of items and is stored in the local Archaeological Museum.

One of fundamental tasks to be accomplished in the course of research into pilgrim badges is to assign them to respective sanctuaries and thus to identify townspeople's preferences in choosing places to which they made their pilgrimage. Analysed from such a perspective sets of devotional items from the South Baltic region, especially those dating back to the 13th and the 14th centuries, reveal certain tendencies that differentiate them from the badges discovered

³⁶ Their prototypes were most probably shelves *Pecten Maximum* L. used since the 11th century as a symbol of pilgrimage to the tomb of St James the Greater in Compostela, e.g. K. Köster: *Pilgerzeichen und Pilgermuscheln von mittelalterlichen Santiagostraßen*, Neumünster 1983, p. 142 f.; A. Haasis-Berner: *Die Pilgerzeichen des 11.-14. Jahrhunderts. Mit einem Überblick über die europäische Pilgerzeichenforschung*, in: *Archäologie als Sozialgeschichte. Studien zu Siedlung, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im frühgeschichtlichen Mitteleuropa*, eds. S. Brather, Ch. Bücker, M. Hoepfer, Rahden 1999, p. 272.

³⁷ Cf. B. Spencer: *Medieval pilgrim badges. Some general observations illustrated mainly from English sources*, "Rotterdam Papers" 1968, no. 1, p. 139, and remarks made by: L. Andersson: *Pilgrimsmärken och vallfahrt. Medeltida pilgrimskultur i Skandinavien*, "Lund Studies in Medieval Archaeology" 7, Lund 1989, p. 188.

³⁸ M. Rębkowski: *Pielgrzymki mieszkańców średniowiecznych miast południowego wybrzeża Bałtyku w świetle archeologii. Wstęp do badań* [Pilgrimages of the inhabitants of medieval towns situated on the South Baltic coast in the light of archaeology. An introduction to the research], "Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej" [Quarterly of the History of Material Culture] 52, 2004, no. 2, pp. 153–188.

³⁹ R. Samariter: *Pilgerzeichen und religiöse Zeichen aus Stralsunder Frankenvorstadt*, "Bodendenkmalpflege in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern" 2008 (2009), Jb. 56, pp. 191–212; idem: *Neue Pilgerzeichen und religiöse Zeichen aus Stralsund*, in: *Wallfahrer aus dem Osten. Mittelalterliche Pilgerzeichen zwischen Ostsee, Donau und Seine*, eds. H. Kühne, L. Lambacher, J. Hrdina, Frankfurt am Main 2013, pp. 145–178; J. Ansorge: *Mittelalterliche Pilgerzeichen aus der Hansestadt Wismar*, "Bodendenkmalpflege in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern" 2008 (2009), Jb. 56, pp. 213–257; idem: *Pilgerzeichen sowie religiöse und profane Zeichen aus der Grabung für das Ozeaneum in Stralsund*, in: *Das Zeichen am Hut im Mittelalter*, eds. H. Kühne, L. Lambacher, K. Vanja, Frankfurt am Main 2008, pp. 83–114.

in western Europe. First of all, apart from few cases, the pilgrim badges from French, English and Italian shrines, Rome included, are not found on the South Baltic coast. The finds of the characteristic shells of St James (*Pecten maximus* L.) are more common and provide evidence that the pilgrims under discussion visited the tomb of the saint in a distant Compostela. However, the greatest part of badges discovered in the Baltic region was produced in supra-regional sanctuaries located in German-speaking area, among which the most popular were sacred places on the Rhine and the Maas rivers.

Pilgrimage sanctuaries on the abovementioned rivers were arisen in the 12th century and four of them, namely in Aachen, Cologne, Maastricht and Trier, became in the course of time the most important pilgrimage destinations in Germany.⁴⁰ Considerable number of pilgrim badges from the first three aforementioned shrines have been discovered in the Baltic region. The growing role of Aachen and Cologne as sacred places to some extent stemmed from the fact they were located on the so-called Low German route (*Niederstraße*) leading to Compostela.

In the 13th century Aachen became popular and very soon one of major pilgrim centre in northern Europe. In the cathedral church there were kept holy relics, namely the swaddling-bands and loin-cloth of Jesus Christ, the nightgown of Virgin Mary as well as shawl of St John the Baptist. It was also there that the cult of Charlemagne was particularly strong.⁴¹ Aachen was, however, mainly Saint Mary's sanctuary. Most pilgrim badges produced there presented the image of "Enthroned Virgin and the Child" also known as *Maria Aquensis*, or Blessed Virgin Mary's robe outstretched in the same fashion as it was displayed to pilgrims from the cathedral gallery.⁴² As far as the Hanseatic towns are concerned, a substantial number of such items were discovered, among other things, in Gdańsk, Greifswald, Lübeck, Stralsund and Wismar.⁴³

⁴⁰ K. Köster: *Mittelalterliche Pilgerzeichen und Wallfahrtdevotionalien*, in: *Rhein und Maas. Kunst und Kultur 800–1400*, Köln 1972, pp. 146–147; A. Haasis-Berner: *Die Pilgerzeichen des...*, p. 274, Abb. 2.

⁴¹ For general information on Aachen as a pilgrim destination see: E. Stephany: *Heiligtumsfahrt*, in: *Rhein und Maas...*, pp. 142–145; see also: K. Herbers: *Stadt und Pilger*, in: *Stadt und Kirche*, red. F.-H. Hye, Linz–Donau 1995, p. 219 f.

⁴² K. Köster: *Mittelalterliche Pilgerzeichen...*, p. 21; A. Haasis-Berner: *Pilgerzeichen des Hochmittelalters*, Würzburg 2003, pp. 157–166.

⁴³ Early finds and literature listed by M. Rębkowski: *Pielgrzymki...* [Pilgrimages...], pp. 167–169. Recent discoveries in Wismar and Stralsund: cf. J. Ansorge: *Mittelalterliche Pilgerzeichen...*, pp. 221–224; idem: *Pilgerzeichen und Pilgerzeichenforschung in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern*, in: *Wallfahrer aus dem Osten...*, pp. 131–135; R. Samariter: *Neue Pilgerzeichen...*, pp. 152–153; see also: M. Rębkowski: *The Finds of the Pilgrim Badges from the Polish Baltic Coast*, in: *Wallfahrer*

Since the second half of the 12th century, masses of pilgrims had arrived in Cologne to adore the relics of St Ursula and her companions, who are said to have died nearby, and the relics of the Three Kings transferred there from Milan in 1164. Very soon Cologne became a place of worship of supra-regional importance and items produced there were inspired by the above mentioned relics. Pilgrim badges, presenting characteristic image of the “ship of St Ursula” and thus making a reference to the fragment of hagiographic legend about sea voyage made by the holy martyr, were discovered during archaeological excavations in Gdańsk, Szczecin and Stralsund⁴⁴. Furthermore, badges brought by pilgrims from Cologne and presenting the “Bow of the Magi” were found in Lübeck, Elbląg and Stralsund.⁴⁵

In the Hanseatic towns located on the Baltic coast, there have been also found a great number of pilgrim badges presenting St Servatius holding a key, optionally subduing a dragon with lower part of his crosier. His cult became extremely strong since the second half of the 12th century in Maastricht where his tomb was located.⁴⁶ Such badges were discovered on the South Baltic coast, namely in Rostock, Kołobrzeg, Elbląg, Gdańsku, Stralsund and Wismar.⁴⁷

As already mentioned, devotional objects made in the aforementioned three sanctuaries are well represented and found along the entire Baltic coast, i.e. in towns where any pilgrim badges were at all discovered. According to the estimates, the pilgrim badges from the shrine on the Rhine and the Maas rivers

aus dem Osten..., pp. 42–45. Extremely large collection of the badges depicting St Mary, found in Gdańsk and as it seems mostly derived from Aachen, has been recently published by H. Paner: *Średniowieczne świadectwa kultu Maryjnego. Pamiątki pielgrzymie w zbiorach Muzeum Archeologicznego w Gdańsku* [Medieval testimony of the cult of St Mary. The pilgrim souvenirs from the collection of the Archaeological Museum of Gdańsk], Gdańsk 2013.

⁴⁴ M. Rębkowski: *Pielgrzymki...* [Pilgrimages...], pp. 162–165; idem: *The Finds...*, pp. 39–40; J. Ansorge: *Pilgerzeichen und Pilgerziehnforschung...*, p. 131. First references made by K. Köster: *Mittelalterliche Pilgerzeichen...*, p. 154.

⁴⁵ M. Rębkowski: *Pielgrzymki...* [Pilgrimages...], pp. 165–167; R. Samariter: *Pilgerzeichen...*, pp. 201–202, 206–207. Recently more on such pilgrim signs A. Haasis-Berner, J. Poettgen: *Die mittelalterlichen Pilgerzeichen der Heiligen Drei Könige. Ein Beitrag von Archäologie und Campanologie zur Erforschung der Wallfahrt nach Köln*, “Zeitschrift für Archäologie des Mittelalters” 2002, Vol. 30, pp. 173–202, see for references.

⁴⁶ *Lexicon des Mittelalters*, Vol. VII, München 1995, pp. 1791–1792; *Lexicon der christlichen Iconographie*, Vol. VIII, Rom–Freiburg–Basel–Wien 1994, pp. 330–331; K. Köster: *Mittelalterliche Pilgerzeichen...*, pp. 154–155; L. Andersson: *Pilgrimsmärken och...*, pp. 67–69.

⁴⁷ M. Rębkowski: *Pielgrzymki...* [Pilgrimages...], pp. 160–162; idem: *The Finds...*, pp. 37–38; J. Ansorge: *Pilgerzeichen und Pilgerzeichenforschung...*, pp. 131–132.

represented several dozen per cent of all items, and in some cases, e.g. Stralsund, even more than 50%.⁴⁸

Based on the above, it can be stated that the pilgrimage idea emerged among the inhabitants of the Hanseatic towns shortly after their chartering, namely in the 13th century. For the same period of time there are dated the oldest examples of the pilgrim signs found in towns of Lübeck, Stralsund, Rostock and Tallin (Reval).⁴⁹ In the 13th and 14th centuries the inhabitants of the region under discussion made their pilgrimage the most frequently to major supra-regional sanctuaries situated in German-speaking area, among which enormous popularity was achieved by sacred places located on the Rhine and the Maas rivers.⁵⁰ This is reflected both in archaeological finds and in results of research conducted in selected towns and based on written sources such as, e.g. bourgeois testaments.⁵¹ The popularity of the aforementioned sanctuaries stemmed from a number of things. Presumably, it had to do indirectly with trade contacts established between the towns of the Baltic region and the Rhineland, or with the fact that some sanctuaries were founded on the route leading from northern Europe to Compostela.⁵² Last, but not least, popularity under discussion probably followed from the fact that townspeople's identified themselves with the culture of the regions situated in north-western Germany.

Conclusion

The majority of towns situated on the Baltic coast which joined with time the Hanseatic League, were founded in the 13th century inside of different political structures. Each had its own and unique character to which the following

⁴⁸ M. Rębkowski: *Pielgrzymki...* [Pilgrimages...], p. 184 f.; J. Ansgore: *Pilgerzeichen sowie...*, p. 89; idem: *Pilgerzeichen und Pilgerzeichenforschung...*, p. 131; R. Samariter: *Neue Pilgerzeichen...*, p. 173 and Tab. 1.

⁴⁹ M. Rębkowski: *Pielgrzymki...* [Pilgrimages...], p. 181, see for literature.

⁵⁰ Change would eventually take place at the end of the Middle Ages, i.e. in the 15th century, when in this part of Europe pilgrimages to local shrines would assume greater importance. The process is confirmed also in archaeological finds, e.g. J. Ansgore: *Pilgerzeichen sowie...*, p. 89.

⁵¹ See: H. Wernicke: *Religiöses Alltagsleben in den pommerschen Hansestädten während des Spätmittelalters*, "Zeszyty Kulickie" [The Kulice Journal], Nr. 2: *Z dziejów chrześcijaństwa na Pomorzu* [From the history of Christianity in Pomerania], ed. L. von Zitzewitz, Kulice 2001, Fig. 23, p. 163; M. Rębkowski: *Pielgrzymki...* [Pilgrimages...], pp. 167–171.

⁵² On the pilgrim route leading from northern Germany to Compostela cf. K. Köster: *Pilgerzeichen und Pilgermuscheln...*, p. 14 and Abb. 8; idem: *Mittelalterliche Pilgerzeichen...*, p. 211.

contributed: local factors determining development, ethnic and cultural background, topographical conditions, etc. However, in many respects one can notice a number of similarities, if not common features, characterizing the towns situated even at a fair distance. To name at least some of them, long known to researchers: analogical legal realities, rules governing the organization of urban space, ethnic and linguistic bonds of majority of inhabitants or economic realities. Discoveries made in the course of archaeological excavations have shed a new light on the subject matter under discussion.

As a matter of fact, archaeological research on medieval towns situated in the Baltic region and belonging to the Hanseatic League has been conducted on a large scale since the 1980's. Since then, urban archaeology began to flourish which resulted also in quick increase of the number of excavated sources. Studies undertaken in this scope have addressed a number of issues relating to the medieval and post-medieval history of the Hanseatic towns and provided a new light on the hitherto unknown elements of the urban culture. In many cases one may notice striking resemblance which proves the cultural unity of the inhabitants of the towns of the South Baltic coast between the 13th and the 15th centuries. At the same time, special attention should be paid to the fact that the aforementioned similarities can be noticed in regard to completely different cultural aspects such as characteristic religious practices as pilgrimage, urban private architecture contributing to the spatial development of towns, and finally tableware – kept and used in every household. It can be expected that the phenomenon of some sort of the cultural unity can be also proven by archaeological research into e.g. the then craft industry, sea transport, etc.

Finally, one should give some thought to reasons underlying the development of cultural unity of the Hanseatic towns located on the South Baltic coast.⁵³ First and foremost, once more attention should be paid to similar legal and economic factors contributing to the development of medieval towns under discussion. Secondly, emphasis ought to be placed to much the same cultural and ethnical origin of the townspeople, the majority of whom came from German territory and spoke the same language. Finally, one must not neglect the importance of long-distance trade contacts which, after all embodied the essence of the Hanseatic League, since they resulted in an exchange of not only goods, but also ideas. All the above

⁵³ Cf. remarks based on single kinds of finds D.R.M. Gaimster: *The Baltic...*, p. 61; J. Piekalski: *Wczesne domy...* [Early burgher's houses...], pp. 131–133.

factors have contributed to the development of cultural unity of the Hanseatic towns and had a major effect on their final form.

**KAMIENICE SIENIOWE, SZKLIWIONE DZBANY
I ZNAKI PRZELGRZYMIE.
O WSPÓLNOCIE KULTUROWEJ
NADBAŁTYCKICH MIAST HANZEATYCKICH
W ŚWIETLE ARCHEOLOGII**

Streszczenie

Badania archeologiczne nadbałtyckich miast należących w średniowieczu do Hanzy rozpoczęto na większą skalę dopiero w latach 80. XX wieku. Odkrywane w ich trakcie źródła pozwalają postawić tezę o istnieniu wspólnoty kulturowej mieszczan południowego wybrzeża Bałtyku w XIII–XV wieku. W artykule, na wybranych przykładach różnych elementów kultury materialnej dobrze czytelnych w źródłach archeologicznych, podjęto próbę wykazania podobieństw istniejących w odległych od siebie miastach nadbałtyckich w różnych sferach życia mieszczan. Analizę przeprowadzono w odniesieniu do: budownictwa – na przykładzie tzw. kamienic sieniowych, które w XIV wieku stały się wspólnym dla wielu miast nadbałtyckich elementem krajobrazu kulturowego; zestawów naczyń stołowych – na przykładzie popularnych w tej części Europy dzbanów kamionkowych oraz czerwonych naczyń szklawionych, jak również dewocjonaliów religijnych – na przykładzie znaków pielgrzymich, wskazujących na istnienie wyraźnych preferencji w wyborze celów pielgrzymek, koncentrujących się na ponadregionalnych sanktuariach pielgrzymkowych położonych w niemieckim kręgu kulturowym, zwłaszcza w rejonie nadreńsko-nadmozańskim.

Przyczyny wytworzenia wspólnoty kulturowej miast upatrywane są w podobnych uwarunkowaniach prawnych i gospodarczych ich rozwoju, podobnym pochodzeniu kulturowo-etnicznym dominującej części mieszczan, wywodzących się z terenów niemieckich, jak też w intensywnych kontaktach handlowych, których skutkiem była przecież nie tylko wymiana towarów, ale również idei.

*IWONA WIERZCHOWIECKA-RUDNIK**

Koszalin

**THE PROBLEM OF PIRACY IN THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE CHRISTIANS AND ARABS
FROM NORTHERN AFRICA
BETWEEN THE 11TH AND 15TH CENTURIES**

Keywords: piracy, the Mediterranean culture, the law of nations, Islam

Summary

Throughout the period between the 11th and 15th centuries, Christian and Arabic countries as well as territorial dominions, although faced with feudal political chaos, managed to take joint action against pirates. Piracy was unanimously treated as a major risk both to inshore safety and safety at sea, as well as to trade and economic growth. Attempts were made to establish institutional framework for prosecuting the pirates and setting terms under which respective counties would remain legally liable. International treaties had laid foundations for the aforementioned framework and imposed certain liabilities on the countries. A number of treaties concluded during the period under discussion and published by an archivist in the 19th century enables modern researchers to get to know the Law of Nations created somewhere in between the Islamic and European legal cultures.

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I.

K. Marks wrote that *Koran and the Muslim law based on it bring geography and ethnography of the whole world down to a simple and convenient form of dividing the world into two halves: orthodox believer and non believer. A non believer is a Giaur, an enemy. Islam curses non believers and sustains a state of constant hostility between the Muslims and non believers. The pirate ships of the berberic countries were a holy fleet of the Islam.*¹ In the 19th century a conviction in the minds of the Europeans was well seeded, cherished until present day, that there is a traditional hostility between the Christians and the Muslims and particular cruelty of the berberic piracy. Although the Christians also performed piracy enhanced in the times of colonial rivalry and religious wars, but European countries did not see it as a major threat for the safety at sea. Piracy was even a sanctioned legal institution of the marine war, entailing the participation of private ships in military actions on the basis of an authorization from a country in the form of letters of marque. The letters ensured legality and therefore freedom to perform military activities at sea including looting ships and property belonging to the enemy. Some of the captured loot was given to the state, and the rest was treated as remuneration for service. The pirates were called marine robbers, thieves at open sea, outlaws. They created crews organized in a democratic way consisting of outlaws, observing their own moral and legal code and insubordinate to any external authority or institution. While corsairs attacked only the enemies of their principal, the pirates attacked every ship without any exception as well as ports.²

The development of the rule of free trade and freedom of seas in the 19th century made countries to undertake steps to offer legal security of navigation. In 1815, at Vienna Congress, a Declaration of Superpowers concerning the abolition of black slave trade was passed, attached to The Final Act, which forbade piracy, and in 1856 at a Congress in Paris corsair activity was banned as well. Due to the resistance of some western countries it was not possible to codify the law

¹ Cit. for K. Libera: *Prawo konsularne*, Warszawa 1952, p. 8.

² See A. Walczak: *Piractwo i terroryzm morski*, Szczecin 2004; S.P. Menefee: *Świat piratów morskich*, Gdańsk 1982; A. Makowski: *Aspekty prawne międzynarodowych sił morskich w zwalczaniu piractwa*, "Prawo Morskie", vol. XV, pp. 21–27; F. Braudel: *La Méditerranée et le monde Méditerranéen à l'époque de Philip II*, Paris 1987, vol. II, p. 191; R. Coulet du Gard: *La Course et la Piraterie en Méditerranée*, Paris 1980.

in order to fight piracy or even define the procedure until the first international conference regarding the sea was organized in Geneva in 1958.³

The Convention of United Nations with regards to sea which is in power at present was passed in 1982. In art. 101 the Convention defines marine piracy as:⁴

- a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
 - on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft,
 - against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
- b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
- c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

The acts of piracy, as defined in article 101, committed by a warship, government ship whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship are assimilated to acts committed by a private ship. A ship is considered a pirate ship if it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 101. The same applies if the ship has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control of the persons guilty of that act. A ship may retain its nationality although it has become a pirate ship. The retention or loss of nationality is determined by the law of the State from which such nationality was derived.

On the basis of art.105, on the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship, or a ship taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith. A seizure on account of piracy may be carried out only by warships or

³ L. Łukasik: *Spółeczność międzynarodowa wobec problemu piractwa morskiego – wybrane aspekty prawne*, "Prawo Morskie", vol. XXV, p. 136.

⁴ *Konwencja Narodów Zjednoczonych o prawie morza*, sporządzona w Montego Bay dnia 10 grudnia 1982 r., Dz. U. z 2002, Nr 59, poz. 543.

military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect.

In the light of penal code, the seizure of control over a marine ship is often connected with violence and illegal deprivation of freedom and taking crew members and passengers hostage. While a robbery is any illegal violent act, deprivation of freedom or an act of looting or threat directed against a ship, people or property on board of the ship within the boundaries subject to jurisdiction of the given country. An attack on territorial waters described as marine buccaneering is not a piracy in terms of international law. The people committing such act are subject to the jurisdiction of the country where the offence is committed, while pirates can be prosecuted by every country. So the offence is only differentiated by the place where it was committed – in case of piracy it is high sea (open) not subject to jurisdiction of any country.⁵

II.

In this article we will try to focus our attention to the problem of piracy in the western part of the Mediterranean in distant past – between the 11th and 15th centuries. In the 11th century, as a result of developing economy in southern Europe, Christian merchants entered into trading contracts with all centers of exchange around the Mediterranean. The demand for the exchange of goods of all types from the distant regions of the world broke through the cultural and religious prejudices and bans between the Muslim merchants and Christian ones. In this particular period of common interests between those cultures, attempts were made to create a stable, safe zone for international trade. Diplomatic missions of emissaries, the system of protection of consuls outside the boundaries of the country and regulated in treaties guarantees of rights and freedom of foreigners in foreign countries, created institutional framework for the development of world trade. At the same time local religious conflicts, wars, dispersion of feudal power political instability of the region and increasing pirate actions corsair activity and contraband were a serious threat for its safety. Preventing wars was impossible, and the evolution of the system of feudal organization of the state towards national states with a strong central power required time. The more we

⁵ K. Wardin: *Współczesne piractwo morskie zagrożeniem dla międzynarodowego transportu morskiego*, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Marynarki Wojennej 2009, XLX, no. 3 (178), p. 91.

must appreciate the fact that in this difficult period – in the civilizational, social and political way – there were joint and loyal attempts to fight with crime at sea. The idea failed shortly after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453. The political and trading rivalry between the Osmons and the Europeans in the Mediterranean, periodically leading to warfare, shook in the 16th century the foundations of regional trading cooperation. In this rivalry the greatest victors were the pirates themselves – Christian and Arab alike⁶. The controlled marine routes, blocked ports and even actively participated in the policies of marine superpowers. Their idea of joint counteraction to piracy was revived in the 19th century but the first realistic success were the provisions of the international Geneva Convention in 1958.⁷

III.

At around 800 B.C., the marine expansion of the Arabs began in the western part of the Mediterranean, although the majority, which invaded the Iberian peninsula set up a Cordoba Caliphate, did not feel connected with the sea. The Arabs said that they are land people and the earth belongs to them and the Christian are people of the sea. The first Caliphs did not bring to their mind that it was possible to “row” at sea. One Arab poet Ceuty refused to take an invitation to Seville, explaining that he was not Moses, who could cross the sea and neither did he intend to build an Arc like Noe did.⁸ However, in 650 B.C. Mouawiyah, the future Caliph, who gave great significance to the strategic role of the fleet and marine expeditions in order to spread Islam and defend from Byzantium, received from the Caliph Othman consent to a marine expedition. Since the 9th century Arab attacks on Mediterranean islands increased significantly. In 814 the Arabs attacked Sardinia and Corsica, in 816 Balears and again Sardinia in 820 and in 831 they seized the country of Palermo. In 838 they attacked Marseille and in 840 they reached Rhone. An unexpected attack of the Vikings in 844 on Seville was a consequence of the developing marine power of the Arab state. Until then their

⁶ See R. Crowley: *Morskie Imperia. Batalia o panowanie na Morzu Śródziemnym 1521–1580*, Poznań 2012.

⁷ See R. Zaorski: *Konwencje genewskie o prawie morza*, Gdańsk 1962.

⁸ N. Barbour: *L'influence de la géographie et de la puissance navale sur le destin de l'Espagne musulmane et du Maroc*, Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée, Année 1970, vol. 8, no. Spécial, p. 48.

fleet was only aimed at defense, but attack on Balears in 849 and, however fruitless, expeditions to Galicia in 859 announced their vaster marine activity.⁹ At the same time we see the increase of extensive trade between the ports of Andalusia and the Muslim ports and Christian neighbors

Between 900 and 975 Andalusia reached its peak as marine superpower. The admiral of the Andalusia fleet Abdurrahman al-Rumahis was the third dignitary in the hierarchy of the Caliphate. The marine expansion of Andalusia was oriented at the west Maghreb and France. The interest in France was due to the seizure by Arab pirates a nobleman's castle in 888 near the village of Fraxinet in the Southern coast of Provence. Fraxinet was changed into a stronghold which became a role model for similar strongholds newly set up on the captured lands to the North as far as Savoie and Piedmont.¹⁰ The successes of the Arab pirates stemmed from the support of caliph Abd ar-Rahman III, the local people, taking advantage and participating in the looting expeditions and local Frankish rulers, who used the pirates as mercenaries in the private wars against each other. In 931 an Italian king Hugon from Arelatu, with the aid of Bisantine warships, destroyed the pirate fleet and the walls of the stronghold, but finally made an agreement with the Arabs on the basis of which they retained Fraxinet, in return for military help against his competitor to the throne. Lack of support from the new caliph Hakam II and the increase of French power caused the Arabs to leave the area of Grenoble and after the battle in 972 they moved back from the St. Bernard's Pass and finally in 975 they left Fraxinet as well. The abandoning of the strongholds – *fraxinum* – was the beginning of an end for the caliphate which swamped in civil war, divided in 1030 into multiple independent emirates, finally fell in 1212. The Muslims never tried to rebuild their marine power again but in the straits and in the immediate proximity of the shoreline they have always been present.

The geographical closeness on the one hand generated conflicts between cultures hostile by nature, but on the other, the vicinity and necessity to share common area forced cooperation. The treaty entered into by Charles the Great and sultan Aaroun-al-Raschid (Harun-al Rashid) facilitated economic growth in the area of the Mediterranean. The Arabs took control in the eastern part of the Mediterranean of the route towards Far East and became go-betweens in the trade with Europe. Christian merchants still, as in ancient times, provided Europe with

⁹ Ibidem, p. 49.

¹⁰ M. Ballan: *Fraxinetum, A Glimpse into the Mediterranean World of the Tenth Century?*, "A Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies" 2010, vol. 41, pp. 23–76.

oriental goods and the East in skin, fabric, salt and salted fish, Similar conditions of life, because of the climate and access to sea, which was a common source of food and sailing route gradually made Christians and Muslims closer to each other despite religious and cultural differences. While in the East the cultural religious and trading rivalry of the Muslims, Greek and Latin people and feuds about sacred shrines for both cultures in Jerusalem, temporarily turned into military conflicts, the relations in the West, between Maghreb, the caliphate in Cordoba and south west Europe were decisively more peaceful. The capture of sacred places in Bethlehem and Jerusalem by the Muslims and the expansion of Islam in the Byzantine territory was a reason for religious wars. Military expeditions of the Muslims and those of the Crusaders true, made trading contacts difficult but there was never a total loss of relations.

IV.

On the other hand, religious tolerance and personal safety and property guarantees for the Christians in Arab lands in the western part of the Mediterranean created a kind of peaceful coexistence of the people from both cultures. It enhanced the development of industry in Italian towns and trading centers on African coast where routes from Northern Europe and trans-Saharan caravans met. In between crusades, Christian knights even hired themselves for military service with Muslim rulers. Even the relations between the Vatican and those rulers were more than diplomatic. From the remaining correspondence we learn that with their consent they sent Catholic priests to Maghreb, set up bishoprics and built churches in the Christian districts.

The political and trading relations between Christians and Muslims in the Mediterranean were regulated by the treaty of peace and trade. The doctrine of the Islamic law excludes peace between Muslims and the “infidels” but at the same time allows for “truce” during which the non-Muslims can safely be in the area of a Muslim state. The institution of truce was the basis for making treaties with Christian states, soothing the doctrine of the constant duty to convert to Islam all “infidels” or their irradiation in case of resistance. In the Arab language such treaties guaranteeing truce were called *soulhy*.¹¹ The treaties were made at the

¹¹ J.-C. Aristid Gavillot : *Les capitulations et la réforme judiciaire. Essais sur les droits des Européens en Turquie et en Egipte*, Paris 1875, p. 5.

request of the Christians who demand for the same legal security of the person and property, freedom of trade, mixture and freedom of religious practices to be respected in the non-Christian countries as in their own. And to obtain legally guaranteed trading benefits, covering duty concessions and ex territorial activity in a Muslim country.¹²

The signed treaties had the character of royal charters, which were a particular form of promulgated trading conventions. The contained two main guarantees: protection of life and property of the Christians and some right in return for specific duties. Amongst the rights and freedoms, the treaties guaranteed at the territory subordinate to Muslim authority: safety of persons, freedom of transactions, jurisdiction and irresponsibility of consuls of Christian countries before the Muslim authorities, extra territorial character and safety of fondouks, of allotted districts with building property, churches and cemeteries, individual responsibility in civil and criminal matters, a free access to foreigner's ports, coming on ships belonging to the party of the treaty, the ban to apply *ius caducum* and mutual ban of piracy, protection of castaways and wrecks and therefore canceling, in mutual relations, *ius naufragii*, which allowed the inhabitants of the coast to seize things the sea threw into the shore. The canceling of coastal law although made the relations more civilized, failed to fully prevent looting. On the basis of adopted treaty decisions, it was possible to demand compensation for inflicted damages.¹³

Duties and obligations of ensuring public order and police laws concerned merchants as well as travelers found on their ships and also their rulers. Muslim rulers made reservations that free access to ports is only limited for the Christians. The articles of the treaty guarantees the freedom of religion and religious practices containing duty laws and regulating the rules of export and import, expropriation and the rules concerning the fight with contraband and piracy, were mutually minding for all entities of both contracting parties – Christians on Muslim territory and Muslims on the territories of Christian rule. (85) The charters and obligations concerned the time and place of stay in the cities (ports) indicated in the treaty and on coastal waters and high sea. The basis of the guarantees of observing the treaty was a rule *pacta sunt servanda*, the rule of “good faith” – *bonae*

¹² *Grand dictionnaire encyclopédique Larousse*, vol. 2, Paris 1982, p. 1758; J. Dalègre, *Grecs et Ottomans 1453–1923 de la chute de Constantinople à la disparition de l'empire Ottoman*, Paris 2002, p. 130.

¹³ L. de la Mas Latrie: *Traité de paix et de commerce. Documents divers concernat les relations des chrétiens avec les Arabes de l'Afrique septentrionale*, Paris 1866, vol. 1, p. 311.

fidei iudicia. The institution of “good faith” was connected with the medieval institution of care, to which the senior obliged himself in feudatory relations and the Muslim institution called *aman*, understood as patronage and care.¹⁴ *Bona fides* was a civilistic general clause, known from ancient times especially in Roman law. In the Middle Ages it was referred to in international law¹⁵ (page 664) and it was applied as protection of legal trust and protection and the aim of the treaty.¹⁶ Reference was made to *bonae fidei iudicia i ius gentium*, especially in the conclusion of the acts and during performing treaty obligations.¹⁷

The example of respecting the rule of “good faith” is the case of 1315, concerning the councilors of Barcelona. On the demand of archbishop of Seville and admiral king of Castile, four armed galleys from Seville took part in the convoy protecting merchants from Barcelona and Valencia. The merchants had good reasons to fear attacks from sailors, sailing under the flag of the hostile kingdom of Tlemcen. After 20 days of the expedition and looting enemy ships, there was a disagreement about the division of the loot and slaves who were the subjects of the sultan of Tunis and Bougie. One of the commanders of the convoy, representing Barcelona, not only refused to participate in the spread of loots, in the part coming from the property belonging to the subjects of the sultan, but even insisted on setting those slaves free and returning their goods to them.¹⁸

Peace treaties, friendship and trade, which remained until our times, and which are known to us, were usually signed in the interest of the Christians, although they contained the clause of mutuality. The Muslim rarely traveled towards European coasts. Therefore, there was no need to establish a steady Arab consul in a Christian country. The local ruler or government took care over the foreigners, resembling the ancient Greek institution called *procsenos*, or the Roman *pretor peregrinus* decided disputes between the Roman citizen and the foreigner and between foreigners.¹⁹

¹⁴ R. Kolb: *La bonne foi en droit international public*, Revue Belge de Droit Internationale 1998/2.

¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 664.

¹⁶ Ibidem, pp. 662–664.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 664.

¹⁸ *Lettre des conseillers de municipaux de Barcelone, de 6 novembre 1315*, in: L. de la Mas Latrie : *Traité de paix et de commerce*, vol. 2, p. 311.

¹⁹ See J. Sutor: *Prawo dyplomatyczne i konsularne*, Warszawa 1977.

It must be noted that almost every treaty, directly or indirectly, regulated the issue of prosecuting piracy in the Mediterranean and the responsibility of countries for the inflicted damages by their own subject, dealing with buccaneering.

V.

Piracy is an intrinsic phenomenon connected with the entire area of the Mediterranean both in the East and West. The procedure was regarded as crime since ancient times, but the countries due to political and material weakness, especially strong fleet, were unable to prevent it or prosecute the culprits of these crimes. Rivalry between scattered centers of power increasingly aided the impunity of the pirates, especially that feudal rulers often used the pirates in private wars. It is difficult to establish nowadays, without thorough investigation, how much authorization the pirates had from the states for their actions at sea, conducted as part of the “holy war” – legal in the light of Islam law, and how much and when it was sole sea robbery. While Christian piracy, right from the ancient times, was a crime, although ineffectively persecuted.

In the East, war conflicts facilitated robberies at sea which Latin and Greek pirates specialized in, as well as contraband. Both Popes and rulers, in their decrees, forbid certain goods to be sold to the Muslims described as *negotia prohibita*. Those consisted of war goods-iron, ropes for ships, building timber, linen and hemp. It was also prohibited to trade with Christian slaves, which the pirates sold to harems and military formations, eg. Mamelut police. Constant Christian-Muslim wars created constant demand for war articles. Neither the ban to trade, nor the consciousness that the smuggled weapons and other goods may be used against Christians, did limit contraband. What is more, merchants themselves dealt with this procedure, unsaturated in their greed. For example, Segurano Salvago, a ship owner from Genoa, transported from Port Euxin in Capadoccia to Alexandria around two thousand children kidnapped from the Black Sea region and sold them as slaves.²⁰

Piracy was, in the Middle Ages, unanimously condemned as a crime against God, the Church and Christianity and public unhappiness.²¹ Both the Church and

²⁰ L. de Mas Latrie: *L'officium robarie ou l'office de la piraterie à Gênes au Moyen Âge*, Bibliothèque de l'école des Châtres, Années 1892, vol. 53, no. 53, p. 266.

²¹ Ibidem, p. 264.

secular rulers tried to counteract contraband and piracy. Their actions intensified in the 13th century in connection with crusades and trading rivalry of the Italian countries with Byzantium and Arab markets. There were attempts to secure trading ships from the attacks by organizing expeditions safeguarded by war ships. There were voices that the Church should even participate financially in those activities. A symbol of the policies of the authorities was threatening these crimes by severe sanctions such as: excommunication, confiscation of property on land, ships and goods, also done in Aran ports. By the end of the 13th century a so called Office for Piracy was established in Genoa-Officium Robarie. Its function was to monitor the problem of piracy and compensation of losses the sailors and merchants incurred from pirates from Genoa. All these actions proved absolute inefficiency of Popes' decrees and the secular public authorities.

VI.

There were complex reasons underlying the development of piracy amongst Christian sailors: 1) the increase of sea trade as a result of the crusades and economic development; 2) the fact that corsair activity in the public law had the form of legal and regular actions during war; 3) including trading ships in war actions; 4) lack of country owned fleet or an inadequate potential of such in eliminating robbers; 5) lack of ability to ensure safety to trading ships; 6) political rivalry of the feudal masters, cities and communes who used pirate fleets in private wars. Systematic development of the Sicilian piracy since the expeditions of the Normans in the tenth century in African ports is an example of the complexity of the problem. Acquisition of maritime trade by merchants from Venice, Genoa and Tuscany caused the collapse of many local markets. It was especially felt in Sicily. An economic collapse and the resulting downfall of real political power, caused that Sicily was one of the first countries, in the period after the surrender of Constantinople, where the Greek and Turkish pirates found their outpost. In a few years Favignana and Marettimo (according to Samuel Butler, Marettimo was the homeland for Odysseus) – two islands in the area of the peninsula and the city of Trapani, became the hideout for pirates, from where they set out on expeditions against ships sailing towards Sardinia and North Africa.²² Trapani, once a rich town, like Messina, located in the north-eastern part, was depopulated in a short

²² L. de la Mas Latrie: *Traité de paix et de commerce*, vol. 1, p. 318.

time and trade died out completely. The terrorized people in the coastal towns and local villages lost the sources of their income and existence.

At the same time, good relations between the inhabitants of the coast of Africa and Sicily were seriously threatened, despite particularly good intentions of the old Sultan of Tunis, Abu Omar. By the decision of the states in Palermo in 1458 a decision was made to build a system of protection of the coast, but in fact it resembled more war preparations than peaceful ones. For ten years, between 1470 and 1479, there was an exchange of diplomatic correspondence between the ruler of Tunis and king Ferdinand, the king of Naples and Jan, the king of Aragon, Sicily and Navarre. Alfons V African, the king of Portugal, joined the negotiations in 1472, and while in Tunis, demanded from the currently reigning vice king of Sicily, to negotiate the release of 500 Christian prisoners of war, remaining in the countries of the emir. A peace treaty was signed then, which according to Muslim law in the relationships with Christians could only have a temporary character. The prisoner were freed and the sultan, to secure the interest of the subjects of Sicily, even appointed a special consul. Those functions together with the title of the vice king were given to a banker, a member of Royal Council in Palermo, Jacob Bonanno.²³ The existence of the treaty was prolonged but the final agreement was not reached, despite great efforts of the Tunisia party and Sicilian advisors, because Barcelona and Naples had the decisive negotiating position and were absolutely uninterested in the ordering of mutual relations. Generally in the 15th century the relations between Aragon and Barcelona, temporarily independent, were friendly with the rulers of Tunis, and Catalanian merchants would safely reach the ports of Maghreb. Meanwhile, the connection of Castile and Aragon caused king Ferdinand and queen Isabela focus their efforts on the struggle with Maura, and the merchants of Italian Republics in care of their own trading business were interested in the destabilization of Sicily. In this way, Naples and Castile sacrificed Sicily for their own interests and indirectly caused the strengthening of safety for the hideouts of Sicilian pirates, and growing criminality of the local people deprived of the possibility of legal sources of income.

King Louis XI conducted a different policy towards the Arab countries, and acted extensively to deepen the relations with the African coast rulers. A particularly friendly relations with sultan Abu-Omar Othman caused that merchants from Provence reached African ports safely. From the notarial documents displayed in

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 319, see treaties in vol. 2, pp. 171–174.

Perpignan it appears that merchants from Roussillon, a province which belonged to the rulers of Aragon, also profited from those friendly French-Muslim relations. Having the guarantees of safety from the Muslims, they could bravely face Christian pirates.

VII.

It must be noted that almost every treaty contained an agreement on the joint prosecution of piracy. A collection of treaties and other documents collected and published by L. de la Mas Latrie, is a valuable source of knowledge of the international aspect of this particular problem. The collection contains 84 original treaties and other diplomatic documents. The oldest treaty comes from 1155 and the last from the beginning of the sixteenth century. In this article we are going to merely point out some examples that illustrate the above issue.

For example, in 1236 a treaty was signed between the kingdom of Tunis and Genoa. In the treaty it was decided that if a citizen of Genoa or another, being under the power and care of Genoa, attack Saracens in the sea, will be traced, prosecuted and sentenced to death as well as loss of their property to the benefit of the Saracens. Furthermore, the treaty obliged the people of Genoa to participate in the actions of the Saracens organized against the pirates.

In 1314²⁴ 1323 a treaty was signed in Barcelona for four years between Jacob II, the king of Aragon, Valencia, Sardinia and Corsica and the king of Tunis to provide armed Christian galleys in order to track pirates together.²⁵ At the same time Jacob II referred to the king of Morocco, Abu al-Hasasan with the request for financial aid and sending the Aragon knights, being in his service, in connection with war for Sardinia and Corsica.²⁶ He skillfully reminded him about the galleys which he had sent as help for his predecessor, who fought for Ceuta with the king of Grenada. At the same time he offered a renewed treaty of peace and friendship in return for the return of knights, he offered to send a few Aragon galleys to

²⁴ *Traité de paix et de commerce conclu pour dix année entre Jaques II, rois d'Aragon, de Valence, de Sardaigne et de Corse, et Abou-Yahia Zakaria El-Lihyani roi de Tunis et de Bougie*, in: L. de la Mas Latrie: *Traités de paix et de commerce*, vol. 2, p. 306.

²⁵ *Traité de paix et de commerce conclu pour le quatre ans entre Jaques II, rois d'Aragon, de Valence, de Sardaigne et de Corse, et Abou-Yahia Abou-Bekr, roi de Tunis et de Bougie en 1314*; L. de la Mas Latrie: *Traités de paix et de commerce*, vol. 2, p. 319.

²⁶ *Lettre de Jaques II, roi d'Aragon, à Abou-Saïd-Othman, 1323, 1 mai, de Barcelone*, in: L. de la Mas Latrie: *Traités de paix et de commerce*, vol. 2, p. 315.

defend the coast of Morocco from the pirate attacks. The signed treaty in 1339 decided about taking mutual actions in order to trace pirates and prosecute them by the country from which they came. The countries obliged themselves to repair damaged done by their own pirates or corsairs. The treaties signed by Florence and Pisa with Tunis in 1392 and 1421 concerning the elimination of piracy, were closely bound to the practices applied in the region of undertaking joint actions against the pirates. The most important provision concerned the obligation of Italians to participate in every war expedition organized by the sultan against Toscana pirates and all other pirates entering the ports of Toscana.²⁷ From the act written in Latin stems the duty of providing armed galleys, but in the Arab text there was a clearly phrased order to subject the galleys under the command of the sultan. It is possible that the translator (drogman) compiled the Latin text in a way to make it more appropriate for the ambitions of the Christians. The parties to this treaty decided that the authorities of Florence and Pisa will search pirates on land, as well as at sea. The procedure of piracy connected with an illegal apprehension of the subjects of the sultan was threatened with death penalty and the loss of property on land and goods on the ship to the benefit of the sultan. Another treaty was made on 23 April 1445 for a period of 31 years. In art. 7 and 8 the decisions from the previous agreement were repeated.²⁸

Conclusion

In the Middle Ages, just like in Roman times, there was a difference in waging war against hostile parties from looting pirate feats on ships under any flag. War in the light of then-existing law had a legal character and all acts against life and private and public property were not treated as violation of the law. However, acts of piracy were acts of sea robbery and barbarianism (primitive, savage uncivilized actions). Robbery and looting at sea and within the ports was a crime, punishable by highest possible sentences in all countries of the Mediterranean.

²⁷ *Traité perpétuel de paix et de commerce entre Abou-Farès Abd-el-Aziz, roi de Tunis, d'une part, la république de Florence et de Pise et le seigneur de Piombino, d'autre part, conclu en 1421*, in: L. de la Mas Latrie: *Traité de paix et de commerce*, vol. 2, pp. 352, 353.

²⁸ *Traité de paix et de commerce conclu pour la trente et un années solaire entre la république de Florence et de Pise et le roi de Tunis, 1445, 23 avril [à Tunis]*, in: L. de la Mas Latrie, *Traité de paix et de commerce*, p. 357.

The procedure of piracy has a tradition as long as the history of sea transportation. For thousands of years people were conscious of the strategic and economic significance of marine communication, which had at its disposal the area of seas and oceans covering 70,8% of the Earth's surface. Aristotle wrote that *as concerns marine forces, possessing them in certain amount is useful. Because a country should cast fear not only amongst its own citizens but also on some of their neighbors, as well as to be able to offer help both on land and at sea. When establishing the quantity and number of those forces one must take into account the country's living interest. Because if it takes leading position and enters great politics, it must be in possession of a marine force suitable for the tasks.*²⁹

This fact was also evident to organized criminal groups. Not only due to anticipated profits, but also because of the fact that the vastness of the seas and jagged coastline made searching and prosecution difficult. The marine area guaranteed higher probability of impunity than land.

The development of national markets and the intensification of international trade, on one hand, and the escalation of political and economic rivalry of the marine countries on the other, facilitated in the 16th century and centuries that followed, an increase of danger of piracy and corsair activity on the Mediterranean. All countries presented a surprising political particularism and attained their goal by all means also using mercenaries and corsairs. One can risk a thesis that between the 11th and 15th centuries, the Christian and Arab countries and territorial rulers, even though existed in the conditions of total feudal chaos, were able to work out common actions in order to eradicate sea criminals. They were treated unanimously as threat for the trade and economic development. We must give credit to the fact that they managed to create institutional framework for common eradication of pirates and to work out rules of legal responsibility of each state. However, there was lack of ability to effectively counteract robberies. The administrative organization, even though professional in some states, was based on bureaucracy, was financially, material and logistically inefficient to fight piracy. Apart from Venice, the countries did not possess a sufficient fleet of war ships or system of convoys.³⁰ In most countries political power was weak and unstable, and often hired pirate mercenaries in their struggle for succession. From the treaties and the remaining diplomatic correspondence, which L. de la Mas

²⁹ Arystoteles: *Polityka*, Warszawa 2011, p. 192.

³⁰ B. Doumerc: *Des Echelles du Levant aux brumes atlantiques*, in: *Venice 1500, La puissance, la novation et la concord: le triomphe du mythe*, ed. Ph. Braunstein, Paris, pp. 132–133.

Latrie collected, it appears that due to technological advantage in shipbuilding, the political relations in Europe and the increase of marine rivalry between the countries, a greater responsibility for pirate acts until the 15th century lies on Christians, although in European tradition it is the Muslims who bear the blame for barbarian acts.³¹ It was due to the fact that from European perspective it was thought that Christians suffered more from pirate attacks than Muslims. Higher level of development of trade on the part of the Christian merchants automatically generated an impression of higher losses in confrontation with Muslim pirates. Christian piracy developed in the times of crusades and the conquering of Sicily by the Normans, who joined Italian robbers.

PROBLEM PIRATÓW W RELACJACH ŻEGLUGOWYCH POMIĘDZY CHRZEŚCIJANAMI I ARABAMI Z AFRYKI PÓŁNOCNEJ OD XI DO XV WIEKU

Streszczenie

W okresie od XI do XV wieku chrześcijańskie i arabskie państwa oraz władztwa terytorialne, mimo że funkcjonowały w warunkach feudalnego chaosu politycznego, były zdolne do wypracowania jednności działań skierowanych przeciwko piratom. Piractwo traktowano zgodnie jako zagrożenie bezpieczeństwa morskiego i przybrzeżnego a także zagrożenie handlu i rozwoju gospodarczego. Próbowano stworzyć ramy instytucjonalne do wspólnego ścigania piratów oraz wypracować zasady odpowiedzialności karnej państw. Ich podstawą były zawierane traktaty międzynarodowe, nakładające na państwa określone zobowiązania. Zbiór traktatów z tego okresu opublikowany w XIX wieku przez archiwistę umożliwia współczesnym badaczom zapoznać się z prawem międzynarodowym tworzonym na pograniczu islamskiej i europejskiej kultury prawnej.

³¹ L. de la Mas Latrie: *Traité de paix et de commerce*, vol. 1, pp. 233–234.

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THE FRENCH CONQUEST OF ALGIERS

Keywords: Algeria, France, Ottoman Empire, Barbary piracy, Lord Palmerston, “independence and integrity” doctrine, fly-whisk incident

Summary

The article is an attempt to present and discuss – based on the struggle against Barbary pirates and corsairs waged in the Mediterranean Sea – dynamic and complex political and economic processes as well as diplomatic efforts that contributed to the French conquest of Algiers in 1830. The first three decades of the 19th century were among the most turbulent periods in the history of the French nation. Defeated and humiliated by the enemy coalition in 1815, France did not give up on her “imperial dream”, this time trying to make it come true in a non-distant Maghreb. The way to achieve this goal was, however, quite bumpy. At that time, the western part of the Mediterranean Sea was an arena of competition, mainly between the United States and Great Britain. After all, this turned out to be very favourable to France. Wishing to introduce an extra element into the game, eliminate rivals for overseas supremacy, as well as win Russia – that was gradually strengthening her influence in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea – as an ally, at the end of the 1820’s Great Britain became an advocate of her neighbour across the English Channel. Gradually regaining her economic potential and international importance, France reached for Algiers by entering the armed conflict. However, the French stronghold in Maghreb would soon pose a major challenge to the British colonialism in Africa. Expressing their major concern over the security of so-called “imperial route” leading via the Mediterranean sea, British politicians and statesmen adopted a new political stance

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toward the declining Ottoman Empire. Owing to their “independence and integrity” doctrine (formulated in 1830’s), the rich Ottoman heritage managed to “survive” by the outbreak of World War II.

Once the wars of the Napoleonic era had come to an end, superpowers – particularly western Europe and Great Britain – did not involve much in the matters of the Middle East. The old continent was recovering after the violent conflict, while Great Britain faced serious internal social and economic problems.¹ Initiated in 1798 by the French invasion of Egypt, the crisis was gradually becoming less severe in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. However, the emerging political situation did not entail the dawn of peaceful era in this region. In fact, already during the war with Napoleonic France, and particularly once it was over, in the west part of the above mentioned sea a new hotbed of international conflict emerged and began to escalate. The conflict that would soon lead to serious political and economic consequences.

Shortly after the outbreak of war with republican France, British authorities introduced modifications into the international law of the sea announced at the beginning of the seven-year war (1756). The law, also known as The Rule, was enacted against hostile countries and their allies, and allowed to search merchant ships and confiscate American goods on their way to the states belonging to European coalition.² American maritime trade suffered major losses due to these restrictions. These were even more severe since the government headed by William Pitt the Younger appropriated the law also referred to as impressment on the strength of which the Royal Navy vessels – while searching the ships – had the right to impress British soldiers who served in the U.S. merchant marine. In order

¹ See Z.S. Zalewski: *Wpływ wewnętrznych przeobrażeń gospodarczych i społecznych na rozwój Imperium Brytyjskiego w XIX w.* [Effect of internal economic and social transformation on the rise of the British Empire in the 19th century], in: *Echa Przeszłości* [Echoes of the Past] ed. W. Gieszczyński, vol. X, Olsztyn 2009, p. 113, passim.

² See *The Rule of 1756*, in: C.J. Colombos: *The International Law of the Sea*, Forth Revised Edition, London 1961, pp. 613–614; The aforementioned doctrine was formulated in the 17th century when, after naval warfare with Holland, Great Britain abandoned a mediaeval principle known as *Consolato del Mare* and followed a ruthless French theory of “becoming infected” (la théorie de l’infection) according to which a ship or a cargo travelling from a neutral country became “infected” the moment they had any contact with a ship or a cargo travelling from a country at war, and in line with the 17th century principle of the contraband of war, the Royal Navy reserved the right to confiscate such a cargo, sometimes together with the ship. See R. Bierzanek: *Morze otwarte ze stanowiska prawa międzynarodowego* [The Open Sea and the International Law], Warszawa 1960, pp. 34–35.

to prevent that from happening, the Americans began to direct merchant ships traffic through the Straits of Gibraltar toward French ports located on the Mediterranean coast. However, these routes were not safe either. It was in this part of the world that merchants had for ages dealt with a great plague of Barbary pirates.

It can be assumed that, mainly for economic reasons, the United States were the first country which in modern history took planned and successful actions against the widespread plague of buccaneers in the western part of the Mediterranean sea. Throughout the period 1801–1804, they waged the so-called First Barbary War during which on the order of Thomas Jefferson the U.S. navy undertook a number of military operations, mainly against Hamet Caramanly Paşa, the Dey of Tripoli.³ After a series of dramatic battles and several blockades on the port of Tripoli, representatives of both parties entered negotiations, following which on 23 February the so-called Eaton-Hamet convention was ratified. Soon, on 4 July 1805, the USA signed peace and friendship treaty with Hamet Caramanly Paşa.⁴

In 1975, agreement was reached with the Ottoman governor of Algeria who was a principal and patron of corsairs and pirates active on the Algerian coast. On the strength of this agreement, the U.S. government undertook to pay annual tribute to the dangerous satrap which was supposed to strengthen the security of American maritime commerce. However, as the war with the fourth Napoleonic coalition (1806–1807) escalated, Great Britain intensified her anti-American action in the Atlantic. As a result, since 1807 Americans paid small amounts of money to Hadzi 'Ali ben Khrelil Paşa (1809–1815) and after the American-British war outburst in 1812 they stopped paying at all.⁵ In 1810, the irritated Ottoman governor declared war on the United States, thus giving free hand to corsairs and pirates who very soon nearly completely pushed the American trade shipping to the east, but also west of Gibraltar, i.e. in a non-distant Atlantic.⁶

In September 1812, Algerian corsairs hijacked a small American brig together with an eleven-man crew.⁷ Needless to say, this act of violence outraged the

³ See S.P. Waldo: *The Life and Character of Stephen Decatur: Late Commodore and Post-captain in the Navy of the United States, and the Navy Commissioner*, Hartford 1821, p. 65.

⁴ See "War" and Peace: *The United States and the Garrison of Tripoli*, in: *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics. A Documentary Record. European Expansion, 1535–1914*, vol. I, ed. J.C. Hurewitz, New Haven–London, Yale University Press 1975, pp. 157–161.

⁵ Ottoman governors of Algeria were addressed: Paşa (1517–1700), Dey (1700–1718) and Paşa-Dey between 1718 and 1830. They were also addressed Beylerbeys, i.e. Bey of Beys.

⁶ See *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., p. 202.

⁷ See *ibidem*.

American society. Therefore, shortly after signing peace treaty with Great Britain in Ghent (24 December 1814) and once military actions had finally been over (13 February 1815), on 5th March Congress passed the act on launching punitive expedition against Algiers.

In the second half of May, two strong squadrons of the U.S. navy, under the command of two Commodores Stephen Decatur and William Bainbridge, left the U.S. coast and headed for the Mediterranean Sea. The first squadron raised anchor on 20 May in New York, whereas the other left Boston shortly after.⁸

On 14 June, a nine-warship squadron under Decatur's command went through the Straits of Gibraltar.⁹ Three days later, near the Spanish coast (to be more specific Cabo di Gata) the Americans came across the main squadron of Algerian fleet. *USS Constellation* attacked *Meshuda*, a flagship frigate, and pushed it under the fire of *USS Guerriere*. After two gun salvos, the enemy vessel attempted to escape but was cut off by the fire of *USS Epervier* and eventually had to surrender. In this battle, Admiral Rais Hammidu, under whose command Algerian squadron took military actions, and 30 seamen were killed, while 406 became prisoners of war.¹⁰ On 19 June, *Estedio*, a brig equipped with 22 guns, was conquered. Several days later, on 28 June, commodore Decatur's warships casted their anchors in the roadstead of Algiers, blocking it completely from the sea.¹¹

On 30 June, representatives of Ömar ben Muhammad Paşa (1815–1817), Algiers harbour master and Swedish consul came onboard of the flagship *USS Guerriere*. Peace treaty, the content of which was beforehand accepted by both parties, was signed by the Dey of Algiers the same day and the American party, represented by American consul William Shaler and commodore Stephen Decatur, concluded the document on 3 July. Under clause 1 of the treaty, the American navy and merchant marine regained their freedom in the western part of the Mediterranean sea. According to clause 2, both parties agreed to annul the obligation assumed by the USA to pay annual tribute to the governors of Algiers.¹²

⁸ See *The Navy*, ed. W.J. Holland, Washington 2000, p. 27; *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., pp. 156–161, 202.

⁹ The squander comprised of: three frigates (*flagship USS Guerriere*, *USS Macedonian*, *USS Constellation*), two sloops of war (*USS Ontario*, *USS Epervier*) and four schooners (*USS Flambeau*, *USS Spark*, *USS Spitfire*, *USS Torch*). See S.P. Waldo: op. cit., p. 274.

¹⁰ See *ibidem*, p. 275; W.M. Fowler Jr.: *We Have Met the Enemy and They Are Ours; 1775–1815*, in: *The Navy...*, op. cit., p. 27.

¹¹ See S.P. Waldo: op. cit., p. 276.

¹² See *The Treaty of Peace, 30 June and 3 July 1815*, in: *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., p. 203 f.

The peace treaty did not, however, bring about the expected results. Unfortunately, both versions went missing on its way through the Atlantic to Washington to be ratified by Congress. Ömar ben Muhammad Paşa, on whose stance the British had a profound influence, considered this an act of American dishonesty, nearly dishonour, and used it as an excuse for breaking the agreement signed at the end of June and the beginning of July. Subsequently, he demanded that the treaty of 1795, favourable to Algiers, was reintroduced.¹³ The Barbary corsairs and pirates were again given the right to plunder merchant ships. Having accepted the Algerian challenge, the command of the U.S. navy decided to join forces, i.e. Stephen Decatur's and William Bainbridge's squadrons, and under the command of the latter formed a strong Mediterranean Squadron comprising of 18 warships the guns of which were supposed to make it possible again to sail safely in Barbary waters.

At the same time, the concentration of the U.S. naval forces near Gibraltar caused unrest in London. Since 1757 (i.e. after Robert Clive's victory over Sirāj-ud-Dawlah's troops under Palāshi in west Bengal and once the British Parliament had passed India Act in 1784) Great Britain began to develop on Indian subcontinent a leading economic centre for her overseas empire and a solid military base to defend the centre.¹⁴ For the sake of her imperial ambitions, it was also then that the so-called British "imperial route", leading through the Straits of Gibraltar, the Mediterranean Sea, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and Aden toward India and the Far East, was "under construction". Therefore, since the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries every sign of hostile activity near this route caused a big stir and concern in London. This time it was no different. Lord Liverpool's¹⁵ government responded to the challenge presented by the Americans.

In spring 1816, a strong team under the command of the Admiral of British Mediterranean Fleet, Lord Exmouth,¹⁶ reached major ports on the Barbary coast. Revealing the military power of Royal Navy was to make the Ottoman governors in Tunis, Tripoli and most of all Algiers conduct negotiations with Great Britain,

¹³ See Ömar Paşa to President James Madison, 24 April 1816, in: *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., p. 206.

¹⁴ *The Swing to the East*, in: V.T. Harlow: *The Foundation of the Second British Empire. Discovery and Revolution*, vol. I, London–New York–Toronto 1952, p. 63, passim.

¹⁵ Robert Banks Jenkinson, 2nd Earl of Liverpool. British prime minister in the years 1812–1827.

¹⁶ Edward Pellew (1757–1853), Baron Exmouth, after the victory over Algiers upgraded to become 1st Viscount Exmouth.

and make it evident for the Americans that the British empire dominated in this part of the globe.

Shortly after, the heads of the semi-countries under discussion were given a written ultimatum in which the British Admiral demanded, among other things: *that each corsair garrison concluded a separate treaty with Great Britain, (...), and governors of Tunis and Tripoli signed a declaration on the strength of which Christians taken hostages for ransom by pirates or corsairs shall be released.*¹⁷ The most powerful, Ömar ben Muhammad Paşa, asked the British Admiral to extend the deadline they had for specifying how much time they needed to make consultations with a suzerain in Constantinople – sultan Mahmud II.¹⁸ The Englishman agreed and returned to London.

Soon, however, new circumstances emerged and speeded up the sequence of events that were about to happen. To be more specific, Algerian Arabs revoked permit for coral divers in the bay near Bône city (Annaba) they had granted to the British and brutally attacked Italian and Corsican divers.¹⁹ The horrifying and bloody incident outraged London and was used by the British government as an excuse to crush the governors of Ottoman provinces in Maghreb. Anti-Barbary “crusade” launched by Lord Liverpool’s government was joined by Holland.

Commanding a strong nineteen-warship Royal Navy squadron, Admiral Lord Exmouth headed for the Mediterranean sea again.²⁰ Near Gibraltar, the British fleet was joined by a small Dutch squadron under the command of Vice-admiral Theodorus Frederik van Capellen. The naval forces sailed toward the Barbary coast and soon floated at anchor in the roadstead of the port of Algiers. After an unsuccessful attempt to take British consul and his family on board of the Royal Navy vessel, on 27 August 1816 Admiral Lord Exmouth, under whose command the joined forces took action, sent Ömar ben Muhammad Paşa another ultimatum, this time in a very firm tone. If the conditions presented in the ultimatum were not met, the Englishman threatened to destroy the enemy fleet, storehouses on

¹⁷ PRO, *British and Foreign State Papers* 3, pp. 509–516.

¹⁸ See *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., p. 209.

¹⁹ See *ibidem*.

²⁰ The squadron under the command of Rear-Admiral Exmouth comprised of 19 vessels: 6 liners (*HMS Queen Charlotte*, *HMS Albion*, *HMS Impregnable*, *HMS Superb*, *HMS Minden* and *HMS Leander*), 4 frigates (*HMS Granicus*, *HMS Glasgow*, *HMS Hebrus* and *HMS Severn*), 5 sloops of war (*HMS Britomart*, *HMS Mutine*, *HMS Heron*, *HMS Prometheus* and *HMS Cordelia*) and 4 gunboats (*HMS Belzebub*, *HMS Hecla*, *HMS Fury* and *HMS Infernal*) See C.H. Gifford: *History of the Wars Occasioned by the French Revolution, from the Commencement of Hostilities in 1792, to the End of 1816 (...)*, vol. II, London 1817 p. 1713.

the coast, arsenal and fortress units.²¹ Furthermore, the document specified how the hostile party was to show its agreement or disagreement with the ultimatum. If the former was the case, a salvo of three Algerian guns was to be fired three up to four hours after receiving the document.²²

By noon, no salvo could be heard. Seeing that the ultimatum was rejected, at 2:30 p.m. Admiral Lord Exmouth ordered the British and Dutch vessels to form a battle array. Twenty minutes later all crews headed slowly for the port and fortifications in Algiers. Having approached the land so close so that the gun fire could reach the warships, the crews began to lower the upper sail when all of a sudden fortress guns fired. Several minutes after 3 p.m. the British and Dutch responded by firing their guns and battered Algerian action stations.²³ During a nine-hour battle lasting till midnight, the coalition fleet destroyed 33 out of 37 corsair ships moored at the port and half of guns located in the forts on the coast.²⁴

On the following day, defeated Ömar ben Muhammad Paşa signed three vitally important documents, namely peace treaty with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, peace treaty with Great Britain, and Declaration on the Abolition of Christian Slavery. The treaty with Great Britain provided for: *from, now on an absolute and inviolable peace will reign between His Majesty the King of Great Britain and the Kingdom (sic!) of Algeria (...)*²⁵. *The parties to the treaty have agreed that (...) ships as well as citizens and subjects representing the parties shall not harm each other, more specifically they shall not attack each other both in words and in deeds, but shall have deep respect and genuine sympathy for each other.*²⁶

As a signatory of the Declaration on the Abolition of Christian Slavery, Ömar ben Muhammad Paşa had to immediately release the Europeans kidnapped for ransom. In a report sent on 24 September 1806 to the Board of Admiralty, Admiral Lord Exmouth wrote that 1083 persons were set free in Algiers, the only exception were two Spanish men, a merchant and vice-consul who had to remain imprisoned by the time they paid back their debts.²⁷

²¹ See *Admiral Lord Exmouth's Second Ultimatum to the Dey of Algiers*, in: *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., p. 210.

²² See *ibidem*.

²³ See C.H. Gifford: op. cit., p. 1720.

²⁴ See *ibidem*; *Admiral Lord Exmouth's Second...*, op. cit., p. 210.

²⁵ *Treaty of Peace: Great Britain and Algiers, 28 August 1816*, in: *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., p. 210.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 210–211.

²⁷ See *Admiral Lord Exmouth's Final Report to the Admiralty, 24 September 1816*, in: *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., s. 212.

Consequences following from a spectacular military victory of Great Britain in the so-called Second Barbary War can be analyzed in several dimensions. First and foremost, the British Empire assumed greater authority among Christian countries which for centuries (by 1816) suffered major economic losses and moral damage from the Barbary pirates.²⁸ Moreover, the coerced treaties eliminated the main reason behind the American military intervention and consequently made the presence of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea completely unnecessary. Analyzing the events in the context of the then European and global politics, it is beyond doubt that defeating the rulers of Algeria, Tunis and Tripoli provided Great Britain with enormous benefits but, at the same time, posed increasingly difficult challenges to her. Although the British Empire had strengthened her political and military position on the “imperial route”, her successes aroused growing suspicion from the authorities in Vienna, Petersburg, Berlin, Paris and Constantinople. British political circles were perfectly aware of this and therefore had decided to follow the old Tudor doctrine, also known as balance of power in Europe, even more consistently. In fact, a chance of doing so would soon come their way.

On 20 November 1818, Austria, Russia, Prussia and Great Britain, participants in the “Concert of Europe” formed during the Congress of Vienna, addressed issues relating to the occupation of defeated Napoleonic France in the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.²⁹ However, their attention was attracted by another thing of major importance. They knew that, defeated by British, Ömar ben Muhammad Paşa and particularly his successors, namely Ali IV Paşa (1817), Muhammad VI ben Ali Paşa (1817), Ali V ben Ahmed Paşa (1817–1818) and Hüseyin ben Hassan Paşa (1818–1830), would attempt to re-build the corsair power of their country disregarding the peace treaties signed. Shipwrecks, drown during the battle of 27 August 1816, were removed from the fairways, four warships were

²⁸ Christian slavery had been the case with Islamic countries since the 12th century. To save the oppressed, Jan de Matha formed the Order of the Most Holy Trinity for the Redemption of the Captives six years after the 3rd crusade. Pope Innocent III granted the Order his approval with a papal bull *Operante divine dispositionis*. The Order was particularly active in the Orient and North Africa. Over the centuries, Spanish, Portuguese, French and Italian Trinitarians, also referred to as Redemptorists, ransomed thousands of their compatriots from Turkish and Arab captivity. See Z.S. Zalewski: *Lwowskiego Zakonu Przenajświętszej Trójcy dzieło redempcji Polaków z niewoli tureckiej w końcu XVII w.* [Lvov Order of the Most Holy Trinity Act of Releasing the Poles from Turkish Captivity at the End of the 17th Century], in: *Echa Przeszłości* [Echoes of the Past], ed. W. Gieszczyński, vol. XI, Olsztyn 2010, p. 114.

²⁹ Aix-la-Chapelle is a French name. Akwizgran is a historical name, nowadays German name Aachen is used. Town situated in Rhineland-Palatinate.

bought and several more were under construction, funds were raised and yet, regardless of the treaty provisions, corsairs and pirates did not give up on their dirty business.³⁰

Algeria was an issue raised providently in Aix-la-Chapelle by British diplomats who, in accordance with the aforementioned Tudor doctrine, had become the advocates of France and made serious attempts to help her re-attain a strong position in Europe. As a major player in European and global politics, France was to become a crucial element of its Mediterranean segment and at the same time perform an important function, particularly in the face of the unwanted American presence in Barbary waters and fierce competition among Great Britain, Russia and Austria in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea.

To apply the aforementioned principles, the Duke of Wellington and his diplomatic service had contributed to a decision on withdrawing occupation troops from France, incorporating them into so-called Quadruple Alliance formed on 20 November 1815 in Paris and establishing European Quintuple Alliance based on the arrangements made by the aforementioned „Concert of Europe“. Furthermore, participants in the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle decided to send Hüseyin ben Hassan Paşa a note, despite objections stated by a Russian representative Count Ioannis Antonios Kapodistrias. Furthermore, they had decided to form a British-French naval squadron the commanders of which would undertake diplomatic mission in Algiers or, if necessary, military operation against the Dey of Algiers.³¹

As a full participant in the “Concert of Europe”, France willingly joined the operation planned by the British. In 1819, both countries selected a few ships from their fleets to form the aforementioned British-French squadron. Under the command of Vice-admiral Sir Thomas Freemantle and Rear-Admiral Jurien de la Gavière, the vessels reached the Mediterranean Sea and at the beginning of September blockaded the port of Algiers. On 5 September 1819, three identical notes were sent to the Deys of Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers. Appointed as commissioners representing all the countries taking part in the “Concert of Europe”, the commanders of the British-French squadron handed the note over to the Dey of Algiers during an audience. To quote a fragment of the note or at least the threatening message it conveyed: *The allied superpowers expect the Barbary states to obey the law and norms respected by all civilized nations. If the aforementioned*

³⁰ See *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., p. 213.

³¹ See *Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, Protocol No. 30*, in: *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., p. 213.

*Regencies feel like hindering trade conducted by other countries, the entire Europe will use her weapon.*³² These words left no illusions. To add to the picture, the Admirals informed the Dey that the British and French governments expected him to present his stance in writing.³³

On 9th September, during another audience Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Fremantle and Rear-Admiral Jurien de la Gavière tried to convince Hüseyin ben Hassan Paşa into signing and sealing the declaration they had submitted in which he was to state that: „*from the moment he was appointed Dey of Algiers, he has never harmed any European nation and so is his intention in the future.*”³⁴ Needless to say, the Dey did not sign the declaration and, what is more, at the end of the meeting he was arrogant enough to state that he would consider friendly only those countries which were officially represented in Algiers, while as long as the rest did not establish peaceful relations with Algeria, they would be treated as enemies.³⁵ That being said, the European “envoys” realized that the Algerian tyrant’s did nothing else than uttered a threat of pirate attacks against merchants unless their mother countries paid so-called protection money. That is why, the only thing they could do at the end of the meeting was to state that: *such behaviour may be a major threat to his existence in the held position.*³⁶

Eventually, the British-French mission turned into a fiasco. Taken under the wings of the clever Dey of Algiers, the Barbary pirates – though decimated – were still active. Therefore, European superpowers expressed their growing concern. Among them particularly alarmed was Great Britain since where the Royal Navy operated, both international and her own merchant fleet continued to suffer major losses. Hence, Lord Liverpool’s government decided to face a new challenge.

In the spring of 1824, two British vessels *HMS Naiad* and *HMS Cameleon* bombarded the port of Algiers and destroyed corvette *Tripoli*. On 23rd May, the British fleet sunk one more enemy vessel near Bône.³⁷ When the Mediterranean Fleet under the command of Admiral Sir Harry Burrard-Neale approached the

³² *Identic Note to the Dey of Algiers and the Beys of Tunis and Tunisia*, in: *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., p. 214.

³³ See *Summary Minutes of British and French Admirals’ First Audience with Hüseyin Paşa, the Dey of Algiers, 5 September 1819*, in: *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., p. 215.

³⁴ See *Summary Minutes of British and French Admirals’ Second Audience with Hüseyin Paşa, the Dey of Algiers, 9 September 1819*, in: *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., p. 216.

³⁵ See *ibidem*, p. 217.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ See *Dictionary of Battles and Sieges. A Guide to 8,500 Battles from Antiquity through the Twenty-first Century*, ed. T. Jaques, Greenwood Press, Westport CT. USA 2007, A–E, p. 33.

coast backed up by reinforcements and threatened to open shellfire, Hüseyin ben Hassan Paşa accepted the ultimatum,³⁸ yet when the British sailed away, the pirates continued their dirty business. Needless to say, another anti-pirate operation did not produce the expected results.

At the same time, accepted as a participant in the “Concert of Europe” during the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, France dared to pursue her increasingly imperialistic policy. Removed forcibly from the Middle East in 1801, she did not abandon her imperial ambitions but, having regained her international importance and economic potential in the 1820’s, decided to put her plans into effect closer to her southern frontier, i.e. in Maghreb.

While the Mediterranean Fleet under the command of Admiral Burrell-Neale made an attempt to regulate British-Algerian relations, the squadron of French warships blockaded the port of Tunis. After the city had surrendered, France offered the defeated Husayn bin Mahmud (1824–1835) to sign a peace treaty that was extraordinarily favourable to her. Tunisian Berleybey had to declare, among other things, that *The French residing in the Kingdom of Tunis shall enjoy their privileges and concessions and shall be treated as citizens of the most favoured nation*.³⁹ Under clause 4 of the treaty, the conquerors enforced on the defeated an extremely low, namely 3% level of tariffs on goods imported to Tunis by French merchants or citizens.⁴⁰ To the above provisions clause 15 added perfectly well, namely giving priority to French ships in the port of Tunis.⁴¹ However, what draws attention is the following fragment of clause 3: *neither privilege nor advantage will be given to other nations which may not be equally shared by the French nation, even though they have not been specified in the said capitulations and treaties*.⁴² In this way, the French government announced they would pursue colonial policy in Africa. Major French battle for establishing a stronghold in Africa took place in Algeria six years later.

At first with purely economic background, the Algerian-French conflict had been escalating for nearly thirty years. To deal with the consequences of the British sea blockade (particularly in the Atlantic), in 1792 as well as between

³⁸ See *ibidem*, pp. 33–34.

³⁹ See *Treaty of Peace and Renewal of Capitulations: France and the Garrison of Tunis 21 May and 15 November 1824*, in: *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., p. 222.

⁴⁰ See *ibidem*.

⁴¹ See *ibidem*, p. 223.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 222.

1795 and 1797 the government of Republican France bought substantial amount of grains in Algeria, mainly to provide the troops involved in military operation in Italy with food supplies. The transaction was credited by the then Dey and guaranteed by two banker's families living in Algiers, namely the Bakris and the Bushnaqs. By 1798 the French government paid off certain amount of the debt.⁴³ Nevertheless, at the end of the administration period, the French Directory (1795–1799), followed by the Consulate (1799–1804), and finally the Napoleonic Empire accused Jewish bankers of cooperating with Great Britain, the chief enemy of France, and refused to pay the rest of the abovementioned debt.

After the collapse of Napoleonic Empire, the government formed by King Louis XVIII (1814–1824) decided to put an end to unpleasant situation that had lasted for over twenty years. It was in 1819 that a select committee was established to oblige France to pay off 7 million francs to the Bakris and their creditors. The committee's decision, however, did not impose any obligation to repay about 70,000 francs to the Dey⁴⁴ who, having found that out, reminded the French government of his 70,000 and demanded 2.5 million francs from the debt owed to the Jewish bankers.⁴⁵ Although Hüseyin ben Hassan Paşa's demand caused confusion over the issue that after all bothered both parties, France considered it ungrounded and simply ignored it.

The Algerian tyrant did not, however, abandon his claims. After Charles X had taken the throne (1824–1830), he posted three letters to the French king in which he addressed issues relating to the debt settlement. Since there was no reply, on 30 April 1827 Hüseyin ben Hassan Paşa invited Pierre Deval, the then consul general of France in Algiers, for a private audience in his palace to demand explanations as to why the French king had been ignoring him. When the embarrassed diplomat could not provide an exhaustive answer, the Dey got upset, came up to him, hit him three times with a fly-whisk and ordered him to leave.⁴⁶

The incident had led to a number of far-reaching consequences since the behaviour of the Dey of Algiers was nothing else than recognizing Deval a persona non grata and making him leave Algeria. Needless to say, this had dramatically deteriorated Algerian-French relations and, to a lesser extent, Turkish-French

⁴³ See A. Dziubiński: *Podbój Maghrebu przez Francję* [The French Conquest of Maghreb], Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź 1983, p. 17.

⁴⁴ See *ibidem*, p. 18.

⁴⁵ See *ibidem*.

⁴⁶ See *The Deval Report, 30 April 1827*, in: *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., p. 228.

relations, and was the main reason behind international diplomatic dispute that was soon to lead to a serious military conflict.

At the end of May, into the port of Algiers came French schooner the commander of which ignored the Ottoman regulations and got in touch directly with the Consul. What the captain did contributed to the escalation of disagreement between the court of Hüseyin ben Hassan Paşa and Deval. The French diplomat found himself in an extremely difficult situation which improved a bit when on the following day four French warships reached the roadstead of the port of Algiers. The Admiral sent Hüseyin an ultimatum that demanded flying French flags in front of a citadel, which was the Dey's seat, and at the top of the main tower (Bure Mawlay Hasan) and below them the green flags of the Prophet within the following 48 hours. Otherwise France was to launch military operation against the fortress.⁴⁷ The ultimatum offended religious feelings of the Muslims who were deeply hurt and humiliated, which was probably the main goal of French diplomats.

Apart from the above, one more thing deserves attention. There was a time when French settlers established a number of towns on the Mediterranean coast, and to be more specific in Bône province. On a patch granted by the authorities in Constantinople at the end of the 17th century, French fishermen and coral divers built houses which were eventually destroyed by the Arabs during the Napoleonic Wars. However, it was in the 1820' that they were rebuilt as a consequence of enormous pressure placed on Algerian authorities to abolish Christian slavery and once the plague of the Barbary pirates had been halted. Mindful of the tragic end of their predecessors, new settlers build fortifications in Bône and La Calle that were referred to as "French bastion" and comprised of eighteen guns and a garrison of over one hundred soldiers.⁴⁸ However, as their position in Africa had gradually strengthened, the French began to incite the Kabyles – ancient people who inhabited mountainous part of north-east Algeria.⁴⁹ They were given guns, gunpowder and other materials they were supposed to use for fighting the Turkish as well as local Ottoman and Arab authorities.

Hüseyin ben Hassan Paşa got upset and decided to get rid of European troublemakers from Algeria for good. He gave orders to attack European villages in

⁴⁷ See *Report of the Dey Hüseyin Paşa, to the Ottoman Grand Vezir, 19 December 1827*, in: *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., pp. 228–229.

⁴⁸ See *ibidem*, p. 229.

⁴⁹ See *ibidem*.

Bône and La Calle. Soon the French navy began to evacuate survivors and on 12 June 1827 took a retaliatory action, i.e. blockaded Algiers from the sea.⁵⁰ From that moment a series of minor incidents took place between the feuding parties. On 4 October 1827, a naval battle, lasting for over three hours, was fought at the entrance to the port, during which, according to a report prepared by Hüseyin ben Hassan Paşa for sultan Mahmud II, the French squadron was defeated and the ships that “survived” *were fleeing like birds from a hunter*.⁵¹ The actual result of the battle was quite different. The Dey’s fleet did not manage to get through the blockade and had to hide behind the seawall to find shelter under the fire of fortress guns.⁵²

The Ottoman governor was perfectly aware of serious consequences following from the above. From that moment on, the conflict with the European superpower entered a new phase and its outcome (potentially favourable for Algeria) depended on political or maybe even military support from the authorities of Constantinople. On 19 December 1827, Hüseyin ben Hassan Paşa sent – through Grand Vizier Benderli Mehmed Selim Sirri (Serasker) Paşa⁵³ – a report to sultan Mahmud II in which he referred to increasingly deteriorating situation in the province and asked him for help. The sultan read the report and, apart from several words written in the margin to express his content about the “victory”, he ignored Hüseyin ben Hassan Paşa’s request.⁵⁴ Mahmud II had a reason to be so reserved. Having in mind Greek struggle for independence waged since March 1821 and growing threat from the outbreak of war with Russia, he did not want to come into another military conflict in the western frontiers of his empire.

At the same time, the Turkish forces were completely absorbed by war with Russia (1828–1829) and focused their attention on a Greek province striving for independence. Being directly involved in Algerian matters, France did not remain indifferent to this, either. Since the Ottoman monarchy faced a particularly dramatic situation at the end of 1820’s, Algerian-French conflict reached deadlock.

On 14 September 1829, the Treaty of Adrianople concluded the Russo-Turkish war and both parties of the conflict in Maghreb came to conclusion that it was

⁵⁰ See *ibidem*, p. 230.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

⁵² See A. Dziubiński: *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁵³ The then Grand Vizier Benderli Mehmed Selim Sirri (Serasker) Paşa came from Bendera, a city situated in the present-day Moldova. He held the highest office in the Empire from 15 September 1824 to 26 October 1828.

⁵⁴ See *The Middle East and North Africa...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 228–231.

the right moment to resolve it. Hüseyin ben Hassan Paşa counted on support from Turkey (an official province of which Algiers still was). Of certain importance to his political plans were also silent (and eventually hollow) promises made in 1827 by the British consul in Algiers about strong support from the British government.⁵⁵ On the other hand, France realized that a three-year and extremely costly blockade of Algiers caused minor economic damage to her enemy.⁵⁶

Mounting tension over the Ottoman province in Maghreb was used by King Charles X and French political circles, especially having in mind that the Bourbon restoration together with ancien régime doctrine caused serious internal economic and political crisis. It was generally believed that the Algerian war could be a solution to increasingly serious internal problems, and conquering Algeria along with her ports would substantially contribute to expanding lucrative trade with North Africa, already carried on by Marseilles. All things considered, decision was made to accelerate the course of events.

On 2 August 1829, the French naval forces, which continued to blockade Algiers, headed for the Algerian coast provocatively. Having noticed the French warships approaching the land, the crew of fort defending the access to Algiers opened fire and coastal artillery bombarded the French flagship.⁵⁷ This serious incident was immediately used by the French authorities to pursue a stricter policy not only toward their enemy, but also toward North Africa, prospectively in the Mediterranean Sea, and toward other areas neighbouring Africa. From that moment on, the events took place at a breakneck pace.

Soon, King Charles X dismissed as a matter of urgency French ambassador in London, ultra royalist Jules Auguste Armand Marie, the Duke of Polignac, and on 8 August 1829 appointed him prime minister and at the same time minister of foreign affairs. Holding absolute power over the country, the Duke soon formed his political circle that opted for the then promoted colonial idea and wished to use the Algerian military incident as an excuse as soon as possible.

In the context of the then international political situation, Algerian plans were neither simple nor easy to implement. The Duke of Polignac decided to seek allies and made an attempt to convince the governor of Egypt, Muhammad Alī, into taking military action against the Dey of Tunis and the Dey of Tripoli

⁵⁵ See *ibidem*, p. 242.

⁵⁶ See A. Dziubiński: *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁵⁷ See *The French Conquest of Algiers, 12 March–5 July 1830*, in: *The Middle East and North Africa...*, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

which the governor was to carry out under the French protective umbrella.⁵⁸ The Walī of Egypt accepted de Polignac's offer and declared he would send the army of 40,000 to Maghreb, however on condition that France would lend him 20 million francs (on favourable terms) and four warships.⁵⁹ The price of alliance with Muhammad Alī seemed, however, too high. The French authorities, afraid of the empowerment of the Ottoman governor struggling with Turkey for Egypt's independence, decided to undertake operations on her own.

As could be expected, French political actions taken in the Mediterranean Sea, and particularly her military operations, disturbed the balance of power achieved only fourteen years earlier during the Congress of Vienna, but were above all taken against the strengthening position of Great Britain in the region under discussion. Under new circumstances, it came as no surprise that Great Britain, participants in the „Concert of Europe” and the Ottoman Porte had no choice but to respond. Having understood the complicated nature of things, attempts were made to allay suspicion expressed by the British authorities who were particularly sensitive to heightened activity of France along the developed “imperial route”.

Critical were years 1829–1830 when political efforts were intensified. The Duke of Polignac and his government held talks with the countries that had entered Quintuple Alliance over necessity to come up with a final solution to problems posed by the Barbary pirates and corsairs, and presented their ideas for resolving the Algerian crisis. Two continental superpowers, namely Prussia and Russia, at first provided support to France. They, and particularly Russia, found the hegemony of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean Sea unacceptable for it might have led to the political domination of Great Britain in the region under discussion. On the contrary, Austria remained friendly neutral.

At the same time, France faced serious difficulties while implementing her plans, the most acute was resistance from the British government. Soon, Lord Gorderich's cabinet exerted political pressure on Russia, Prussia and Austria, which made them withdraw from the already provided support. Appointed prime minister on 22 January 1830, the Duke of Wellington, famous conqueror in the Battle of Waterloo, expressed his deep mistrust toward the restitution of the French “imperial dream” and adopted a tough stance on the matter. Consequently, cooling

⁵⁸ See M.E. Chamberlain: *'Pax Britannica'? British Foreign Policy, 1789–1914*, London–New York 1988, p. 83; *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., p. 242.

⁵⁹ See A. Dziubiński: op. cit., p. 24.

of relations between London and Paris was observed. Colonial plans that France had about Africa were also questioned by the Sublime Porte. In the face of international isolation and strong objection from other countries, the Duke of Polignac once more turned to Muhammad 'Alī to ask for his participation in the campaign. However, the Walī of Egypt refused the French offer. Ignoring the circumstances, the French government decided to launch military invasion in Algiers.

In February 1830, King Charles X ordered to mobilize his forces, which, needless to say, deteriorated the French-British relations. In order to ease mounting political tension, the French prime minister sent an instruction to the ambassador in London, the Duke de Laval,⁶⁰ which obliged him to present to the British authorities an official French stance on the matter. It stated, among other things, that France would intervene militarily as a representative of the Christian world in order to: *a) eliminate piracy, b) abolish Christian slavery, c) abolish obligation imposed on the Christian countries to pay protection money to the Dey.*⁶¹

Two weeks before launching military operation in Algiers, ambassador de Laval received one more note which he was to present to the British government the moment the military actions were launched. According to the instructions, he, based on the accomplished fact, was to inform that King Charles X could not halt his offensive which he had launched for the sake of Christians, while in case of victory: *the issue would become open and unaffected by individual interests, and: the King asks his allies to send their ambassadors in Paris adequate instructions on the matter.*⁶²

On 25 May, the great fleet, under the command of Admiral Victor Guy Duperré, comprising 103 warships and 572 cargo ships manned by 37,000 soldiers, departed from Toulon and headed south, for Africa.⁶³ Led by Louis de Bourmont, Lieutenant General and Count de Ghaisnes de Bourmont, on 14 June the French troops landed near Cape Sidi Ferruch. Expanding the operation to the east, toward the capital, three-division French corps defeated Algerian forces of 50,000 soldiers

⁶⁰ Anne Pierre Adrien de Montmorency, Duc de Laval (1768–1837).

⁶¹ *Prince de Polignac, Premier and Foreign Minister, to the Duc de Laval, French Ambassador (London), 12 March 1830*, in: *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., pp. 243–244.

⁶² *Prince de Polignac to the Duc de Laval, 12 May 1830*, in: *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., p. 244.

⁶³ See *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., p. 242. According to Dziubiński, for her invasion of Algiers France used: 103 naval vessels, 675 transport ships, 27 000 seamen, 36 000 soldiers and 103 field guns. See A. Dziubiński: op. cit., p. 25.

on the plateau of Staoueli on 19 June.⁶⁴ Violent struggle lasted by 4 July and ended in the conquest of Algiers. On the following day, Hüseyin ben Hassan Paşa signed the act of capitulation.

Under the Treaty, Qasbash citadel and other fortifications of Algiers were to be handed over to the French army the same day by 10 a.m. on condition that the Dey would not be captured and, moreover, given the right to retain his personal possessions and choose if he and his family would stay in their motherland, under the protection of French authorities, or leave the country. The conquerors guaranteed that the followers of Muslim religion would retain their rights, enjoy freedom of trade, have right to property, etc.⁶⁵

Twenty-nine years after the Napoleon campaign in the Orient had been accomplished, French imperialism in North Africa had become a fact.⁶⁶ The conquered stronghold was, admittedly, less attractive than the one on the African-Asian frontier, yet it was Algeria that was a base for expansion to take place all over Africa. The French government immediately seized this opportunity and began to colonize neighbouring Tunisia.

Expanding since 1830, French colonialism in Maghreb had led to irreversible consequences for the Mediterranean states, West Africa and European superpowers. For over a century, it had exerted a profound influence on international policy pursued not only in the region under discussion, but globally. As for a complex series of political, economic, cultural and social processes initiated by the French conquest of Algiers in 1830, special emphasis shall be placed on the formulation of a new doctrine by Palmerston⁶⁷ and John Ponsonby⁶⁸ against the disintegrating Ottoman Empire. By 1914, i.e. when Turkey joined the Central Powers during the First World War, independence and integrity doctrine was a guide for the British politicians and government in defining major actions to be taken against the Ottoman Porte. As far as the period under consideration is concerned, Great Britain

⁶⁴ See *ibidem*, p. 26.

⁶⁵ See *Convention for Delivery of the Cities and Forts: France and the Dey of Algiers, 5 July 1830*, in: *The Middle East and North Africa...*, op. cit., pp. 242–245.

⁶⁶ See L. Bystrzonowski: *O Algeryi, a głównie o wypadkach zaszłych w tym kraju od zajęcia onego przez Francuzów* [On Developments in Algeria after the French Conquest], vol. I, Lipsk 1846, pp. 77–80, 191–192.

⁶⁷ Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston (1784–1865), minister of foreign affairs between 1830 and 1841 as well as between 1846 and 1851, British prime minister in the years 1855–1858 and 1859–1865.

⁶⁸ John Ponsonby, 1st Viscount Ponsonby (1770–1855), ambassador of Great Britain in Constantinople in the years 1832–1841.

mounted her resistance (through political or military action) to the vision outlined by European empires – mainly Russia and France – to divide among them the vast yet disintegrating Ottoman Empire that was doing its best to remain independent and unaffected territorially. Last but not least, being grateful for the protection, Constantinople authorities let “Perfidious Albion” develop the “imperial route” leading through the controlled territories as well as conquer and govern Egypt informally.

PODOBÓJ ALGIERII PRZEZ FRANCJĘ

Streszczenie

Po zakończeniu wojen epoki napoleońskiej, mocarstwa – a głównie zachodnioeuropejskie z Wielką Brytanią włącznie – nie angażowały się zbyt mocno w sprawy Bliskiego Wschodu.

Jednakże wytworzona sytuacja polityczna nie oznaczała nadejścia ery pokoju w opisywanym regionie świata. Jeszcze podczas walk z napoleońską Francją, a zwłaszcza tuż po ich zakończeniu, w północno-zachodniej części Afryki pojawiło się oraz zaczęło nabrzmiewać nowe zarzewie konfliktów międzynarodowych, które w niedalekiej przyszłości miały doprowadzić do poważnych następstw politycznych i gospodarczych.

Po 29 latach od zakończenia kampanii napoleońskiej w Oriencie instalacja imperializmu francuskiego w Afryce Północnej stała się faktem dokonanym. Zdobyty przyczółek – jakim była Algieria – stanowił niezłą bazę do rozwinięcia ekspansji we wszystkich kierunkach Czarnego Łądu. Rząd w Paryżu niezwłocznie wykorzystał tę okoliczność i jeszcze w tym samym roku rozpoczął proces kolonizacji sąsiedniej Tunezji.

Rozszerzający się od 1830 roku francuski kolonializm w Maghrebie przyniósł nieodwracalne następstwa państwom położonym w basenie Morza Śródziemnego, Afryce Zachodniej oraz głównym mocarstwom europejskim. Na ponad 100 lat wywarł poważny wpływ na kształtowanie się polityki międzynarodowej nie tylko na omawianym obszarze, lecz także w świecie.

*MAGDA GAWINECKA-WOŹNIAK**

Toruń

**KIRCHE IN NORWEGEN IN DER POLITIK
DER DEUTSCHEN BESATZUNGSMACHT
UND NORWEGISCHER FASCHISTEN**

**THE CHURCH IN NORWAY
VS. POLICY PURSUED BY GERMAN OCCUPANTS
AND NORWEGIAN FASCISTS**

Keywords: World War II; the Nazi German conquest of Norway; the Lutheran Church in Norway; attitude of the German Third Reich and Quisling's government toward the Lutheran Church

Summary

The paper is aimed at presenting policy pursued by German occupants and Norwegian fascists toward the Church in Norway during World War II. Resistance mounted by the Lutheran Church to the Nazis, in Norwegian literature referred to as "kirkekampen" (struggle waged by the Church), is hardly addressed by Polish authors.

The article is nearly completely based on Norwegian literature, and printed sources are used as primary source material.

In 1940, after Norway had been invaded, the Norwegians had to face a new (occupation) reality. The authorities of the German Third Reich did not however follow a uniform policy toward the Church in the occupied Europe. In Norway, the Church was state-run, in other words the state was obliged to propagate Lutheran religion and enable Norwegian citizens to follow their religious practices. In 1940, the occupants did not

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immediately take action against the Church. Furthermore, both the Nazi Germany and the NS assured the invaded about their positive approach to religion. They did not intend to interfere in the matters of the Church as long as the clergy did not oppose the new political situation. Events that took place at the turn of 1940 and 1941 proved that the German Third Reich and the NS planned to connect the Norwegians to gas supply system. Nevertheless, the Church ceased to be loyal toward the occupants when the Norwegian law was being violated by the Nazis. The conflict between the Church and the Nazi authorities started at the end of January and the beginning of February 1941, yet it had its origin in political and religious developments that took place in Norway during the first year of occupation. Massive repressions against the clergy began in 1942, and bishops were the first to suffer from persecution. In February 1942, they were expelled, lost their titles and had to report to the police regularly. Very soon they lost the right to make speeches at gatherings. It is worth mentioning Bishop Beggrav who was interned between 1942 and 1945, i.e. longest of all clergy members. Since temporary expelling of priests from their parishes paralyzed their pastoral activity, in 1943 the Ministry of Church and Education began to send the "non grata" pastors to isles situated north of Norway. Nevertheless, the internment conditions in which the clergymen lived were much better than the conditions in which Norwegian teachers were being kept. What contributed to such a difference was strong objection stated by the German Third Reich against continuing the conflict with the Church. Just as in the Nazi Germany, Hitler postponed taking final decision about the future of the Norwegian Church and planned to settle the matter after the war. In this way, he prevented Quisling from pursuing his own policy toward the Church.

Die Geschichte Norwegens während des Zweiten Weltkrieges ist dem polnischen Leser, außer Informationen über den Verlauf von Kriegshandlungen der norwegischen Kampagne und den polnischen Anteil daran, sehr wenig bekannt. Es ist immer noch nicht besonders einfach die Vergangenheit dieses Landes kennenzulernen, hauptsächlich wegen der Sprachbarriere. Das Ziel des vorliegenden Artikels ist die Darstellung der Politik deutscher Besatzungsverwaltung und norwegischer Faschisten in Bezug auf die Kirche in Norwegen während des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Die Frage des Widerstandes von der Lutheranischen Kirche gegen die nationalsozialistische Verwaltung, die in der norwegischen Literatur als „kirkekampen“ (Kirchenkampf) bezeichnet wird, ist in der polnischen Literatur fast nicht vorhanden.

Der Artikel beruht fast ausschließlich auf norwegischer Literatur, und den Quellengrundmaterial stellen Druckquellen dar. Das ist eine Sammlung von Dokumenten, Briefen, Berichten, Artikeln der Nazipresse, die vom Direktor des Departements im Ministerium für Kirche und Bildung, Sigmund Feyling

herausgegeben wurde.¹ Eine wichtige Ergänzung für *Kirkelig Hvitbok* stellen Dokumente dar, die im Buch von H.C. Christie gedruckt wurden.² Einen beachtlichen Platz in meiner Arbeit nahmen auch Informationen ein, die den Erinnerungen eines herausragenden Vertreters der Lutheranischen Kirche und des „kirkekampen“-Führers, des Bischofs von Oslo – Eivind Berggrav entnommen wurden.³

Der deutsche Überfall auf Norwegen am 9. April 1940 war für die dortige Gesellschaft schockierend. Das Land war auf keinen Krieg vorbereitet: Die Gefahr seitens Deutschland wurde übersehen und die militärische Entwicklung des Landes eine lange Zeit vernachlässigt. Norweger vermuteten nicht, dass ihr Land zum Schauplatz von Kriegshandlungen wird. Noch an demselben Tag gab der mit Deutschen kollaborierende Führer der 1933 gegründeten nationalsozialistischen Partei Nasjonal Samling (weiter: NS), Vidkun Quisling in einer Radiosprache den Sturz der Regierung von Johan Nygaardsvold und die Berufung einer neuen „nationalen Regierung“, an deren Spitze er stand, bekannt. Schnell verlor er jedoch die Sympathie deutscher Verwaltung, die ihn u.a. die Entstehung der Widerstandsbewegung in Norwegen zur Last legte. Auch die Mitglieder des Obersten Gerichts, der zu dieser Zeit einzigen Regierungsinstitution in Oslo (Der König und die Regierung begaben sich ins Landinnere, um von dort aus weitere Entscheidungen zu treffen.) waren an dem Fortschaffen von Quisling interessiert. Nach Quislings Absetzung berief man den Administrationsrat, der die Leitung von Ministerien übernahm. Die Gründung des Rates war die Folge der Einigung zwischen Deutschen und den im Land gebliebenen Spitzenvertretern des norwegischen, politischen Lebens. Jedoch schon am 24. April 1940 wurde Josef Terboven zum Reichskommissar für Norwegen ernannt, um die deutsche Administration in Norwegen zu stärken, sie in der Hand einer Person zu konzentrieren, und um der Besatzungsmacht sämtliche norwegische Institutionen zu unterordnen.⁴ Am 25. September 1940 gab Kommissar Terboven bekannt, dass der König und die Regierung nach Norwegen nicht zurückkehren, der Administrationsrat

¹ *Kirkelig Hvitbok, Utgitt på foransaltning av Kirke – og undervisningsdepartementet*, hg. S. Feyling, Oslo 1942.

² H.C. Christie: *Den norske kirke i kamp*, Oslo 1945.

³ E. Berggrav: *Da kampen kom*, Oslo 1945.

⁴ E. Bull: *Klassekamp og felleskamp 1920–1945*, in: *Norges Historie*, hg. K. Mykland, Bd.13, Oslo 1980 (weiter: NH), pp. 355–362; O. Høidal: *Quisling – en studie i landssvik*, Oslo 1988, pp. 300–321; C. Madajczyk: *Faszyzm i okupacje 1938–1945* [Faschismus und Okkupationen 1938–1945], Bd. 1, Poznań 1983, pp. 271–273; T. Cieślak: *Norwegia. Z dziejów XIX–XX wieku* [Norwegen. Aus der Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts], Poznań 1970, pp. 108–110.

aufgelöst und die Tätigkeit politischer Parteien – außer NS – verboten wurde. Es wurden dreizehn kommissarische Minister ernannt, von denen neun NS angehörten.⁵ Aufgaben des Ministers für Kirche und Bildung übernahm der Professor an der Technischen Hochschule (Norges Tekniske Høyskole) in Trondheim, Ragnar Skancke, ab 1933 ein Mitglied von NS.⁶ Die Ansprache Terbovens vom 25. September 1940 war für die zukünftige politische Entwicklung Norwegens – und somit auch für die das Verhältnis Kirche–Staat – entscheidend. Es wurde eindeutig, dass die Besatzungsverwaltung NS unterstützen will, und die Ideen der Partei unter dem norwegischen Volk verbreiten.⁷

Im Jahre 1940 mussten sich Norweger dem Problem der neuen Okkupationswirklichkeit stellen. Die Regierung und der König blieben in der Emigration, Hilfe seitens England und westlicher Verbündeter war nicht ausreichend. Norweger fühlten sich, sich selbst überlassen zu sein, sowohl seitens eigener Politiker als auch seitens westlicher Großmächte. Unter dem Volk herrschten Pessimismus und Bedrücktheit, die die Kollaboration – besonders unter Gewerbekreisen – begünstigten. Einige Zeit verging, bis Norweger eine entschiedene, feindliche Haltung zur Besatzungsverwaltung annahmen und begannen, sie zu manifestieren. Neben Abneigung zur Unterordnung einer fremden Macht trugen dazu insbesondere die gegen König Haakon VII. gerichtete Handlungen bei. Nachdem der König den Vorschlag, mit Deutschen zusammenzuarbeiten, abgelehnt hatte, begann die deutsche Luftwaffe Elverum, in dem er sich aufhielt, zu bombardieren., Dank seiner Einstellung in den ersten Kriegswochen gewann Haakon VII. Hochachtung und Bewunderung seiner Landsleute, und wurde zum wichtigsten Symbol der Opposition und zum Helden der Gesellschaft.⁸

Gleichzeitig mit immer brutaleren Methoden der Okkupationsverwaltung nahm die Unzufriedenheit der Gesellschaft die Form eines Protestes und einer aktiven Handlung an. Norweger manifestierten ihre Antipathie für die Besatzungsmacht auf einfache und direkte Weise, d.h. durch Straßenproteste, das Wegreißen von NS-Plakaten. Das war der Ausdruck spontaner Gefühle der Bevölkerung und man kann sie als nicht formelle Anfänge einer allgemeinen Widerstandsbewegung qualifizieren. Den Ausgangspunkt für eine organisierte

⁵ E. Bull: op. cit., p. 364.

⁶ H.C. Christie: op. cit., p. 37.

⁷ T. Austad: *Kirkens Grunn. Analyse av en kirkelig bekjennelse fra okupasjonstiden 1940–1945*, Oslo 1974, p. 64.

⁸ E. Lange: *Samling om fellesmål 1934–70*, in: *Aschehougs Noreges Historie*, hg. K. Helle, Bd. 11, Oslo 1998, p. 78.

Widerstandsbewegung stellte die „neue Ordnung“, die von Terboven im September 1940 eingeführt wurde.⁹

Die Verwaltung des Dritten Reiches führte keine einheitliche Politik den Kirchen auf besetzten und okkupierten Territorien Europas gegenüber. Die Vielfalt der Okkupationssysteme entschied über unterschiedliche Politik in Bezug auf eine bestimmte Kirche. Im Rahmen allgemeiner politischer, wirtschaftlicher und militärischer Ziele wurden Regeln und Richtungen der kirchlichen Politik bestimmt. Über Besetzung Norwegens entschied man aus strategischen und wirtschaftlichen Gründen. Norweger hielt man für nordisch-germanisches Volk, für den besten Stoff zum Formen eines neuen Menschen. Norwegen sollte zum Mitglied des „germanischen Reiches“ werden, und die Einführung der „neuen Ordnung“ – zur Bildung der Meinung beitragen, dass der Okkupant ein zivilisierter Aggressor ist.¹⁰ Trotz seines Antiklerikalismus schob Hitler die Zerstörung der Kirche Norwegens für die Nachkriegszeit auf, denn er war sich dessen bewusst, dass die Verfolgung die Position der Kirche nur stärken kann.¹¹

Die Kirche in Norwegen war eine staatliche Kirche, d.h. der Staat war verpflichtet, die lutherische Religion zu unterstützen und religiöse Praktiken zu schützen. Norweger, die sich zum Luthertum bekannten, hatten die Pflicht, ihre Kinder nach Luthers Lehre zu erziehen.¹² Der König als Oberhaupt der Kirche – der Konstitution nach – musste evangelisch-lutherischer Konfession sein, er hatte auch die selbständige gesetzgebende Macht gegenüber der Kirche in Ritualfragen inne. Der König gab Anweisungen aus und bestimmte Vorschriften bezüglich kirchlicher Dienste, Kultusformen und der Liturgie. Er ernannte auch alle Staatsbeamten, nachdem er eine Beurteilung von der Regierung eingeholt hatte. Der König führte seine Macht durch kirchliche, zentrale Administration aus, d.h. durch das Ministerium für Kirche und Bildung (weiter: MKuB), das am 30. November 1814 gegründet wurde. Das Ministerium bereitete alle Sachen vor, in denen der König später während einer Plenumstagung der Regierung entschied. Es hatte auch eine selbständige Entscheidungsmacht in laufenden, administrativen Fragen inne. Unter der Aufsicht des Parlaments verwaltete es über kirchliche Fonds und bereitete den Haushaltsplan für die Kirche vor, den dann

⁹ Ibidem, p. 91.

¹⁰ C. Madajczyk: op. cit., p. 273.

¹¹ A. Bullock: *Hitler studium tyranii* [Hitler – eine Studie der Tyrannei], Warszawa 1975, p. 353.

¹² K. Hansson: *Norsk kirkerett*, Oslo 1935, p. 24.

das norwegische Parlament – Storting – verabschiedete. Geistliche bekamen eine Entlohnung für ausgeführte Arbeiten zu Gunsten des Staates, z.B. beim Geburtsregister.¹³

Im Jahre 1940 trat die Besatzungsverwaltung nicht offen gegen die Kirche auf, zudem versicherten sowohl Deutsche als auch NS-Mitglieder, dass sie der Religion gegenüber positiv eingestellt sind. Terboven sagte im Juni 1940, dass er die seelsorgerische Tätigkeit nicht einschränkt, wenn sie „frei von politischem Engagement“ sein wird. Auch der Minister Skancke betonte, dass er christliche Werte beschützen will, und ähnliche Postulate beinhaltete das NS-Programm.¹⁴ Man hatte vor, so lange in Kirchenfragen nicht einzugreifen, wie lange Geistliche sich der neuen politischen Situation nicht widersetzen. Die Aussagen von Terboven und Skancke beruhigten jedoch den Klerus nicht.¹⁵

Die Besatzungsmacht wollte keinen Konflikt mit der Kirche, hauptsächlich wegen ihrer moralischen Autorität und einer breiten Unterstützung der Gesellschaft (ca. 97% Norweger gehörten der staatlichen Kirche an). Die Kirche war ein Gegner, den man zu meiden versuchte. Die Hauptvoraussetzung von NS war die Nutzung der Kirche „im Dienste der neuen Ordnung“, deswegen äußerte man sich positiv über das Christentum. Um jeden Preis versuchte man die Okkupation so glatt einzuführen, wie es möglich war.¹⁶ Seit Frühling 1940 war die Situation in Pfarrgemeinden unklar und es herrschte Verwirrung. Im Sommer 1940 schickte also der Bischof von Oslo, Eivind Berggrav, der Spitzenvertreter von Den Norske Kirke während der Okkupation, ein Schreiben an alle Pastoren und Pfarrräte unter dem Titel „Provisorium und Ewigkeit“, in dem er zur Loyalität der Besatzungsverwaltung gegenüber laut der Bestimmungen des Haager Abkommens von 1907 rief, die er als „das im Land geltende Recht“ bezeichnete.¹⁷ Der Bischof wollte zu diesem Zeitpunkt keinen Konflikt entfachen, denn er bereitete einen Plan vor, dank dem die Kirche stark und zu einem erfolgreichen Widerstand gegen die Okkupationsverwaltung fähig sein sollte. NS-Programm beinhaltete zwar Parolen über den Schutz von Religion, moralischen Werten, aber nur um auf diese Weise Gläubige zu beruhigen. Obwohl keine der Parteien einen Konflikt wollte, wies die Situation selbst so tiefe Gegensätze auf, dass es nur die Frage der

¹³ Ibidem, pp. 30–31.

¹⁴ C.F. Wisløff: *Norsk kirkehistorie, t. 3*, Oslo 1971, pp. 421–422.

¹⁵ C.H. Christie, op. cit., p. 29.

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 36.

¹⁷ T. Austad: op. cit., p. 65.

Zeit war, wann ein offener Streit ausbricht. Schon im September 1940, kurz nach dem Auftritt Terbovens, tauchte eine Angelegenheit auf, die sehr deutlich eine neue Periode in dem Verhältnis Staat – Kirche markierte: Es ging nämlich um Gebete.¹⁸

An jedem Sonntag betete man in den Kirchen für Norweger, für das Heimatland, für Landsleute auf dem Hochsee und im Ausland, für den König und das Parlament. Nach dem 25. September 1940 stellte die Verwaltung fest, dass Worte zur neuen politischen Situation nicht passen, deswegen verbat Minister Skancke sie im Gebet zu verwenden. Die Bischöfe kamen zum Schluss, dass sie zu diesem Zeitpunkt nicht bereit sind, den Widerstand zu leisten und seine eventuelle Folgen zu tragen, und der „christliche Front“ erst aufgebaut wird, so redigierte Berggrav in Eile ein neues Gebet, das Anforderungen der Verwaltung entsprach.¹⁹ Es enttäuschte jedoch viele Geistliche, die meinten, dass man einen offiziellen Protest gegen die Politik des Besatzers erheben sollte. Die Bischöfe wurden der Schwäche und Unterwürfigkeit beschuldigt. Auf einigen Gebieten, besonders im Westen und im Norden des Landes, bezeichnete man den Text als Nazigebet. Die Mehrheit von Pastoren nahm jedoch die Anordnung von Bischöfen an.²⁰ Obwohl sich die Kirche der Verwaltungsforderung nach einem neuen Gebetstext nicht widersetzte, hinderte jedoch der Protest Bischof Berggravs im November 1940 das Ministerium an der Übernahme von religiösen Rundfunksendungen, die ein wertvolles Mittel der nationalsozialistischen Propaganda sein sollten. NS verhielt sich noch vorsichtig der Kirche gegenüber und trat den Rückzug an, wenn man auf Widerstand stieß, außerdem wurde die Lage von Deutschen kontrolliert.²¹

Ereignisse, die um die Wende vom 1940 zu 1941 stattfanden, zeigten sehr deutlich, was Deutsche und NS anstrebten: Die norwegische Gesellschaft sollte der Nazifizierung unterzogen werden. Laut des Haager Abkommens sollte die Besatzungsverwaltung die im besetzten Land geltenden Rechte beachten.²² Die Deutschen nicht nur missachteten norwegische Rechte, sondern sie führten neue ein, von denen einige sich auch auf die Kirche bezogen. So setzte man mit der Anordnung über die Entlassung von Beamten, die die „neue Ordnung“ nicht akzeptierten, das Rentenalter bis auf das 65. Lebensjahr herab, um somit

¹⁸ C.H. Christie: op. cit., p. 37.

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 39.

²⁰ T. Austad: op. cit., p. 67.

²¹ E. Berggrav: op. cit., pp. 101–103.

²² C.F. Wisløff: op. cit., p. 421.

unwillkommene Beamten loszuwerden, an ihrer Stelle NS-Mitglieder anzustellen. Einen radikaleren Eingriff in interne Fragen der Kirche stellte die Verordnung des Polizeiministeriums vom 13. Dezember 1940, auf deren Grundlage die Polizei Pastoren zum Bruch des Beichtgeheimnisses unter Androhung einer dreimonatigen Haft zwingen konnte. Viele Geistliche gaben jedoch von der Kanzel bekannt, dass sie weiterhin die Pflicht des Beichtgeheimnisses befolgen.²³

Die Loyalität der Kirche der Besatzungsverwaltung gegenüber wurde unter Frage gestellt, als Nazis begannen, das Recht zu brechen. Zum Ereignis, das den stärksten Eindruck machte, war die Amtsenthebung der Mitglieder vom Obersten Gericht, nachdem das Justizministerium begonnen hatte, in die Unabhängigkeit von Gerichten einzugreifen. Der Amtsrücktritt der Mitglieder von einer Institution, das das Befolgen vom Recht und der Konstitution bewacht, warf Licht auf die in Norwegen zu dieser Zeit herrschende Gesetzlosigkeit.²⁴ Zugleich verübten uniformierte NS-Abteilungen (Hird) systematisch Angriffe auf das norwegische Volk. Die Hird-Kampagne rief einen organisierten Widerstand der Gesellschaft und auch der Kirche hervor.²⁵

Gleich Anfang 1941 trafen sich in Oslo Bischöfe und das Ergebnis dieser Zusammenkunft war das an Minister Skancke gerichtete Schreiben vom 15. Januar 1941. Die Bischöfe nannten darin Gewalttaten, wiesen auf die wachsende Beunruhigung und Furcht der Gesellschaft hin, sie stellten auch fest:

Die Konstitution Norwegens besagt, dass die Evangelisch-Lutherische Religion die offizielle Staatsreligion ist. (...) In Bezug darauf, was in letzter Zeit passierte, fragen wir, ob der Staat die Ordnung bewahren will, die die Kirchenlehre voraussetzt.

Bischöfe wiesen auf drei konkrete Ereignisse hin. Das erste war „programmatische Gewaltanwendung seitens Hird“, Angriffe auf Schüler und Lehrer des Handelsgymnasiums in Oslo. Man zitierte den Befehl des Polizeiministeriums, dass die Polizei in die Handlungen von Hird nicht eingreifen, sondern sie „aktiv unterstützen“ soll. Das zweite Ereignis war ein Gruppenrücktritt der Mitglieder vom Obersten Gericht von der Ausübung staatlicher Ämter. Die Bischöfe kommentierten das wie folgt: „Die Tatsache selbst, dass alle Mitglieder einer Institution sich zum Rücktritt gezwungen fühlten, musste in der Kirche ein tiefes Gefühl der Unsicherheit bezüglich Grundlagen des gesellschaftlichen Lebens

²³ H.C. Christie: *op. cit.*, p. 47.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 48.

²⁵ O. Høidal: *op. cit.*, pp. 390–391.

hervorrufen“. Schließlich sprach man die Frage der Anordnung vom Dezember 1940 an, die die Pflichtverletzung bezüglich Beichtgeheimnisses durch Geistliche betraf. „Unsere Pflicht des Beichtgeheimnisses wurde nicht durch Recht bestimmt, sondern sie war immer eine grundsätzliche Bedingung des Dienstes in der Kirche. Eine unentbehrliche Voraussetzung der seelsorgerischen Arbeit ist die, dass „Menschen Vertrauen an ihren Pastor haben.“ Das Schreiben endete mit der Forderung, diese Fragen zu klären.²⁶

Als nach 14 Tagen immer noch keine Antwort kam, erstatteten die Bischöfe: Eivind Berggrav, James Maroni – Bischof von Agder und Johan Støren – Bischof von Nidaros dem Minister einen Besuch. Ihm wurde ein früher ausgearbeitetes Memorandum überreicht, in dem das Verhältnis Kirche-Staat auf Grund Luthers-Lehre über zwei Gewalten – der irdischen und der geistigen – beschrieben wurde:

Die Kirche ist kein Staat, und der Staat ist keine Kirche. Die Kirche ist eine geistige und souveräne Gesellschaft, die auf Gottes Wort und Glaubensgemeinschaft beruht. Die Kirche hat die volle Macht, um das Evangelium allen Menschen zu verkünden. Deswegen kann die Kirche nie schweigen, wenn Gottes Wort vernachlässigt wird.²⁷

Das Dokument endete mit dem Aufruf zum Aufhören mit allem, was „der göttlichen heiligen Pflicht“, die auf Recht, Wahrheit und Gewissensfreiheit beruht, zuwider steht.²⁸

Drei Tage später, am 5. Februar 1941, kam die Antwort des Ministers. Skancke kündigte die Übergabe der Sache bezüglich Hird-Angriffe an das Justizministerium zwecks Bestrafung von daran Schuldigen an. Bald erwies sich jedoch, dass keine Handlung unternommen wurde. Nach der Meinung des Ministers hörte die Verwaltung nie auf, Gerechtigkeit und Ordnung zu beschützen. Er hatte auch nicht vor, in Angelegenheiten der Kirche einzugreifen, denn „sie braucht Ruhe in dieser schwierigen Zeit“. Die Antwort des Ministers stellte einen deutlichen Versuch dar, das Problem zu unterschätzen. Zugleich bat man Bischöfe um

²⁶ *Brev til sjefen for Kirke- og Undervisningsdepartementet Statråd R.Skancke, 15 januar 1941*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, p. 19–22.

²⁷ E. Molland: *Kirkens kamp*, in: *Norges krig 1940–1945, Bd. 3*, Oslo 1950, p. 43.

²⁸ H.C. Christie: *op. cit.*, p. 56.

die Annahme „der neuen politischen Ordnung und der amtierenden Verwaltung mit Verständnis“.²⁹

Da die Sache sehr ernst war, entschieden sich die Bischöfe, die Lage detailliert in Pfarrgemeinden zu klären. Deswegen wurde im Februar 1941 ein „Hirtenbrief an Geistliche und Gläubige“, der den Bischofsbrief an Minister vom 15. Januar 1941, das dem Minister persönlich überreichte Memorandum und die Liste von christlichen, die Bischöfe unterstützenden Organisationen beinhaltete, gedruckt und an alle Pfarrgemeinden geschickt. Diese Sammlung von Dokumenten sollte am 9. Februar 1941 vorgelesen werden. Sie wurde in einer Anzahl von 50 Tausend Exemplaren gedruckt, und das Büro des Biblischen Vereins machte man zur Versandzentrale. Von da aus verbreitete man den Brief ab 6. Februar 1941.

Als sich der Brief noch im Druck befand, lud die deutsche Sicherheitspolizei Bischof Berggrav zum Verhör, denn der oben beschriebene Bischofsbrief wurde am 15. Januar 1941 bei BBC vorgelesen. Am 7. Februar schritt die Polizei in den Sitz des Vereins ein und konfiszierte die restlichen Exemplare des gedruckten Dokuments, d.h. ca. 7 Tausend Stück. Die norwegische Polizei bekam den Befehl, den Brief in ganzem Land in Beschlag zu nehmen. Insgesamt fielen in die Hände der Polizei 20 Tausend Exemplare. Trotzdem wurde der Brief in ganz Norwegen in Kopien und Abschriften verbreitet und in vielen Kirchen vorgelesen. Dort, wo die Polizei das Verbot seiner Veröffentlichung einführte, informierten Pastore kurz nach der Predigt, dass zu diesem Zeitpunkt der Bischofsbrief gelesen werden sollte, jedoch wurde es von der Polizei verboten.³⁰

Von allen Dokumenten, die die Bischöfe bisher versendeten, war dieser am bedeutendsten. In breiten Kreisen der Gesellschaft rief die Tatsache, dass die Kirche Initiative zeigte und sich als Rechtsbeschützer engagierte in dem Zeitpunkt, in dem „die Verwaltung Gewalt und Ungerechtigkeit den Seelen gegenüber zulässt“ Verblüffung hervor, aber sie beeindruckte auch die Nazis, deren sofortige Reaktion die Konfiszierung des Briefes war.³¹ Der Brief wurde zur Ermunterung, zum Ansporn für die zivile Widerstandsbewegung, u.a. für Sportler und Schauspieler, die begannen Auftritte in Rundfunk und auf nationalsozialistischen Treffen abzulehnen, und im Mai 1941 einen Streik wegen Entlassung ein paar

²⁹ *Rundskrivelse fra Kirke- og Undervisningsdepartementet til Bispekollegiet i Den norske kirke, 5 februar 1941*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, pp. 23–24.

³⁰ E. Molland: op. cit., p. 44.

³¹ T. Austad: op. cit., p. 82.

Schauspieler vom Nationaltheater anfangen.³² Der Widerstand der Gesellschaft gegenüber NS und Versuchen der Nazifizierung dieser Gesellschaft wuchs in der Regel proportional zu verschiedenen Zwängen Quislings, und wurde besonders stark, nachdem sich die Kirche zum Kampf aufgestellt hatte. Die Kirche stellte die einzige unabhängige Institution dar, die frei von Einflüssen seitens der Deutschen und NS war. Als die Tätigkeit aller Parteien außer NS verboten wurde, und Presse und Rundfunkübertragungen der Zensur unterzogen wurden, konnte die Kirche ihren Widerwillen NS gegenüber öffentlich äußern. Die einzig mögliche Form des Kampfes mit dem Besatzer waren selbstsichere und kompromisslose Manifeste, die im Gegensatz zur Regierungslinie standen. Die einzige Waffe des Klerus waren Worte, und die Kanzel – die einzige freie Rednerbühne in Norwegen.³³

Am 1. Februar 1941 trat Sigmund Feyling die Stelle des Departmentdirektors im MKuB an. Bald wurde er zur Hauptperson für Fragen der Kirche im Ministerium und zum Verantwortlichen für Versuche ihrer Nazifizierung. Der neue Direktor hatte pädagogische Ausbildung und gehörte zur radikalsten Bewegung von Laien, die die Kirche am stärksten kritisierte. Danach studierte er Theologie und wurde zum Geistlichen. In den 30er Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts beobachtete er die Situation in Deutschland sehr aufmerksam und übte Kritik an Hitler für Eingriffe in religiöses Leben. Jedoch schon im Jahr 1940 trat er NS bei und stellte sich zu Kommissar Terboven positiv ein.³⁴

In einer Rundfunkansprache gleich nach dem Amtsantritt sagte Feyling, dass er diesen angehörte, die mit der Demokratie in der Zwischenkriegszeit unzufrieden waren und er hielt eine Stärkung der Staats- und Verwaltungsautorität für unentbehrlich. Er strebte so eine Situation an, dass norwegische Christen die neue, politische Situation im Land unterstützen und er wollte dazu Luthers Lehre nutzen, die die Gehorsamkeit der Verwaltung gegenüber begründen sollte.³⁵

Die praktische Folge des Programms von Feyling war eine Reihe an Schreiben und Taten, deren Ziel war, Kontrolle über die Kirche zu gewinnen.

³² T.Gjelsvik: *Hjemmefronten. Den sivile motstand under okkupasjonene 1940–1945*, Oslo 1977, p. 48.

³³ M. Gawinecka: *Niektóre aspekty walki Kościoła norweskiego z nazizmem w latach 1940–1942* [Einige Aspekte des Kampfes der norwegischen Kirche gegen den Nazismus in den Jahren 1940–1942], in: *Norwegia w pierwszej połowie XX wieku* [Norwegen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts], hg. E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, Toruń 2004, p. 95.

³⁴ *Norsk Krigsleksikon 1940–45*, hrsg. H.F. Dahl et al., Oslo 1995, p. 102.

³⁵ T. Austad: op. cit., p. 83.

Am 11. Februar 1941 erließ das Ministerium das Verbot des Vorlesens von „politischen Schriften von der Kanzel“, denn:

Den Minister erreichten Klagen, dass von Pastoren von der Kanzel und während offizieller Zusammenkünfte Worte ausgesprochen werden, die man als Widerwillen der Verwaltung und der Partei gegenüber verstehen kann. (...) das Ministerium hofft darauf, dass die Mehrheit des Klerus der Verwaltung loyal ist, denn verhält sich korrekt und verdient keine Kritik. Wir fordern, dass alle Geistlichen Vorsicht in ihren Predigten bewahren. Zukünftige Klagen werden als Betreiben einer dem Staat feindlichen Propaganda verstanden.³⁶

Der letzte Satz blieb nicht nur eine Drohung auf Papierblatt. Die Neigung zum Suchen nach Politik in Predigten war besonders unter lokalen Parteimitgliedern sichtbar, denn sie kamen zu Gottesdiensten mit Heft und Bleistift. Die, die es nicht wollten, der „neuen Zeit dienen“, mussten mit rechtlichen Folgen wegen einer dem Staat feindlichen Handlung rechnen. Die Meinung der Kirche wurde immer häufiger durch das Ministerium als eine dem Staat feindliche Propaganda anerkannt.³⁷

Am 5. April 1941 erließ Feyling eine weitere Direktive: Er beklagte sich darin dafür, dass der Klerus der einzigen, legalen Partei gegenüber feindlich eingestellt ist und dass dieses Verhalten sowohl dem Staat als auch der Kirche keinen Vorteil bringt. Darin stellte er auch Richtlinien bezüglich Predigten dar:

In derzeitigen Situation ist es notwendig, dass alle Geistlichen, die einer oder keiner Pfarrgemeinde angehören, in ihren Predigten nur das ansprechen, was im Evangelium nachahmenswert ist. Sie sollen aber keine politischen Spannungen anrühren, die eine traurige Tatsache in unserer Gesellschaft darstellen.³⁸

Das Ministerium beabsichtigte, Predigten auf die rein religiöse Sphäre zu beschränken, ohne dass darin aktuelle politische Situation kommentiert und das Evangelium zur Kritik gesellschaftlicher Beziehungen in Norwegen verwendet wird. Die Kanzel wurde zu einem wichtigen Werkzeug der zivilen Widerstandsbewegung und deswegen wollten NS und MKuB sie schwächen.

³⁶ *Rundskriv fra Kirke- og Undervisningsdepartementet til presteskapat, 11 februar 1941*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, p. 25

³⁷ I.Hagen: *Den norske kirke i storm*, Oslo 1967, p. 39.

³⁸ *Rundskriv fra Kirke- og Undervisningsdepartementet til presteskapat og menighetsråd, 5. april 1941*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, pp. 45–48.

Die Direktive rief eine spontane Reaktion der Bischöfe und Pastoren hervor, die darauf reagieren mussten, dass MKuB sich so deutlich das Recht zum Eingriff in Predigte anmisst. Die Bischöfe nahmen Stellung zur Anordnung des Ministeriums in ihrem Schreiben vom 12. April 1941, das an Pastoren und Pfarrräte gerichtet wurde. Darin stellten sie fest, dass die Priesterweihe ihnen das Recht gab, Gottes Wort zu verkünden, Sakramente zu spenden, Kranke und Arme zu pflegen, und alles andere tun, was der „heiligen Mission“ angehört. Der Staat verwaltete nur über „äußere Angelegenheiten“ und ausschließlich auf dieser Grundlage konnte die Lutherische Kirche Kontakte mit dem Staat unterhalten.³⁹

Handlungen der Besatzungsverwaltung, die zur Einschränkung der Meinungsfreiheit führen sollten, stellten einen Versuch dar, die Kirche Interessen des Staates zu unterordnen, und in so einer Situation konnte die Kirche nicht schweigen, so verteidigte sie einstimmig ihre geistige Freiheit gegen Eingriffe des Staates.

MKuB begann ab Herbst 1941 allmählich die Herrschaftsgebiete zu betreten, die für die Bischofsverwaltung vorbehalten waren. Dabei meinte es, dass es Bischöfe von ihren administrativen Pflichten befreien will, damit sie mehr Kräfte ihrer seelsorgerischer Tätigkeit widmen können.⁴⁰ In der Wirklichkeit bedeutete das eine Einschränkung von Bischofsbefugnissen – keiner bezweifelte das.

Im Juni 1941 veröffentlichte Feyling seinen Katechismus „Lehre und Leben“ (*Lære og liv*), der vom Ministerium als Lehrbuch für Religionsunterricht in Grundschulen anerkannt wurde. Das neue Lehrbuch beinhaltete den Satz über eine bedingungslose Gehorsamkeit an die Staatsverwaltung und das Bestrafen sämtlicher Tätigkeit, die ihr feindlich wäre. Der Tradition gemäß sollte das Buch zuvor einer bestimmten Institution vorgestellt werden, in deren Besetzung sich Bischöfe, Vertreter theologischer Fakultäten, Schuldirektoren und Lehrerräte befanden. Im obigen Fall wurde das nicht getan.⁴¹

Das Ministerium begann auch, Geistliche laut der Verordnung über die Altersgrenze für Staatsbeamte zu entlassen. Auf diese Weise wurden am 5. Juli zwei Bischöfe: Støren und Maroni und fünf Pastore in den Ruhestand versetzt. Der Ernst der Lage erforderte die Einberufung aller Bischöfe nach Oslo. Zugleich wurde in diesen Tagen Bischof Berggrav von Terboven geladen. Der Kommissar

³⁹ *Fra biskopen. Svar til prester og menighetsråd på den stilide spørsmål, 12 juni 1941*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, pp. 56–59.

⁴⁰ H.C. Christie, op. cit., p. 101.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 79.

informierte den Bischof über die Beschlagnahme aller Kirchenglocken und ihr Umschmelzen für Kriegszwecke. Berggrav beklagte sich, dass die Entscheidung in Verbindung mit Versetzung in den Ruhestand einiger Geistlichen negative Stimmung in der Gesellschaft hervorrief. Diese Information war für Terboven deutlich überraschend.⁴² Er selbst führte eine gemäßigtere Politik der Kirche gegenüber als NS und MKuB und bemühte sich, Konflikte mit ihr zu meiden. Seine Kirchenpolitik wurde von dem Propagandaminister Goebbels beeinflusst, der empfahl, eine harte Politik der Kirche gegenüber erst nach Kriegsende zu führen. Deswegen informierte Terboven den Bischof schon am nächsten Tag persönlich über das Wiederrufen der Entscheidung von Skancke. Die Situation war ein Beweis für die Tatsache, dass gerade Terboven die entscheidende Gewalt auf dem Gebiet der Kirchenpolitik inne hatte.⁴³

Als der Plan der Entlassung von Bischöfen, die über 65 waren, und der Ernennung für ihre Ämter von NS-Mitgliedern misslang, begann das Ministerium die Personen für Kirchenämter zu ernennen, die der Verwaltung gegenüber Loyalität zeigten. Am häufigsten verfügten sie über keine entsprechende Ausbildung und Qualifikation. Das Ministerium setzte die Übernahme einer Reihe an bischöflichen Administrationsbefugnissen weiter fort: Und es verweigerte die Priesterweihe diesen Personen, die die Bischöfe empfahlen. Es hörte auf, Bischöfe in Fragen religiöser Zeremonien hinzuziehen.⁴⁴

Immer häufiger verschickte MKuB seine Rundschreiben in Kultusfragen direkt an Pastore und Pfarrgemeinden unter Ausschluss von Bischöfen. So eine Situation fand im September 1941 statt, als Dekane ein Telegramm vom Ministerium bekamen, dass sie während der nächsten Messe der Opfer zweier angeblich durch Engländer versenkten Schiffe gedenken sollen. Die Erfüllung dieser Forderung wurde die Teilnahme an der gegen Alliierten und der norwegischen Regierung in London gerichteten Propaganda bedeuten, und das konnte die Kirche nicht machen. Deswegen betete man in der Mehrheit der Kirchen für alle, die während des Krieges in Wehmut versunken sind.⁴⁵ Das Senden des Telegramms direkt an Dekane war eine absichtliche Verachtung der Bischöfe. Früher oder später mussten sie auf das eigenmächtige Betreten ihres Verwaltungsgebietes durch das Ministerium reagieren. Den Anlass dazu gab die Einführung einer neuen

⁴² Ibidem, pp. 87–88.

⁴³ T. Austad: op. cit., p. 84.

⁴⁴ H.C. Christie: op. cit., pp. 100–101.

⁴⁵ B. Nøkleby: op. cit., p. 49.

Ordnung für Orgelspieler, die am 4. November 1941 – ohne früheres Vorlegen den Bischöfen – an Pastoren geschickt wurde.⁴⁶ Obwohl die Ordnung selbst kein ernstes Problem darstellte, verletzte die Form ihrer Bekanntgabe das Kirchenrecht. In seiner Protestschrift an MKuB vom 19. November 1941 stellte der Bischof von Oslo fest, dass in allen religiösen Zeremonien betreffenden Fragen sind Bischöfe diese, die den Kern der Kirche vertreten, und nicht das Ministerium. Alle das Problem betreffenden Schriften müssen über Bischöfe versendet werden, oder Pastoren sollen informiert werden, was für Einstellung Bischöfe bezüglich einer bestimmten Sache haben.⁴⁷ MKuB antwortete sofort, indem es sich auf den Art. 16 der Konstitution als Grundlage seiner Entscheidungen bezüglich des Kultus berief. Außerdem betonte es, dass der Bischof von Oslo kein Recht hatte, im Namen aller Bischöfe aufzutreten und dass er keine besondere Stellung im bischöflichen Kollegium hat.⁴⁸

Unter dem Einfluss der Kirchenpolitik, die von der Regierung geführt wurde, arbeiteten die Bischöfe ein Dokument über die Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Kirche und dem Staat aus, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Aspekten des Kirchenrechtes – Kirchenregeln (Kirkens Orden). Am 15. Dezember wurde das Dokument an MKuB geschickt und eine Woche später – an Pastoren und Pfarrräte. Darin stellte man fest, dass die Beziehungen Kirche – Staat nur dann „im Einklang mit dem Wesen der Kirche“ möglich waren, wenn die Verwaltung Bischöfe respektierte und sie in allen Fragen bezüglich des Glaubens zurate zog. Man berief sich auf die Rechte König Christian V. von 1687, auf die königliche Resolution von 1895, die Konstitution, und vor allem auf Praxis und Tradition. „Kirchenrechte gibt es nicht immer in Paragraphen, häufig ist das eine kirchliche Tradition“ – lesen wir im Dokument. Das Verhältnis Kirche – Staat sollte auf gegenseitigem Vertrauen beruhen. Auf den Vorwurf des Ministeriums bezüglich der Stellung vom Bischof von Oslo antwortete man, dass er nie einen besonderen Platz im Bischofskollegium forderte und sich nie im Namen anderer Bischöfe aussprach, ohne ihnen das Problem früher vorgelegt zu haben.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ *Rundskriv fra Kirke- og Undervisningsdepartementet til Rikets sokneprest, 4 november 1941*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, pp. 133–135.

⁴⁷ *Brev fra Oslo bikop til Kirkedepartementet, 19 november 1941*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, p. 136.

⁴⁸ *Brev fra Kirkedepartementet til biskorer, 24 november 1941*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, pp. 137–138.

⁴⁹ *Kirkens Orden*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, pp. 139–138.

So kam es zu einer Auseinandersetzung um Kompetenzen zwischen dem Ministerium und den Bischöfen. Der Streit betraf die Frage, wer das Recht hat, die Kirche in Norwegen zu leiten. Da keine kirchliche Gesetzgebung existierte, die deutlich die Einteilung der Kompetenzen zwischen das Ministerium und die Bischöfe definieren würde, beruhte die Zusammenarbeit der Parteien im großen Ausmaß auf gegenseitigem Vertrauen und dem Gewohnheitsrecht. Bisher reichte das aus, denn Tradition und Bräuche waren in Norwegen sehr stark. Während der Okkupation war die Lage anders: Die Kirche trat vor die Regierung, die mit allen möglichen Mitteln versuchte, sie zu kontrollieren, in ihre administrative und geistige Tätigkeit einzugreifen.

Die Kirchenpolitik des Ministeriums stellte sich ein Hauptziel: Die Kirche sollte der „neuen Ordnung“ gehorchen. Es ging um die Bildung einer starken staatlichen und nationalen Kirche, die mit NS loyal kooperieren würde. Diesen Trend konnte man besonders deutlich in Feylings Tätigkeit beobachten.⁵⁰ Einige typische Tendenzen in MKuB-Politik im Jahre 1941 sind: Verhinderung des Kommentierens der Lage im Land durch die Kirche, Einführung in die Schulen und Predigten von Inhalten, die NS und den Nationalsozialismus unterstützen, Bevorzugung von der Regierung loyalen Geistlichen, Stärkung der Stellung des Ministeriums in der kirchlichen Administration durch Übernahme einer Reihe an Aufgaben, die bisher Bischöfe ausführten.

Der Konflikt zwischen der Kirche und der nationalsozialistischen Verwaltung begann Ende Juni – Anfang Februar 1941, aber seine Ursachen lagen in der politischen und religiösen Entwicklung Norwegens im ersten Jahr der Besatzung, insbesondere nach dem 25. September 1940. Die Kirche erfuhr jedoch 1941 keinen „Frontalangriff“, und alle Handlungen des Ministeriums waren eher Eingriffe, die für die kirchliche Integrität gefährlich waren. Eher war MKuB, das von NS-Mitgliedern geleitet wurde, ein Gegner der Kirche in diesem Zeitraum – und nicht die deutsche Besatzungsmacht, die eine vorsichtige Kirchenpolitik führte.

Im Februar 1942 wuchs die Krise zwischen dem Ministerium und den Bischöfen an. Am 1. Februar 1942 wurde der NS-Führer Vidkun Quisling zum Ministerpräsidenten (ministerpresident) ernannt und ihm wurde die Aufgabe der Bildung einer „nationalen, norwegischen Regierung“ anvertraut.⁵¹ Eigentlich ist in Norwegen nichts Bahnbrechendes passiert und Kommissar Terboven hatte

⁵⁰ I. Hagen: op. cit., p. 84.

⁵¹ B. Nøkleby: op. cit., p. 7.

– wie bisher – die höchste Zivilmacht im Land inne. Die Amtsgewalt Quislings blieb bis auf die Gebiete eingeschränkt, in denen er zivilen und militärischen Zielen Deutschlands nicht schaden konnte. Kommissar Terboven nutzte den größten Teil seiner Rede auf dem Schloss Akershus (Sitz der Besatzungsverwaltung) zum Angriff an Bischof Berggrav, was das Ende einer gemäßigten Einstellung der Kirche gegenüber ankündigte.⁵²

Die Entwicklung von Ereignissen im Jahr 1942 bewies, dass Quisling größere Freiheit in seinen Handlungen bezüglich der Kirche bekam, obwohl Terboven jederzeit eingreifen konnte. Für die Kirche war das keine Wende zum Besseren. Die deutsche Verwaltung war für Religion nicht positiv eingestimmt, aber sie war sich dessen bewusst, dass die Kirche in Norwegen einen besonderen Platz in der Gesellschaft annahm, deswegen mied sie die Provokation ihr gegenüber. Über die Haltung der Deutschen entschied eine objektive Einschätzung dessen, was für die Besatzungsmacht am besten ist. Quisling richtete sich nach anderen Gründen. Die Kirche stand zwischen ihm und der Gesellschaft, das Erreichen der Stellung, die sie hatte, war für ihn somit eine Prestigefrage. Ohne Bedeutung war auch nicht die persönliche Einstellung Quislings zu Berggrav, den er für seinen größten Feind hielt, da der Bischof zum Sturz seiner Regierung im April 1940 beitrug.⁵³

Quisling nutzte eine staatliche Zeremonie zur Feststellung aus, dass er als Ministerpräsident auch der Oberhaupt der Kirche war.⁵⁴ Die Machtübernahme Quislings sollte mit einer Sondermesse in der Kathedrale Nidaros in Trondheim, einem der meist angebeteten, historischen Kirchen Norwegens, gewürdigt werden.⁵⁵ Die Messe sollte am 1. Februar 1942 um 11 Uhr von einem zu NS gehörenden Pastoren, Peder Blessing Dahle, gelesen werden.⁵⁶ Der Pastor, der normalerweise um diese Zeit eine Messe las – Arne Fjellbu, verschob sie auf 14 Uhr.⁵⁷

Ein paar Personen, vor allem uniformierter NS-Mitglieder, nahmen am ersten Gottesdienst teil. Gleich danach überschwemmte ein Scharr an Menschen die Kathedrale. In der Kirche befanden sich 1,5 Tausend Personen als die Polizei befahl, ihre Tür zu schließen. Draußen versammelten sich 2–3 Tausend Personen,

⁵² B. Nøkleby: *Josef Terboven – Hitlers mann i Norge*, Oslo1992, p. 208.

⁵³ H.C. Christie, op. cit., p. 118.

⁵⁴ T. Austad: op. cit., p. 88.

⁵⁵ B. Nøkleby: *Holdningskamp...*, p. 45.

⁵⁶ H.C. Christie, op. cit., p. 118.

⁵⁷ *Trondheim Domkirkes menighetsblad nr. 2 1942*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, p. 191.

und obwohl es sehr kalt war (-25°C) wollten sie nicht nach Hause gehen. Bald kamen vor die Kirche weitere Polizeiabteilungen, die versuchten, die Versammelten zum Verlassen des Kirchenplatzes zu zwingen. In der Situation konnte schnell ein Konflikt ausbrechen, deswegen appellierte Bischof Støren an die Menschenmenge, dass sie sich zurückzieht und der Provokation nicht unterliegt. Die Versammelten blieben jedoch vor der Kathedrale stehen und sangen Psalmen und Nationallieder.⁵⁸ Das Ministerium beschuldigte dafür den Dekan und enthob ihn am 19. Februar des Amtes.⁵⁹

Nicht nur in Trondheim, sondern im ganzen Land wurde diese Tat der Verwaltung als ein brutaler Angriff auf die Kirche wahrgenommen. Keine rechtliche Prozeduren oder Vorschriften konnten die Tatsache verbergen, dass polizeiliche Kräfte gegen die Kirche und Gläubiger angewendet wurden. Darauf musste die Kirche anders als bisher reagieren. Am 23. Februar 1942 entschieden sich die Bischöfe, dass sie auf ihre weltlichen Ämter verzichteten.⁶⁰ Einen Tag später, am 24. Februar schickte jeder von ihnen (E. Berggrav, J. N. Støren, W. Krohn-Hansen, J. Maroni, H. G. Hille, G. Skagestad, A. Fleischer) einen gleichen Brief an Minister Skancke, in dem er die Gründe seines Rücktritts erklärte. Als Grund für ihre Entscheidung nannten die Bischöfe die Ereignisse in Trondheim und ihre Folgen.⁶¹

Die Entscheidung der Geistlichen war außergewöhnlich, bisher gab es kein ähnliches Ereignis in der Geschichte der norwegischen Kirche. Die Bischöfe brachen somit die administrative Zusammenarbeit mit dem nationalsozialistischen Ministerium ab. Ihr Rücktritt von weltlichen Ämtern war kein kirchlicher Streik, wie das die Nazipropaganda häufig bezeichnete. Die Bischöfe verzichteten nicht auf die Lehre der Kirche, sondern sie brachen die Beziehung mit dem Staat, der durch MKuB vertreten war, ab. Sie verzichteten auch auf Vorteile und Pflichten, die mit einem staatlichen Amt verbunden waren, jedoch bewahrten sie ihre Aufgaben als geistige Oberhäupter von Diözesen.⁶²

Dieses Verhalten fand Anerkennung und Zustimmung von Pastoren und Gläubigern. Es erwies sich, dass die Wahrnehmung durch die Bischöfe ihrer Aufgaben und ihrer Berufung den Erwartungen von Gemeindemitgliedern entsprach.

⁵⁸ B. Nøkleby: *Holdningskamp...*, p. 44.

⁵⁹ H.C. Christie: op. cit., p. 129.

⁶⁰ I. Hagen: op. cit., p. 58.

⁶¹ *Brev fra Norges biskoper, 24 februar 1942*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, pp. 223–226.

⁶² T. Austad: op. cit., p. 91.

Der Bischofsbrief wurde in norwegischen Kirchen am 1. März 1942 vorgelesen. Gleich danach teilte die Mehrheit von Pastoren dem Ministerium schriftlich mit, dass sie sich mit ihren Bischöfen solidarisieren und sie weiterhin als eigene Vorgesetzten anerkennen.⁶³ MKuB reagierte sofort, indem es die Bischöfe entthob (24. März 1942) und die Leitung von Diözesen Dekanen übergab.⁶⁴ Die letzten jedoch lehnten es entschieden ab und traten – ähnlich wie Bischöfe – von ihren weltlichen Ämtern zurück.⁶⁵

Diese Tat führte zu einer persönlichen Teilnahme Quislings am Kampf gegen die Kirche, denn er hielt sich für den Vorgesetzten von Den Norske Kirke, und somit verstand die Entscheidung der Bischöfe als gegen ihn persönlich gerichtet. Sofort nachdem die Bischöfe ihren Rücktritt bekanntgegeben hatten, kritisierte er sie in seinem Brief vom 26. Februar, den er an alle Geistlichen verschickte. Im Schreiben beschuldigte er die Bischöfe, dass sie das Christentum zur Führung „einer schädlichen Politik und zum Dienen dem Kommunismus“ ausnutzen. Sie wurden von ihm als „unbedeutende Leute in hohen Ämtern, ohne historische Vorstellung, die das zerstören, was von Vätern des Landes gebildet wurde und die nicht sehen, dass sie irreparable Schäden dadurch verursachen“ bezeichnet. Bischof Berggrav belastete er mit Schuld für „die Zerstörung der Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit Norwegens, das Verursachen enorm großer materieller und moralischer Schäden und Leiden norwegischer Gesellschaft“.⁶⁶ Ein paar weitere Wochen dauerte das Anschwärzen der Bischöfe in der Nazipresse. Gleichzeitig wurde betont, dass seitens der Verwaltung keine Interventionen unternommen wurden, die die Freiheit der Kirche einschränken konnten, und NS hatte große Achtung für die Religion.⁶⁷

Am 26. Februar wurde Berggrav von der Stelle des Bischofs von Oslo entlassen und ihm wurde das Recht entzogen, den offiziellen Titel zu tragen. Anfang März entließ man die übrigen Bischöfe und befahl der ganzen Gruppe, sich zweimal am Tag bei der Polizei zu melden.⁶⁸ Die Gewaltanwendung führte nur dazu, dass Bischöfe durch das Volk als Märtyrer behandelt wurden. Als Pastoren

⁶³ H.C. Christie: op. cit., p.132.

⁶⁴ *Telegram Kirkedepartementet til samtlige biskoper, 24 februar 1942*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, pp. 226–227.

⁶⁵ H.C. Christie, op. cit., p. 133.

⁶⁶ *Rundskriv til alle proster i den norske statkirke fra ministerpresident, 26 februar 1942*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, pp. 227–233.

⁶⁷ *Aftenposten – I. IV. 1942*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, pp. 240–241.

⁶⁸ B. Nøkleby: *Holdningskamp...*, p. 55.

die Protestschrift der Bischöfe vorlasen, waren die Kirchen so voll wie nie zuvor. Leute waren mit der bischöflichen Haltung berührt und viele weinten offen.⁶⁹

Die Entlassung von Bischöfen schien für Quisling einfach zu sein, jedoch als er Personen finden wollte, die sie ersetzen sollten, fingen Schwierigkeiten an. Die Dekane, die laut dem Kirchenrecht unter Abwesenheit der Bischöfe ihre Büros leiten sollten, verweigerten die Annahme dieser Aufgaben und traten von ihren Ämtern zurück. Angesichts dessen gab der Minister am 4. März 1942 Namen sieben Pastoren an, die die Leitung der Diözesen übernahmen. Alle waren entweder NS-Mitglieder oder NS-Anhänger.⁷⁰

Quisling war sich dessen bewusst, dass der Rücktritt der Bischöfe mit der Auflösung der Staatskirche drohte, deswegen befahl er NS-Mitgliedern, keine lokalen Kampagnen gegen den Klerus zu unternehmen. Das Hauptziel der ministerialen Politik im März 1942 war es, nicht zulassen, dass der Klerus niedrigeren Grades eventuell von seinen Ämtern zurücktritt. Außerdem ging es um das Abbrechen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Pfarrgemeinden und Bischöfen, deswegen entließ man über zehn Geistliche – hauptsächlich auf Grund der Verordnung über die Altersgrenze.⁷¹

Am 12. März 1942 wurde das Verbot über das Vorlesen in den Kirchen von Schriften entlassener Bischöfe erlassen. Man warnte auch, dass „illoyale Handlung der Verwaltung gegenüber und neue Versuche, Unruhen unter Gläubigern zu entfachen, ein entschiedenes Handeln seitens des Ministeriums verursachen“. MKuB drohte mit konkreten Artikeln des Strafgesetzbuches, die sich auf Verräter bezogen und sogar mit einer lebenslangen Freiheitsstrafe bedroht waren.⁷² Pastoren ließen sich jedoch keine Angst einjagen. Mit Ausnahme einiger von ihnen, die der Partei angehörten, unterstützte die Mehrheit ihre Bischöfe, pflegte Kontakte mit ihnen und wollte mit neuen Vorgesetzten nichts zu tun haben.⁷³

Der bischöfliche Verzicht auf weltliche Ämter bedeutete für die Verwaltung einen relevanten Verlust der Autorität. Die Bischöfe dagegen gewannen an Hochachtung sogar außer kirchlichen Kreisen. Viel ernster als der Prestigeverlust war für MKuB die Isolation, in der es sich befand. Es verfügte weiterhin über

⁶⁹ T. Gjelsvik, op. cit., p. 72.

⁷⁰ *Rundskriv fra Kirke- og undervisningsdeparatemetet til presteskapet, 4 mars 1942*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, p. 236.

⁷¹ T. Austad: op. cit., S. 94.

⁷² *Rundskriv fra Kirke- og undervisningsdeparatemetet til presteskapet, 12 mars 1942*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, pp. 234–235.

⁷³ K. Hansson: op. cit., p.100.

das Administrationsapparat und versuchte mit seiner Hilfe eine Beziehung zum Klerus und zu Pfarrgemeinden zu bewahren, jedoch verlor es diesen Kontakt. Der Rücktritt der Bischöfe und Dekane von staatlichen Ämtern stellte den ersten Schritt zur Ablösung der Kirche von staatlicher Kirchenverwaltung dar.⁷⁴

Die Wochen nach dem bischöflichen Rücktritt nutzte der norwegische Klerus für Konsolidierung und Beratungen. Unter Pastoren gab es die Stimmen dafür, dass auch sie wie Bischöfe und Dekane verfahren sollen. Besonders aktiv war das Milieu junger Geistlicher von Oslo, die dem Minister in der Tat eine Schrift mit ihrem Ultimatum vorlegten. Darin stellte man fest, dass Pastoren ihren, mit dem Staatsamt verbundenen Pflichten weiter nicht nachgehen werden, falls die Meinung der Kirche über bestimmte aktuelle Fragen nicht berücksichtigt wird. Das war keine Drohung, sondern eine Warnung davor, was passieren könnte, wenn sich die Politik des Ministeriums für Kirche und Bildung nicht ändern würde.

Im Manifest, das in den Kirchen am 22. März 1942 vorgelesen wurde, protestierte man gegen die Anordnung Quislings über die Teilnahme der Jugend an der NS-Organisation, und im Schlussteil formulierte man die Bedingung: „Das, ob ich mein Amt weiter ausübe, hängt davon ab, ob die Befugnisse der Kirche in Sachen, die heute streitig sind, respektiert werden“.⁷⁵

In dieser Zeit formulierten Bischöfe ein Dokument, das die offizielle Stellungnahme der Kirche zur aktuellen religiösen und politischen Situation enthielt. Das Manifest sollte auch der Verwaltung und dem Volk Handlungsmotive des Klerus nahe bringen. Im Endergebnis entstand „Kirkens Grunn“ (Die Grundlagen des Funktionierens von der Kirche) – das wichtigste Schreiben, das die Kirche während des Krieges erarbeitete.⁷⁶ Ursprünglich dachte man an die Verbindung der Veröffentlichung von „Kirkens Grunn“ mit der Entscheidung von Pastoren über den Verzicht auf Staatsämter nicht. Jedoch im Frühling verschärfte sich die Lage im Land und die Regierungspolitik in Bezug auf die Kirche wurde noch aggressiver. Deswegen wurde der Entschluss gefasst, beide Sachen zu verbinden. Als Anhang zu „Kirkens Grunn“ fügte man eine Erklärung von Pastoren hinzu, in der sie ihre Unterstützung in Bezug auf den Inhalt des Dokuments äußerten und auf die Ausübung von Staatsämtern verzichteten. Die durch Bischöfe

⁷⁴ Ibidem, p. 99.

⁷⁵ Cit. für H.C. Christie: op. cit., p. 155.

⁷⁶ Weiteres zu den Umständen, in denen das Dokument entstand und zu seinen Inhalten siehe bei M. Gawinecka: op. cit., pp. 107–109.

im Februar 1942 angewendete Formel über das Fortsetzen ihrer seelsorgerischer Arbeit wurde hier wiederholt.⁷⁷

„Kirkens Grunn“ verteidigte die Unabhängigkeit der Kirche vom Staat in allen geistigen Fragen. Das Dokument enthielt auch keine Empfehlungen oder Ratschläge der Bischöfe. Es sollte auch nicht als Deklaration einer kirchlichen Gruppe verstanden werden: Schon in der Einführung betonte man, dass das eine Erklärung aller Gläubiger ist. Im Schlussteil unterstrich man direkt, dass die Entwicklung von Ereignissen in Norwegen nach dem 25. September 1940, und insbesondere nach dem 1. Februar 1942 die Kirche zu einer Handlung dieser Art zwang. In keinem der Artikel wurde auch die deutsche Besatzungsverwaltung direkt angeklagt, denn man wollte sie auf diese Weise nicht provozieren.⁷⁸

Das Vorlesen von „Kirkens Grunn“ wurde für Ostersonntag, den 5. April 1942, angesagt. Sie sollte die Funktion einer Erklärung für den Rücktritt von Staatsämtern und den Abbruch der Zusammenarbeit mit der staatlichen Leitung der Kirche haben.⁷⁹ Im Jahre 1942 verzichteten 645 von 699 Geistlichen, die Staatsbeamten waren, auf ihre weltliche Ämter, was 92,3% des gesamten Klerus ausmachte. Für die, die gegen Deutsche und NS waren, war das die einzig mögliche Alternative. Somit war Den Norske Kirke vom April 1942 bis Mai 1945 keine Staatskirche mehr. 70% Pastore, die die Aktion nicht unterstützten, waren entweder NS-Mitglieder oder –Anhänger, und ein Teil hatte Angst vor so einer drastischen Entscheidung.⁸⁰ Das Vorlesen des Dokuments war eine Manifestierung der Kircheneinstellung der NS-Politik gegenüber. Es zeugte auch von einer starken Solidarität der Kirche als Institution. Die Tat der Geistlichen war so schnell und gut koordiniert, dass Quisling und seine Ministern staunen mussten. Das Erste, womit sich die Regierung beschäftigte, war die Suche nach dem, der die Kampagne leitete.⁸¹

Am 8. März 1942 veröffentlichte die Nazipresse einen Artikel, in dem Quisling Geistliche als „Betrüger und Verräter“ bezeichnete.⁸² Die Art und Weise seiner Äußerung zeugte davon, dass er mit immer größeren Emotionen auf den Widerstand reagierte, auf den er im Frühling 1942 stieß. Quisling kehrte zur

⁷⁷ *Erklaring*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, p. 272.

⁷⁸ *Kirkens Grunn*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, pp. 265–272.

⁷⁹ T. Austad: *op. cit.*, p. 188.

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 189.

⁸¹ H.C. Christie: *op. cit.*, p. 171.

⁸² *Nasjonal Samling og Kirken, 8 mars 1942*, in: *Kirkelig Hvitbok...*, pp. 278–284.

Gewalt zurück, trotzdem, dass dieses Mittel bei früherer Verwendung umgekehrte Auswirkungen hatte als beabsichtigt. Am 8. April 1942 schickte er an jeden protestierenden Geistlichen ein Telegramm, in dem er mit hohen Strafen drohte, wenn man bis zum 11. April 1942 das bisherige Amt nicht wieder übernimmt.⁸³ Quislings Drohungen blieben jedoch nicht leer. Viele Geistliche wurden aus eigenen Pfarrgemeinden vertrieben und diese Vorgehensweise praktizierte Quisling während der ganzen Okkupation.⁸⁴ Seine Stellung wurde durch die Offensive, die er im Februar 1942 begann, bedeutend geschwächt. Statt schnell Erfolg zu erreichen, was – wie er ständig betonte – mit seinem Amtsantritt als Regierungschef⁸⁵ erfolgen sollte, gelang ihm nur einen starken, moralischen Front zu bilden, der all seine Bemühungen zunichtemachte. Der Front wurde von der Kirche geführt. Die Reaktion Terbovens war anfangs ähnlich: Der Kommissar war den Geistlichen böse, und wollte sie sogar in den Norden Norwegens deportieren. Bald jedoch begann er vorsichtiger zu handeln, was bedeutete, dass er sich unter Druck seitens Berlins befand.⁸⁶

Der Rücktritt von Bischöfen und Pastoren von weltlichen Ämtern, der im Frühling 1942 stattfand, führte zu einer Spaltung in Den Norske Kirke. Der Flügel, der die administrative Zusammenarbeit mit dem Staat abbrach, umfasste alle Bischöfe, 92% Pastoren, beide theologische Fakultäten, christliche Organisationen und Pfarrräte. Nur Bischöfe und Pastoren verzichteten offiziell auf die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Staat, aber andere Institutionen und Behörden unterstützten die Entscheidung der Geistlichen und solidarisierten sich mit ihnen.⁸⁷ Die durch Quisling erschaffene Kirche war temporal, auf Minderheit basierend, und in einer besonderen politischen Situation in Norwegen gegründet. Das war die Staatskirche, geleitet durch MKuB mit dem Ministerpräsident als „summus episcopus“. Ihre Arbeit wurde von Mitgliedern oder Anhängern der Partei unterstützt. Nicht ohne Grund nannte man sie NS-Kirche. Man schätzt ein, dass in der Organisation ca. 100 Pastoren arbeiteten.⁸⁸ In vielen Pfarrgemeinden nutzten wirkliche und nationalsozialistische Geistliche dieselben Kirchengebäude, jedoch arbeiteten sie nicht zusammen. Außerdem arbeiteten NS-Geistliche bei leeren

⁸³ H.C. Christie: op. cit., p. 173.

⁸⁴ Ibidem, pp. 253–256.

⁸⁵ O. Høidal: op. cit., p. 446.

⁸⁶ Ibidem, p.198.

⁸⁷ T. Austad: op. cit., p. 201.

⁸⁸ Ibidem, pp. 203–204.

Kirchen und das war ein sichtbarer Beweis dafür, wie Quisling einen großen Teil der Gesellschaft gegen sich und seine Partei richtete. Gläubige verweigerten die Zusammenarbeit mit der Verwaltung getreuen Geistlichen, und um eigene Kinder zu taufen, gingen sie in benachbarte Pfarrgemeinden.⁸⁹

Repressionen den Geistlichen gegenüber in einer größeren Skala begannen Anfang 1942: Die ersten an die strengere Methoden angewendet wurden, waren Bischöfe. Im Februar 1942 wurden sie entlassen, ihren Titel beraubt, und mit der Pflicht auferlegt, sich bei der Polizei zu melden, bald kam dazu noch das Verbot für Ansprachen bei Versammlungen⁹⁰. Im Sommer dieses Jahres bereitete das Ministerium eine weitere Kampagne gegen Geistliche vor: Es nahm den entlassenen Bischöfen und Pastoren ihre Priestergewände weg.⁹¹ Bischof Berggrav war von allen Geistlichen am längsten inhaftiert: Er war in den Jahren 1942–1945 interniert. Da die Vertreibungen vom Klerus aus Pfarrgemeinden die seelsorgliche Tätigkeit erfolgreich lähmten, begann das Ministerium 1943 unwillkommene Pastoren auf die kleinen Inseln im Norden Norwegens zu verbannen. Vom April 1944 deportierte man alle Geistlichen nach Lillehammer, wo innerhalb eines Jahres sich vier Bischöfe und über fünfzig Pastoren fanden. Im Dezember 1944 unterbrachte man die Geistlichen auf der Insel Helgøya auf dem See Mjøsa, wo sich früher eine Besserungsanstalt für Jungen befand, denn nach Lillehammer wurde das militärische Hauptquartier verlegt. Inhaftierungsbedingungen für Geistliche waren unvergleichlich besser als z.B. die für Lehrer. Der Grund dieser Differenzierung ist in einem deutlichen Widerspruch Deutschlands gegen das Fortsetzen des Konflikts mit der Kirche zu suchen. Ähnlich wie im Dritten Reich verschob Hitler die endgültige Abrechnung mit der Kirche in Norwegen für die Zeit nach dem Kriegsende und somit waren Quisling die Hände gebunden.⁹² Im Sommer 1945 veröffentlichte man Angaben bezüglich Repressionen, die gegen norwegische Geistliche gerichtet wurden. Demnach wurden 93 Personen (ca. 12%) von diesen, die „Kirkens Grunn“ unterzeichneten, für kürzere oder längere Zeit inhaftiert. Einige von ihnen blieben in Konzentrationslagern in Deutschland, und zwei starben in deutscher Gefangenschaft. 127 Geistliche

⁸⁹ K. Hansson: op. cit., p. 112.

⁹⁰ H.C. Christie: op .cit., pp. 230–233.

⁹¹ Ibidem, p. 244.

⁹² B. Nøkleby: *Holdningskamp...*, pp. 65–66.

(15,6%) wurden zum Verlassen ihrer Pfarrgemeinden gezwungen. Insgesamt verhinderte man 222 Geistlichen gewöhnliche seelsorgerische Dienste.⁹³

KOŚCIÓŁ W NORWEGII W POLITYCE OKUPANTA NIEMIECKIEGO I NORWESKICH FASZYSTÓW

Streszczenie

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie polityki okupacyjnych władz niemieckich i norweskich faszystów wobec Kościoła w Norwegii w okresie drugiej wojny światowej. Zagadnienie przeciwstawiania się Kościoła luterńskiego władzom nazistowskim, określane w literaturze norweskiej jako „kirkekampen” (walka Kościoła) jest praktycznie nieobecne w literaturze polskiej. Artykuł oparty jest prawie wyłącznie na literaturze norweskiej a podstawowy materiał źródłowy stanowią źródła drukowane.

Po zajęciu Norwegii w 1940 roku Norwegowie stanęli przed problemem jak ustosunkować się do nowej, okupacyjnej rzeczywistości.

Władze Trzeciej Rzeszy nie prowadziły jednolitej polityki wobec Kościołów na zajętych i okupowanych terytoriach Europy. Kościół w Norwegii był kościołem państwowym tzn. państwo miało obowiązek wspierać religię luterńską i chronić praktyki religijnej. W 1940 roku władza okupacyjna nie wystąpiła otwarcie przeciwko Kościołowi, a co więcej zarówno Niemcy, jak i członkowie NS zapewniali o pozytywnym stosunku do religii. Nie zamierzano ingerować w sprawę Kościoła tak długo, jak duchowni nie sprzeciwiali się nowej sytuacji politycznej. Wydarzenia, do których doszło na przełomie lat 1940-1941 wyraźnie pokazały do czego zmierzają Niemcy i NS – społeczeństwo norweskie miało zostać znazyfikowane. Lojalność Kościoła wobec władzy okupacyjnej stanęła pod znakiem zapytania w chwili łamania przez nazistów prawa norweskiego. Konflikt między Kościołem a władzą nazistowską zaczął się na przełomie stycznia i lutego 1941 roku, ale jego podstawy leżały w rozwoju politycznym i religijnym Norwegii w pierwszym roku okupacji. Represje wobec duchowieństwa na większą skalę rozpoczęły się na początku 1942 roku, pierwszymi wobec których zastosowano ostrzejsze metody byli biskupi. W lutym 1942 roku zostali zwolnieni, pozbawienie tytułu i nałożono na nich obowiązek meldowania się na policji, wkrótce zabroniono im przemawiać na zgromadzeniach. Najdłużej zatrzymanym wśród wszystkich duchownym był biskup Beggrav, internowany w latach 1942–1945. Ponieważ tymczasowe wygnania kleru z parafii skutecznie paraliżowały działalność duszpasterską, Ministerstwo Kościoła i Edukacji rozpoczęło w 1943 roku zsyłanie niepożądanych pastorów na wysepki na północy

⁹³ Ibidem, p. 71.

Norwegii. Warunki przetrzymywania duchownych były bez porównania lepsze niż na przykład nauczycieli. Przyczyn tej różnicy należy szukać w wyraźnym sprzeciwie Niemiec wobec kontynuowania konfliktu z Kościołem. Podobnie jak w Niemczech, Hitler odłożył ostateczny rozrachunek z Kościołem w Norwegii na okres po zakończeniu wojny i tym samym ograniczył możliwość prowadzenia własnej polityki wobec kościoła przez Quislinga.

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Szczecin

**THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
AND THE NAVAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
IN GENEVA (1927)****

Keywords: Great Britain, naval disarmament, Coolidge Conference

Summary

The Naval Disarmament Conference was held in Geneva between 20 June – 4 August 1927 on the initiative of the American President Calvin Coolidge. It was a continuation of the process initiated during the Washington Conference (12 November 1921 – 6 February 1922). It was then that Great Britain, the United States of America, Japan, France and Italy determined the ratio of the naval forces in the class of battleships and aircraft carriers in line with the following: 5 : 5 : 3 : 1.75 : 1.75. During the so-called Coolidge Conference (1927) the American party did its best to conclude an international treaty and consequently achieve parity between the US Navy and Royal Navy in all classes of warships.

The British government accepted an invitation to the Geneva Conference (1927) assuming that their delegation would succeed in forcing through the disarmament plan formulated by the Admiralty. The plan was aimed at modifying the Washington Treaty in order that the British Empire could make savings and at the same time improve her national security. The British plan was aimed at prolonging the service life of battleships

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** Research in London for this article was supported by the De Brzezie Lanckoronski Foundation.

and aircraft carriers, reducing the displacement and calibre of guns carried by battle-ships, and, last but not least, dividing the cruisers into heavy and light as well as imposing limitations only on the number of the former.

The British plan met with strong objection from the American delegation. Attempts made to reach a consensus over parity between the Royal and US Navy in the class of cruisers were unsuccessful, and the conference eventually turned into a fiasco. Such a state of affairs had to do with strategic, political and economic issues. The Admiralty opposed to reaching an agreement which put the security of the British Empire at a serious risk, and the majority of the British ministers were inclined to believe that the conference breakdown would be lesser evil than agreeing to the American demands. The British diplomats strove for adopting a common stance with the Japanese delegation in order that the responsibility for the conference collapse rested with the American party.

Once the First World War had come to an end, attempts were made to impose limitations on naval armaments undertaken by superpowers under international treaties. It was then that arms limitation and disarmament conferences became a key element of international politics. During the Washington Conference (12 November 1921 – 6 February 1922), the ratio of naval forces of the British Empire, the United States of America, Japan, France and Italy in the classes of capital ships and aircraft carriers was determined in the following way: 5 : 5 : 3 : 1.75 : 1.75.¹

¹ See for more: R. Dingman: *Power in the Pacific. The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914–1922*, London 1976, pp. 139–219; K.J. McDonald: *The Washington Conference and the Naval Balance of Power, 1921–22*, in: *Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power. Britain and America in the Twentieth Century*, eds. J.B. Hattendorf, R.S. Jordan, Basingstoke–London 1989, pp. 189–213; M.H. Murfett: *Look Back in Anger: The Western Powers and the Washington Conference of 1921–1922*, in: *Arms Limitation and Disarmament. Restraints on War, 1899–1939*, ed. B.J.C. McKercher, Westport Conn. 1992, pp. 83–103; R.C. Gamble: *Decline of the Dreadnought: Britain and the Washington Naval Conference, 1921–1922*, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1993; J. Blatt: *France and the Washington Conference*, “Diplomacy & Statecraft” 1993, vol. IV, no. 3, pp. 192–219; B.R. Sullivan: *Italian Naval Power and the Washington Conference of 1921–1922*, *Ibidem*, pp. 220–248; J. Łaptos, W. Rojek: *Francja wobec problemu zbrojeń na konferencji waszyngtońskiej 1921–1922* [France vis-à-vis Armaments Problem at the Washington Conference 1921–1922], “Dzieje Najnowsze” [“Contemporary History”] 1986, yearbook. XVIII, no.1, pp. 5–16; W. Waszczykowski: *Problemy redukcji i ograniczenia zbrojeń morskich w polityce zagranicznej Stanów Zjednoczonych na Konferencji Waszyngtońskiej (12 XI 1921–6 II 1922)* [Problem of Reduction and Limitation of Naval Armaments in the US Foreign Policy at Washington Conference (12 XI 1921–6 II 1922)], “Acta Universitatis Lodziensis” 1986, Folia Historica 28, pp. 35–60; A.M. Brzeziński: *Stanowisko Francji wobec waszyngtońskiej konferencji rozbrojeniowej (12 XI 1921–6 II 1922)* [The Attitude of France towards Disarmament Conference at Washington (12 XI 1921–6 II 1922)], *Ibidem*, pp. 13–33; A. Harasimowicz: *Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec zagadnienia rozbrojenia 1921–1937* [British Diplomacy and Disarmament Problem 1921–1937], Łódź 1990, pp.

Under the Washington Naval Treaty, signed on 6 February 1922, Great Britain had lost its naval supremacy in the aforementioned classes of ships. For political, economic and strategic reasons, so-called “Two-Powers Standard” (that the Royal Navy “should at least be equal to the naval strength of any two other countries”), which since 1889 was considered essential for the British Empire to maintain her naval supremacy, was replaced with “One-Power Standard” (that the Royal Navy “should not be inferior in strength to the Navy of any other Power”).² However, as correctly noticed by John R. Ferris, “Britain had lost its special position at sea in principle while retaining that status in practice”. In fact, the Washington Naval Treaty did not impose any limitation on the number of cruisers and other auxiliary ships, to which France objected. Consequently, the British Empire still enjoyed her supremacy in the aforementioned naval ship classes, which was of major importance to the safety of sea routes and allowed her to develop this part of fleet unrestrainedly.³

The naval disarmament conference held in Geneva between 20 June and 4 August 1927 was convened on the initiative of American President Calvin Coolidge whose main objective was to adopt the Washington ratio (5 : 5 : 3 : 1.75 : 1.75) toward all naval ship classes, and most of all establish parity between the US Navy and the Royal Navy. The conference was a fiasco. The main, yet not the only reason behind such a state of affairs, was an unresolved American-British conflict over parity in the class of cruisers. Although the conference in Geneva formally ended without any consensus and was eventually postponed, international public opinion had no doubts about its outcome. In the USA, irritated President Coolidge, who expected that the conference success will be a major opportunity for Republican Party to improve their image in the eyes of American society, on 2 August 1927 declared he would not stand for re-election in 1928 (famous “I do not choose to run”). Lord Robert Cecil, representing Great Britain at the conference, on 9 August 1927 handed in his resignation to protest against

16–25, 34–53; W. Rojek: *Spory o władanie morzem. Polityczno-dyplomatyczne aspekty zbrojeń morskich w okresie międzywojennym 1919–1939* [Disputes about Ruling the Seas. Political and Diplomatic Aspects of Naval Armaments in the Interwar Period 1919–1939], Kraków 1994, pp. 55–90.

² *Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report* [further: PDHC], 4th Series, vol. CCCXXXIII, col. 1171, Lord G. Hamilton, First Lord of the Admiralty, 7.03.1889; *Ibidem*, 5th Series, vol. CXXVI, col. 2301, W. Long, First Lord of the Admiralty, 17.03.1920.

³ J.R. Ferris: *The Symbol and the Substance of Seapower: Great Britain, the United States and the One-Power Standard, 1919–1921*, in: *Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s. The Struggle for Supremacy*, ed. B.J.C. McKercher, London 1991, pp. 55–80.

disarmament policy pursued by the British government. Although the conference was held behind closed doors, details were widely publicized. Press coverage was, however, sensational in tone and full of rumours. Journalists created atmosphere of suspicion around the conference. This had a negative effect on public opinion, pressure from whom to some extent affected the governments of countries participating in the conference and did not make it easier for the delegates gathered in Geneva.⁴

The article is aimed at presenting and discussing British government's stance toward the Geneva conference. It was in 1968 that David Carlton, a British historian, outlined in an article published in "Political Science Quarterly" the main objectives of the British during the "Coolidge Conference". It was him who, for the first time, used archival materials (most of all correspondence carried on by Lord Robert Cecil) and referred to the conference as "one of the most dramatically unsuccessful international gatherings of the twentieth century".⁵

From that moment on, the subject matter was addressed by many researchers who analyzed in detail the background of the conference, its course, as well as reasons and consequences following from its breakdown. As far as the British perspective is concerned, the "Coolidge Conference" was discussed mainly by authors devoting their attention to British maritime (armament) policy,⁶ British

⁴ Documents concerning the Geneva conference, in historiography referred to as Coolidge Conference, (i.e. records of plenary sessions, records of committee meetings, records of delegate meetings and proposals put forward by respective delegations) were published by the Americans just after the conference: *Records of the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament held at Geneva from June 20 to August 4, 1927*, Geneva 1927 [further: RCLNA], pp. 1–164; *Limitation of Naval Armaments. Records of the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament held at Geneva, Switzerland, from June 20 to August 4, 1927* (Senate Document no. 55, 70th Congress, 1st Session), Washington DC 1928, pp. 1–220; On this basis, papers on the Geneva conference were published during the inter-war period. As for the British perspective, of major importance are two publications by authors connected with the Royal Institute of International Affairs: A.J. Toynbee: *Survey of International Affairs 1927*, London 1929, pp. 43–82; J.W. Wheeler-Bennett: *Disarmament and Security since Locarno, 1925–1931. Being the Political and Technical Background of the General Disarmament Conference, 1932*, London 1932, pp. 103–127; Cf. American stance presented in a publication under the auspices of Council on Foreign Relations: Ch.P. Howland: *Survey of American Foreign Relations*, vol. 1, New Haven 1928, pp. 543–553; See also PhD thesis completed in Geneva: R.A. Chaput: *Disarmament in British Foreign Policy*, London 1935, pp. 153–166.

⁵ D. Carlton: *Great Britain and the Coolidge Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927*, "Political Science Quarterly" 1968, vol. LXXXIII, no. 4, pp. 573–598.

⁶ S. Roskill: *Naval Policy Between the Wars*, vol. I: *The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919–1929*, London 1968, pp. 498–516; W.-H. Bickel: *Die anglo-amerikanischen Beziehungen 1927–1930 im Licht der Flottenfrage. Das Problem des Machtausgleich zwischen Großbritannien und der Vereinigten Staaten in der Zwischenkriegszeit und seine Lösung*, Dissertation, Zürich 1970, pp. 40–68; M. Hall: *Anglo-American Relations and Naval Policy 1919–1930*, Ph. D. dissertation, McGill University, Montreal 1990, pp. 290–318; W. Rojek: *Spyry o władanie*

disarmament policy⁷ as well as bilateral Anglo-American relations.⁸ These were, however, fragments (chapters) of monographs and unpublished PhD theses, occasionally articles. In her latest article on the matter, Carolyn J. Kitching states that “a definitive study of the Coolidge Naval Conference awaits an author”.⁹

The present paper refers to policy formulated by the British at the Geneva conference, i.e. objectives formulated by the British government and tactic of the their delegation. Therefore, the article is to present and discuss the stance adopted by the British government and respective ministers toward:

- accepting parity between the Royal Navy and the US Navy in all classes of ships,
- reaching consensus over naval arms limitation, since the original British proposal was rejected,
- conference breakdown.

On 10 February 1927, President Coolidge invited British, Japanese, French and Italian governments to take part in the conference devoted to further limitation of naval arms and based on the provisions of the Washington Naval Treaty. The invitation came as no surprise to the British diplomacy¹⁰ since the idea emerged already in 1923, i.e. when Coolidge was elected President after Warren G. Harding had passed away. From that moment on, the press speculated

morzem... [Disputes about Ruling the Seas...], pp. 106–117; Ph.P. O’Brien: *British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900–1936*, Westport Conn. 1998, pp. 186–194.

⁷ D.J. Shorney: *Britain and Disarmament 1916–1931*, Ph. D. dissertation, Durham University, 1980, pp. 198–210; Ch. Hall: *Britain, America and Arms Control, 1921–1937*, New York 1987, pp. 44–54; D. Richardson: *The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s*, New York–London 1989, pp. 119–139; A. Harasimowicz: *Dyplomacja brytyjska...* [British Diplomacy...], pp. 62–73; R.W. Fanning: *The Coolidge Conference of 1927: Disarmament in Disarray*, in: *Arms Limitation and Disarmament...*, pp. 105–128; idem: *Peace and Disarmament. Naval Rivalry and Arms Control 1922–1933*, Lexington 1995, pp. 51–80; C.J. Kitching: *Britain and the Problem of International Disarmament, 1919–1934*, London 1999, pp. 97–109.

⁸ M.J. Brode: *Anglo-American Relations and the Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927*, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1972, pp. 75–121; Ch. E. Newton, *Anglo-American Relations and Bureaucratic Tensions, 1927–1930*, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1975, pp. 9–38; B.J.C. McKercher: *The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924–1929. Attitudes and Diplomacy*, Cambridge 1984, pp. 55–76.

⁹ C.J. Kitching: *Sunk Before We Started? Anglo-American Rivalry at the Coolidge Naval Conference, 1927*, in: *Arms and Disarmament in Diplomacy*, eds. K. Hamilton, E. Johnson, London–Portland OR 2008, pp. 91–111.

¹⁰ *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939*, Series I, vol. III, eds. W.N. Medlicott, D. Dakin, M.E. Lambert, London 1970 [further: DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III], no. 333, p. 565, Minute by J.D. Gregory, FO 10.02.1927; The National Archives [further: TNA], Cabinet Papers [further: CAB] 24/185, C. P. 59 (27), “Further Limitation of Naval Armaments. Proposals of the Government of the United States (Communicated by the American Ambassador in London)” 10.02.1927.

about prospective calling by the United States the so-called Second Washington Conference. The issue was discussed by diplomats. The American initiative was, however, frozen and arms limitation was to be analyzed by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference [further: PCDC] set in 1925 by the League of Nations. The United States accepted invitation to participate in the commission sessions, yet they did not abandon the idea of calling a separate conference gathering the superpowers and devoted exclusively to naval armament and disarmament. They addressed the matter when talks about land, air and naval disarmament, held by PCDC, reached deadlock.¹¹

Nota bene, between 1926 and 1927 the Admiralty began secret preparations for convening analogical conference in London at which they were to present proposals concerning naval arms limitation and, consequently, reduce expenditure on naval armaments, yet not undermining the security of the British Empire. Coolidge's invitation reached London when a narrow circle of British ministers, familiar with the matter, analysed Admiralty's idea. In other words, American President anticipated the British initiative.¹²

Not knowing the stance and plans of the Admiralty, the officials of the Foreign Office recommended caution before taking any decision. Alexander Cado-gan suggested two responses to the invitation, namely unconditional or conditional acceptance, the latter case entailing that Great Britain was willing to take President's proposal into consideration although chances of success were slight since France and other countries would not agree on a separate conference focusing solely on naval arms limitation. Ronald H. Campbell stressed that President Coolidge proposed convening the conference mainly for intrapolitical reasons: "Republican electioneering is bare, and the President must shortly reach decision in the matter of cruiser construction. To build or not to build is becoming the burning question of the hour, and will have an important effect on the party's prospect. (...) The administration probably do not want to embark on an extensive building programme, but they are in position to do so if needs must. If the

¹¹ D.R. McCoy: *Calvin Coolidge. The Quiet President*, New York 1967, pp. 364–366; B.J.C. McKercher: *Wealth, Power, and the New International Order: Britain and the American Challenge in the 1920s*, "Diplomatic History" 1988, vol. XII, no. 4, pp. 430–431; idem: *Of Horns and Teeth: The Preparatory Commission and the World Disarmament Conference, 1926–1934*, in: *Arms Limitation and Disarmament...*, pp. 176–178; W. Rojek: *Spory o władanie morzem...* [Disputes about Ruling the Seas...], pp. 99–106.

¹² S. Roskill: *Naval Policy...*, vol. I, pp. 499–500; T. Kuramatsu: *The Geneva Naval Conference of 1927: The British Preparation for the Conference, December 1926 to June 1927*, "Journal of Strategic Studies" 1996, vol. XIX, no. 1, pp. 104–106.

conference results in the limitation of cruisers on a fixed ratio, the big–navy party is silenced; if no agreement is reached, the case for building is unassailable. In the former event there is the additional credit of having called conference. The Republicans profited enormously as a result of Washington [Conference] and would do so again if Mr. Coolidge were now to succeed where the League had appeared likely to fail”. Campbell also claimed that the British decision about participating in the conference depended on “our own naval policy”. He advised not to accept the invitation unless the Admiralty was ready to accept reduction in the number of cruisers in a ratio 5 : 5 : 3 and the British government was certain about the conference success. Foreign Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain who made himself acquainted with the Admiralty plans, summed up opinions expressed by his subordinates in the following way: “The American formula (5–5–3) is, I think, unacceptable, but no power has a greater interest in further limitation than ourselves & we could certainly propose an alternative line of advance – if other naval powers could be got into conference”.¹³

Lord Cecil, head of the British delegation in PCDC, called for accepting the invitation and believed that the success of conference might contribute to reducing the risk from naval arms race and consequently budgetary expenditure on fleet development. However, he anticipated that France and Italy would decline the invitation and was afraid that Coolidge’s initiative might ruin chances of reaching consensus over land and naval disarmament.¹⁴

That the British accepted Coolidge’s proposal stemmed mainly from Admiralty’s idea to use the conference for presenting the British plan for armaments limitation.¹⁵ An answer to American President’s invitation was prepared on 15 February 1927 during a meeting attended, among others by: Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Austen Chamberlain, Lord President of the Council Arthur J. Balfour, Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston S. Churchill, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs Leopold

¹³ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 333, pp. 566–568, Memorandum by A. Cadogan, 11.02.1927; ibidem, no. 334, pp. 568–571, Memorandum by R.H. Campbell, 12.02.1927; ibidem, no. 334, p. 571, footnote 3, Minute by A. Chamberlain, 14.02.1927; See also: B.J.C. McKercher: *The Second Baldwin Government...*, p. 61; A. Harasimowicz: *Dyplomacja brytyjska...* [British Diplomacy...], pp. 63–65; W. Rojek: *Spory o władanie morzem...* [Disputes about Ruling the Seas...], pp. 106–107; T. Kuramatsu: *The Geneva Naval Conference...*, pp. 107–108.

¹⁴ The British Library, Cecil Papers [further: BL, Cecil Papers], Add. MSS 5121, pp. 104–107, Note by Viscount Cecil of Chelwood “Disarmament. President Coolidge’s Proposal for a separate Naval Conference”, 14.02.1927.

¹⁵ T. Kuramatsu: *The Geneva Naval Conference of 1927...*, p. 108.

S. Amery, First Lord of the Admiralty William C. Bridgeman and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster Viscount Cecil of Chelwood. According to a participant in the meeting: “The problem was how to show sufficient enthusiasm in accepting and yet safeguard our own particular position as well as the susceptibilities of the French and others who are already committed to the League of Nations scheme”.¹⁶ On the following day, once certain amendments had been introduced, reply was approved by the British government. Although agreed to participate in the Geneva talks over naval arms limitation, the British party highlighted their interests and demanded that the conference should be coordinated with the League of Nations sessions held to discuss disarmament issues. According to the British note, the size of the British fleet depended on “the special geographical position of the British Empire, the length of inter-imperial communications, and the necessity for the protection of its food supplies”. Nevertheless, the British government was willing to see “to what extent the principles adopted at Washington can be carried further, either as regards the ratio in different classes of ships between the various Powers, or in other important ways”.¹⁷ After consultations with Dominions, reply from the British government was sent to the Americans on 25 February 1927.¹⁸

Japan was the first to reply to the American proposal (on 19 February 1927) and the only country that did not raise any objections. According to speculations made by the Foreign Office, France boycotted Coolidge’s initiative and argued it violated the principle providing for the interdependence of three kinds of weapon. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Admiralty and Naval Staff unanimously opposed their participation in the conference. As a member of PCDC, France advocated reduction in global tonnage, not paying attention to classes, and was supported by most countries participating in PCDC against Great Britain, the United States and Japan that, on the contrary, opted for reducing the tonnage in particular classes of ships. Furthermore, France was afraid of being forced to accept parity with Italy, just as at the Washington conference, yet this time in the class of auxiliary ships. Pressed by the USA, France agreed to send an „informant” to

¹⁶ *The Leo Amery Diaries*, vol. I: 1896–1929, eds. J. Barnes, D. Nicholson, London 1980, p. 496.

¹⁷ TNA, CAB 23/54, Cabinet 10 (27), Conclusion 1, 16.02.1927 & Appendix “Proposed answer to invitation from President of the United States of America to a Conference on Naval Disarmament”.

¹⁸ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 340, pp. 576–578, Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard, FO 25.02.1927 & Enclosure “Memorandum”.

participate in the conference sessions. Inspired by the French decision, Italy also refused to take active part in the conference and delegated an “observer”.¹⁹

In this event, in March 1927 the United States offered London and Tokyo to organize conference only for the three Powers, which they readily accepted. The meeting was to take place on 20 June 1927 in Geneva, to prove that it was no competition for the League of Nations and PCDC.²⁰ The British consent to participate in the conference without France and Italy entailed that the Admiralty would change its attitude. So far they considered the participation of these two countries in the conference a condition indispensable (sine qua non) for the participation of Great Britain.²¹

In London, the Foreign Office and Dominions Office were actively involved in organizing the procedural side of the conference, while content-related preparation rested with the Admiralty. Memorandum of the Naval Staff, issued on 14 April 1927, included a draft instruction for the British delegation to make sure that naval arms limitation would not put the security of the British Empire at risk. Furthermore, expenditure on “naval defence” was to be reduced through modifying the Washington Naval Treaty and putting its provisions into practice with reference to cruisers, destroyers and submarines.

The amendments were to involve:

- prolonging the service life of capital ships and aircraft carriers,
- reducing the displacement and calibre of guns carried by capital ships and aircraft carriers,
- reducing the number of heavy cruisers (10,000-ton carrying 8-inch guns),
- reducing the tonnage and calibre of guns carried by other cruisers (max. 7,500-ton carrying 6-inch guns).

¹⁹ P.P. Żurawski vel Grajewski: *Zabiegi dyplomacji amerykańskiej na rzecz zwołania Genewskiej Konferencji Morskiej w 1927 roku* [The Action of the American Diplomacy for the Convocation of the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927], “Acta Universitatis Lodziensis” 1995, Folia Historica 53, pp. 96–102; A.M. Brzeziński: *Rozbieżności pomiędzy Francją i Stanami Zjednoczonymi w sprawie rozbrojenia w dwudziestoleciu międzywojennym* [Disarmament Differences between France and United States in Inter-War Period], ibidem, pp. 115–118; J.A. Bongiorno: *Fascist Italy and the Disarmament Question, 1928–1934*, New York 1991, pp. 13–14; See also: J. Blatt: *The Parity that Meant Superiority: French Naval Policy towards Italy at the Washington Naval Conference, 1921–1922, and Interwar French Foreign Policy*, “French Historical Studies” 1981, vol. XII, no. 2, pp. 223–248.

²⁰ P.P. Żurawski vel Grajewski: *Zabiegi dyplomacji amerykańskiej...* [The Action of the American Diplomacy...], pp. 103–106.

²¹ T. Kuramatsu: *The Geneva Naval Conference of 1927...*, pp. 108–109.

Provisions of the Washington Naval Treaty were to be extended through:

- determining in the scheme the service life of particular classes of war-ships,
- reducing the number of cruisers, destroyers and submarines,
- reducing the displacement and calibre of guns carried by destroyers and submarines.

The British Naval Staff suggested dividing cruisers into two classes, namely heavy (with a displacement of 10,000 tons and carrying 8-inch guns) and light (with a displacement of 7,500 tons and carrying 6-inch guns).

The British Naval Staff reluctantly accepted the idea of reducing the number of cruisers in the scheme, having in mind their importance to the security of the British Empire. They, however, were aware that placing constraints only on the tonnage and calibre of guns carried by cruisers might lead to no reduction in the number of destroyers and submarines in the scheme.

The number of heavy cruisers, cooperating with capital ships and altogether forming battle fleet, was to be determined for the British Empire, the United States and Japan based on the following ratio: 5 cruisers for every 3 capital ships. On the other hand, the number of light cruisers, used for controlling sea routes, was to be determined on the basis of “the length of the sea routes to be defended and the density of the trade normally using the routes”. Based on these parameters, the Naval Staff was inclined to believe that the British Empire would gain the right to have 70 cruisers, the United States 47 cruisers and Japan 21 cruisers (see Table 1).

Table 1. Number of Cruisers

	Fleet	Trade	Total
British Empire	25	45	70
United States of America	25	22	47
Japan	15	6	21

Source: TNA, CAB 4/16, CID Paper no. 808-B, Memorandum by the Naval Staff “Further Limitation of Naval Armaments” 14.04.1927.

The Naval Staff emphasized that “the needs of the British Empire for protection of trade are absolute and not relative, and that for this reason no reduction on the 45 for this purpose can be accepted”. The number of British destroyers and submarines depended on the strength of other countries’ fleets in the

aforementioned classes.²² If the British proposals concerning the number of cruisers had been forced through at the Geneva conference, the British Empire would have successfully accomplished her strategic objectives and developed her fleet, i.e. this particular class of ships. Furthermore, the United States would have had to implement their plans on a smaller scale, whilst Japan would have had to restrain radically her aspirations toward increasing the number of cruisers (see Table 2).

Table 2. Cruisers of the British Empire, the United States and Japan on the 1st February, 1927

	Cruisers Built		Cruisers Building*		Cruisers Projected**	
	numbers	tonnage	numbers	tonnage	numbers	tonnage
British Empire	48	238,400	14	70,000	9	–
U.S.A.	32	269,425	5	50,000	13***	–
Japan	33	195,601	6	54,200	4	–

*Vessels building includes only those vessels which have actually been laid down or for which money is voted in the current estimates.

**Vessels projected includes vessels authorised or projected, but for which no money is yet voted.

*** 3 only authorised.

Source: Command Paper 2809 (1927), *Fleets (The British Empire and Foreign Countries)*, London 1927; A.J. Toynbee: *Survey of International Affairs 1927...*, p. 32.

On 20 May 1927, the Committee of Imperial Defence advised to accept the suggestions from the Naval Staff as a basis for the negotiations to be conducted by the British delegation in Geneva, with the reservation that they should have “a reasonable latitude in regard to details”. Giving his account of the proposals, Bridgeman emphasized that British acceptance shall enable Great Britain to save over £5,000,000 annually on capital ships and cruisers throughout the period 1931–1940. At the same time, he referred to savings on destroyers and submarines as “problematical”, and stressed a need for including a clause in the scheme to

²² TNA, CAB 4/16, CID Paper no. 808-B, Memorandum by the Naval Staff “Further Limitation of Naval Armaments” 14.04.1927; Cf. Memorandum by Admiralty Plans Division “Limitation of Armaments: Cruisers”, 17.03.1927, in: *Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1919–1939*, ed. M. Simpson, Farnham 2010, pp. 75–77; See also: N.H. Gibbs: *Grand Strategy*, vol. I: *Rearmament Policy*, London 1976, pp. 24–26; E. Andrade Jr.: *Arms Limitation Agreements and the Evolution of Weaponry: The Case of the “Treaty Cruiser”*, in: *Naval History. The Sixth Symposium of the U. S. Naval Academy*, ed. D.M. Masterson, Wilmington Del. 1987, pp. 179–183; D. Richardson: *The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy...*, pp. 119–122; T. Kuramatsu: *The Geneva Naval Conference...*, pp. 112–114; J.R. Ferris: ‘It is our business in the Navy to command the Seas’. *The Last Decade of British Maritime Supremacy, 1919–1929*, in: *Far-flung Lines. Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman*, eds. G. Kennedy, K. Neilson, London–Portland OR 1997, p. 147.

revise it in case France and Italy developed their naval arms. Bridgeman hoped that the aforementioned states would be positive about British proposals and, with time, join the Geneva scheme. He intended to surprise the American delegation at the conference, and therefore the details of the proposals were to be kept secret until the last moment “in order that they might be launched on men with open minds, unbiased by possible misrepresentation and criticism which might appear in the press should the proposal become known”. Sir Austen Chamberlain pointed out that the United States would certainly demand parity with the Royal Navy. Bridgeman claimed that “the Admiralty would not take a grave view if the United States built to their limit. Admiralty must however, resist a limitation by total tonnage”. Admiral of the Fleet Earl David Beatty the First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff²³ added to the above statement and claimed that the Admiralty was willing to agree on reducing the number of heavy cruisers (10,000-ton carrying 8-inch guns) analogically to capital ships. As for light cruisers, the British delegation was to enter into negotiations “on the principle that it was undesirable for us to impose any limit on the number of small cruisers”. It was settled that, depending on how the situation would develop, the delegates “should be at liberty to accept such a limitation”.²⁴ On 25 May 1927, the British Cabinet approved recommendations given by Committee of Imperial Defence to be followed by the British in Geneva.²⁵

The conference was preceded by no (sic!) preliminary talks among the British, the American and the Japanese parties. The Department of State considered them unnecessary, while the British diplomats did not press the remaining parties to do so, the more so because Chamberlain knew the tactical plan of the Admiralty. They intended to surprise the US delegates in an open forum by presenting their proposals and taking the initiative at the conference²⁶. Prime Minister Baldwin utterly forbade Lord Cecil to inform the American delegates participating in

²³ See: B.M. Ranft: *Admiral David Earl Beatty (1919–1927)*, in: *The First Sea Lords. From Fisher to Mountbatten*, ed. M.H. Murfett, Westport Conn.–London 1995, pp. 127–140.

²⁴ TNA, CAB 2/5, CID Minutes of the 227th Meeting, 20.05.1927; See also: *The Modernisation of Conservative Politics. The Diaries and Letters of William Bridgeman 1904–1935*, ed. Ph. Williamson, London 1988, p. 204; *The Leo Amery Diaries*, vol. I, p. 507.

²⁵ TNA, CAB 24/185, C. P. 159 (27), note by M. Hankey “Forthcoming Conference of Naval Powers at Geneva in regard to the Reduction and Limitation of Naval Armaments” 23.05.1927 & Appendix “CID Draft Minutes of the 227th Meeting, May 20, 1927”; TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 34 (27), Conclusion 3, 25.05.1927.

²⁶ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, No. 350, pp. 588–589, Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard, FO 5.04.1927; *ibidem*, no. 350, footnote 2, p. 589, Sir E. Howard to Sir A. Chamberlain, Washington 6.04.1927; T. Kuramatsu: *The Geneva Naval Conference...*, pp. 111–112.

PCDC about the British proposals to be put forward²⁷. The Admiralty did not play it straight with the US representatives, and yet had a positive attitude to a suggestion “that proportional limitation viz. 5, 5, 3, laid down by Washington treaty for capital ships should be extended to the other classes of ship (...) though reserving question of numbers of cruisers etc., that would be required by Great Britain”. The American party interpreted this as a full consent to “the extension of the Washington rations to all categories of vessels”.²⁸

The conference, attended by the three superpowers²⁹ and convened on the initiative of President Calvin Coolidge, opened in Geneva on 20 June 1927 in the boardroom of the League of Nations Council. The British government³⁰ was represented by a delegation headed by William C. Bridgeman,³¹ Lord Cecil³² and Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick L. Field (Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff).³³ As for

²⁷ BL, Cecil Papers, Add. MSS 51080, pp. 194–195, Letter from Lord Cecil to S. Baldwin, 8.03.1927 & Letter from S. Baldwin to Lord Cecil, 9.03.1927.

²⁸ It was in November 1926 and March 1927 that Rear Admiral Hilary P. Jones, expert of the American delegation in PCDC in Geneva, discussed the matter with the Admiralty representatives (DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 338, pp. 574–575, Sir E. Howard to Sir A. Chamberlain, Washington 17.02.1927; S. Roskill, *Naval Policy...*, vol. I, p. 503; B.J.C. McKercher: *The Second Baldwin Government...*, pp. 67–68; Ch. Hall: *Britain, America and Arms Control...*, p. 39).

²⁹ A French *Mission d'Information* and Italian unofficial observers attended plenary sessions and the meetings of the Executive and Technical Committees of the naval conference (DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 366, footnote 2, p. 610, editorial note).

³⁰ Dominions were represented by their respective delegations at the Geneva Conference, which proved that all members of the British Commonwealth enjoyed equal status in line with arrangements made at the Imperial Conference in 1926. Canada: E. Lapointe – Minister of Justice and W.A. Riddell – Canadian Advisory Officer at Geneva; Australia: Sir J. Cook – High Commissioner in London; New Zealand: Sir J. Parr – High Commissioner in London, and Admiral Earl Jellicoe – former British Governor-General of New Zealand; South Africa: J.S. Smit – High Commissioner in London and C. Pienaar – Trade Commissioner in Europe; Irish Free State: K. O'Higgins – Minister for External Affairs, J. A. Costello – Attorney General, and M. MacWhite – Permanent Representative to League of Nations. W. C. Bridgeman acted as representative for India (A.J. Toynbee: *The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement*, Oxford 1928, pp. 94–95; *Limitation of Navies. Imperial Delegates to Geneva Conference*, “The Times” 9.06.1927; *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1927*, vol. I, Washington 1942 [further: FRUS 1927, vol. I], pp. 45–46, F.B. Kellogg to H. Wilson, Washington 9.06.1927; *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy*, vol. III: 1926–1932, eds. R. Fanning et al., Dublin 2002, pp. 132–133, Letter from J.P. Walshe to M. MacWhite, Dublin 17.06.1927).

³¹ For Bridgeman's account of talks and debates held at the Geneva conference see his diary: *The Modernisation of Conservative Politics...*, pp. 205–209.

³² For more on the role of Lord Cecil at the Geneva conference, see: G. Johnson: *Lord Robert Cecil. Politician and Internationalist*, Farnham 2013, pp. 184–189.

³³ For more on Admiral Field, see: N. Tracy: *Admiral Sir Charles E. Madden (1927–1930) and Admiral Sir Frederick L. Field (1930–1933)*, in: *The First Sea Lords...*, pp. 149–154.

the American party, the delegates were Hugh Gibson,³⁴ American ambassador in Brussels, and, already retired, Admiral Hilary P. Jones³⁵ (in the years 1922–1923 Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet). Finally, the Japanese delegation included Admiral Viscount Saitō Makoto (Governor-General of Korea) and Viscount Ishii Kikujirō (Japanese ambassador in Paris).³⁶ In the first plenary session, Gibson was elected chairman and Hugh Wilson (US envoy in Berne) was appointed secretary general of the conference. Once procedural issues had been discussed, respective groups of delegates presented their proposals concerning naval arms limitation.³⁷

Gibson called for applying “ratios and principles of the Washington Treaty” and reducing the total tonnage of cruisers (ships with a displacement between 3,000 and 10,000 tons), destroyers (ships with a displacement between 600 and 3,000 tons) and submarines in 5 : 5 : 3 ratio (see Table 3). The treaty drawn up in Geneva was to be adjusted to the Washington Treaty in terms of validity period as well as procedures for modifying and renouncing its provisions.³⁸

³⁴ For more on the role of Gibson at the Geneva conference, see: R.E. Swerczek: *Hugh Gibson and Disarmament: The Diplomacy of Gradualism*, in: *U.S. Diplomats in Europe*, ed. K.P. Jones, Santa Barbara 1981, pp. 78–79; idem: *The Diplomatic Career of Hugh Gibson, 1908–1938*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1972, pp. 208–218.

³⁵ For more on the role of Jones at the Geneva conference, see: W.F. Trimble: *Admiral Hilary P. Jones and the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference*, “Military Affairs” 1979, vol. XLIII, no. 1, pp. 1–4.

³⁶ See: K. Ishii: *Diplomatic Commentaries*, Baltimore 1936, pp. 192–197.

³⁷ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 363, pp. 605–606, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 20.06.1927; *Limitation of the Navies. Geneva Conference Begun. The Three Schemes*, “The Times” 21.06.1927; *How many Ships, and Why?*, “The Times” 22.06.1927.

³⁸ For more on the American stance at the Geneva conference, see: R.H. Ferrell: *Frank B. Kellogg – Henry L. Stimson*, New York 1963, pp. 91–104; G.E. Wheeler: *Prelude to Pearl Harbor. The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921–1933*, Columbia Missouri 1963, pp. 131–151; E. Andrade Jr.: *United States Naval Policy in the Disarmament Era, 1921–1937*, Ph. D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1966, pp. 129–155; R.W. Dubay: *The Geneva Naval Conference of 1927: A Study of Battleship Diplomacy*, “Southern Quarterly” 1970, vol. VIII, no. 2, pp. 177–199; W.F. Trimble: *The United States Navy and the Geneva Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament, 1927*, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Colorado, Boulder 1974, pp. 151–341; H.A. Hyde: *Scraps of Paper. The Disarmament Treaties Between the World Wars*, Lincoln, Nebraska 1988, pp. 157–165; R. G. Kaufman: *Arms Control during the Pre-nuclear Era. The United States and Naval Limitation between the Two World Wars*, New York 1990, pp. 108–111; P.P. Żurawski vel Grajewski: *Stany Zjednoczone wobec problemu kontroli zbrojeń w dobie Komisji Przygotowawczej do Genewskiej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej 1925–1930* [The United States and Arms Control Problem in the Era of the Preparatory Commission for the Geneva Disarmament Conference 1925–1930], Warszawa 2000, pp. 97–154; idem: *Cele i metody negocjacyjne dyplomacji amerykańskiej w dziedzinie kontroli zbrojeń w latach 1925–1930* [The Negotiation Purposes and Methods of American Diplomacy Dealing with Arms Control in 1925–1930], “Dzieje Najnowsze” [“Contemporary History”], 2001, vol. XXXIII, no. 1, pp. 78–83; B.J.C. McKercher: *A Certain Irritation*:

Table 3. American original proposals at Geneva Conference (tons)

	United States	British Empire	Japan
Cruisers	250,000–300,000	250,000–300,000	150,000–180,000
Destroyers	200,000–250,000	200,000–250,000	120,000–150,000
Submarines	60,000–90,000	60,000–90,000	36,000–54,000

Source: A.J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1927...*, London 1929, pp. 44–45.

The British proposals put forward by Bridgeman provided for:

- prolonging the service life of capital ships from 20 to 26 years,
- determining the service life in other classes of ships: 24 years for heavy cruisers (carrying 8-inch guns); 20 years for destroyers; 15 years for submarines,
- reducing the displacement of capital ships from 35,000 to about 30,000 tons,
- reducing the caliber of guns carried by capital ships from 16 to 13.5 inches,
- reducing the displacement of aircraft carriers from 27,000 to 25,000 tons,
- reducing the caliber of guns carried by aircraft carriers from 8 to 6 inches,
- adopting the ratio 5 : 5 : 3 in the class of cruisers with a displacement of 10,000 tons and carrying 8-inch guns,
- determining the acceptable number of cruisers with a displacement of 10,000 tons and carrying 8-inch guns,
- reducing the maximum displacement and calibre of guns carried by the projected cruisers to 7,500 tons and 6-inch guns respectively,
- reducing the maximum displacement of destroyer leaders to 1,7500 tons and destroyers to 1,400 tons,
- reducing the caliber of guns carried by destroyer leaders and destroyers to 5 inches,
- reducing the displacement of big submarines to 1,600 tons and small submarines to 600 tons as well as reducing the caliber of guns to 5 inches both in the former and the latter case,
- reducing the number of submarines.

British suggestions provided for applying “the Washington ratio” (5 : 5 : 3) only in the case of heavy cruisers (with a displacement of 10,000 tons and carrying

8-inch guns). In his speech, Bridgeman highlighted the role of navy in ensuring the security of sea routes for the British Empire. He did not, however, define the British “defence requirements” then, i.e. a minimum number of heavy and light cruisers essential for providing the aforementioned security.³⁹

By contrast, Japanese proposals had the most general character. They called for maintaining the status quo, i.e. not launching programmes aimed at fleet development, and imposing limitations on the construction or purchase of ships in the future unless within the global tonnage determined for every country (ships with a displacement of more than 3,000 tons after 16 years, ships with a displacement of less than 3,000 tons after 12 years). The delegation wanted to change the ratio widely criticized in Japan, to be more specific from 5: 3 into 5 : 3.5. They, however, avoided playing it straight from the very beginning of the conference.⁴⁰

On 21 June 1927, the British delegation convened a meeting to analyse American and Japanese proposals paying special attention to the British security and domestic savings. The American proposal (that a displacement of a single cruiser (10,000 tons) should not be reduced) was unacceptable for security reasons since it would oblige the British Empire to reduce the number of cruisers to about 30. Unlike the British proposal, American and Japanese suggestions on the scheme provided neither for reducing the displacement and calibre of guns carried by warships, nor expenditure on the construction of cruisers, destroyers and submarines.⁴¹

³⁹ Command Paper 2964 (1927), *Geneva Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armaments June – August 1927. Speeches in Plenary Session by the Right Hon. W.C. Bridgeman, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty*, London 1927 [further: Cmd. 2964 (1927)], pp. 2–7; *Geneva Naval Conference. Mr. Bridgeman’s Speech*, “The Times” 22.06.1927; DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 364, pp. 606–608, Notes on British Empire Proposals, Geneva 20.06.1927.

⁴⁰ For more on the Japanese stance at the Geneva conference, see: A.B. Clemensen: *The Geneva Tripartite Conference of 1927 in Japanese-American Relations*, Ph. D. dissertation, The University of Arizona, 1975, pp. 166–216; S. Asada: *From Washington to London: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Politics of Naval Limitation, 1921–1930*, “Diplomacy & Statecraft” 1993, vol. IV, no. 3, pp. 162–169; idem: *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor. The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States*, Annapolis Md. 2006, pp. 111–122; B.J.C. McKercher: *A Sane and Sensible Diplomacy: Austen Chamberlain, Japan, and the Naval Balance of Power in the Pacific Ocean, 1924–1929*, “Canadian Journal of History” 1986, vol. XXI, no. 2, pp. 207–208; M.A. Epstein: *Naval Disarmament and the Japanese: Geneva, 1927*, Ph. D. dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1995, pp. 183–321; I. Gow: *Military Intervention in Pre-War Japanese Politics. Admiral Katō Kanji and the ‘Washington System’*, London 2004, pp. 162–172; idem: *The Royal Navy and Japan, 1921–1941*, in: *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000*, vol. III: *The Military Dimension*, eds. I. Gow, Y. Hiramata, J. Chapman, Basingstoke 2003, pp. 112–113; T. Kuramatsu: *Britain, Japan and Inter-War Naval Limitation, 1921–1936*, in: *ibidem*, pp. 131–132.

⁴¹ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 365, pp. 608–609, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 21.06.1927; See also: E. Andrade Jr.: *The Cruiser Controversy in Naval Limitations Negotiations*,

After the first plenary session, talks were held behind closed doors in Executive Committee and Technical Committee, as well as during informal meetings called by particular groups of delegates. Japanese party informed Bridgeman they would back the proposal for reducing the displacement and calibre of guns carried by capital ships if they were granted concession in other clauses – among which possible change of the 5 : 3 ratio.⁴² The Americans, taken aback by the British, voiced strong reservations over revising the Washington Treaty and particularly the clause specifying the displacement and guns carried by capital ships. They put forward arguments against taking final decision in the absence of France and Italy, and claimed it was too soon to settle the issue. In fact, under clause 21 a conference could be convened to introduce amendments to the Treaty, yet 8 years later after it had come into force, i.e. in 1931.⁴³

After week-long talks and negotiations, in a report presented to Prime Minister Baldwin, Bridgeman admitted that he was a “little disappointed” with their progress and final outcome. Some sort of success was achieved only in terms of pattern to be followed while imposing limitations on submarines and defining which small vessels would not be subjected to any limitations (depot ships, mine-sweepers, etc.). As for limitations on the displacement and calibre of guns carried by capital ships, Japanese delegates received instructions from Tokyo enabling them to enter into discussion “but not until after agreement had been reached upon the other class of vessel”. The American delegation, on the contrary, was still looking forward to receiving instructions from Washington. Bridgeman anticipated major difficulties in establishing a pattern to be followed while imposing limitations on cruisers. “The problem will be to find some formula which, whilst satisfying the Americans in regard to the Japanese numbers in relation to their own, will at the same time avoid in appearance the 5 : 3 ratio, which is so hateful to the Japanese. Nor (...) will it be easy, in light of the much smaller needs of the United States and of their claim for equality with us, to induce them to admit justice of our claim to the number of cruisers required for the defence of the British Empire”.⁴⁴

1922–1936, “Military Affairs” 1984, vol. XLVIII, no. 3, pp. 113–115.

⁴² DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 367, p. 611, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 22.06.1927.

⁴³ Ibidem, no. 368, pp. 611–612, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 22.06.1927; ibidem, no. 370, pp. 613–614, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 23.06.1927.

⁴⁴ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 379, pp. 621–624, British Delegation to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 28.06.1927 & Enclosure: W.C. Bridgeman to S. Baldwin, Geneva 27.06.1927.

Bridgeman's expectations came true on 28 June 1927 when the Executive Committee joined the discussion. The Japanese delegation was willing to accept "in principle" the British proposal and divide cruisers into two classes (heavy and light). The Americans were, by contrast, reluctant to take a stance not knowing the British "requirements" for cruisers. Consequently, the British had to declare their intentions and inform the US delegation they would make claim to 70 cruisers (15 cruisers with a displacement of 10,000 tons and 55 smaller vessels) with a total displacement of about 600,000 tons. Demanding parity with the Royal Navy, the Americans were "dismayed" by this demand.⁴⁵

Originally, the British delegates were to present "defence requirements" on the class of cruisers in the second plenary sitting, and prove during a public debate that the United States did not have sufficient grounds for claiming parity with the British Empire in this class of warships. The Americans did, however, see through their tactics and made them present their stance behind closed doors. Public opinion learnt from the press about requirements imposed by the British and was given an "appropriate" American comment, owing to which the US delegates avoided discussing a delicate matter in an open forum.⁴⁶

It was on 29 June 1927 that the Geneva conference was for the first time addressed in the British Cabinet session.⁴⁷ A.J. Balfour paid other ministers' atten-

⁴⁵ Ibidem, no. 381, pp. 625–626, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 29.06.1927; Sir Cuthbert Morley Headlam, Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, providing his commentary on the Geneva negotiations, noted in his diary for 4.07.1927: "Affairs at Geneva do not appear to be going any too well – the Americans are impossible – but what strikes me as being the mistake is to have gone into this conference without any preliminary parleyings and without any one of the 3 Powers knowing what the proposals of the other powers were – of course we had a well thought-out cut and dried scheme – we knew what we wanted and why we wanted certain things – apparently the Americans have no reasons to give for what they are demanding and the Japanese just sit tight and say nothing, quite content with things as they are – I gather that the prospects of a satisfactory agreement are not very bright" (*Parliament and Politics in the Age of Baldwin and MacDonald. The Headlam Diaries 1923–1935*, ed. S. Ball, London 1992, p. 126).

⁴⁶ FRUS 1927, vol. I, pp. 52–53, H. Gibson to F.B. Kellogg, Geneva 1927; Nota bene, British ambassadors in Washington and Tokyo also learned about British demands (70 cruisers with a total displacement of about 600,000 tons) post factum, from the press and other diplomats. Howard and Tilley were completely surprised with these claims and considered them impossible. It was on 6 July 1927 that the Foreign Office confirmed that information concerning the issue was "perfectly correct" (DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 394, p. 635, Sir E. Howard to H.S. London, Manchester Mass. 5.07.1927; ibidem, no. 399, footnote 1, p. 639, Sir J. Tilley to Sir A. Chamberlain, Tokyo, 4.07.1927; ibidem, no. 399, pp. 639–640, Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir J. Tilley, FO 6.07.1927, repeated to Washington).

⁴⁷ According to Th. Jones, secretary of Prime Minister Baldwin, no one expected the issue to be addressed at the session. In his diary for 30 June 1927 he noted: "Hankey gave me an account of yesterday's Cabinet. The question of naval parity with the United States was brought up by

tion to press coverage from which they might learn that the US government “was determined to accept nothing less than a basis of parity with this country [Great Britain] for all units of naval strength”.⁴⁸ Balfour stressed that if “it were the policy of the Government not to oppose parity”, it was necessary “to remove all misunderstanding by a public announcement to this effect”. Sir William Tyrrell, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, representing the Foreign Office during Sir Austen Chamberlain’s absence, confirmed that analogical information was received from the American chargé d’affaires in London⁴⁹ and was reported by ambassador Howard according to whom “United States Government feel they can only continue the Conference on an agreed basis of parity for all units”.⁵⁰ Rear Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, representing the Admiralty, highlighted that accepting the parity of naval forces “was contrary to previous policy and was believed to be strongly opposed by the Admiralty”. Once the matter had been discussed, the government, however, decided that the British delegates staying in Geneva should be informed that “for diplomatic reasons we think it most desirable to say publicly and at once what we believe to be your view, namely, that while we mean to build cruisers up to our needs, we lay down no conditions limiting [the United States’] cruisers to a smaller number. Do you see any objection?”. The instruction was prepared by Balfour.⁵¹

In his reply to the Foreign Office, on 30 June 1927 Bridgeman stated he did not see any reason why such a statement should not be issued, all the more so because on 29 June in his conversation with Gibson and then with representative of the Associated Press, he opted for denying tendentious news announced by the American press that presented the British proposals concerning naval arms

Balfour without notice, and there was a confused discussion” (Th. Jones, *Whitehall Diary*, vol. II: 1925–1930, ed. K. Middlemas, London 1969, p. 104).

⁴⁸ See: *Future of Sea Power. U.S. and Geneva Conference. Equality with Britain. Washington Claim*, “The Times” 27.06.1927.

⁴⁹ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 377, pp. 620–621, Sir W. Tyrrell to Sir E. Howard, FO 28.07.1927.

⁵⁰ Ambassador Howard, staying in a summer residence in Manchester Mass. believed that it should be made clear to the Department of State that parity in all classes of ships was accepted by Great Britain. “If I could obtain assurance that this will be conceded I would go to Washington and to give to Secretary of State any explanations as to other matters which you think desirable” (ibidem, no. 378, p. 621, Sir E. Howard to Sir A. Chamberlain, Manchester Mass. 28.06.1927).

⁵¹ TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 37 (27), Conclusion 10, 29.06.1927; DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 383, pp. 627–628, Sir W. Tyrrell to H.S. London, FO 29.06.1927; See also: D. Carlton: *Great Britain and the Coolidge Naval Disarmament Conference...*, p. 576; Ch. Hall: *Britain, America and Arms Control...*, p. 45; D. Richardson: *The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy...*, pp. 124–125; C.J. Kitching: *Britain and the Problem of International Disarmament...*, pp. 99–100.

limitation and capital ships displacement reduction as an attempt to revise the Washington Treaty in order that the Royal Navy maintained her naval supremacy.⁵² Furthermore, Bridgeman suggested that, apart from making a statement to the press, ambassador Howard should inform the Department of State formally, yet not necessarily in writing, “that we have no intention or desire to question American claim to parity” and added: “we should prefer it put in general terms applicable to present conference rather than in the form of admission that parity was definitely conceded at Washington [in 1922] as regards all types of vessels”. Bridgeman expected that his suggestions would make it easier for Howard to take measures for convincing the Americans to accept the British proposal for reducing the displacement of capital ships and the calibre of guns they carried.⁵³

Gibson informed Washington that “the idea of absolute parity between the United States and Great Britain has been unequivocally admitted by Bridgeman”. Nevertheless, in an interview given to the Associated Press Bridgeman suggested that the British delegation was not going to waive their claim to 70 cruisers.⁵⁴

On 1 July 1927, the Foreign Office instructed ambassador Howard to confirm in the Department of State Bridgeman’s statement addressed to Gibson and express hope that this would enable the US government to enter into discussion on the British proposal for capital ships. The instruction emphasized that the British government “would greatly regret if Conference convened by the United States Government were to end in failure or partial failure owing to exclusion of capital

⁵² For more see: N.H. Gibbs: *The Naval Conferences of the Interwar Years: A Study in Anglo-American Relations*, “Naval War College Review” 1977, vol. XXX, no. 1, p. 53; D.C. Watt: *Succeeding John Bull. America in Britain’s Place 1900–1975. A Study of the Anglo-American Relationship and World Politics in the Context of British and American Foreign-Policy-Making in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge 1984, pp. 57–59; B.J.C. McKercher: *The British Diplomatic Service in the United States and the Chamberlain Foreign Office’s Perceptions of Domestic America, 1924–1927: Images, Reality, and Diplomacy*, in: *Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895–1939, Memorial Essays Honouring C.J. Lowe*, eds. B.J.C. McKercher, D.J. Moss, Edmonton 1984, pp. 233–238; idem: *Esme Howard. A Diplomatic Biography*, Cambridge 1989, pp. 306–313.

⁵³ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 386, pp. 629–630, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 30.06.1927.

⁵⁴ FRUS 1927, vol. I, pp. 65–66, H. Gibson to F.B. Kellogg, Geneva 30.06.1927; in an authorized interview for the Associated Press Bridgeman stated that “Great Britain has no intention of contesting the principle of parity between the naval strength of the United States and Great Britain. (...) Our policy has been to state frankly what are the British requirements but we never disputed the American claim for parity as established by the Washington treaty. It is true that we think our special needs demand higher number in certain types of vessels but we do not deny the right of the United States to build up to an equal figure in any type of warship she thought it necessary” (ibidem, p. 65, H. Gibson to F.B. Kellogg, Geneva 30.06.1927; Cf. DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 386, footnote 4, p. 629).

ships from the negotiations". On the same day, half an hour later after intervention from the Admiralty, Howard received another telegram recommending not to follow the instructions.⁵⁵

W.S. Churchill was also against Howard's reporting on parity to the Department of State. After the Cabinet session, on 29 June 1927, he submitted a memorandum to set out that "we ought not to let ourselves be netted in a scheme of parity with the United States in cruisers and other ancillaries". Churchill also claimed that "there can really be no parity between a Power whose navy is its life and a Power whose navy is only for prestige. Parity for the former is supremacy for the latter". In his memorandum, he admitted that the United States had funds not only to achieve parity, but also advantage over the British Empire in the class of cruisers. At the same time, he claimed that the US would not soon achieve such a goal since Great Britain continued to enjoy certain supremacy in this respect and the American public opinion would certainly voice their criticism for burdening the US budget. Churchill did not share Admiralty's view that 70 cruisers were "the minimum compatible with security". In fact, he believed that reducing this number and imposing constraints on the Royal Navy development plans would have a calming effect on the US administration and help avoid British-American arms race in the class of cruisers. As for financial perspective and savings, Churchill considered it most essential to limit the displacement of capital ships. He was inclined to believe that the Americans "wish to keep the size of the battleships as large as possible, in order no doubt to be able to cross the Pacific and attack Japan". He also supported the idea of reducing the displacement of battleships regardless of the US protest. "We ought not to hesitate to press our Admiralty proposals into the fullest light publicity, with the result that our interest in this respect will more and more be in harmony with those of Japan [...] Above all we ought not to be disturbed by unjust American irritation, nor let them feel that we shall make haste to obey their will".⁵⁶

⁵⁵ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 389, pp. 631–632, Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard, FO 1.07.1927; *ibidem*, no. 389, footnote 2, p. 632; Howard was critical about the instruction and claimed it would be "inadvisable even to hint at possible failure of conference". Furthermore, he expected that presenting their stance on capital ships the Americans would state "that they had never contemplated discussion on this point when issuing the invitation" (*ibidem*, no. 391, p. 633, Sir E. Howard to Sir A. Chamberlain, Manchester Mass. 2.07.1927).

⁵⁶ TNA, CAB 24/189 (27), Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer "The Naval Conference" 29.06.1927; Sir Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet secretary, also opposed the American claim to parity in the class of cruisers. In his letter to Prime Minister Baldwin and Lord Balfour of 29 June 1927, he argued: "I have been at many conferences with Americans. Time after time

Churchill's memorandum was presented in the Cabinet session on 4 July 1927. It was then that the Cabinet was to decide if Howard should or should not confirm in the Department of State that in Geneva Bridgeman had assumed parity obligation to Gibson. Admiral Beatty paid attention to the fact that Bridgeman's declaration was misinterpreted: "we did not dispute the American claim to parity as laid down in the Washington Treaty. That, however, only referred to the Battle Fleet and did not apply to Cruisers required for the protection of trade. The impression seemed to have been formed that Mr. Bridgeman had said that he was willing to accept parity in all classes".⁵⁷ He also informed the Cabinet that "the Admiralty were prepared to consider parity in regard to Cruisers of the 10,000 tons category, but that they still adhered to the view that it was undesirable to limit the Cruisers necessary for the protection of sea communications and trade". Beatty was therefore against providing Howard with instructions on parity. According to the Admiralty estimates, the British Empire should have 70 cruisers at her disposal, the United States – 47, while Japan 21. Information provided by the British delegates staying in Geneva indicated that the Americans would not abandon equality principle in the class of cruisers, which would enable the Japanese to demand about 50 vessels of this category. Therefore, the British delegation suggested "that endeavours should be made to reach an agreement on basis of limitation of numbers of 8-inch Cruisers with maximum displacement of 10,000 tons, leaving each nation free to build to their requirements in smaller Cruisers with a lower maximum tonnage and smaller guns".⁵⁸

Further discussion held by the Cabinet members revealed the complexity of situation. It came as no surprise that Washington voiced a strong reservation against British approval for parity with the United States in cruiser category and claim to 70 cruisers, in which case the conference would lead to arms development

we have been told that if we made this or that concession, we should secure the goodwill of America. We gave up Anglo-Japanese alliance. We agreed to pay our debts (...). I have never seen any permanent result follow from policy of concession. I believe we are less popular and more abused in America than ever before, they think us weak (...). I would refuse either to be blackmailed or browbeaten, and stand absolutely to our preconceived plan of action" (S. Roskill: *Hankey. Man of Secrets*, vol. II: 1919–1931, London 1972, p. 439; See also: D. Carlton: *Great Britain and the Coolidge Naval Disarmament Conference...*, pp. 576–577).

⁵⁷ Ambassador Howard reported from Washington: "the atmosphere here has evidently been greatly cleared by Mr. Bridgeman's declaration to the press that we are not trying to block American parity in any branch of the navy" (TNA, Foreign Office Papers [further: FO] 800/261, p. 71, Letter from Sir E. Howard to Sir A. Chamberlain, Washington 1.07.1927).

⁵⁸ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 388, p. 631, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 30.06.1927.

and not limitation. On the contrary, if the demanded number of cruisers (70) was reduced, the Admiralty could not “guarantee the protection of trade routes”. Additionally, “if America insisted on building 70 cruisers, Japan would demand 50, in which event the Admiralty would require more than 70 British Cruisers. It was also pointed out that, by securing parity, the American Navy really obtained a great superiority, since British Cruisers had to be spread for the protection of our world-wide communications, whereas the American Cruisers could be concentrated at any point”.

Summing up the discussion, Prime Minister Baldwin stated that despite everything “it appeared desirable to instruct Sir Howard to use the same language to the American Secretary of State as Mr. Bridgeman had used at Geneva”. A new version of instructions for Howard, produced by Sir A. Chamberlain, was approved by the Cabinet.⁵⁹

In a telegram sent on 4 July 1927 to Howard, Chamberlain advised him to confirm to the US government that in Geneva Bridgeman assured Gibson “that while we must build cruisers up to our needs, we lay down no conditions of limiting American Cruisers to a smaller number”. Furthermore, Howard was to express sincere hope that the US government would eventually join the discussion on reducing the displacement and calibre of guns carried by capital ships, as well as assure that the British proposals were not to challenge the Washington ratio in this ship class.⁶⁰

Therefore, attempts made by Churchill and Admiral Beatty to cancel instructions originally sent to Howard on 30 June 1927 were fruitless.⁶¹

In his letter to Lord Cecil staying in Geneva, Sir A. Chamberlain referred to discussion held by the Cabinet members on 4 July 1927 and informed that

⁵⁹ TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 38 (27), Conclusion 5, 4.07.1927 & Appendix – draft telegram to Sir E. Howard (Manchester Mass.), FO, 4.07.1927.

⁶⁰ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 393, pp. 634–635, Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard, FO 4.07.1927.

⁶¹ After the Cabinet meeting, Leopold Amery noted in his diary for 4 July 1927: “Cabinet at which (...) we got on the difficult question of Geneva and the American claim to parity. Winston and Beatty both wanted to water down or explain away Willie [Bridgeman]’s latest announcement in such a sense as to meant that if the Americans built as many cruisers as we did we should feel obliged to build more. That may be true for the ultimate strategic needs but would be a fatal thing to say now, would break up the Conference and provoke a general competition in armaments. In the end we decided to tell Howard [British Ambassador in Washington] to repeat Willie’s statement making it clear that we must be free to build what we need in the way of cruisers, but have no objection to America building as many if she needs them. The difficulty I see is that if Japan asks for three-fifths of any total which we may possible consent to in cruisers, or even a lesser proportion, America will feel bound to build level to us” (*The Leo Amery Diaries*, vol. I, pp. 514–515).

Admiral Beatty “showed some irritation about the statement made in Geneva and extreme sensitiveness as to the use of the word ‘parity’. The Cabinet were, however, aware that they must support Bridgeman and yourself, and that to use any other language in Washington than that which you had used at Geneva was unthinkable”. Furthermore, Chamberlain admitted that he himself was concerned over how the Geneva discussion on cruisers might develop. “As far as I can make out, we are in the right on the basis of actual needs. America threatens to build for prestige an equal number, though her needs are not equal. Japan, who might raise no objection to our figure if it stood by itself, will raise her claim if the Americans raise theirs. Then our number in turn becomes insufficient, and we find ourselves moving in a vicious circle in which America and Japan may unite to denounce us as using the Disarmament Conference to start new race of armaments”. Admiral Beatty together with other Cabinet members believed that a way out of tense situation consisted “in confining the new restrictions to the larger class of cruisers and excluding the smaller commerce protectors from the scope of the present agreement”, yet Chamberlain stated clearly he did not have any opinion on the matter.⁶²

Lord Cecil was an enthusiastic advocate of American unrestricted right to parity. In his letter to Chamberlain he admitted: “I was extremely glad that the Government telegraphed urging that we should admit the American claim to parity”. He also argued that it should not be a matter in controversy “since the Americans can obviously always build as many ships of any class we can, it seems to me folly to object to their claim to do what they obviously can do”. Moreover, for the sake of a successful outcome of the conference, Cecil was willing to agree that the United States should have a greater number of cruisers at their disposal than Great Britain, although he was perfectly aware that the Admiralty disapproved such a proposal.⁶³

⁶² DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 397, pp. 637–639, Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain to Viscount Cecil, 5.07.1927.

⁶³ “They (the experts) are now working at a plan with regards cruisers, by which each of the government will state their programme up to the year 1936; that in fact will give us the number of cruisers we require without forcing the Americans to build the same number, and the programme will show a larger tonnage being built each year than ours, though even so they will not have reached anything like parity by 1936. This, plus a formal admission that they are entitled to parity may be enough for American opinion. The only difficulty, as I understand it, is that it might enable the Americans to have a considerably larger number of large cruiser than us. To my heretical mind there would be no very great objection to this, but the Admirals think otherwise and are making their assent to this programme plan dependent on an undertaking by the Americans that they will

Following the instructions, on 6 July 1927, ambassador Howard in his conversation with Frank B. Kellogg, head of American diplomacy, provided his assurance about parity. Kellogg admitted that based on talks between Admiral H.P. Jones and representatives of the Admiralty, prior to Geneva conference, the American party was inclined to believe that the British government would not oppose parity in the class of cruisers. Hence, stance adopted by the British at the very beginning of the conference surprised the Americans which, however, changed once Bridgeman had made his statement to Gibson. Kellogg avoided stating whether or not he discussed in Geneva the British proposals for reducing the displacement of capital ships, and stressed the necessity to consult it with Curtis D. Wilbur (Secretary of the Navy). On the other hand, he considered placing limitations on the global tonnage of cruisers as major problem addressed at the conference. Referring to the matter, he claimed that American proposals were based on the assumption that consensus should impose lower limitations. At the same time, the British party put forward their suggestions providing for higher global tonnage of cruisers. Kellogg investigated Howard whether or not the British would lower their demands upon the class of cruisers and add a political clause to the agreement in order to allow arms development “if anything occurs in the interim to upset general status quo of the fleets in the world”. Howard stated he had not been granted the right to comment on the British proposal in Geneva and was sceptical about the possibility of revising Kellogg’s political clause⁶⁴. During another meeting, on 7 July 1927, Kellogg informed Howard that in principle the Americans were not against talking over the British proposal on capital ships on condition that consensus was reached over all other issues addressed in Geneva.⁶⁵

At the same time, discussion held at the conference over placing limitations on cruisers reached deadlock. The Americans, so far consistently refusing to talk over British proposals, during a session of the Executive Committee on 5 July 1927 presented a document which they referred to as “maximum effort to meet British view point”. To be more specific, they called for reducing the global tonnage of cruisers both in the Royal Navy and the US Navy to reach the same level, namely at the most 400,000 tons by 31 December 1936 (before that the

not build more large cruisers than we shall” (ibidem, no. 392, pp. 633–634, Letter from Viscount Cecil to Sir A. Chamberlain, 2.07.1927).

⁶⁴ Ibidem, no. 401, pp. 641–642, Sir E. Howard to Sir A. Chamberlain, Washington 6.07.1927. Cf. FRUS 1927, vol. I, pp. 72–74, F.B. Kellogg to H. Gibson, Washington 6.07.1927.

⁶⁵ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 409, p. 654, Sir E. Howard to Sir A. Chamberlain, Washington 7.07.1927.

Americans demanded limitations ranging from 250,000 to 300,000 tons). Within the acceptable tonnage of 400,000 tons, the American party did, however, reserve the right to build 25 heavy cruisers with a displacement of 10,000 tons and a global tonnage of 250,000 tons. The remaining 150,000 tons rested with light cruisers which, on the other hand, they wanted to equip with 8-inch guns, analogically to heavy ones. According to Bridgeman, the US proposal was brought forward by Admiral H.P. Jones as an “ultimatum” and there was no chance that the British delegation would accept it. In a report prepared for Prime Minister Baldwin, Bridgeman expressed his opinion: “if we agreed we should be in position either of submitting to inferiority to, and not parity with, America in offensive power, or abandoning number of cruisers we consider essential for the protection of our food supplies. Agreement with his [Jones] plan would also entail ludicrous result that a conference called for limitations of armaments had eventuated in a decision which would enormously increase offensive power of the fleets of the world”.⁶⁶

Situation in Geneva was discussed by the Cabinet members on 6 July 1927. Admiral Beatty, Chief of Naval Staff, set out reasons why American proposal was unacceptable. First of all, it provided the American fleet with advantage in terms of the number of heavy cruisers. Secondly, the maximum global tonnage (400,000 tons) demanded by the US would not enable the British fleet to have at her disposal the number of light cruisers essential “for trade protection”. Therefore, Beatty suggested: “we should agree to the Washington ratio of 5–5–3 in regard to the 10,000-ton class of Cruiser with 8-inch guns, but that for the smaller we should not agree to a limit”, which was approved by the Cabinet.⁶⁷

Bridgeman was informed that the British government considered the situation in Geneva “very grave”. He was advised not to take any decision and postpone any discussion to hold consultations with London, in order that the Committee of Imperial Defence had time to come with instructions.⁶⁸ Bridgeman assured that before receiving new instructions, he would not make any decision, neither to break off the negotiations, nor to cancel the previously made arrangements.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Ibidem, no. 395, pp. 635–636, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 5.07.1927; TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 39 (27), Appendix II (b), H. S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 5.07.1927; DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 403, pp. 644–647, W.C. Bridgeman to S. Baldwin, Geneva 6.07.1927; ibidem, no. 424, p. 670, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 12.07.1927; *The Modernisation of Conservative Politics...*, pp. 206–207; See also: S. Roskill: *Naval Policy...*, vol. I, p. 505; B.J.C. McKercher, *The Second Baldwin Government...*, p. 71.

⁶⁷ TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 39 (27), Conclusion 8, 6.07.1927.

⁶⁸ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 398, p. 639, Sir A. Chamberlain to H.S. London, FO 6.07.1927.

⁶⁹ Ibidem, no. 404, pp. 647–648, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 7.07.1927.

In the session of the Committee of Imperial Defence on 7 July 1927, Admiral Beatty submitted a memorandum to present his arguments for reaching consensus over disarmament. Such consensus would enable the British Empire to build up savings and would consist in:

- 1) reducing the number of heavy cruisers in ratio 5 : 5 : 3;
- 2) reducing the displacement of light cruisers and calibre of guns they carried;
- 3) “increasing lives of ships”⁷⁰.

Once the situation had been thoroughly discussed, paying special attention to the then latest information provided by the British delegation,⁷¹ decision was taken not to send Bridgeman new instructions but “a statement of the British case” prepared by Lord Balfour. Bridgeman was to use it when and how he considered appropriate “for the purpose of making clear to America and the world the strength and reasonableness of our position and the sincerity of our effort to promote further limitation of armaments”. Moreover, he was advised to insist on differentiating “between the larger type of fighting cruisers and the smaller type which we require for the purpose of imperial communications”. This distinction was as significant as “between battleships and cruisers” and had to do with Great Britain’s readiness to accept “equality” with the United States in the class of heavy cruisers, unlike light cruisers in which category the British Empire had to retain “freedom of action”.⁷²

“A statement of the British case”, released by Lord Balfour and sent to Bridgeman in Geneva as well as Howard in Washington, specified to the public why the British Empire could not accept parity in the class of light cruisers (particularly due to her geographical situation).⁷³

⁷⁰ TNA, CAB 4/16, CID Paper no. 818–B, “Cruisers” Memorandum by Lord Beatty communicated verbally to the Committee of Imperial Defence at its 228th Meeting held on July 7, 1927.

⁷¹ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 405, pp. 648–649, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 7.07.1927.

⁷² TNA, CAB 2/5, CID 228th Meeting, 7.07.1927; TNA, CAB 4/16, CID Paper 816–B Revise, Code Telegram to British Delegation at Geneva, no. 102, of July 7, 1927; DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 406, pp. 649–650, Sir A. Chamberlain to H.S. London, FO 7.07.1927; *ibidem*, no. 407, pp. 650–651, Sir A. Chamberlain to H.S. London, FO 7.07.1927.

⁷³ *Ibidem*, no. 408, pp. 651–653, Sir A. Chamberlain to H.S. London, FO 7.07.1927; *ibidem*, no. 411, pp. 655–656, Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard, FO 8.07.1927; Having been granted Chamberlain’s consent, Howard presented “a statement of the British case” to the Department of State (FRUS 1927, vol. I, pp. 86–88, The British Embassy to the Department of State, Washington 9.07.1927).

In the session of the Committee of Imperial Defence on 7 July 1927, Churchill stated firmly that “Great Britain should not be over anxious in regard to a possible breakdown of Conference at Geneva. To become entangled in an undesirable set of conditions and limitations would be much worse in effect than a breakdown of the Conference”. Discussion with Chancellor of the Exchequer on the matter was initiated by Sir A. Chamberlain to stress that “everything should be done, compatible with safety, to secure the success of the present negotiations”. He was inclined to believe that the breakdown of Geneva conference might not only lead to the US arms development, but also have a detrimental effect on disarmament negotiations conducted under the auspices of the League of Nations in PCDC.⁷⁴

On the following day, Alanson B. Houghton, American ambassador in London, assuring he had not consulted Washington and acted on his own,⁷⁵ referred to the Geneva conference deadlock in his conversation with Chamberlain. The former pointed out negative consequences following from possible breakdown of the conference such as pressure from “the Big Navy people” to build up the US fleet, a demand that the President found hard to resist. Houghton investigated whether a compromise level “in the neighbourhood of 400,000 tons” in the class of cruisers could be accepted by the Cabinet – a piece of information he could disclose to Coolidge in writing. After he had consulted Prime Minister Baldwin, Lord Balfour and Admiral Beatty, on 11 July 1927 Chamberlain made the following proposal to Houghton: “instead of endeavouring to fix maximum overhead tonnage for all time based on theoretical needs and embracing far larger construction than any of the Powers now had in contemplation, a solution should be sought on lines of an agreement as to the total in each class beyond which each party could not go up to 1936, viz., the date of the expiration of the Washington Treaty, before which the whole subject must obviously be again considered”. Should the above proposal be approved by the US government and included in instructions sent to Gibson staying in Geneva, the British authorities were to send analogical statement to Bridgeman.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ TNA, CAB 2/5, CID 228th Meeting, 7.07.1927.

⁷⁵ In fact, Houghton followed the orders of Kellogg (FRUS 1927, vol. I, pp. 78–79, F.B. Kellogg to A.B. Houghton, Washington 7.07.1927).

⁷⁶ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 412, pp. 656–658, Record by Sir A. Chamberlain of a conversation with the American Ambassador, FO 8.07.1927; FRUS 1927, vol. I, pp. 84–85, A.B. Houghton to F.B. Kellogg, London 8.07.1927; DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 413, p. 658, Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain to Mr. Houghton, FO 8.07.1927; *ibidem*, no. 423, pp. 667–670, Memorandum by Sir A. Chamberlain recording a Conversation with the United States Ambassador on July 11 respecting the Naval Conference at Geneva, FO 11.07.1927; FRUS 1927, vol. I, pp. 97–98,

On 12 July 1927, Chamberlain informed Bridgeman what the talks with Houghton had produced. According to Chamberlain, proposal put forward to the American party was much the same as suggestions made by Bridgeman as to possible way out of the deadlock.⁷⁷ He was, however, afraid that conducting negotiations simultaneously in two locations, namely in Geneva and in London, could involve a substantial risk. "It would be interpreted everywhere that ministers here and particularly Admiralty were not in accord with views of Cabinet whereas in fact we have been working in complete agreement with Foreign Office and government at home from the start".⁷⁸

Nevertheless, Chamberlain's proposal did not enable the parties to achieve the expected breakthrough in negotiations, although at the very beginning Kellogg expressed his readiness to arrive in Geneva if Chamberlain did the same. Talks between ambassador Howard and Kellogg indicated that the US party misinterpreted the British proposal and was inclined to believe that the British delegation had dropped their claim for dividing cruisers into two classes, namely heavy and light. Once Kellogg had been put right, he informed Houghton that the British proposal was "valueless and of no significance to us".⁷⁹

Furthermore, it turned out that Kellogg misinterpreted a statement made by Lord Balfour at the Washington conference in 1921. The former believed that the latter expressed Great Britain's approval for overhead tonnage limitations in regard to auxiliary vessels, namely up to 450,000 tons.⁸⁰ Therefore, the Ameri-

A.B. Houghton to F.B. Kellogg, London 12.07.1927; TNA, CAB 24/187, C. P. 196 (27), Memorandum by A. Chamberlain 12.07.1927; TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 40 (27), Conclusion 4, 13.07.1927; Ambassador A.B. Houghton was not enthusiastic about President Coolidge's initiative on convening a conference and inviting five superpowers to it to discuss naval arms limitation. He was sceptical about the success of the conference from the very beginning and claimed that Great Britain would not approve limitations on the construction of cruises – extremely essential for the British security. He was also afraid that the conference would produce the opposite effect from what all the parties intended, i.e. instead of limiting, the US fleet would develop. He warned the US government against being accused of contributing to the conference breakdown (as its main initiator) and therefore advised Kellogg against going to Geneva as a delegate (J.J. Matthews: *Alanson B. Houghton. Ambassador of the New Era*, Lanham 2004, pp. 172–177).

⁷⁷ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 428, p. 673, Sir A. Chamberlain to H.S. London, FO 12.07.1927; See also: *ibidem*, no. 416, p. 661, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 9.07.1927; *ibidem*, no. 417, pp. 662–663, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 10.07.1927.

⁷⁸ *Ibidem*, no. 434, p. 676, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 13.07.1927.

⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, no. 437, pp. 678–679, Sir E. Howard to Sir A. Chamberlain, Washington 13.07.1927; *ibidem*, no. 440, p. 680, Sir E. Howard to Sir A. Chamberlain, Washington 14.07.1927; FRUS 1927, vol. I, p. 108, F.B. Kellogg to A.B. Houghton, Washington 16.07.1927.

⁸⁰ Sir M. Hankey provided complete documentation suggesting that the British delegates at the Washington conference were willing to accept parity only in regard to „Fleet Cruisers” and

cans were surprised by British demands in the class of cruisers uttered in Geneva (c.a. 600,000 tons), the more so because at that time Great Britain had at her disposal cruisers (built and building) with a total of about 380,000 tons.⁸¹

In his conversation with Howard on 14 July 1927, Kellogg stated “he had never heard” of proposal put forward by Admiral H. P. Jones in Geneva. In his memorandum of 5 July 1927, he demanded recognizing the US right to have 25 heavy cruisers at their disposal (with a displacement of 10,000 tons and 8-inch guns, overhead tonnage not exceeding 250,000 tons) within the proposed limit, i.e. 400,000 tons in the class of cruisers.⁸² Chamberlain ordered Howard to inform Kellogg about Jones’s offer since it seemed to him that the Department of State had not been provided with a complete picture of the situation in Geneva. “Fact that State Department were left in ignorance of this paper makes me fear that our position at Geneva has never been fairly reported to them”.⁸³

On 18 July 1927, Houghton reported to the head of British diplomacy that the American party had withdrawn from arranging the meeting between Kellogg and Chamberlain in Geneva. Furthermore, he stated that, according to Kellogg, consensus could be reached at the conference on one condition, namely if Great Britain made concessions “upon the question of total tonnage and on the size of cruisers”. Houghton could not, however, tell what exactly these concessions should involve, and Chamberlain concluded that the best thing to do would be to “leave the matter in the hands of our delegations at Geneva”.⁸⁴

“always insisted on the necessity for additional number for the protection of our Imperial communication” (TNA, CAB 4/16, CID Paper 815-B, “Cruisers. Note by the Secretary on the Proceedings at Washington” 6.07.1927).

⁸¹ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 418, pp. 663–664, Sir E. Howard to Sir A. Chamberlain, Washington 10.07.1927; *ibidem*, no. 427, pp. 672–673, Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard, FO 12.07.1927; *ibidem*, no. 433, pp. 672–673, Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard, FO 12.07.1927.

⁸² *Nota bene*, documents disclosed by the Americans suggest that Gibson sent Admiral Jones’s proposal to Kellogg already on 5 July 1927 (FRUS 1927, vol. I, p. 71, H. Gibson to F.B. Kellogg, Geneva 5.07.1927), which entails that Kellogg either deliberately misinformed Howard, or was really under-informed on the matter. See historians’ views on the issue: Ch. Hall: *Britain, America and Arms Control...*, p. 46; D. Richardson: *The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy...*, pp. 138–139; B.J.C. McKercher: *A Certain Irritation’...*, p. 848.

⁸³ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 440, p. 680, Sir E. Howard to Sir A. Chamberlain, Washington 14.07.1927; *ibidem*, no. 447, p. 684, Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard, FO 15.07.1927; *ibidem*, no. 450, p. 688, Sir E. Howard to Sir A. Chamberlain, Washington 16.07.1927.

⁸⁴ *Ibidem*, no. 460, p. 696, Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard, FO 18.07.1927; FRUS 1927, vol. I, pp. 108–109, F.B. Kellogg to H. Gibson, Washington 16.07.1927; *ibidem*, p. 116, A.B. Houghton to F.B. Kellogg, London 19.07.1927.

At the same time, attempts were made by American and Japanese parties to resolve deadlock over the class of cruisers. With this end in view, a committee of British, American and Japanese junior delegates was formed since it was generally agreed that a plenary session attended by senior delegates would come down to repeating their conflicting opinions and thereby make it impossible to reach consensus.⁸⁵

On 12 July 1927, talks held by junior delegates⁸⁶ produced a draft agreement to be discussed by senior delegates. It provided for:

- overhead tonnage limit for auxiliary vessels (service life of cruisers not longer than 16 years and service life of destroyers not longer than 12 years), namely 550,000 tons for Great Britain and the United States and “approximately” 3/5 of the limit for Japan.

Under the remaining arrangements:

- each country reserves the right to keep an additional 20% of the aforementioned tonnage in “units over age limits specified above”,
- number of heavy cruisers (with a displacement of 10,000 tons) is to drop to 12 units in the British fleet, 12 units in the American fleet, and 8 units in the Japanese fleet,
- “all other cruisers constructed in the future are not to exceed 6,000 tons or mount a gun exceeding 6 inches”;
- British, Japanese and American cruisers exceeding tonnage limits (6,000 tons) and calibre limits (6-inch guns) proposed for new cruisers, will be “scrapped” before 1945.⁸⁷

In his report for the Cabinet, Bridgeman claimed that the “proposed total tonnage would appear to meet our requirements up to 1936 which is the earliest possible date proposed for termination of this agreement and for some years after”. Furthermore, he was inclined to believe that the agreement would enable the British Empire to keep 12 heavy cruisers of 10,000 tons, 60 light cruisers of

⁸⁵ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 422, pp. 666–667, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 11.07.1927.

⁸⁶ The British Empire was represented by R.H. Campbell and captain W.A. Egerton, the United States – by A.W. Dulles and captain W.W. Smyth, and Japan – by S. Saburi and captain T. Hori. Talks were “entirely informal” and were not “in any sense binding upon any of delegation” (FRUS 1927, vol. I, pp. 98–100, H. Gibson to F.B. Kellogg, Geneva 12.07.1927; *ibidem*, pp. 100–101, H. Gibson to F.B. Kellogg, Geneva 12.07.1927).

⁸⁷ Namely 1 British York-class cruiser and 4 Hawkins-class cruisers, 4 Japanese Furutaka-class cruisers, and 10 American Omaha-class cruisers (DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 429, p. 674, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 12.07.1927).

6,000 tons (in which 1 minelayer and 1 light aircraft carrier) and 14 destroyer squadrons. In addition to that, Bridgeman stated that consensus “was reached with great difficulty and appears to offer a possible way out of impasse into which we have drifted” and that it was “entirely provisional”.⁸⁸ In fact, during a meeting organized on 13 July 1927 and attended by senior delegates representing Great Britain, the United States and Japan it turned out that the Americans voiced reservations about reducing displacement and calibre of guns carried by new cruisers (namely 6,000 tons and 6-inch guns respectively), whilst the Japanese “made considerable difficulty on the score that figures under this scheme do not show sufficient reduction all round”. Bridgeman was afraid that “if the Japanese persist in making difficulties over total tonnage figures for auxiliary surface vessels allocated in scheme now under consideration they may well wreck the agreement”.⁸⁹

On 12 July 1927, Chamberlain communicated to the British delegation in Geneva suggestions from the British ambassador in Washington. According to the latter, the delegates of Dominions should voice their strong support for Great Britain’s proposal on cruisers. Sir E. Howard was inclined to believe that such backup would exert “an excellent effect on United States public opinion”.⁹⁰ Because the situation at the Geneva conference had changed, Bridgeman did not consider it necessary to take such measures, yet took such a possibility into account if the Americans again adopted a stiff stance. However, he believed that such a step would create a risky impression “that we are uneasy as to justice of our case” and “that we were dragging Dominions at our heels”. In a session of the Executive Committee, Bridgeman emphasized that Dominions supported wholeheartedly the British stance in a dispute with the United States, of which the Americans were perfectly aware.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Ibidem, no. 430, pp. 674–675, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 12.07.1927; ibidem, no. 431, p. 675, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 12.07.1927.

⁸⁹ Ibidem, no. 435, p. 677, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 13.07.1927; ibidem, no. 436, pp. 677–678, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 13.07.1927.

⁹⁰ Ibidem, no. 425, p. 671, Sir A. Chamberlain to H.S. London, FO 12.07.1927.

⁹¹ Ibidem, no. 432, p. 675, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 13.07.1927; on Australian and Canadian stance see: P. Twomey: *Small Power Security through Great Power Arms Control? – Australian Perceptions of Disarmament, 1919–1930*, “War and Society” 1990, vol. VIII, no. 1, pp. 88–89; B.J.C. McKercher: *Between Two Giants: Canada, the Coolidge Conference, and Anglo-American Relations in 1927*, in: *Anglo-American Relations...*, pp. 81–124; T.W. Harris, *A Treaty is Better than a Battleship: Canada, Autonomy and Interwar Naval Disarmament*, Ph.D. dissertation, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo 2013, pp. 100–132.

On 13 July 1927, the Cabinet ordered the Committee of Imperial Defence to study agreement proposed by junior delegates representing the three powers.⁹²

In a session held on the following day, most members of the Committee of Imperial Defence were against accepting the aforementioned proposal. It was decided that the British delegation should put forward a motion to postpone the Geneva conference sessions and return to London to participate in consultations. According to Beatty, the Admiralty could possibly accept 5 : 3 ratio with Japan, “but should it turn to be 5 to 3.5 the Admiralty would be quite unable to advise Government to accept it, as such arrangement would place us in very dangerous position *vis-à-vis* Japan”. Above all else, the Admiralty was against accepting British parity with the US in regard to cruisers with a overhead tonnage of 550,000. Lord Balfour approved the British-American parity in the class of capital ships and heavy cruisers, yet not in the class of light cruisers. He argued: “owing to the configuration of our Empire and the distribution of its component parts, we must build according to our minimum requirements for defence. If the United States chose build up to equal numbers with us, they would be violating their own principles, but we must not actually announce that we would not concede parity to the United States”. Similar stance was adopted by Lord Salisbury, Churchill, Sir S. Hoare and L. Amery. Only Sir A. Chamberlain did his best to prove that the proposal under consideration had certain advantages to the British. Churchill suggested that the British delegation should return to London and take part in consultations. Prime Minister Baldwin approved the idea since he hoped that landmark decisions on further action in Geneva would be made by the Cabinet members before his departure for Canada.⁹³

On 14 July 1927, Bridgeman was informed that before taking final decision at the conference, he would have to return to London to hold consultations and

⁹² TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 40 (27), Conclusion 4, 13.07.1927; After the Cabinet session, L. Amery noted in his diary for 13 July 1927: “Short Cabinet at which we discussed the further developments at Geneva. What it comes to is that a conference convened by the Americans for the reduction of expenditure on naval armaments is becoming a conference for increasing naval armaments in order to satisfy America’s claim to be equal with us in every class of vessel. The unscrupulousness of the American Press at Geneva has gone beyond all limits. It all confirms me in my own conviction that disarmament conferences are fundamentally wrong and that the only real way to bring about disarmament is peaceful policy” (*The Leo Amery Diaries*, vol. I, p. 516).

⁹³ TNA, CAB 2/5, CID 229th Meeting, 14.07.1927; *Baldwin Papers. A Conservative Statesman 1908–1947*, eds. Ph. Williamson, E. Baldwin, Cambridge 2004, p. 198; after the Committee of Imperial Defence session, L. Amery noted in his diary for 14 July 1927: “CID at which we chiefly discussed Geneva and decided to ask Bridgeman to come home and discuss things with us before he irrevocably committed us to an overhead total” (*The Leo Amery Diaries*, vol. I, p. 516).

therefore Geneva sessions had to be postponed for at least a week. Telegram stated very briefly: “in particular we are concerned about total tonnage limit”.⁹⁴

Bridgeman and Lord Cecil were both amazed and objected to adopting such a solution. They were afraid that postponing the conference for such a long time “would give the impression that we were doubtful of our position, and that possibly we no longer possessed full confidence of our government, which would seriously impair prospect of agreement”. Therefore, Bridgeman and Lord Cecil asked for a detailed explanation as to why they had been invited for consultations to London since so far they had been following the instructions and were not going to agree on any solution without consent from the British government.⁹⁵

On 14 July 1927, the second plenary session was held in Geneva on Great Britain’s initiative.⁹⁶ Particular groups of delegates presented their stances once more. Bridgeman and Lord Jellicoe represented the British Empire, Japanese proposal was put forward by Viscount Ishii, whereas the American one was submitted by Gibson.⁹⁷ According to Bridgeman, “plenary meeting went off reasonably well. Attitude conciliatory all around. Salient feature was that American made it plain that they and the Japanese could reach agreement on total tonnage tomorrow i.e. that we at present are obstacle to agreement. At the end Gibson said: ‘if some basis can be found which is mutually acceptable to British and Japanese

⁹⁴ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 439, footnote 1, p. 679, Sir A. Chamberlain to H.S. London, FO 14.07.1927.

⁹⁵ *Ibidem*, no. 439, pp. 679–680, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, 14.07.1927. Bridgeman was the more surprised by being invited to London as three days before Chamberlain passed on the following message from Prime Minister Baldwin: “the Government desire to express to you their warm appreciation of the skill, patience and tact with which you and all members of the British delegation and its staff have conducted the difficult negotiations with which you have charged. We are happy to find confirmation in recent telegrams of the complete agreement which is established between the delegation and the government and which has led you to the same conclusions and alternative suggestions as we had reached” (*ibidem*, no. 419, pp. 664–665, Sir A. Chamberlain to H.S. London, FO 11.07.1927).

⁹⁶ According to Gibson, Bridgeman insisted on holding the second plenary session of the conference “in order to state British position as he [Bridgeman] was under serious home criticism on account of the general misrepresentation of the British attitude abroad. Bridgeman assured me that he would confine himself to statement of British case and would take no action which could be considered provocative. He would ask no questions or he might ask certain general questions which would not be embarrassing and which I could answer or not as I chose” (FRUS 1927, vol. I, p. 95, H. Gibson to F.B. Kellogg, Geneva 11.07.1927).

⁹⁷ For more see: RCLNA, pp. 25–34; Cmd. 2964 (1927), pp. 7–12; *Geneva Navy Conference. Plenary Sitting. Frank Statement by Mr. Bridgeman. Lord Jellicoe on Cruisers*, “The Times” 15.07.1927; *Geneva Naval Conference. Mr. Bridgeman’s Speech*, “The Times” 15.07.1927; *Empire’s Need of Cruisers. Lord Jellicoe Defence*, “The Times” 15.07.1927; *Not Without Hope*, “The Times” 15.07.1927.

delegations I feel sure that it will be possible for American delegation to make agreement complete'. This gives an opportunity to arrange with Japanese, if they can meet our requirements. Discussions which we hope may lead to provisional agreement, subject always your approval before any final step is taken, are proceeding and are not unpromising. We are only afraid that interruption at this juncture may throw negotiations back to the point from which they started".⁹⁸

The situation at the Geneva conference was thoroughly analysed and discussed in London during the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Further Limitation of Naval Armaments, formed on 14 July 1927 by decision of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The former was represented by S. Baldwin, Sir A. Chamberlain, Lord Balfour, Lord Salisbury, W. S. Churchill and Admiral Beatty.⁹⁹

The Cabinet Committee on Further Limitation of Naval Armaments discussed the matter on 15 July 1927, and the British delegates received two telegrams from London. The former was a brief message from the Prime Minister informing that the Cabinet had decided there was no need for Bridgeman to take part in the consultations.¹⁰⁰

The latter, sent few hours later, presented major objectives to be accomplished by the British delegation in Geneva. The message also stated that if their actions were in line with the original assumptions, there was not need for them to return to London either. The telegram emphasized: "we have at Washington agreed by treaty to equality of battleships. We are now prepared to agree by treaty to equality of large cruisers. We certainly do not mean quarrel with America if she chooses to build up to any strength which she deems necessary. But we cannot admit by treaty that in regard to small cruisers the case of the British Empire resembles other Powers; or that parity of number means parity of strength. We cannot consent therefore to the insertion in a great international instrument of any provision which could be interpreted as meaning that we had bound ourselves to any arrangement which placed us in a position of permanent naval inferiority". According to arrangements made by the Committee of Imperial Defence on 14 July 1927, the delegates were also instructed that "although therefore ready to agree to a ratio for the 10,000 ton 8" cruisers we could not agree to fixing by treaty a permanent total tonnage limit for all classes of ships whether specified in

⁹⁸ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 442, p. 681, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, 14.07.1927; See also: S. Roskill: *Naval Policy...*, vol. I, pp. 508–509.

⁹⁹ TNA, CAB 27/350, LNA (27), 1st Meeting, 15.07.1927.

¹⁰⁰ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 444, p. 682, Sir A. Chamberlain to H. S. London, FO 15.07.1927.

classes or lumped together”. They were advised to make further attempts to reach consensus “fixing the actual units of the annual programmes of new cruisers for the three Powers” in the following 5 years or “if absolutely necessary up to 1936”.¹⁰¹

Bridgeman and Lord Cecil were surprised and dismayed by the above instructions. On 17 July 1927, in his letter to Chamberlain, Cecil recalled that on 29 June 1927 Bridgeman asserted Gibson that “we accepted to the full their claim for parity in all respects with our fleet”, which Howard confirmed in Washington. Therefore, it was virtually impossible to say to the Americans that “we propose to limit the large cruisers which may be inconvenient to us but we decline altogether to limit the small cruisers because they are the things that matter us”. Cecil was convinced that the Americans would not accept a scheme placing limitations only on heavy cruisers, hence giving them parity with Great Britain in this class of ships, and at the same time giving the latter advantage in the class of light cruisers.¹⁰²

It was on 17 July 1927 that British and Japanese delegations managed to reach consensus over reducing the total tonnage of auxiliary ships in line with the following formula:

1. 500,000 tons for the British Empire; 325,000 tons for Japan (ratio 5 : 3.25).
2. Keeping additional 25% of total tonnage in vessels over age.
3. Reducing the number of 10,000-ton cruisers, namely 12 for both the British Empire and the United States, 8 for Japan.
4. Keeping the undermentioned vessels: the British Empire (1 York-class cruiser and 4 Hawkins-class cruisers), the United States (10 Omaha-class cruisers) and Japan (4 Furutaka-class cruisers).
5. Japan would accept clause under which by 31 December 1936 no cruiser shall be built with a displacement exceeding 6,000 tons and carrying guns with calibre exceeding 6 inches.

¹⁰¹ “As to period of agreement we should much prefer the shorter as it better safeguards our position and affords better chance of agreement. The longer the period the nearer the Americans might come to equality of numbers in practice as distinguished from theoretical right to parity, and (...) equality of number (...) would result in actual inferiority for us” (ibidem, no. 446, pp. 683–684, Sir A. Chamberlain to H.S. London, FO 15.07.1927).

¹⁰² Ibidem, no. 457, pp. 693–695, Letter from Viscount Cecil to Sir A. Chamberlain, 17.07.1927.

7. Within total tonnage of auxiliary ships, limitations on tonnage of cruisers and destroyers shall be determined in per cent.¹⁰³

Bridgeman called for presenting the British-Japanese proposal to the Americans, all the more so because on 14 July 1927 Gibson assured they would accept it. Three days later, Bridgeman informed Prime Minister Baldwin and the government: "If we may proceed on the these lines I have great hope of reaching agreement. If not I see no alternative but breakdown of conference".¹⁰⁴ Ronald H. Campbell, official at the Foreign Office and secretary of the British delegation in Geneva, in his correspondence with his colleague Gerald H. Villiers, claimed that "the scheme seems to give us all we want" and stressed that the Americans "will never sign anything that does not give them now, and at once, a paper equality with us".¹⁰⁵

On 18 July 1927, Bridgeman learnt that the British-Japanese proposal was an issue for the Admiralty that was willing to accept it in a revised version and on condition that "the limits so fixed for small cruisers are only a temporary expedient to secure a working arrangement for the next few years and not acceptance of principle that the needs of United States and ourselves for small cruisers are equal".¹⁰⁶ On the following day, Bridgeman reported that the projected scheme would be valid only by the end of 1936 and considered any attempts to change the British stance on parity "impossible".¹⁰⁷

On 19 July 1927, once another session of the Cabinet Committee on Further Limitation of Naval Armaments had been closed, British delegation read they were awaited in London for consultations and clarifying the Geneva situation. According to the telegram, the Admiralty was against accepting the British-Japanese proposal, whereas the members of the Cabinet Committee on Further Limitation of Naval Armaments did not share Bridgeman's and Cecil's view on recognizing parity between Great Britain and the United States in regard to light cruisers.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ *Ibidem*, no. 449, pp. 686–687, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 16.07.1927; *ibidem*, no. 455, pp. 690–691, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 17.07.1927.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibidem*, no. 454, pp. 689–690, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 17.07.1927.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibidem*, no. 456, pp. 691–693, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, 17.07.1927.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibidem*, no. 458, p. 695, Sir A. Chamberlain to H.S. London, FO 18.07.1927.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibidem*, no. 462, p. 697, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 19.07.1927.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibidem*, no. 463, p. 698, Sir A. Chamberlain to H. S. London, FO 19.07.1927; Cf. opinion that Bridgeman recorded in his diary: "The P. M. (Prime Minister) summoned us home for reasons which were rather complicated. Winston (Churchill) had got excited & thought we were giving away too much, Balfour who invented the word 'parity' at Washington thought we had been really mean what it seemed to mean. Beatty was worked up to say that we were conceding too much to

In the Cabinet session on 20 July 1927, Prime Minister Baldwin made it evident to the other ministers that he decided to summon the Geneva delegates for consultations in London and announced he would hold a special sitting of the Cabinet with their participation on 22 July 1927.¹⁰⁹

Leopold Amery (Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs) and Lord Birkenhead (Secretary of State for India), absent in the Cabinet session, presented their views to the Prime Minister in writing.

Having consulted Churchill (on 20 July) and Bridgeman (on 21 July), L. Amery could firmly state that the former was an opponent of accepting British-American parity in regard to light cruisers, which, according to him, was contradictory to statement that Bridgeman had already made to the American delegates. Therefore, he reported to the Prime Minister: “our only chance is to accept parity hoping that the Americans will not build or that the Senate will throw out agreement anyway”.¹¹⁰

Like Churchill, Lord Birkenhead was among ministers expressing stiff opposition to parity between the Royal Navy and the US Navy in all classes of ships. In his memorandum of 21 July 1927, he suggested:

- forcing through, with greater publicity, British proposals for reducing the tonnage and gun calibre on capital ships,
- determining, at a lowest possible level, parity between the British Empire and the United States in the class of heavy (10,000-ton) cruisers,

the Japanese, & some one else thought it a good opportunity for restarting the idea of naval holiday which greatly attracted Winston (Churchill) (*The Modernisation of Conservative Politics...*, p. 209).

¹⁰⁹ TNA, CAB 24/188, C. P. 204 (27), Note by M. Hankey “Further Limitation of Naval Armaments. The Geneva Conference” 18.07.1927; TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 41 (27), Conclusion 1, 20.07.1927; Sir Cuthbert Morley Headlam noted in his diary for 21 July 1927: “This morning I had talk with Willie Bridgeman. He is much annoyed at being summoned home and assures me that if he is asked to eat his words or do anything silly he won’t go back – he means this. Apparently the Cabinet is nervous that he is giving away too much (*Parliament and Politics...*, p. 127).

¹¹⁰ Amery’s diary for 20 June 1927: “He [Churchill] also talked a bit about Geneva on which he is all out for defying the Yanks and saying that we will not allow anyone to build up a parity with us in small cruisers. I do not see how we can say this after what we have made Willie say already, nor can I understand the consistency between this and Winston’s attempt to cut down the Navy Estimates. The only argument I gather is that he thinks that if we tell the Yanks sharply to mind their business and not to presume to compete with us at sea they will take it lying down and we can then afford not to build more than a minimum ourselves”. Amery’s diary for 21.01.1927: “To the Admiralty and had a short talk with Willy [Bridgeman], afterwards writing Stanley [Baldwin] to say that he could not ask Willie [Bridgeman] to eat his words and that anyway our only chance is to accept parity hoping that the Americans will not build or that the Senate will throw out agreement anyway” (*The Leo Amery Diaries*, vol. I, p. 519).

- recognizing, purely theoretical, Americans’ right to parity in the class of light cruisers and “the maintenance of our claim to complete freedom in the construction of light cruisers – conceding the like freedom to the United States”.

Birkenhead argued that consent to actual parity would entail “an actual disparity” and pose a serious risk to diplomatic standing of the British Empire. In the future, should any conflict with Washington arise, “we become the vassals of the United States”. Birkenhead referred to the American proposal for imposing limitations on global tonnage of cruisers as “a dangerous snare” and claimed that “the only safe and sane course is for us to remain faithful to the maritime traditions of our people. These traditions demand that if war break out between ourselves and any other country in the world, or any other reasonably conceivable combination of countries, we shall prove able to maintain the vital arteries of the people whose trustees we are”. He was nonchalant about possible breakdown of the conference. “I should not be in the last alarmed if the Americans made a break on this issue. The conference was their child, not ours. If it fails is their failure, not ours. And I would add that they cannot exploit that failure much if we can establish common ground with the Japanese”. Furthermore, Birkenhead minimized the risk of possible naval arms race between the United States and Great Britain should the conference turn into a fiasco and claimed that “there are pacifist and Nonconformist forces in America which will not stand for a race in naval armaments if our case is adequately projected over the footlights”. Birkenhead concluded by threatening to retreat in case the British government accepted actual parity with the United States in the class of light cruisers.¹¹¹

On 21 July 1927, the fourth session of the Cabinet Committee on Further Limitation of Naval Armaments was attended by Bridgeman and Lord Cecil. It was then that Admiral Beatty recalled reservations voiced by the Admiralty over British-Japanese proposals of 17 July 1927 and stressed that “this scheme, if adopted now, would undoubtedly be used as a precedent when the question came to be reconsidered before the expiration of the Treaty in 1936, and that, by adopting it now, we should be adopting for an indefinite time the principle of parity

¹¹¹ TNA, CAB 24/188, C. P. 210 (27), Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India “Naval Conference” 21.07.1927; P.P. O’Brien mistakenly attributed the authorship of the memorandum to Baldwin and dated his departure for Canada to 21 July 1927 (P.P. O’Brien: *Churchill and US Navy, 1919–1929*, in: *Winston Churchill. Studies in Statesmanship*, eds. R.A.C. Parker, C. Barnett, London 1995, pp. 35; idem, *British and American Naval Power...*, p. 193).

with the United States in the numbers and tonnage of the smaller Cruisers, which in fact, owing to our peculiar conditions, spells inferiority, as well as accepting a ratio for Japan which exceeded that which Admiralty had from the first declared to be the limit of safety”.

Having discussed the matter thoroughly, the Committee members stated that the conference breakdown should be avoided by all means and attempts should be made to reach consensus compatible “with security and economy”. Two alternative suggestions were put forward in the Cabinet session as to a new British stance in Geneva. Needless to say, the Cabinet was to approve only one.

The first alternative involved 1) rejecting British-Japanese proposals of 17 July 1927; 2) making “a comprehensive statement of our policy covering the whole field of naval reduction and limitation of armaments” as a basis for further discussion at the conference, 3) proposing scheme aimed exclusively at:

- reducing tonnage and gun calibre on destroyers and submarines, and prolonging the service life of these classes of ships,
- dividing cruisers into two classes (heavy 10,000-ton cruisers and light cruisers),
- determining the number of heavy cruisers in the British fleet (12 units), the American fleet (12 units) and the Japanese fleet (8 units) as well as prolonging the service life of these classes of ships up to 20 years,
- reducing tonnage (up to 6,000 tons) and gun calibre (up to 6 inches) on light cruisers,
- reducing tonnage and gun calibre on capital ships and aircraft carriers, and prolonging the service life of these classes of ships.

Possible decision on reducing the number of light cruisers and overhead tonnage in the class of destroyers and submarines “should be left to a future Conference”. Should the proposal be rejected by the US delegates, “the Conference would be allowed to break down”.

According to the other alternative, once in Geneva the British delegation was at first to present the objectives of the British policy and if the Americans refused to discuss the matter (which was almost certain), in order to prevent the conference breakdown Bridgeman and Cecil were to suggest British-Japanese proposals of 17 July 1927 as a basis for further talks. Obviously, with the reservation that the arrangements already made in regard to light cruisers would be a temporary

modus vivendi by 1936 and not a precedent for a new treaty to come into force after 1936.¹¹²

Arrangements made by the Cabinet Committee on Further Limitation of Naval Armaments were discussed in the Cabinet session on 22 July 1927. The Prime Minister opened the meeting with presenting Amery's and Birkenhead's views, whilst Sir A. Chamberlain reported the then latest news from Ambassador Howard staying in Washington who claimed that there were slim chances for British-American consensus over cruisers.¹¹³

The Cabinet members were unanimous on the fact that the first alternative provided by the Cabinet Committee on Further Limitation of Naval Armaments would prove unacceptable to the Americans and lead to immediate breakdown of the conference.¹¹⁴ Hence, although some preferred the first variant, the discussion centred on the second one and eventually it was agreed that once in Geneva the British delegation would present it as their major objective. Consequently, Bridgeman informed that the Admiralty would draft amendments to the British-Japanese proposals put forward on 17 July 1927 in order to adjust them to "the indispensable requirements of Imperial Defence".

Negotiations conducted in Geneva so far were based on the assumption that arms limitation scheme would be valid by the end of 1936 (the expiry date of the

¹¹² TNA, CAB 24/188, C. P. 211 (27), Note by M. Hankey "Reduction and Limitation of Naval Armaments. Note on the present position of the Geneva Conference" 21.07.1927.

¹¹³ On 21 July 1927, Kellogg informed Howard that the United States would not accept the scheme for cruisers on British conditions (imposing limitations on the calibre of guns on light cruisers, namely up to 6 inches), and Senate "would never ratify any agreement in this sense, as American naval authorities held positively that owing to lack of naval bases such cruisers would be of comparatively little use for the protection of the American merchant marine in time of war". Howard also mentioned article by "The Times" correspondent in Washington who, quoting an official at the Department of State, reported "insistence by certain Senators on American fleet being strong enough to maintain against all comers 'traditional American attitude towards neutral commerce in war time'". According to Howard, this was the main reason behind "the stiffness of American attitude over cruiser question" and he did not lend credence to any change in their stance. Hence, Howard was inclined to believe that if the British government was not able "to accept something very like American proposals for cruiser tonnage there is little or no hope of any agreement" (DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 466, p. 699, Sir E. Howard to Sir A. Chamberlain, Washington 21.07.1927; *ibidem*, no. 468, pp. 700–701, Sir E. Howard to Sir A. Chamberlain, Washington 21.07.1927).

¹¹⁴ Lord Salisbury (Lord Privy Seal) informed during the Cabinet meeting on 22 July 1927 that at Bridgeman's request he discussed the issue with, present in London at that time, delegates representing Dominions at the Geneva conference. Salisbury met with delegates from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa (representatives of Canada and Irish Free State did not attend the meeting). "Those present had been definitely opposed to the policy set forth in the first alternative, and were unanimously of opinion that the only course was to continue negotiations on the basis of the scheme drawn up by the 'junior naval experts'".

Washington Treaty concluded on 6 February 1922). So were the recommendations from the Cabinet Committee on Further Limitation of Naval Armaments of 21 July 1927. However, in the Cabinet session, on 22 July 1927 Churchill managed to force through that the scheme should be valid throughout “the period covered by our present programme construction”, i.e. only by 1931.¹¹⁵

In the Cabinet meeting convened on 22 July 1927, Lord Balfour presented to the ministers a draft statement on the policy to be followed by the British Empire in terms of naval arms limitation. Needless to say, the statement was to be used by the British delegation in Geneva.¹¹⁶

What Balfour called into question was whether the Cabinet actually strove for revising the Washington conference arrangements in regard to parity between the United States and the British Empire in the class of capital ships. He argued that the British government accepted invitation to Geneva to add to decisions made in Washington “by diminishing yet further naval expenditure while maintaining national security”. Based on the two principles, the British delegates brought forward proposals for reducing the displacement and gun calibre on capital ships, “while leaving unaltered the numbers fixed at Washington”, and suggested that the number and gun calibre “of large fighting Cruisers” should be reduced in line with the Washington formula for capital ships (5 for the British Empire, 5 for the United States and 3 for Japan). In his statement, Balfour proved that analogical formula could not be adopted for light cruisers “employed for policy purposes in times of peace, and for protecting lines of communication in time of war”. He claimed that “such vessels are of more vital necessity to an Empire, whose widely scattered parts are divided from each other by seas and oceans, than to one which is essentially continental; to an Empire whose most populous parts are dependent for their daily bread on seaborne trade, than to one which is self-supporting and self-contained; to an Empire which would perish if it failed to protect its external trade, than to one for whom external trade, however important, was not a matter of life and death”. Balfour highlighted major differences between geographical

¹¹⁵ Churchill was inclined to believe that naval development programme established in regard to British cruisers in 1925 could be modified only by the decision of the Cabinet and after consultations with the Treasury, and should not be affected by decisions taken in Geneva (M. Gilbert: *Winston S. Churchill*, vol. V: *Companion Part I Documents. The Exchequer Years 1922–1929*, London 1979, p. 1028; W.S. Churchill to S. Baldwin and A. Chamberlain, 11.07.1927; Cf: DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 421, p. 666, Sir A. Chamberlain to H.S. London, FO 11.07.1927).

¹¹⁶ TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 43 (27), Conclusion 1, 22.07.1927; B. J. McKercher mistakenly dated the Cabinet session to 20 July 1927 and Baldwin’s departure for Canada to 21 July 1927 (B.J.C. McKercher: *The Second Baldwin Government...*, pp. 74).

situation of the British Empire and the United States and argued that “the sea routes on which Britain depends for her existence lie largely in narrow waters bordered by other States. This is not the case with America, whose most important lines of communications lie either on land within her own frontiers, by sea long her own coasts, or in the great oceans”.¹¹⁷

On 24 July 1927, Lord Cecil in correspondence with Sir A. Chamberlain, referred to the document in the following words: “Further study of A. [rthur] J. [ames] B. [alfour]’s document filled me with misgiving. It seems to me quite certain as it stands to lead to a breakdown of the negotiations”. Cecil was certain that the Americans, demanding parity based on “equal cruiser strength”, would not accept the British-Japanese proposals after Admiralty’s modifications. Hankey shared his opinion and “rather rejoiced at it”, which caused Cecil’s irritation. The latter highlighted that “the document is drafted in language which from its very point and vigour is bound to lead to recrudescence of all the bitterest controversy”. Therefore, Lord Cecil doubted seriously if the Geneva negotiations were successful and objected to announcing “a statement of the British case” of which he was the main promoter. Lord Cecil claimed that the document should not be presented to the Americans unless agreement was concluded or in an amended version. He eventually suggested that Lord Balfour should take his place and represent Great Britain in Geneva.¹¹⁸

Despite reservations voiced by Lord Cecil in his letter to Sir A. Chamberlain, on 25 July 1927, the Cabinet Committee on Further Limitation of Naval Armaments approved the amended statement of the British case.¹¹⁹ Cecil became

¹¹⁷ TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 43 (27), Appendix, 22.07.1927; See also: J.H. Tomes: *Balfour and Foreign Policy. The International Thought of a Conservative Statesman*, Cambridge 1997, pp. 192–194.

¹¹⁸ Lord Cecil concluded his letter with the following words: “I understand that A.[rthur] J.[ames] B.[alfour] says he wishes for an agreement and therefore doubtless thinks he could achieve it on the basis of his document. Perhaps with his great dialectical skill and unrivalled authority he might do so. Why should he not try? I could easily retire – on some health pretext or the like. The public would see in his substitution a perfectly natural wish to send someone with greater authority to whom the Admiralty would be willing to entrust power to speak for them. If he succeed tant mieux. If he did not I could always consider my position!” (TNA, FO 800/261, pp. 143–144, Letter from Lord Cecil to Sir A. Chamberlain, Hatfield, 24.04.1927).

¹¹⁹ Balfour amended the initial version of the statement by emphasizing (in conclusion) that parity could not be accepted in regard to light cruisers since “nominal parity” would mean for the British Empire nothing else but “real inequality” and added “a caveat in regard to the temporary character of the agreement so far as concerns Cruisers other than the large type which works with the Fleet”. “In the opinion of His Majesty’s Government there need be no difficulty in arriving at a temporary arrangement about the immediate future of Cruiser building. But the British Empire cannot be asked to give to any such temporary arrangement the appearance of an immutable

convinced that his resignation would lessen the possibility of achieving consensus at the Geneva conference¹²⁰ and the Committee, having consulted Bridgeman and Cecil, decided that “the best method of giving publicity to it will be by an announcement in both Houses of Parliament”.

Afterwards, the Committee accepted the British-Japanese proposal of 17 July 1927, revised by the Admiralty, that the British delegates were to use as a basis for further negotiations. The only difference lied in overhead tonnage. In the original proposal, total tonnage was determined for auxiliary ships (i.e. cruisers and destroyers), whereas in its amended version overhead tonnage was defined for cruisers, destroyers and submarines. How the granted tonnage would be used rested with signatories to the treaty, with the reservation that the number of heavy (10,000-ton) cruisers would be reduced in line with the following formula: 12 units for the British Empire, 12 units for the United States and 8 units for Japan. Such a scheme enabled the Admiralty to retain the right to build a sufficient number of light cruisers, yet having accepted limitations on the number of submarines. Furthermore, the British intended to divide submarines into two classes (small and large) and reduce the overhead tonnage in the class of large submarines.

At the same time, Admiral Beatty considered it relevant to stress that, even in an amended version, British-Japanese proposals imposed parity between Great Britain and Japan in the class of light cruisers and destroyers in 5 : 3.25 ratio, which was quite risky.

In the Committee session, held 22 July 1927, discussion again centred on the expiry date of the scheme projected for naval arms limitations. The Cabinet was in favour of the year 1931, whilst the Admiralty suggested that the arrangements should be valid through 1936. They argued that the former enabled the United States and Japan to build cruisers equipped with 8-inch guns after 1931 and in this way outclass British cruisers carrying 6-inch guns built between 1927 and 1931. Attention was also paid to the fact that the issue would become a burning question after 1936. Hence, should the treaty expire by the end of 1931, the

principle; for this is liable to be interpreted in the future as a formal surrender of the doctrine of maritime equality. Such temporary agreement must not be treated as a precedent, or deemed to embody a settled principle. Any other course would inevitably be interpreted in the future as involving the formal surrender by the British Empire of maritime equality, a consummation which His Majesty's Government are well assured is no part of the President's [of the United States] policy". (TNA, CAB 24/188, C. P. 212 (27), Appendix I "Second Revise of Draft Statement" 26.07.1927).

¹²⁰ See: *The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters*, vol. 2: *The Reform Years, 1921–1927*, ed. R. Self, London 2001, p. 417, Letter from N. Chamberlain to H. Chamberlain, 24.07.1927.

Admiralty opted for waving claim to limitation on the calibre of guns carried by light cruisers (up to 6-inch) and agreeing to equip all cruisers with 8-inch guns, which would entail higher costs of their construction. The Committee members were perfectly aware that adopting a new stance on the matter would encourage the United States to become approbative. Final decision was to be taken by the Cabinet.

Responding to Churchill's request, the Committee adopted a recommendation according to which "programmes of naval construction agreed to at the Geneva Conference should be regarded as a maximum, and the Government of the day should not be held to be bound to build up to them. They must remain free to decide the programme of naval construction in each year according to the needs of the situation and the available financial resources".¹²¹

In a session of 26 July 1927, chaired by Sir A. Chamberlain, the Cabinet¹²² eventually accepted all recommendations from the Cabinet Committee on Further Limitation of Naval Armaments and approved the final version of statement on British policy drawn up by Lord Balfour.¹²³ The amended British-Japanese proposal of 17 July was welcomed. At the same time, Admiral Beatty stressed that such a decision entailed abandoning the original instructions sent by the Admiralty to the British delegates in Geneva. Furthermore, he claimed that the proposal set a dangerous precedent for establishing "a principle of inferiority on the sea with United States" and was incompatible with defence requirements for the ratio

¹²¹ TNA, CAB 27/350, LNA (27), 5th Meeting, 25.07.1927; TNA, CAB 24/188, C. P. 212 (27), Note by M. Hankey "The Geneva Conference on Reduction and Limitation of Naval Armaments" 26.07.1927.

¹²² On 23 July 1927, Prime Minister Baldwin and Prince of Wales undertook an official visit to Canada. During the Cabinet meeting on 22 July 1927, Baldwin asked the ministers "whether, in view of the important national issues involved in the Geneva Conference, it would be advisable for him to postpone his departure for Canada on the following day as the guest of the Canadian Government on a visit for which an elaborate programme had been arranged". The Cabinet members agreed that major objectives to be followed by British delegation in Geneva had already been formulated and therefore "it was indispensable, nor in the public interest, that the Prime Minister should postpone his departure" (TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 43 (27), Conclusion 2, 22.07.1927; See also: K. Middlemas, J. Barnes: *Baldwin. A Biography*, London 1969, pp. 368–371).

¹²³ Lord Cecil stated that "although at the Cabinet Committee he had acquiesced in the Statement and did not wish to dissent from it, in his view the effect of the announcement would be to add to the difficulties of the Delegates at Geneva". Whereas Bridgeman "thought it essential that the substance of the Statement should in any case be communicated by him to the other Delegations immediately on his return, and felt that the hands of the Delegates would be strengthened if this Statement were made as a Cabinet declaration in London and not merely by them in Geneva" (TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 44 (27), Appendix I, "Third Revise of Draft Statement. As approved by the Cabinet on 26th July, 1927").

between British and Japanese cruisers. It was also Beatty who warned the government that if the United States and Japan developed their fleets in line with limits granted in the scheme, the Sea Lords would not be able “with the means left at their disposal, to fulfill the responsibilities resting upon them”.¹²⁴

As for the expiry date of the scheme for naval arms limitation, the majority of the Cabinet members (10 ministers) were in favour of “not terminating before the year 1936, but subject to a provision that the armament of the smaller type of Cruiser must not exceed 6-inch calibre”, which was Cabinet’s conclusion. Only 6 ministers, including Bridgeman and Lord Cecil, “were in favour of giving to the Delegates some latitude (if they could not by any means achieve agreement on the basis of a maximum armament of 6-inch guns) to negotiate in the last resort a *modus vivendi* until 1931 on the basis right to arm the smaller Cruisers with 8-inch guns”.¹²⁵ Ministers representing the majority argued that the government should choose a solution that was “in the interest of economy and national security”, although they knew that the United States might find it unacceptable and consequently the conference might end in a fiasco. Cecil felt so “incensed” by what the ministers said (“to the effect that it would be better have no agreement”) that he asked to minute that “if the Conference (to the success of which he attached the greatest importance) should break down on the question of 6-inch guns, he must be free to consider his position”.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 44 (27), Appendix II, “Final Modified Anglo-Japanese Scheme”.

¹²⁵ According to D. Richardson, treaty in force by 1936 and imposing limitations on the calibre of guns (up to 6-inches) carried by light cruisers, was backed by the following 10 ministers: Birkenhead, Churchill, Cuncliffe-Lister, Gilmour, Guinness, Hoare, Hogg, Joynson-Hicks, Peel and Worthington-Evans; on the contrary, treaty in force by 1931 and providing for the possibility of equipping all cruisers with 8-inch guns, was supported by the following 6 ministers: Balfour, Bridgeman, Cecil, A. Chamberlain, N. Chamberlain and Percy (D. Richardson: *The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy...*, pp. 134–135, 234, footnote 68; See also: T. Kuramatsu: *Viscount Cecil, Winston Churchill and the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 – si vis pacem para pacem versus si vis pacem para bellum*, in: *Personalities, War and Diplomacy. Essays on International History*, eds. Th. G. Otte, C. Pagedas, London–Portland OR 1997, p. 113).

¹²⁶ TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 44 (27), Conclusion 1, 26.07.1927; *The Modernisation of Conservative Politics...*, p. 209; For more on the sessions of the Cabinet Committee on Further Limitation of Naval Armaments (25.07.1927) and the Cabinet (26.07.1927) see: J.C.C. Davidson’s account (the Chairman of the Conservative Party): “I was very frightened on Monday the 25th, because Austen [Chamberlain] apparently allowed Winston [Churchill] to reopen the whole question of the cruiser programme. Willie [Bridgeman] was not only very worried but exceedingly angry, and at one time was in minority of one. I gather that they pressed him again to go back to Geneva admit that he had exceed his instructions with regard to parity, to which he replied bluntly that he would do no such thing, but that he was quite prepared to announce that the British Government had changed its mind. All these things however, apparently passed off, and now he is going back to

On 27 July 1927, “a statement of the British case” was announced in the British Parliament, to be more precise in the House of Commons by Sir A. Chamberlain¹²⁷ and in the House of Lords by Lord Salisbury.¹²⁸

Commenting on it, Kellogg claimed in conversation with Henry G. Chilton (British chargé d'affaires in Washington) that “United States government would never agree to limitation in one class of cruiser and not in another and that if British delegates returned to Geneva with proposals for limitation of 10,000 ton cruisers and freedom of action with regard to smaller cruisers conference was doomed to failure”.¹²⁹

After he had returned to Geneva, on 28 July 1927 Bridgeman presented British proposal in a session attended by the British, American and Japanese delegates. The proposal provided for:

1. Reducing total tonnage of cruisers, destroyers and submarines to 590,000 tons for the British Empire and the United States, and to 385,000 tons for Japan (ratio 5 : 5 : 3.26).
2. Possibility for every Power of disposing additional 25% of the abovementioned tonnage “in vessels over age”.
3. Possibility of replacing vessels over age with new ones: in the case of 10,000-ton cruisers after 18 years, light cruisers and destroyers after 16 years, and submarines after 13 years.
4. Keeping the undermentioned vessels with a displacement exceeding 6,000 tons (as for the British fleet: 4 Hawkins-class cruisers, 1 York-class

Geneva to stand firm on the six inch gun in defensive cruiser. I have tried to find what happened at the Cabinet last night but apart from the fact that Jix [Sir William Joynson-Hicks] and Winston [Churchill] have got their way, which means I imagine reversing the decision of the Cabinet last Friday [22.07.1927] over which you presided” (M. Gilbert: *Winston S. Churchill*, vol. V: *Companion Part I...*, pp. 1037–1038, J.C.C. Davidson to S. Baldwin, 27.07.1927).

¹²⁷ *Naval Disarmament. Sir A. Chamberlain on British Policy*, “The Times” 28.07.1927; PDHC, 5th Series, vol. CCIX, cols. 1246–1249; Ernest Thurtle (Labour Party) commented on Chamberlain’s statement in the following way: “It is not the case that, if each Power represented at Geneva is going to insist upon the special conditions of its own national security, agreement is going to be utterly impossible, and, in these circumstances, had we not better bring the protracted farce at Geneva to an end at the earliest possible moment?” (ibidem, col. 250).

¹²⁸ *Parliamentary Debates. House of Lords. Official Report* [further: PDHL], 5th Series, vol. LXVIII, cols. 933–936; Ambassador Houghton immediately informed the Department of State that according to Chamberlain’s statement, the British government would not enter into agreement “involving the formal surrender by the British Empire of maritime equality” (FRUS 1927, vol. I, p. 136, A.B. Houghton to F.B. Kellogg, London 28.07.1927).

¹²⁹ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 471, p. 702, H.G. Chilton to Sir A. Chamberlain, Washington, 28.07.1927.

- cruiser and 2 Emerald-class cruisers; as for the American fleet: 10 Omaha-class cruisers; as for Japanese fleet: 4 Furutaka-class cruisers).
5. Dividing cruisers into two classes: a) heavy 10,000-ton cruisers, b) light cruisers with a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons carrying at most 6-inch guns.
 6. Reducing the number of heavy 10,000-ton cruisers – to 12 units in the British fleet, to 12 units in the American fleet and to 8 units in the Japanese fleet.
 7. Dividing destroyers into “flotilla leaders” (1,500–1,850 tons) and destroyers (do 1,500 tons), and placing limitations on calibre of guns carried by this class of ships (at most 5-inch guns).
 8. Reducing total tonnage of “flotilla leaders” to 16% of overhead tonnage in the class of destroyers.
 9. Dividing submarines into two classes (class A with a displacement between 1,000 and 1,800 tons, and class B with a displacement up to 600 tons) and placing limitations on calibre of guns carried by this class of ships (at most 5-inch guns).
 10. Determining total tonnage of submarines, namely 90,000 tons for the British Empire and the United States, and 60,000 tons for Japan (ratio 5 : 5 : 3.3), with the reservation that only 2/3 of the tonnage could be used for class A submarine construction.
 11. Retaining by every Power complete freedom in disposing of the tonnage defined in clause 1 and at the same time accepting restrictions included in clauses 6, 8 and 10.¹³⁰

Gibson, one of American delegates, made it clear that “he had no authority to sign any treaty restricting armament of new construction cruisers to a gun less than 8” calibre” and had to turn to Washington for instructions on the matter. The Japanese were also unwilling to accept this clause, although – according to their declarations – by 1936 they did not intend to have at their disposal more than eight heavy cruisers equipped with 8-inch guns. Nonetheless, Bridgeman got the impression that if the British and the Americans reached consensus over the issue, the Japanese party would do exactly the same. Hence, the United States had the final say. It was crystal clear to Bridgeman that “if their objection to the

¹³⁰ Bridgeman did not present British proposals on limiting the displacement and calibre of guns carried by capital ships and aircraft carriers since they would be discussed once the remaining issues had been settled (ibidem, no. 472, p. 702, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 28.07.1927; ibidem, no. 473, p. 703, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 28.07.1927).

6-inch gun is maintained, Conference must break. Only alternative I can see is an attempt compromise on gun between 6-inch and 7.5 inch which would eliminate argument with which Americans are obsessed about armed merchantmen".¹³¹

Cecil also expressed alarm over the situation in Geneva and referred to it as emergency. The only way to resolve deadlock he saw in a compromise solution, namely in entering into treaty valid only through 1931 "with permission for all parties to build 8 inch gun cruisers". He furthermore was inclined to believe that the British government should change their stance on the issue in order to prevent the conference from breaking down in which case Anglo-American relations would obviously deteriorate and the treaty on naval arms limitation would be nothing else but wishful thinking.¹³²

On 29 July 1927, in the Cabinet session chaired by Sir A. Chamberlain, the British ministers agreed that instructions for their delegates could change not a bit since "nothing has occurred to cause them to alter their previous decision". Hence, the Cabinet did not approve backing compromise solutions mentioned by Bridgeman and Cecil. It was then that Admiral Beatty stated that "the introduction of new type of gun [intermediate between 6-inch and 8-inch, such as 7-inch] would be highly inconvenient and involve increased tonnage and expense". He also argued that the fiasco of the Geneva conference would not result in naval arms race between the United States and the British Empire. The latter, having advantage in the class of cruisers, did not have to respond immediately to possible development of the American fleet and could implement the already established programme. Furthermore, Cecil's proposal (a scheme allowing cruisers to carry 8-inch guns, yet only by 1931) was also considered unacceptable. It was assumed

¹³¹ Ibidem, no. 474, pp. 704–705, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 29.07.1927; Bridgeman on the session: "Throughout this meeting we were struck with the manner in which the attitude of the American delegates had stiffened during our absence in London. We attributed this in part to the exacerbation caused, not unnaturally, by the prolonged interruption of the conference, and in part to effect produced by the ministerial declaration which was interpreted as a qualification of the line previously taken by His Majesty's Government in regard to question of parity" (*British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Confidential Print*, general eds. K. Bourne, D.C. Watt, Part II: *From the First to the Second World War*, Series J: *The League of Nations, 1918–1914*, ed. P.J. Beck, vol. 6: *The Question of Disarmament 1934–1938, and Naval Disarmament Discussions, 1924–1936*, Frederick Md. 1992 [further: BDFA, II, ser. J, vol. 6], Doc. 166, p. 304, W.C. Bridgeman to Sir A. Chamberlain, 6.08.1927).

¹³² DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 475, pp. 705–706, H. S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 29.07.1927.

that once limitation was imposed on the calibre of guns on carriers (the aforementioned 8 inches), it would be extremely difficult to change (reduce) it after 1931.¹³³

Therefore, Bridgeman was informed that if the Americans definitely rejected proposals put forward by the British on 28 July 1927, he was to demand the right to make a statement in a plenary session and refer to the aforementioned proposals, “including Capital Ships, in order to make widely known the large measure of limitation and economy at which they had aimed”. In case the Americans brought forward a counter-proposal, Bridgeman was to provide his commentary and send it to London for government’s consideration.¹³⁴

On 31 July 1927, Gibson reported to Bridgeman and Cecil that the US government did not regard the British proposals of 28 July 1927 as a basis for a possible consensus paying attention to the clause under which the calibre of guns on cruisers was to be reduced. Gibson pledged himself to provide a final answer after consultations with the President and the Secretary of the Navy. Hence, the third plenary session was to take place on 4 August 1927.¹³⁵

In a meeting summoned on 28 July 1927, the American delegation again discussed possible ways of breaking the deadlock over the issue of cruisers. One

¹³³ TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 46 (27), Conclusion 1, 29.07.1927. The then views held by the British ministers are referred to in private correspondence of Neville Chamberlain (Minister of Health): “We had a lot of Cabinet meetings over Geneva which looks now like breaking down. I trust that it will be apparent to the world that the reason for the failure is entirely due to the obstinate insistence by the Americans on conditions which would inevitably have led to increase & not decrease armaments. But they know how to work their own Press; they are entirely devoid of scruples and I doubt if they will allow our case ever to be squarely put in the U. S. A. where they have succeeded in stirring up a bitter anti-British feeling. It is difficult to keep one’s temper with them” (*The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters*, vol. 2, p. 418, Letter from N. Chamberlain to I. Chamberlain, 30.07.1927; See also: TNA, FO 800/261, p. 160, Letter from Jix [W. Joynton-Hicks] to Sir A. Chamberlain, 29.07.1927).

¹³⁴ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 477, pp. 706–707, Sir A. Chamberlain to H.S. London, FO 29.07.1927; *ibidem*, no. 478, pp. 707–708, Sir A. Chamberlain to H.S. London, Geneva 29.07.1927; Chamberlain provided Bridgeman with instructions on final speech: „Press message from United States seem to indicate clearly that State Department is now only considering how American attitude can be stated to greatest advantage and our own placed in most disadvantageous light at (...) plenary meeting. I venture therefore to express hope that you will not confine yourselves to re-stating and justifying British proposals but will also bring out clearly the fact that American proposals as to size of cruisers and guns contradict Gibson’s principles and increase instead of diminishing both cost and aggressive character of navies” (*ibidem*, no. 481, pp. 709–710, Sir A. Chamberlain to H.S. London, FO 30.07.1927).

¹³⁵ *Ibidem*, no. 484, p. 711, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 31.07.1927; Cf. FRUS 1927, vol. I, pp. 142–145, H. Gibson to F.B. Kellogg, Geneva 31.07.1927; William R. Castle Jr., the Assistant Secretary of State, in his conversation with Henry G. Chilton claimed that the then latest British proposals “were not acceptable to the United States Government while the Secretary of State told the press that they were even worse than the original ones” (DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 476, p. 706, H.G. Chilton to Sir A. Chamberlain, Washington, 29.07.1927).

of their proposals was to add a political clause to the treaty in order that it could be revised or abrogated by a signatory if he found out that its terms were breached by any party through launching naval development programme.¹³⁶ The British delegates objected to inserting such a clause and claimed that by doing so the American delegation attempted to make them approve the treaty on American terms (reducing total tonnage of cruisers within one class and open option for installing 8-inch guns on all cruisers).¹³⁷ Bridgeman, however, took another possibility into account, namely of presenting an alternative clause to be added in the treaty on British terms. To be more specific, based on proposals submitted to the Americans on 28 July 1927, a new clause was to provide for limitations on the number of cruisers carrying 8-inch guns, namely up to 12 units in the British fleet and the American fleet, and up to 8 units in the Japanese fleet.¹³⁸

On 2 August 1927, the Japanese delegation took their last attempt to “save” the Geneva conference and put forward a proposal to the other two delegations to conclude the treaty in effect by 31 December 1931 and impose limitations on the tonnage of auxiliary ships according to the following provisions:

- the British Empire and Japan shall be pledged to implement only the approved programmes for auxiliary ship construction,
- number of 10,000-ton cruisers shall not exceed 12 units in the British fleet and the American fleet and 8 units in the Japanese fleet,
- displacement of light cruisers shall not exceed 8,000 tons,
- the United States shall declare they would not develop their naval power beyond that of the British Empire,
- next conference shall be convened no later than at the very beginning of 1931 to address issues unsettled in 1927.¹³⁹

Bridgeman informed the Cabinet about Japanese proposals and provided his commentary: “if Americans accept it we feel that Japanese in view of their desire to avoid breakdown would be seriously hurt at our refusal”. He also claimed that

¹³⁶ According to the British delegates, the clause was proposed by Allen W. Dulles, legal adviser of the American delegation at the Geneva conference. Hence, in British sources it is referred to as “Dulles Clause”. See the content of the clause: *ibidem*, no. 487, p. 713, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 1.08.1927.

¹³⁷ *Ibidem*, no. 486, p. 713, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 1.08.1927.

¹³⁸ *Ibidem*, no. 488, p. 714, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 2.08.1927; See the content of British alternative to “Dulles Clause”: *ibidem*, no. 489, pp. 714–715, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 2.08.1927.

¹³⁹ Substance of the Japanese proposal: *ibidem*, no. 493, pp. 717–718, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 2.08.1927.

should the British government accept the proposal brought forward by the Japanese, the latter were willing to back the British suggestions as to placing limitations on the displacement and calibre of guns carried by battle ships.¹⁴⁰

On 3 August 1927, in the Cabinet meeting chaired by Sir A. Chamberlain, it was agreed unanimously that the American proposal for adding political clause “was altogether unacceptable”. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles E. Madden, The First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff (successor of Admiral Beatty),¹⁴¹ stated that also an alternative version of political clause proposed by Bridgeman “would be open to the objection that, if at any point the United States decided to call a new Conference and to embark on a programme 8,000-ton 8” Cruisers, any British 6” gun Cruisers built in the interval would become obsolete, so that the money spent on them would have been to a great extent wasted”.

Giving attention to Japanese proposal, the Cabinet was willing to accept it, yet on condition that certain amendments were introduced in order to make it compatible with British interests since the ministers “were deeply impressed with necessity of keeping in with Japan if possible, and all the more if agreement with America turns out to be impossible”.¹⁴² Bridgeman was informed that the Cabinet would present its final stance on the matter in a meeting on 4 August. If the Americans accepted the Japanese proposal as a basis for further discussion, Bridgeman was to make sure that plenary session of the conference, originally to take place on 4 August, would be postponed. On the other hand, should the Americans reject the Japanese offer and put forward no counter-proposal, Bridgeman was to suggest reaching consensus at least over issues already agreed upon in Geneva (namely 10,000-ton cruisers, destroyers and submarines) and over imposing limitations on the displacement and calibre of guns carried by capital ships.¹⁴³

In the evening on 3 August 1927, in an informal meeting attended by British, American and Japanese delegates, the US party made it clear they would not take Japanese proposal into account without making an additional reservation

¹⁴⁰ Ibidem, no. 492, pp. 716–717, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 2.08.1927; BDFA, II, ser. J, vol. 6, Doc. 166, p. 306, W.C. Bridgeman to Sir A. Chamberlain, 6.08.1927.

¹⁴¹ For more information about Admiral Madden, see: N. Tracy: *Admiral Sir Charles E. Madden (1927–1930)*..., pp. 141–149.

¹⁴² D. Carlton: *Great Britain and the Coolidge Naval Disarmament Conference...*, p. 593.

¹⁴³ TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 47 (27), Conclusion 1, 3.08.1927; ibidem, Appendix III, Draft telegram to Geneva, for consideration at a Meeting of the Cabinet to be held on Thursday, August 4, 1927, at 12 Noon; DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 497, pp. 722–723, Sir A. Chamberlain to H.S. London, 3.08.1927; See also: R.S. Grayson: *Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe. British Foreign Policy, 1924–1929*, London 1997, p. 156.

about imposing limitations on overhead tonnage of British cruisers, namely not exceeding 400,000 tons. Needless to say, the British considered this unacceptable and hence the Americans refused to continue discussion on the proposal. The only issue left for consideration was how the conference should be closed. Gibson proposed that in the last plenary session “an agreed statement of progress made and difficulties encountered” should be read out and the conference should be postponed “in order that the whole question should be further discussed between governments”. Under pressure from Bridgeman, Gibson eventually concurred that every delegation should have a chance to present their viewpoints, yet without further discussion. “It was agreed that meeting should close in friendly atmosphere”.¹⁴⁴

In the afternoon on 4 August 1927, the Cabinet summoned a meeting, again chaired by Sir A. Chamberlain, to debate possible approval for the amended Japanese proposal.¹⁴⁵ However, just before the session opened, the British government received information from Geneva that the American delegation voted against the Japanese proposal because the British delegation did not accept the US provision under which total tonnage in the class of cruisers was to be reduced to 400,000 tons. Had things taken such a turn, further discussion on the amended Japanese proposal seemed pointless, yet the Cabinet members agreed that “the Admiralty’s views on the Japanese proposal as amended at the meeting on the previous day ought to be placed on record”¹⁴⁶. It was Admiral Madden who read out in the Cabinet meeting a telegram received early in the morning from Rear Admiral Pound who had joined the British delegation to substitute for indisposed Admiral Frederick L. Field. Pound reported: “One of two things must now result. A. Inclusion in treaty of points tentatively agreed upon by Technical Committee. B. No treaty. It is most unlikely America will agree to A.”. Hence, the conference

¹⁴⁴ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 499, pp. 725–726, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva 4.08.1927.

¹⁴⁵ TNA, CAB 24/188, C. P. 219 (27), Note by M. Hankey “Reduction and Limitation of Naval Armaments. The Geneva Conference” 3.08.1927.

¹⁴⁶ The Admiralty objected to the Japanese proposal in its amended (by the Cabinet) version since it would make Great Britain abandon her plans to build cruisers equipped with 6-inch guns. By doing so, the British Empire would be left behind after 1931 when other countries started to build cruisers carrying 8-inch guns. Furthermore, the Admiralty stressed that the USA insisted that overhead tonnage for cruisers should not exceed 400,000 tons. If the British Empire accepted such a formula, she could have only 47 cruisers (12 cruisers of 10,000 tons + 35 cruisers of 8,000 tons) and not 70 cruisers at her disposal (TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 48 (27), Appendix I, Memorandum by First Sea Lord presented to Cabinet 4th August 1927 “Analysis of the Japanese Proposals. Geneva Conference”).

outcome had been foregone and the Cabinet concluded “that no further instructions should be sent to the British Delegation at Geneva”.¹⁴⁷

As expected by Rear Admiral Pound, during a morning meeting on 4 August 1927, the American delegates refused to sign the treaty providing only for 10,000-ton cruisers, destroyers and submarines “without question of cruiser tonnage having been settled”. Bridgeman reported: “Japanese while not raising any objection to British proposals saw no advantage in pursuing question in view of opposition of American delegation”.¹⁴⁸

In the afternoon on 4 August 1927, the last (third) plenary session of the conference took place and Bridgeman, Saito and Gibson took the floor. It was Gibson who read out a joint declaration at the end of the session and the conference was eventually postponed.¹⁴⁹

Subsequently, on 30 July 1927, the Foreign Office sent British diplomats in Washington, Tokyo, Paris and Rome instructions in case of the conference breakdown. According to the guidelines, the British stance was to be presented in a positive light. The British ambassadors were to express “great disappointment of His Majesty’s Governments that they have been unable to achieve reduction in expenditure on naval armaments which they so ardently desire and which their own proposals entailed, owing to rigid adherence of United States to proposals whilst giving Great Britain and the United States an equal tonnage of cruisers would leave us without a sufficient number of them to protect our sea communications,

¹⁴⁷ TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 48 (27), Conclusion 1, 4.08.1927; N. Chamberlain referred to the atmosphere during the Cabinet meetings on 3 and 4 August 1927 in his private correspondence: “When I got to the F.O. [Foreign Office] I learned that the Americans had bust the Conference and we might have spared ourselves all the discussion and all the friction of the day before. For the proceedings had been stormy and Winston [Churchill] had been in the worst possible mood: childish petulant, truculent, impatient & offensive. When he is like that “team work” becomes – well – very difficult. And all for nothing!” (*The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters*, vol. 2, p. 419, Letter from N. Chamberlain to I. Chamberlain, 5.08.1927).

¹⁴⁸ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 500, pp. 726–727, H.S. London to Sir A. Chamberlain, Geneva, 4.08.1927.

¹⁴⁹ For more information see: RCLNA, pp. 35–46; Cmd. 2964 (1927), pp. 12–21; *Failure at Geneva. The Conference “Adjourned”. Suggested Earlier Resumption. Final Survey*, “The Times” 5.08.1927; *The Conference at Geneva. Mr. Bridgeman’s Speech*, “The Times” 5.08.1927; *The Conference “Adjourns”*, “The Times” 5.08.1927; *Geneva. Causes of the Failure. Lack of Proper Preparation. The Political Factor*, “The Times” 6.08.1927; Commenting on the last plenary session held in Geneva, Bridgeman reported to Chamberlain: “You will have observed that, while Mr. Gibson expressed such anxiety lest individual statements should lead to some embitterment of relations, his own speech was the only one of a tendentious nature, containing, as it did, more than one misrepresentation of fact” (BDFa, II, ser. J, vol. 6, Doc. 166, p. 307, W.C. Bridgeman to Sir A. Chamberlain, 6.08.1927; See also: S. Roskill: *Naval Policy...*, vol. I, p. 513).

and by their insistence on building a large number of cruisers with eight inch guns entailing a great increase in armament and cost instead of the reduction in both which we were seeking. Anyone who regards the situation dispassionately and impartially will agree that it would be impossible for His Majesty's Government to agree by treaty to fall below the One Power standard".¹⁵⁰

The attitude of the British establishment toward the Coolidge conference fiasco is revealed in private correspondence carried on between British military, politicians and diplomats. Admiral Beatty in his letter to Bridgeman admitted openly: "I am glad to know that the Conference has come to an end without the Americans having achieved what they undoubtedly set out do: i.e. to achieve command of the sea at no cost. Every nation in the history of the world has only obtained Sea Power as the result of great achievements and the price of many lives and much money. The D --- D Yanks thought they could get it for nothing!! I wish the true story of their ridiculous attitude under the guise of economy and disarmament could be made plain to the World. It would flatten the Big Navy party in the United States for all time. I thank Le Bon Dieu that you were head of our delegates. No one else would have had the patience and clear headedness to have weathered the storm".¹⁵¹

The First Lord of the Admiralty shared Admiral's Beatty view. In his letter to Sir A. Chamberlain on 7 August 1927 he wrote: "It was quite clear when we went back that the American attitude had hardened, but I don't think they ever meant from the beginning to agree to anything which they could not represent at home as having twisted the Lion's tail (...) But I really don't think much, if any, harm has been done. We have not given anything away, and the Americans have been shown to have no reason but conceit for building so many large new

¹⁵⁰ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 482, p. 710, Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard, FO 30.07.1927; G.C. Kennedy: *Britain's Policy-Making Elite, The Naval Disarmament Puzzle and Public Opinion, 1927-1932*, "Albion" 1994, vol. XXVI, no. 4, p. 632. The ambassadors received a detailed memorandum on the Geneva conference prepared by News Department Foreign Office: *British Documents on Foreign Affairs. Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, general eds. K. Bourne & D.C. Watt, Part II: *From the First to the Second World War, Series C: North America, 1919-1939*, ed. D.K. Adams, vol. 18: *Arbitration, Arms Control and Pact of Paris, 1927-1929*, Frederick Md. 1995 [further: BDFP, II, ser. C, vol. 18], Doc. 10, pp. 9-11, "A Memorandum regarding the Attitude adopted by the British Delegation at the Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments in Geneva, from June 20 to August 4, 1927" by A. Yencken, FO 17.08.1927.

¹⁵¹ *The Beatty Papers. Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence and Papers of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty*, vol. II: *1916-1927*, ed. B.M. Ranft, Aldershot 1993, p. 355, Letter from Earl Beatty to W.C. Bridgeman, London 6.08.1927.

cruisers (...) I don't think it will lead to any competitive building, and I should not be surprised if there was some reaction in America against the Big Navyites and the Steel Trust's machinations". The leader of the American delegation, H. Gibson, was called "a mean and untruthful twister" by Bridgeman who believed that the American correspondents "got orders from Gibson the first day to discredit and misrepresent our proposals". Referring to a growing number of critical remarks about inadequate preparation for the conference, Bridgeman to some extent agreed with the critics: "No doubt we shall be blamed for not having prepared the ground more fully for the Conference. But I am sure if we had broached our scheme earlier the American press would have been just as bad or worse, and probably the Conference would never have been held and the opportunity would have been missed of exposing the impostures of the American designs and of improving our relations with the Japs". Bridgeman mentioned two positives of the conference, namely close cooperation with the representatives of Dominions and "good relationship" with Japanese delegation.¹⁵²

In his letter to ambassador Howard in Washington, on 10 August 1927 Sir A. Chamberlain admitted that the conference in Geneva was the most problematic issue he had so far dealt with in his career.¹⁵³ "I have been more worried about the Geneva than about anything which occurred since I took my present Office. No doubt a great mistake was made in entering upon such a Conference without a preliminary exchange of ideas, and for this I must take a share of blame. I confess that I did not foresee in any way the rigidity of the American attitude and I was afraid that any enquiry as to the views of the State Department might be regarded as unsympathetic and as dictated by a desire to find a means of declining the President's invitation. I must add that our own Admiralty were as reluctant to

¹⁵² TNA, FO 800/261, pp. 184–186, Letter from W.C. Bridgeman to Sir A. Chamberlain, 7.08.1927; See also: *The Modernisation of Conservative Politics...*, p. 210, letter from W.C. Bridgeman to M.R. Bridgeman, 10.08.1927.

¹⁵³ Sir A. Chamberlain was acting Prime Minister during Baldwin's stay in Canada. At a decisive moment, on 3 August 1927 three ministers, namely Churchill, Joynson-Hicks and Birkenhead, threatened to resign if Great Britain changed its stance on 6-inch guns, and Cecil – if the British stance did not change (R.S. Grayson: *Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe...*, p. 156); Chamberlain wrote in a letter to his sister: „Well, I have a hectic time. The P.M. [Prime Minister] may find the Cabinet still complete when he returns or he may find it minus the Chancellor of the Duchy – at present I cannot tell which – but at one moment last week I had four resignations threatened, three of them actually in my hands. I told the P. M. [Prime Minister] it was not safe for him to leave until the Geneva Conference was over, & he will never go so far afield again I can prevent him" (*The Austen Chamberlain Diary Letters. The Correspondence of Sir Austen Chamberlain with His Sisters Hilda and Ida, 1916–1937*, ed. R.C. Self, London 1995, p. 317, Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain to I. Chamberlain, 7.08.1927).

disclose their plan in advance as were the Americans themselves, but the result has been a great misfortune since the difference in opinion in regard to cruisers is now no longer a difference between Governments only but has become something of a battle-cry among the public in each country”.

According to Chamberlain, the American stance at the Geneva conference was “wholly unreasonable in itself and contrary to the principles laid down by Gibson in his opening speech at the Conference. The Americans have never contended that they needed the same cruiser tonnage as does the British Empire, and indeed from the first to the last their Delegation at Geneva declined to make any statement and explanation of their needs such as our Delegates gave freely. Their claim was purely and simply that, whatever tonnage we had, they must have also. In other words, they were not thinking of limiting armaments to what was required for national security, but making a claim to build for prestige. Having no need for the small cruiser to police the trade routes, they proposed to use the tonnage which they claimed to build large cruisers with large guns such as are the concomitants of fleets. The effect was and is that they not only render our older ships obsolete, but they oblige other Powers – ourselves – to build in future nothing but larger cruiser armed with 8”guns. As numbers are essential part of our need, this in itself increases our tonnage demand by the excess tonnage involved in each ship constructed over that which would have been required had they seen their way to adopt our proposal to limit the use of the 8” gun”.

Furthermore, in his letter to Howard, Chamberlain agreed with Bridgeman about the leader of American delegation. According to Chamberlain, Gibson was “to small a man to handle so big a Conference” and did not have “much influence with the American naval delegates”. Furthermore, he expressed serious doubts over reports sent by Gibson to the Department of State and wondered if they “gave full or even a fair picture of the British case and attitude”.

However, it was Chamberlain who was inclined to believe that the tone of statements made by the representatives of the US government after the Geneva conference¹⁵⁴ gave hope that the fiasco would not have a negative effect on Anglo-American relations in the future.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ See: *Statement by Mr. Kellogg. Failure Not Final*, “The Times” 5.08.1927; *Feeling in the U.S.A. Mr. Coolidge’s View. No Armament Race*, “The Times” 6.08.1927; *Gen. Dawes on Naval Disarmament. Competitive Building “Unthinkable”*, “The Times” 9.08.1927.

¹⁵⁵ DBFP, ser. IA, vol. III, no. 503, pp. 729–731, Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir E. Howard, 10.08.1927.

The British government and diplomats hoped that the unsatisfactory outcome of the conference would not have significant repercussions for the aforementioned relations and would not become a subject of a public debate in Great Britain. These expectations were shattered by Lord Cecil's resignation on 9 August 1927 (made public on 30 August).¹⁵⁶ The American press and administration were given an additional argument supporting a hypothesis that the responsibility for the Geneva fiasco rested with the British government. In a memorandum of 17 November 1927, the Foreign Office noted that: "The failure at Geneva has certainly done nothing to improve Anglo-American relations; on the contrary, it has strengthen enormously those elements in the Unites States who are unfriendly to Great Britain, and whose object is to 'show the world' conclusively that, while the 19th century may have belonged to Britain, the 20th century undoubtedly belongs to the United States".¹⁵⁷ During a debate in the House of Lords on 16 November 1927, Lord Cecil revealed a behind-the-scenes discussion held by the British government once the delegates had arrived in London, and claimed that Churchill had beyond any doubt contributed to the conference breakdown. It was Lord Balfour who polemicized on the issue with Cecil.¹⁵⁸ In the House of Commons on 24 November 1927, the Labour Party proposed a motion of no confidence in the government and voiced their criticism over, among other things "the lack preparation by the Government and the military character of the British delegation which seriously contributed to the failure of the recent naval conference at Gene-

¹⁵⁶ For more information see: BL, Cecil Papers, Add. MSS 51080, pp. 209–217, Letter from Lord Cecil to S. Baldwin, 9.08.1927; *Lord Cecil and the Cabinet. A Wish to Resign. Freedom to Work for Disarmament*, "The Times" 29.08.1927; *Lord Cecil Resigns. A Letter to Mr. Baldwin. Differences on Disarmament. Prime Minister Reply*, "The Times" 30.08.1927; *The Cabinet, The League, and Lord Cecil*, "The Times" 30.08.1927; R. Cecil: *A Great Experiment. An Autobiography*, New York 1941, pp. 185–189, 358–366; idem: *All the Way*, London 1949, pp. 190–191; Th. Jones: *Whitehall Diary*, vol. II, pp. 109–110; D. Carlton: *Great Britain and the Coolidge Naval Disarmament Conference...*, p. 594; D. Dutton: *Austen Chamberlain: Gentleman in Politics*, Bolton 1985, p. 277; B.J.C. McKercher: *The Second Baldwin Government...*, pp. 77–79; T. Kuramatsu: *Viscount Cecil, Winston Churchill and the Geneva Naval Conference...*, pp. 118–119; K. Middlemas, J. Barnes: *Baldwin...*, pp. 371–372; S. Roskill: *Hankey...*, vol. II, pp. 441–444; G. Johnson: *Lord Robert Cecil...*, pp. 189–193.

¹⁵⁷ TNA, CAB 24/188, C. P. 244 (27), "Memorandum respecting the effect on public opinion in the United States of Lord Cecil's Resignation from the Government" FO, 11.10.1927; TNA, CAB 24/189, C. P. 292 (27), "Memorandum respecting the future of Anglo-American relations" FO, 17.11.1927; B.J.C. McKercher: *The Second Baldwin Government...*, pp. 77–80.

¹⁵⁸ PDHL, 5th Series, vol. LXIX, cols. 88–100; *U.S. Naval Policy. Effect of British Announcement. Washington and Lord Cecil*, "The Times" 17.11.1927; *Cruisers and Lord Cecil*, "The Times" 18.11.1927; BDF, II, ser. C, vol. 18, Doc. 24, pp. 26–28, Sir E. Howard to Sir A. Chamberlain, Washington 24.11.1927.

va". The government, represented by Sir A. Chamberlain and Bridgeman, entered a dispute over theses advanced by the opposition, and the motion was eventually rejected by the Conservative Party that constituted the overwhelming majority in the House of Commons.¹⁵⁹

Under pressure from Churchill and against Admiralty's stance, on 11 November 1927 the British government decided to build only one out of three cruisers projected in the programme for a fiscal year 1927–1928 (see Table 4).¹⁶⁰

Table 4. British Cruiser Programme for 1925–1930

	1925–1926	1926–1927	1927–1928	1928–1929	1929–1930
Cruisers Class "A" *	4	2	1	1	1
Cruisers Class "B" **	–	1	2	2	2

* Class A = 10,000 tons carrying eight 8-inch guns; ** Class B = 7,500 tons carrying six 6-inch guns.

Source: Command Paper 2476 (1925), *Navy. Programme of New Construction*, London 1925, p. 2.

On 16 November 1927, Bridgeman reported to the House of Commons that the British government "has decided that, in the light of the situation disclosed at recent Geneva Naval Conference, it is not necessary or desirable to proceed with laying of the other two ships this year"¹⁶¹. In the US, this was considered an attempt to counter criticism against the British government voiced by Lord Cecil.

¹⁵⁹ TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 57 (27), Conclusion 3, 23.11.1927; PDHC, 5th Series, vol. CCX, cols. 2071–2206; *Parliament and Politics...*, p. 134; B.J.C. McKercher: *The Second Baldwin Government...*, pp. 88–91, See also: R.W. Westphal Jr.: *Naval Defence Policy & the House of Commons: A Study of Parliamentary Commentary Over Naval Issues, 1919–1929*, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Exeter, 2005, pp. 274–275.

¹⁶⁰ TNA, CAB 23/55, Cabinet 55 (27), Conclusion 3, 11.11.1927; For more information see: M. Gilbert: *Winston S. Churchill*, vol. 5: *1922–1939*, London 1976, pp. 247–252; D. MacGregor: *Former Naval Cheapskate: Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy, 1924–1929*, "Armed Forces & Society" 1993, vol. XIX, no. 3, pp. 321–322, 326–330; B.J.C. McKercher: *The Politics of Naval Arms Limitation in Britain in the 1920's*, "Diplomacy & Statecraft" 1993, vol. IV, no. 3, s. 45–46; Ch.M. Bell: *Winston Churchill, Pacific Security, and the Limits of British Power, 1921–1941*, in: *Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas Before the World Wars. Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel*, ed. J.H. Maurer, London 2003, pp. 60–61; idem: *Churchill and Sea Power*, Oxford 2013, pp. 120–122.

¹⁶¹ PDHC, 5th Series, vol. CCX, col. 1013; *Cruiser Construction To Be Delayed*, "The Times" 17.11.1927; *Cruiser Construction. Only One To Be Laid Down This Financial Year*, "The Times" 17.11.1927; See for more: R.W. Westphal Jr.: *Politics or Posturing: A Legislative Debate on Naval Expenditures 1925–9*, "Mariner's Mirror" 2004, vol. XC, no. 2, pp. 202–216.

On the other hand, the “Big Navy” regarded this a “bluff” and an effort to foil their plans for developing the US fleet.¹⁶²

At the same time, the Americans did their best to prove they could achieve parity with Great Britain, if not within the proposed scheme for arms limitations, then probably through developing the US Navy. On 14 December 1927, Thomas S. Butler, Chairman of the Naval Committee of the United States House of Representatives, presented a programme aimed at increasing the US fleet by 71 warships in the following 9 years, in which: 25 10,000-ton cruisers, 9 destroyer leaders, 32 submarines and 5 aircraft carriers. The programme cost was estimated at \$740,000,000.¹⁶³

To sum up, it should be stated that with their scheme for naval arms limitation the British wanted to surprise the other delegations participating in the Geneva conference. Their main objective, aimed at building up some savings while complying with their “defence requirements”, ended in failure. American and Japanese delegations refused to enter into discussion on imposing limitations on the displacement and calibre of guns carried by capital ships unless other issues were settled. Furthermore, the US party opposed the British proposal for adding to the treaty a clause under which cruisers would be divided into two classes, namely heavy (with a displacement of 10,000 tons and equipped with 8-inch guns) and light (with a displacement of 7,500 tons and equipped with 6-inch guns), and under which clause only the former would be reduced in number. Since they had not developed as impressive network of naval stations as the British, the Americans preferred heavy cruisers since they carried 8-inch guns and could operate within broader scope than light ones.

Nevertheless, the main reason behind British-American dispute over the issue was a disparity between two doctrines, namely the British “maritime belligerent rights” and the American “freedom of the seas”. Great Britain did her best

¹⁶² *U.S. Naval Policy. Effect of British Announcement. Washington and Lord Cecil*, “The Times” 17.11.1927; *Big Navy Talk. Propaganda in America. The Saner View. Need for Calm Judgment*, “The Times” 22.11.1927.

¹⁶³ T.G. Davis: *A Navy Second to None. The Development of Modern American Naval Policy*, reprint edition, Westport Conn. 1971, p. 326. Sir A. Chamberlain referred to this fact in a letter to his sister: “But what do you say to Prest. [President] Coolidge & his 25 “light” cruisers of 10,000 tons each? What a difficult people they are to live it! It is a really heartbreaking task to improve our relations. We are told that the settlement of the Irish question & the payment of the debt had produced such a greatly improved feeling & now it seems to be as good business as ever to twist the lion’s tail. Ah me! Ah me!” (*The Austen Chamberlain Diary Letters...*, p. 321, Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain to H. Chamberlain, 17.12.1927).

to increase the number of light cruisers at her disposal to monitor sea routes in times of peace and, should the war erupted, to blockade sea trade between her opponents and neutral states. The Americans, on the contrary, preferred heavy cruisers to, as a neutral party, be able to get through the British naval blockade in case of war.¹⁶⁴

After the conference in Geneva had been closed, on the Foreign Office's initiative the British government set up a special committee that was to discuss possible amendments to the British doctrine in order to encourage the United States to waive their claim to parity with Great Britain in the class of cruisers.¹⁶⁵

Before the Geneva conference, the British government assumed that parity between the Royal Navy and the US Navy would be accepted only in regard to heavy cruisers, whilst the number of British light cruisers would be by no means reduced under the treaty. Needless to say, the American claim to parity in all classes of ships left this assumption up in the air. At the end of June 1927, the British party (i.e. the delegates in Geneva and the government in London) attempted to solve the problem by accepting parity with the reservation that the British Empire had to have a specific number of cruisers at her disposal, required for security reasons.¹⁶⁶ The American party did not, however, support the British doctrine referred to as "absolute needs" and demanded "mathematical parity" at a level too low (400,000 tons) from the British viewpoint. Concern voiced by the British government over possible consent from the British delegation to consensus incompatible with the British policy were dispelled when the delegates arrived in London to take part in the consultations.

From that moment on, the outcome of the Geneva conference was foregone. The majority of the Cabinet members advocated the British naval supremacy and

¹⁶⁴ Bridgeman on the Geneva conference in his diary: "They [Americans] never consented to tell us why they wanted so many heavily armed cruisers, but occasionally threw out hints about dealing with our armed merchantmen, which they did not believe in as argument & never used much in plenary meetings. The real object which they came was to try to get 'parity' cheap by forcing us to give up the numbers we require for security, and also to prevent us from intercepting contraband in wartime. They hoped to get a good election cry for Coolidge by saying they had only made a further peace move, but also twisted the British Lion's tail by making him reduce his cruiser strength" (*The Modernisation of Conservative Politics...*, p. 207).

¹⁶⁵ B.J.C. McKercher: *The Second Baldwin Government...*, pp. 69, 92–103; idem: *Belligerent Rights in 1927–1929. Foreign Policy versus Naval Policy in the Second Baldwin Government*, "Historical Journal" 1986, vol. XXIX, no. 4, s. 963–974; idem: *Wealth, Power, and the New International Order...*, pp. 437–438; A. Harasimowicz: *Dyplomacja brytyjska...* [British Diplomacy...], pp. 74–78; Cf. T. Kuramatsu: *The Geneva Naval Conference...*, p. 116.

¹⁶⁶ See: TNA, CAB 63/39, M. O. (27) 6, Memorandum by Sir M. Hankey "Cruisers. The Question of Parity with the United States of America", 21.07.1927.

hence undermined possible negative consequences following from the conference breakdown. Those in favour of consensus and compromise were obviously in the minority. At the same time, it is worth stressing that there were virtually no grounds for reaching consensus. The British government did, however, their best to avoid being accused of contributing to the conference fiasco.¹⁶⁷ Hence, after consultations with the British delegates, at the end of July 1927 the Cabinet submitted proposals that not only protected the British interests, but could also be accepted by the Japanese, which would make the Americans the only party unwilling to arrive at consensus.¹⁶⁸

As for the British ministers who objected to parity with the United States, crucial role was played by Churchill, though not all historians pay attention to this fact.¹⁶⁹ In a memorandum of 20 July 1927, prepared after Bridgeman and Cecil had returned to London to take part in consultations, Churchill presented a complete picture of his views. At the same time, he opposed to:

- accepting Admiralty’s claim about a minimum necessary for the security of the British Empire (namely 70 cruisers),
- entering into disarmament agreement since it posed a major threat to “the Foundations of British Sea Power”,
- recognizing “absolute parity by treaty with the United States”.

¹⁶⁷ As far as historians are concerned, opinions vary as to which party was to the greatest extent responsible for the “Coolidge Conference” breakdown: “a large measure of responsibility for the failure, must rest on British shoulder, and in particular the shoulders of Churchill and Beatty” (D. Richardson: *The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy...*, pp. 138–139), “The blame for conference’s collapse rest almost entirely with the British government” (Ph.P. O’Brien: *British and American Naval Power...*, p. 194), “Although blame for failure can be apportioned to each of the three powers, the United States deserves the lion’s share” (B.J.C. McKercher: *A Certain Irritation’...*, pp. 847–850).

¹⁶⁸ Similar views were held by the Americans. President Coolidge, on holiday while the conference was being held, on 25 July 1927 informed Kellogg he was against modifying the American proposals – “if others are unwilling to accept it, we can very well be content with having made a fair proposal and leave others with the responsibility for its rejection” (G.F. Goodfellow, Calvin Coolidge: A Study of Presidential Inaction, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, 1969, p. 352).

¹⁶⁹ Ph. Towle: *Winston Churchill and British Disarmament Policy*, “Journal of Strategic Studies” 1979, vol. II, no. 3, pp. 336–338, describing Churchill’s negative attitude toward general disarmament in the 1920’s, he did not make any reference to the Geneva conference (1927). S. Roskill: *Naval Policy...*, vol. I, analyzing the conference, he ignored Churchill’s role, and M. Gilbert, Churchill’s official biographer, did not write a word about Geneva. M. Gilbert: *Winston S. Churchill*, vol. 5: *1922–1939...*; However, in a supplement to Churchill’s biography, M. Gilbert disclosed important documents to illustrate Churchill’s attitude toward the conference and parity (idem: *Winston S. Churchill*, vol. V: *Companion Part I...*).

Churchill called for taking a strong line in Geneva to take account of the British interests, regardless of the US response and likely breakdown of the conference. “After all, who called the Conference? Who called it for political motives? Who is most interested in producing something that can be hawked about the American platforms in 1928 as an English submission to American parity, i.e., supremacy? That is surely not our affair [...] The only chance of a good Naval Agreement is that the United States shall accept our considered and sober view. If they want an agreement, let them pay the price for it in fair accommodation. They risk nothing, we risk everything. They are trying to buy the sovereignty of the seas by mere money power, and this has never been done in history of the world. They do not even expect to have to cash the cheque”.¹⁷⁰

The literature on the subject offers two contrary opinions as to Churchill’s stance. According to B.J.C. McKercher, Churchill pursued two conflicting policies simultaneously – on the one hand he was conflicted with the Admiralty and strove to hold down the rate of the British Navy development, and on the other hand he was for the British supremacy at sea. The aforementioned historian is inclined to believe that Churchill was “nothing more than a political opportunist whose every move was designed to bring him closer to the premiership”.¹⁷¹ Contrary view is expressed by T. Kuramatsu according to whom Churchill’s stance was not paradoxical but rather a combination of two priorities, namely a “strategic and economic one”.¹⁷²

Churchill was wrong to assume that the US government would remain passive after the unfortunate outcome of the conference and that, having in mind the American public opinion, would not decide to back the programme aimed at developing the US fleet.

¹⁷⁰ M. Gilbert: *Winston S. Churchill*, vol. V: *Companion Part I...*, pp. 1030–1035, Memorandum by Sir W.S. Churchill “Cruisers and Parity” 20.07.1927. Memorandum, subtitled “Cabinet Memorandum”, was not probably “circulated” officially since it does not appear in the archive records in TNA, CAB 24. Churchill presumably handed it over to the other ministers non-officially. This is confirmed by the memorandum submitted by Lord Birkenhead on 21 July 1927 (see footnote 111). See also: BL, Cecil Papers, Add. MSS 51073, pp. 132–133, Letter from Lord Cecil to W.S. Churchill, 26.07.1927.

¹⁷¹ B.J.C. McKercher: *The Second Baldwin Government...*, pp. 11; idem: *The Politics of Naval Arms Limitation...*, pp. 45–46; idem: *Churchill, the European Balance of Power, and the USA*, in: *Winston Churchill...*, pp. 53–55.

¹⁷² T. Kuramatsu: *Viscount Cecil, Winston Churchill and the Geneva Naval Conference...*, p. 115; see also: P.P. O’Brien: *Churchill and US Navy...*, pp. 32–38; idem: *British and American Naval Power...*, pp. 188–194; Ch.M. Bell: *Churchill and Sea Power...*, pp. 113–119.

Lord Cecil was the only minister who insisted on concluding the treaty on American terms.¹⁷³ Nevertheless, he mistakenly believed that concession from the British Empire on the calibre of guns carried by cruisers would allow to reach consensus with the Americans. At the Geneva conference there were no grounds for the British-American agreement on reducing the global tonnage in the class of cruisers. Therefore, his dismissal was hard to understand for other ministers. Nevertheless, it should be stated that Cecil predicted with accuracy the consequences following from the conference fiasco. Revealed at the “Coolidge Conference”, divergences between the British and the Americans over naval arms limitation scheme contributed to the deadlock in the disarmament negotiations conducted under the auspices of the League of Nations in PCDC.

BRYTYJSKI RZĄD WOBEC MORSKIEJ KONFERENCJI ROZBROJENIOWEJ W GENEWIE (1927)

Streszczenie

Morska konferencja rozbrojeniowa w Genewie (20 czerwca – 4 sierpnia 1927 r.) została zwołana z inicjatywy amerykańskiego prezydenta Calvina Coolidge’a i miała stanowić kontynuację procesu zapoczątkowanego na Konferencji Waszyngtońskiej (12 listopada 1921 r. – 6 lutego 1922 r.). Na konferencji w Waszyngtonie ustalono stosunek sił morskich Imperium Brytyjskiego, Stanów Zjednoczonych, Japonii, Francji i Włoch w klasie pancerników i lotniskowców według ratio: 5 : 5 : 3 : 1,75 : 1,75. Na konferencji Coolidge’a w 1927 roku strona amerykańska dążyła do uzyskania w traktacie międzynarodowym parytetu pomiędzy US Navy i Royal Navy we wszystkich klasach okrętów wojennych.

Brytyjski rząd przyjął zaproszenie na konferencję w 1927 roku wychodząc z założenia, że delegacja brytyjska zdoła w Genewie przeforsować własny plan rozbrojenia opracowany przez Admiralicję. Polegał on na modyfikacji zasad traktatu waszyngtońskiego w taki sposób, aby zapewnić oszczędności finansowe, ale jednocześnie zachować bezpieczeństwo Imperium Brytyjskiego. Głównymi elementami brytyjskiego planu było: wydłużenie okresu pozostawania w służbie pancerników i lotniskowców, redukcja

¹⁷³ In his letter of 17 August 1927 to professor G. Murray, activist of League of Nations Union, Cecil wrote: “any agreement would be have been better than none” (T. Kuramatsu: *Viscount Cecil, Winston Churchill and the Geneva Naval Conference...*, p. 115).

kalibru dział i wyporności pancerników, wprowadzenie traktatowego podziału krążowników na ciężkie i lekkie oraz nałożenie ograniczeń ilościowych tylko na krążowniki ciężkie.

Brytyjski plan spotkał się ze zdecydowaną opozycją delegacji amerykańskiej. Próby opracowania kompromisowego porozumienia w sprawie paritetu pomiędzy flotą brytyjską i amerykańską w klasie krążowników zakończyły się niepowodzeniem, a konferencja zakończyła się fiaskiem. Przesądziły o tym względy strategiczne, polityczne i ekonomiczne. Admiralicja była przeciwna porozumieniu, które narażało na szwank bezpieczeństwo Imperium Brytyjskiego, a większość członków rządu brytyjskiego uważała, że niepowodzenie konferencji będzie mniejszym złem niż kapitulacja przed żądaniami amerykańskimi. Dyplomacja brytyjska dążyła do ustalenia wspólnego stanowiska z delegacją japońską, aby odium za niepowodzenie konferencji skierować na przedstawicieli Waszyngtonu.

*BOLESŁAW HAJDUK**

Szczecin

**THE SWEDISH TRADE UNION, SWEDISH SOCIETY
AND POLISH PRO-INDEPENDENCE EMIGRATION
IN SWEDEN TOWARD THE INDEPENDENT SELF-GOVERNING
TRADE UNION SOLIDARITY AND THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION
IN THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC IN THE YEARS 1980–1990**

Keywords: Sweden, Polish emigrants, the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity, opposition in Poland in the years 1980–1990

Summary

As far as the Polish People's Republic (PRL) and the communist years are concerned, support from professional organizations, society members, authorities and Polish emigration in Sweden to the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union (NSZZ) Solidarity ("Solidarność") and democratic opposition took a number of forms. Before the first independent trade union was established, activists of the Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party had supported the creation of such structures in the Polish People's Republic (PRL). Furthermore, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen and Sverige – LO), whose members were mainly social democrats, already during the 1980 strikes got in touch with the structures organizing public speeches of Polish workers. Consequently, the Swedish party supported striking workers on an international arena. This help was provided among others by Olof Palme, chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party, as well as in the form of financial assistance for organizational purposes and the purchase of printing machines. When martial law was imposed in

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the Polish People's Republic and Solidarity together with other opposition groups were declared illegal, Social Democratic and other Swedish trade unions supported the Polish underground democratic opposition in a number of ways. Money and gifts were collected and sent to PRL, and numerous propaganda and information activities were undertaken in Scandinavia, Europe and all over the world.

Apart from the assistance provided by the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), support from the Swedish officials and Swedish society was of profound importance to the opposition groups established in the Polish People's Republic. After martial law had been imposed in PRL, minister Ole Ullsten together with Danish and Norwegian ministers of foreign affairs unanimously criticized restricting civil liberties in the Polish People's Republic as well as detaining (arresting) of Solidarity leaders and activists. Strong support for the then illegal structures of Solidarity and Polish people was offered by Swedish non-governmental and charity organizations such as the Swedish Red Cross, organization "Save the Children", Lutheran Help, Free Evangelic Church and Individual Relief. Attention should also be paid to help provided by Swedish people and Swedish educational institutions.

Special emphasis should also be placed on support that the democratic opposition groups in the Polish People's Republic received from their compatriots in Sweden. Two organizations, namely Polish Emigration Council (RUP), consisting of 16 pro-independence organizations, and Polish Emigration Federation (FUP), coordinated aid programmes launched in Sweden to give a hand to Solidarity and the democratic opposition.

Last but not least, one mustn't neglect support from Denmark-based Scandinavian Committee for Independent Poland headed by professor Eugeniusz S. Kruszewski. By the time it was transformed into Polish-Scandinavian Institute in December 1984, the aforementioned Committee had been leading a propaganda campaign, among other things in Sweden, to provide reliable information about political goings-on, the persecuted oppositionists, steps taken by the communist regime and actions taken internationally to help Polish people.

As far as the Polish People's Republic (PRL) and the communist years are concerned, support from professional organizations, society members, authorities and Polish emigration in Sweden to the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union (NSZZ) Solidarity ("Solidarność") and democratic opposition took a number of forms. The representatives of Swedish social democrats were the first to express their interest in the development of pro-independence opposition structures, long before Solidarity was founded. It was Sten Johnson, a professor of sociology, social democrat and editor of "Tiden" magazine, who in December 1977 got in touch with the activists of Worker's Defense Committee (KOR) (established on 23 September 1976). During his stay in Poland he met Adam Michnik and Jan

Lityński, and spoke with Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Jacek Kuroń. Similar interest in the development of pro-independence opposition in the Polish People's Republic was shown by Gunnar Frederiksson – a historian of philosophy who systematically published information about social climate and changing situation in our country in a daily newspaper „Aftonbladet”.¹ Face-to-face meetings with the activists of Polish opposition were reported in the Swedish press, e.g. in a widely-read daily newspaper “Dagens Nyheter”, to make the Swedish society aware of the fact that the democratic opposition existed and suffered from repressions in the Polish People's Republic.² Generally speaking, the Swedish trade union, and not only social democratic circles, was interested in forming the independent trade union in Poland. Consequently, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen and Sverige – LO), whose members were mainly social democrats, already during the 1980 strikes got in touch with the structures involved in organizing public speeches of Polish workers. On 22 August 1980, the board of Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party declared their solidarity with shipyard workers striking in Gdańsk. Furthermore, it was no coincidence that in August 1980 Olof Palme, chairman of the aforementioned party, together with two other social democratic leaders, namely Will Brandt (Germany) and Bruno Kreisky (Austria), signed an appeal to Edward Gierek for the disuse of force against the Polish workers.³ From the moment the strikes began, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation expressed their direct support for the protest and the protestants. Inter-Company Strike Committee in Gdańsk shipyard received financial assistance from the Swedish union for organizational purposes and the purchase of printing machines. To become familiar with the needs of the newly created independent trade union (first in the Polish People's Republic), in September

¹ P. Jaworski: *Szwedzka pomoc dla Polski i „Solidarności” 1980–1981* [Swedish Aid for Poland and Solidarity 1980–1981], “Suecia Polonia” 2010, Y. IX, no. 3 (33), p. 26.

² Z. Zak-Stadfors: *Szwecja* [Sweden], in: *Akcja niepodległościowa na terenie międzynarodowym 1945–1990* [International Independence Action 1945–1990], joint publication, ed. T. Piesakowski. *Materiały do dziejów polskiego uchodźstwa 1945–1990* [Materials for the History of the Polish Diaspora 1945–1990], vol. IV, London 1999, pp. 441–442.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 437; B. Hajduk: *Polskie uchodźstwo niepodległościowe w Skandynawii w latach 1945–1989* [Polish Refugees in Scandinavia in Quest for Independence 1945–1990], in: *Zakończenie II wojny światowej. Polityka i dyplomacja międzynarodowa 1945–2005* [Putting an End to WWII. International Politics and Diplomacy 1945–2005], ed. M. Nurek, Gdańsk 2006, p. 204.

1980 Charles Kassman, a special delegate of the Swedish Confederation (LO), arrived in Gdańsk to meet Lech Wałęsa and Jacek Kuroń.⁴

Once the strikes had been over, Solidarity was founded and officially registered on 10 November 1980, and cooperation with the Swedish Trade Union Confederation continued. At the invitation from the Confederation (LO), delegates representing National Coordinating Commission NSZZ Solidarity, and to be more specific Bogdan Lis (vice-chairman) and Alicja Pieńkowska, visited Sweden between 26 and 28 February 1981. During their stay, they discussed issues relating to Solidarity representation in Sweden, though the candidature of Jakub Świącicki was eventually rejected by the Swedes. Moreover, further development and aid were scheduled, namely the delivery of printing machines.⁵ A form of support for the Polish trade union and a tribute to its chairman Lech Wałęsa was an award presented in May 1981 by Social Democratic newspaper "Arbetet" for his "courage and action taken in favour of Polish workers in other that, by peaceful measures, independent trade union was founded".⁶ Via Denmark, Lech Wałęsa came to accept the award with his wife Danuta. The programme of stay included a welcome in the city hall by Arne Lundber, mayor of Malmö, meeting with the workers of "Knockum" shipyard, press conference in the office of a daily newspaper "Arbetet", meeting with Malmö dwellers as well as representatives of Polish emigration organizations (among other things, Polish Emigration Council in Sweden, Central Committee for Independent Poland, and Pro Polonia Society in Denmark). In his speech, Lech Wałęsa expressed his gratitude for the award which, according to his words, would be spent on the then current activities of Solidarity.⁷

The first in the Polish People's Polish Republic, independent trade union was supported internationally, which was reflected, among other things, in the participation of representatives of Swedish trade union in the 1st Congress of NZSS Solidarity Delegates held in September and October 1981. The Swedish Confederation (LO) was represented by Gunnar Nilsson (leader), Thorbjørn Carlsson

⁴ P. Jaworski: *Szwedzka pomoc dla Polski...* [Swedish Aid for Poland...], op. cit., p. 28.

⁵ Ibidem, pp. 29–30; "Kronika" [The Chronicle], April–May 1981, no. 3/4, pp. 28–29.

⁶ The jury consisted of: Lars Engvist – chief editor of "Arbetet", Einar Eriksson - president of a district trade union in Skaane, Erik Jönsson and Kurt Ward – board members of Social Democratic Party, Gunnar Nilsson - president of LO, and, last but not least, Olof Palme – chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, "Kronika" [The Chronicle], August–September 1981, no. 8/9, p. 31.

⁷ "Kronika" [The Chronicle], August–September 1981, no. 8/9, pp. 29 and 32.

accompanied by his wife, Ture Mattsson and Irena Lundberg. Furthermore, Johansson was an “envoy” of Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation (TCO).⁸

Equipment and financial support was provided to Solidarity by the Swedish trade union as well as International Confederation of Free Trade Union (ICFTU) between 1980 and 1981. It was Lech Wałęsa who asked ICFTU to coordinate actions taken in favour of Solidarity in November 1980. According to the available information, by 13 December 1981 the Polish trade union received over 2 million Swedish crowns (i.e. circa 500 thousand dollars) from the Swedish union. Apart from that, Swedish professional organizations delivered equipment worth about 1.3 million Swedish crowns. The Swedes purchased, among other things, two printing machines and delivered them to Solidarity branches in Gdańsk and Wrocław. Zbigniew Bujak was inclined to believe that the support provided by the Swedish party was essential for Solidarity at that time since it enabled the activists to prepare all the necessary materials for the 1st Congress of NZSS Solidarity Delegates.⁹

Support lent by the Swedish Confederation (LO) was of major importance to the continuity of the Polish trade union and its underground activity, especially after martial law was imposed on 13 December 1981 to suspend Solidarity activity and eventually declare it illegal (officially in October 1982). Representatives of the two largest professional organizations, i.e. Gunnar Nilsson, vice-president of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), and Lennart Bodstrom, president of the Swedish Trade Union Organization (TCO), lodged a protest in the embassy of the Polish People’s Republic in Stockholm. They opted for setting up an ad hoc international committee to investigate living conditions in internment facilities.¹⁰ It was also the Swedish Confederation that organized all over Sweden a series of protests and manifestations to express their loyal support for the Poles. On 14 December 1981, the Swedish activists in cooperation with Polish emigration organizations held the first in Sweden and in the world street demonstration in favour of Solidarity. Another public manifestation backed up by the Confederation,

⁸ Archiwum Krajowej Komisji NSZZ “Solidarność” w Gdańsku [Archives of the National Commission of NSZZ Solidarity], Biuro Koordynacyjne NSZZ “Solidarność” w Brukseli [The Coordinating Office Abroad of NSZZ Solidarity in Brussels] (further: AKK NSZZ “Solidarność”, BKwB), sign. 433840 Sweden, lack of page number: Przedstawiciele związków zawodowych z zagranicy na I zjeździe “Solidarności” [Representatives of international trade unions in the 1st Congress of NZSS Solidarity], December 1981.

⁹ *Szwedzka pomoc dla Polski...* [Swedish Aid for Poland...], op. cit., pp. 29 and 30.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 34; “Kronika” [The Chronicle], January–February 1982, no. 1/2, p. 12.

attended by trade unionists and members of the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament), took place to condemn the introduction of martial law and commemorate the anniversary of December 1970 protest of workers in Gdansk. It is also worth mentioning a number of demonstrations inspired and organized by the Confederation, namely in 1982, 1983, 1984 and 1985 to mark the anniversaries of August Agreements and the aforementioned 1970 protest.¹¹ Wishing to express their strong and solid support for Solidarity underground activity, more than 100,000 Swedes signed a petition addressed to the Polish government and, in this way, demanded annulling martial law, releasing the interned and recognizing the legality of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union (NSZZ) Solidarity.

Using their connections with the Swedish social democrats, the Confederation helped Polish activists in Sweden to open Information Bureau in Stockholm immediately on 13 December 1981. Directors of Bureau, eventually closed in 1989 and before that a unit of the Coordinating Office Abroad of NSZZ Solidarity headed by Jerzy Milewski in Brussels, were Marek Michalski and Stefan Trzeciński. The Bureau in Stockholm launched its propaganda and informational activity to report actions taken by Solidarity and the Polish opposition. It also offered direct help to the Poles and cooperated with aid organizations formed in Sweden. To be more specific, the Bureau organized regular transport of gifts and helped people cross the Polish border.¹²

It is worth emphasizing that the Swedish trade union provided Solidarity with strong and loyal support all the way – when the Polish union and its underground activity were declared illegal, when the Polish activists entered a dialogue with the Polish government and finally when they regained complete freedom. The members of Solidarity requested further back-up for their actions, especially when their activity was banned and they suffered numerous repressions. In their appeal of 2 April 1983 addressed to the chairman of LO, Gunnar Nilsson, members of the board of the Temporary Coordinating Commission NSZZ Solidarity, headed by Bogdan Lis, asked for help. The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) received a framework programme of activities to be undertaken both in Poland and abroad. The programme defined the amount of capital required for

¹¹ “Kronika” [The Chronicle], January–February 1982, no. 1/2, p. 12; March–April 1982, no. 3/4, p. 31; September–October 1982, no. 9/10, p. 25.

¹² E. Michalik: *Emigracja polska w Szwecji po drugiej wojnie światowej* [Polish Emigrants in Sweden after WWII], in: *Polacy w Skandynawii* [Poles in Scandinavia], ed. E. Olszewski, Lublin 1997, p. 202.

the accomplishment of objectives.¹³ In response, in 1983 the National Secretariat of LO allocated 250,000 Swedish crowns for supporting Solidarity underground activities. Furthermore, for the sake of information campaign and independent education, the Confederation transferred additional 75,000 Swedish crowns. According to information provided to the Swedish Confederation by Zbigniew Bujak (leader of Solidarity in Mazowsze region), to continue its underground activity, the Polish union spent the above sum on buying printing devices and broadcasting equipment for Solidarity radio station, as well as covering the then current expenses.¹⁴ A form of financial assistance for the Polish union was also a prize presented by editorial boards of Swedish “Dagens Nyheter” and Danish “Politiken” on the initiative of the Swedish union (LO), in the amount of 50,000 Swedish crowns (c.a. 7,000 dollars). In the rationale, one may read that „Wałęsa deserved the prize for his struggle for the right to live in freedom and truth”. This time it was the head of Solidarity branch in Brussels, Jerzy Milewski, who accepted the prize.¹⁵

Financial aid provided by the Swedish trade union throughout the entire period of Solidarity underground activity, was not cut off once the organization regained its full rights. For instance, a training programme, developed by Solidarity leaders to define necessary organizational actions to be taken by the union in (at last) free Poland, was also backed by the Swedes.¹⁶

Of profound importance were support and actions taken by the Confederation (LO) internationally to intervene directly with the authorities of the Polish People’s Republic and defend the imprisoned Solidarity members. The Swedish

¹³ NSZZ „Solidarność”, BKwB, sign. 433840 Sweden, lack of page number: Pismo Tymczasowej Komisji Koordynacyjnej NSZZ “Solidarność” do przewodniczącego LO Gunnara Nilssona [Letter from the Temporary Coordinating Commission of NSZZ Solidarity to Gunnar Nilsson - president of LO], 02.04.1983; ibidem: lack of page number: Biuro Koordynacyjne NSZZ “Solidarność” Zagranicą do Rune Molina z LO [The Coordinating Office Abroad of NSZZ Solidarity to Rune Molin representing LO], 13.04.1983.

¹⁴ Ibidem: lack of page number: Przewodniczący Regionu Mazowsze NSZZ “Solidarność” do prezydenta Centrali Związkowej LO Stiga Malma [Leader of Solidarity in Mazowsze region to Stig Malm - president of the Swedish Confederation (LO)], 25.01.1984.

¹⁵ “Kronika” [The Chronicle], March–April, May–June 1983, no. 3/4, p. 8 and no. 5/6, p. 28.

¹⁶ AKK NSZZ “Solidarność”, BKwB, sign. 433840, lack of page number: Pismo szefa Biura Zagranicznego NSZZ “Solidarność” do przewodniczącego Wydziału Zagranicznego LO Ulfa Edströma [Letter from the head of the Coordinating Office Abroad of NSZZ Solidarity to Ulf Edström – head of LO International Department], 11.10.1980; ibidem, lack of page number: Wydział Zagraniczny Landsorganisation i Sverige do NSZZ “Solidarność” w sprawie programu edukacyjnego [LO International Department to NSZZ Solidarity on education programme], 29.01.1990.

union promoted attempts made by the Poles union to become a member of the World Confederation of Labour and International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, which ended in success in November 1986.¹⁷

Furthermore, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) protested vigorously against the imprisonment of the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR) and Solidarity activists, among others Bogdan Lis, Władysław Frasyniuk and Adam Michnik. In their appeal of 15 November 1985 to the Polish government, the Confederation members demanded releasing all political prisoners and trade unionists as well as declaring Solidarity legal. Such a protest was filed by the head of the LO international department in the embassy of the Polish People's Republic in Stockholm.¹⁸ A number of appeals were also made by Swedish Social Democratic Youth League (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Ungdomsförbund), among other things in February 1985 in an open letter to the Polish authorities.¹⁹ Protest campaigns of 1987 and 1988 were aimed at restoring Solidarity's right to take full part in Polish political life and entering a dialogue with its leader Lech Wałęsa.²⁰ Furthermore, special emphasis should be placed on the willingness of the Swedish trade union to provide Lech Wałęsa with legal aid in a lawsuit that the PRL authorities filed against him. Such support was granted in February 1986 by Hans – Goeran Franck law firm that cooperated with the LO.²¹

Activities undertaken by Solidarity were also backed by other trade unions founded in Sweden, e.g. the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation – TCO). On 13 April 1983, Jerzy Milewski,

¹⁷ "Tydzień Polski" [The Polish Week], 8.06.1985, pp. 14–15.

¹⁸ AKK NSZZ "Solidarność", BKwB, sign. 433840, lack of page number: Apel Centrali Związkowej LO do rządu PRL sygnowany przez przewodniczącego Stiga Malma [Appeal by the Swedish Confederation (LO) to the Polish government signed by Stig Malm, LO president], 22.05.1985; *ibidem*: lack of page number: Pismo sekretarza departamentu zagranicznego Centrali Związkowej LO Erika Karlssona do Światowej Konfederacji Wolnych Związków w Brukseli [Letter from Erik Karlsson, secretary of LO International Department, to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Brussels], 15.11.1985.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*: lack of page number: List otwarty Związku Socjalistycznej Młodzieży Szwedzkiej do rządu PRL [Open letter from the Swedish Socialist Youth League to the Polish government], February 1985.

²⁰ *Ibidem*: lack of page number: Oświadczenie zarządu Centrali Związkowej LO w sprawie NSZZ "Solidarność" [Statement by the leaders of the Swedish Confederation (LO) on NSZZ Solidarity], March 1988; *ibidem*: lack of page number: Pismo Biura Koordynacyjnego NSZZ "Solidarność" w Brukseli do szefa Stiga Malma w sprawie poparcia ruchu strajkowego w Polsce [Letter from the Coordinating Office Abroad of NSZZ Solidarity in Brussels to Stig Malm, LO president, on supporting strikes in Poland], 23.08.1988.

²¹ *Ibidem*: lack of page number: Telegram sekretarza LO Erika Karlssona do Lecha Wałęsy [Telegram from Erik Karlsson, LO secretary, to Lech Wałęsa], 7.02.1986.

head of Solidarity branch in Brussels, asked TCO for financial and organizational help. In response, TCO sent general Wojciech Jaruzelski a letter in which they defended Janusz Pałubicki, demanded discontinuing proceedings against him and his immediate release. Together with members of other confederations, TCO participated in conference organized by Solidarity in Warsaw between 24 and 28 October 1988. TCO leaders eventually decided to support the reconstruction of the Polish trade union and offered 200,000 Swedish crowns (about 30,000 dollars) for this purpose.²²

Moreover, the Coordinating Office Abroad of NSZZ Solidarity in Brussels turned for help to the Swedish Metalworkers' Union. It was in Gdansk in September 1980 that Solidarity got in touch with the aforementioned Union and workers of "Knockum" shipyard in Malmö.²³ However, since no documents are available, the actual scope of assistance offered by the former cannot be defined.

On the other hand, support provided by Graphic Workers' Union (Grafiska Fack Förbundet) is richly documented. Direct cooperation began in October 1980 when the representatives of the Union, namely Ture Mattsson and Bertil Frick, arrived in Poland, among other things to identify what Solidarity required in terms of equipment, in other words to organise the supply of printing machines. Afterwards, in February 1982, a delegation of Swedish printers came to Poznan at the invitation of Inter-Company NSZZ Solidarity Committee. Talks were held over bringing the equipment from Sweden. Furthermore, the Swedish delegates met Solidarity activists, Lech Wałęsa and Andrzej Celiński, to discuss other forms of support that could be lend to the Polish trade union. Under the arrangements made, a five-person group of printers travelled to Sweden to participate in vocational training. During the period referred to as martial law, the

²² Ibidem., lack of page number: Biuro Koordynacyjne NSZZ "Solidarność" w Brukseli do Svena Tockstedta [The Coordinating Office Abroad of NSZZ Solidarity in Brussels to Sven Tockstedt], 13.04.1983; J. Milewski do przewodniczącego TCO Borna Rosengrena w Sztokholmie [Jerzy Milewski to Born Rosengren, president of TCO in Stockholm], 13.04.1983; ibidem: lack of page number: List otwarty Centrali Związkowej TCO do gen. Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego [Open letter from the Swedish Confederation (TCO) to general Wojciech Jaruzelski], September 1983; ibidem: lack of page number: Pismo przewodniczącego Szwedzkiego Związku Urzędników Samorządowych Lennarta Sahlstena do Joanny Pilarskiej w Brukseli [Letter from Lennart Sahlsten, president of the Swedish Municipal Workers' Union, to Joanna Pilarska in Brussels], 27.06.1988; ibidem: lack of page number: Centrala TCO do Lecha Wałęsy [The Swedish Confederation (TCO) to Lech Wałęsa], 20.11.1989; "Tydzień Polski" [The Polish Week], 18.08.1984.

²³ AKK NSZZ "Solidarność", BKwB, sign. 433840, lack of page number: Przewodniczący Biura Koordynacyjnego NSZZ "Solidarność" w Brukseli do szefa Związku Szwedzkich Metalowców [Head of the Coordinating Office Abroad of NSZZ Solidarity in Brussels to the president of the Swedish Metalworkers' Union], 13.04.1983.

Swedish printers-unionists protested against placing a ban on Solidarity activity, persecuting its members and transferring the tied up capital of the Polish trade union to pro-PRL professional organizations, as well as demanded the return of 840 Swedish crowns taken from the then illegal Solidarity.²⁴

Apart from aid granted by the Swedish trade union, support from Swedish authorities and society was also of major importance to Solidarity. After it had been founded, Ola Ullsten, leader of the Liberal People's Party and foreign minister in the coalition government formed by the prime minister Nils Olof Thorbjörn Fälldin, said that due to the threat of the USSR intervention in the Polish People's Republic, attempts made in favour of democratizing eastern Europe should not be hindered by external forces. Subsequently, in September 1981, he stated firmly that countries ought not to interfere with internal affairs of other states since this might be detrimental to international cooperation. When martial law was imposed in the Polish People's Republic, Ola Ullsten together with foreign ministers of Denmark and Norway as well as opposition leaders in Scandinavia unanimously condemned restricting civil liberties in Poland as well as interning (arresting) Solidarity leaders and activists.²⁵

Initially reserved toward the goings-on in the Polish People's Republic, Olof Palme, leader of Swedish Social Democratic Party, eventually changed his mind. When civil liberties were restricted as a result of martial law, he came to conclusion that the situation in the PRL was no longer an internal matter, but should be considered an international issue. During demonstration organized in Stockholm on 13 March 1982, Palme demanded releasing all the imprisoned, giving up on repressing the activists and declaring Solidarity legal. He expressed his opinion a few days later while giving a speech in the Riksdag. On 8 October 1982, the Social Democratic Party won the elections and Palme became prime minister. Holding an official function, he still had a negative attitude to the Polish government though, as correctly observed by Jaworski, they hoped that the newly formed Swedish Social Democratic government would be more PRL-friendly.²⁶

This negative attitude was also held by Ingvar Carlsson who, after the assassination in February 1986, was appointed a new leader of Social Democratic

²⁴ Ibidem: lack of page number: Rezolucja 55 oddziału Związku Zawodowego Pracowników Poligrafii w Jönköping, Motala i Atvidaberg [Resolution by 55th branch of the Paper Workers' Union in Jönköping, Motala and Atvidaberg], dated 12.03.1983; "Kronika" [The Chronicle], March–April 1981, no. 3/4, p. 29.

²⁵ "Kronika" [The Chronicle], January–February 1982, no. 1/2, p. 12.

²⁶ P. Jaworski: *Szwedzka pomoc dla Polski...* [Swedish Aid for Poland...], op. cit., pp. 31, 34.

Party and a prime minister (through 1991). A crucial step taken by the Swedish government when martial law was imposed in Poland involved granting the right of political and humanitarian asylum to all Polish emigrants. It is worth adding that such a status was also granted to Polish people who arrived in Sweden in the years 1968–1970, i.e. when anti-Semitic campaign was unleashed by the Polish authorities.²⁷

Major support for Solidarity and the Poles was also provided by Swedish charity organizations such as Swedish Red Cross (Röda Korset), organization Save the Children (Rädda Barnen), aid organizations belonging to religious associations, i.e. protestant Lutheran Help (Lutherhjälpen) or Free Evangelic Church (Evangeliska Frikyrkan), catholic organizations attached to parishes, humanitarian organizations such as Individual Relief (Individuell Manniskohjälp), etc. A wide range of humanitarian activities were undertaken by the Swedish Red Cross which by November 1981 allocated 5 million Swedish crowns for helping Poland, owing to which antibiotics, dressing materials, food (fruit and vegetables), detergents and other articles of every-day use were bought. On 9 and 10 January 1982, the Swedish Red Cross together with two other organizations, namely Save the Children and Sverige Lions Club, organized the collection of money. The action was called „Donate 1 crown”, attracted 20,000–40,000 volunteers and collected about 8.4 million Swedish crowns. Altogether, according to information derived from the Swedish Red Cross, about 40 million Swedish crowns were collected in 1982. Charity activities undertaken by the abovementioned organizations enabled to send Polish people gifts, and to be more specific 2.5 tons of children’s clothing, 200,000 pairs of shoes and 50,000 blankets.²⁸

On the other hand, in 1981 the organization Save the Children made a generous donation of 4.3 million Swedish crowns to selected groups of Polish citizens. The sum included: 1 million Swedish crowns from the Swedish government, 1 million donated by the radio station, and the rest of the sum collected by Swedish institutions and individual donors. The organization “Save the Children”

²⁷ Throughout the abovementioned period more than 5,000 Polish Jews and about 2,600 political refugees arrived in Sweden; see A. Chodubski, E. Olszewski: *Stan badań nad zbiorowościami polonijnymi w Skandynawii* [Research on the Polish community in Scandinavia], in: *Polacy w Skandynawii...* [Poles in Scandinavia], op. cit., s. 424; E. Michalik: *Polityka imigracyjna w Szwecji* [Swedish Immigration Policy], in: *Polacy w Skandynawii...* [Poles in Scandinavia...], op. cit., p. 209; eadem: *Emigracja polska w Szwecji...*, op. cit., p. 194;

“Kronika” [The Chronicle] March–April 1982, no. 3/4, p. 31.

²⁸ *Dzień w którym wszyscy Szwedzi złożyli się po koronie* [The Day when all Swedes Donated a Crown], “Suecia Polonia” 2010, no. 3 (93), p. 3.

spent the funds raised on buying footwear, clothing and food (including milk for the children) which were distributed in cooperation with regional branches of Solidarity. The organization also provided children's homes with food parcels and offered financial assistance to 185,000 children in Cracow, Lublin and other cities. Last but not least, thanks to action taken by Rädde Barnen in cooperation with Swedish scouts, state railways and women's organizations, 170,000 Polish children could wear new shoes.²⁹

What also deserves attention is support provided to Solidarity and Polish people by church organizations formed in Sweden. It is worth mentioning charity action organized by Lutheran Help (Lutherhjälpen) thanks to which in November 1982 catholic institutions in Poland received over 1000 tons of canned meat and financial support amounting to 20.5 million Swedish crowns during the said year. Money was collected in protestant parishes, among other things in Värnamo by pastor Klister Fjadervik and in Anderstorp with a major contribution from pastor Börje Finnstedt. Altogether they managed to collect 5 tons of food, 5 tons of clothing and 3 tons of personal hygiene products, a greater part of which were brought to Poland by Wojciech Seliga, parish priest of the catholic church in Jönköping, to the order of the Sisters of the Holy Family and the most needy individuals. Furthermore, 1.5 tons of food were handed over by pastor Krister Fjadervik from Värnamo to organizations attached to Evangelical Church in Poland.³⁰ Similar charity activities were undertaken by Independent Evangelical Church. However, since no information concerning such initiatives is available, the actual scope of assistance cannot be defined. Likewise, no data has been collected about charity actions taken by Individual Relief organization.

Substantial aid was also offered by the catholic Church. It was the parish in Jönköping, and particularly the aforementioned priest Wojciech Seliga, that was first to provide such help. The parish succeeded in collecting 5.5 tons of food and dental surgery equipment which were brought to the Polish People's Republic at the beginning of May 1981 and handed over to the Sisters of the Society of the Sacred Heart in Warsaw who ran a nursing home for the disabled children. Another transport of aid, i.e. medications, clothing and food, was arranged by the parish

²⁹ P. Jaworski: *Szwedzka pomoc dla Polski...* [Swedish Aid for Poland...], op. cit., p. 32; "Kronika" [The Chronicle] November–December 1982, no. 11/12, p. 30.

³⁰ "Kronika" [The Chronicle] May–June, November–December 1981, no. 5/6, p. 32 and no. 11/12, p. 24; March–April 1982, no. 3/4, p. 31.

in Jönköping to Poznan, Radom and Cracow in January 1982.³¹ Furthermore, contribution made by Kaj Engelhardt, chief editor of weekly magazine “Katolsk Kyrkotidning”, mustn’t be neglected since the collected 300,000 Swedish crowns were a substantial sum allocated for helping the Poles.³²

Swedish schools did not ignore problems encountered by Polish citizens either. They got in touch directly with educational institutions in Poland and, having identified their needs, sent them food, cleansing agents, copybooks, pens and writing paper. A well-known example is of Swedish teacher working in a lower-secondary school in Jönköping who collected 7 tons of food and sent it to Poland on 10 December.³³

The Swedish society had also performed a great number of spontaneous actions. For instance, dwellers of Kungsör, a town situated 160 kilometres from Stockholm, in September 1984 organized help for the Poles, to be more specific 8 tons of clothing, footwear, hygiene products, medications, coffee, and other goods. Funds and necessities were also collected by shop owners, members of local groups such as Musicians’ Union in Eskilstuna or Metalworkers’ Union in Fagerst and Arbog. The townspeople also raised money for arranging the transport. For example, part of gifts were delivered to charity organization attached to the diocese in Gdańsk by Olavi Koljonen, president of trade union in Eskilstuna, and Taisto Fors, a local merchant.³⁴

The Swiss media were also actively involved in actions taken to support Solidarity and the democratic opposition in the Polish People’s Republic. A widely-read Swedish daily – “Dagens Nyheter” published interviews with the opposition members who stayed in Sweden at that time, among others Mirosław Chojecki (founder of the Committee for Social Self-Defense “KOR”, publisher and member of the Temporary Coordinating Commission NSZZ Solidarity in the west) and Tadeusz Konwicki, a Polish intellectualist.³⁵ After the Polish Writers’ Association had been dissolved, representatives of the Swedish PEN club, Architects’ Association and Journalists’ Association defended Polish literates and delivered a protest

³¹ “Kronika” [The Chronicle] May – June 1981, no. 5/6, p. 32; January–February 1982, no. 1/2, p. 29.

³² P. Jaworski, *Szwedzka pomoc dla Polski...* [Swedish Aid for Poland...], op. cit., p. 32.

³³ Ibidem, p. 32; “Kronika” [The Chronicle] November–December 1982, no. 11/12, p. 24.

³⁴ “Kronika” [The Chronicle] January - February 1985, no. 1/2, p. 23.

³⁵ AKK NSZZ “Solidarność”, Solidarity Private Archive of Aleksandra Dąbrowska – Pe-tersem (further: PA “Solidarność” AD-P), lack of page number: Note, February 1984; “Dagens Nyheter” 15.11.1983.

letter to the PRL embassy in Stockholm in which they demanded re-establishing the Polish Writers' Association and releasing the imprisoned publicists, among others Tadeusz Bielecki.³⁶ Furthermore, Swedish television gave publicity to Solidarity and strongly backed activities undertaken by the Polish workers. On 9 July 1984, it broadcasted a TV programme about the origin of the Committee for Social Self-Defense "KOR" and its leading activists, namely Jacek Kuron, Zbigniew Romaszewski and Adam Michnik, as well as active members of Solidarity, to name some: Zbigniew Bujak, Lech Wałęsa and Anna Walentynowicz.³⁷

Special attention should also be paid to involvement of the Swedish artists who supported Solidarity and other opposition groups formed in the Polish People's Republic. A number of performances were given, among other things in the Royal Swedish Opera and theatres in Stockholm, Goteborg and Uppsala, starred by the distinguished Swedish artists who wished to express their wholehearted support for the Polish trade union and the Poles. The funds raised were transferred to the opposition organizations in the Polish People's Republic in cooperation with aid organizations such as the Swedish Red Cross, Save the Children and Sverige Lions Club. On 23 January 1982, the Artists' Association organized in Uppsala a cultural festival known as „Week for Poland” which included 25 musical and theatrical performances, shows and other events. Needless to say, the whole process was streamlined by the Royal Swedish Mail which sent parcels and gifts to the Polish People's Republic free of charge.³⁸

It was also in Sweden that organizations offering direct support to Solidarity and the democratic opposition were formed. For instance, the Swedish Solidarity Support Committee (Svenska Stödskommite för Solidaritet) was set up in December 1981 and continued its outreach work by 1989. The Committee organized a wide-ranging campaign in favour of Solidarity and granted temporary aid for the Poles who arrived in Sweden after 1981. Moreover, support committees were established all over Sweden, e.g. Solidarity Support Committee in Södertälje and the Polish Solidarity Committee (Polen Solidaritets Kommite), the members of which were both Poles and Swedes, in Uppsala. It should also be noted that two of the aforementioned organizations, namely the Swedish Solidarity Support Committee and the Polish Solidarity Committee in Uppsala, represented the

³⁶ "Kronika" [The Chronicle] November–December 1983, no. 11/12, p. 6; "Notatki Skandynawskie" [Scandinavian Notes] April 1986, no. 4, p. 2.

³⁷ "Kronika" [The Chronicle] July–August 1984, no. 7/8, p. 3.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, January–February 1982, no. 1/2, p. 29.

Polish trade union during sessions of the Conference of Solidarity Support Organizations (CSSO), among other things in 1983. As far as southern Sweden is concerned, increased activity was the case with the Southern-Swedish Solidarity Support Committee in Malmö, later transformed into Independent Information Agency. Last but not least, organization headed by a Polish emigrant Andrzej Koraszewski published political books and brochures in three languages, i.e. Polish, Swedish and English, and distributed them all over Europe and the Polish People's Republic.³⁹

Certainly, some sort of support for the Polish democratic opposition and Solidarity were Nobel Prizes awarded to Czesław Miłosz and Lech Wałęsa for their achievements and as expression of genuine sympathy that the Swedish authorities and society had toward Solidarity attempts to restore democracy and found independent trade union.⁴⁰

Generous support for the Polish trade union and the democratic opposition was also provided by Polish refugees, and particularly pro-independence activists living in Sweden. As a matter of fact, cooperation with and support for the opposition groups formed in the Polish People's Republic had been the case long before Solidarity was established (i.e. before 1980). Polish emigrants firmly backed actions taken by: Workers' Defense Committee ("KOR" – 1976), Committee for Social Self-Defense "KOR" (1977), Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (1977), Society for Academic Courses (1978), Committee of the Free Trade Unions (1978), and independent student movement created as a unit of Student Solidarity Committee (1977).⁴¹ Involvement from emigrants, reflected in a broad

³⁹ AKK NSZZ "Solidarność", PA "Solidarności" AD-P, lack of page number: Wycinek prasowy czasopisma „Tydzień Polski” [Press clipping from The Polish Week magazine] 8.06.1985; Z. Zak – Stadfors, Szwecja [Sweden], in: Akcja niepodległościowa... [International Independence...], op. cit., pp. 444, 447; E. Michalik: *Emigracja polska w Szwecji...* [Polish Emigrants in Sweden...], op. cit., pp. 202–203.

⁴⁰ Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku, NSZZ "Solidarność" [National Archives in Gdansk, NSZZ Solidarity] (further: APG, NSZZ – "S"), 291, lack of page number: Echa Nobla, [News on the Noble Prize] 1981; "Życie Warszawy" [Warsaw Daily] 31.10.1983; "Berlingske Tidende" 7.10.1983; „Dagens Nyheter" 24.12.1983; "Aftenposten" 10.12.1983; „Kronika" [The Chronicle] November–December 1980, no. 11/12, p. 23; January–February, May–June 1984, no. 1/3, pp. 5, 6, 17 and 24; May–June 1981, no. 5/6, p. 28; May–June 1982, no. 5/6, p. 27; November–December 1983, no. 11/12, pp. 2–3.

⁴¹ On the Polish emigrants in Sweden, democratic opposition in the Polish People's Republic and their cooperation before 1980 see: A. Kłonczyński: *My w Szwecji nie porastamy mchem. Emigranci z Polski w Szwecji w latach 1945–1980* [In Sweden We are not Covered with Moss. Polish Emigrants in Sweden 1945–1980], Gdańsk 2012, pp. 271–281; A. Friszke: *Opozycja polityczna w PRL w latach 1945–1980* [Political opposition in the Polish People's Republic in the years 1945–1980], Londyn 1984, pp. 453, 490, 500, 527, 557, 559; Z. Zak-Stadfors, *Szwecja...* [Sweden],

scope of assistance for the opposition, became particularly intense during the 1980 strikes, when Solidarity was formed and when martial law was introduced – eventually leading to repressions against the opposition members. Needless to say, Polish emigrants played a leading role in supporting Solidarity and anti-regime movement in the Polish People's Republic.⁴²

One more remarkable fact are social actions taken by Polish Combatants' Association (SKP), the "oldest" organization established by Polish emigrants in Sweden. Local branches of the Association organized support manifestations, meetings with Solidarity activists staying in Sweden and collected funds to provide the Poles with essential goods. Furthermore, they cooperated with a national unit of the Association attached to Solidarity in Gdansk in March 1981.⁴³

At the same time, coordination of support actions taken in favour of Solidarity and the opposition rested with Polish Emigration Council (further: FUP) established in August 1946 as a mother institution for 16 pro-independence organizations operating in Sweden. In August, the Council appealed to the Polish emigrants to lend financial support to the shipyard workers on strike. The Council itself provided their compatriots with food aid.⁴⁴

Analogical function, i.e. coordination of assistance provided to the Polish opposition, was performed by FUP in the years 1978–1985. FUP activists arranged meetings with prominent Polish dissidents, among others Czesław Miłosz, Jan Błoński, Ryszard Krynicki, established close cooperation with the opposition in the Polish People's Republic and kept Swedish media posted about the situation after the August strikes. Owing to Janusz Sławomirski, secretary of

op. cit., pp. 428–442; E. Michalik: *Emigracja polska w Szwecji...* [Polish Emigrants in Sweden...], op. cit., pp. 201–203; B. Hajduk: *Polskie uchodźstwo niepodległościowe w Skandynawii...* [Polish Refugees in Scandinavia...], op. cit., pp. 199–205.

⁴² According to the estimates, throughout the period under discussion, organizations and associations formed by the Polish community in Sweden had about 4,000 members, and the population of Polish emigrants (of Polish descent) in respective years during the analysed decade stood at: in 1981 – 27,466, in 1984 – 30,000, in 1986 – 38,500, in 1994 – 40,000; see J. Och: *Niektóre struktury organizacyjne współczesnej Polonii szwedzkiej. Ich organizacja oraz płaszczyzny aktywności* [Selected organizations formed by the modern Polish community in Sweden and their activity], in: *Polacy w Skandynawii...* [Poles in Scandinavia], op. cit., pp. 237, 245; E. Michalik: *Emigracja polska w Szwecji...* [Polish Emigrants in Sweden...], op. cit., p. 194.

⁴³ APG, NSZZ – "S", 201, p. 499: Koło Kombatantów NSZZ "Solidarność" w Gdańsku do Rady Uchodźstwa Polskiego w Szwecji [NSZZ Solidarity Polish Combatants' Association in Gdansk to Polish Emigration Council], 12.03.1981; "Kronika" [The Chronicle] July–August 1981, no. 7/8, p. 30, July–August 1984, no. 7/8, p. 28.

⁴⁴ E. Michalik: *Emigracja polska w Szwecji...* [Polish Emigrants in Sweden...], op. cit., p. 202; "Kronika" [The Chronicle] September–October 1980, no. 9/10, p. 29, May–June 1981, no. 5/6, p. 28.

FUP, materials from the 1st Solidarity Congress were published and distributed in Sweden.⁴⁵ In 1982, differences and animosities between the aforementioned organizations created a need among Polish emigrants for establishing a new unit (i.e. the Polish Congress in Sweden), especially in the context of political developments taking place in the Polish People's Republic at that time. At the end of the 1980's, the Congress was a mother institution for twenty-two pro-independence organizations and their representatives in Sweden. The Congress members immediately responded to events occurring in the Polish People's Republic, e.g. they passed a resolution in a general meeting on 17 January 1982 to protest against terror used by the PRL authorities as well as demand releasing all political prisoners and recognizing the legality of Solidarity. Furthermore, the Congress called the governments of the Free World for imposing sanctions against the communist regime, the USSR and other countries belonging to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (RWPG).⁴⁶ Apart from that, it was Central Association of the Polish Community Abroad (CZOP) that played a prominent role in bringing together Polish pro-independence and other organizations. It was established in 1977 during the congress in Stockholm as a mother institution for twelve local organizations formed by the Polish community abroad.⁴⁷

By October 1985, both democratic oppositionists and political transformation in Poland were actively supported by the Katyn Committee, established by Tadeusz Głowacki in 1975. As a dedicated activist of exile organizations and an ardent patriot, he deserves special attention.⁴⁸ Tadeusz Głowacki was a member of

⁴⁵ A. Kłoczyński: op. cit., p. 167.

⁴⁶ Ibidem; "Kronika" [The Chronicle] January–February 1982, no. 1/2, p. 7.

⁴⁷ E. Michalik: *Emigracja polska w Szwecji...* [Polish Emigrants in Sweden...], op. cit., p. 203.

⁴⁸ Tadeusz Głowacki was born on 30 September 1917 in Cracow. During the Second World War he was a radio operator in the Naval Command Headquarters in the Hel Peninsula. After the Polish capitulation, he was captured and became a prisoner of war. He escaped from a POW camp in 1944 and managed to reach Sweden. An engineer by profession, he found employment in Sweden enterprises producing paper. Between 1958 and 1985 he managed his own engineering and technical firm in Stockholm where he passed away on 20 August 2001. It is beyond doubt that the Katyn Committee and its head Tadeusz Głowacki have contributed significantly to giving publicity to the Katyn Massacre not only in Europe, but all over the world. Truth about the massacre was revealed in a richly documented book entitled "Katyn 1940" published in 1984. "Kronika" [The Chronicle] September–December 1985, no. 9/12, pp. 59–60; E.S. Kruszewski: *Śp. Tadeusz Andrzej Głowacki 30.09.1917–20.08.2001* [The Late Tadeusz Andrzej Głowacki 30.09.1917–20.08.2001], in: XVI Rocznik Instytutu Polsko-Skandynawskiego [16th Yearbook of Polish-Scandinavian Institute], Kopenhaga 2001, p. 44; Katyn kronikker om mordet på polske soldater i 1940 i Sovjetunionen. Udvalget foretaget af Eugeniusz S. Kruszewski, Redaktor Tadeusz Głowacki, Kobenhavn-Stockholm 1984; "Kronika" [The Chronicle] November–December 1983,

the International Federation of the Polish Combatants Association, Coordination Council for Polish Compatriots of the Free World and Polish Emigration Council (chairman between 12 June 1971 and December 1972). He was actively involved in raising funds from the Polish Combatants Associations in Sweden, Norway and Germany as well as other exile organizations, Danish ones inclusively. Despite strong protest from the PRL and the USSR governments, the first in Europe monument commemorating the Katyn massacre was erected in Stockholm in 1957. Chaired by Głowacki, the Katyn Committee had made a major contribution to lending active support for the workers on strike and opposition groups. In January 1980, the Press Office was opened to provide information concerning the developments in Poland and forward it to the world top newspapers and magazines.⁴⁹ The Katyn Committee organized financial aid as well, among other things in December 1981. It was Janusz Kon – an activist of Human and Civil Rights Movement – to whom 4831 Swedish crowns (1 thousand dollars) were handed over. Furthermore, financial assistance in the amount of 500 Swedish crowns was provided to the Polish Educational Society to support schools in the PRL, and 250 Swedish crowns were received by Amnesty International. Apart from that, the Katyn Committee financed the purchase of food supplies that were sent to Polish people.⁵⁰ Last but not least, it cooperated closely with the Katyn Committee in Cracow established in 1978 by Adam Macedoński. In December 1980, the latter received 400 Swedish crowns from the former.⁵¹

As far as help provided to Solidarity and the democratic opposition in the Polish People's Republic is concerned, the Katyn Committee collaborated actively with Denmark-based Committee for Independent Poland. The latter was a mother institution for three local units, namely Copenhagen branch, Stockholm branch and Oslo delegacy which laid foundations for establishing in 1975 Central Scandinavian Committee for Independent Poland, eventually transformed into Scandinavian Committee for Independent Poland. The co-founders of the Committee were professor Eugeniusz Kruszewski from Copenhagen and the aforementioned Tadeusz Głowacki (at the same time the head of the Swedish branch). Throughout the period under consideration, i.e. between 1980 and 1990, the primary objective

no. 11/12, p. 29, January–February, May–June 1984, no. 1/2, p. 28, no. 5/6, p. 32, “Notatki Skandy-nawskie” [Scandinavian Notes] March–April 1980, no. 3/4, p. 2.

⁴⁹ “Kronika” [The Chronicle] March–April 1980, no. 3/4, p. 29.

⁵⁰ Ibidem: May–June 1981, no. 5/6, pp. 28 and 32; January–February, November–December 1982, no. 1/2, p. 29 and no. 11/12, p. 30; May–June 1984, no. 5/6, p. 27.

⁵¹ Ibidem: May–June 1981, no. 5/6, pp. 28 and 32.

of the Committee was to supply the public opinion in Europe and in the world with reliable information regarding political developments in the Polish People's Republic, represent Polish emigrants and Poles living in the PRL in an international arena, and coordinate actions taken by the Polish exile organizations in Scandinavia, particularly in terms of rendering assistance to the democratic opposition in the PRL. For this purpose, a department granting aid to Polish people was established as a unit of the Central Committee on 9 October 1981. By the time it was disbanded, i.e. in December 1984, Scandinavian Committee for Independent Poland had been leading a propaganda campaign, among other things in Sweden, to provide reliable information about political goings-on, the persecuted oppositionists and martial law.⁵²

One more successful initiative, the main aim of which was to support the Polish oppositionists and promote pro-independence ideas among the Polish emigrants in Sweden, was "Kronika" [The Chronicle] – a magazine produced under the direction of professor Eugeniusz Kruszewski and edited by Tadeusz Głowacki in the years 1973 – 1985. It was issued in three Scandinavian capitals, i.e. Copenhagen, Stockholm and Oslo, on a monthly or bimonthly basis, and sent to major emigration centres and libraries. The magazine provided information on activities undertaken by Polish pro-independence organizations, artistic events attended by the Poles living in Scandinavia, as well as published Scandinavian and Polish press reviews. Throughout the period 1980 – 1990, "Kronika" [The Chronicle] addressed issues relating to Solidarity such as strikes initiated by the workers, actions taken by the PRL authorities, imprisonment of Solidarity activists and delegates, as well as attitudes held by Scandinavian officials and societies toward these events. Furthermore, "Kronika" [The Chronicle] produced leaflets, articles and other materials concerning the underground struggle for independence waged by the democratic opposition or the doings of the PRL authorities.⁵³

⁵² Ibidem: September–October 1980, no. 9/10, p. 24; January–February, July–August, November–December 1982, no. 1/2, pp. 7, 29, no. 7/8, pp. 6, 29–30, no. 11/12, pp. 25, 31; July–August, September–October 1983, no. 7/8, pp. 29–30, no. 9/10, pp. 28–29; May–June 1984, no. 5/6, p. 27; January–February 1985, no. 1/2, p. 30; "Noty Skandynawskie" [Scandinavian Notes] January–February 1984, no. 1/2, pp. 28, 31, August 1984, no. 8, p. 27, December 1985, no. 12, p. 1, June 1990, no. 6, p. 1, November 1990, no. 11, pp. 1–2; J. Wasylkowski: *Na rzecz Wolnej Polski. Towarzystwo Polskie w Danii i jego poprzednicy 1973–2001* [For the sake of Free Poland. Pro Polonia Society in Denmark and its predecessors], Kopenhaga 2002, pp. 42–57.

⁵³ E. Later-Chodyłowa: *Prasa polonijna i emigracyjna w Skandynawii* [The Polish Emigration Press in Scandinavia], in: *XIX Rocznik Instytutu Polsko-Skandynawskiego 2003/2004* [19th Yearbook of the Polish-Scandinavian Institute 2003–2004], Kopenhaga 2004, pp. 69–70; E. Olszewski: *Emigracja polska w Danii 1893–1993* [Polish Emigrants in Denmark 1893–1993],

Last but not least, the Committee for Independent Poland had also made a major contribution and helped Polish people in financial terms, namely by establishing Independent Poland Foundation the main aim of which was to raise money for providing food, clothes and direct financial support for, among others, the aggrieved intellectuals (200 \$).

All things considered, the author of the present article has not, however, discussed the subject matter thoroughly, in particular all actions that the Swedish trade unions, the Swedes and the Polish emigrants who had arrived in Sweden in quest for independence, had taken to support the Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union (NSZZ) Solidarity, the democratic opposition and people living in the Polish People's Republic. Therefore, it is beyond any doubt that the issue requires further analysis.

**SZWEDZKIE ZWIĄZKI ZAWODOWE I SPOŁECZEŃSTWO
ORAZ POLSKIE UCHODŹSTWO NIEPODLEGŁOŚCIOWE W SZWECJI
WOBEC NIEZALEŻNEGO SAMORZĄDNEGO ZWIĄZKU ZAWODOWEGO
„SOLIDARNOŚĆ” I OPOZYCJI DEMOKRATYCZNEJ W PRL
W LATACH 1980–1990**

Streszczenie

Wsparcie przez organizacje zawodowe, społeczeństwo i władze oraz polską emigrację niepodległościową w Szwecji udzielane NSZZ „Solidarność” i opozycji demokratycznej w Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej (PRL) miało różne formy. Przed powstaniem pierwszego niezależnego od władz związku zawodowego rozwój struktur opozycji wolnościowej w PRL wspierali działacze Szwedzkiej Socjaldemokratycznej Partii Robotniczej. W okresie fali strajków robotniczych, które nasiliły się w Polsce w sierpniu 1980 roku zdominowana przez socjaldemokratów Centrala Szwedzkich Związków Zawodowych (LO) nawiązała bliskie kontakty z strukturami organizującymi wystąpienia polskich robotników. Efektem ich były wsparcie strajkujących robotników na arenie

Warszawa–Lublin 1993, pp. 445–449; E.S. Kruszewski: *Polacy w Danii wobec pojaltańskiej Polski (1944–1990)* [Poles in Denmark and Poland after the Yalta Conference (1944–1990)], in: *W służbie Polsce i emigracji. Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Edwardowi Szczepanikowi* [Serving Poland and Polish expatriates. A Tribute to Professor Edward Szczepanik], eds. L. Nowak, M. Szerbiński, Gorzów Wlkp. 2002, p. 168; B. Hajduk: *Polskie uchodźstwo niepodległościowe...* [Polish Refugees in Scandinavia...], op. cit., p. 214.

międzynarodowej, między innymi przez przywódcę socjaldemokratów Olofa Palme-go oraz pomoc finansowa na potrzeby organizacyjne i dostawy urządzeń poligraficznych. Po wprowadzeniu w PRL stanu wojennego oraz delegalizacji NSZZ „Solidarność” i pozostałych grup opozycyjnych zarówno socjaldemokratyczne, jak i inne szwedzkie związki zawodowe rozwinęły różne formy pomocy dla opozycyjnych struktur działających w tzw. podziemiu. Gromadzono i przekazywano środki finansowe, organizowano zbiórki i transport darów oraz rozwijano intensywną działalność propagandowo-informacyjną w Skandynawii, w Europie i w świecie.

Poza pomocą udzielaną przez szwedzkie związki zawodowe ważne znaczenie dla struktur opozycyjnych w PRL miało wsparcie ze strony czynników oficjalnych i społeczeństwa szwedzkiego. Po wprowadzeniu stanu wojennego w Polsce, minister Ole Ullsten wspólnie z ministrami spraw zagranicznych Danii i Norwegii, jednoznacznie potępił ograniczanie swobód obywatelskich w PRL oraz internowania (aresztowania) przywódców i działaczy NSZZ „Solidarność”. Ogromnym wsparciem dla „nielegalnych” struktur „Solidarności” oraz społeczeństwa polskiego była pomoc niesiona przez wyspecjalizowane szwedzkie instytucje pozarządowe i charytatywne takie jak: Szwedzki Czerwony Krzyż, organizację Ratujcie Dzieci, Pomoc Luterańska, Wolny Kościół Ewangeliczny i Pomoc Indywidualna. Na odnotowanie zasługuje również aktywność pomocowa społeczeństwa szwedzkiego, w tym placówek oświatowych, w różnych regionach Szwecji.

Poza tym ważną rolę w akcji niesienia pomocy antyreżimowej opozycji demokratycznej w PRL odgrywało uchodźstwo polskie w Szwecji. Koordynacją programu pomocowego w Szwecji na rzecz „Solidarności” i opozycji zajmowała się Rada Uchodźstwa Polskiego, skupiająca 16 organizacji niepodległościowych oraz Federacja Uchodźstwa Polskiego.

W dziedzinie niesienia pomocy NSZZ „Solidarność” i opozycji demokratycznej w PRL wspomnieć również należy o wielostronnym wsparciu kierowanego przez profesora Eugeniusza S. Kruszewskiego Skandynawskiego Komitetu na Rzecz Wolnej Polski z siedzibą w Danii. Do chwili przekształcenia w Instytut Polsko-Skandynawski w grudniu 1984 roku SKnRzWP prowadził aktywną akcję propagandową, m.in. na terenie Szwecji, informującą o wydarzeniach politycznych w PRL, prześladowaniach opozycjonistów, poczynaniach władz reżimowych oraz działaniach wspierających podejmowanych na arenie międzynarodowej.

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**VERTRETER DES BRITISCHEN KONSULARDIENSTES IN STETTIN
IN DEN JAHREN 1946–1951**

**REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH CONSULATE IN SZCZECIN
IN THE YEARS 1946–1951**

Keywords: consular service, British consulate, Szczecin, Joseph Walters, David Garnett Mitchell, Henry Francis Bartlett

Summary

The article describes the functioning of British consulate in Szczecin, paying special attention to activities undertaken by the heads of the consulate (vice-consuls), namely Joseph Walters, David Garnett Mitchell and Henry Francis Bartlett who were knowledgeable and competent officials delegated from the Foreign Office in London. Nevertheless, what had a negative effect on the work they carried out in the city on the Odra river was internal and external invigilation by the Security Service (SB) and the fact they were isolated and had hardly any contact with Polish institutions or the local community. Duties performed by the vice-consuls included not only standard administrative procedures (e.g. granting visas) or attention for their few compatriots, but most of all the observation of processes and events taking place in West Pomerania. Information

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
function, which the British consulate fulfilled by submitting reports to their supervisors, was performed through reading local newspapers, asking people for their opinion, listening to the local community and “the hubbub of the street“. While at the very beginning the vice-consuls placed an emphasis on economic or socio-demographic issues, since the end of the 1940’s they paid special attention to political matters in their reports, which had to do with changes arising from the socialisation of life in Poland.

The reports submitted by the British consulate confirmed the Foreign Office in their opinion about the presence of Polish people in West Pomerania. Needless to say, it was rather negative. The communist administration and new inhabitants of the former German lands were often criticized for the walking pace of the reconstruction and development of particular areas of economy which, according to the British, did not guarantee the adequate development of the region. Her Majesty’s Diplomatic Service, which questioned the belonging of Szczecin and the adjacent area to Poland and at the same time officially honoured the Potsdam agreement, postponed adopting their stance on the Polish-German border by the time another peace conference was organized. Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that by applying to Polish authorities for permission to establish vice-consulate in Szczecin, Great Britain recognized formally that Polish authorities did administer West Pomerania.

Anfang August 1945, weniger als einen Monat nach der offiziellen Übernahme Stettins von der sowjetischen Militärbehörde durch die polnische Verwaltung, und kurz vor den Entscheidungen der Potsdamer Konferenz über die Übergabe unter die polnische Administration der Gebiete Deutschlands östlich der Linien der Flüsse: der Oder und der Lausitzer Neiße, erwog man in Londoner Foreign Office die Frage der Gründung einer Vertretung Großbritanniens in der Stadt an der Oder. Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, der bald nach Warschau fahren sollte, um dort das Amt des Botschafters des Vereinigten Königreiches anzutreten, setzte voraus, dass konsularische Stellen in Polen – außer typischen Pflichten – insbesondere die Funktion des Beobachters auszuüben haben. Sie sollten vor allem prüfen, ob die polnische Provisorische Regierung der Nationaleinheit ihre Versprechungen in Bezug auf Presse- und Glaubensfreiheit und in Bezug auf demokratische Durchführung der Parlamentswahl hält.¹

¹ J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty brytyjskiego wicekonsula w Szczecinie Josepha Waltersa z 1946 r., cz. I* [Berichte des britischen Vizekonsuls in Stettin Joseph Walters von 1946, Teil I], „Zapiski Historyczne“ 1997, H. 1, S. 82–83 (weiter zitiert als: Berichte von 1946, Teil I); idem: *Pierwsze sprawozdanie brytyjskiej służby konsularnej o Pomorzu Zachodnim (15 II 1946 r.)* [Der erste Bericht des britischen Konsulardienstes über Westpommern (15. Feb. 1946)], „Przegląd Zachodniopomorski“, 1998, H. 1, S. 195–196.

Aus der Sicht westlicher Diplomaten schien Stettin ein wichtiger Ort zu sein, vor allem wegen seiner geographischer Lage, wegen der Stationierung der sowjetischen Armee und wegen seines Hochseepotentials, die dann bestimmte politische, militärische und wirtschaftliche Folgen implizierten. Die Stadt an der Mündung eines großen und schiffbaren Flusses, der den Norden und Süden Europas verbindet, die Stadt, die im Grenzgebiet liegt, das seiner Staatsangehörigkeit noch nicht sicher ist, konnte durch den britischen Außen- und Geheimdienst nicht außer Acht gelassen werden. Angesichts der Dynamik demographischer Veränderungen und der Entwicklung polnisch-deutsch-russischer Beziehungen in Westpommern nach der Beendigung der Kriegshandlungen fehlte dem britischen Außendienst an aus dieser Region stammenden Informationen, was für die Gründung einer konsularischen Geschäftsstelle sprach. Die Stadt an der Oder sicherte der Londoner Regierung eine günstige Möglichkeit zur Observation von Ereignissen auf ehemaligen Reichsgebieten, umso mehr, dass hier bald Repatriierungswege für Polen und Aussiedlungsrouten für die deutsche Bevölkerung aus und in die britische Besatzungszone in Deutschland verlaufen sollten.²



Joseph Walters

Mitte Dezember 1945 informierte die Botschaft Großbritanniens in Warschau das polnische Außenministerium über den Vorschlag der Berufung Joseph Walters für den Posten des Vizekonsuls in Stettin. Am 12. Januar nächsten Jahres, einen Tag vor seiner Ankunft in Polen, erteilte ihm das Warschauer Ministerium sog. temporale Anerkennung, d.h. ein vorläufiges Erlaubnis für die Führung seiner Tätigkeit, für den Zeitraum bis zur Ausstellung des Exequaturs (das er aber nicht erhielt) – einer formellen Zustimmung. Die Stadt an der Oder gehörte dem konsularischen Bezirk in Danzig, das die Woiwodschaften: Olsztyn, Pommern, Danzig und Stettin umfasste. Der Danziger Generalkonsul des Vereinigten Königreiches

² *Szczecin w dokumentach polskiej służby dyplomatycznej 1945–1950* [Stettin in den Dokumenten des polnischen diplomatischen Dienstes 1945–1950], Einführung, Auswahl und Bearbeitung Ryszard Techman, Szczecin 1996, S. III–IV; J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Szczecin w polityce brytyjskiej w latach 1945–1970* [Stettin in der britischen Politik in den Jahren 1945–1970], in: *Polska w podzielonym świecie po II wojnie światowej (do 1989 r.)* [Polen in einer geteilten Welt nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (bis 1989)], Studiensammlung hg. M. Wojciechowski, Toruń 2002, S. 299.

– Eric Arthur Cleugh, machte den ernannten Vizekonsul mit dem ihm untergeordneten Gebiet während seines ersten Besuchs in Stettin, der am 11. Februar 1946 statt fand, bekannt.³

Das britische Vizekonsulat begann seine Tätigkeit Ende März, als Joseph Walters in die Stadt an der Oder kam. In der Organisationsperiode, die ein paar Monate dauerte, befand sich der Sitz der Stelle im Hotel „Continental“ (Straße: 3-go Maja), und danach (ab Anfang August), nach einer Renovierung von Büroräumen und der mit ihnen verbundenen Privatwohnung des Vizekonsuls, im Gebäude in der Straße Jedności Narodowej 11. Lokale Behörden der Selbst- und der Hochseeverwaltung waren in der Regel zur Gründung einer ausländischen, konsularischen Geschäftsstelle positiv eingestellt, denn somit wuchs der Rang der Stadt. Einige von ihnen meinten jedoch, dass die Anwesenheit der Briten „für unsere neue Freunde heikel sein wird“, wobei sie natürlich unter „Freunden“ Russen verstanden.⁴

Die Wahl von Joseph Walters für die Stelle in Stettin war sicherlich nicht zufällig, wenn auch in Bezug auf seine militärische Vergangenheit, die in der gegenwärtigen Wirklichkeit Westpommerns unzweifelhaft brauchbar war. Foreign Office bemühte sich die Regel anzuwenden, dass man nach Polen Personen entsendet, die die Fähigkeit einer scharfsinnigen Beobachtung von Ereignissen besitzen, und nicht nur Fertigkeit und Gewandtheit in administrativen Aufgaben, die typisch für Konsularbeamte sind. Walters erfüllte dieses Kriterium, obwohl (oder vielleicht – deswegen) er keine Erfahrung im Auslandsdienst für seinen Land hatte, denn die Vertretung an der Odermündung war die erste Arbeit dieser Art auf seinem Berufsweg.

Er kam in die Stadt an der Oder als erwachsener, 35jähriger Mann,⁵ denn er wurde am 30. Juni 1911 in London geboren. In England hinterließ er seine Frau (Rose Elizabeth Watkin) und einen 4jährigen Sohn. Laut Spekulationen des polnischen Sicherheitsdienstes sollte er angeblich polnischer Abstammung sein (angeblich war sein Vater ein Pole, und seine Mutter eine Engländerin), er selbst jedoch dementierte entschieden derartige Vermutungen in Anwesenheit von

³ J.Tebinka, R.Techman: *Pierwsze sprawozdanie...* [Der Erste Bericht...], S. 198; Instytut Pamięci Narodowej Oddział w Szczecinie (Institut für Nationales Gedenken Abteilung in Stettin, weiter: IPN Szczecin), 009/1468, Bd. 3, S. 207.

⁴ J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. I* [Berichte von 1946, Teil I], S. 86; IPN Szczecin, 006/75, Bd. 3, S. 195, 329.

⁵ Er war ein nicht großer (ca. 165 cm groß), braunhaariger Brünnette, schlank, mit dunklen Augen und Hautfarbe, mit dichtem, schwarzem Haar – IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 3, S. 228–229.

Angestellten des Konsulats. Er meinte, sich vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg mehrmals bei Bekannten in der Woiwodschaft Poznań aufgehalten zu haben, und seinen Vater sollten mit der Zweiten Republik Polen keine Bande des Blutes sondern nur Geschäfte verbinden. Während dieser Aufenthalte lernte er Polnisch sprechen, und er vertiefte diese Kenntnis während des Krieges, als er täglich mit Polen auf dem Gebiet Großbritanniens verkehrte. Denn er leistete in den Jahren 1940–1945 seinen Wehrdienst in der Armee des Vereinigten Königreiches ab, wo er einige Zeit als Verbindungsoffizier (und Dolmetscher) zwischen der britischen Partei und dem Geschwader Nr. 303 diente. Er lernte damals viele polnische Offiziere kennen, und sogar – wie er sich erinnerte – war er kurz bei Brigadegeneral Władysław Kalkus im Stützpunkt Polnischer Luftwaffe in Blackpool im Dienst. Es ist nicht auszuschließen, dass er damals für Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) arbeitete – worüber die polnische Sicherheitsbehörde eindeutig voreilig urteilte, indem sie vermutete, dass Walters in der Endphase des Krieges durch den britischen Geheimdienst nach Belgien entsandt wurde. In der Terminologie von Mitarbeitern des Sicherheitsamtes verwendete man den Terminus Intelligence Service als Bezeichnung für den britischen Geheimdienst, ohne verschiedene im Vereinigten Königreich tätige Geheimdienste zu unterscheiden⁶. Sollte Walters ein SIS-Mitarbeiter sein, musste diese Tatsache in Moskau dank Kim Philby, einem höheren Offizier des britischen Geheimdienstes, und in Wirklichkeit einem sowjetischen Geheimagent bekannt sein. Unabhängig von eventuellen russischen Warnungen wurden westliche Diplomaten und ihre Familien durch die kommunistische Gegenspionage in Polen, d.h. das Erste Department des Ministeriums für öffentliche Sicherheit und seine lokale Strukturen routinemäßig einer Bearbeitung unterzogen.

Die Hauptpflichten des Vizekonsuls beschränkte sich auf Pflege und Schutz von Rechten seiner Staatsangehörigen; Berichten über wirtschaftliche und politische Lage im konsularischen Bereich; Beaufsichtigung der Realisierung durch Polen von Verträgen, die Warschau und London miteinander schlossen. Er vertrat auch die britische Regierung und erfüllte die Rolle des Gastgebers für Besucher, begleitete sie bei Feierlichkeiten und diente ihnen mit Informationen. Außerdem

⁶ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 90; Bd. 3, S. 115, 181–182, 202, 228–229; 006/75, Bd. 3, S. 29–30, 196. Die Frage der Ausnutzung von konsularischen Mitarbeitern in der Geheimdiensttätigkeit der UdSSR und ihren Satellitenstaaten wird in der neusten wissenschaftlichen Literatur außer Acht gelassen: S. Dorrill: *MI6. Fifty Years of Special Operations*, London 2000; R.J. Aldrich: *The Hidden Hand Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence*, London 2001; K. Jeffery: *MI6. The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949*, London 2010.

hatte er die Obrigkeit über Handelsschiffe Großbritanniens und sorgte für englische Seeleute, die aus unterschiedlichen Gründen im Stettiner Hafen geblieben waren.

Die Ankunft in Stettin eines Vertreters von Foreign Office konnte dem kommunistischen Sicherheitsdienst nicht entgehen, denn er beobachtete aufmerksam westliche, in Polen akkreditierte Diplomaten. Die Tätigkeit des Vizekonsulats wurde der sog. Objektbearbeitung „Kolonía“ unterzogen, und Walters selbst, als dem Hauptfigurant, gab man die Bezeichnung „Brytan“. Man nahm im voraus an, dass er als SIS-Offizier, der dem kommunistischen System gegenüber feindlich eingestellt sein sollte, sich mit dem Nachrichtendienst beschäftigt.⁷ In der damaligen Auffassung der Geheimpolizei, verstand man Spionage als Sammeln von allerlei Informationen, nicht nur militärischen, sondern auch wirtschaftlichen und politischen, ohne zu berücksichtigen, dass Tätigkeiten dieser Art zu konsularischen Aufgaben gehörten, die das internationale Recht regelte. Dieser Voraussetzung wurden gewonnene Informationen darüber, was der britische Vizekonsul gerade vornahm, nicht nur angepasst, sondern sogar gebeugt. Je nach zugänglichen technischen und menschlichen Mitteln verfolgte man seine Schritte: zuerst durch äußere Beobachtung, und dann durch Anwerben von Personen aus seiner nächsten Umgebung. Walters fand zwar schnell heraus, dass er beschattet wird, jedoch blieb der ständige „Schutz“ bestimmter Dienste nicht ohne Einfluss auf seine berufliche Arbeit, sein gesellschaftliches Leben, seine Launen und seine Meinung über Polen.⁸

Die Beziehungen des Briten zu Behörden und Parteiverwaltung der Woiwodschaft waren von Anfang an höchstens nur sehr formell und sporadisch. Eine bessere Beziehung hatte er zuerst zum Stadtpräsidenten Piotr Zaremba, jedoch allmählich wurde sie schwächer, um Ende des Jahrzehnten völlig abzusterben. Ähnlich sahen Privatkontakte Walters aus, denn die Mehrheit von Bekannten hatte nach einiger Zeit Angst, sich mit ihm zu treffen, wegen Handlungen der Sicherheitsbehörde, die alle die konsularische Stelle besuchende Personen einer operativen Bearbeitung unterzog.

⁷ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 3, S. 226; siehe Weiteres zur Tätigkeit des Ersten Departments MBP: P. Pleskot: „*Tarcza partii i narodu*”. *Kontrwywiad Polski Ludowej w latach 1945–1956. Zarys struktur i wybór źródeł* [„Schutzschild der Partei und der Nation“. Gegenspionage der Volksrepublik Polen in den Jahren 1945–1956. Eine Skizze der Struktur und Quellenauswahl], Warszawa 2010.

⁸ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 3, S. 43, 227–228.

Von Anfang seines Aufenthalts in Stettin an pflegte Walters einen lebhaften Kontakt mit Vertretern der konsularischen Stelle Quai-d'Orsay, die anderthalb Monat später als die britische gegründet wurde. Britisch-französische Beziehungen fanden ihren Ausdruck in gemeinsamen Besuchen, der Veranstaltung von Empfängen und gesellschaftlichen Treffen, Ausflügen, Belieferung mit diplomatischer Post u. ä.⁹ Nach der Gründung Mitte 1948 der schwedischen Konsularagentur beriet der Vizekonsul des Vereinigten Königreiches den schwedischen Vertreter, wie er auf hiesigem Gebiet handeln soll, und er kommentierte später, dass er „als Vertreter aller Staaten außer bolschewistischen fungiert“.¹⁰

Walters brauchte dem Schutz über die Untertanen Seiner Majestät nicht allzu viel Zeit opfern, denn die Anzahl der Einwohnern Westpommerns, die früher die britische Staatsangehörigkeit besaßen, überstieg in den 40er Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts keine dreißig Personen. Ein paar bekamen kleine finanzielle Nothilfe, in vereinzelt Fällen zahlte man Witwen englischer Soldaten eine Rente aus. Die administrative Behörde stellte manchmal Fälle der Staatsangehörigkeit des Vereinigten Königreiches von bestimmten Personen in Frage, was eine konsularische Intervention erforderte, die in der Regel erfolglos blieb. Der Vizekonsul suchte in seinem Bezirk u.a. nach Grabstätten der während des Zweiten Weltkrieges gefallenen englischen Flieger, die über Westpommern abgeschossen worden waren.¹¹

Typische konsularische Arbeit administrativen Charakters, und insbesondere Visa und Pässe betreffende Angelegenheiten, nahmen den Verwalter des britischen Konsulats nicht besonders in Anspruch. Er stellte wenige Visa für die Ausreise aus Polen nach Großbritannien, wenige Transit-Visa, die zur Durchfahrt durch die britische Besatzungszone Deutschlands berechtigten und Aufenthaltsvisa aus.

In einem bescheidenen Ausmaß erfüllte Walters auch Pflichten, die mit dem Hochseeverkehr verbunden waren, denn britische Handelsschiffe nicht besonders

⁹ R. Techman: *Konsuln der Französischen Republik in Stettin in den Jahren 1946–1950*, „*Studia Maritima*“, vol. XXII (2009), S. 117 ff.; idem: Jacques Leguebe, konsul francuski w Szczecinie w latach 1946–1948 [Jacques Leguebe, der französische Konsul in Stettin in den Jahren 1946–1948], in: *Tempus nostrum est, Księga pamiątkowa ofiarowana profesorowi Edwardowi Włodarczykowi w 60. rocznicę urodzin* [Tempus nostrum est. Festschrift für Professor Edward Włodarczyk anlässlich seines 60. Geburtstages], hrsg. W. Stepiński, D. Szudra, R. Techman, Szczecin 2006, S. 163.

¹⁰ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 3, S. 215, 231; R. Techman: *Anfänge des Konsulardienstes skandinavischer Staaten in Stettin nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, „*Studia Maritima*“, vol. XXVI, Szczecin 2013, S. 119.

¹¹ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 162; Bd. 4, S. 4, 30, 178; Po 0014/75, Bd. 2, S. 245–246.

zahlreich die Stadt an der Oder besuchten. Die Flagge Großbritanniens erschien hier zum ersten Mal am 9. September 1946, als das Dampfschiff „North Down“ den Hafen anliefe.¹² Der Vizekonsul vermittelte übrigens zu dieser Zeit zwischen UNRRA-Vertretern und der britischen Handelsmission. In den Jahren 1947 und 1948 liefen nur ein paar britische Schiffe den polnischen Teil des Stettiner Hafens ein, ein bisschen mehr – über zehn – im nachfolgenden Jahr, was sowieso ein sehr kleines Prozent des ganzen Hafenverkehrs bildete.¹³

Gegen die im Westen geltenden Regeln schränkte das Sicherheitsamt Walters den Zugang zum Hafenkai ein, indem es ihm die Ausstellung eines ständigen Passierscheines verweigerte: Er bekam nur Einzelpassierscheine, jedes Mal, wenn nach Stettin ein englischer Schiff ankam. Während ein paar Amtsjahren musste der Vizekonsul sporadisch in Angelegenheiten britischer Seemänner eingreifen, anders als seine Kollegen in den Häfen in Danzig und Gdingen, wo Mannschaften britischer Schiffe unter Alkoholeinfluss Krawallen auslösten, verunglückten, oder ihre Einheiten verließen. Im September 1948 übernahm der Brite die Vertretung der weltältesten Klassifikationsgesellschaft Lloyd Register of Shipping in London für die Häfen: Stettin und Swinemünde.¹⁴

Während der Amtszeit an der Oder konzentrierte sich Walters vor allem auf Informationstätigkeit, die ihren Ausdruck in gelegentlichen und periodischen Berichten fand. Der Brite schickte sie an seine Vorgesetzten in Danzig, seltener nach Warschau, manchmal direkt nach London. Er stellte sich darin als ein gewissenhafter und einigermaßen unparteiischer Beobachter der damaligen Wirklichkeit dar. Da ihm jedoch die Wirklichkeit seines Aufenthaltslandes – sowohl das politische als auch das wirtschaftliche System – fremd war, mied er keine kritischen Bemerkungen, die meistens berechtigt waren. Ihn störten z.B. einige Eigenschaften von Einwohnern (Unzuverlässigkeit, Neigung zum Durchlavieren, Faulheit), die er von der Autopsie kannte und nicht selten zu Unrecht auf die ganze Nation übertrug.¹⁵

Inhalte seiner Berichte entnahm er unterschiedlichen Quellen: Er schöpfte Daten aus einer detaillierten Analyse der einheimischen Presse, fragte nach

¹² R. Techman: *Kalendarium morskie Szczecina. Rok 1946 r.* [Seekalendarium Stettins. Das Jahr 1946], „Przegląd Zachodniopomorski“, 2001, H. 3, S. 250.

¹³ IPN Szczecin, Po 0014/75, Bd. 2, S. 211. Seit Juni 1948 bis Ende Mai nächsten Jahres liefen in den Stettiner Hafen nur 7 Schiffe unter britischen Flagge ein – Archiwum Straży Granicznej w Szczecinie (Archiv des Grenzschutzes in Szczecin), WOP-Stab, 222/38, S. 291.

¹⁴ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd.3, S. 126, 137, 143, 162, 214–215, 231.

¹⁵ J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty z 1946 r.* [Berichte von 1946], Bd. I, S. 88.

Meinung und Bewertung viele Personen, Vieles schlussfolgerte er aus der Observation seiner Umgebung. Dank dem ausgeprägten Sinn für Beobachtung, der angeborenen Intelligenz registrierte er mit Einzelheiten „Stimme des Volkes“, Verhalten von Bürgern, Ereignisse in der Stadt.

Wegen seiner Funktion lernte Walters eine Reihe von Personen kennen, die in der Staatsverwaltung, Institutionen und Hochseeunternehmen beschäftigt waren und die ihn über Verschiedenes informierten. Diese Kontakte hatten am häufigsten amtlichen Charakter, viel seltener – gesellschaftlichen, jedoch nach der Meinung der Offiziere von der Geheimpolizei bildeten sie ein Agentennetz, dessen Gründung man gerade dem Vizekonsul zuschrieb.¹⁶ Angesichts gefälschter Beschuldigungen zahlten einige dieser Personen für die Bekanntschaft mit dem Briten mit hohen Urteilen und Freiheitsstrafen. Eine dieser Personen, die sehr verdient war (Kazimierz Bartoszyński), starb im Gefängnis.¹⁷

Obwohl der britische Vizekonsul Stettin im Mittelpunkt seiner Interessen stellte, entgingen wichtigere Ereignisse oder – im breiteren Sinne – in Westpommern verlaufende Prozesse seiner Aufmerksamkeit nicht. Im ersten Jahr der Konsulatstätigkeit betraf die informative Arbeit eigentlich gesellschaftlich-wirtschaftliche Fragen, was nicht heißt, dass der Brite sich in der politischen Lage seines Amtslandes, in der Tätigkeit von wichtigsten Parteien, in Handlungen des Sicherheitsapparates in Bezug auf Gegner des aufgezwungenen kommunistischen Systems nicht auskannte. Er übermittelte Informationen über die Domination der Polnischen Arbeiterpartei (Polska Partia Robotnicza – PPR) und der Polnischen Sozialistischen Partei (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna – PPS), über konjunkturbedingte (als kleiner Übel) Beitritte zur zweiten der Parteien, über Niederschlagen der Opposition, die er mit Recht nur in der Polnischen Volkspartei sah – der einzigen, reellen Kraft, die unter gewöhnlichen Umständen im Stande war, sich der neuen Ordnung wiederzusetzen. Das wahre Gesicht der gesellschaftlichen Akzeptanz zeigte Walters im April 1946, indem er über den Verlauf des Festes anlässlich der Befreiung Stettins - „Trzymamy Straż nad Odrą“ (Wir halten die Wache an der Oder) berichtete, als es zur Manifestation zur Ehre des Vizepremiers Stanisław Mikołajczyk, des PSL-Führers, kam.¹⁸

¹⁶ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 4, S. 24.

¹⁷ Ibidem: Po 0014/75, Bd. 1, S. 9; Bd. 2, S. 210–211; Bd. 7, S. 199–201; R. Techman: *Ludzie morskiego Szczecina (część 16)* [Leute des Hochseestettins (Teil 16)], in: *Kronika Szczecina 2006 (nr XXV)*, Szczecin 2007, S. 143; siehe auch P. Pleskot, zitierte Arbeit, S. 195.

¹⁸ J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. I* [Berichte von 1946, Teil I], S. 89, 97–98; idem: *Raporty brytyjskiego wicekonsula w Szczecinie Josepha Waltersa z 1946 r., cz. II* [Berichte

Der Vertreter von Foreign Office war überzeugt, dass die Parlamentswahlen im Januar 1947, trotz der Schikanen der Verwaltung und besonders trotz der Handlungen des Geheimdienstes, die erwähnte Bauernpartei gewinnt. Wenn auch der Verlauf einer gesamtpolnischen Volksabstimmung ein halbes Jahr zuvor bei Walters keine Vorbehalte weckte, so berichtete er im Januar 1947 von mehreren Beispielen an Wahlmanipulationen, darunter über den Zwang zu einer öffentlichen Stimmabgabe für die Liste des sog. Demokratischen Blocks. Nach der Bekanntmachung von (gefälschten) Ergebnissen konnte er sich nur mit Schwierigkeiten mit der Niederlage Mikołajczyks abfinden: Er informierte seine Vorgesetzten, dass die Wahlen „*unter Zwang und Terror*“ stattfanden. Die PSL-Niederlage setzte er mit der wachsenden Gesetzlosigkeit der Geheimpolizei und dem endgültigen Verfall der Demokratie in Polen gleich. Das widerspiegelte sich in seiner Vorgehensweise: Er wurde vorsichtiger, glaubte und vertraute wenigen Personen und schränkte seine Kontakte mit Polen ein.¹⁹

Einen wichtigen Punkt unter wirtschaftlichen Informationen, die die konsularische Stelle verließen, stellten: demographische Fragen, die Problematik eines breit verstandenen Wiederaufbaus, die sowjetische Anwesenheit (darunter die militärische), und die Übergabe des Stettiner Hafens dar, d.h. diese Fragen, die relevant für die Stadt und die Stettiner Woiwodschaft in den ersten Nachkriegsjahren waren.²⁰

Der Vizekonsul schenkte seine besondere Aufmerksamkeit dem Austausch der Bevölkerung in Westpommern – einerseits der ausgesiedelten deutschen und andererseits der ankommenden polnischen. Er berichtete seinen Vorgesetzten über die Routen für Transport von Deutschen in die britische Besatzungszone, über den Verlauf dieser Erscheinung, ihre Steigerungsmomente, Wendepunkte, und ihren Rückgang. Er interessierte sich für die Repatriierung von Polen, die aus englisch-amerikanischen Lagern zurück kamen, für ihren körperlichen und psychischen Zustand nach der Rückkehr in die Heimat.²¹

des britischen Vizekonsuls in Stettin Joseph Walters von 1946, Teil II], „Zapiski Historyczne“, Bd. LXII, 1997, H. 2–3, S. 115–116 (weiter zitiert als: Berichte von 1946, Teil II).

¹⁹ The National Archives, Kew, FO 371/56443, Bericht von Walters über den Verlauf der Volksabstimmung vom 30. Juni 1946; FO 371/66090, Bericht von Walters vom 20. Januar 1947; IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 3, S. 208, 232; Bd. 4, S. 29.

²⁰ J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. I.*, S. 89.

²¹ Ibidem: S. 89, 94, 98, 104–105; J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. II* [Berichte von 1946, Teil II], S. 105, 108–109, 112, 120.

Der Mitarbeiter von Londoner Foreign Office stellte seinen Vorgesetzten ein relativ kompetentes Bild in Bezug auf: Zufluss von Polen auf die neu erhaltene Gebiete, ihre Routen, Intensität und Entwicklung dieses Prozesses, und auch eine interessante Charakteristik der Westpommern besiedelnden Bevölkerung dar. Seiner Meinung nach bildeten die Repatriierten aus Westen eine Elite-Gruppe, in einem bestimmten Sinne sogar eine höher stehende Zivilisationsgruppe mit einem passenden Vermögensstand. Die besser situierten kamen von früheren Gebieten hinter dem Bug. Die die aus tiefem Russland kamen waren dagegen in schlechtem körperlichem und materiellem Zustand: abgemagert, unbekleidet und arm. Walters bemerkte sowohl den Organisationschaos als auch Verpflegungs- und Finanzmängel in der Hilfesicherung für die meist Bedürftigen. Er stellte Veränderungen im Charakter des polnischen Siedlungswesens fest, dessen Eigenschaften ein immer stärkerer Bevölkerungszufluss in die Städte, die Stärke dieser Gruppen und ihre wirtschaftliche Lage waren.²²

Walters nagte eine besondere Anwesenheit von Juden in Stettin, die Mitte 1946 die zahlreichste Einwohnergruppe (25000 Personen – über 35% der Einwohnerzahl) darstellten und die hierhin wellenweise von den Gebieten der UdSSR kamen, um nach dem Pogrom von Kielce allmählich in den Westen und dann am häufigsten nach Palästina zu fliehen. Briten waren bemüht, den Judenzufluss auf ihr Mandatsterritorium wegen der gespannten Innenlage und aus Furcht in Bezug auf die Stellungnahme arabischer Länder zu stoppen. Der Vizekonsul beobachtete in der polnischen Gesellschaft Anzeichen des Antisemitismus: Er deutete kleine Vorfälle an, stellte aber die Erscheinung selbst nicht übertrieben dar. Polen verhielten sich in bilateralen Kontakten in der Regel korrekt, sogar teilnahmslos – wahrscheinlich beruhigt wegen dem vorläufigen Zustand jüdischen Aufenthaltes.²³

Walters interessierte sich für die Lage der deutschen, in Stettin gebliebenen Bevölkerung, die einerseits zwar eine billige Arbeitskraft für Polen darstellte, andererseits jedoch auf eine würdige Weise behandelt wurde. Er sah darin eine Diskrepanz in der Stellungnahme, denn einerseits gab es Einwohner, die

²² J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. I...*, S. 90, S. 94–95, 98, 105; J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. II...*, S. 107–110, 119–120.

²³ J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. I...*, S. 89–90, 105; idem, *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. II...*, S. 105, 110; A.J. Kochavi: *Post-Holocaust Politics. Britain, the United States and Jewish Refugees 1945–1948*, London 2001, S. 172–182.

Deutsche zur Arbeit brauchten und andererseits die Verwaltung mit ihrer Politik einer schnellst möglichen Verweisung dieser Nation aus Polen.²⁴

Der Aufmerksamkeit des Briten konnte die Alltagsexistenz der Stettiner nicht entgehen. Walters bemerkte das niedrige Lebensniveau, bedingt durch niedrige Gehälter und hohe Unterhaltskosten, was er u.a. der Randlage Stettins, der Ineffizienz des Transports u.a. zuschrieb.²⁵ Chaos und ein langsames Tempo des Wiederaufbaus der Stadt, verursacht durch die Inkompetenz von Baufirmen, durch die niedrige Effizienz von Arbeitskräften, durch den Mangel an einer entsprechenden Organisation der Arbeit und Baumaterialien u.a. beschrieb Walters sogar zu kräftig, indem er notierte, dass „der Sachstand für praktisch jede, von Polen in Stettin realisierte Unternehmung typisch ist“. Er benotete viel höher die Dynamik der Handlungen von der Privatinitiative bei der Eröffnung von Restaurants, Läden, Handwerksbetrieben und Kaufhäusern als die des staatlichen Unternehmertums.²⁶

Ohne Schwierigkeiten hörte der Brite der Meinung der Straße aufmerksam zu und notierte die Stimmung der hiesigen Gemeinschaft, mehr als irgendwo anders anfälligen für Gerüchte verschiedener Art. Unkritisch akzeptiert und verschönt bei jeder Wiederholung riefen sie ambivalente Gefühle hervor, je nach vermittelten Inhalten: entweder Aufregung und freudiger Erwartung oder Bedrücktheit. Das war der Ursprung einer in der ersten Hälfte 1946 starken Überzeugung, dass Polen die Stadt verliert, oder aber es kommt zu einer Internationalisierung des Stettiner Hafens. Der Unglaube an Beständigkeit der nahe gelegenen Grenze, der im Bewusstsein eines durchschnittlichen Bürgers verwurzelt war, stellte – Walters Meinung nach – eine gewisse psychische Barriere dar, die die Entwicklung Stettins erschwerte. Die Umfragen dieser Art erlaubten Walters auch die Feststellung darüber, dass die kommunistische Verwaltung eine geringe Unterstützung hat, aber auch dass die Mehrheit polnischer Bürger passiv ist, denn sie sich vor Repressionen fürchtet.²⁷

²⁴ J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. I...*, S. 89, 94, 98, 104–105; idem: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. II...*, S. 105, 108–109, 112, 120.

²⁵ J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. I...*, S. 90, 93–94; idem: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. II...*, S. 118–119.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, S. 108.

²⁷ R. Techman: *Internacjonalizacja miasta czy portu? Kilka uwag o dokumencie z 1946 r.* [Internationalisierung der Stadt oder des Hafens? Einige Bemerkungen zum Dokument von 1946], „Przegląd Zachodniopomorski“, 1996, H. 4, S. 151–167; J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. I...*, S. 105.

Selbstverständlich mussten einen ehemaligen Offizier der britischen Armee auch die Fragen der Stationierung sowjetischen Militärs in den Grenzen Westpommerns, insbesondere in Stettin und Swinemünde, beschäftigen. Selbstverständlich konnte er nur Schätzdaten über seine Anzahl verwenden, die angesichts der ständigen Dislozierung einzelner Einheiten und des Mangels an Identifikationszeichen u.a. nur sehr abweichend waren. Auf jeden Fall wies der Vizekonsul seine Vorgesetzten auf eine allgemeine Einteilung der UdSSR-Abteilungen hin, und genau – auf eine Abgrenzung von Befugnissen (die Grenzlinie stellte die Oder dar) zwischen der Nördlichen Militärgruppe der Sowjetischen Armee in Liegnitz (von Marschall Rokossowski) und der Sowjetischen Militärischen Verwaltung Deutschlands in Berlin (von Marschall Sokołowski).²⁸ Er betonte, dass infolge der Lokation auf diesem Gebiet von ein paar Infanteriedivisionen, eine ernste Gefahr für die Bevölkerung anstieg, denn Soldaten und Marodeure raubten und sogar mordeten, was von der Ansiedlung auf dünner besiedelten Gebieten entmutigte. Walters war sogar ein Augenzeuge von der mangelnden Sicherheit in Stettin, wo es in den ersten Monaten 1946 zu regulären Kämpfen zwischen Militärestreifen und in den Ruinen sein Wesen treibenden Truppen kam. Außerdem war die Stadt an der Oder ein Paradies für Plünderer, und sie lockte Randalierer aus dem Landinneren an. Eine ernstere Veränderung zum Guten sah Walters erst Ende dieses Jahres, als Milizkräfte wuchsen und die Anzahl an sowjetischen Abteilungen sank.²⁹

Da Walters ein paar Hochseefachleute kannte, legte er detaillierte Berichte über den damaligen Zustand des Stettiner Hafens und seiner Übernahme durch die polnische Verwaltung ab. Seine Vorgesetzten bekamen allgemeine Angaben über sein Zerstörungsgrad, Nutzungskapazitäten, über die Übernahme einzelner Hafenobjekte und Konzeptionen ihrer Nutzung, u.a. Er hob die Taktik der Handlung der sowjetischen Militärverwaltung hervor, die erst unter Zwang einzelne Bereiche des Hafens übergab. Walters stellte als typische Eigenschaften der Moskauer Politik folgendes fest: Verzögerungstaktik, Erschwerungen bei Verhandlungen, Nichteinhalten von Terminen zur Fortsetzung des Abbaus und der Ausfuhr von Gütern, oder sogar ihre boshafte Zerstörung. Er irrte sich nicht, als er behauptete, dass fremde Einheiten den Stettiner Hafen nicht zurückgeben, nachdem sie die Umladung von Kriegsbeute beendet haben, sondern dass sie eine neue Erklärung

²⁸ Ibidem, S. 91, 93; J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. II...*, S. 116–117.

²⁹ J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. I...*, S. 91, 93, 101; idem: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. II...*, S. 117.

für ihre weitere Anwesenheit finden werden, was bald der Handelsverkehr in der sowjetischen Hafenzonen bestätigte. Mit einem starken Skeptizismus sah Walters die Perspektiven einer schnellen Inbetriebsetzung des Stettiner Hafens in vollem Umfang durch die Verwaltung der Republik Polen an, denn er beobachtete die Devastation von Kais und Anlagen, finanzielle Beschränkungen des polnischen Staates und den Mangel an Fachmanns- und Arbeiterkräften.³⁰

Der sich für die Problematik des breit verstandenen Transports interessierende Vizekonsul übermittelte mehr oder weniger präzise Angaben über Brückenzerstörungen, unzureichende Schiffbarkeit der Oder, Stehenbleiben von Schleppern und Kahnern, hohe Transportkosten, Verhandlungen mit Niederländern bezüglich Kohlelieferungen als Gegenleistung für Binnengewässerfuhrpark, u.a.³¹

Den Briten beschäftigten die Fragen der Gewerbe in Westpommern, die Anzahl und das Grad der Zerstörung von Betrieben, der Umfang ihrer Herstellung, der Nationalisierungsfortschritt und die Stärke des Privatsektors. Insbesondere machte ihn die sowjetische Demontage der Fabrik für synthetisches Benzin in Police, das Schicksal des Motorbetriebes in der Ortschaft Altdamm (heute Dąbie) bei Stettin oder die Verstaatlichung von deutschen Unternehmen neugierig.³²

Walters interessierte sich für die Entwicklung der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit zwischen polnischen und britischen Firmen. Der hiesige Privatsektor war jedoch nicht im Stande, Handelskontakte mit Westen anzuknüpfen. Der Brite hoffte, dass der in Juni 1947 unterzeichnete polnisch-britische Handelsvertrag auch Stettin Vorteile bringt, indem er den Warenaustausch steigert und Hochseewarenverkehr belebt. Deswegen fand auch die Idee der Eröffnung einer festen Schifffahrtlinie zwischen der Stadt an der Oder und Häfen Großbritanniens Anerkennung des Vizekonsuls. Walters hatte seinen direkten Anteil an der Entwicklung von Hafendienstleistungen, denn er beauftragte die erste Sachverständigenfirma „M. Płodowski i S-ka“ mit der Bedienung aller englischen, nach Stettin ankommenden Schiffe bezüglich Feststellung von Maß und Gewicht, Festlegung von Warensortiment und -gattungen, Aufsicht über die Beladung, Stauen und Trimmen, u.a.

³⁰ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 245–246; Bd. 3, S. 226–227; Po 0014/75, Bd. 2, S. 211, 245–246; J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. I...*, S. 91, 95–96, 98–99, 102–103; idem: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. II...*, S. 103–104, 107–108, 113–114, 119.

³¹ J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. I...*, S. 92, 96, 99, 102–104; idem: *Raporty z 1946 r., cz. II...*, S. 104–105, 112–114, 118.

³² Ibidem, S. 112.

In Bezug auf eine andere Situation, die durch die Ideologisierung des Lebens in Polen Ende 40er Jahre verursacht wurde, kamen an die Spitze der Liste von den durch den Briten übermittelten Informationen politische Fragen, die auch in Verbindung mit Bedingungen der materiellen Existenz des Menschen analysiert wurden. Walters nahm Proteste von Hafendarbeitern wahr, die sich u.a. in Verweigerung der Beladung von sowjetischen Schiffen mit auf dem polnischen Markt fehlenden Lebensmitteln ausdrückten, und die nach einer Gegenaktion der Geheimpolizei beendet wurden. Er entblößte Lügen der kommunistischen Propaganda und übermittelte u.a. Daten über die wahre Lage von Arbeitern, um den Mythos des Arbeiterparadieses in Polen zu enttarnen. Der Vizekonsul zeichnete seinen Vorgesetzten das Bildnis des Geistes von einfachen Bürgern, ihre Furcht vor Kriegsausbruch, Zustände „politischer Apathie“ auf.³³

Walters übergab an Foreign Office Informationen über die Vormachtstellung von PPR und die Marginalisierung der Rolle von PPS, dann über die Vereinheitlichung von Arbeiterparteien Mitte Dezember 1948. Er verfolgte politische Prozesse und Säuberungsaktionen in Bezug auf sog. unerwünschte Elemente auf Posten in der Staatsverwaltung und Parteiorganen. Er schrieb über die Verhaftung ehemaliger Mitglieder der Polnischen Heimatarmee (AK) und anderer Unabhängigkeit anstrebender Organisationen, und über die propagandistische Diskreditierung dieser Gruppierungen. Seiner Aufmerksamkeit entgingen zahlreiche – trotz Schärfung von Strafen für den Versuch eines illegalen Grenzübergangs – Fälle der Flucht von Polen und Juden in Westen nicht. In der Belegung der Tätigkeit jüdischer Organisationen, die sich mit Menschentransport beschäftigten, wollte er eine Änderung der Stellung von der polnischen Regierung bezüglich der Emigration dieser ethnischen Gruppe sehen.³⁴

Die Vorgesetzten bekamen von ihm hochwertige Informationen in Bezug auf die Demographie Stettins Anfang 1949, und v.a. in Bezug auf deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen, die sich – wie er betonte – Ende 40er Jahre änderten. Er zeichnete hier ein Bild des Verhältnisses zwischen beiden Nationen in der Oder-Stadt, das wahrscheinlich sehr nah der Wahrheit lag. Das Verhältnis charakterisierten: das Behandeln „mit voller Höflichkeit“, der Schutz und die Privilegierung der Deutschen durch die Russen, was dazu führte, dass die Ersten

³³ J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty brytyjskich wicekonsulów w Szczecinie z 1949 r.* [Berichte britischer Vizekonsuln in Stettin vom Jahr 1949], „Zapiski Historyczne“, 2000, H. 1, S. 108, 113 (weiter zitiert als: *Raporty z 1949 r.* [Berichte von 1949]).

³⁴ *Raporty z 1949 r.* [Berichte von 1949], S. 108–109.

„*sehr arrogant zur Gereiztheit von Polen*“ wurden. Er schlussfolgerte aus dieser Situation aus, dass „offensichtlich eine fundierte Überzeugung in der deutschen Kolonie besteht, verstärkt durch aus der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands kommende Gerüchte, dass der Krieg unabwendbar ist, und dass Stettin zum Reich zurück kehrt“.³⁵

Mit einem kritischen Auge sah Walters der immer stärkeren Ideologisierung der Stettiner Presse – eines Schalltrichters der Zentralpropaganda – zu. Er bemerkte hysterische Angriffe auf den Marshall-Plan und den „*angel-sächsischen Imperialismus*“ anlässlich der NATO-Gründung, die übertriebene Darstellung der Macht der „*Fortschrittselemente*“ in Westen und der Bewaffnung und des Fiebers, das mit Kriegsvorbereitungen verbunden war.³⁶

In wirtschaftlichen Fragen dieser Periode bemerkte Walters den sehr relevanten Prozess der Wirtschaftssozialisierung, den finanziellen und steuerlichen Druck in Bezug auf die sog. Privatinitiative, die mit der gleichzeitigen Entwicklung des Staats- und Genossenschaftssektors zusammenschumpfte.³⁷

Die internationale Lage und Spannungen zwischen den Blocks: dem kapitalistischen und dem sozialistischen, hatten einen gewissen Einfluss auf das Verhalten des britischen Vizekonsuls. Er glaubte an die Unvermeidlichkeit eines militärischen Gefechtes. Teilweise teilte sich ihm sogar die Kriegsfurcht mit, denn er überlegte in einer großen Aufregung, was nach dem Kriegsausbruch „mit ihm Bolschewisten machen, ob ihn UB verhaftet und erschießt“.³⁸

Politische Veränderungen in Polen Ende 40er Jahre versetzten den Vertreter von Foreign Office in eine pessimistische Stimmung, und übten ihren Einfluss auf seine immer negativere Bewertung der Einwohner seines Amtslandes aus. Ihm dienstlich nahe stehende Personen bemerkten, dass ihn „*immer mehr ärgert, dass Polen immer kommunistischer werden*“, und sogar, dass es „ihn ekelt“ vor den in der Republik Polen herrschenden Verhältnissen. Man notierte auch seine Aussage, dass er „von Polen und der roten Ordnung schon genug hat“.³⁹

Der ein paar Jahre dauernde Aufenthalt Joseph Walters in Stettin brachte mit sich als Ertrag Meinungen über den Vizekonsul, die sich nicht auf seine Berufstätigkeit bezogen, sondern vor allem auf seine allgemeine Charakteristik. Ende der

³⁵ Ibidem, S. 108–110, 112.

³⁶ Ibidem, S. 112.

³⁷ Ibidem, S. 108.

³⁸ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 3, S. 215.

³⁹ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 3, S. 214–215; Bd.4, S. 4.

40er Jahre bewerteten ihn vor allem Polen: sowohl die Mitarbeiter der britischen, konsularischen Stelle als auch Personen, die häufiger mit dem Vertreter von Foreign Office im Kontakt waren. In wieweit sie objektiv sind und Walters Gestalt einigermaßen korrekt beschreiben, ist schwer heute festzustellen, denn es gibt keine Möglichkeit, sie mit anderen Quellen zu konfrontieren.

Den Äußerungen von Polen, die den Vizekonsul zu dieser Zeit näher kennen, ist die Information über seine relativ komplexe Natur zu entnehmen. Angeblich war er launisch, von Zeit zu Zeit nörglerisch, nicht selten „böse und sehr mürrisch, sogar den Personen gegenüber, denen er vertraute und sympathisch fand“. Er war ein anspruchsvoller Chef, sehr pedantisch, jedoch nicht immer bewertete er seine Untergesetzten gerecht.⁴⁰ Es kann sein, dass sein Verhalten in Bezug auf das Personal negativ von der Situation beeinflusst wurde, in der er sich befand: In der Wirklichkeit eines Menschen, der vom Sicherheitsamt in seinen Handlungen gehindert oder eingeschränkt, von Bekannten abgetrennt wurde; in der Wirklichkeit eines Menschen voll mit Furcht, und sogar eines Menschen, der sich über sein Schicksal in einem von Kommunisten regierten Land nicht sicher sein kann.

Im Privatleben waren für Walters Maß und Zurückhaltung charakteristisch. Diese Eigenschaften bezogen sich auf sein Verhalten während Empfänge, auf Alkoholgenuss oder Kontakte mit Frauen, obwohl er doch nicht immer jeder Versuchung widerstand. Nach Polens Meinung war der Vizekonsul, wahrscheinlich spezifisch im Vergleich mit der allgemein anerkannten Gastfreundschaft der polnischen Nation, besonders sparsam, oder sogar geizig, jedoch organisierte er von Zeit zu Zeit üppige Empfänge. Er pflegte sein Äußeres, zog sich elegant an, und bemühte sich auf diese Weise – wie man betonte – „das Erscheinen eines Weltmannes und Diplomaten“ aufzubewahren.⁴¹

Die britischen, konsularischen Beamten, die auf Walters angeblichen Egoismus hinwiesen, prophezeiten ihm eine lange Karriere, denn er konnte seine Qualifikation mit der Fähigkeit, sich bei seinen Vorgesetzten beliebt zu machen, verbinden. Bei Foreign Office galt er für einen begabten Veranstalter und einen Kenner polnischer Verhältnisse, worauf natürlich seine ein paar Jahre dauernde Dienstzeit in der Stettiner Stelle ihren Einfluss hatte. Walters selbst war wohl mit der Bewertung seiner Tätigkeit nicht ganz zufrieden, denn er zeigte auf, dass „London nicht verstand, dass seine Arbeit für die schwierigste Organisationsperiode

⁴⁰ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd.1, S. 247–248; t. 3, S. 128, 134–135, 168–169, 228–229.

⁴¹ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd.1, S. 237; Bd. 3, S. 228–229.

zufiel, als man sogar nicht in Ruhe durch die Stettiner Straßen spazieren konnte, und nicht besonders sicher war, wenn man beim Einbruch der Dunkelheit ausging“.⁴²

Für seine „Betreuer“ vom Geheimdienst, mit ihrem nicht besonders scharfsinnigen Verstand, war der Brite „sehr clever, schlau, intelligent, vorsichtig im Gespräch und im Verhalten bis zum Übermaß“. Er mied, sich über politische Fragen in Anwesenheit von Polen zu äußern, und sogar verbat er ihnen diese Themen in seiner Anwesenheit anzusprechen.⁴³ Man kann die Feststellung riskieren, dass Wachsamkeit und Verschlossenheit, Misstrauen und Argwohn Menschen gegenüber eine Schutzreaktion Walters gegen Bedrängnis seitens des Sicherheitsamtes war. Zur Ehrensache für die Stettiner Geheimpolizei wurde ein Schuldnachweis, dass „Brytan“ sich mit der Spionage beschäftigt, aber man ertappte ihn nie auf einer Tat – einer direkten Führung von Geheimdiensttätigkeit, und zum einzigen Quasi-Beweisstück wurden unter Zwang verfälschte Aussagen unschuldig verhafteter Personen.

In Folge einer traditionellen Rotation des Personals im Auslandsdienst wurde Joseph Walters mit der Verbalnote vom 17. Februar 1949 zum Konsul Seiner Majestät in Posen durch die Botschaft Großbritanniens in Warschau ernannt. Fünf Tage danach nahm das polnische Auslandsministerium die Tatsache der britischen Ernennung zur Kenntnis und erteilte Walters eine vorläufige Anerkennung.⁴⁴

Sein Aufenthalt in Posen dauerte nur anderthalb Jahre, denn die gespannten polnisch-britischen Beziehungen und auch die Notwendigkeit, das Personal wegen einer schwierigen wirtschaftlichen Lage zu reduzieren, hatten die Aufhebung der Mehrheit an konsularischen Stellen des Vereinigten Königreiches in Polen zur Folge. Walters verließ die Hauptstadt Großpolens höchst wahrscheinlich am 20. September 1950 und besuchte das Land, in dem sein Auslandsdienst für Großbritannien begann, nie mehr wieder.⁴⁵

⁴² Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 232; Bd. 2, S. 89–90; Bd. 3, S. 265.

⁴³ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 247–248.

⁴⁴ Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych w Warszawie (Archiv des Außenministeriums in Warszawa, weiter: AMSZ Warszawa), Sammlung 16, Bündel 46, Band (weiter: Bd.) 804, s. 49; IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 89, Bd. 3, S. 264–266, 277–278.

⁴⁵ IPN Szczecin, 006/75, Bd. 4, S. 20. Nach seiner Ausreise aus Polen hatte er verschieden Funktionen im Londoner Außenministerium inne, trotzdem machte er keine bedeutendere diplomatische Karriere. Vom 6. November 1950 war er Vizekonsul und Konsul in Frankfurt am Main (bis 1953), dann – Vizekonsul und der zweite Sekretär in der Botschaft Seiner Majestät in Monrovia. In den Jahren 1955–1959 arbeitete er bei Foreign Office in London und wurde danach



David Mitchell

Zu Walters Nachfolger in Stettin ernannte die Regierung Seiner Majestät David Garnett Mitchell, einen dreißigjährigen⁴⁶ Mann, der am 23. Mai 1917 in Edinburgh zur Welt kam. Er hatte Ausbildung mittleren Grades und eine kurze Dienstzeit in der Londoner Diplomatie hinter sich.⁴⁷ Er kam nach Polen mit seiner Ehefrau (Elizabeth, geb. Taylor) am 8. Oktober 1947, nur ein paar Monate nachdem er begonnen hatte, in Foreign Office zu arbeiten. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt bekleidete er den Posten eines Beamten im britischen Auslandsdienst in Frankreich. In Warschau übernahm er die Stelle eines Archivbeamten in der Botschaft des Vereinigten Königreiches. Seine Frau war als Sekretärin von Robert Smith, dem hiesigen Handelsrat, tätig. Mitchells erfreuten sich als Ehepaar eines guten Rufes, sie mochten gesellschaftliches Leben, jedoch ihre mangelnde Polnisch-Kenntnisse (abgesehen von der damaligen politischen Wirklichkeit) erschwerten ihnen das Anknüpfen von näheren Kontakten mit Polen. Erwähnenswert ist, dass Foreign Office sich bemühte, in seine Außenstellen „hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang“ keine Junggesellen, sondern verheiratete Beamten zu entsenden, damit sie keiner Versuchung unterliegen, was zur Folge die Arbeit in der ihnen unterliegenden Agentur negativ beeinflussen konnte.⁴⁸

Mit einer Verbalnote vom 17. Februar 1949 benachrichtigte die Botschaft Seiner Majestät das polnische Außenministerium über die Ernennung von D.G. Mitchell zum Leiter des Vizekonsulates Großbritanniens in Stettin. Ein paar Tage später (am 22. Februar) erteilte ihm das Warschauer Auswärtige Amt seine

der Erste Sekretär der Botschaft des Vereinigten Königreiches in Kairo. Im Jahre 1961 kehrte er in Foreign Office zurück, und ein Jahr später wurde er in die britische Botschaft in Pretoria versetzt, und nach einiger Zeit bekam er die Funktion des Konsuls in Johannesburg. Er starb am 14. August 1969 im Alter von 58 Jahren – *Raporty z 1949 r...*, S. 107, Anm. 19; Informationen von Foreign Office vom 10.12.2013 (im Besitz der Autoren).

⁴⁶ Das war ein großer Mann, der ca. 180 cm zählte, ein leicht kahl werdender Blonder, mit schmallem Gesicht, blassem Teint und einer vortretenden Nase – Instytut Pamięci Narodowej w Warszawie (Institut für Nationales Gedenken in Warszawa, weiter: IPN Warszawa), Evidenzkarte des Personals fremder diplomatischer Vertretungen und konsularischer Ämter Nr. Z/Z-W/024/49; IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 184, 278; Bd. 3, S. 267, 276, 278.

⁴⁷ Informationen von Foreign Office vom 10.12.2013 (im Besitz der Autoren); *Raporty z 1949 r...*, S. 107, Anm. 20; IPN Warszawa, Evidenzkarte des Personals..., Nr. Z/Z-W/024/49; IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 84.

⁴⁸ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 70–71; Bd. 2, S. 82; Bd. 3, S. 255, 260, 267, 276; IPN Warszawa, Evidenzkarte des Personals..., Nr. Z/Z-W/024/49.

vorläufige Anerkennung zur Ausübung dieser Funktion für den Zeitraum zur Vorlegung entsprechender Dokumente. Diesbezüglich kam es – es ist ungewiss, weswegen – zu einem bedeutenden Verzug, denn die Ernennungsurkunde zum Konsul (Kommissionsbriefe) wurde von Georg VI. mit dem Datum des 1. Januars 1950 ausgestellt. Das Exequatur von der polnischen Verwaltung bekam Mitchell als Vizekonsul Großbritanniens für das Gebiet der Woiwodschaften: Stettin und Köslin (nach der neuen administrativen Einteilung der Republik Polen), mit Sitz in Stettin, erst am 28. Juli 1950.⁴⁹

David G. Mitchell kam nach Stettin mit seiner Ehefrau am 29. März 1949 und zwei Wochen lang wurde er von seinem Vorgänger über das Funktionieren des Amtes unterrichtet. Er übernahm von Walters das Vizekonsulat mit unverändertem Bestand an Personal (Sekretärin, Köchin, Zimmermädchen, Autofahrer), das von Polen gesichert wurde. Während seines Aufenthalts an der Oder wurde Mitchell befördert: Nach ein paar Monaten bekam er den Dienstgrad des Vizekonsuls, mit der Gültigkeit vom Anfang 1950.⁵⁰

Das polnische Personal der konsularischen Stelle empfand den neuen Vorgesetzten in der Regel positiv. Er machte einen guten Eindruck, denn er war relativ fröhlicher Gesinnung, liebenswürdig und höflich, sachlich und konkret, jedoch beherrscht und wortkarg im Gespräch. Mitchell grenzte deutlich das Berufliche vom Privaten ab, und führte ein ausgewogenes Eheleben. Polen behandelte er jedoch mit Abstand: Er beobachtete sie aufmerksam, denn er vermutete, dass jeder von ihnen ein Informant des Sicherheitsdienstes sein könnte.⁵¹

Charakteristisch für ihn waren: großer, beruflicher Ehrgeiz und Überzeugung, dass er eine bedeutende diplomatische Karriere macht. Sehr geschickt gestaltete er seinen Berufsweg, indem er auf unterschiedliche Weise Bekanntschaften mit Beamten der Botschaft des Vereinigten Königreiches in Warschau pflegte, um ihr Wohlwollen zu gewinnen, und indem er in ihrer Anwesenheit alle Verdienste bei der Erledigung von Angelegenheiten bei polnischen Ämtern nur sich zuschrieb, was sein Vorgänger mit dem pejorativen Terminus *Karrierismus* bezeichnete.⁵²

⁴⁹ AMSZ, 16, w. 46, Bd. 804, S. 50; IPN Warszawa, Evidenzkarte des Personals..., Nr. Z/Z-W/024/49; IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 79.

⁵⁰ IPN Szczecin, 006/75, Bd. 8, S. 351.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 237, 278.

⁵² *Ibidem*, 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 237, Bd. 2, S. 89–90.

D. G. Mitchell hatte praktisch keine Möglichkeit, nähere Beziehungen mit Vertretern der Stettiner Stadt- und Woiwodschaftsverwaltung aufzubauen. Regionale Leiter von Administrationsämtern waren sehr vorsichtig in Bezug auf eine Bekanntschaft mit dem britischen konsularischen Vertreter. Beiläufige Kontakte mit ihm waren besonders formell, sogar offizielle Empfänge anlässlich des Nationalfeiertages Großbritanniens (Geburtstag Seiner Majestät) wurden in der Regel boykottiert, eventuell kamen Beamten „niedrigeren Dienstgrades“. Das Nichtkommen zu einem Bankett dieser Art im Juni 1949 (eigentlich der erste Fall dieser Art in der Stadt an der Oder) eingeladener Personen: des Woiwoden, Vize-Woiwoden und des Stadtpräsidenten bezeichnete Mitchell als höchst taktlos und „nicht besonders gut von der Kenntnis gesellschaftlicher Normen und gutes Benehmens zeugend“. Dabei betonte er, dass „sich Polen doch nicht im Kriegszustand mit England befindet“.⁵³

In den ersten ein paar Monaten nach seiner Ankunft in Stettin knüpfte Mitchell eine nähere Beziehung eigentlich nur mit ehemaligen britischen Staatsangehörigen an, die Polen geheiratet hatten (und dabei ihre bisherige Staatsangehörigkeit zu Gunsten der polnischen verloren) und mit ihnen an die Oder gekommen waren. Das „englische Milieu“, wie das die polnische Geheimpolizei bezeichnete, das nur ein paar Personen zählte, sollte angeblich während der ersten Etappe seiner Tätigkeit die Hauptquelle der Information darstellen. Ende 1949 sollte der Vizekonsul angeblich seinen Bekanntenkreis unter Polen durch seine Teilnahme an Kultur- und Sportveranstaltungen vergrößern.⁵⁴

Die Gestaltung des gesellschaftlichen und kulturellen Lebens um die durch Mitchell geleitete Stelle für Personen, die ihre Wurzel in Großbritannien hatten, und für Stettiner, die sich für England interessierten, hatte keine Aussicht auf Erfolg. Die Ersten zählten nur ein paar Personen und die Zweiten – auch wenn zahlreicher – mieden nähere Kontakte mit einer fremden konsularischen Agentur aus Angst vor Repressionen. Mitchell sah, dass man sich fürchtet, ihn sogar anlässlich offizieller Empfänge zu besuchen, jedoch „trotz Propaganda gegen Westen, mit der Seelen hiesiger Bevölkerung berieselt wurden, traf er bisher immer auf liebenswürdigen Empfang und Einstellung seitens der Einwohner“, was er für einen großen Verdienst seines Vorgängers hielt.⁵⁵

⁵³ *Raporty z 1949 r...*, S. 117–118; IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 3, S. 298–299; Bd. 4, S. 24–25, 30.

⁵⁴ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 156, 279; Bd. 4, S. 87, 96, 130, 132.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 237, 278, Bd. 3, S. 298–299, Bd. 4, S. 24–25.

Den konsularischen, in Stettin akkreditierten Kreis betrachtete er selektiv. Was selbstverständlich ist, pflegte er nähere Kontakte mit westlichen Vertretern, und hielt deutlichen Abstand von diesen, aus den sog. Staaten der Volksdemokratie. Besonders guten Kontakt hatte er ausschließlich mit konsularischen Beamten Frankreichs, nicht so nahen – mit Vertretern skandinavischer Länder, unter denen er einen Schweden viel besser beurteilte als einen Finnen, denn ihn störte die Angehörigkeit zur sozialdemokratischen Partei des Letzterwähnten. Dem sowjetischen Konsul - Iwan Borisow,⁵⁶ abstattete er keinen Besuch nach seiner Ankunft, was er wegen seines niedrigeren konsularischen Ranges und kürzeren Dienstzeit machen sollte. Interessant ist jedoch, dass während des ersten, offiziellen Treffen des konsularischen Kreises in Stettin bei einem Empfang im Juni 1949 der Russe auf ihn einen positiven Eindruck wegen seiner Kenntnis der konsularischen Etikette, wegen seinem angemessenen Benehmen und hohem intellektuellen Niveau machte. Er lobte auch das Wissen und die Gewandtheit des Generalkonsuls der Tschechoslowakei, jedoch erlaubte er sich keine nähere Kontakte mit ihm, wegen der Barriere, die – seiner Meinung nach – die Zugehörigkeit zum Block der kommunistischen Länder darstellte. In den nächsten Monaten, in denen immer wieder die Spionagearbeit westlicher Ländern Polen gegenüber propagandistisch aufgebauscht wurde, musste seine Beziehung zum Moskauer Vertreter so schlecht aussehen, dass Mitchell sich sogar von ihm nicht verabschiedete, als er Stettin verließ. Der Kontakt mit dem Tschechien war am wenigsten einwandfrei, da die Woiwodschaftsparteiverwaltung ihm vorwarf, dass er sich Franzosen und Engländern zu sehr genähert hatte. Die lokale Verwaltung intervenierte beim Zentralkomitee der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei (PZPR) in Warschau, was wahrscheinlich die Abberufung des ČRS-Vertreters zur Folge hatte.⁵⁷

Der Vertreter Großbritanniens traf auf eine nicht besonders gute Periode in der Tätigkeit des Konsulats in Westpommern, als die Hysterie über die

⁵⁶ Siehe R. Techman: *Iwan Siergiejewicz Borisow – pierwszy konsul radziecki w powojennym Szczecinie (1948–1952)* [Iwan Siergiejewicz Borisow – der erste sowjetische Konsul in Stettin der Nachkriegszeit (1948–1952)], in: *Tantum Possumus Quantum Scimus, Księga pamiątkowa dedykowana profesorowi Zdzisławowi Chmielewskiemu w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin* [Tantum Possumus Quantum Scimus, Festschrift für Professor Zdzisław Chmielewski anlässlich seines 70. Geburtstages], red. R. Gaziński, A. Makowski, Szczecin 2012, S. 307–326.

⁵⁷ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 3, S. 298–299; Bd. 4, S. 24–25; Z. Po 0016/59: Meldung über die Lage Abt. I WUBP in Szczecin für den Zeitraum vom 25. Mai bis zum 25. Juni 1949 r. und vom 25. August bis zum 25. September 1949; IPN Warszawa, Z. BU 0 1178/1062/Jacket, S. 169; R. Techman: *Adolf Kania – pierwszy konsul Czechosłowacji w Szczecinie w latach 1949–1951* [Adolf Kania – der erste Konsul der Tschechoslowakei in Stettin], „Śląskie Studia Historyczne“ Nr. 11, 2004, S. 162, 165.

Spiongearbeit von Ausländern ihren Höhepunkt erreichte und dazu führte, dass konsularische Stellen kapitalistischer Länder von äußeren Einflüssen isoliert wurden. Mitchell wurde – wie sein Vorgänger – detailliert durch das Sicherheitsapparat, das ihn mit dem Decknamen „Siwek“ bezeichnete, bearbeitet. Besonders wurden Mitchells äußere Kontakte, das Schließen von Bekanntschaften, seine Ausflüge außer der Stadt, seine Interessen für verschiedene Lebensbereiche beobachtet, wobei man annahm, dass der Vizekonsul auf diese Weise Grundlagen für eine breitere Tätigkeit gegen den polnischen Staat aufbaute.⁵⁸

Die Verhaftung im November 1949 von André Robineau – dem Sekretär des französischen Konsulats in Stettin, der wegen Spionage angeklagt wurde – und sein späterer (um ein paar Monate) Prozess machten einen großen Eindruck auf die in Stettin akkreditierten Vertreter westlicher und skandinavischer Ländern. Die Sache, die man propagandistisch zu einem übergroßen Ausmaß aufbauschte, führte zum – wie Mitchell schrieb – „Boycott aller Ausländer und sogar die meist ergebenen Freunde des Westens zogen sich für eine gewisse Zeit zurück“. Er betonte außerdem, dass die Verwaltung die Gelegenheit nutzte, um unter dem Vorwand der Robineau-Affäre sich sog. „durch fremde Mächte inspirierten Klassenfeinden“ zu entledigen, u.a. Verwalter Staatlicher Landwirtschaftsbetriebe, die häufig Eigentümer von nationalisierten Grundstücken aus der Vorkriegszeit waren.⁵⁹

Für den britischen Vizekonsul hatte der Fall von Robineau eine besondere Bedeutung, denn der Franzose erwähnte beim Aussagen vor einem Militärgericht die Bekanntschaft und Kontakte mit Mitchell, worauf die Ehefrau des Briten sogar in Ohnmacht fiel. Kurz nach der Beendigung der Verhandlung und der Urteilsverkündung fuhr er in den Urlaub nach London, wo er höchst wahrscheinlich bei Foreign Office Bericht über die entstandene Situation erstattete. Die polnische Geheimpolizei betrachtete sein Verlassen der Stadt als einen unbestrittenen Beweis für die Spionage, wobei sie im Voraus annahm, dass er deswegen in die Stadt an der Oder bestimmt nicht mehr zurückkehrt, was sich – zu ihrer Befangenheit – als unwahr erwies.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd.1, S. 149; Bd. 4, S. 24–25, 101,137.

⁵⁹ *Raporty z 1949 r...*, S. 139–140; über den Fall von Robineau weiters siehe in D. Jarosz, M. Pasztor: *Robineau, Bassaler i inni. Z dziejów stosunków polsko-francuskich w latach 1948–1953* [Robineau, Bassaler und andere. Aus der Geschichte polnisch-französischer Verhältnisse in den Jahren 1948–1953], Toruń 2001, S. 145–163.

⁶⁰ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 128–129, 149, 200, 208.

Die Folge der Verhaftung und des Prozesses von Robineau war eine selbstverständliche Vorsicht Mitchells in der Führung des konsularischen Büros. Das betraf Kanzleiarbeit: „Er eröffnete die ganze Korrespondenz eigenhändig und untersuchte dabei jeden Briefumschlag. Er wurde misstrauischer und argwöhnisch polnischen Mitarbeitern gegenüber. Der Vizekonsul und seine Frau schrieben an ihre Vorgesetzten, dass man in Polen die aus England kommenden Briefe eröffnet (sog. Dampfsystem), obwohl man offiziell negiert, dass es im Land die Zensur gibt“.⁶¹

Im Gesamtbild der Arbeit von Mitchell überwog – gemäß der bisherigen Praxis – die informative Tätigkeit. Die typische konsularische Arbeit war von geringerer Bedeutung. Die „britische Kolonie“ war in seinem Bezirk nicht zahlreich, der Visaverkehr gering, u.s.w. Der Vizekonsul erhielt u.a. Anträge britischer Staatsangehöriger deutsche Abstammung in Bezug auf ihr Vermögen, er informierte über Verschiedenes, beantwortete Fragen bezüglich britischer Institutionen, Familiensuche im Ausland und Beschäftigung, u.a. Er übte auch die Funktion des Gastgebers auf seinem Amtsgebiet aus, denn die konsularische Stelle bildete eine gewisse Basis für Abstecher Richtung Skandinavien und Deutschland. Sie wurde auch häufig von Gästen aus verschiedenen Ländern besucht.⁶²

Mitte April 1949 wurde Mitchell zum Agent von Lloyd's Register für Häfen der Stettiner Woiwodschaft ernannt, und deswegen u.a. standen ihm Schifffahrts- und Hafenangelegenheiten nah. Außer Fragen die strikte mit dieser Funktion verbunden waren (Kollisionen, Schiffshavarien u.Ä.) interessierten ihn auch: Hafenverkehr, Anzahl an nach Stettin kommenden Einheiten und Angelegenheiten ihrer Besatzungen. Er berichtete seinen Vorgesetzten von der sinkenden Zahl an Seemännern, die in polnische Häfen fahren wollten, wofür Gründe: die restriktive Befolgung von Zollvorschriften und durch Spezialdienste durchgeführte Kontrollen sein sollten. Mitchell sah darin eine bewusste Handlung zur Entmutigung ausländischer Kapitäne und Reeder zur Sendung ihrer Schiffe nach Polen. Die, die an Land gehen, sollten sich – seiner Meinung nach – nicht im hiesigen „Dom Marynarza“ (Seemannshaus) aufhalten, denn dort wird „kommunistische

⁶¹ Ibidem, Po 0016/59: Rechenschaftsbericht Nr. 12 über die Arbeit der Abt. I WUBP in Szczecin für den Zeitraum vom 25. November bis zum 25. Dezember 1949; Z. 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 172.

⁶² Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 62.

Propaganda verübt“, sondern den Weg zu seinem schwedischen Äquivalent (gegründet in Stettin im Jahr 1947) einschlagen.⁶³

Anfang 1950 machte ihm der Sicherheitsdienst Schwierigkeiten bei der Ausstellung eines termingebundenen Hafepassierscheines, wodurch er Probleme hatte, denn als Lloyd-Agent musste er Hilfe brauchende Schiffe verschiedener Flaggen betreten können. In einer Anwendung unverhohlenen Ärgers drohte Mitchell sogar, dass er „verursacht, dass polnischen Konsuln in jedem zivilisierten Hafen nichts vereinfacht wird“. Er gab noch dazu, dass Milizbehörden ihm Schwierigkeiten bei Erledigung von Angelegenheiten bezüglich Registrierung von Bürgern und Ausstellung von Aufenthaltsvisen machten.⁶⁴

Zu Mitchells Wissensquellen wurden vor allem Presse und direkte Beobachtung. Obwohl jedoch sein Vorgänger im Stande war, alleine Gebrauch von zugänglichen Medien zu machen, denn er Polnisch gut kannte, musste Mitchell sich fast ausschließlich mit der Übersetzung von Texten durch seine Sekretärin begnügen. In einem viel geringeren Ausmaß dienten ihm mit allgemeinen Informationen vereinzelt Stettiner, die den Mut hatten, Kontakt mit dem Vizekonsul aufzunehmen. Eine kurze Zeit lang gehörten dazu Leiter ein paar privater Hafenfirmer, die Englisch sprachen. Außer den oben erwähnten Ehefrauen von Polen, die Engländerinnen laut ihrer Abstammung waren, bekam er Informationen von seinen Landsleuten (Vertragsingenieure, Schiffskapitäne), und auch von Deutschen, die die konsularische Stelle wegen verschiedener Angelegenheiten besuchten. Landessaufträge, vor allem an die Küste, schufen ein bestimmtes Bild des untergeordneten Bezirks.⁶⁵

In der Bewertung der Lage auf den vom deutschen Territorium abgesonderten Gebieten des nordwestlichen Polens repräsentierte Mitchell die typische Ansicht britischer Verwaltung. Stettin war für ihn „die Stadt voll von Gegensätzen, ohne jeglichen polnischen Hintergrund, ohne jegliche Spuren der Vergangenheit“. ⁶⁶ Gründe für den Mangel an Investitionen in Westpommern sah er im fehlenden Glauben der zugewanderten Bevölkerung daran, dass diese Gebiete bei Polen bleiben. Er neigte zur Ansicht des Danziger Vizekonsuls Albert Allan Gordon, dass „es keine Möglichkeit gab, den Prozess der Besiedlung dieser Gebiete durch

⁶³ Ibidem, Po 0016/59: Rechenschaftsbericht Nr. 9 über die Arbeit der Abt. I WUBP in Szczecin für den Zeitraum vom 25. August bis zum 25. September 1949; 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 64; Bd. 4, S. 130.

⁶⁴ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 98–100, 131, 157; Z. 006/75, Bd. 8, S. 353.

⁶⁵ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 237, 278; Bd. 4, S. 96, 130–131.

⁶⁶ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 3, S. 278.

Polen aufzuhalten, genauso wie es keine Möglichkeit gab, den Prozess der Besetzung von Wilnius und Lwow durch Russen aufzuhalten“.⁶⁷

Die Stimmen des Volkes gaben ihm den Ansporn zum Notieren, dass Gespräche über die Gründung eines separaten westdeutschen Staates (BRD) auch eine Welle an Äußerungen über die Zukunft Stettins auslösten, und sogar – offener Diskussionen über die Gefahr der Rückkehr Stettins zum östlichen Deutschland (DDR).⁶⁸ Der Brite wies darauf hin, dass die internationale Lage einen starken Einfluss auf die Verstärkung von Gerüchten über Kriegsausbruch hatte, die angeblich durch die Verschlechterung der sowjetisch-jugoslawischen Beziehungen hervorgerufen wurden.⁶⁹

Pessimistisch sah er dem Fortschritt beim Wiederaufbau Stettins zu, da er meinte, dass man entschieden zu wenig dafür machte. Die Stagnation sollte die Kampagne: der Restauration des Uferboulevards, des Niederreißen zerstörter Gebäude und der Beseitigung von Ruinen überwinden. Das wurde durch die Aktion des Ziegelgewinns (vor allem für den Wiederaufbau Warschaus) hervorgehoben, die vorübergehend Gerüchten über die Rückkehr Stettins zu Deutschland ein Ende setzte.⁷⁰

Mitchell beschäftigten Fälle zahlreicher zu dieser Zeit, politischer und wirtschaftlicher Verfahren, die „wellenartig periodisch“ stattfanden. Er schrieb u.a. Beispiele von Strafen auf, die häufig unverhältnismäßig zu begangenen Taten waren. Er betonte z.B., dass der Prozess sog. „Saboteure“ aus Police (sie sollten angeblich Altmetall gestohlen haben), in dem zwei Todesurteile fielen, wurde „in Form einer Geschichte über Klassenhass arrangiert“, und Zeugen der Anklage stellte man dagegen „als einfache Arbeiter, die sich nach patriotischen Motiven richten und als Vorbild für andere gelten“. Mitchell bemerkte, dass häufige Verfahren in Sachen sog. Flüsterpropaganda dazu führten, dass „politischer Witz fast ganz von Gesprächen verschwand“.⁷¹

Der britische Vizekonsul gewann auch Informationen mit militärischem Charakter auf legalem Weg, jedoch verfügte er in diesem Bereich nur über allgemeine und fragmentarische Angaben. Ihn interessierten sowjetische Einflüsse in

⁶⁷ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 232–233.

⁶⁸ *Raporty z 1949 r...*, S. 115.

⁶⁹ Ibidem, S. 127–128.

⁷⁰ Ibidem, S. 118, 128.

⁷¹ Ibidem, S.115, 118,122,130; IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 86.

Westpommern, das Stationieren des Militärs dieses Landes, die Einrichtung des Truppenübungsplatzes in der Nähe von Drawsko, u.Ä.⁷²

Mitchell machte die Frage der illegalen Emigration neugierig, die es immer in Stettin gab, obwohl einige Fluchtwege gesperrt wurden. Den Ansporn zum Schreiben an seine Vorgesetzten über „Massen“-Flucht von Polen in den Westen gaben ihm mit eigenen Augen beobachtete „melancholische Prozessionen nicht verwirklichter Flüchtlinge in das Quartier des Grenzschutzes zurück“. Er versuchte zu ergründen, ob Versuche des Menschenschmuggels von Deutschen erleichtert wurden. Der Brite bemerkte das Problem der „Verwicklung“ von Sport in die Politik, d.h. eine strenge Kontrolle der Sicherheitsverwaltung über Schiffsfahrtsclubs, was die Flucht mit einem Jacht verhindern sollte.⁷³

Einen großen Eindruck machte auf Mitchell 1949 das Abandonnieren der britischen Staatsangehörigkeit durch George Bidwell, den Direktor der englischen Kulturinstitution in Polen – British Council. Seiner Meinung nach konnte Bidwell das „wegen materieller Vorteile oder auf Grund einer starken Nervenüberanstrengung machen“. Der Vizekonsul versuchte zu ergründen, welchen Eindruck das auf Polen machte, da er eine ernste Beunruhigung in akademischen Kreisen Stettins sah.⁷⁴

Mit Neugier sah Mitchell Festen verschiedener Art zu, die seiner Lebenserfahrung fremd waren, und die häufig propagandistische Parolen und Pathos erfüllten. Im Juni 1949 stellte er untypische Feierlichkeiten anlässlich Hochseefeiertages fest: ohne politische Manifestationen, ohne „Versuche, Enthusiasmus zu wecken“, frei von Paraden und Fahnen.⁷⁵ Der 1. Mai 1950 machte auf ihn dagegen einen unangenehmen Eindruck. Empfindlich gegen Verwenden von Nationalsymbolen stellte er „Taktlosigkeit und fehlende Höflichkeit seitens Polen und der Regierung“ fest, als er geschmacklose Karikaturen und die auf „irgendeinem *Regenschirm*“ hängende, ausgefranste, britische Nationalfahne bemerkte.⁷⁶ Er konzentrierte sich auf dem Feiern des Internationalen Tag des Friedens, das genau nach Plan verlief und keine Spontanität aufwies. Als scherzhaftes und ironisches Kommentar diente ihm die Feststellung, dass „eine große Anzahl an Personen

⁷² *Raporty z 1949 r...*, S. 134; IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 4, S. 24–25.

⁷³ *Raporty z 1949 r...*, S. 119, S. 122, 136–137; IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 4, S. 5; Po 0016/59: Meldung über die Lage Abt. I WUBP in Szczecin für den Zeitraum vom 25. Mai bis zum 25. Juni 1949 und vom 1. Juli bis zum 1. August 1949.

⁷⁴ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 3, S. 300; *Raporty z 1949 r...*, S. 117.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*, S. 121, 126.

⁷⁶ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 65, 234.

Stettin verlässt, denn sie will nicht in Folge des Kampfes um Frieden sterben“. Er betonte jedoch, dass eine große Gruppe an Personen daran glaubt, dass „ein Krieg sie vom sowjetischen Joch befreit“. ⁷⁷

Fragen des Klerus und der Religion konnten Mitchell nicht entgehen: Er bemühte sich um Daten bezüglich der allgemeinen Anzahl an Kirchen und Pfarrer, der Massenhaftigkeit des religiösen Kultus, der Reaktion der Gesellschaft auf sog. „Lubliner Wunder“ und seiner Wirkungskraft, bezüglich Verhaftungen und Prozesse von Geistlichen. In seinen Berichten befanden sich Informationen über Hexenjagd in Bezug auf die Kirche, die die Verwaltung veranstaltete, und über ihr Diskreditieren, über Ablenken einer möglichst großen Gruppe der Gesellschaft von kirchlichen Feierlichkeiten, über das Schikanieren von an Gottesdiensten teilnehmenden Beamten, über Unter-Druck-Setzen von Pfarrern, dass sie politische Informationen verraten, die sie während Beichte erfuhren, über Pressekampagnen und über Verurteilungsworte in Bezug auf die Vatikanstadt, insbesondere wegen ihrer anti-polnischen Einstellung. Der Vizekonsul bemerkte, dass der Kampf „gegen das Böse des Klerikalismus“ einen bestimmten Erfolg mit sich bringt, denn immer weniger Personen bekennen sich zu irgendwelchen religiösen Überzeugungen. ⁷⁸

Damalige Fragen der Landwirtschaft interessierten den britischen Vizekonsul unter dem Gesichtspunkt der in polnischen Dörfern vorgehenden gesellschaftlich-wirtschaftlichen Prozesse, und insbesondere unter dem Gesichtspunkt der sog. Liquidation von Kulaken in Bezug auf reichere Landwirte und der Wegnahme ihres Maschinenparks, den sie einst bei der Ansiedlung bekamen. ⁷⁹

Mitchell interessierte auch die Nationalitätsproblematik, vor allem deutsche und jüdische Fragen. Die Informationsquellen stellten vor allem die in Staatlichen Wirtschaftsbetrieben oder in sowjetischen Militärabteilungen eingestellten Deutschen dar. Sie besuchten die konsularische Stelle, um – in den meisten Fällen – zu ihren sich in der britischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands, und später in der BRD, befindenden Familien ausreisen zu können. Ersuche um Hilfe diesbezüglich gaben Mitchell die Möglichkeit, an Informationen über ihre Arbeit,

⁷⁷ *Raporty z 1949 r...*, S. 129–130, 133, 135–136; IPN Szczecin, Po 0016/59: Rechenschaftsbericht Nr. 9 über die Arbeit der Abt. I WUBP in Szczecin für den Zeitraum vom 25. September bis zum 25. Oktober 1949.

⁷⁸ *Raporty z 1949 r...*, S. 122, 125–126, 129, 137; IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 4, S. 96; Po 0016/59: Meldung über die Lage Abt. I WUBP in Szczecin für den Zeitraum vom 25. Juli bis zum 25. August 1949.

⁷⁹ *Raporty z 1949 r...*, S. 122–123.

materielle Lage, allgemeine Situation oder Verhältnis zu Polen, u.Ä. zu gelangen. Er war ihnen gegenüber relativ misstrauisch, denn er fürchtete eine Provokation seitens des Sicherheitsdienstes. Er wies seine Vorgesetzten darauf hin, dass Deutsche einen eigenen Club namens „Antifa“ gründeten, der von Russen finanziert wurde, und der „ohne Zweifel zum Zentrum der politischen Indoktrinierung sein wird“. Mitchell signalisierte schwierige Lage der Deutschen, nachdem sie ihre Arbeit in polnischen Unternehmen verloren hatten und auf mangelnde Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten in sowjetischen Einheiten trafen.⁸⁰ In Bezug auf die jüdische Emigration Ende der 40er Jahre betonte er die Tatsache, dass die Aktion, die er unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Transportorganisation, der Reisekosten und Transportrouten darstellte, ohne finanzieller Hilfe von außen nicht möglich gewesen wäre.⁸¹

Obwohl die politische Situation Polens um die Wende von den 40er zu den 50er Jahren, und insbesondere die Ideologisierung des Landes und seine Umwandlung im kommunistischen Geiste, in Mitchells Berichten überwogen, vergaß er wirtschaftliche Fragen nicht. Er interessierte sich für die Entwicklung des Stettiner Hafens, den Zustand von Kais, für die Hafennutzung, und auch für kleine Häfen der westlichen Küste, von denen er einen Teil persönlich besuchte.⁸² Er informierte seine Vorgesetzten über die Entwicklung des tschechoslowakischen Transits über Stettin, und betonte dabei, dass die Bedienung dieser Ladungen die Freundschaft zwischen den Ländern an der Weichsel und an der Moldau auf die Probe stellte. Die Situation kommentierte er wie folgt: „Den Tschechien weder traut man noch mag man sie“.⁸³

Die Festnahme des Vizekonsuls für ein paar Stunden im August 1950 (zusammen mit dem ersten Sekretär der britischen Botschaft) in der WOP-Kontrollstelle in Diewenow, die er als „unerhörte Verletzung der Bewegungsfreiheit eines Diplomaten“ bezeichnete, erfuhr interessante, jedoch abweichende Bewertungen. Mitchell sah darin einen Vorteil, denn er meinte, dass seine Vorgesetzten ihm jetzt daran glauben sollen, was er über die in seinem Amtsgebiet herrschende

⁸⁰ Ibidem, S. 137–138; IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 157; Bd. 4, S. 4–5, 24–25, 96–98; Po 0016/59: Meldung über die Lage Abt. I WUBP in Szczecin für den Zeitraum vom 25. Mai bis zum 25. Juni 1949 r., vom 25. Juli bis zum 25. August 1949 r. und vom 25. August bis zum 25. September 1949.

⁸¹ IPN Warszawa, 01299/116, S. 24.

⁸² IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 278–279; Bd. 4, S. 5; Po 0016/59: Meldung über die Lage Abt. I WUBP in Szczecin für den Zeitraum vom 25. Mai bis zum 25. Juni 1949.

⁸³ *Raporty z 1949 r...*, S. 123; IPN Szczecin, Po 0016/59: Meldung über die Lage Abt. I WUBP in Szczecin für den Zeitraum vom 1. Juli bis zum 1. August 1949.

Verhältnisse sagt. Anders wurde der ganze Vorfall von seinem Vorgänger im Amt, Joseph Walters interpretiert, der Mitchell verdächtigte, dass er diese Tat (bewusste Einreise in die grenznahe Zone) beabsichtigt und vorgeplant hatte, um London bewusst zu machen, auf was für einem schwierigen Gebiet er ihr Land vertrat, und was für Schwierigkeiten ihm die hiesige Verwaltung bereitete.⁸⁴

Allgemein gesehen waren das Funktionieren/die Tätigkeit der britischen konsularischen Stelle und der Aufenthalt ihres Leiters in Stettin nicht einfach. Handlungen der Geheimpolizei erschwerten nicht nur die Berufsarbeit, sondern sie verhinderten fast ganz das Anknüpfen näherer Kontakte mit Polen. Mitchell zog kein Nutzen aus Segnungen kultureller Institutionen: Er verzichtete auf Theater, denn er kannte kein Polnisch, Kino dagegen passte ihm wegen vorgeführter Filme – vor allem sowjetischer, die er uninteressant fand – nicht. Der Mangel an Gesellschaft und an irgendwelchen Vergnügungen wurden sogar – wie er meinte – „Ursache eines Nervenzusammenbruchs und der letzten Krankheit der Ehefrau“. Abende, insbesondere an Wochenenden, verbrachte er am häufigsten im Kreis englischer Ingenieure. Von Zeit zu Zeit erstatteten ihm Kapitäne britischer Schiffe, die den Stettiner Hafen anliefen, Besuche.⁸⁵

Mitchell teilte sich die Stimmung der stalinistischen Periode mit, denn ein paar Wochen bevor er Stettin verließ, erlaubte er sich die Bemerkung, dass er vielleicht irgendwann mal nach Polen zurück kommt, jedoch „will er nicht, dass man ihn an einem schönen Tag in irgendwelche schmutzige Angelegenheiten verwickelt, da Russen eine Obsession in Bezug auf Spionage von Ausländern haben, und dasselbe bezieht sich jetzt auch auf Polen“.⁸⁶

Der Vizekonsul David Garnett Mitchell verließ Stettin und Polen am 21. September 1950. Bevor das geschah, führte er einen halben Monat lang seinen Nachfolger in Geheimnisse seiner Arbeit ein.⁸⁷ Seine weitere Berufskarriere sah folgend aus: Zuerst versetzte man ihn in die Botschaft seiner Majestät in Kairo (als zweiten Sekretär), in den Jahren 1952–1955 war er Konsul in Patras (Griechenland), später Vizekonsul und Geschäftsträger in Monrovia (1956–1957), von

⁸⁴ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 85–86, 90.

⁸⁵ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 1, S. 172, 234–235.

⁸⁶ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 86.

⁸⁷ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 82, S. 97; IPN Warszawa, Evidenzkarte des Personals..., Nr. Z/Z-W/024/49; Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych w Pradze (Archiv des Außenministeriums in Prag, weiter: AMSZ Praga), Terytorialny Oddział (Territoriale Abteilung, weiter: TO), k.I.: Schreiben gen. kon. A. Kania vom 21. September 1950 an das Außenministerium und die ČSR-Botschaft in Warszawa.

1957 bis 1960 in Foreign Office, 1960 – Konsul in Harar und Asmar (Äthiopien), Konsul und Generalkonsul in Bordeaux (1961–1967), danach in Foreign Office (als erster Sekretär), und der Stellvertretende des britischen Vertreters für Saint Vincent im Jahr 1969.⁸⁸



Henry Bartlett

Nach D.G. Mitchell übernahm das britische Vizekonsulat in Stettin Henry Francis Bartlett, der am 8. März 1916 in London geboren wurde. Er beendete St. Paul's School, war Absolvent Queen's College in Oxford, Ruskin School of Drawing und der Kalifornischen Universität. Ab Anfang Juni 1940 arbeitete er in der britischen Informationsbibliothek in New York, und dann wurde er (ab 10. Dezember 1942) zum Assistenten des Direktors vom Britischen Überseepresseservice, die dem Informationsministerium unterlagen. Danach hielt er sich in Algier beim Französischen Komitee für die Nationale Befreiung, wo er als Fachmann für propagandistischen Krieg arbeitete. Mit dem 12. Oktober 1944 trat er ein Amt im Informationsdepartment in Paris an, und am 16. Mai 1947 wurde er zum Vizekonsul in Lyon in Frankreich. Über zehn Monate später (21. Juni 1948) ging er zu Foreign Office in London über – als vorläufiger jüngere Ausführungsbeamte. Später wurde er zum Beamten des 4. Grades befördert. Ein paar Jahre dauernder Aufenthalt in Frankreich ermöglichte ihm, seine Sprachkenntnisse im Französischen auf hohem Niveau zu festigen. Vor seiner Reise nach Polen lernte er ein bisschen Polnisch, aber konnte sich der Sprache nicht bedienen. Er kam mit einem Schiff nach Gdingen am 30. Juli 1950.⁸⁹

Das polnische Außenministerium nahm in der Antwort auf die britische Note (Nr. 371/49/73/50 – 8. September 1950) die Benennung H. F. Bartletts zum

⁸⁸ Informationen von Foreign Office vom 10.12.2013 (im Besitz der Autoren); J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Raporty z 1949 r...*, S. 107, Anm. 20.

⁸⁹ Informationen von Foreign Office vom 10.12.2013 (im Besitz der Autoren); J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Ostatni raport brytyjskiego wicekonsula w Szczecinie Henry'ego F. Bartletta o sytuacji w tym mieście (6 III 1951 r.)* [Der letzte Bericht des britischen Vizekonsuls in Stettin Henry F. Bartlett über die Lage in der Stadt (6. März 1951)], „Przegląd Zachodniopomorski“, 2000, H. 4, S. 223, Anm. 1; IPN Warszawa, BU 0 1178/1062/Jacket, S. 3, 166, 169; Evidenzkarte des Personals..., Nr. 1874; AMSZ Praga, TO, k. 1: Schreiben gen. kon. A. Kani vom 21. September 1950 an das Außenministerium und die ČSR-Botschaft in Warschau.

Leiter der Stelle in Stettin zur Kenntnis, indem es ihn am 22. September dieses Jahres in dieser Funktion provisorisch anerkannte. Er bekam jedoch kein Exequatur, denn drei Monate später fiel die Entscheidung über die Auflösung der britischen Agentur an der Oder.⁹⁰

Nach Stettin kam er zusammen mit seiner Ehefrau (Alice Desdemona Roy, portugiesischer Abstammung) am 9. September 1950 und er bereitete sich zur Übernahme des Amtes unter der Aufsicht seines Vorgängers vor.⁹¹ In der Meinung des polnischen Personals, die es nach ein paar Wochen formulierte, „schien er vom Bürokratismus von Foreign Office erfüllt zu sein. Er ist sorgfältig und pedantisch, im Rechnungswesen wenig begabt“. Im Laufe der Zeit ergänzte man noch, dass er von Natur her sehr sparsam war, und zudem sich keiner guten Gesundheit erfreute, denn er litt unter Ischias.⁹²

Bartlett ließ künstlerische Vorliebe erkennen, denn er beschäftigte sich als Hobby mit Malerei, und zeigte in diesem Bereich eine große Begabung. Er hatte zwei bedeutende Ausstellungen in Gemäldegalerien in Paris (September 1947) und in London (Dezember 1949). Systematisch präsentierte er Gemälde während Sommerausstellungen „Artist of Fame and Promise“. Die Ausreise in die ausländische Außenstelle schränkte seine Tätigkeit in diesem Bereich ein, jedoch verkaufte er viele seiner Werke an verschiedene Diplomaten während des Aufenthalts in Warschau, wo er traf, nachdem er Stettin verlassen hatte.⁹³

Die ersten Wochen an der Oder zeugen von Bartletts Versuchen, die bestmöglichen Beziehungen mit lokaler Verwaltung und Angestellten des Konsulats aufzubauen. Seine Hoffnung auf nähere Kontakte mit der Stettiner Behörde hatte keine Begründung. Ihm wurden Schwierigkeiten – genauso wie seinen Vorgängern – bei der Erlangung eines Hafepassierscheins gemacht. Den erhielt er endlich nach langen Bemühungen. Mit der lokalen Verwaltung verband ihn eigentlich eine sporadische Amtskorrespondenz. Polens Furcht vor dem allmächtigen Sicherheitsapparat war so groß, dass sogar offizielle Besuche des Vertreters eines der westlichen Länder bei Ämtern und Institutionen unerwünscht waren. Bartlett

⁹⁰ AMSZ Warszawa, Sammlung 16, Bündel 46, Bd. 805, S. 23; IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 98.

⁹¹ Er war ein nicht großer Mann, ca. 165 cm groß (wahrscheinlich deswegen bekam er von Sicherheitsbehörde das Pseudonym „Kajtek“), mit grauen Augen und dunklem Haar – IPN Warszawa, BU 01178/1062/Jacket, S. 4, 11, 167, 169; Evidenzkarte des Personals..., Nr. 1874.

⁹² IPN Warszawa, BU 0 1178/1062/Jacket, S. 169.

⁹³ Ibidem, S. 11, 68, 145, 169; IPN Szczecin, Po 0014/50, Bd. 19, S. 47; Z. 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 157.

bekam das im November 1950 zu spüren, als der Kapitän des Stettiner Hafens seinen Besuch absagte, was der Vizekonsul eindeutig verstand: Er „erschrak im letzten Augenblick“.⁹⁴

Er bemühte sich, korrekte, obwohl sporadische und offizielle Kontakte mit dem sowjetischen Konsul zu unterhalten. Einen guten Eindruck machte auf ihn der tschechoslowakische Generalkonsul, u.a. wegen seiner guten Umgangsformen. Eine traditionelle und herzliche Beziehung verband ihn mit dem französischen Vizekonsul, ganz guten Kontakt hatte er mit Vertretern Schwedens und Finnlands. Das Verschwinden des Franzosen am 24. Oktober 1950, eine Stunde vor dem abgesprochenen Besuch beim Briten, besorgte ihn sehr und er begann, nach ihm zu suchen. Er wusste damals noch nicht, dass der Vertreter von Quaid'Orsay ohne Grund im Rahmen von Retorsionen von der Straße durch den polnischen Sicherheitsapparat „genommen“ wurde.⁹⁵

Nachdem der Leiter des französischen Konsulats befreit worden war und Polen sofort verlassen musste, wurde Bartlett, der bei Foreign Office hoch geschätzt wurde, angewiesen, sich um die Stelle zu kümmern und dem gebliebenen Personal, dem gegenüber man ein wenig Misstrauen spürte, mit Rat und Hilfe beizustehen. Dieses Misstrauen erwies sich als begründet, denn der Sekretär des Konsulats, der mit dem Briten in guten – beruflichen und gesellschaftlichen – Beziehungen war, ersuchte ein paar Monate später um politischen Asyl in Polen.⁹⁶

Der Vizekonsul kümmerte sich um Engländerinnen von der Abstammung her, zahlte einer dieser Personen eine Rente aus, unterstützte finanziell andere von ihnen, die sich in schwieriger Lebenslage befanden, übermittelte Korrespondenz von Verwandten aus dem Vereinigten Königreich, unterstützte Bemühungen um Widergewinn der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Heimatland. Einige von den Frauen wurden vom Sicherheitsdienst belästigt und schikaniert, man revidierte ihre Häuser, eine von ihnen wurde aus der Grenzzone ausgesiedelt, eine andere verlor ihre Arbeit. Die britische Botschaft in Warschau, die von Problemen dieser Art unterrichtet war, schlug vor, dass die Personen Konsulate dann besuchen, wenn es um „Fälle höchster Notwendigkeit“ geht. Ein Teil von den Frauen beantragte die Scheidung von ihren Ehemännern (Polen), und dann (nach der Entscheidung

⁹⁴ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 209.

⁹⁵ IPN Warszawa, BU 0 1178/1062, Jacket, S.11, S. 169; IPN Szczecin, Z. 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 157, 161; R. Techman: *Georges Estrade – ostatni konsul francuski w powojennym Szczecinie (1949–1950)* [Georges Estrade – der letzte französische Konsul in Stettin der Nachkriegszeit], in: *Kronika Szczecina 2007*, Szczecin 2008, S. 126–127.

⁹⁶ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 209, 214, 249.

darüber) strebte die Befreiung von der polnischen Staatsangehörigkeit an, um nach England zurückzukehren. In Fällen dieser Art war die Londoner Verwaltung bereit, den britischen Pass zu verleihen.⁹⁷

Die Stelle in Stettin bekam von Zeit zu Zeit Korrespondenz von in der BRD wohnenden Deutschen, die u.a. Ersuche um Hilfe bei Revindikation des von ihnen hinterlassenen Gutes auf den durch Polen besetzten Gebieten. Darunter traf er auf einen besonderen Fall: Eine ehemalige Stettinerin, die zu dieser Zeit in Dänemark wohnte, bat um die Sicherung ihres Vermögens in Form von Schmuckstücken, Gegenständen aus Gold und Porzellan, das in Kellerräumen bestimmter Häuser vor ihrer Flucht aus Stettin versteckt wurde.⁹⁸

Der Brite, der auch Agent von Londoner Lloyd war, wickelte auch Kollisions- und Havariefragen britischer Schiffe ab, entschied über die Auszahlung von Entschädigungen an Polen z.B. für Schäden wegen eines Zusammenstoßes von Schiffseinheiten mit dem Hafenkai. Er stand auch mit Rat und Tat für den Fall von Zusammenstoß Schiffe anderer Flaggen. Ihren Kapitänen gab er zu verstehen, dass die in Polen durchgeführten Reparaturen durch Lloyd-Fachleute in Westen nicht anerkannt werden, u.a. deswegen, da Spezialisten dieses Klassifikationsvereins aus Polen verwiesen wurden.⁹⁹

Um die Umgebung nicht zu verletzen, äußerte der Vizekonsul Seiner Majestät anfangs offiziell „keine Zweifel über die Zugehörigkeit Stettins zu Polen“.¹⁰⁰ Im Laufe der Zeit erlaubte er sich jedoch die Bemerkung, dass die Geschichte anders verläuft, als Polen sie haben wollen, und sie sind „wie Zigeuner. Wenn sie irgendwo kurz verweilten, erheben sie Ansprüche an diese Gebiete“.¹⁰¹ Zu Ende seines Aufenthalts an der Oder schätzte Bartlett die Bedeutung Stettins für die Republik Polen ein, indem er betonte, dass seine gegenwärtige Lage „ein geographischer Unsinn ist“.

Dem Briten waren die Befürchtungen der Einwohner bekannt: Sie wurden von der Frage gequält, ob „Kreml Stettin Deutschen zurückgibt“. Auf Grund der Beobachtung der Leute auf den Straßen schloss er jedoch wohl zu voreilig, dass

⁹⁷ AMSZ Warszawa, Sammlung 9, Bündel 20, Bd. 261: Dienstnotiz vom 13. Februar 1952; IPN Warszawa, BU 01178/1062/Jacket, S. 13; IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 161, 209, 252; Staatsarchiv in Szczecin, Präsidium des Woiwodschaftsnationalrates, 13908, S. 52, 61–62; 13912, S. 107, 114, 116.

⁹⁸ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 209.

⁹⁹ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 156, 160, 216, 249.

¹⁰⁰ IPN Warszawa, BU 0 1178/1062/Jacket, S. 11, 169; IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 157.

¹⁰¹ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 210–211.

„hier die Apathie herrscht, deren Gründe die fehlende Sympathie für diesen Ort und die fehlende Motivation zur Arbeit sind“. Bei Überlegungen über die Lage der Stadt an der Oder (unter Betonung der Besonderheit dieses Ortes in Polen) für die Zukunft und über mutmaßliche Einstellungen ihrer Einwohner, kam er zur Schlussfolgerung, dass „Wenn Stettin Deutschen zurückgegeben werden sollte, könnten neu angekommene Bewohner der Stadt, die kein Vermögen und keine Wurzel besitzen, ruhig die Deportation ins Landinneres akzeptieren. Sie sahen doch schon so viele Deportationsaktionen. Gewaltige Reaktionen könnte Polen als Land wegen des verletzten Nationalstolzes äußern. (...) Generell jedoch dominiert ein Zwischentrend, nach dem Stettin, obwohl formell polnisch, sich als eine freie Stadt (für Russland und seine Satellitenstaaten) entwickelt. Falls es anzunehmen ist, dass Polen und die Östliche Zone Deutschlands nichts anderes als Kolonien des russischen Imperiums sind, hat die Stettiner Enklave keine größere internationale Bedeutung als jedes andere Grenzgebiet zwischen zwei Kolonien. Nur im Fall einer Vereinigung von West- und Ostdeutschland könnte Stettin zum Gegenstand eines ernsten Konflikts werden“.¹⁰²

Der Vizekonsul bewertete kritisch den Aufbau der Stadt, der chaotisch und deutlich weniger intensiv als dieser von Danzig und Warschau war. Dabei betonte er, dass der Verzicht auf die Renovierung der am stärksten während des Krieges beschädigten Gebäude zu ihrem fast ganzheitlichen Wertverlust führte. Bartlett unterstrich, dass viele Personen in ihre Sitze im Landesinneren zurückkehrten, denn „sie konnten sich diesem trüben Ort voll mit Ruinen, wo das allgegenwärtige Regime herrscht, das von keinen Spuren des ehemaligen Polens gemildert wird, nicht anpassen“.¹⁰³ Seiner Meinung nach wurde der Wiederaufbau der Stadt – im Gegensatz zum Wiederaufbau des Hafens – als keine vorrangige Aufgabe betrachtet, was davon zeugen sollte, dass die Regierung „Orte bevorzugt, deren Besitz für sie sicherer ist“.¹⁰⁴

Bei der Konzentration seiner Aufmerksamkeit auf der Stettiner Bevölkerungs mosaik erlaubte sich Bartlett die – seiner Meinung nach – größte Populationsgruppe, die die Stadt besiedelte, nämlich die Bauernschicht von den früheren Ostgebieten der Zweiten Republik Polen besonders negativ und allzu streng zu beurteilen. Er unterstrich ihr niedriges Wissensniveau (am häufigsten – Analphabetismus), und betonte außerdem, dass diese Personen „nicht so fleißig und

¹⁰² J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Ostatni raport brytyjskiego wicekonsula...*, S. 249.

¹⁰³ *Ibidem*, S. 238.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibidem*, S. 246–247.

sauber sind wie die verdeutschten Einwohner Danzigs, und auch keine Begabung für Gewerbe wie die Einwohner von Katowitz oder Lodz aufweisen. Dominierend sind Verantwortungslosigkeit, Schmutz und Primitivismus eines Polen aus Osten“.¹⁰⁵

Bartlett interessierte sich für Fragen der katholischen Kirche, für ihre Struktur und Hierarchie und bemerkte dabei, dass die Kampagne der Verwaltung „die zur Errichtung eines festen Bistums und dadurch – durch Implikationen – zur Anerkennung durch die Vatikanstadt des polnischen Besitz-Titels an westlichen Territorien führt, erfreut sich lokaler Unterstützung sogar in Kreisen, die für die Regierungspropaganda nicht anfällig sind“. Aus verschiedenen Prämissen schlussfolgerte er, dass Einflüsse der Kirche in Westpommern schwächer waren als die in alten Teilen Polens.¹⁰⁶

Er brachte seinen Vorgesetzten den Prozess technischen Wiederaufbaus, Nutzung, Handelsumsätze u.Ä. des Stettiner Hafens näher. Er sah Vorteile seiner Lage und die Funktion Swinemündes. In der Gründung der polnischen Reederei – Polska Żegluga Morska – sah Bartlett keine wirtschaftliche Gründe, sondern nur politische: „Das Ziel ist nur, Kreml die Bedeutung Stettins für Polen vorzuzeigen“. Der Brite deutete an, dass Polen „sich bemühen, um die Entwicklung des Hafens in Stettin die Atmosphäre des Mystizismus zu schaffen, wie sie auch mit Gdingen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg gemacht hatten“.¹⁰⁷

Kurz nach seinem Amtsantritt erlebte er in einem fremden Land die Währungsreform, die für ihn eine relativ große und unangenehme Überraschung (Angst um den Verlust eines Teils seines Gehaltes) war. Er tadelte eher nicht die Reform selbst, sondern die Art und Weise auf die Geldaustausch erfolgte. Bartlett bemerkte, dass die Reform zur Verarmung der Gesellschaft führt, und für ein aussagekräftiges Kommentar dieser Staatsaktion diene ihm der Satz: „Polen wird der Sowjetunion immer ähnlicher“.¹⁰⁸

Der Vizekonsul verfolgte mit Aufmerksamkeit den Prozess des ehemaligen Flugattaché Großbritanniens – Claude Henry Turner. Die Person selbst bewertete er sehr negativ. Er war überzeugt, dass Turner schon bestimmt „in Sold des Sicherheitsamts steht, so sagt er, was im befohlen wird“. Polen gegenüber

¹⁰⁵ Ibidem, S. 239.

¹⁰⁶ Ibidem, S. 247–248.

¹⁰⁷ Ibidem, S. 241–242, 244.

¹⁰⁸ IPN Szczecin, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 163.

verharmloste er bewusst die Bedeutung des Prozesses, jedoch bezweifelte er die Schuld des oben Erwähnten nicht.¹⁰⁹

Den Briten beschäftigten andere Fragen politischen Charakters, wie z.B. Beratungen des Friedenskongresses, der in Breslau stattfand. Zu Recht kommentierte er, dass nur die Kommunisten zur Debatte gelassen wurden, die Kominform (Informationsbüro Kommunistischer Parteien und Arbeiterparteien mit Sitz in Bukarest) vertraten, das einen Teil des allgemeinen „kommunistischen Klüngels“ bildete, der an der Spitze der Bewegung stand.¹¹⁰

Nach ein paar Monaten Arbeit legte das polnische Personal der Stettiner konsularischen Stelle Großbritanniens dem Sicherheitsamt eine vollständige Meinung über seinen Vorgesetzten vor. Er war vor allem ein anspruchsvoller und besonders pedantischer Chef. Man wies jedoch auf eine hohe Nervosität, Misstrauen und Launenhaftigkeit des Briten, die ihre Quelle in seinen gesundheitlichen Problemen haben konnte. Die Sekretärin unterrichtete ihn zwar in Polnisch, aber das Erlernen der Sprache bereitete ihm Schwierigkeiten, und obwohl er sich eifrig bemühte, viel zu sprechen, beklagte er sich über Probleme mit der Verständigung, besonders per Telefon beim Verständigen.¹¹¹

Am 22. Dezember 1950, nachdem ein paar britische Konsulate in Polen (Kattowitz, Lodz, Posen) aufgelöst worden waren, informierte die Warschauer diplomatische Vertretung des Vereinigten Königreiches Bartlett über die endgültige Entscheidung des Botschafters: Die Stelle in Stettin wird geschlossen. Der Vizekonsul selbst sagte, dass es an der Oder „nichts mehr Interessantes zu tun gibt, außer gewöhnlichen Administrationsangelegenheiten“. Auf diese Weise teilte er mit, dass die Hauptfunktion des Konsulats, d.h. die Informationsfunktion, für London ihre Bedeutung verlor. Er meinte sogar, dass ausländische Stellen westlicher Länder hinter „dem Eisernen Vorhang“ eine nach der anderen aufgelöst werden, denn höchst wahrscheinlich ein Krieg ausbricht.¹¹²

Der Vizekonsul und besonders seine Ehefrau hatten keine guten Erinnerungen an den Aufenthalt in Stettin zu dieser Zeit. Fast hermetisch eingesperrt in ihrem Sitz wurden sie eigentlich des gesellschaftlichen Lebens und Kontakten mit der Umgebung beraubt. Zurückweisung, Probleme mit der administrativen

¹⁰⁹ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 211, 214.

¹¹⁰ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 206–207.

¹¹¹ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 214.

¹¹² Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 219, 226.

Verwaltung und ständige Überwachung durch den Sicherheitsdienst sorgten für keine gute Laune.¹¹³

Mit dem 1. Februar 1951 begann Henry Francis Bartlett das Vizekonsulat in Stettin aufzulösen, was bis Ende des Monats dauern sollte. Der offizielle Abschied fand in einem wenige Personen zählenden Kreis im Sitz der Konsularischen Agentur des Königreiches Schweden am 6. März 1951. Der Vizekonsul freute sich, dass er Stettin verlässt, „wo er zu kurz anwesend war, um kompromittiert zu werden“ – so sagte er selbst. Am Abend dieses Tages fuhr er mit einem Zug nach Warschau, wo er schon morgen früh seine Arbeit in der Botschaft Seiner Majestät begann, die er fast zwei Jahre ausübte.¹¹⁴

Mit dem 23. Februar 1951 wurde H.F. Bartlett zum zweiten Sekretär ernannt und im nächsten Jahr trat er das Amt des ersten Sekretärs an (und zugleich des Leiters der konsularischen Sektion). Er beschäftigte sich mit Konsul-, Visa- und Administrationsfragen u.Ä.¹¹⁵ Warschau verließ er am 8. Januar 1953 und begab sich zu Foreign Office in London.¹¹⁶

Bei der Bewertung seiner beruflichen Arbeit in Polen, gab Bartlett zu, dass sie besonders interessant war, obwohl er das Land unter den, die er bisher kennen lernte, am wenigsten mochte. Auf verdeckte Weise äußerte er sich vor allem zum kommunistischen Regime und zur Tätigkeit des Sicherheitsdienstes. Was interessant ist, betonte er seine besondere Zufriedenheit mit seinem sechsmonatigen Aufenthalt in Stettin trotz vieler Unannehmlichkeiten, die er dort erfuhr.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 267.

¹¹⁴ Ibidem, 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 230, 240, 250–252, 256, 259, 265.

¹¹⁵ AMSZ Warszawa, Sammlung 16, Bündel 46, Bd. 805, S. 49; IPN Warszawa, BU 01178/1062/Jacket, S. 3, 148, 164–165; Evidenzkarte des Personals..., Nr. 1874; IPN Szczecin, Z. 009/1468, Bd. 2, S. 257.

¹¹⁶ Die ersten zwei Jahre arbeitete er bei Foreign Office. Im Zeitraum vom 1955 bis 1960 hatte er die Funktion des ersten Sekretärs der britischen Botschaft in Caracas (Venezuela) inne, Danach in Mexiko (1960–1964), und von 1964 bis 1967 war er Konsul in Khorramshahr (Iran), später (1967–1969) – Stellvertretende des hohen Kommissars in Brisbane in Australien, Berater und Geschäftsträger in Manila (1969–1972), Botschafter in Paraguay von 1972 bis 1975; Ehrenprofessor nat. der Universität in Asuncion (1975), Exec. Officer, Utah Foundation in Brisbane (1976–1989). Er ließ sich in Australien in Brisbane nieder. Ritter des Ordens Heiligen Michales und Georges (1975). Sein Berufsleben lang und dann auch als Pensionierter beschäftigte er sich mit seinem Hobby – mit Malen, und stellte seine Bilder in Gemäldegalerien in Caracas (1957, 1959), Mexiko (1962), Brisbane (1969, 1978, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996) – nach Informationen von Foreign Office vom 10.12.2013 (im Besitz der Autoren); J. Tebinka, R. Techman: *Ostatni raport brytyjskiego wicekonsula...*, S. 223, Anm. 1; IPN Warszawa, BU 01178/1062/Jacket, S. 148, 164.

¹¹⁷ IPN Warszawa, BU 01178/1062/Jacket, S. 55.

Der Blick auf die ganze Tätigkeit von drei britischen Vizekonsuln in Stettin nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg erlaubt die Feststellung, dass sie zu scharfsinnigen und gut vorbereiteten Mitarbeiter des konsularischen Dienstes von Foreign Office gehörten. Der Schwerpunkt ihrer Arbeit lag in geringem Grad auf typischen Administrationshandlungen, die mit Visaausstellung, Anmeldung und Fürsorge für Landsleute, deren geringe Anzahl sich in Westpommern befand, verbunden waren, sondern in der Beobachtung von Prozessen und Ereignissen, die in der Region vorkamen. Die jeweilige Sachlage wurde dann in Form verschiedener Bearbeitungen und Berichte wiedergegeben, die die Obrigkeit bekam. Sofern in den ersten Jahren man Nachdruck auf wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftlich-demographische Fragen legte, insofern dominierten seit Ende der 40er Jahre politische Angelegenheiten, was mit einer anderen Situation zusammenhing, die in Folge der Ideologisierung des ganzen Lebens in Polen entstand. Daten für diese Materialien entnahmen die Konsuln einer genauen Lektüre der lokalen Presse, der Befragung nach Meinungen und Bewertungen verschiedener Personen, dem Zuhören der Volksstimme, d.h. dem Zuhören, wie ist die Erfahrung, die Stimmung und die Meinung in dem Milieu. Zu betonen ist die Tatsache, dass die Briten bestimmte Ereignisse sehr treffend pointierten, eventuell sehr anschaulich, manchmal mit einem Hauch an Spott oder Ironie, aber auch mit Kritizismus darstellten.

Das Stettiner Ballungsgebiet und Westpommern waren ein interessantes Territorium für die Vertreter von Foreign Office, denn hier – wie in einem Schmelztiegel – vermischte sich unterschiedliche Problematik, nicht nur polnische, sondern auch sowjetische, deutsche, tschechoslowakische u. s. w. Dank der Tätigkeit der nach Stettin entsandten Vizekonsuln gelangen ihre Vorgesetzten an das Wissen über zahlreiche und differenzierte Fragen in der Nachkriegsgeschichte der Stadt an der Oder und der Woiwodschaft, und der polnische Forscher bekam nach Jahren ein wertvolles Bild über sie, das auf Grund relativ objektiver Übermittlungen britischer Beamten entstand. Die Glaubwürdigkeit der Vizekonsuln des Vereinigten Königreiches erweckt keine besonderen Zweifel, obwohl ihr Zugang zu wertvollen Informationen im Laufe der Zeit sich verengte, da auch der Kreis von Personen, mit denen sie sich treffen konnten, immer geringer wurde. Besonders schwierig, oder eigentlich fast unmöglich, war der Zugang zu lokalen kommunistischen, ideologisch voll geformten Entscheidungsträgern, denen eine nähere Bekanntschaft mit Vertretern kapitalistischer Staaten sowieso mit ernsten Folgen drohte.

Die Tätigkeit der Vizekonsuln von Foreign Office – vor allem zwei Letzter – fiel auf eine besonders schwierige Zeit der Stalinisierung Polens zu, in der man jeden westlichen Bürger für einen Spion hielt und ihn unter die „Obhut“ der Geheimpolizei nahm. Die äußere und die interne Überwachung der konsularischen Stelle, ihre Isolierung von der lokalen Gesellschaft, das Erschweren von Kontakten mit Institutionen und sogar das Verhindern an jeglichem Kontakt mit einem Durchschnittseinwohner beeinflussten negativ das gewöhnliche Funktionieren der britischen Agentur in Stettin.

Allgemein gesehen ermöglichten die Übermittlungen der Stettiner Vizekonsuln Foreign Office die in London herrschende Meinung über die polnische Anwesenheit in Westpommern zu festigen. Sie war entschieden nicht positiv, denn man äußerte sich kritisch über Handlungen kommunistischer Verwalter und der neuen Bevölkerung ehemaliger deutscher Gebiete besonders in Bezug auf das langsame Tempo des Wiederaufbaus und der Entwicklung in verschiedenen Lebensbereichen, das – laut den Bewertenden – keine angemessenen Bewirtschaftung des besetzten Territoriums garantierte. Selbstverständlich vermindern ungünstige für die Republik Polen und ihre Einwohner Informationen ihren historischen Wert nicht. Ganz im Gegensatz: Sie unterstreichen ihn sogar, denn sie liegen näher der Wahrheit, als der Ton polnischer Übermittlungen.

Die britische Diplomatie, die in der Wirklichkeit den polnischen Besitz von Stettin und der umliegenden Region in Frage stellte, unterstützte formell den Potsdamer Vertrag, der die endgültige Regelung der deutsch-polnischen Grenze zur Entscheidung für die nächste Friedenskonferenz ließ. Jedoch mit dem Ersuchen an die polnische Verwaltung um die Zustimmung für die Eröffnung eines Vizekonsulats in Stettin bestätigte Großbritannien – nicht nur *de facto* – das gerade diese Behörde in Westpommern entscheidet.

PRZEDSTAWICIELE BRYTYJSKIEJ SŁUŻBY KONSULARNEJ W SZCZECINIE W LATACH 1946–1951

Streszczenie

W artykule scharakteryzowano funkcjonowanie placówki konsularnej Wielkiej Brytanii w Szczecinie przez pryzmat działalności jej kierowników, wicekonsulów: Josepha Waltersa, Davida Garnetta Mitchella i Henry'ego Francisa Bartletta, którzy należeli do wnikliwych i dobrze przygotowanych urzędników Foreign Office w Londynie. Negatywny wpływ na możliwości ich pracy w mieście nad Odrą miała inwigilacja zewnętrzna i wewnętrzna brytyjskiego przedstawicielstwa przez służby bezpieczeństwa, jego ścisła izolacja przez utrudnienie kontaktów z instytucjami i lokalną społecznością. Działalność wicekonsulów obejmowała nie tyle typowe czynności administracyjne (np. udzielanie wiz) lub opiekę nad nielicznymi rodakami, co przede wszystkim obserwację procesów oraz wydarzeń zachodzących na Pomorzu Zachodnim. Funkcję informacyjną, której wyrazem były różne raporty przekazywane władzom zwierzchnim, wypełniali Brytyjczycy na podstawie dokładnego studiowania miejscowej prasy, zasięgania opinii różnych ludzi, słuchania otoczenia i gwaru ulicy. O ile w pierwszych latach kładli oni nacisk na zagadnienia gospodarcze czy społeczno-demograficzne, to od końca lat czterdziestych dominowały w ich raportach sprawy polityczne, co wiązało się z odmienną sytuacją, jaką niosła socjalizacja życia w Polsce.

Przekazy przedstawicieli konsularnych Wielkiej Brytanii pozwalały Foreign Office utrwalić panującą w Londynie opinię o polskiej obecności na Pomorzu Zachodnim. Nie była ona pozytywna, gdyż pod adresem komunistycznej administracji oraz nowej ludności dawnych niemieckich ziem, kierowano najczęściej krytyczne uwagi, odnoszące się zwłaszcza do powolnego tempa odbudowy i rozwoju różnych dziedzin gospodarki, nie gwarantującego – w brytyjskiej ocenie – należytego zagospodarowania tego regionu. Dyplomacja JKM, faktycznie kwestionująca przynależność Szczecina i przyległego obszaru do Polski, formalnie stała na stanowisku umowy poczdamskiej, która ostateczne uregulowanie granicy polsko-niemieckiej odkładała do decyzji przyszłej konferencji pokojowej. Należy jednak zauważyć, że występując do polskich władz o zgodę na powołanie wicekonsulatu w Szczecinie, Wielka Brytania potwierdziła nie tylko *de facto*, że to one sprawują rządy na Pomorzu Zachodnim.

*JOANNA KUSTOWSKA**

Szczecin

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION HELD IN POLAND IN 2005 AND 2007 ACCORDING TO “THE GUARDIAN”

Keywords: the British press; parliamentary election in Poland; Poland’s image in Great Britain; political parties in Poland

Summary

Parliamentary elections has always been arousing extreme emotions in Poland. The 2005 and 2007 elections were widely addressed in the Polish media. Furthermore, the election campaign and the final election results attracted the attention of the British press, which was reflected in a number of articles published in the United Kingdom in 2005 and 2007 respectively. The main reason behind interest that the British press had in the political situation in Poland had to do with large population of Polish emigrants residing in the UK.

The article is aimed at presenting the standpoint of one of widely-read English dailies which shapes not only the British foreign policy, but also the British public opinion, namely “The Guardian”.

Through presenting the profiles of two main political parties running for the 2005 and the 2007 elections in Poland (i.e. Civic Platform as well as Law and Justice), “The Guardian” did its best to affect the results of the vote. The articles published in the daily not only described the political parties, but were also aimed at creating the image of Poland in Great Britain. Depending on the election results, the image of Poland and Poles was subject to change.

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“The Guardian”, British daily dealing with political matters, devoted much of its attention to parliamentary election held in Poland in Autumn 2005 and 2007. Before taking a good look at articles published in the newspaper, it is worth presenting the profile of the daily and political preferences expressed by its journalists.

Originally “The Manchester Guardian”, “The Guardian” was first published in Manchester in 1821, and since 1961 has been coming out also in London. At the very beginning a weekly, now it is published Monday through Saturday and owned by world-famous Guardian Media Group plc., “The Guardian” boasts of being the first British daily produced entirely in colour. Having in mind the place and moment in history when it was first published, “The Guardian” is said to have liberal-democratic character, in other words to be in favour of the political programme outlined by British Labour Party.

As for parliamentary election, since 1945 “The Guardian” has been a committed supporter of Labour Party or Liberal Democrats (an exception was election held in 1951 when the daily backed the candidature of Winston Churchill). Political sympathy expressed toward liberal parties is reflected in articles published by the daily. This was also the case with press coverage of two leading Polish political parties running for election both in 2005 and 2007, namely Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Platform of the Republic of Poland (PO).

Parliamentary election held in Poland in 2005

Autumn of 2005 was an important time for Polish internal policy since it was then that two major events took place, namely parliamentary election (to the Sejm and the Senate) as well as presidential election. The former was scheduled for 25 October 2005 and was the first election to be held after Poland had joined the European Union.

After a number of corruption scandals surrounding Social Democratic Alliance (SLD), the Poles were to decide if they wanted to give power to the then ruling party or hand it over to another political group.

Pre-election polls did not however give SLD much chance of being as successful as in 2001 when the party received 41.04% of the vote.¹

¹ Data derived from National Electoral Commission, http://wybory2001.pkw.gov.pl/sjg2_k.html.

Describing the situation in Poland prior to the election, the journalists of “The Guardian” focused mainly on presenting the profiles of two leading political parties struggling for power in Poland, namely Civic Platform (PO) as well as Law and Justice (PiS). The groups differed considerably in a number of aspects, yet the daily labelled both as right-wing parties. First articles describing the aforementioned groups were published in “The Guardian” on 14 September 2005. Before that only few references had been made about the forthcoming election, mainly in the context of Polish emigrants living in Great Britain. Comparing the number of publications on Civic Platform as well as Law and Justice, definitely more information was provided about the latter. In the first article, entitled “The twins who would take over Poland” and published on 14 September 2005,² Ian Traynor, correspondent of “The Guardian”, described the competing parties, referring mainly to Jarosław Kaczyński and Lech Kaczyński, and discussed the image of Poland to be created if the Kaczyńskis brothers won the election. Traynor presented Kaczyńskis as politicians sharing Catholic ideas and holding unfriendly attitude toward Germans, Russians, gays, communists or hooligans. He referred not only to their views and personality traits, but also described their appearance. Traynor described Jarosław Kaczyński as a short, fat and grey-haired candidate for the premiership with unfriendly facial expression. He portrayed Lech Kaczyński in a similar way, the only difference laying in a beauty mark on the cheek of the latter.

Contrary to the Kaczyńskis brothers, Traynor did not give much attention to Donald Tusk and Civic Platform (PO). He presented the leader of PO as a politician supporting right-wing views, yet more centred than those expressed by the leader of Law and Justice (PiS), hence very similar to the ones put forward by the daily. In fact, all the articles published by “The Guardian” were written in a similar tone. In his article of 12 March 2006 entitled “Homophobia seeps cross New UE”,³ Daniel McLaughlin stated that Poland was the least tolerant toward same-sex couples out of all the states that joined the European Union on 1 May 2004. He paid attention to one more problem, namely coalition that was in power in Poland at that time. According to McLaughlin, the leader of Law and Justice expressed his controversial views on numerous occasions, namely that homosexual people should not be teachers so that they could not “win young minds over”.

² I. Travor: *The twins who would take over Poland*, “The Guardian”, 14 September 2005.

³ D. McLaughlin: *Homophobia seeps cross New EU*, “The Guardian”, 14 March 2006.

To add to the picture, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, prime minister designated by Law and Justice, claimed that homosexuality was something unnatural and hence the government should counteract presenting contrary views⁴. McLaughlin in a very subtle way (unlike other correspondents of the daily) pointed out that these politicians, who after all shall be the example of tolerance and defend minorities, intimidated, humiliated and deprived these groups of the right to work and lead a normal life.

Furthermore, "The Guardian" made several references to the movie entitled "O dwóch takich, co ukradli księżyc" [The Two Who Stole the Moon] starred by Lech Kaczyński (Jacek) and his brother Jarosław (Placek) in 1962. This was intentional and aimed at making it evident to the readers they would vote not only for a right-wing politician (who PiS's leader obviously was), but also for the boy they probably remembered from the movie. In this way, the journalists suggested that the political programme of the party would be as unrealistic as a fairy tale.

Compared to the Kaczyńskis brothers, the leader of Civic Platform, Donald Tusk, was presented as a liberal and centre-right politician in charge of the victorious party. Just as Polish titles, the daily under consideration anticipated that after winning the election Civic Platform would form coalition with Law and Justice, which was to open a new chapter in Polish politics. As expected by "The Guardian", the party led by Donald Tusk was supposed to counterbalance conservative and sometimes narrow-minded views expressed by their potential coalition partner.

In his article published on 24 September (i.e. one day before the election) and entitled "Polish right heads for election landslide", Ian Traynor wrote that since both were right-wing parties, Law and Justice and Civic Platform would eventually form a coalition. At the same time, he stressed that such an "alliance" would be very fragile.⁵ Traynor indicated that according to the pre-election polls, PiS and PO could expect 30% of the vote respectively and it was difficult to state clearly which party would be an outright winner, whereas the former ruling party, namely the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) could gain at most 5% of the vote.

As anticipated by "The Guardian", the most interesting competition in the 2005 election would take place between two major committees, namely Electoral Committee of Civic Platform and Electoral Committee of Law and Justice.

⁴ Ibidem.

⁵ I. Traynor: *Polish right heads for election landslide*, "The Guardian", 24 September 2005.

According to the official results published by National Electoral Commission,⁶ and to be more specific its chairman Ferdynand Rymarz, Law and Justice won 155 seats in the Sejm, whilst Civic Platform gained 133 mandates. The results of the election to the Sejm were surprising not only for Civic Platform, which according to pre-election polls was designated as a winner,⁷ but also for the journalists of "The Guardian" whose articles supported the party led by Donald Tusk. The required electoral threshold was exceeded by the following parties: the Republic of Poland Self Defense Party (56 seats), Social Democratic Alliance (55 mandates), Polish Families League (34 seats), and Polish Peasant Party (25 mandates). Two seats were gained by German Ethnic Minority which did not have to reach a 5% electoral threshold. The turnout of voters did not, however, exceed 50% and amounted to 40.57%.⁸

The results of the election to the Senate of the Republic of Poland were announced on the same day. Out of 100 mandates, 49 seats were gained by Law and Justice, 34 mandates were received by Civic Platform of the Republic of Poland, 7 seats - by Polish Families League, 3 mandates were won by the Republic of Poland Self Defense Party, 2 seats were gained by Polish Peasant Party and, last but not least, 1 seat was gained by New Senate 2005 Elector Electoral Committee. The remaining four mandates were received by independent candidates, namely Kazimierz Julian Kutz, professor Marian Milek, Maciej Plazynski, Bogdan Borusewicz.⁹

First commentaries after the parliamentary election were published by "The Guardian" on another day, i.e. on 26 September 2005. Ian Traynor, the correspondent of the daily specializing in political and historical events taking place in central Europe, in his article entitled "Poland swings to the right in general election"¹⁰ summed up the election to the Sejm and the Senate. As suggested by the title, Poland was presented as a country that since the first free election (i.e. since 1989) was not capable of selecting unanimously one party that could run the country on its own. Traynor claimed that, contrary to expectations, both

⁶ National Electoral Commission, <http://wybory2005.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/PL/WYN/M/index.htm>, 2005.

⁷ I. Traynor: *Polish right heads...*

⁸ Result of the voting, National Electoral Commission, www.wybory2005.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/PL/WYN/F/index.htm, 2005.

⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰ I. Traynor: *Poland swings to the right in general election*, "The Guardian", 26 September 2005.

Civic Platform and Law and Justice might be unwilling to form a coalition. Furthermore, he made a reference to the then forthcoming presidential election that, according to him, could become an opportunity for the Kaczyńskis brothers to take over two highest positions in Poland.

“The Observer”, weekly owned by Guardian Media Group, i.e. the company publishing “The Guardian”, featured the article entitled “Poland’s former child stars twin poll victory” on 25 September 2005 (Sunday), i.e. when the election was being held in Poland and hence Polish press could not publish anything because of the election silence.¹¹ The author, Daniel McLaughlin, published also in “The Guardian”. He pointed to a precedent on a European scale that might be created in Poland if the twin politicians govern the country. Contrary to Ian Traynor, who in his article “Polish right heads for election landslide”¹² of 24 September 2005 stated it was difficult to point to the outright winner of the parliamentary election, Daniel McLaughlin designated Law and Justice as a winner.

His attitude toward the Kaczyńskis brothers was not at all surprising. He expressed his contempt and called them “Kaczory” [The Ducks] (using both Polish and English counterparts). He also described them as conservative Catholics holding radical views and expressed hope that Polish people would eventually make a wise choice (in other words vote for Civic Platform).

It was Simon Tisdall, journalist of “The Guardian”, who believed in the coalition between Civic Platform and Law and Justice. In his article entitled “Suitors circle a Poland in limbo”¹³ of 27 September 2005,¹⁴ he stated that although the Poles chose Law and Justice and hence gave up on radical reforms¹⁵ proposed by Civic Platform, Jarosław Kaczyński still needed a partner with whom he and his party could co-rule.

According to Tisdall, whether or not the coalition would be formed depended on the results of presidential election for which Donald Tusk and Lech Kaczyński were to run. To prove his thesis, Tisdall cited Wojciech Kosca, Transitions Online analyst, who believed that such a coalition could not be created because of mutual

¹¹ D. McLaughlin: *Poland’s former child stars twin poll victory*, “The Guardian”, 25 September 2005.

¹² I. Traynor: *Polish right heads...*

¹³ S. Tisdall: *Suitors circle a Poland in limbo*, “The Guardian”, 27 September 2005

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ Such reforms include: a 15% flat tax, public spending cut, and entering the Euro zone.

attacks made by the electoral committees of candidates standing for the presidential election.

Scant attention was paid by "The Guardian" to Social Democratic Alliance (SLD). In the commentaries published after the election, SLD was described as a humiliated post-communist party involved in a number of political scandals and incapable of achieving similar electoral success as in 2001. In fact it was only the fifth in a row to enter the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and was outdistanced by such parties as Self Defense Party and Polish Families League. As for the remaining political groups that had received mandates in the Sejm, hardly any reference was made. Had it become evident that Law and Justice would form a coalition with one or more winning parties, "The Guardian" very briefly described the profiles of two of them, namely Self Defense Party and Polish Families League.

The article entitled "Poland's disenchanting killed off 'New Europe'"¹⁶ referred to discontent expressed by the British government over the results of election. Labour Party together with its leader Tony Blair hoped that Civic Platform, which according to the pre-election polls was supposed to win¹⁷, would become a new ally of the British in the European Parliament. Similar opinions about the results of election were expressed in Brussels where everyone was afraid that the newly elected Polish president and the government would seek every possible way of contravening standards and regulations implemented by the European Union in order to block the EU reforms.

The article summing up the results of both parliamentary and presidential election, entitled "Poland's disenchanting killed off 'New Europe'", was published on 28 October 2005, i.e. five days after Lech Kaczyński had been elected president of the Republic of Poland. The author of the article, Jonathan Steele, did his best to explain an unprecedented situation that took place in Poland. He tried to convince his readers that the main reason why radical right-wing parties came to power was growing poverty and inequalities among particular Polish regions.

This had to do with a difficult situation faced by the Poles. In order to determine the number of the poor, "The Guardian"¹⁸ quoted data published by the World Bank according to which this group constituted 12% of the Polish population in

¹⁶ J. Steele: *Poland's disenchanting killed off 'New Europe'*, "The Guardian", 28 October 2005.

¹⁷ I. Traynor: *Poland swings...*

¹⁸ According to „The Guardian”, the poor are those whose daily income does not exceed 1.25 £

2005. Hence, it came as no surprise that the Poles felt frustrated and supported Law and Justice. In his article, Steele mentioned the notion of “New Europe” construed by Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense in the cabinet of American president George W. Bush between 2001 and 2006. The term referred to post-communist countries situated in central and east Europe that became involved in the Iraq War after 2003 and were to bring about liberal changes there. According to the thesis formulated by Steele, “New Europe” ended when Polish society inclined toward political right, consequently putting an end to the stage of reforms initiated in 1989. Such a state of affairs was not only the journalists’ but also the British government’s concern. Steele went even further in his vision and claimed that Poland, which for the past 15 years had strove for reforming herself, stopped halfway or even had taken a step backward.

After the election and once Law and Justice had announced its candidate for the premiership, the party led by Jarosław Kaczyński attempted to form a coalition with Civic Platform, which was essential for running the country. Meanwhile, both groups conducted electoral campaigns of their candidates for the presidency. They did not, however, manage to reach an agreement. This lack of consensus had to do with personal issues (i.e. who would take over particular posts) as well as mutual accusations made by the two parties during the presidential campaign. Since they failed to create a coalition and soon Lech Kaczyński was appointed president of the Republic of Poland, minority government headed by Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz was formed on 31 October 2005. The government coalition was created in May 2006, after stabilization pact had been concluded.

Before the election and the coalition (eventually formed with the Republic of Poland Self Defense Party and Polish Families League), the politicians of Law and Justice attached profound importance to cooperation between Poland and Great Britain. It was hardly known Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, politician and physics teacher, who triumphed in the election and was appointed prime minister. One of the main goals to be accomplished by Law and Justice as part of their foreign policy was to reach an agreement with Great Britain.

One of reasons behind adopting such a stance was sympathy expressed by Polish people in the survey conducted by Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS).¹⁹

¹⁹ Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS), *Sprzymierzeńcy Polski w Unii Europejskiej* [Supporters of Poland’s membership of the European Union], *Komunikat z badań* [Survey report] BS/120/2007, Warsaw, July 2007, p. 2.

They declared that Great Britain was one of major supporters of Poland in the European Union.²⁰

Parliamentary election held in Poland in 2007

On 7 September 2007, the Fifth Term of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland passed the Act on shortening the term of office of the Sejm.²¹ It was concluded by the then Marshall of the Sejm, Ludwik Dorn, and entered into force on the date of its adoption. The Act was aimed at shortening a constitutional 4-year term of office of the Sejm, shortening the term of office of the Senate, and thus holding early parliamentary election. Such a decision stemmed from the collapse of coalition among three parties, namely Law and Justice, Polish Families League, and the Republic of Poland Self Defense Party. Early election was scheduled for 21 October 2007 by the president Lech Kaczyński.

Just as in 2005, the main rivals were Civic Platform and Law and Justice. This time, however, no one considered the two parties potential coalition partners, but rather fierce opponents. Early election was to show in which political group Polish society had confidence. To be more specific, if the Poles trusted the party that had ruled for the past two years or believed in election promises made by the party led by Donald Tusk. The media became heavily involved in the electoral campaign. "The Guardian" paid close attention to the "Polish case".

Three days before the parliamentary election, Kate Connolly in her article entitled "Divide and conquer"²² presented a distorted image of Jarosław and Lech Kaczyńskis. Expressing her criticism, she was hardly complimentary when describing the physical appearance of the brothers and their personality traits. Just as other journalists of "The Guardian", to differentiate between the brothers, Connolly presented Jarosław as an old bachelor living with his mother and a cat. This image was reinforced by cat's hair on the suit of the prime minister.

President Lech Kaczyński's was presented as a man with a chubby-cheeked face and a characteristic beauty mark on one cheek. Having read these descriptions, one might get the impression that the twin brothers had little in common.

²⁰ 28% of the respondents declared that Great Britain was the main supporter of Poland's membership of the EU, followed by the Czech Republic (22%), France (19%), Lithuania (16%).

²¹ Act of 7 September 2007 on shortening the term of office of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, *Dziennik Ustaw* 2007, nr 163, poz. 1154 [Journal of Laws 2007, no. 163, item. 1154].

²² K. Connolly: *Divide and conquer*, "The Guardian", 16 October 2007.

However, to show that this was not the case, Connolly quoted Slawomir Sierakowski, journalist of “Krytyka Polityczna” [The Political Critique], who claimed that the Kaczyńskis brothers used one and the same brain.²³ In other words, he was inclined to believe they held similar views about internal and foreign policy to be pursued by the Polish government. To prove his thesis, Sierakowski quoted the Kaczyńskis’ mother, Jadwiga who when relating to their childhood said that even if they argued over something, at the end of the day one was ready to “die for” the other in line with the three musketeers motto “one for all, all for one”. Once Lech and Jarosław had taken over two highest posts in the Polish politic arena, the situation was no different. They cooperated closely with each other, made difficult and very often ineffective decisions, and were always supportive to each other. Just as journalists of “The Guardian”, while describing the leader of Law and Justice (Jarosław) and the president of the Republic of Poland (Lech), Connolly could not avoid mentioning their connections with Catholic Radio Maryja [Virgin Mary Radio]. The electorate of the Kaczyńskis was referred to as “the brigade of mohair berets”, whereas Father Tadeusz Rydzyk was presented as an influential priest who controlled not only the listeners of his radio, but also the president and the prime minister (by threatening he would not support them in the then forthcoming parliamentary election). In order to present a full picture, Connolly cited two elderly residents of Zoliborz (district of Warsaw) who represented the “core” electorate of Law and Justice party. Two men, Wladyslaw and Janek, emphasized the virtues of the Kaczyńskis brothers. They complained about Civic Platform, and blamed the Russians and Germans for Poland’s misfortune. Furthermore, they were disgusted with the fact that young people, upon whom the results of the election might depend and who according to them did not know real life, did not notice the problem. The title of the article, namely “Divide and conquer”, might be considered a hint given to Civic Platform how to deal with the domination of the Kaczyńskis brothers, namely that in order to defeat the twin politicians, Civic Platform should not let them rule together.

Civic Platform (PO), together with its leader Donald Tusk and their young electorate, represented the other extreme. According to Connolly, the majority of PO’s voters were young people living in big cities, spending their leisure time in trendy pubs and creating the positive image of Poland among their friends and acquaintances living and working abroad. As for the followers of Civic Platform (fighting

²³ Ibidem.

with narrow-minded and nationalistic Law and Justice), the former president of Poland, Lech Walesa, was her staunch supporter. Regarded a world authority, he was promoted by "The Guardian" as a statesman advising Polish people who they should vote for. Walesa's words were cited in a number of articles. He described Jarosław Kaczyński as an unworldly person incapable of using modern technologies (could not send short messages, had not opened a bank account, did not have a driving license, etc.). Connelly paid special attention to the phenomenon of brain drain and its scale for which she blamed, among other things, the policy pursued by the xenophobic Kaczyńskis brothers. Most British and Polish titles "designated" Civic Platform with her leader Donald Tusk as a triumphant party. "The Guardian" highlighted the role of Polish emigrants living in Great Britain and the fact they could have decisive influence on the results of election.

The election campaign was very brief. It began officially on 8 September (one day after the election date had been announced) and ended on 19 October (i.e. lasted less than six weeks). Needless to say, before the aforementioned date was set, the parties had taken a number of actions as part of their election campaigns, namely displayed their election posters or released their TV commercials. Furthermore, the political groups presented their campaign slogans. Civic Platform attracted her potential voters with a slogan "By żyło się lepiej. Wszystkim" [So that everyone lived a better life]. On the other hand, Law and Justice announced "Zlikwidujemy korupcję" [We will root corruption out], whereas the Republic of Poland Self Defense Party started her campaign with the following slogan: "O prawdę i godność" [For truth and dignity].

In 2007, the parliamentary election was held on Sunday (21 October). The turnout of voters was record in more than 30,000 electoral districts. According to the official statement released by National Electoral Commission, it reached 53.88%, which was the highest result in the parliamentary election held in Poland after 1989. The turnout in the 2005 election was 13.31% lower and stood at 40.57%. Carrying out further analysis, it can be noticed that the turnout of voters living in urban areas was considerably higher than the turnout of voters living in rural areas, namely 58.8% and 45.3% respectively. An interesting fact was that the highest turnout of voters was reported abroad, namely 78.26%. As for Poland, the highest turnout was the case with Mazowieckie voivodship (60.50%), whilst the lowest was reported in Swietokrzyskie voivodship (47.45%). According to the election results disclosed by National Electoral Commission, in the 6th term of the Sejm, i.e. in the years 2007–2011, the vote polled by particular parties

represented: 41.51% in the case of Civic Platform, 32.11% in the case of Law and Justice, 13.15% for Left and Democrats, and 8.91% for Polish Peasant Party. In terms of the number of mandates in the Sejm, Civic Platform gained 209 seats, whereas Law and Justice won 166 seats. Left and Democrats received 53 mandates, while Polish Peasant Party gained 31 seats. Traditionally, German Ethnic Minority gained one mandate. The remaining parties did not exceed the election threshold and did not receive any seats in the Sejm, to be more specific: Self Defence of the Republic of Poland (1.53% of the vote), Polish Families League (1.30% of the vote), Polish Labour Party (0.99% of the vote) and, last but not least, Women's Party (0.28% of the vote).

Analyzing the results of election to the Senate, it can be noticed that the main two opponents, namely Civic Platform as well as Law and Justice, gained considerable number of seats in the Senate (out of 100 mandates). As for the new term, the former gained 60 seats, whereas the latter won 39 mandates. Last but not least, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz was elected as independent senator and not a member of Left and Democrats Party.

Altogether, the number of voters amounted to 16,495,000. Civic Platform received 6.7 million votes, Law and Justice polled 5.2 million votes, Left and Democrats obtained 2.1 million votes, whereas Polish Peasant Party secured 1.4 million votes. Civic Platform won the election in northern, western and central voivodships. As usual, Law and Justice triumphed in eastern and southern voivodships. The highest number of votes (namely 534,241) were obtained by the leader of Civic Platform – Donald Tusk. Second highest result was the case with prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński (273,684 votes). Lower number of votes were gained by: the head of parliamentary club of Civic Platform Bogdan Zdrojewski (213,883 votes), Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro (164,681 votes) and his rival from Cracow – former senator of Civic Platform Jarosław Gowin (160,465 votes). Even fewer votes were gained by the vice-leader of Civic Platform Bronisław Komorowski (139,320 votes) and deputy prime minister Przemysław Gosiewski (138,405 votes). After considering the electoral protests, The Supreme Court Labour Law, Social Security and Public Affairs Chamber passed the Act of 17 January 2008 to conclude that the election was valid.

The parliamentary election held on 21 October 2007 was featured in “The Guardian”. Presenting the results, the journalists used catchy titles, for instance “The Triumph of Civic Platform”, “The Poles entered a new era of integration with Europe”, “More Tolerance and Freedom in Poland”, “The Poles rejected

populism and fear” – to name only some commentaries provided by the British daily which, just as before the election, expressed its support for Civic Platform.

In the Monday issue of the daily, Mark Tran joyfully reported that Civic Platform, i.e. the party for which the development of European cooperation was a point of honour, had won the election in Poland.²⁴ According to Tran, the importance of Poland in Europe would increase thanks to enthusiastic approach held by the leader of Civic Platform toward closer integration with the EU structures and his friendly approach toward European, and particularly German, politicians. Furthermore, he claimed that the results of election would enhance the image of Polish government as a team of politicians with whom everyone (not only the British) would find it easier to cooperate. Tran believed that the EU leaders were in favour of the choice made by the Poles and hoped for more effective cooperation with Donald Tusk than with Jarosław Kaczyński, especially having in mind “aggressive nationalism and the manufacturing of enemies at home and abroad” which was the case with the latter.²⁵ The Germans and Russians were the most satisfied with such a change since it was a chance for improving the relations between the European Union and Russia. According to Tran, the only country which could be discontent with the results of election in Poland were the USA. Such a state of affairs stemmed from pre-election promises made by Donald Tusk, namely that once his party had won, they would put an end to Polish mission in Iraq and Polish soldiers would finally return home.

The election victory of Civic Platform improved considerably the image of Polish society. “The Guardian” changed significantly its approach to young Polish people who overcame their lethargy, took the fate of their homeland in their hands and voted for Civic Platform. This had also translated into higher turnout of voters which rose by 15% in comparison with the 2005 election.²⁶ Furthermore, Tran noticed that the electorate of Law and Justice, i.e. elderly people, could feel frustrated and find it hard to live in a new reality. Formulating his policy, Jarosław Kaczyński highlighted the risk which, according to him, Russia posed to Poland. This policy, based on envy and hostility, was familiar and acceptable to the Poles who remembered communist times. To prove his words, Tran presented opinions

²⁴ M. Tran: *Polish winners pledge pro-EU Shift*, “The Guardian”, 22 October 2007.

²⁵ Ibidem.

²⁶ T.G. Ash: *If our political parties did not exist, would we ever need to invent them?*, “The Guardian”, 25 October 2007.

expressed by young generation who voted in order to “save Poland” from Law and Justice.

On 21 October 2007 (Sunday), when election silence was to be observed in Poland and thus political parties could not turn to public agitation, “The Guardian” disclosed on its website information gathered by Daniel McLaughlin, the daily’s correspondent in Wrocław.²⁷ Contrary to his colleagues, in the article entitled “Twins fear the verdict of angry youth” McLaughlin described the situation in Poland using short statements made by young Poles living in Wrocław.

One more article looking at the parliamentary election in Poland, entitled “Separating the terrible twins”,²⁸ was published on 22 October 2007. Analogically to views expressed by Mark Tran,²⁹ it stated that “Polish democracy grew up on Sunday, when the country’s voters rejected the strident, xenophobic nationalism of Jarosław Kaczyński”.³⁰ Nevertheless, apart from a number of positive aspects and benefits accruing from the choice made by Polish people, this time “The Guardian” also noticed problems that might be faced by the newly formed government. President Lech Kaczyński’s attitude would be first and major obstacle for liberal conservatives (how “The Guardian” called Civic Platform) to exercising unlimited power. The daily emphasized that it was Jarosław Kaczyński, and not his brother, who had lost the election. In other words, the leader of Law and Justice had to say goodbye to the premiership, while his younger brother, Lech, kept the presidential seat. As expected, this posed a number of problems and gave rise to conflicts between two most important persons running the country, which might have a detrimental effect on the situation in Poland. After all, presidential veto and blocking the Acts passed by the Polish parliament would be of no use for facilitating the functioning of political apparatus. It soon turned out that this was the case. The other obstacle to be overcome by the new government was the image of Poland created by the Kaczyńskis brothers through their policy. Needless to say, this image would not change overnight. An important task to be accomplished by Civic Platform was to blot out politicians’ (particularly European ones) memories of the past two years of Law and Justice ruling. According to “The Guardian”, German politicians would find it particularly difficult to forget that the country which they wholeheartedly supported in aspiring to the European Union and in

²⁷ D. McLaughlin: *Twins fear the verdict of angry youth*, „The Guardian”, 21 October 2007.

²⁸ *Separating the terrible twins*, “The Guardian”, 23 October 2007.

²⁹ M. Tran: *Polish winners...*

³⁰ *Separating the terrible twins...*

negotiating the European Community budget for the years 2007–2013, over the past two years was a troublesome neighbour, and the relations between the two states [Germany and Poland] were affected by painful history and mutual accusations. Similar situation was the case with relations between Poland and Russia which, according to the daily, resulted in imposing a ban on the import of Polish meat. Embargo on imports should be considered a political decision.

Apart from a number of commentaries on “terrible twins” and positive opinions concerning liberal conservatives, i.e. Civic Platform, “The Guardian” also mentioned reasons behind the loss experienced by Law and Justice, namely that it was no longer the largest party in the Sejm. Furthermore, Polish Families League and the Republic of Poland Self Defense did not exceed the required election threshold. Such a state of affairs probably stemmed from the fact that Polish society was fed up with wheeling and dealing as well as political scandals surrounding the government. Secondly, as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance and the EU Member State, the Poles, according to Timothy Garton Ash,³¹ felt safe for the first time since 1989. Needless to say, the political parties that had ruled Poland for the past two years (between 2005 and 2007) deprived Poles of such a feeling. Although Law and Justice party announced the creation of the 4th Republic of Poland that would combat corruption and “the system” and make Poland powerful and independent, it failed to fulfil its election promises. Similar opinion was expressed by Ian Traynor in his article “Poland rejects populism and xenophobia in favour of pro-Europe liberal conservatives”.³² According to “The Guardian”, Civic Platform was to create a coalition with Polish Peasant Party. This would give them altogether 240 seats out of 460 mandates in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and hence enable to form majority government. The journalists of the daily expressed their sincere regret that the two parties had not gained 60% of the vote, which would allow to override the president’s (Lech Kaczyński) veto.³³

It is also worth mentioning the turnout of Polish voters living in the United Kingdom in the 2007 parliamentary election and the role ascribed by “The Guardian” to this group of electors. When Poland joined the European Union in 2004, Great Britain did not adopt a transitional period for new EU Member States due to which the number of Poles residing in the United Kingdom increased

³¹ T.G. Ash: *If our political...*

³² I. Traynor: *Poland rejects populism and xenophobia in favor of pro-Europe liberal conservatives*, “The Guardian”, 23 October 2007.

³³ *Ibidem*.

significantly. In September 2005, i.e. when the parliamentary election was held in Poland, the number of Poles was not extremely high. However, in 2007 it was estimated that about one million of Polish emigrants (including seasonal workers) lived in Great Britain.³⁴

Most of them were entitled to go to the polls and hence, according to British and Polish journalists, their votes could determine the results of parliamentary election. Contrary to the 2005 election, politicians took active part in “struggle for winning the votes of Poles living abroad”. On 29 September 2007, “The Guardian” published a commentary by Helen Pidd under obvious title: “Britain becomes battleground in Polish election”. In her in-depth article, she presented the profiles of both candidates for the premiership as well as discussed the purpose of the visit undertaken by Donald Tusk to the UK. As highlighted by Pidd, most Polish emigrants living in Great Britain were going to vote for Civic Platform, just because they were not led by Jarosław Kaczyński. What deserves attention are last words of Pidd’s article in which she claimed that contrary to expectations, it might turn out that politicians as well as British and Polish press miscalculated the number of Poles who would go to the polls (Pidd stressed that only 6000 electors voted in 2005 in the UK).

Conducting his electoral campaign, the leader of Civic Platform planned to visit Great Britain to convince Polish emigrants to vote for his party. It should be emphasized that it is not embedded in the Polish culture to organize mass election rallies “in American style” during which the audience chants the name of a candidate. At the weekend between 28 and 29 September 2007, Donald Tusk travelled to Great Britain on cheap flight during which he met Polish emigrants. He spoke to several Polish families who worked in the UK, visited supermarket employing Polish people and took part in the Polish festival. During his campaign, Donald Tusk, accompanied by Radosław Sikorski, arranged a series of meetings with young people to present his programme known as “Return home”. The leader of Civic Platform unveiled his plans to Polish journalists: “I will ask them for support but most of all I want to talk to them about reasons behind their emigration and what could be done to convince them to return to Poland”.³⁵ In a meeting with Polish emigrants arranged in Polish Community Cultural Centre in Hammersmith,

³⁴ H. Pidd: *Britain becomes battleground in Polish election*, „The Guardian”, 29 September 2007.

³⁵ *Tusk zabiega o głosy w Wielkiej Brytanii i Irlandii* [Tusk canvassing in Great Britain and Ireland], “Wprost” [Bluntly], 24 September 2007.

Donald Tusk took the floor: “I would make a fool of myself if I told Poles living in London: Listen, you should go back to Poland. What for? I could not offer them as well-paid jobs as they have in London. Why should appeals made by politicians be answered? I have to organize things in Poland to convince them [Polish emigrants] to return to Poland in a year, five years, or so. I want to make them believe they can live and work in Poland because they will not come back unless not only prices, but also salaries reach “western standards”.

On 21 October 2007, i.e. on the election day, Polish media broadcasted news about Polish people living in Great Britain and waiting in long queues to vote in the parliamentary election. In the 14th issue of *Biuletyn Migracyjny* [Migration Bulletin] published by the University of Warsaw, article was published about Polish emigrants and the effect they may exert on the results of election in Poland. Unlike during the 2005 parliamentary election when only 35,611 Polish emigrants casted their votes, in 2007 the total of 205 election districts were established in 93 countries, 20 of which in Great Britain. For the sake of comparison, 21 election districts were established in the United States, which proved that the number of Polish electors living in Great Britain was great and they exerted a profound effect on the results of election. As anticipated both by British and Polish media, Polish emigrants, and particularly those living in Great Britain, had a major effect on the final results of election.

After the official results of parliamentary election had been announced, it turned out that journalists and researchers were right to claim that the number of Poles voting abroad would increase (146,812 valid votes were casted).³⁶

According to National Electoral Commission, the majority of Polish emigrants living in Great Britain voted for Civic Platform (74.5%). For the sake of comparison, situation was opposite in the United States. Polish community living in the USA backed Law and Justice (66.14%). According to *Biuletyn Migracyjny* [Migration Bulletin],³⁷ Polish emigrants did not however have the final say in the election since their turnout was symbolic. “The simulation indicated that regardless whether or not votes casted by emigrants were taken into account, in electoral district nr 19 (Poles living abroad had the right to vote for Warsaw’s district deputy candidate list) the distribution of mandates was similar: 11 mandates

³⁶ Migration Bulletin, University of Warsaw, November 2007, p. 4.

³⁷ Ibidem.

for Civic Platform, 6 mandates for Law and Justice, and 2 mandates for Left and Democrats”.³⁸

According to “The Guardian”, Polish electors living in Great Britain and Ireland had one thing in common, namely they had a rational and less hysterical approach to the parliamentary election than their compatriots in Poland.³⁹ For a few days after the election the daily under discussion had published commentaries announcing return to democracy in Poland. What is worth noticing is the fact that the articles published in “The Guardian” neither backed the party led by Jarosław Kaczyński, nor expressed positive opinions about Law and Justice. “The Guardian” expressed its unequivocal support for Civic Platform and hoped that new standards would be introduced to Polish politics.

OCENA WYBORÓW PARLAMENTARNYCH W POLSCE W LATACH 2005 I 2007 PRZEZ BRYTYJSKI DZIENNIK „THE GUARDIAN”

Streszczenie

Wybory parlamentarne w Polsce budzą duże emocje. Wybory w 2005 i 2007 roku były szeroko opisywane przez polskie media. Kampanią wyborczą oraz ostatecznym rezultatem wyborów zainteresowały się także brytyjskie media. Zainteresowanie to znalazło odzwierciedlenie w artykułach prasowych, które ukazywały się w 2005 i 2007 w Zjednoczonym Królestwie. Głównym czynnikiem, dla którego prasa w Wielkiej Brytanii zainteresowała się sytuacją polityczną w Polsce była duża liczba emigrantów z Rzeczypospolitej przebywająca na terenie Wysp.

Artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie stanowiska jednego z najważniejszych angielskich dzienników, który kreuje nie tylko brytyjską politykę zagraniczną ale także wpływa na opinię mieszkańców Wielkiej Brytanii – gazety “The Guardian”.

„The Guardian” poprzez zaprezentowanie dwóch odmiennych wizerunków głównych partii politycznych w Polsce – które miały zmierzyć się w wyborach w 2005 i 2007 roku – Platformy Obywatelskiej i Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, starał się wpłynąć na wynik głosowania. Artykuły prasowe, które ukazywały się na łamach publikatora opisywały nie tylko partie polityczne, ale także miały na celu wykreowanie wizerunku Polski na Wyspach. W zależności od wyniku głosowania obraz Polski i Polaków ulegał diametralnej zmianie.

³⁸ Ibidem.

³⁹ *Separating the terrible twins...*